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5. For a discussion of the legal ramifications of the scandals,seeMarc D. Stern. of Tortsl'Relrgr on in the News6 (Summer 2003),2-3,26 6. A particularly strong voice on thesematters is constitutional lawyer Marci see Marci Hamilton, God vs. The Gavel: Religion and the Rule of Law (New yorkl bridge University Press,2005); and Marci Hamilton,Justice Denied: What America
Do to ProtectIts Children(NewYork Cambridge Universitypress,200g). 7. See Airport Commissioners v.lews U.S.569(t987). for lesu.s,4B2 8. See Larsen v. Valente, 456U.S. Z2B(1982). 9. seeMcDanielv.Paty,435 u.s. 6I B (r97B); c atholicc onference v.Abortion bilization,4ST U.S. 72 (1985). lO.SeeCruzv.Beto,405U.S.3l9 (1972);O'Lonev.EstateofShabazz,482U.S.342 and cutter v. wilkinson,544u.s. 709(2005). on the general questionof the legal
surrounding religious practice in prison, seewinnifred Fallers Sullivan, prison Faith-BasedReform and the constitution (princeton: princeton university press,
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LATINO AND AFRICAN AMERICAN RELIGIONAND POLITICS
ll-Braunfeldv.Brown,366u.s.599(1961).Also seeJacobsonv.Massachusetts,l
1l (1905); Princev.Massachusetts,32l U.S.158 (1944). 12.Sherbert v. Verner,374 U.S.398 (t 963).
'l'lrroughout this book, we often have distinguished Americans not simply by the rliversity of their religious traditions and behaviorsbut also by their race.Thus we into as a group but havedivided evangelicals lrirvefocusednot only on evangelicals and bebeliefs political explaining when categories wlrite and African American lrirviors;similarly, we have placed Latino and non-Latino Catholics into separate This is an acknowledgementthat racial and ethnic identity is inextricably p,r()ups. and that fact has political significance.In linked with religion in the United States, I lris chapterwe take a stepback to considerthe complex interaction of race,religion, lncl politics in America. we focus on two crucial, prominent racial and ethnic groups in the united States: Latinos and African Americans.Religion has alwaysbeen a highly significant lirrcein theAfrican American and Latino communities.In few other racial or ethnic in fact, does religion play a more central role. But the two groups have disg,roups, litrctive histories and diverse cultures that make them a useful comparison as we tonsider the impact of religion on politics within thesetwo communities.We begin and catching with Latinos,a community that is growing rapidly in the United States tlrc attention of the political establishmentas a result-a fact on full display in the We then considerthe rich traditions presidentialelectioncampaigns. pirstseveral community. Arnerican ol'religionand politicswithin tlreA{ric:an
13.Gonzales v. O Centro EspiritaBeneficiente lJniaoDo Vegetal,546 U.S. 4lg "WorkplaceReligionpolicy Duej' The Washington 14.PeterBaker, post, 1997.14. 15.See Cutterv. Wilkinson,544 prison Religion. U.S.709(2005); Sullivan, 16.VanOrdenwasdecided at the same time asMcCreary Countyv.ACLUol 545u.s. 844(2006),whichheld thar the contextsurroundingTen commandmntr playsin somecounty courthouses suggested that countieshad no secularpurposc therefore violatedthe Establishment Clause. lT.onthematterofexcessiveentanglement,alsosee walzv.Taxcommission,sgT 664(re70). 18./usticescaliamadethis comment in his opinioninLamb\ chapelv.center UnionFree School (1993). District,508 U.S.3S5 19.Wallace v.Jffiee, 105S.Ct.2479(1985). "LemonLawl'NewRepublic 20.]effreyRosen, 208(March29, Igg3\, 17. 2I . stevenP.Br own,TiumpingReligion: TheNew christian Right, theFreespeech and theCozrfs(Tuscaloosa,AL: Universityof Alabamapress,2002). 22.on YoungLife,seehttp://www.younglife.org; on Fellowship of christian http://www.fca.org;on Youth for Christ, http://www.yfc.net;on Student http://www.studenfventure.com. 23.Margaret Battinfirstgot us to takethis sulrjecl serriously.
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T H E C H A N G I N G S T A T U SO F L A T I N O R E L I G I O N There is no better place to begin a discussionof Latino religion than with the of Roman Catholicism in Hispanic culture and history.l Hispanic Catholicism remarkably deep roots in North America, predating even the immigration of ritans to the United States in the early 1600s. The Spanishbrought Roman C icism with them during their conquestsin the continent in the sixteenth cen Fueledby the efforts of Catholic missionaries, who were intimately connected Spanish colonization, Catholicism spread through the native populations of American Southwest-a region that now includesTexas, New Mexico,Arizona, ifornia, and the fringes of bordering states.Simply looking at a map of the with its hundreds of cities,streets,and public spaces named in Spanishafter and other symbols of the Catholic faith (consider the names of California's most prominent cities-Los Angeles, SanFrancisco, and SanDiego-as just one lustration), we sensethe unmistakablelegacyof both Catholicism and Spanish onization in the American Southwest. Roman Catholicism continuesto play a central role in the lives of Latino icans.Today about two-thirds claim an affiliation with Catholicism, and many intensely committed to the beliefs and practices of the institutional Chu Slightly more Latino than non-Latino whites attend religious servicesregularly claim that religion is very important to them.3Certain aspectsof Catholicism onate particular\ well with Hispanics,including a strong attachment to Mary mother of God, reflecting the Latino emphasison family.a Although many Latinos sharethe Spanishlanguageand other aspects of worship stylesand religious practicesamong Latino Catholicsvarywidely. Much the diversityis tied to different countriesof origin; Mexicans,Cubans,Puerto Dominicans, and Latinos with other national roots often take somewhat di approaches in their practiceof the Catholic faith. The differencesare especially nounced among foreign-born Hispanics who have had relatively little exposurl the enormous pressureof assimilation into the broader American culture.s Although expressions of Catholicism among Latino Americans are both and diverse,the relationship betweenthe Latino community and the Catholic gious tradition sometimeshas been an uneasyand ambivalent one. During Spanish colonial period, for example,Latino converts often were suspici<lue Catholic missionswere complicit in the brutalitiesof conrluest. Many otlrers the decades have felt an alienationfrom the ilnrrrigrnlrl gr()upstlrat cl<lnrl Catholicleadership, most rrotablytlrosewith rools ilr lrcllnrl, (lcrnrirrry,
irnd other European countries.And today Latino connections to the Catholic ( lhurch are diminishing, with someLatinos now converting to other faiths or mainlaining a spiritual life outsidethe institutional Church. This is a matter of increasing eoncernfor the Catholic hierarchy.6 This uneasyrelationship with the organized church today is partly the result of sccular cultural and economic pressuresbeyond the church's control. As secondirnd third-generation Latinos assimilateinto American culture and join the middle class,they often lose parts of cultural identity, including their catholicism, that lheir parents or grandparents brought from their countries of origin. But many l,atinos also perceive that throughout its history the church itself often has been irrattentiveto the unique culture and concernsof Hispanic catholics.TFor example, rrcommon complaint is a chronic shortageof SpanishJanguage massesor Latinooliented youth ministries.8Or consider Latino participation in the Catholic hierirrchy,a key feature of church life. Until the 1940s, spaniards remained the largest group of spanish-speakingpriests in the American catholic church, and the first Mcxican American bishop, Patricio Flores,was not installed until 1970.Although lhc number of Latino bishopshas grown sincethe 1970s, the historicallack of inlcgration into church government simply reinforcesthe belief of some Latinos that I Ircy have been"second-class citizens"within the Church. It is in this milieu that a familiar, and very intense,competition has emergedbelwccn the catholic church and non-catholic religious traditions for Latino memlrt'rs.Many Protestantdenominations nowhave departmentsthat focus entirely on I lisPanicoutreach,and they often offer spanish-speaking worship servicesand varlotrs forms of social and economic aid to Latino communities. A strong majority rrl Lirtino Americans remain catholic (some 68 percent), and their absolutenumlrcrs have steadily expanded as a result of continuing immigration from Mexico errrlother Latin and SouthAmerican Catholic countries. At the sametime a substantialProtestantminority has grown among Latinos in llrc tJnitedStates. Some 15 percentof Latinos are Protestants, some from Central Arrrcricancountrieswhere a spirited Protestantism is now flourishing but many wlro ltave converted from Catholicism in the United States. Other Latinos in the I lrritcdStates are not involvedin religion at all.e Within Latino Catholicism itself there is a strong strain of Pentecostal or charisttrirliclirith,one that stresses a religionthat is vibrantly experiential and spirit-filled, r iorrrcthing that is routinein many l)rotestant l,atinochurches. Fullyhalfof all Cath'tlrirrismatic"todescribetheirfaith, olit l,atitttlsusew<lrclssuchus"l)etttccoslll"ancl (lullrolics,rr[l'hese"renewalist"Latino rotttparcd l l ' t t o t tl. l h p n t r i c t t lj r r s tl 0 p c r c c no
