The Two Truths

The Conventional Truth (savti satya) The Highest Truth (paramrtha satya).

To move beyond the thought of early Buddhist schools (bhidharmikas) Ngrjuna confronts three main needs: 1. 2. a new style of analysis that moves beyond reductionism, a new account of knowing things as they are, and

3. a new approach to the definition of conventional reality (savti satya).

1. A New Style of Analysis

Ngrjuna must critique the claim that through a strictly reductive analysis, one comes upon things that are ultimately real (paramrtha satya). The bhidharmika style of reductive analysis: one analyzes an entity by attempting to break it into its component parts, and if it cannot be broken down further, the entity (svabhva) is ultimately real.

A chair, for example, is not ultimately real because it can be broken down into more fundamental parts; and when the analytical process is brought to its conclusion, one eventually arrives at irreducible, partless particles (dhammas) that are the basic stuff of the chair. For Vaibhika the essence is svabhva. For Ngrjuna, an entity might be dependent on other entities. If the entity is found to be dependent, then one must conclude that it lacks essence (svabhva) and is thus not ultimately real.

For Ngrjuna, one cannot give an account of what nirva is in itself without referring to its opposite, the world of dukha (unsatisfactoriness, dis-easy) that is sasra. In other words, nirva has no meaning without sasra, just as long is meaningless without short. Ngrjuna thus concludes that nirva is not at all different from sasra (Mlamadhyamakakrik 25.19). Sasra and nirva, however, both lack essence because the identity of each is dependent on the other. Hence, any attempt to draw any ultimate distinction between them must fail.

2. A new account of knowing things as they are

Dukha can only be stopped by eliminating ignorance, and that to eliminate ignorance one must see things as they truly are. For the Vaibhika, to see things as they truly are is to experience what is ultimately real. In doing so, one can eliminate ignorance: the confused belief that somewhere among those elements one will find ones absolute, fixed identity or self-nature (tman).

For Ngrjuna, however, ignorance is not just a confusion about ones personal identity; instead, it is the deeply ingrained cognitive habit that makes beings see all things as if they had some fixed, absolute identity or essence (svabhva). Thus, to eliminate ignorance one must realize that no entity has any such essence, and this means that one must realize that no entity is ultimately real.

But if no entity is ultimately real, what does it mean to see things as they truly are? At the end of the analysis, what is left that one could see? To answer this question, Ngrjuna employs a metaphor that runs throughout Mahyna thought. Inasmuch as no entity can have a nonrelational identity, every entity lacks essence, and Ngrjuna speaks of this lack of essence as emptiness (nyat).

Ngrjuna points out that even emptiness lacks essence and is thus ultimately unreal. This emptiness is empty of really being emptiness (nyat-nyat), thus, one avoids nihilism.

3. Conventional Truth
Ngrjuna maintains that an entity that does not exist ultimately may nevertheless exist conventionally.

Truth in Early Buddhism

The theory of Two Truths is not presented in the early Pli suttas. It appears first in Abhidharma works. This theory is specifically developed by Mdhyamikas. In Aguttara Nikya, the Buddha says there are two kinds of suttas: 1. Ntattha: suttas whose meaning is drawn out. It is a direct statement and it can not be interpreted further.

2. Neyyattha: suttas whose meanings have to be drawn out. This is an indirect statement that can be further developed. The Buddha says that he made use of the two kinds of statements: Ntattha and neyyattha. Ntattha is not higher or lower than neyyattha. But nitattha must not be misunderstood as neyyattha. In A. I, 60 (PTS) it is said: "Whoso declares a sutta with an implicit meaning as a sutta with explicit meaning (and conversely), such a one makes a false statement with regard to the Blessed One."

In D. 9: "These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world, which the Perfect One (Tathgata) uses without misapprehending them." In the early discourses, we find only such a distinction, but in the later development of Abhidharma, we find discussing on two truths. In early Buddhism, paramattha is always used for nibbna, never used in any other sense.

