The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one

jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence. G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966 AFRICA vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC. FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among them were spouses Africa and heirs of Ong, sued Caltex Phil, the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for damages. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire. The RTC and CA found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that there was due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of rep ipsa loquitor should apply on the part of Caltex Phil? RULING: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means the thing or transaction speaks for itself. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present: (a) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The negligence of the employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course of things does not happen. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award for damages. G.R. No. 194320 February 1, 2012 MALAYAN INSURANCE vs. ALBERTO a FACTS: An accident occurred at the corner of EDSA involving a Nissan Bus, an Isuzu Tanker, a Fuzo Cargo Truck and a Mitsubishi Galant. The Isuzu Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before the vehicular incident. All three vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved forward and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker. Previously, Malayan Insurance issued Car Insurance Policy in favor of First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation, insuring the Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability. Malayan Insurance paid the damages sustained by the assured. Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to Rodelio Alberto, the registered owner, and Enrico Alberto Reyes, the driver, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured. When they refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance was constrained to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence against them. CONTENTION OF MALAYAN: Malayan Insurance contends that respondents failed to present any evidence to overturn the presumption of negligence. CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENTS: They claimed that Malayan Insurance did not present any witness who should affirm any negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo truck before and after the incident, there was no evidence which would show negligence on their part. ISSUE: W/N the respondents are liable by virtue of res ipsa loquitur doctrine? RULING: Yes. The requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally, no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.

G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996 BATIQUIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Dr. Batiquin performed a simple caesarean operation on Mrs. Villegas. Afterwards, she began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She consulted again Dr. Batiquin who prescribed her certain medicines. The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring that bothered her. She consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho and submitted herself to another surgery. She was found to have an ovarian cyst and a piece of rubber material was embedded on the right side of her uterus. ISSUE: W/N Dr. Batiquin is liable under the doctrine of rep ipsa loquitor ? RULING: Yes. Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen in those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." In the instant case, all the requisites of the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, Mrs. Villegas was bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into her body, which, does not occur unless through the intersection of negligence. Second, since aside from the caesarean section, she underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. Dr. Batiquin failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in Villegas's abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof. G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999 RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Erlinda Ramos was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. Dr. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a "cholecystectomy" operation. Rogelio Ramos asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anaesthesiologist. Erlinda was prepared for the operation. However, Dr. Hosaka was not yet around. Dr. Gutierrez, who was to administer anaesthesia, intubated the patient. Then Dr. Hosaka arrived and he ordered to call Dr. Calderon, another anaesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room she tried to intubate the patient. The patient's nailbed became bluish and she was placed in a trendelenburg position a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patient's brain. Erlinda went comatose because she was incorrectly intubated. ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply? RULING: Yes. The damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur. In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the administration of anaesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anaesthesia if the proper procedure was followed. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anaesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious. Dra. Gutierrez is negligent for she failed to properly intubate Erlinda. She admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation and no prior consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation, she was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of anaesthesia to Erlinda. Her act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. Dr. Orlino Hosaka as the head of the surgical team or the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner. His negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anaesthesiologist observed proper anaesthesia protocols. Furthermore, he had scheduled

