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Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia Author(s): John S. Dryzek Source: Political Theory, Vol.

33, No. 2 (Apr., 2005), pp. 218-242 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038413 . Accessed: 19/09/2011 11:03
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DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia


JOHN S. DRYZEK AustralianNational University

For contemporarydemocratictheorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation. But the recent rise of deliberativedemocracy (in practice as well as theory) coincided with ever more form in deeply dividedsocieties. This essay prominentidentitypolitics, sometimes in murderous considers howdeliberativedemocracycan process the toughest issues concerningmutuallycontradictoryassertions of identity.After considering the alternative answers provided by agonists and consociational democrats,the author makes the case for a power-sharing state with attenuated sovereigntyanda moreengaged deliberativepolitics in apublic spherethat is semidetached from the state and situated transnationally. Keywords: deliberativedemocracy; consociational democracy; agonism; identitypolitics; ethnic conflict

I. DEMOCRACY CONFRONTSIDENTITYCONFLICTS Democracyis today a near-universalvalidatingprinciplefor political systems. And accordingto contemporarydemocratic theorists,at least since the early 1990s, democracyis largely, though not exclusively, a matterof deliberation. Democratic practice too has witnessed a range of deliberative innovations. The same decade thatsaw the rise and rise of deliberativedemocracy also saw identitypolitics prominent,sometimes in murderousform. IdentitypoliAUTHOR'SNOTE:Previousversions of this article were presented to the Conferenceon Deliberative Democracyand SensitiveIssues at the UniversityOfAmsterdam,March25-26, 2003, the Social and Political TheoryProgramat Australian National University,and the Departmentof Political Science at the Universityof North Carolina. For commentsI thank TjitskeAkkerman, Bora Kanra,Ilan Kapoor,Stephen Leonard, ChristianList, GerryMackie, Claus John Forester, and Iris Young. Offe, BenjaminReilly,Mark Warren,
POLITICALTHEORY, Vol. 33 No. 2, April 2005 218-242 DOI: 10. 1177/0090591704268372 c 2005 Sage Publications

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tics, including the murderous variety, are hardly new. But as the cold war world order fell apart, the political gap was often filled by assertions and denials of identity. Religious fundamentalisms showed renewed vigor, in calls "McWorld."' opposition to each otheras well as what BenjaminBarber I consider how deliberativedemocracy can process whatare arguablythe toughest kinds of political issues, the mutually contradictoryassertions of identity that define a divided society. The assertions in question might involve nationalism (Republicans and Unionists in NorthernIreland; any numberof separatistmovements), combinationsof religious and ethnic conflicts (Palestinians versus Israelis), and religious versus secular forces (Islamic fundamentalism against Western liberalism on the global stage; fundamentalists Islamists versus secularistsin Turkeyand Algeria;Christian versus liberalismin the United States). The basic problemin all these cases is that one identity can only be validated or, worse, constitutedby suppression of another.Radical Islamists cannot live in or with a McWorld.A state that was no longer a Jewish state forged in struggle would be anathemato many Israelis. Christianfundamentalistsregardthe political presence of gays and but as a standingaffrontto who they are. A mullesbians notjust as an irritant tinationalsociety is notjust a policy opposed by militantSerb nationalists, it is a perceived attack on their core political being. Deliberationacross divided identities is hard.On a widely sharedaccount, deliberationis what Bessette calls the "mildvoice of reason"2-exactly what is lacking in tough identity issues, at best an aspirationfor how opponents might one day learn to interact once their real differences are dissolved. Deliberative democrats influenced by Rawls might follow him in excluding the "background culture" from the purview of public reason. But, as Benhabib points out, issues generated by the backgroundculture and its "comprehensive doctrines" can be especially pressing.3 Gutmann and Thompson believe thatdeliberationcan be extendedto deep moral disagreements, but the precondition is commitment on all sides to reciprocity, "the capacity to seek fair terms of cooperation for its own sake,"such that arguments are made in terms the other side(s) can accept.4Again, mutual acceptance of reasonableness is exactly what is lacking in divided societies. Gutmann and Thompson require adoption by all sides of a particular moral psychology--openness to persuasionby critical argument-that is in fact not widely held, and explicitly rejected by (say) fundamentalistChristians.5Moreover, they apply the reasonableness standardto the content of contributionsto debate, not just the motivation of speakers.Thus they are vulnerable to criticism from difference democrats such as Young, who accepts reasonableness as a norm for motivationbut not for'the content of communicative statements,because that involves suppressionof alternative

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forms.6More radical difference democrats and agonists see deliberation in terms of theerasureof identity,a form of communicationstuckin neutralthat does not recognize difference, partial in practice to well-educated white males, especially when it prizes the unitarypublic reason advancedby Rawls and his followers. Those asserting identities for their partmay feel insulted by the very idea thatquestions going to their core be deliberated.What they want is instead "cathartic"communication that unifies the group and demands respect from others.7 I arguefor a discursive democracy that can handle deep differences. The key involves partiallydecoupling the deliberativeand decisional moments of democracy,locating deliberationin engagement of discourses in the public sphere at a distance from the sovereign state. I approachthis argumentby examining two very different responses to divided societies. The first is agonistic, seeking robust exchange across identities. The recent history of agonism owes much to Hannah Arendt, William Connolly, and Bonnie Honig,8 but I focus on the work of Chantal Mouffe, because she explicitly advocates agonism against deliberative democracy in plural societies. The second response is consociational, seeking suppression of interchange through agreementamong well-meaning elites. I do not treat these two as "straw man"extremes between which a moderate path should be sought. Indeed, I arguethat a defensible discursive democracy for divided societies can develop elements of both.

II. AGONISM The agonistic charge is that deliberative democracy is incapable of processing deepdifference.Mouffe arguesthatthe main task for democracy is to convert antagonism into agonism, enemies into adversaries, fighting into critical engagement.9 Deep difference is accompanied by passions that, she believes, cannotbe resolved by deliberation,committedas it is to rationalistic denial of passionand the pursuitof consensus thatin practiceboth masks and serves power.Heralternativeis agonistic pluralisminvolving "avibrantclash of democraticpolitical positions."'1"Theprime task of democraticpolitics is not to eliminatethe passions,.. . but to mobilise these passions towards the promotion of democratic designs."" Acceptance of the legitimacy of the positions of others comes not through being persuaded by argument, but throughopennessto conversion as a result of a particularkind of democratic The outcome is not agreement but ratherrelationships that comattitude.12 bine continuedcontestationwith deep respect for the adversary-indeed it is