Theravda

In Pli literature, sammuti and paramattha are used to refer to two degrees of reality. Sammuti means common agreement. What is based on common agreement is sammuti. Paramattha is used as direct reference to dhammas. A thing can be explained in two ways: 1. It can be explained on the basis of our common sense. 2. It can be explained by reference to dhamma.

In Pali commentaries or sub-commentaries, they never say that one truth is higher than the other. The commentators say that the Buddha uses different languages to teach students, according to the language that the students speak.

Vaibhikas
Concerning the conventional, the Vaibhikas are straightforward: it is just a matter of recognizing that words such as chair are convenient fictions that allow us to speak easily of what is really there, namely, many irreducible particles.

Thus, conventionally real things are composed of the irreducible, ultimately real stuff of the universe. But for Ngrjuna, there is no such stuff, nor does one find anything else that is really there in the case of a chair or anything else. How then does one make sense of conventional reality? To answer this question, Ngrjuna must redefine the notion of conventionality. For the Vaibhika, a conventional entity depends on the highest because it is made from ultimately real stuff,

for Ngrjuna the conventional and the highest define and depend upon each other through their mutual exclusion, as in other dyads such as long and short or sasra and nirva.

Mahyna schools use Savti, paramrtha. Savti means to conceal the true nature of reality.

The Conventional Truth in Madhyamaka

Ngrjuna said in his MMK: The Buddhas teaching rests on two truths: conventional truth, and truth in the highest sense. One who does not comprehend the distinction between these two truths, does not comprehend the profound meaning of the Buddhas teaching (MMK, 24: 8-9).

The Sanskrit texts have two spelling for the word for conventional truth, savti and savtti. Savti derives from the root v, to cover, hide, obstruct, thus suggesting that Savti-satya is covered or hidden truth (satya). But savtti derives from the root vt, to exist, arise, come about, activate, thus suggesting that savtti-satya is the truth that comes about within the world.

Candrakrti describes savti in a threefold etymology as basic misunderstanding, mutual dependency, and symbolic discourse. The most fundamental of these is basic misunderstanding. (Nagao, Foundational 40) Since the Yogcra thinkers regarded language as the locus of all worldly convention, they would appear to have thought or worldly convention as deriving from a Sanskrit spelling of savtti, deriving from the root, vt, to arise. (Nagao, Foundational 42)

In the Dharmapla lineage of Yogcra introduced to China by Xuanzang (who translated Savti as Shi-su, worldly), the orthodox interpretation of the truth of worldly convention is that it is truth both hidden and manifest. In combining these opposite ideas, this interpretation apparently makes use of both Sanskrit spellings and attempts to synthesize worldly convention in the Chinese compound Yin-xuan ( hidden v and manifestation vt). It hides the truth through basic misunderstanding and primal ignorance. It is a process of verbal manifestation, a bringing of doctrine to speech, not full perfection itself. (Nagao, Foundational 45).

Worldly convention has therefore the senses of hidden and manifest, the themes of social custom and language complementing these meanings in the background. This doctrine is not, however, limited to Dharmaplas lineage of Yogcra. It is also clearly presented in Candrakrtis teaching on the three meanings of error, mutual dependency, and language. That is to say, the notion of worldly convention as both clouded occlusion and manifestation implies the sequential continuity of ascent and descent, of transcending the world and re-engaging in the world. (Nagao, Foundational 45)

Sum up: Savti refers to being conventional, worldly, and is contrasted with paramrtha, which means being super-worldly, the highest sense. Nagao has analyzed the term Savti from both aspects of Madhyamaka and Yogcra. He concludes, Savti means convention by its existence, a meaning that is common to both schools of Madhyamaka and Yogcra; it is a hindrance covering the truth, but it is the same time truth itself manifested. (Nagao Mdhyamika 18) Savti, derived from the Pli samuti, first began with an ordinary meanings as common sense, conventional, and so forth. Later, its meaning became, covering and manifesting, and finally the combined meaning of covering-manifesting. Covering-

manifesting expresses the paradoxical nature of Mahyna Buddhism and describes the world of bodhisattvas. (Nagao Mdhyamika 13).