another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anaesthesiologist regarding the anaesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition. G.R. No. 187926 February 15, 2012 JARCIA and BASTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Belinda Santiago lodged a complaint with the NBI against Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr and Dr. Marilou Bastan for their alleged neglect of professional duty which caused her son, Roy Jr, to suffer serious physical injuries. Roy Jr. was hit by a taxicab and he was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency medical treatment. An X-ray of his ankle was ordered and the X-ray result showed no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia. Dr. Bastan entered the emergency room and conducted her own examination of the victim. Mrs. Santiago insisted on having another x-ray of her child on the upper part of his leg but they told her there was no need to examine it. Eleven days later, Roy Jr. developed fever, swelling of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot. Mrs. Santiago brought him back to the hospital and the X-ray revealed a right mid-tibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture in the shaft of the bone. ISSUE: W/N res ipsa loquitor be applied? RULING: No. The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. In this case, the circumstances that caused Roy Jr.s injury and the series of tests that were supposed to be undergone by him to determine the extent of the injury suffered were not under the exclusive control of Drs. Jarcia and Bastan. It was established that they are mere residents of the Manila Doctors Hospital at that time who attended to the victim at the emergency room. The second requisite is not present. G.R. No. 158996 November 14, 2008 SPOUSES FLORES vs. SPOUSES PINEDA FACTS: Teresita Pineda consulted Dr. Fredelicto Flores, regarding her medical condition. She complained of general body weakness, loss of appetite, frequent urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fredelicto asked her for the history of her monthly period to analyze the probable cause of the vaginal bleeding. He advised her to return the following week or to go to the UDMC for a general check-up. As for her other symptoms, he suspected that she might be suffering from diabetes and told her to continue her medications. However, when her condition persisted, she went to consult Dr. Flores at his UDMC clinic. Dr. Flores did a routine check-up and ordered her admission to the hospital. He directed the hospital staff to prepare the patient for an "on call" D&C operation to be performed by his wife, Dr. Felicisima Flores. She was taken to the operating room. It was only then that she met Dr. Felicisima, an obstetrician and gynecologist. Dr. Felicisima and Dr. Fredelicto conferred on the patient's medical condition. Dr Felicisima also interviewed and conducted an internal vaginal examination of the patient. Dr. Felicisima proceeded with the D&C operation with Dr. Fredelicto administering the general anesthesia. Her condition had worsened. She experienced difficulty in breathing and was rushed to the ICU Further tests confirmed that she was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus Type II. Due to complications induced by diabetes she died. RULING: The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiff's injuries; the plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he had been injured and defendant has been at fault, but also that the defendant's fault caused the injury. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony. Stress, whether physical or emotional, is a factor that can aggravate diabetes; a D&C operation is a form of physical stress. Dr. Mendoza explained how surgical stress can aggravate the patient's hyperglycemia: when stress occurs, the diabetic's body, especially the autonomic system, reacts by secreting hormones which are counterregulatory; she can have prolonged hyperglycemia which, if unchecked, could lead to death. Medical literature further explains that if the blood sugar has become very high, the patient becomes comatose. When this happens over several days, the body uses its own fat to produce energy, and the result is high levels of waste products in the blood and urine. This was apparently what happened in Teresita's case; in fact, after she had been referred to the internist Dr. Jorge, laboratory test showed that her blood sugar level shot up to 14.0mmol/l, way above the normal blood sugar range. Thus, between the D&C and death was the diabetic complication that could have been prevented with the observance of standard medical precautions. The D&C operation and Teresita's death due to aggravated diabetic condition is therefore sufficiently established. Dr. Fredelicto's negligence was his failure from the very start to identify and confirm, despite the patient's complaints and his own suspicions, that diabetes was a risk factor that should be guarded against, and his participation in the imprudent decision to proceed with the D&C operation despite his early suspicion and the confirmatory early laboratory results. He not being an internist or a diabetologist he should have likewise refrained from making a

decision to proceed with the D&C operation since he was neither an obstetrician nor a gynecologist. The conclusion that the decision to proceed with the D&C operation, notwithstanding Teresita's hyperglycemia and without adequately preparing her for the procedure, was contrary to the standards observed by the medical profession. Deviation from this standard amounted to a breach of duty which resulted in the patient's death. Due to this negligent conduct, liability must attach to the petitioner spouses. G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007 PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. vs. AGANA FACTS: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid." Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Ag ana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it but they told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. Spouses Agana went to the United States to seek further treatment. After four months of consultations and laboratory examinations, Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to the Philippines. They flew back in the Philippines, thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze. The pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment to Dr. Ramon Gutierrez who detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- foul-smelling gauze which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Then, Natividad underwent another surgery. ISSUE: 1. W/N Dr. Ampil is liable under res ipsa loquitur? 2. W/N the hospital is also liable? RULING: 1. The requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. As stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the "Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. To our mind, it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividads body. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes. Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes. 2. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists. In cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a patient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physicians negligence. In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. G.R. No. 150355 July 31, 2006 MANILA DOCTORS HOSPITAL vs. CHUA FACTS: Chua was admitted in Manila Doctors Hospital for hypertension and diabetes. While Chua was confined, Judith, her daughter, had been likewise confined for injuries suffered in a vehicular accident. After the discharge of Judith, Chua remained in confinement and the hospital bills for both patients accumulated. Chua was pressured by the hospital, through its Credit and Collection Department, to settle the unpaid bills. Vicky Ty, daughter of Chua,