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not easy to speak in termsof "outcomes."Mouffe (like Gutmannand Thompson) is vulnerable to questions about where exactly the required attitude should come from, especially where groups asserting identity themselves feature hierarchyand repression."' While accepting Mouffe's identification of the need to transformantagonism into, if not agonism, at least more civilized engagementas the primary task for democracy in divided societies, I differ from her on three grounds. The first is in the content of critical interchange. Mouffe wants this interchange to be energized by core identities, otherwise passion is missing. Yet, paradoxically,identities for Mouffe have to be fluid to the extent of enabling thoroughconversion in one group's attitudeto another.But if identities themselves are highlighted, exchange is more likely to freeze identities than convert them. As Forester points out, being respectful of others is one thing; accepting at face value claims that preferencesand interestsare in fact basic values is quite another,requiringa more challenging orderof problem solving.14If interchange is to move beyond confrontationand stalemate, then, Foresterargues, the focus should be on the specific needs of the parties, not on the articulationand scrutiny of general value systems. His example concerns gay activists and fundamentalistChristiansmeeting over HIV/AIDS care in Colorado. The last thing thatneeds to be done is to reinforce mutually hostile identities;for example, by debatingwhetherit is legitimateto treatthe HIV/AIDS issue in the moral terms favoredby the Christians,as opposed to the public health terms favored by the gays. But if individualscan listen to each others' stories, they might at least accept one another'sspecific needswhich can be reconciled, even when value systems and identities cannot. This is a kind of reciprocalrecognition, but not the kindof vibrantexchange of passions proposed by Mouffe. from Mouffe involves the way deliberativeinteraction A second departure is conceptualized. Mouffe may be right that deliberationin the image of a philosophy seminar-dispassionate and reasoned-cannot handle deep difference. However, it is possible to formulatean accountof discursive democracy that is more contestatorythan this image, so more robustin the face of deep difference. of the main task of democracyhas no obviThird,Mouffe's interpretation ous place for collective decision making and resolutionof social problems. She scorns consensus as a cover for power,but at least consensus implies that decisions can get made. When agonistic pluralismdoes attendto collective decisions, it is only to point to the need for them to be open to further contestation. I explore a way to combine critical engagementand collective decision, but this requires a differentiationof the ways politics can be con-

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ducted in differentsites. While Mouffe emphasizes the variety of sites (culture, workplace, home, school, etc.), for her the content of politics is undifferentiated, everywhere agonistic.

CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY III.ANALGESIA: A very different sort of criticism of deliberative democracy's ability to process divisive issues follows from argumentsthat they should be removed from contentious democratic debate altogether. From this perspective, Mouffe's assertion that "a well functioning democracy calls for a vibrant for "vibrantclashes" risk clash of democraticpolitical positions" is naive,15 basis of claims is the for consociational Such Lijphart's disintegration. to share governan between the leaders of each bloc democracy, agreement ment, involving "grandcoalition, segmental autonomy,proportionality,and minority veto."l6 Lijphartbelieves consociationalism is "the only workable of type democracy in deeply divided societies.""'Neither Lijphartnor his sympathizershave takenon deliberativedemocracyin these terms-illustration of the chasm between democratic theorists and students of real-world democraticdevelopment.But it is not hardto deduce what they ought to say about deliberativepolitics. Lijphartpoints to success stories where a consociational approach has defused religious and/orethnic conflicts, such as his own Netherlands,Austria, Switzerland,Malaysia, South Africa in the 1994 to 1996 transitionfrom andIndia.(Few of these cases actually meet all four of his defining apartheid, criteria for consociationalism.) But conflict resolution is achieved at the expense of severaldimensions prized by democratictheorists, including the deliberative dimension. Elections have little meaning, as the same set of leaderswill governirrespectiveof the result. Moreover,contentiousdeliberation occurs only between the leaders of differentblocs, and even then mostly in secret (for fear of inflaming publics), ruling out much of a role for parliamentary debate. The political communication of ordinary people is shepherdedinto within-blocchannels where it can do little damage. This channeling obstructsany kind of deliberative still less agonistic interaction across differentblocs below the elite level, because "segmentalautonomy"is basic. Consociation precludes any role that public deliberation construed as social learning might play in reconciliation in divided societies. But as Kaufman points out, ethnic hatreds are the product of symbolic politics in particularpolitical circumstances.'"As such, they are learned, and so can be unlearnedor transformed,19 though that can be an uphill task in the face of

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persistentnegative understandingsand myths. In this light,by freezing cleavages, a consociational regime may actually reinforce or, worse, create the kind of conflict it is designed to solve.20A deliberativedemocratwould hope to less vicious symthatreflection stimulatedby interactioncould contribute bolic politics, not tied to myths of victimhood and destiny.Segmental autonomy precludes such a politics, because deliberation confined within segDebate leads ments succumbs to Sunstein's "law of group polarization."21 more as individuals to the extreme, get their only group position's becoming others. talk like-minded in with confirmed prejudices

RESPONSE A DELIBERATIVE IV TOWARD Agonists believe deliberativedemocracy cannot deal with divisive issues because it is too constraining in the kind of communication it allows. Consociationalists believe deliberativedemocracycannotdeal with divisive issues because it is too open to diverse claims and claimants. Deliberative democracy can be defended against both sides, but it has to take them seriously, and be preparedto takeelements from each. On theface of it this ought to be impossible, given their diametric opposition. The key is a differentiation of political sites within a society that agonists and consociationalists alike have not contemplated:the formerbecause they addressonly politics in the abstractratherthan its institutionalspecifics, the latterbecause they see only a politics tightly attachedto the state. Deliberativedemocracy can process contentious issues in a politics of engagement in thepublic sphere, even if it has problems doing so when it comes to deliberation within the institutions of the state. In this light, a conception of discursive democracy in terms of a public A sphere thatis home to constellations of discourses can be broughtto bear.22 discourse can be understood as a shared way of making sense of the world embedded in language. Thus any given discourse will be defined by assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities. These shared terms enable subscribersto a given discourse to recognize and convert sensory inputs into coherent accounts of situations.These accounts can then be shared in intersubjectively meaningful fashion. Thus discourses feature storylines, involving opinions about facts and values. Familiarexamples of such discourses include market liberalism (dominant in global economic affairs) and sustainable development (ubiquitous in environmentalaffairs). The content of collective decisions depends strongly(butnot exclusively) on the relative weight of competing discourses in a domain. For example, the