aa)
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Catholics remain loyal to the Catholic Church, but they are much more likely other Catholics to report experiencingor observing divine revelations,mi healings,or even speakingin tongues.rr Pentecostaland charismatic Protestantchurches have emerged as a real native to the Catholic Church for Latinos.But we must be careful to paint an rate picture of Latino Pentecostals.Latino Pentecostalism in America century-old movement that has attracted many Mexicans and other immi with its emphasison gifts of the Holy Spirit; Pentecostalismis open to all and tentionallv subordinatesracial and social differences.SomeLatino Pentecostalg former Catholics, but many others have been lifelong adherents of faiths, often within establisheddenominations such asAssembliesof God and in Latino American Vinevard. Indeed,it is not uncommon for Pentecostalism ilies to run generationsdeep.r2 Nor should anyonethink that Latino Protestantismhas grown only Catholic Church has wholly ignored or alwaystaken for granted its Latino bership. Far from it. A quarter to a third of all Catholics in the United Somebishops and Latino, a fact not lost on Catholic Church leaders.l3 havebeen keenly attentiveto both the specialcharacterand diversity of Latino within American Catholicism.For example,Robert Emmett itual expressions archbishop of San Antonio from 1941 to 1969,was particularly instrume: raising social justice concerns on behalf of his Hispanic parishioners,who al migrants frequently facedpoverty and a lack of job skills.Lucey'sefforts in the formation of the bishop'sCommittee for the SpanishSpeakingin 1945, the U.S.Conferenceof Catholic Bishopshassponsoredseveral the 1970s, (called Encuentros)of pastoral leadersto discussplans for ministering to th Catholics.The USCCB also recently issued a major study that addresses And, in light of the legacyof Latino for focus on the Latino membership.ra immigration, the American Church has taken up major fundraising for At the same churchesin Latin American countries sinceat leastthe 1960s. Catholic churches can match the intimacy and community of many Latino churches.Nor do many have a Latino minister as is standard in These limitations have damagedthe appeal of the Latino congregations. Church for more than a few Latinos, but they have also stimulated the to addresstheseproblems.ts Church to move aggressively In short, the religious divisions within the Latino community are real mentous for various religioustraditions in America.Thesedivisions alao veloping at preciselythe sametime that politicul elitcsarc beconringmorS p<lliticnl re$(ltlrcc, a trctnctttlotts that [,atinos corrstitule
LATINOS IN PUBLIC LIFE 'l'he Hispanic population, which includes more than 44 million Americans and has grown more than 150 percent since 1980,has surpassed African Americans as the lLrrgest racial or ethnic minority in the united States.t6 This fact alone has enormous political implications. It is no wonder that electedofficials and political parties have crnbarked on an intense competition for the Latino electorate,even though low voter turnout in past electionshas diminished some of its potential influence.The l,ltino presencein American politics also has generatedmyriad policy debates, Irom the status of undocumented workers to affirmative action in education to linglish-only requirements.The high profile of thesepolitical and policy issueswill orrly increaseover time as the number of Latino Americans continues to grow. 'Ihe Hispanic population is undergoing rapid cultural changeaswell. To be sure, ttranyLatinos,particularly the foreign born, maintain strong ties to the cultures of ( )uba,Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic,and other countries in Latin A rnericaand the Caribbean.But others,especially thosewho arenative-born Amerlclrrs, have assimilated into American culture. Many now count English as their although a larger proportion is bilingual.tTIn fact, language aclrlirrrary language, rlrrisitiongivesus a clue asto how assimilationmight affect religion because Latinos wlro claim to be primarily English speakersare also more likely to be members of 18 lrlotcstantchurches. 'l'his rangeof dynamicsaccountsfor the significant differencesbetweenforeignnnrl native-born Latinos on a variety of issues, including opinion on mattersof pols rrnd culture. When lllc the foreign- versusnative-born division is combined with tlre tliversity of religious traditions and areasof origin, it becomesdifficult to identlly slrong cohesionin Latino perspectives on public life. There is certainly no Ftorrolithic Latino opinion, and that fact has political implications too. Wt: can say,however,that Latinos as a group are somewhat more conservative whites on issuessuch asgender roles,abortion, homosexuality, thart tt<u'r-Hispanic pttrl olhcr matters that touch on family life. The role of family is a key factor in the grrrlilicirl thinking of Latinos,with foreign-born and Spanish-dominantspeakers lilcely to espouse traditionalist views of family, including opposition to aborftoll marriage.Even when controlling for thesefactors,howtlorr lights and same-sex lriglr attendance ratesin Catholic or evangelical , churchestends to remain a prcclictorof conservatisnr on socio-moralissues.re Latinosas a group also are terrrlly conscrvative on mnttcr$ol'clrurchirnclstate, asillustratedin their support ut'guttizecl pruycrirr publicse hooh (70 pcrccnt)anclprovidingparentswith statevlo u c l r c r( s6 0p e l c e n l ) , r r l f t t t i r l r te l tlrrcltionn
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On many issuesrelated to economicsand immigration, however,Latinos to the left of the ideological spectrum.Although they favor the role of churcheg providing social services,Hispanics are more likely than non-Hispanic whites acceptthe possibility of higher taxes in exchangefor more government This view, which is correlatedwith the generallylower socioeconomicstanding HispanicAmericans, also reflectsthe liberationist religious teachingson social tice and "the option for the poorl' especially within Catholicism.2lMoreover, are much more likely than other demographicgroups to support providing benefits to illegal immigrants.22 The lessonhere is that ethnic identity and grant history shapehow Latinos from acrossreligious traditions think about policy issues. It may be tempting to seein theseissuepositions the makings of another of quintessentialswing voters,not unlike the Catholic voting population asa w There may be some evidenceof the emergenceof a new swing electorate, but it difficult to point to religion as a sourceof such an alignment.23 To be sure,the tinction between Protestantand Catholic Latinos appearsto explain some encesin partisanvoting and identification.Thirty-six percentoflatino for example,identifu with the Democratic Party,in contrast to 55 percent of Catholics; Republican Party affiliation reflects the gap in reverse,with 36 of Latino evangelicals identifying with the GOP in comparison to only l8 of Latino Catholics.2a Yet despitethesedifferences, about half of all Latinos i with the Democratic Party,compared to about one-in-five for the Republicano. What is more, recentvoting patterns suggest that statedpartisanship doesnot essarilypredict vote choice-and may portend changesin party identification the future.At leastone postelectionsurveyin 2008 suggested that evenLatino gelicals flipped the partisan direction of their vote from the previous Whereas 58 percent of Latino evangelicals voted for GeorgeW. Bush in 2004, percent voted for Barack Obama in 2008.26 In addition, to the extent that do constitutea swing electorate, a host of factorsother than religion, including generation,and country of origin, shapetheir voting patterns. Are there other indicators of religion-basedpolitical behavior among The conventionalwisdom is that, asidefrom myriad religioussocialservice that serveLatino populations,few distinctively religious groups engagein advocacyon behalf of Latinos.It is certainly true that many of the most promi Latino groups-the Leagueof united Latin American citizens, the Mexican Amtr. ican Legal Defenseand Educational Fund, and the National council of La Raza,tg name a few-are not explicitly religiousin characteror focus,some emergingrt.