represented that she will settle the bills as soon as the funds become available. The hospital threatened to implement unpleasant measures unless Vicky undertakes her mother's obligation as well as the obligation of her sister, Judith, to pay the hospitalization expenses. The hospital cut off the telephone line in her room and removed the air-conditioning unit, television set, and refrigerator, refused to render medical attendance and to changed the hospital gown and bed sheets, and barred the private nurses or midwives from assisting the patient. RULING: The operation of private pay hospitals and medical clinics is impressed with public interest and imbued with a heavy social responsibility. But the hospital is also a business, and, as a business, it has a right to institute all measures of efficiency commensurate to the ends for which it is designed, especially to ensure its economic viability and survival. SC held that Chua failed to prove the damages claimed. The evidence in the record firmly establishes that the staff of Manila Doctors Hospital took proactive steps to inform the relatives of Chua of the removal of facilities prior thereto, and to carry out the necessary precautionary measures to ensure that her health and well-being would not be adversely affected. It was also undisputed that the hospital administrator, Sister Galeno, prior to the removal of the facilities, consulted the attending physician, Dr. Sy. He stated that he consented to the removal since the removal of the said facilities would not by itself be detrimental to the health of his patient, Chua. The evidence in the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that respondent Chua had been adequately attended to. The Court finds that the facilities in question are non-essential for the care of respondent Chua and, hence, they may be lessened or removed by the petitioner for the sake of economic necessity and survival. G.R. No. 165622 October 17, 2008 MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION vs. DE LEON FACTS: Raul De Leon was the presiding judge of Branch 258, RTC in Paraaque. He noticed that his left eye was reddish and also had difficulty reading. He consulted Dr. Milla about his irritated left eye and the latter prescribed the drugs "Cortisporin Opthalmic" and "Ceftin" to relieve his eye problems. He went to the Betterliving, Paraaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to Aurmela Ganzon, a pharmacist assistant. He paid for and took the medicine handed over by Ganzon. At his chambers, he requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on his left eye. Instead of relieving his irritation, he felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine, "Cortisporin Otic Solution." He returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and teary. When he confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription. In fact, it was her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of the needed Cortisporin Opthalmic. CONTENTION OF MERCURY: It pointed out that the proximate cause of De Leons unfortunate experience was his own negligence. He should have first read and checked to see if he had the right eye solution before he used any on his eye. It explained that there is no available medicine known as "Cortisporin Opthalmic" in the Philippine market and what was written on the piece of paper he presented to Ganzon was "Cortisporin Solution." RULING: Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable. They failed to exercise the highest degree of diligence expected of them. They can not exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them. SC once more reiterated that the profession of pharmacy demands great care and skill. It reminded druggists to exercise the highest degree of care known to practical men. In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or supervision of ones employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption. Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to high standard of diligence expected of them as pharmacy professionals. They were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed eye drops to De Leon. Worse, they have once again attempted to shift the blame to their victim by underscoring his own failure to read the label. As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its employees in dispensing to him the right medicine. SC has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on ones absolute honesty and peculiar learning. G.R. No. 139008 March 13, 2002 ROBERT DEL MAR vs. CA and NORMA DEL MAR FACTS: Norma executed Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Robert, her son, covering the three parcels of land situated in Mabini, Santiago City. More than 22 years of possession by Robert, a complaint for reconveyance was filed by Norma. She alleged that Robert obtained the Certificates of Title through fraud and deceit. Robert claimed that Norma sold the properties to him before the former left for the United States. Moreover, the properties were transferred for good, sufficient and valuable consideration; hence the sale was lawful and valid. During the pre-trial conference, neither Robert nor his counsel, Atty. Federico Abuan, appeared, by reason of which the trial court issued

an order declaring petitioner as in default. The non-appearance was due to the failure of Atty. Abuan, Jr. to inform petitioners attorney-in-fact, Angelita Austria, of the scheduled hearing. CONTENTION OF ROBERT: Atty. Abuans failure to file the required pleading constituted fraud against him, and that his absence from the country while the appeal was pending constituted a mistake that was excusable. RULING: It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Exceptions to this rule arise when (1) such negligence is so gross, palpable, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of the due process of law; and (2) the application of such due process results in the outright deprivation of o nes property through a technicality. The negligence of Atty. Abuan does not fall under these exceptions. His negligence in this case was his inexcusable failure to file the required appellants Brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of Robert. But the latter was not without fault. He was aware of Atty. Abuans failure to appear at the pre-trial conference, a failure that had placed him in default. Because he was in default, Normas evidence was received ex parte by the RTC. No wonder, the trial court decided against him. Yet, he retained Atty. Abuans services for the appeal. One is bound by the decisions of ones counsel regarding the conduct of the case, especially where the former does not complain against the manner in which the latter handled the case. In effect, he consented to the shabby and negligent treatment of his case by his counsel. Hence, he should not complain now of the negligence or fraud done to him by his lawyer. A partys counsel cannot be blamed for negligence, if the party was likewise guilty of the same. Clients should suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom they themselves hired, and whom they had full authority to fire at any time and replace with another. G.R. No. 149454 May 28, 2004 BPI vs. CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE FACTS: CASA Montessori International opened an Account BPI, with CASAs President Ms. Lebron as one of its authorized signatories. After conducting an investigation, BPI discovered that nine of its checks had been encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos. It turned out that Sonny D. Santos with account at BPIs Greenbelt Branch was a fictitious name used by Leonardo Yabut who worked as external auditor of CASA. He voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature of Ms. Lebron and encashed the checks. RULING: SC has repeatedly emphasized that, since the banking business is impressed with public interest, of paramount importance thereto is the trust and confidence of the public in general. Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even required, of it. For allowing payment on the checks to a wrongful and fictitious payee, BPI -- the drawee bank -- becomes liable to its depositordrawer. Since the encashing bank is one of its branches. Pursuant to its prime duty to ascertain well the genuineness of the signatures of its client-depositors on checks being encashed, BPI is "expected to use reasonable business prudence. In the performance of that obligation, it is bound by its internal banking rules and regulations that form part of the contract it enters into with its depositors. Unfortunately, it failed in that regard. First, Yabut was able to open a bank account in one of its branches without privity; that is, without the proper verification of his corresponding identification papers. Second, BPI was unable to discover early on not only this irregularity, but also the marked differences in the signatures on the checks and those on the signature card. Third, despite the examination procedures it conducted, the Central Verification Unit of the bank even passed off these evidently different signatures as genuine. Without exercising the required prudence on its part, BPI accepted and encashed the eight checks presented to it. As a result, it proximately contributed to the fraud and should be held primarily liable for the "negligence of its officers or agents when acting within the course and scope of their employment." BPI must bear the loss.