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content of criminaljustice policy varies with the weight of discourses stressing, respectively,the psychopathology of the criminalmind, rationalcalculation of the costs andbenefits of criminal acts by perpetrators, and the circumstances of povertythatlead individuals to a life of crime. The engagement of discourses andits provisionaloutcomes aredemocraticto the degree they are under dispersedinfluence of competent actors, as opposed to manipulation by propagandists,spin doctors, and corporateadvertisers.The possibility of contestation and engagement means discourses have to be treated as less totalizing and constraining than some followers of Michel Foucault claim. Discourses must be amenableto reflection, if only at the margins.The requisite communication is deliberation not agonism because it is oriented to persuasion ratherthan conversion, and it retains some connection (however loose) to collective decision. Some recenttreatmentsof deliberativedemocracydo, then, meet the agonist's critique.23 Agonists see deliberation as deadening and biased in the kind of communication it allows. But the engagement of discourses can accommodate many kinds of communication beyond reasoned argument, including rhetoric, testimony, performance, gossip, and jokes. However, three tests mustbe appliedto secure the intersubjectiveunderstandingprized by deliberativedemocrats.Once we move beyond ritualisticopenings, communication is required to be first, capable of inducing reflection; second, noncoercive; and third, capable of linking the particularexperience of an individual or group with some more general point or principle.24 The last of these threecriteriais crucial when it comes to identity politics gone bad. A harrowingstory of (say) rape and murderin a Bosnian village can be told in terms of guilt of one ethnic group and violated innocence of another-fuel for revenge.But the storycan also be told in termsof violation of basic principles of humanitythat apply to all ethnicities, making reconciliation at least conceivable (though not easy). How can this discursive approach be applied to divided societies? To begin, taking identities seriously means allowing different communicative forms thatcan accompany particularidentities; this is Young's connection. However, this recognition often helps little when it comes to deeply divided societies, because, as Moore points out, societies deeply divided in identity are often not divided at all in culture.25 Culturally,there are few differences between Catholics and Protestantsin NorthernIreland, and between Serbs, Croats, andthe world's most secular Muslim community in former Yugoslavia. It is, then,a mistaketo treatidentity conflicts as merely a matterof multiculturalism.This treatmentof identity in terms of culture extends even to Benhabib's defense of universalist deliberative democracy against cultural

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She accepts that "culturehas become a ubiquitoussynonym for relativism.26 an identity, identity markerand differentiator,"27 even as she "pleads for recand that faciliof the radical polyvocality of all cultures"28 hybridity ognition tates deliberationboth within and across groups.29 Identities are bound up with discourses. It is in this sense that nations are the productof disin Benedict Anderson's terms "imaginedcommunities,"30 how can reflective But not culture. not courses, engagement across genes, discourses move beyond the vain hopes of agonists when identities are only asserted dogmatically and so relativistically, fueled by existential resentments?31 Engagement is less likely to end in hostility if the focus is on specific needs (e.g., security, education) rather than general values. An example comes from Turkey,where headscarvesworn by young Islamic women were long a symbolic markerthat excluded them from secularTurkishuniversities. Beginning in 2002, a reframing of the issue in terms of the education needs of young women and the characterof educationas a basic humanright gained ground, and the issue looked less intractable.Avoidance of head-on confrontationmeans the other side is less easily accused of a hidden agenda to capturethe state, and one's own side cannot so easily claim alone to represent "the people" or safeguardthe polity.32 needs she advocates will Deveaux worries thatthe emphasis on particular be rejected by deliberativedemocrats because of its inconsistency with uniBut particularneeds are often amenable to expresversalist public reason.33 sion in termsof more generalprinciples.Even the materialadvantageof (say) patriarchsin a culturalgroup can be arguedin termsof stabilityand continuity. And public reason itself can be plural.34 A deeper problem in emphasizing needs is thatsome needs can be manipulated to justify hostility. Notably, advocates of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia arguedthatit was necessary to ensurethebasic need of security,at least for theirown side. But such argumentscould resonateonly within theirown ethnic group. Demagogues can manipulateneeds-talkin a destructive direction,just as they can manipulateany otherkind of talk. A focus on needs is likely to contributeto conflict resolution only in the context of an engaged dialogue across difference, but not when communication is segmented within groups. Deliberative rituals and indirect communication(as opposed to confrontation) also have roles to play in reconstructingrelationships.Foresterdemonstrates the importance of (say) small talk between erstwhile opponents over a sharedmeal with no explicit connection to the issue at hand.35 Experiments with n-person prisoner's dilemmas show that even a period of irrele-

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vant discussion can increase the incidence of subsequentcooperative behavSo even cheap talk can help moderateconflict, though by itself such talk ior.36 is insufficientto produce the requisite engagement across discourses.

AND THE STATE IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES V DEMOCRACY I turnnow from the "what"to the "where"of deliberation, beginning by pointing to the desirabilityof loosening the connection between the deliberation and decision moments of democracy in a divided society. Such loosening resists one strong currentin deliberative democratic theory, which sees the properhome for deliberation in the institutions of the sovereign state, such as legislatures,courts, public inquiries,committees, and administrative tribunals.To see why a degree of separationis desirable, consider what happens when deliberation and decision are joined in the context of divisive identity. Mainly, decision overwhelms deliberation-especially when decision is tied to sovereign authority.Since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, sovereignty has had an all-or-nothingcharacter.Westphaliaestablished the norm in internalaffairs and the principle that the religion of the of noninterference is the prince religion of the state.At the time in Europe,religion was the main, almost sole, identity that mattered. Later, identity came also to involve nationality,ethnicity, and class, but the idea of one identity per state persisted. Identityissues could become intractablein the context of the politics of the state:the game is all or nothing. The very worst repression of competing identities has often come from actors' strugglingto secure their hold over the state, and the state's hold over society. As Rae demonstrates,episodes ranging from expulsion and forced conversion of Jews in fifteenth-centurySpain to the Armenian genocide in Turkeyto ethniccleansing in formerYugoslaviain the 1990s can all be attributed to state-building These elites pursue"pathologicalhomogenizaelites.37 tion" to secure a mass identity to accompany and bolster the incipient state. Contra Hobbes, it is leviathan under construction that creates murder and misery, ratherthan curbing them. Electoral democracy does not solve matters, and may exacerbate them. The game becomes one of ensuring that the state is defined to ensure that one's favoredidentitywill win key votes. This definition can involve drawing physical boundariesor manipulatingthe electoral system or gerrymandering or using suffragerestrictions(e.g., measurestakento stop AfricanAmericans from voting in the American South, ranging over propertyqualifications,literacy tests, and exclusion of those with a criminal record).