that the extent of faith-based Latino activism has been search,however,suggests Moreover,even with prominent secularSroupsleading the way, underestimated.2T the very existenceof those groups points to the real possibilities for mobilization among Latinos-mobilization that religious institutions could foster.The example of C6sarCh6vez,the legendary farmworkers organizer,is instructive. Spurred by a deep liberationist understanding of his own Roman Catholicism, ChSvezhelped unionize thousands of Hispanic farmworkers in California from the 1950suntil His work with farmworkers caught the eye of many Catholic his death in 1993.28 who provided vocal support; he even ended one priestsand other religious leaders, with a specialCatholic massattendedby religious elites of his severalhunger strikes from acrosstraditions.2e stand in the way of religion-basedmobilizasignificant challenges Nevertheless, tion of Latinos asa group.For example,the rapid assimilation of many second-and the likelihood that the Latino community third-generation Latinos may decrease After all, if most Latinos as a whole will emergeas a distinctive political group.3o becomedeeplyacculturatedinto mainstreamAmerican society,there may be nothing particularly"Latino'about their political attitudesor behaviorsafter a few more generations.To the extent that religion plays a role in politics, then, Latinos in the future may appearlike anyone elsewithin the religious traditions into which they assimilate. Moreover, the very description of a group of Americans as "Latino" or "Hispanic" beliesthe many waysnonwhite Hispanicsperceivetheir own ethnic identity' Many prefer to think of themselvesas Cuban American, Mexican American, or Puerto Rican (for example) rather than Latino, and these categoriesmatter both for religion and politics. Cuban Americans in South Florida have a very different political focus from, say,Mexican Americans in California or Puerto Ricans in New York City.3t The nuances and syncretism of religious practices acrossthese countries of origin reinforce differencesamong Latino Americans, making broadbasedpolitical mobilization lesslikely than if a homogeneous group could be defined clearly.32 In any event,there is no doubt that Latinos are becoming more visible players in American politics. As an important part of Barack Obama'swinning coalition, As their voting bloc in the 2008 presidential election.33 they were a much-discussed voting turnout ratesand other forms of political participation increase-and with every election the trend contintles in that direction-Hispanic Americans will grow cver more important politically.lt remititrsto be seenwhether religion will play a signilicant role in clefiningthe uature nnd scopcof Latino political mobilization,
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but the rich history of Catholicism and other faiths within the Latino community givesreligion strong potential as a political resource.
the black National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc.) bring together many individual congregationsunder one umbrella, but unlike hierarchical denominations such as the EpiscopalChurch, they usually do not supply much direction from the top. Christianity in the black communiry asin the white community, has experienced
AFRICAN AMERICAN RELIGIONAND POLITICS: IOWARD A BROADERVIEW In his fascinatingand sometimeseccentric American Religion,HaroldBloom argues convincingly that to understand African American expressionsof Christianity in the United States,one must appreciateboth their evangelicalside and their distinctlyAfrican American side.3aWhereas Roman Catholicism has had a profound influence on Latino Americans,black Christianity is rooted in American evangelicalism. Like the influence of colonization and assimilation in Hispanic history, black evangelicalismalso has been shapedprofoundly by the historical experience of racein the United States. It is important to remember that African American re. ligion is overwhelmingly Protestant-and evangelical-in character. African American Christians are keenly focused on scripture, and many affirm the Bible as literally true. In fact, nearly two-thirds of African Americans (62 percent) claim that it is true in all aspectsor nearly so.Moreover, 80 percent of all African Americans report praylng daily, compared to the national averageof 58 percent.35 Another indication of the evangelicalismof African American Christianity involves worship style.African American servicesemphasizepreaching and music and often considerableexpressiveness, as is also the casein white and interracial Pentecostal worship services. There is little of the liturgy or firm traditionalism that characterizesmost Roman Catholic and many mainline Protestant worship ser. vices.This is not to saythat the tlpical African American worship service is indis. tinguishable from a white evangelicalservice.In African American churches,thef is significantly more interaction between the congregation and the pastor during worship. Music plays a central role; there is a clear connection betweenthe call and response musical motif and the typical flow of an African American service. African American church music is significant both within and outside of the religious con. text. In worship, musical expressionis a central element of emotional religious ex' perience.In the broader culture,African American spirituals gaverise to a myriad of other musical forms, from gospelto blues to jazz and rock and roll. A third similarity between white and black evangelicalisminvolves church or. ganization. Both African American and white evangelicaldenominations favor t Iooseorganizational structurethat tendsto uphold the autonomyof the individuel (asin the white Southcrn llnptist Conventionand congregation. Suchconventions
numerous and sometimescontentiousconflicts that have produced permanent schisms,sometimesover doctrine and sometimesover personalities.ManyAfrican American Baptists,who comprise more than a third of the black population, are affiliated with severaldifferent denominations,including the National Baptist ConNational Baptist Convention Incorporated.36 vention, USA, Inc., and the Progressive which hasbeen The secondlargestblack Protestantsub-tradition is Pentecostalism, growing rapidly in the African American community. It is organized in several major denominations,especiallythe Church of God in Christ (COGIC)-which is one of the fastest-growingdenominations in the United States-and numerous inAnother historically prominent sub-tradition is the black dependent churches.3T Methodist tradition, exemplified by the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church (which is the oldest African American denomination), the African Methodist EpiscopalZion (AMEZ) Church, and the Christian Methodist Episcopal (CME) Church. In evangelicalchurches,whether they have white, black, or multiracial congregations,the laity normally hire their pastor directly without involvement by the denomination. In most black churches the pastor (who is almost always a man by tradition) is a powerful and generallydominant frgure.The pastor is almost always the center of his church, and he makesthe important decisionsabout community and political activities.His church often risesand falls with him. Recruiting a good pastor is therefore essentialfor every African American church.38 A recent study of African American clergy found that many have not completed college or advancedtheological training, although some black pastors are highly educated.For financial reasons,a significant number of African American clergy find employment outside of their congregations.There are plenty of exceptions, but often black pastors must confront economic struggles in their personal and family lives as well as in their churches,especiallywhen they serve small or rural congregations.The situation often is complicated by a wide range of challenging circumstancesfacing black Americans.African American clergy who serve in urban areasmust contend with issuesof drug abuse,violence, and abject poverty on a regular basis.Sometimesblack pastorshave to take personal action just to residents arrcl of their church neighborhoods keepmembersof their congregations 'l'his powe'rlirl llpon Rock:The Miracle of a Black alive.ru SamuelG. Freeclman'.s
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At the same " Church describessome of these challengesin unmistakable terms.a0 time, a large number of black churchesservethe ever-expandingAfrican American middle and upper classes. Attracting young people is a universal challengefacedby all American religious groups.Black clergy routinely worry that they have a particularly hard time attract: havea large ing young black men to church.Many African American congregations majority of female members,ar and there is a feeling in someAfrican American circlesthat church,if not religion, is for women, exceptfor the key position of minister, Moreover, some religious alternativesseemto appealmore to men than to women in the African American community. Among thesealternativesis Islam; a vast ma: jority of African American Muslims are men.a2 from It is crucial to remember that African American Christianity is inseparable To know the history and shared experiencesof black people in the United States. the history of African American Christianity is to understand its traditions of both resistanceand accommodation; to appreciateits communal side and its individu. Reli alism; and to recognize its prophetic dimension and its priestly focus.a3 has servedasa crucial refugefor African Americans for severalhundred years. ing slavery and beyond, the church was the one place where African Ameri usually could be safeand free.The church remains today as the central insti of the black community and is integral to the identities of many African Ameri citizens.aswell as a crucial resourcein their civic activism.aa But the distinctly African American side of Christianity has significance transcendsthe black community. African American spirituals, such as "Were There?" or "Swing Low, SweetChariotl'are now widely sung by Christians of This fact is both ironic and inspiring because racial and ethnic backgrounds.as spiritualsemergedfrom the dim daysof slavery. African slaves, stripped of invented the spirituals to bring themselves hope during long, difficult, and containsthe lyric "BeforeI'll bc daysof forced labor.One spiritual,for example, slave,I'll be buried in my grave,and go home to my Father and be freel' is the black spiritual,with its emphasison Christi ended,but among its legacies and the theme of liberation. The black spiritual is but one of the many contributions made by African Americans to the broader culture of the States. From the beginning African American Christianity has emphasizedan i In this sense of God as a consoler as well as a liberator of the oppressed. can be a vehicleof hope for the weary and the downtrodden,a function that tinuesto be important for African Americanstoday as it wirsin the daysof