The Highest Truth

The Highest truth, which always transcends conventional truth, is beyond thought and language. This is why the Buddha always remained in his (noble) silence when he was questioned on metaphysical matters.

But the Highest Truth cannot be understood without recourse to conventional truth. It has been said: The highest truth cannot be taught without recourse to conventional language. Nirva cannot be realized, if we do not realize the highest truth. (MMK, 24: 10) Thus, the highest truth must be expressed in words. In the final analysis, we cannot say that the highest truth is higher than the conventional truth, or the conventional is lower than the highest.

The path (conventional) must precede the attainment of cessation (highest). The entire process of human practice to cessation through the cultivation of the truth of the path is worldly and conventional. Se we cannot say one has priority to the other. Each of these two truths is useful. Paul Williams explains that the highest truth is that all things, including any emptiness itself, lack highest truth. Therefore Madhyamaka uses ultimate truth in two senses:
1

Paul Williams; Anthony Tribe, Buddhist Thought, 148

(1) the first is the ultimate truth as an ultimate truth, i.e. something resistant to analysis, as primary existence (i.e. dharmas in Abhidharma). In this sense, Madhyamaka is saying that there is no such thing as an ultimate truth. (2) the second is the ultimate truth as the ultimate way of things (the dharmat), how it ultimately is, what is found to be the case as a result of ultimate analysis, searching for primary existence. This is the lack, the absence, of that primary existence, i.e. emptiness.

Thus it is the ultimate truth in sense 2 (nyat) that there is absolutely no ultimate truth in sense 1 (the dharma theory of bhidharmikas).

Ngrjuna Does not Deny Conventional Truth

Chap 22: V11: It is empty is not to be said, nor It is non-empty, nor It is both [empty and non-empty], nor It is neither. They are mentioned only for the purpose of verbal designation (prajapti). (Tetralemma)
Two Truths

Chap. 24 The Four Noble Truths V.7:We say that you do not comprehend the purpose of emptiness. As such, you are tormented by emptiness and the meaning of emptiness.

V.8: The Dharma-teaching of the Buddha rests on two truths: Conventional truth, and truth in the highest sense. V.9: Who do not know the distribution of the two truths, they do not understand the profound reality of the Buddhas teaching. V.10: Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught. Without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is not attained. V.11: A wrongly perceived emptiness ruins a person of meager intelligence. It is like a snake that is wrongly grasped or knowledge that is wrongly cultivated.

Early Yogcra: Asaga and Vasubandhu.

The Yogcra emphasizes mind (citta) or consciousness (vijna) in its responses to the three issues, namely: style of analysis, seeing things as they truly are, and an account of the conventional. 1. Analysis,

Asagas main style of analysis is also relational, but the notion of an ultimately real personal identity is rooted in ones sense of subjectivity. The subjectivity is tied to the objects. The subjectivity must also be ultimately unreal because it can truly be a subjectivity only if it perceives objects. Asaga follows Ngrjuna in extending the critique of essence (svabhva), but Asaga suggests that this goal is best reached by critiquing the selfs (tman) alleged objects. The false impression of

ultimately real selfhood is rooted in ones sense of subjectivity as a perceiver of objects. Thus, in showing that there are no ultimately real elements that could serve as objects. For the Vaibhikas, the objects basically consist of the irreducible elements that they take to be ultimately real; hence, Asagas critique must demonstrate that all those elements are not ultimately real.

Vasubandhu chooses to employ a reductive analysis to demonstrate the ultimate irreality of such particles. But in contrast to reductionists such as the Vaibhika, Vasubandhu is willing to reduce matter to the point where it no longer exists. He demonstrates that irreducibility is incompatible with material existence: if material particles were irreducible, then they could have no size, but if they have no size, then how could an accumulation of them form gross objects such as jars or chairs? On the other hand, if they do have size, then they clearly are not irreducible, since they then must have parts, such as front, back, left, right, top, and bottom.