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Multicultural liberals have addressed what a multi-identity state might look like,38though they err by treatingidentity differences as mere cultural differences.39Such a state might involve devolution of authorityto regions dominatedby minoritycultures,legal recognitionand promotionof minority quotas for a particlanguages, and group representation(e.g., parliamentary ular group). These theorists are more compelling on the liberal aspects of such a state-the specification of rights for individualsand groups. They are less compelling when it comes to the democraticaspects.Proposalsfor group representationare fraughtwith difficulty when it comes to specifying which they have. If thereis advantagein groupscount and how much representation as an oppressed minority,everyone will try to claim that being categorized divisions. so status, raising A betterapproachto electoral democracyin divided societies is the "electoral engineering" proposed by Horowitz and given flesh by Reilly.40 Reilly shows that "centripetal"politics can be induced by systems of preferential vote (SV), and single voting such as the alternativevote (AV), supplementary transferablevote (STV). Leaders of ethnic parties have an incentive to seek second, third, and fourthpreferencesof voters from the other side of the ethnic divide, and so moderatetheirpositions. Reilly's clearestpositive example is Papua New Guinea, which used the Australian-modelAV before it foolishly changed to first-past-the-postvoting in 1975. If there are not enough voters with moderateattitudes,preferentialvoting will fail to assist reconciliation-as shown by elections in NorthernIrelandin 1973 and 1982 conducted under STV.41 Only in 1998, after"a core group of moderatesemerges from both sides of the communaldivide"does STV work This finding begs the question of exactly how better in Northern Ireland.42 moderate attitudes can be promoted. Perhaps AV would work better than STV in Northern Ireland, in keeping with Horowitz's claim that, though it promotes moderationbetterprecisely because it has a majormajoritarian, So unlike under STV, under AV memberscannot be elected threshold.43 ity with the supportonly of a hardlineminority.However,Reilly shows with reference to the use of AV in Fiji that if the engineering is not done precisely right,instability and violence can still result. Apparentlytechnical aspects of the AV system specified as partof the 1997 Fijianelectoralreformturnedout to favor ethnic Indian parties, whose success led to an indigenist coup in 2000. Parallel problems have arisen with the use of SV in Sri Lanka.Precision electoral engineering is difficult in the chargedsettingof a divided society, especially once different sides realize thatrules arenot neutraland so try to influence their content. The deadly numbers game is transferredto the meta level.

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Despite these difficulties, Horowitz's and Reilly's analyses are a step beyond Schumpeterianminimalist accounts of the establishment of stable electoral democracy. Przeworski argues that the stability of an electoral democracyrests on losers' acceptingdefeat in the expectation thatthey might be able to win in a subsequentelection, or because they fear the consequences of the breakdownof ordermore than those of defeat.44Horowitz and Reilly show exactly why such acceptancemay be facilitated by voting systems that draw the sting from defeat by inducing victors to moderation. Some kind of preferentialvoting is clearly best for divided societies. My point is simply that electoral engineering is not enough, because there is so much more to politics than elections. How else, then, might deliberative democrats respond to the challenge posed by a deadly numbersgame? At one level they could pin theirhopes on the civilizing force of deliberation to defuse conflict (and so provide one essential preconditionfor preferentialvoting to work). But now the familiar scale problem arises: deliberation, at least of the face-to-face variety concan only ever be for the few. Perhapsthereare nected tightlyto stateauthority, who might be so civilized, but in a politics of mass vota few representatives ing tightly connected to definitionof the sovereign state, they can all too easily be overwhelmed by demagogues. Thus in Northern Ireland,the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein still prosper at the expense of, respectively,the more moderate"Official"Unionists and Social Democratic LabourParty--even at a time when compromise is in the NorthernIrishairas never before, and the paramilitarieson both sides have laid down (most of) their arms.

IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE VI.LOCATING DELIBERATION A moreradicaldiscursivedemocraticresponse would ask why democracy and deliberationmust be joined to head counting and sovereign authority. Consociationaliststake a step in this direction on the head-countingdimension, because they suppress voting's connection to collective decision. But they do not escape the difficulties associated with construction of sovereign authorityby constitutional settlement. Consociationalism is therefore vulnerableto Horowitz'spessimism concerning any kind of institutionaldesign (including centripetal electoral systems) in divided societies: "So many forces favor the pursuit and exacerbation of conflict . .. that anything less than a coherent package is unlikely to provide sufficient counterweight to these forces, and yet only partialmeasuresthatare doomed to fall shortof the

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coherentpackage standa real chance of adoptionmost of the time.""45 Though Horowitzrecognizes no limits to the reachof this conclusion, his pessimism actuallyrefers only to constructionof the formalinstitutionsof the sovereign state. Contemplation of the informal communicativerealm might soften his conclusion. Democratic deliberationin a public sphereat some distancefrom (but not completely unconnected with) the sovereign statecan make a major contributionhere. The desirability of locating deliberationin the engagement of discourses in the public sphere in divided societies can draw on Mackie's observation that people are rarely seen to change their minds in deliberativeforums.46 Even if an individual is persuaded,it is hardfor him or herto admitit, for then credibilityis lost. Actually such changing of minds is common in what Fung classifies as "cold" deliberative settings-where participantsare not partiCitizens' juries and sans, and the forum is either unofficial or advisory.47 deliberativeopinion polls exemplify this category,and it is normalto see substantialopinion shifts therein.48 In contrast,under "hot"deliberation,tied to collective decision and involving partisans,participantshave more strongly formed views going into deliberation,and so cannot easily change. Deliberation tied to sovereign authorityin divided societies is about as "hot"a setting as one can imagine. Most conceptions of deliberativedemocracy requirereflection and the possibility that minds can be changed in the forum itself This is unlikely if one's position is tied to one's identity.Locating deliberationin the engagement of discourses in the public sphere avoids this problem because reflection is a diffuse process, takingeffect over time. With time, degree of activation of concern on particularissues can change. Individuals can shift from partisanshipto moderation to apathy and vice versa,and may even come to adoptdifferentattitudes.Nothing as dramaticas the kind of conversion Mouffe seeks is required.This situationis less fraught than that in hot deliberation, where reflection can take effect only in the choices of individuals under the gaze of both opponents and those with a shared identity. As Mackie points out, deliberation-inducedreflection can eventually lead an individual to change his or her mind. But he or she can most easily admit that in a different setting, at anothertime and place, with different participants, where face and credibility associated with having staked out a position are no longer decisive. This consideration supports A guaranteethatconDeveaux's specification of a "revisability" principle.49 tentious issues can be revisited provides a way for those who have changed their minds to both save face (by not admitting it for the present) and contributeto conflict resolution (by accepting a changed position later).