To this day many religious African Americans find some comfort in the assurance of heavenly peaceand salvation through a fervent and celebratory belief in a benevolent God. At the sametime, religion also has servedas a powerful justification and mobilizing force for civil rights activism among African Americans.a6 There is also a long-standing effort within some theological circles to maintain a strong black liberation ideology.IamesCone and Cornel West havebeen the leading black liberation theologians.Cone played a crucial role in the late 1960sas elements of the civil rights movement turned toward more radical expressionsof discontent. His seminalwork,BlackTheology andBlackPower,justified the blackpower movement in religiousterms.aT West,a public intellectualand religion professorat Princeton University, has written extensivelyon the subjugation of African Americans, most notably in his now-classicbook, RaceMatters.a8
H I S T O R YA N D B L A C K P O L I T I C A L A T T I T U D E S What is most striking about religion and politics in the African American community is the closeconnection betweenthe two. Politics is centrally important in black Christianity, and African American churchesoften are openly involved in politics in a variety of ways.There is simply no sharp division betweenreligion and politics in the black community today; in a sense,AfricanAmericans embracethe Old Testament model in which the paths of religion and politics often crossed. Before the civil rights revolution in the South,however,involvement in politics could be dangerous and sometimes deadly for African Americans. To be sure, African American churcheslong haveheld that the Gospelsemphasize socialjustice and equity. Even before the civil rights movement began in the 1950s,plenty of African American citizens were fighting for change,albeit behind the scenes.By and large, however, before the 1950smost African Americans, especially in the South, justifiably saw the public arena as a dangerous place that ought to be avoided.ae Thus, politics was relevant in the early years of black Christianity only in a theologicalsense; the image of |esusChrist as an avengingliberator of the clowntrodden spoke poignantly to the early African American experience. During the more than two centuries of slavery in North America, many black people converted to Christianity, although American Christianity remained a distinctly white religion. Few allowances were made for black adaptationsof white Ohristianity,but distinctly African-inspireclversionsof Christianity developed rronetheless. The first black llaptist c<tngrergrrtions were organizedin the South at thc enclof the eighteenthcentury,but rttunyslrrves were not allowedto attend any
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servicesat these or other churches.Therefore clandestineworship groups on plantations, coming to be known collectively as "the invisible institutionl's0 night, slaves taught themselves to read the Bible,which provided both spiritual intellectual refuge from the drudgery and pain of the forced labor they during the day. The early African American Methodist churcheswere organized not by but by free people lMng in the North who saw white churchesas complicit in perpetuation of the institution of slavery. Segregation was enforced in churcheseven in the North. Northern black Christians felt that by creating own, separatechurches,they would be able to asserttheir collective power forcefully. The beginnings oforganized, separateblack Protestantexpression to 1787,when severalAfrican Americans withdrew from St. George's Episcopal Church in Philadelphia. They met and prayed together informally yearswith other African Americans. Finally in 1794 the white Methodist Bis FrancisAsbury dedicatedBethel Church of Philadelphia, the first African Episcopalchurch, which survives to this day and is known as Mother Bethel.5l African American religion entereda new era after the Civil War. Black Ch anity becamemore formally organized,and it no longer operated under any of white tutelage.This period saw major expansionof black Baptist and denominations.Later in this era,the African American Pentecostal movement born in California. African American Pentecostalleaderstoday are proud of fact that their religious movement does not trace its roots explicitly to Eu Protestantism.Thus black religion thrived and diversified in the wake of pation, but after ReconstructionAfrican Americans shied awayfrom open engagement. The vast majority of African Americans lived in the South in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,and the political freedom of tion proved fleeting. During World War I, African Americans began moving north in searchof and a better life outside ofthe segregated South. This processaccelerated WorldWar II and in the yearsafterward,when the mechanization of southern culture spurred even more northward migration. Eventually about half of AfricanAmericans settledoutside the South.Large northern cities soon sizableAfrican American communities, which bred a comfort level that many African Americans to expresstheir opinions freely and without fear both in and outside of church. These changesdid not, however, give risc much political mobilization in the African American religious community. Old picions remained,and evangelical theology continued tqlteachwhat previous
African Amerexperiencehad underlined: that politics was corrupt and dangerous. ican churches continued to shun official political involvement and urged their members to follow suit.52 Despite this legacy,everlthing began to changein the 1950sand the 1960s. and African American churchesshifted dramatically toward political engagement, this shift changed history. The civil rights movement that began in the 1950swas led in its earliest,and arguably most productive, yearsby black Baptist pastorsand Rev.Martin Luther King Ir. was certainly the most visible pastor in congregations. the movement's leadership, but he worked in coalition with other prominent African American clergy, such as Rev. Ralph Abernathy and Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth, through the Southern Christian LeadershipConference. For thesepastors,the time had come to claim civil rights for all African Americans.They had few doubts that God supported this prophetic decision,and by the 1960s African American churches-particularly Baptist churches-throughout the South were transformed into organizational centersfor the civil rights movement. Although African American clergy did not constitute the only force arrayedon behalf of the civil rights revolution, without the crucial support of black churches,it It was in church that African Americans heard the would never have happened.s3 rnessage that called them into the politics of protest and found the moral inspiration to risk a great deal individually for the collectivebenefit of all. It was also in church that they planned strategyand developedthe skills theywould need to take up the causeof civil rights. The movement for civil rights, however, did not win quick support from all African American churches. Such involvement-and confrontation-with the world did not sit well with the dominant black evangelical theology, nor did it squarewith the painful-and sometimesfatal-experiences of African Americans politically. Thus a strong and active who previously had dared to assertthemselves rcsistance to the civil rights movement emergedfrom within organizedblack Christianity. Perhapsthe most visible opponent was Rev.foseph H. Jackson,longtime hcad of the National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc., and a major figure in the Afiican American Christian communig. In his retrospectiveaccount,he portrays lrimself and others like him asdeeply committed to traditional"Christian activism" on behalf of African Americans. But he-and many other voices of African American religion-opposed Dr. King'sparticular form of religiouspolitics.sa most obvious victories actually happened One of the civil rights movement'.s long-standingattitudes wi t hin A frican A merican religiorr.'l'lremovementchanged produced the politicalchurchthat politicalinvolventeut,'l'lti,l rerrehuttge rcgrrrcling