The conclusion of this analysis is a philosophical idealism that totally denies the existence of matter. 2. Seeing things as they truly are For Ngrjuna, when one reaches the conclusion of the analysis, ones seeing things as they truly are is just seeing emptiness; later Indian Madhyamakas will speak of it as the seeing that is nonseeing.

For Ngrjuna, emptiness is utter lack of essence; hence, they are all ultimately unreal. For Asaga and Vasubandhu, emptiness is the absence of subjectobject duality in the mind of the perceiver. There remains nevertheless the undeniable fact of consciousness itself. Asaga and Vasubandhu explain their new notion of emptiness through the theory of the three natures (trisvabhva). The usual order of enumeration is: the constructed nature (parikalpita svabhva), the dependent nature (paratantra svabhva), and

 the perfect nature (parinipanna svabhva). The constructed and the perfectare actually two different modes of the dependent nature. That is, the dependent nature is the causal flow of consciousness itself: it is the sequence of one moment of consciousness produced by its own previous moment and going on to produce its own subsequent moment. This ongoing stream of consciousness can appear in two different modes.

For ordinary persons, it appears with a dizzying variety of sensory and mental objects, and each mental moment except for the deepest sleep is replete with such an object. To put it another way, when one sees the color blue, the apparent existence of the blue object as an external, independent object is false. But the fact that it is appearing to consciousness is undeniable, and since the Yogcra analysis shows that it could not be external and independent of the mind, it must be within the mind itself. Seeing that flow of mind in that waynamely, as devoid of the apparent subject- object dualityis to see the perfect nature.

The dependent nature is a way of referring to the causal flow of mind that is dependent since each moment of consciousness is contingent upon its own previous moment, which acts as its cause. The constructed nature refers to the objects that appear in the mind such that they seem distinct from the subjectivity that apprehends them. This dualistic distinction between subject and object is constructed by ignorance.

In this system, emptiness describes the causal flow of mind in terms of its ultimate mode, the perfect nature. That is, ultimately the causal flow of consciousness (the dependent nature) is empty or devoid of the seeming subject-object duality (the constructed nature) that appears in the ordinary experience that is the constructed nature. Thus, to see emptiness or the perfect nature is to see the causal flow of mind as it truly is, namely, utterly devoid of the subject-object duality that is the constructed nature.

3. the conventional reality (exit because of karma of oneself and the shared),
All ordinary perceptions, as when one sees colors such as red and yellow, are driven by ignorance, in that the red and yellow colors seem distinct from the subjectivity that perceives them. These perceptions are not caused by material objects, since matter does not in fact exist. What, then, could cause such perceptions? The answer is foundational consciousness or layavijna. Also translated as storehouse consciousness, this form of awareness is

entirely unconscious, but within it lie all the seeds (bja) of experience, such as the perceptions of a red apple or of yellow corn. When one sees the red apple or the yellow corn, it is not that ones perception is caused by some material object. Instead, various circumstances have come together to allow the seeds of those perceptions to ripen. Ones world, in short, is just a projection of mind. Asaga and Vasubandhu are not proposing some kind of mental monism where everything is reducible to one universal mind. Their rejection of monism becomes evident when one asks: if the world is just a projection of ones mind, why is it that a perceptual object

(such as an unpleasant smell) cannot become something else (the bouquet of a rose) merely by the intention of ones mind to make it so? Part of the answer is the conditioning of each individuals mind, whereby ones reality is incapable of such radical and immediate alterations. But part of the answer is also the influence of an infinite number of other minds. In other words, the seeds that ripen into experiences in ones own mind have been created not only by ones own previous experiences, but also by the experiences of all the minds of the beings around one. This notion of inter-subjectivity, which in Yogcra literature is tied to the workings of karma, enables the Yogcra to surpass Ngrjuna in their account of the conventional.