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VII.INSTITUTIONAL SPECIFICS The public sphere is sometimes conceptualized as an institution-free zone, but thatis not necessarily right. Two sorts of institutionslocated in the public spherecan play roles in facilitating discursive engagement:networks and discursivedesigns, whose contributionsI now discuss. In relativelywellbehaved political systems, the network form of organizationcan help establish dispersed control over the content and relative weight of discourses, facilitating negotiation across difference. Schlosberg analyses environmental justice networks in the United States in these terms.50These networks arose from a series of local actions and have no centralized leadership.They involve individualsfrom very differentrace and class backgrounds,in some cases from groups otherwise quite hostile to each other. Togetherthey successfully changed the content of public discourse on environmentalaffairs, most importantlyby establishing the very idea of environmentaljustice as a public concern. In societies more deeply divided, the development of networks across divisions could be a greaterchallenge, given thatsuch societies are divided into blocs with dense within-bloc communication but little across-bloc communication. On the other hand, even in the United States these networks developed across groups who otherwise lived in quite separateworlds, given the informal apartheidof American cities. Networks are at the "informal"end of the institutional continuum.More formalarethe institutionsFung calls "recipesfor public spheres.""' He has in mind designed forums such as citizens' juries, deliberative polls, planning cells, policy dialogues, and participatoryproblem-solving exercises. Any such exercise is not in itself a public sphere, so Fung's terminology is a bit misleading.Rather,each is a "micro"moment in the "macro"life of the public sphere. There are many such discursive designs available. Some involve lay citizens picked at random,some involve partisans.Some are small scale, some try to engage larger numbers of interlinked deliberators (such as the exercises sponsoredby the AmericaSpeaks Foundation). Some debatea specific issue ordecision, othershave a broaderremit. Sponsors can include governments,nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs), academics, and foundations. A few have a direct link to policy making, most lack any such direct connection from recommendationto collective decision. Theircritics deride the general lack of direct influence on policy content, and theirsponsorsoften strivefor such impact. But from the point of view of promotingdialogue in divided societies, this absence of directpolicy connection may be positive because it provides a space for exploratoryinterchange across difference.For example, in 2001 a deliberativepoll was conductedon the issue of relationsbetween the indigenous and nonindigenous peoples of

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Australia. Deliberating groups were made up of oversampled Aborigines selected in consultation with indigenouscommunitiesandrandomlyselected nonindigenous others. Television coverage took the proceedings into a broader public sphere. The results of the poll had no immediate or direct impact on public policy, but the poll itself constitutedone moment in a long process of reconciliation across a deep divide.

AND ITS REMEDIES VIII.BAD CIVILSOCIETY Recognition of the centralityof engagementacross discourses in the public spheredoes not mean thatthe state shouldbe conceptualizedas the source only of problems for divided societies, andthe public sphereonly as a benign source of solutions. Public spheres can be segmented, the source of interethnicconflict,52and prone to Sunstein's "law of group polarization"if individualscommunicate only with like-mindedothers.53 Polarizationcan be exacerbatedby segmented media such as right-wing talkradio in the United States and, most notoriously, Hutu hate radio prior to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. (The latter was controlled by Hutu extremists associated with the government,so not entirely a public spherephenomenon.)The fact that sectarian demagogues can flourish therein is exactly why consociationalists seek to silence the public sphere. Snyder and Ballentine believe that such communicative extremism is a especially if problem in societies emergingfrom authoritarianism, particular caution of tradition lack against a They any professionaljournalism.54 they liberalfree-for-all in political communication,recommendingboth stateregulation of speech (as in Malaysia since 1969) and NGO intervention to restrict hate speech and promote professional journalism in integrative media. The problem of what Chambersand Kopstein (2001) call "badcivil sociFocusing on racist hate ety" is not confined to postauthoritarian societies."55 advocate and Chambers in the United States, greaterincome Kopstein groups insecure individuals to fewer mean which would social and justice, security be tempted by sectarianextremism. Chambersand Kopsteinalso guardedly endorse intervention to shape group life through (for example) subsidies to They approveof the relatively benign organizations that provide services.56 role played by Ford, the EurasiaFoundation,and Soros in promotingbenign group life in the postcommunist world, while recognizing that such efforts may hinder homegrown groups. Calling the state to the rescue of bad civil society is problematicif the state itself is the instrumentof one group in a divided society, or if it is engaged in a

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homogenization projectto bolster its own support. A consociational state is not much betterif it seeks to suppress engagement in the public sphere. But government with incentives to only a power-sharingstate (or a majoritarian to deliberationacross diviis in a to contribute to position appeal minorities) sion in the public sphere.The state need not be the exclusive source of solutions here; NGOs and foundations can play similar parts. And there might even be a role for political theorists when it comes to exposing the false necessities pushed by sectariangroups.

THEPUBLIC SPHERE TRANSNATIONALLY IX. LOCATING Engagement across division can be further promoted by transnational aspects of deliberationin the public sphere. Channels of political influence bodies such as the European can be extended to and from intergovernmental international transnational Union, NGOs, corporations, and other states. Some groups in divided societies have already succeeded in making such links. Forexample, in responseto governmentalrepression and environmental destructionassociated with oil production, the Ogoni people in Nigeria sought help from NGOs based mainly in developed countries. These NGOs in turn pressured their own governments and corporations such as Shell which operate in Nigeria. In Mexico, the Zapatistas in Chiapas have develnetworkof sympathizers.This sort of outreachcomes oped an Internet-based with an obligation to behave according to emerging transnationalnorms of civility. Snyderand Ballentinerecommendtransnationalinterventionto curb the contribution of partisanjournalism to hostility in divided societies.5 Appropriate measures might include professional journalism education, press codes, sponsorshipof nonpartisanmedia, and subsidies conditionalon accurateand balancedcoverage. They point to the success in Cambodiaof a UN media program. Of course, more negative forms of transnationallinkage are possible too, especially by nationalists reaching out to a diaspora. The Irish Republican Army long depended on financial supportfrom Irish Americans, and much of the Serb diaspora was in the 1990s vocal in supporting nationalism and excusing ethniccleansing. The opening of channels to a neighboringstateof sharedethnicityby a minorityis also dangerousand has historicallyprovided a justification for invasion of the Sudetenlandby Nazi Germany,of Cyprus by Turkey,of Croatia by Serbia. So only outreach beyond shared national identity has a civilizing force. This caveat aside, strengthening of transnational sources of political authoritywould be conducive to the weakening

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of the connection between engagement in the public sphere and the deadly contest for sovereign authority. Any associated weakening of the sovereign state might be especially attractiveto those on the receiving end of oppression in countries like Sudan and Rwanda, for whom a centralized state has always brought misery because it has only ever been experienced as the instrumentof one segment. Such weakening is also consistent with the increasingconditionalityof sovereignty in the internationalsystem. NATO interventionin Kosovo in 1999 behindwhich a state helped reinforce the idea thatsovereigntyis not a barrier of sovereigntyandtranssections of its people. The conditionality can terrorize of authority will not please consociationalists, whose plans nationalization conflict to be centralizedandthenresolved in a fully sovereign state. require