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not universal-in the African American community To be sure,a certain ambivalence remains.African Americans acceptand often come political involvement by their churchesand especiallyby their pastors. but by no meansall,African American pastorsare deeplyinvolved in politics. preach regularly about political issues. Some invite candidatesfor public office addresstheir congregations from the pulpit. Somerun local political and lead marches.Somespeakout frequently about politics in the local media. some even wear two hats by serving simultaneouslyas clergy and as electedor pointed public oficials.5s At the sametime,like all laity, members of African American congregations pect that political activity by their clergy will not come at the expenseof vi sick members,preaching effectively,or being availableto counsel those with sonal crises.56 And there are someAfrican American pastorsand traditions that skepticalof political activism.This is particularly the caseamong the many American Pentecostals.5T The civil rights movement put black churches squarely on the liberal side American politics.s8In the process,civil rights liberalism strengthened liberalism among African Americans. At that time, both forms of liberalism firmly and increasingly becoming associatedwith allegiance to the Party.Indeed,by the end of the 1960s, the Democratic presidential nominee count on receMng about 85 percent of the vote of the expandingAfrican Am electorate.The political attitudes of African Americans today are closelylinked perceptions of their collective treatment in American society and the needto work toward equality and economic opportunity. This hasled many Americans to embracea strongly favorableview of government and what it do for them. Such attitudes reinforce support for the Democratic party, which more sympatheticto government action than is the GOP.se
is common-though
involvements since, Rev.fessejackson remains one symbol of African American clerical activism. Another is Rev.Al Sharpton, who has been a powerful voice in NewYork City electoral politics and who mounted a campaign for the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination. Today black clergy are engagedat all levels of politics, addressinglocal issues, lobbying government,and serving as electedofficials themselves.60 By no meanshaveall African Americans rallied around highly visible clergy such asfackson.And |acksonin particular has a host of critics in the African American community-especially in Chicago-who complain that he alwaysseeks the limelight but rarely carriesa project through to completion.Yetfew critics object to him on the basis of his religious focus and there remains affection and support for |ackson among many African Americans in the United States.6r ]acksons presidential campaigns,especiallyhis 1988 run, have been studied at length, and scholars have confirmed that |ackson won massive support from African American Christians.Although racial pride was the single most important factor in rallying support to Jackson, the religious dimension also was significant. This was particularly true among African American women, who are statistically more likely than men to be religious.Women were absolutelycentral to both fackfrom his campaignorganization to the voting booth. |ackson'ssupson campaigns, port network also included such established African American religious figures as Ilev.T. J.Jemison,the former leader of the National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc. Much of fackson's campaign rhetoric was distinctly Christian in its overtones and orientation. He emphasizedempathy for the downtrodden and determination to build community despitethe terrible wounds causedby poverty,drugs,and crime.62 The |ackson campaigns also illustrated another dimension of black religious politics that was reflectedonce again in the historic 2008 election of Barack Obama rs the first African American president: the tremendous importance of local churches.fackson'scampaigns demonstrated the potential of African American churchesaselectoralprecincts where rallies could be held, publicity produced, and organizations formed to ensure significant support from the black community.63 l,ike )ackson's campaign,Obama's team relied heavily on the get-out-the-voteefforts and in unprecedented o[ local black churches, which supportedhim enthusiastically rrumbers.6a As a longtime member of an African American church in Chicago and irs a former faith-based neighborhood organizer, Obama clearly understood the r:rurcial political importance of mobilizing through churches. African American pastorsand clrurchesare convincedthat political activity is rnelns of irnprovingthe African American lot on Earth. ir lcgitimateand necessary Nincty percentof Atricnn Atneriesnclcrgyrpprovcof politicalaction,according
C O N N E C T I O N SB E T W E E N R E L I G I O N A N D P O L I T I C S As we have already suggested, the most visible connectionsbetween black rel and American politics havecome through the actions of various African clergy.Especiallysince the 1960s, many black pastorshavebeen deeply involvcd politics. Rev.Martin Luther King |r. becamethe most famousmodel of"black aspolitical actMst" during his leadershipin the civil rights movement in the I and 1960s. Kingt activism attracteda host of other African American pastorl politics.After his historic presidential candic{acies in 1984and | 988 and nu
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to one study.65 African American Christianity in the United Statestoday is consciously political and increasingly comfortable with that fact. In this way it unlike most of the rest of religion in the United States.Although organized religion in generalhas becomemore openly political today than it was thirty ago,manypeople havenot made peacewith this development.Politics has only comfortable home in American religion, and that is in African American In many cases,there is a tight congruence between what black leaders churchespropose politically and what the African American community will port. This is definitely the casewith regard to the key issueof improving opportunities forAfricanAmerican citizens.Yet there areother issuesaround many religious African Americans hold views that diverge somewhat from of their more secular counterparts. Many African American Christians conservativeattitudes on such issuesas abortion and women'sroles in the At the sametime, African Americans as a group are more sympatheticto gay and economic parity for women than arewhite evangelicals.66 The picture is and complicated,but noneconomic issueshavenot affectedAfrican American itics greatly becauseeconomic justice and civil rights have remained the poli priorities of most black religious leaders.6T Whether thesepriorities might or expand in the Obama era remains to be seen.68 Most major African American interest groups,such asthe National for the Advancement of Colored People(NAACP) and the Urban League,are ular organizations.The lack of a religious orientation on the part ofthese is an artifact of their creation in the early twentieth century. Groups such as NAACP often were intended to be an alternativeto black churches,which sometimesperceivedasbeing overly concernedwith the next world-and thus sufficiently devoted to assistingAfrican Americans in this world. Yet today thert regular contact between African American pastors and churches and branchel the NAACP and the Urban League.This is inevitable becausethese arejust as intertwined with the black middle classas are the largeAfrican denominations.
Although a number of Africans were followers of Islam before they were enslavedin America, only traces of that heritage survived. Modest interest in Islam existedamong some nineteenth-centuryAfrican Americans; certain black intellectuals saw it as an authentic African legacythat had been erasedby the slavemaster. By the early part of the twentieth century, however,unorthodox, "proto-Islamic" movements emerged among growing African American populations in some Thesewere tiny, isolatedgroupswith teachingsthat divergedconnorthern cities.7o siderablyfrom mainstream Islam. Most notableamong thesegroupswas Elijah Mohammed'sNation of Islam.Centeredin Detroit,the Nation of Islam initiallywas a religion of the urban dispossessed, and it remained small and largely unrecognizeduntil its most gifted disciple,MalMalcolm becamea cultural In the 1990s, colm X,burst onto the scenein the 1960s. "K'hats after the 1992 and sweatshirts, icon, with the ubiquitous merchandising of releaseof filmmaker Spike Lee'smovie about his life, Malcolm X. Even those with only a vague understanding of Malcolm's legacyhave come to admire his reputation
BOX 10.I
ELIJAH MOHAMMED
Born Robert Poole,Elijah Mohammed claimed to have received a fantastic theological revelation from his predecessoras head of the Nation of Islam, a mysterious Detroit silk merchant named Mr. Farad.At the heart of his revelation was the idea that whites were a race of devils and an aberration. Blacks, on the other hand, were descendantsof an ancient master race whose wizards had ruled for millions of yearsover an empire that evenincluded Mars.Whites were genetically created by a malcontented mad scientist. They gained ancestry through "Tricknology" and enslaved the remnant of the "Original People,"the "Tribe of Shabazz." Elijah Mohammed was quite critical of African American Christians, particularly clergy. He called black Christian clergy fools for encouraging and spreading the religion of slave masters. During the 1960s,Mohammed made inroads among African Americans, and the Nation of Islam grew. However, a rift between Mohammed and Malcolm X halted the movement'sgrowth. After his death in 1975' Elijah Mohammedt son, Warith Deen Mohammed, became the most prominent African American leader in mainstream Islam. The Nation of Islam ultimately was taken over by the controversialLouis Farrakhan,who continues to preach of racial separation. Mohammed'smessage of the An lnterpretation md lllut'kRadicalism: ltlrrr'tlleligilm S.Wilmore, Source: Gayraud 1998). NY:Orbis, ctl.(Mrrrykrroll, I'erryrle,.lrtl oJ'AJio'Amtrk'un Religious Mstory
ISLAM IN THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY Today a modest but growing number of African Americans are Muslims, many whom are rather recent converts.6e The story of the Muslim dimension of African American experienceillustrates clearly the fluid nature of American giouscultureand the unpredictable politicalconsequences that arisefrom rel (see movements Box 10.1).