X. PUBLIC SPHERE INFLUENCEON THE STATE:LOOSE CONNECTIONS connections) as the Emphasizing the public sphere (and its transnational focus for discursive engagement does not have to mean banning public sphere influence over state actions. This influence is centralto Habermas's model of deliberative democracy." Habermasendorses diffuse "subjectless communication"in the public sphere,producingpublic opinion whose influence can then be turned into communicativepower throughelections, then into administrativepower through legislation. This sequence is insufficient for divided societies for two reasons. The first reason is that "subjectless communication"is too amorphouswhen the identity of subjects themselves is the key issue and public opinion is deeply plural.It is betterundersuch circumstances to think of engagement across discourses ("discourse" itself terms,because for Habermasdiscourse is being defined in non-Habermasian The second reason is that elecunconstrained communication). completely tions are highly problematictransmissionmechanisms.In any society, competitive elections are largely strategic and symbolically manipulatedexercises. In divided societies, the results they register when it comes to the weight of competing groups and of their extremists and moderates depend crucially on the design of the electoral system. And as discussed earlier, a deadly numbersgame at the meta level can resultonce all sides recognize the importanceof electoral engineering. Elections are not the only source of democraticlegitimacy,which can also be secured through responsiveness of public policy to the relative weight of discourses in the public sphere, which does not have to involve the direct

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However, some electoral systems are betterthan others counting of heads.59 when it comes to promotingdiscursiveengagement in a divided society. Preferential voting has the merits of promoting communication across divides involving voters and leaders. Electoral or otherwise, the link from public sphere to state ought not be too tight, because then the deadly contest for sovereign authorityresumes. But if influence is absent entirely, there is a danger the public sphere may decay into inconsequentiality.Such decay would underminethe legitimacy of the state itself.60Between these two extremes one can think of state and public sphere as being loosely connected, or semidetached. Discursive engagementin the public spherecan influence state action in many informal ways. These ways include changingthe terms of discourse in ways thateventually come to pervade the understandings of governmental actors. As Habermasputs it in a moment of expansiveness beyond his stress on elections, "Communicative power is exercised in the manner of a siege. It influences the premises of judgment and decision making in the political system Much of the success of without intending to conquer the system itself."'61 environmentalismand feminism in the late twentieth century can be interpreted in these terms. These two movements provided a new vocabularyincluding,for example, the termenvironment,which did not exist priorto the 1960s. Individualsversed in these discourses eventually occupied influential positions in government. Social movements have at times achieved more formal integrationinto policy making, though sometimes this has proved to be a bad bargainif the movement has received mostly symbolic rewards. Genuine inclusion as opposed to symbolic inclusion is facilitatedto the degree a movementcan establish a link between its defining interest and a core function in the state's system of priorities. For example, the alignment of environmentalismwith the core economic priorityhas recently been facilitated in NorthernEurope In these terms, a groupthatdefines by the idea of ecological modernization.62 one side in a divided society has the capacity once included to connect to the core interestof the state in securing internal order, or at least its leadership does, as is clear from the historical success of consociational settlements in Europe.But as this example makes clear, inclusion of group leadershipbegs some largerquestions about adversarypolitics versus consensual politics in the institutionsof government,andhow this affects social learningacross difference in the public sphere. Otherunresolved questions include the characterof the leadersincluded(radicalsor moderates)and incentives for different sorts of behavioronce included. Movement impact from the public sphere by means of changes in the terms of discourse can occur before, during, and after any such inclusion. In

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divided societies, it is easy to identify rapidchange in the terms of discourse thatcreatedivisions ratherthanheal them.Forexample, Hutuand Tutsiidentities hardlyexisted in Rwandabefore Belgian colonial rule.But morebenign shifts are possible, as indicated by the rethinkingof identity on all sides but especially on the part of formerly dominant whites in South Africa in the 1990s. Changes in the terms of discourse can be broughtabout by the power of rhetoric,which can also reach from the public sphereinto the state. Such was the achievement of Dr. Martin LutherKing Jr. in the 1960s. Because King appealedto the emotional commitmentof white Americansto symbols such as the Declaration of Independenceand the Constitution,he could not easily be dismissed, and eventually the rhetoricforced redefinitionof the ways in which dominant liberal discourse was understood. When Nelson Mandela emerged from prison he could have espoused a rhetoricof victimhood and revenge; instead, he developed a rhetoricof reconciliation that looked forward ratherthan backward, with telling effect on the state structure.Arguments honed in the public sphere may be noticed and heeded by state actors, andrhetoricianssuch as King and Mandeladid of course accompanyrhetoric with argument.This sort of influence is what Habermas(following Arendt) means by "communicativepower"(thoughHabermasacceptsonly argument and rejects rhetoric).

XI. POSITIVEEXAMPLES No polity that I know of exemplifies the sort of discursive democratic engagement in a semidetached public sphere that I am endorsing here. But elements can be discerned in some systems. Consider Canada(classified by Lijphartas "semiconsociational,"even though not one of his four defining features truly applies).63Canada featuresoccasional attemptsto rewritethe constitutionto accommodatethe competingaspirationsof Francophonesand Anglophones, as well as episodes where Quebec looks as though it might secede and then draws back. Attempts to rewrite the constitutionnormally end in deadlock, frustration,and failure--even if elites manage to bargaina resolution,as in the Meech Lake accordsof 1987, which failed to attainratification because of opposition from Anglophones and indigenous peoples. Failure is generally followed by a period of inaction at the constitutional level. In these periods of inaction, Canadais at its best, because individuals on the various sides can then get back to engaging one anotherin the public sphere where struggle over sovereignty is not at stake. Political leadership can get back to the modus vivendi that makes Canadasuch a generally suc-

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cessful society. The peace is disturbed only by political philosophers who believe a constitutional solution is required. This is exactly what is not required-as should be clear from the lessons of what happens when it is tried. A second positive examplecan be found in South Africa's transitionin the mid-1990s. Though claimed by Lijphartfor consociationalism, thatdesignation applies mainly in terms of the grand coalition that oversaw transition. There was no suppression of engagement across racial and ethnic lines as required by consociationalism's "segmental autonomy." Engagement and reflection were promoted by Archbishop Desmond Tutu's 1995-98 Truth and Reconciliation Commission-which operated at arm's length from the coercive authority of the sovereign state (and withstood legal challenges PresidentF W. de Clerk and the AfricanNational from bothformerapartheid was a deliberative institution whose terms of The commission Congress). reference were themselves the product of broad public debate (though the commission was established under the new constitution). It could offer amnesty and recommendreparations,though the implementationof its recommendationsin public policy were haphazard,so its influence on the state may have fallen shortof the optimumin the terms I have developed. Perpetrators and victims of apartheid-era political crimes told their stories, and there and were some very public episodes of reconciliation between perpetrators survivors. South Africa also featured mixed-race discussion groups, and efforts to rethink identity in the media, educational institutions, and elsewhere in the public sphere. of apartheid. Deep division in South Africa did not end with the departure In 1996, a liberalconstitutionwas adoptedthat specified equal rightsfor men and women, clashing with the institution of customary marriage in some African communities. Deveaux discusses a series of consultations initiated by the South Africa Law Commission to resolve this conflict, which threatened the authorityof traditionalleaders." These consultations produced a compromise, which was reflected in legislation, that was acceptableto both women's groups and traditionalleaders. This compromise entailed some reform to traditionalpractices, while retaining the nonliberal bridewealth payment practice, and avoided confronting the authority of traditional leaders. Deveaux does not addressthe issue, but this avoidance of challenge to the "sovereignty"of traditionalleaders may have facilitated deliberative resolution.So althoughtherewas a (rare)tight connection between deliberative forum and legislative outcome, this was possible because the "sovereignty"issue was not confronted.

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XII. THREEKINDS OF FAILURE To further strengthen the case for emphasizing the engagement of discourses in a semidetached public sphere in divided societies, consider three kinds of failure in these terms. The first consists of too tight a connection between public sphereand sovereign authority.The tighterthis connection, the greateris the likelihood of a NorthernIrelandsince deadly contest over the content of sovereignauthority. the 1990s illustrates this difficulty. NorthernIreland is a highly politicized society, so there is plenty of public debatein the media, clubs, bars,community groups, and so forth. However, the organizationsactive in this debate have close links to the political leadershipnegotiating with British and Irish governments over how government in NorthernIrelandshall be organized. Community groups, paramilitaries,and politicians are tightly connected. There is great difficulty in maintaininga public sphere at any distance from the sovereignty contest. Heroic attempts have been made by activists to develop networks concerned with issues such as health care, employment, and welfare across the communal divide, but such networksremainprecarious in the face of sectarianpublic spheresjoined to each other mainly in the institutionsin sovereignty contest. Perhapsthe most successful antisectarian of NorthernIrelandtoday areCommunityPolice Boardswith representatives both communities. These boardsdeal with some of the most divisive andcontentious issues in day-to-day life in NorthernIrelandbut stay away from the sovereignty question. As such they are elements of a semidetached public sphere. A second, very different, kind of failing exists when a public sphere confronts a completely unresponsive state. Indeed, this kind of polity comes close to failing to be a deliberativedemocracyby definition(unless collective outcomes sensitive to public opinion can be produced in nonstateor transstate locations). Northern Irelandat the commencement of the Troubles in the late 1960s may illustrate this condition. At the time, the province had been governed for decades by the Ulster Unionist Party,whose leadership was upper-middleclass. The Troubles began as a civil rights movement on the Catholic side. But unresponsivenessandrepressionon the partof the state played into the hands of the IrishRepublicanArmy,and the social movement gave way to paramilitaryaction and terror.The struggle stoppedbeing about civil rights and startedbeing about sovereignty.On the Unionist side, working-class activists denied access by the traditionalunionist elite organizedin paramilitaryfashion.

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In divided societies, a state thatis completely obtuse in the face of movement activism may play into the hands of warlordswho preferviolence to the traditionalsocial movementrepertoire,exacerbating a sectarianpolitics that is both irresponsibleand violent. Of course, NorthernIrelandwas alreadya sectarianstate-though beginning in the early 1970s, direct rule from London began to amelioratethis aspect. But even a consociational state that is completely unresponsiveto events in the public sphere may be vulnerable. Many factors conspired to drive Lebanon's consociational system into civil war in the 1970s, but one factorwas the complete lack of responsivenessof a elites to emerging social forces, particularly system dominatedby traditional on the Muslim side. Warlordscould then harness these forces. A thirdkind of failure exists when there is no autonomous public sphere worthspeakingof. Again this failureis one of deliberativedemocracyalmost by definition, if (as I have argued)deliberativedemocracy depends crucially on the engagementof discoursesin the public sphere. But theremay also be a threatto political stability.In the case of Austria,decades of a noncontentious partypolitics and consensus governmenteventually provided fertile ground for the rise of right-wing populism in the form of Jorg Haider's Freedom Partyin the late 1990s. In a very differentsetting, YugoslaviaunderTito suppressed any kind of contestatorypolitics, be it within the state or the public sphere, partly for fear of ethnic nationalist mobilization. While the story of the breakdownof Yugoslaviais complex, there were no substantialpolitical forces to standin the way of powerfulfigures from the old regime reinventing themselves as murderousethnic nationalists.

XIII. CONCLUSION Agonism may featureplenty in the way of authentic democraticcommunication, but is hardto apply to any divided society in the real world. States with consociational aspects for their part can sometimes preserve political stability in real-world divided societies, but they undermine the ability of groups to live together throughdeliberativeand democratic social learning. Manypositions may exist in the largeterritorybetween these two models, but my aim has not been merely to stake out a moderate position, for there is validity in aspects of both these "extremes,"and I have tried to show that these aspects can be redeemed and developed in a discursive democracy in divided societies that emphasizes engagement in the public sphere only loosely connected to the state. Contributionsto its development could come from the following:

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* deliberativeinstitutions at a distance from sovereign authority, * deliberativeforums in the public sphere thatfocus on particularneeds ratherthan general values, * issue-specific networks, * centripetalelectoral systems, * a power-sharingstate that does not reach too far into the public sphere, * the conditionality of sovereignty, and * the transnationalizationof political influence.

NOTES
1. Benjamin R. Barber,Jihad vs. McWorld:How Globalism and TribalismAre Reshaping the World(New York: Ballantine, 1995). 2. Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 3. Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture:Equalityand Diversityin the Global Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 108-12. 4. Amy Gutmannand Dennis Thompson, Democracyand Disagreement(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1996). 5. Stanley Fish, "MutualRespect as a Device of Exclusion,"in Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, ed. Stephen Macedo (New York:Oxford University Press, 1999), 88-102, at 92-93. 6. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 16-51. Young identifies herself with agonism (pp. 49-51 ), butthe reasonablenessmotivational normwould set her apartfrom many agonists. She does push deliberativedemocracyin an agonistic direction. 7. William H. Simon, "ThreeLimitationsof DeliberativeDemocracy:IdentityPolitics, Bad in Deliberative Politics, 49-57, at 50-52. Faith, and Indeterminacy," 8. William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference:Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Bonnie Honig, Political Theoryand the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1993). Social Research 66 9. ChantalMouffe, "DeliberativeDemocracy or Agonistic Pluralism?" (1999): 745-58; Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London:Verso,2000); and Chantal Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism, Political Science Series 72 (Vienna: Institutefor Advanced Studies, 2000). 10. Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism, 16. 11. Mouffe, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?"755-56. 12. Ibid., 755. 13. Ilan Kapoor, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?The Relevance of the Habermas-MouffeDebate for ThirdWorldPolitics,"Alternatives27 (2002): 459-87, at472-73. 14. JohnForester,"Dealing with Deep ValueDifferences,"in TheConsensusBuildingHandbook, ed. Lawrence Susskind (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999), 463-93, at 470-72. 15. Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism, 16. 16. Arend Lijphart,"Varietiesof Nonmajoritarian Democracy,"in Democracy and Institutions: TheLife Work ofArend Lijphart,ed. MarkusM. L. Crepaz,ThomasA. Koelble, andDavid