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for uncompromising militancy in the face of white American racism. A popular speaker, he offered an early challengeto Dr. King's nonviolent resistance campaign, which helped to inspire the black power movement. In many respectsKing and Malcolm representedoppositepoles of the African American experience. King wai born to middle-class respectability; his highly educated father was a promi pastor.On the other hand, Malcolm was a streethustler and former convict Ieader of outcast black Muslims. Whereas King preached nonviolent action, colm threatened violence, although he was moving away from this stance at time of his death.Tr The Nation of Islam appealedto African Americans in the 1950sand 1960s two distinct reasons. First, its unique spin on mainstream Islam preachedan att tive message to alienatedurban blacks-particularly men and incarcerated that placedtheir plight on the shouldersof a raceof "white deviis" destinedby to be eradicated. The Nation of Islam also emphasizededucation,sexualdisc hard worh cleanliness, conservativedress,economic self-sufficiency, and rei of the white man'swelfare.This aspectof the faith was especiallyappealingto ers such as Malcolm X, who expressed deep concern over the growing number young African Americans who lived the kind of self-destructive street life which Islam had freed him. Second,Islam'spatriarchal aspectappealedto black men emasculatedby society;as a result,the membership of the Nation of Islam remained heavily In contrast to the matriarchal culture that characterizes the broader African ican community, the Nation of Islam taught that the man wasthe head of the and the woman was to be his helpmate and homemaker.Black Muslims attained certain stature in many cities-even among some non-Muslims-for being disciplined, and militantly separatist. By 1960,the Nation of Islam still had a small membership but was making a rious effort to createa separate society of schools, businesses, and radio (the well asa well-armed militia Fruit of Islam) that operatedin a number of ci The political significanceof the movement was magnified by Malcolmt high of visibility. He combined Elijah Mohammed's interpretation of Muslim with a call for black consciousness, assertion, and pride. Malcolm told angry Afr Americans that they had every right to use whatever it took to defend the againstviolence by whites, and he challengedthe very premisesof Dr. King's violent push for integration and civil rights. Like black Christian liberation gians, Malcolm proposed separation from whites instead of integration, "We,the black man of the world, createdthe white man and we will declared:
kill himl'This rhetoric, of course,was explosivein the atmosphereof the mid1960s.73 The most remarkable part of Malcolm's story,however,came toward the end of his life. Disciplined and puritanical in his behavior,Malcolm X was shockedto learn that Elijah Mohammed was living a lavish and lascivious life. A rift quickly developed between them, as did political divisions.When Malcolm remarked that fohn marked "the chickens coming home to roosti'MoF. Kennedy's assassination hammed ostracized him. Malcolm had become too visible, too controversial,and too much of a threat to Mohammed's leadership. was to embark on his hajj, the traditional Muslim One of Malcolm's responses pilgrimage to Mecca, in 1964.The hajj experiencetransformed Malcolm's understanding of Islam and led him to reject the divergent teachings of the Nation of Islam.Upon returning to America he renounced the "white devil" theology and announced that he had taken a new name,El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz, an indication of his embrace of mainstream Islam.Ta Cut off from the Nation of Islam, he founded his own Sunni mosque and created the Organization of Afro-American Unity. His broadenedvision of Islam was still incomplete when he was gunned down by Nain 1965. tion oflslam assassins Malcolm's legacy is a complex one. To the end he remained pessimistic about the possibility of eradicating white racism in America. He was suspiciousof white liberals who wanted to "help" the cause,and he continued to preach a kind of separatist doctrine that emphasizedAfrican American self-sufficiency.Thus he syrnbolized black pride and assertion for those for whom integration proved lessthan facedby the urban underclass salutary.Many decadesafter his death,the challenges continue to reflect the glaring failure of integration among a segmentof the African A mericanpopulation.T5 and somewhat ironic, legacythat is lesswell The Nation of Islam has a separate, appreciated. When Elijah Mohammed died in 1975,his son Wallace (who took the rrirmeWarith Deen Mohammed) assumedthe leadership of the Nation of Islam. t)uietly but assiduouslyhe beganto lead the movement toward a merger with mainstream Islam, which was the very direction Malcolm X had envisioned.Like Malcolm, Warith Deen Mohammed rejected the racist teachingsof his father. He tlismantled some existing black Muslim institutions and integrated them into nrosques, which were growing thanks to the immigration of Muslims from Asia irnclAfrica.Today,the vast majority of African American Muslims worship alongaround in Sunni (and a few Shi'a)mosques sidc Muslims of all ethnic lrackgntuncls llre Urritecl States.76
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This movement into mainstream Islam probably facilitated the conversion of more African Americans to Islam by providing them with the grounding of a prominent world religion as an alternativeto the "white man's"Christianity.African Americans now make up approximately20 percent of the nation'sMuslim population. However,neither the precisesizeof the Muslim population nor the proportion of African Americans within it is known with great accuracy, in part because of the measurementproblems discussedin Chapter 3.77 A tiny minority of African Americans remains loyal to the Nation of Islam and Elijah Mohammed'sseparatist vision.78 The Nation of Islam today is led by the fiery Louis Farrakhan,who continues to preach black superiority and separation.Farrakhan has achievedan influence well beyond his core religious following (which numbers no more than 10,000)because he articulatesthe same rage as did the young Malcolm X. Critics are uneasy, however,about what they seeas Farrakhan'$ anti-Semitism. Farrakhan gained prominence in 1984when his associationwith |essefackson (to whom he provided bodyguards)becamean issuein the presidential campaign.At that time Farrakhan referred to |ews as members of a'gutter religionl'and /ackson was chastisedfor not renouncing such talk and severinghis ties with Farrakhan.The issuedogged|ackson's presidentialquest in both 1984and 1ggg.7e Farrakhanspolitics representsa mixture of militant racial separatism,self-reliance, and traditional moral values.On abortion, gay rights, and welfare his message ic pointedly conservative. His actualpolitical impact, however,is difficult to measure, His organization has gotten nowhere when it has fielded candidatesfor local and national offices,but it has attractedbroad support for its antidrug activities.so Farrakhan also organized the widely publicized Million Man March in 1995.There lg no doubt that Farrakhan has some followers, particularly in urban areas,but hii influence is relatively circumscribed.
community
itself. The religious pluralism we observe among Hispanic Americans
reflects this history. It remains to be seen whether religion can provide some unity among the many voices that speak to Latino perspectives on American public life.
FURTHER READING Chappell, David. A Stoneof Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Iim Crow. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,2004.An account of the crucial role of churches and pastors in civil rights actMsm in the segregationist South. A Black Theologyof Liberation. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970.The classic Cone, James. text on black liberation theology. Espinosa,Gaston,Virgilio Elizondo, and fesseMiranda,eds.Latino Religionsand Civic NewYork: Oxford University Press,2005.A challengeto Activism in the tlnited Sfafes. conventional wisdom that religion has had little influence on Latino civic activism. Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Leadership Garrow Davidl. Bearing the Cross: New York: William Morrow, 1986.The story of King's political and Conference. religious activism. Harris, FredrickC. SomethingWithin: Religion in African-American Political Activism. NewYork Oxford University Press,1999.An excellent examination of the role of religion in African American political mobilization. Hertzke, AIIen D. Echoesof Discontent:lesseJackson,Pat Robertson,and the Resurgence 1993.Discussionof the 1988 Jesse DC: CQ Press, of Populism.Washington, Jackson campaign. Lincoln, C. Eric, and Lawrence H. Mamiya . The Black Church in the African American Experience.Durham, NC: Duke University Press,1990.Superb work on African American religion. Malcolm X, with Alex HaIey. The Autobiography of Malcolm X. New York: Grove Press, 1965.Malcolm X's account of his life. ldentity: EuangelicalFaith, SeIf,and Society. SanchezWalsh, Arlene M. Latino Pentecostal
CONCLUSION The growing Muslim presencein the United Stateslikelywill make an increasingly important mark on American culture and politics, following in the long-established tradition of African American Christianity. The connectionsbetween religion and politics among Latinos,in contrast,are not as clear.In many respects, HispanlC American religious traditions are still searchingfor their political voice.That search is shaped profoundlyby the historicalnarratives of colonization, immigration,and assimilation, as well as by the existence of diversesubcullureswithin the Latino
New York: Columbia University Press,2003.A fascinating study of diverse expressionsof Latino Pentecostalism. Suro, Roberto, et al. "Changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of American Religioni'Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center/Pew Forum,2007. Quality data on the dynamic role of religion in the [,atino experience. and Democratic Organizing in America. Wood, Richard L. Faith in Action: lkligbn, I7ace, 2(X)2. ljx:rminesthe intersection of race, Olricago:University of Chicago Itress, enpee illly itt urltartrtrcas. politicalorgartizing, rcligiorr, rtncl
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17. Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundalion,2002 National Surtey of Latinos: NOTES 1. In this chapter we use the terms "Latino" and "Hispanic" interchangeably,though the latter term is often used to denote a broader category of people with origins in Spain aN well as Latin America and the Caribbean. 2. Roberto Suro et al.,"changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of American Religion' (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center/Pew Forum, 2007), 5. 3.rbid.,16. 4. Ibid., 18;William V. D'Antonio,"Latino Catholics: How Different?" National Cathollc Rep orter, October 29, 1999. Summary of Findings,http:lllatinostudies.nd.edu/cslr/research/pubs/HispChurchesEnglish WEB.pdi 2002, 16. 18. Suro,"Changing Faithsi' 9. 19.Ibid..70. 20. Espinosaet al.,"Hispanic Churches inAmerican Public Life: Summaryof Findingsi' 2t. 21. For data on these issues,seeSuro,"Changing Faithsi'73-75. For a history oflatino religion from a liberationist perspective, seeMoises Sandoval,On the Moye: A History of the Hispanic Church in the United States(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books' 1990). 22. Espinosa et al.,"Hispanic Churches in American Public Lifel'21. 23. Louis DeSipio and Rudolfo O. de la Garza, eds. ,\wash in the Mainstream: Latino Politicsin the 1996Election (Boulder: Westview Press,1999). 24. Suro,"Changing Faithsl' 79. 25.Ibid. 26. Gaston Espinosa,"Obama Threaded the Moral Needle of Latino Evangelicals in ' 081'Religion Dispatches,ltne 28, 2009. 27. Gaston Espinosa,Virgilio Elizondo, and jesse Miranda, eds.,Latino Religions and Civic Activism in the United Sfafes(NewYork Oxford University Press,2005);Wilson' The Politicsof Latino Faith. religiosity, seeFrederick fohn Dalton, The Moral Vision 28. For a discussion of Chdvez's of Cesar Chavez (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2003); and Luis D. Leon, "Cesar Chavez and Civic Activism in the United and Mexican American Civil Religionl'in laf ino Religions eds.Gaston Espinosa,Virgilio Elizondo, and |esseMiranda (NewYork Oxford UniSfates, versity Press,2005). and the Farmworkers'Struggle r Chavez,the Catholic Bishops, Z9.Marco G. Prouty, Cesa for Social lustice (Tucson: University of Arizona Press,2008). 30. Louis DeSipio, Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia, 1996). Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspec31. Rudolfo O. de la Garza,Latino Voices: tives on American Politics (Boulder: Westview Press,1993). 32. For a broad discussion of Latino politics, seeJohn A. Garcia,Latino Politicsin America: Community, Culture, and Interests(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield' 2003). 33. |ulia Preston, "In Big Shift, Latino Vote Was Heavily for Obama," The New York November 7, 2008,A24; l,arry l{ohter,"McCain Is FalteringAmong Hispanic VotTirnes, A23. crsl' The New York Tiizcs,Octolter 23, 2()01t,
5. George E. schultze, strangers in a Foreign Land: Theorganizingof catholicLatinot

in the United Sfafes (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006); Catherine Wilson, The politics
Latino Faith:Religion, Identity,and urban community (NewYork Newyork universitf Press,2008). 6.Schultze, S/rangers in a Foreign Land;UnitedStates Conference ofCatholic Bishopep committee on HispanicAffairs,Hispanic Ministry at the Turn of theMillennium(wash. ington, DC: USCCB, 1999). T.lanetKornblum,"MoreHispanicCatholics LosingTheir Religionl'USAToday,De. cember12,2002,A1; LisaMakson,"Latinos call u.s. culture Hostile climate for Faith," NationalCatholic Register, March9 -L5, 2003, I, 12. 8.feff Guntzel,"Between TWoCulturesj'National Catholic Reporter,lanuary 30,2A04, 9."Separated Brothersj'TheEconomist,]uly "ChangingFaithsi'3918,2009,31; Suro, 42;GastonEspinosa, virgilio Elizondo, and fesse Miranda,"Hispanicchurchesin Amer. icanPublicLife:summaryof Findingsl'Interim (lanwry 2002) Reports2 l chris L. fenkinc, "IslamLuring More Latinosj'TheWashington Post, |anuary7,2001,C1. 10.Suro,"Changing Faiths," 27. I 1.See alsoSchultze, Strangers in a Foreign Land. 12.Arlene M. Sanchez walsh, Latino Pentecostal Identity:Evangelical Faith, setf, and (NewYork ColumbiaUniversityPress, Sociefy 2003). 13.PewForumon Religion & PublicLife,tJ.S. Religious Landscape Study, http:i/religionl (2008); .pewforum.org/portraits Schultze, Strangers in a Foreign Land. 14.committee on HispanicAffairs,Hispanic Ministry at the Turn of theMillennium, 15.United States Conference of CatholicBishops,"Collection for the Churchin Latin Arnerica:20}7 AnnualReport"(Washington, DC: USCCB,2008);"separated Brothers," 31, 16.U.SCensus "2005-07AmericanCommunitySurvey," Bureau, http://factfindcr (2007). .census.gov/
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34.HaroldBloom,The (NewYork Simon& Schustea American Religion 1992), chap.5. 35.PewForum, U.S. Religious Landscape Study. 36.For more informationaboutsizeof the specific denominations listedhere, seePery Forum, U.S. Religious Landscape Study,12. 37. SeeArthur Pais, Black Pentecostalism: SouthernReligion in an [lrban World (Amherst, MA: Universityof Massachusetts Press, 1982). 38.The classic work is Charles Hamilton,TheBlackPreacher in America(NewYorkl Morrow,1972). 39.LauraR. Olson,Filledwith Spiritand Power: Protestant (Albanyl Clergyin Politics State Universityof NewYork Press, 2000). 40.Samuel G. Freedman, UponThis Rock: TheMiracleof a BlackChurch(New HarperCollins,1993). 41.PewForum,U.S. Religious Landscape Study. 42. On this discussion and the entire subjectof this chapter, seethe wonderfullyin.