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Wilsford (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 225-46, at 228. See also Arend Lijphart,Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977). 17. ArendLijphart,"Prospectsfor Power Sharingin the New South Africa,"in Election '94 SouthAfrica:AnAnalysis of the Results, Campaignand FutureProspects, ed. AndrewReynolds (New York:St. Martin's, 1994), 222. NY: Cor18. StuartKaufman,ModernHatreds:TheSymbolicPolitics of Ethnic War(Ithaca, nell University Press, 2001). 19. See also Jorge M. Valadez, Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and SelfDeterminationin MulticulturalSocieties (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), 36-38. or Power-Sharing Government,"in Democracy and 20. Andrew Reynolds, "Majoritarian Institutions:TheLife Work ofArendLijphart,ed. MarkusM. L. Crepaz,ThomasA. Koelble, and David Wilsford (Ann Arbor:Universityof Michigan Press, 2000), 155-96, at 169-70. 21. Cass R. Sunstein, "TheLaw of GroupPolarization,"Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2002): 175-95. 22. John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford,UK: OxfordUniversityPress,2000); andJohnS. Dryzek, "LegitimacyandEconomy in DeliberativeDemocracy,"Political Theory29 (2001): 651-69. 23. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, chap. 3; Young, Inclusion and Democracy. 24. Dryzek,Deliberative Democracyand Beyond, 68. Young, Inclusion and Democracy,7779, proposes a complementaryset of standards:to ask if an interventionis "respectful,publicly assertable, and does it stand up to public challenge?" 25. Margaret Moore, "Beyondthe CulturalArgumentfor Liberal Nationalism,"CriticalReview of InternationalSocial and Political Philosophy 2 (1999): 26-47. 26. Benhabib,The Claims of Culture. 27. Ibid., 1. 28. Ibid., 25. Political 29. See also Monique Deveaux, "ADeliberativeApproachto Conflicts of Culture," Theory 31 (2003): 780-807, at 781. 30. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 31. As lamentedby Connolly,Identity/Difference. 32. See the guidelines proposedby Meindert Fennema and Marcel Maussen, "Dealing with Extremistsin Political Discussion: FrontNational and 'FrontRepublican' in France," Journalof Political Philosophy 8 (2000): 379-400. 33. Deveaux, "A DeliberativeApproach,"788. 34. James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 83-85. 35. John Forester,The Deliberative Practitioner (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1999), 11553. 36. John M. Orbell, Alphons J. C. van de Kragt,and Robyn M. Dawes, "ExplainingDiscussion-InducedCooperationin Social Dilemmas,"Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54 (1988): 811-19. 37. HeatherRae, State Identitiesand the Homogenisation ofPeoples (Cambridge,UK: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2002). 38. For example,Will Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford, UK: OxfordUniversity Press, 1995). 39. Moore, "Beyond the CulturalArgument."

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40. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1985); and Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineeringfor Conflict Management(Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001). in multimembercon41. STV combines preferentialvoting with proportional representation stituencies. The ballot requires voters to rankall candidates.Candidatesachieving a "quota"are declaredelected; their surplus votes are then redistributed, along with the second preferencesof candidateseliminated on the basis of their low numberof first preferences.If there are (say) six seats perconstituency,a quota could be 16.67 percentof votes. AV uses single-memberconstituencies, again requiringvoters to rankall candidates.Candidatesare eliminated beginning with those with the fewest first preferences, the votes for eliminated candidates being reallocated accordingto the next preference on the ballot. UnderSV, voters identify only their first and second preferences for candidates in a single-member constituency. If no candidate receives a majorityof first preferences, all but the top two candidates(based on firstpreferences)are eliminated, and second choices of votes for all the other candidatesare reallocatedto determine the winner. 42. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies, 136-37. 43. Donald Horowitz, A Democratic SouthAfrica? ConstitutionalEngineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 189. 44. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Europeand Latin America (Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991), 24. 45. Donald Horowitz, "ConstitutionalDesign: An Oxymoron?"in Designing Democratic Institutions(Nomos XLII),ed. Ian Shapiroand StephenMacedo (New York:New YorkUniversity Press, 2000), 253-84, at 262. 46. GerryMackie, "Does Democratic DeliberationChange Minds?"(paperpresentedat the annualmeeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 2002). 47. Archon Fung, "Recipes for Public Spheres,"Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (2003): 338-67. 48. GrahamSmith and CorinneWales, "Citizens'JuriesandDeliberativeDemocracy,"Political Studies 48 (2000): 51-65; and James Fishkin, The Voiceof the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). 49. Deveaux, "A Deliberative Approach,"792. Justice and the New Pluralism: The Challenge ofDif50. David Schlosberg, Environmental ference for Environmentalism(Oxford, UK: Oxford UniversityPress, 1999). 51. Fung, "Recipes for Public Spheres." 52. Claire Jean Kim, Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-KoreanConflict in New YorkCity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). 53. Sunstein, "The Law of Group Polarization." 54. Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalismand the Marketplaceof Ideas,"International Security 21 (1996): 5-40. 55. Simone Chambersand Jeffrey Kopstein,"BadCivil Society,"Political Theory29 (2001): 837-65. 56. Ibid., 855. 57. Snyder and Ballentine, "Nationalismand the Marketplaceof Ideas,"38-39. 58. JtirgenHabermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributionsto a Discourse Theoryof Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). 59. Dryzek, "Legitimacy and Economy." 60. Ibid. 61. Habermas,Between Facts and Norms, 486.

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62. John S. Dryzek, David Downes, Christian Hunold, and David Schlosberg, with HansKristianHernes, Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalismin the United States, United Kingdom,Germany,and Norway (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003). 63. Lijphart,Democracy in Plural Societies. 64. Deveaux, "A DeliberativeApproach,"795-800.

John S. Dryzekis professor in the Social and Political TheoryProgram,ResearchSchool of Social Sciences, AustralianNational University. Recent books include Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (OxfordUniversityPress, 2000), Post-CommunistDemocratization (coauthored, Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Green States and Social Movements (coauthored, OxfordUniversityPress, 2003).

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