formative C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence Mamiya, The Black Church in the African A
51. Lincoln and Mamiya, The Black Church,chap.3. 52. Savage,Your Spirits Walk Beside Us. 53. See Chapp ell,A Stone of Hope; David |. Garrow Bearing the Cross:Martin Luther King, Ir. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: Morrow, 1986); Martin Luther King lr.,Why We Can't Wall (NewYork Mentor, 1964); Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil RightsMovement (NewYork: Free Press,1984);and Hart M.Nelsen and Anne Kusener Nelsen,The Black Church in the Sixties(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,1975). 54. foseph H. |ackson,A Story of Christian Activism: The Hktory of the National Baptist Convention IISA,Inc. (Nashville, TN: Townsend, 1980). 55. Fredrick C. Harris, Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Ac' fivlsz (NewYork Oxford University Press,1999); R. Drew Smith and Fredrick C. Harris, eds., Black Churchesand Local Politics:Clergy Influence, Organizational Partnerships,and Civic Empowerment (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); Richard L.Wood'Faith in Action: Religion, Race,and Demouatic Organizing in America (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress,2002). 56. james H. Hatris,Black Ministers and Laity in the Urban Church (Lanham' MD: University Pressof America, 1987); Smith and Flarris, Black Churchesand Local Politics. 5T.Allison Calhoun-Brown,"The Politics of African American Churches: The Psychological Impact ofOrganizational Resourcesl'Journal of Politics58 (1996),935-953. 58. Harris, Soz ething Within; Smith and Harris, Black Churchesand Local Politics. 59. Hanes Walton and Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the African American Freedom,5thed. (NewYork Longman,2007), chap. 10. Questfor (Jniversal 60. Smith and Harris, Black Churchesand Local Politics. 61. For example, see Adolph L. Reed lt., The lesselackson Phenomenon (New Haven' (lT: YaleUniversity Press,1986);for a critical view of Jacksonin conflict with other African American activists in Chicago, seeGaryRivlin,Fire on thePrairie: Chicago\ HaroldWashof Race(NewYork: Henry Holt, 1992),80-95 and 163-L67. ington and the Politics 62. Allen D. Hertzke, Echoesof Discontent: fesselackson, Pat Robertson,and the Resur' ganceof Popullsz (Washington,DC: CQ Press, 1993), chaps.3,4,and6; CharlesP.Henry' ()ulture and African-American Politics (Bloornington, IN: Indiana University Press,1990). 63. Hertzke, Echoesof Discontent. 64. Corwin Smidt et al.,The Disappearing God Gap? Religion in the 2008 Presidential Iilcction (New York Oxford University Press,forthcoming). 'l'he lllack Ohurch. 65. Lincoln and Mamiya, (16. Landscape Study. Pew Fnrunr on lleligiorr & l'ublie l,ilt', (/.s. Religious
(Durham,NC: Duke UniversityPress, icanExperience 1990). 43.Ibid. 44. SeeDavid L. Chappell, A Stone of Hope:Prophetic Religionand the Deathof llm Crow(ChapelHill,NC: Universityof North CarolinaPress,2003); HarwoodK. McClerk. "Belongingand Doing: PoliticalChurches ing and Eric L. McDaniel, and Blackpoliticd ParticipationiPoliticalPsychology 26 (2005),721-733;and ClydeWilcox and LeopoldO
Gomez,"Religion, Group Identification, and Politics Among American Blacksl' Analy sis 5 | (1990), 27 | -285.
45.See f. WendellMapsonlr.,TheMinistry of Musicin theBlackChurch(Valley PA:fudson, 1984). 46.Lincoln and Mamiya,TheBlnckChurch. 47.lamesCone,Black Theology and BlnckPower(NewYork:Seabury, 1969). 48.CornelWest, (Boston: Race Matters Beacon, 1993). 49.See PeterJ.Paris,TheSocialTeaching (Philadelphia: of theBlackChurches Press, 1985); Barbara DianneSavage, YourSpiritsWalkBeside Us:The Politics of Black ligion (Cambridge, MA: BelknapPress of HarvardUniversityPress,2008); fames Washington, Frustrated Fellowship: TheBlackBaptistQuest Power(Macon, for Social MercerUniversityPress, 1982).
50. Lincoln and Mamiya, The Black Church, chap.2; Albert f. Raboteau,Slave
The "Invisible Institution"in theAntebellum Soutlr(New York Oxford University 1978).
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Leo Owens,God and Government in theGhetto: 6T.Harris,SomethingWithin;Michael The Politicsof Church-State Collaborationin Black America (Chicago:University of Press,2007). Chicago 68.Samuel G. Freedman,'After ObamaVictory,Testfor the Black Clergyi'The New I 5,2008, A19. YorkTimes,November of the blackchurchdepicts 69.The'thallengeof Islam'is how oneof the major studies growth population. Lincoln and Mamiya, TheBlackChurch,389the of the Muslim See 391. 70.Ibid. analysis of the life and times of Malcolm X, seeMarshallFrady, 7l.For an excellent "TheChildren Malcolmj'TheNewYorker, l2,l992.See alsoDavidMills,"Malof October PostWeekly Edition,March colm X: The Messenger and His Messagel' The Washington 26-Aprll I,1990. 72.An indicationof how difficult it is to get a handleon smallreligiousgroupsis the Fradysugin the early 1960s. widelyvaryingestimates of the blackMuslim membership it wasassizable gests its membership wasassmallas10,000; Lincoln andMamiyasuggest to the black Christianpop100,000. Even the higher figure, however, is tiny compared as ulation,which numberedin the millions. Frady,"The Childrenof Malcolml' 73.See of MalcolmX (NewYork Grove, 74.Malcolm X, with AIex Haley,TheAutobiography re64). Apartheid: Segregation andtheMak75.Douglas Massey andNancyDenton,American (Jnderclass (Cambridge, Press, 1998); William MA: Harvard University ing of the |ulius The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: (Chicago: Press, 1990). Universityof Chicago Barboza, Americanlihad: look at AmericanMuslims,seeSteven 76. For an excellent 1993). Islam,\fter MalcolmX (NewYork Doubleday, Middle Classand Mostly Mainstreamt 77. Andrew Kohut et aI,Muslim Americans: (2007 . http:/ipewforum.org/surveys/muslim-americanl ), 17 Electoral Venturej' Muslims'Tentative 78.Don Terry,"Minister Far ShronaForeman, l, 1990. National September Journal, Hertzke, Echoes of Discontent. 79.See Electoral Foreman,"Muslims'Tentative Venture 80.Shrona l' Nationallournal,September l 1990. G E N D E RA N D R E L I G I O N I N A M E R I C A N L I F E There is no doubt that American women asa group are more religiously observant than men. Public opinion polls have noted this discrepancyfor years.Consider the following findings from a massivesurvey conducted in 2008 by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life: Women are more likely to be affiliated with a religion than men (86 to 79 percent), to have an absolutely certain belief in God or a universal sp\rrt (77 to 65 percent),to pray daily (66 to 49 percent),to say religion is very important in their lives (63 to 49 percent),and to attend worship servicesat least weekly (44to 34 percent).' Theseattitudes extend evento women who cameto adulthood in the 1960sand early 1970s, the so-calledbaby boom generation,which sometimesis characterized as the leastreligiousagecohorl in Americanhistory.In fact,boomer women have in tlto lortg traclitionof religiosityamong American not brought about a breal< o1"'rellels," rrsizirllle rnajorityof women ratereligion wolnen.hvenin this gcnerntion In any consideration of religion and politics in the United Statestoday, women merit specialattention. Of course,by no means do all American women sharethe samereligion or politics, but at presentgenderis a strong predictor of religious participation. In this chapterwe first consider the facts about women'sinvolvement in religion in the United States. Next we discusssome of the ways in which female religious activists involve themselvesin political life. Third, we explore the religious and political attitudes of women in the pews.
1l
AND POLITICS RELIGION, GENDER,
l2
THEORIES OF RELIGION,CULTURE, AND AMERICAN POLITICS
Now that we have studied religion in American politics in its wide variety of forms, we need to step back to appreciatethe bigger picture. In this concluding chapter we explore severalbroad theoretical interpretations of the relationships among religion, politics, and culture. Thesebroader theories should help us put much of the previous discussioninto a more meaningful context. Each of these theories helps us comprehend the sometimes bewildering complexity of religion's relevanceto American politics. Someof the theories emphasizeworldwide forces,whereasothmakes its ers restrict themselvesto the United States.Each has its own emphases, own case,and offers distinctive illumination in the quest to understand the place of religion in the political culture of the United States.
CULTURE WARS No theory of religion, politics, and culture in the United Statestoday has gotten that the contours rnore attention than the'tulture wars" thesis.t This theory asserts of religion and politics in America today are best understood by recognizing the existenceof deep social divisions over values and lifestyles.This thesis separates Americans, particularly elites,into two categories:conservativesand progressives' traditional values:reliadhereto and emphasize on the one hatrcl, Conservatives, and oppositionto abortionand homosexualdisuiplinc, gion,marriage and farnily, Flrcssllte irttporlancc of clroiceand diversity progressived ity.On the otlrer lralrcl,
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in every areaof life, including religion, family, and sexualiry The culture wars thesis holds that supportersof eachperspective are sharply critical of-and feel threatened by-the other point of view.Each is struggling for dominance in American culture. This division cuts acrossall sorts of lines in American life, including traditional religious lines.2 Thus sometraditional Catholicstoday find themselvesalignedwith conservativeevangelicals on many social and political issues.Both groups oppose abortion, support public expressions offaith, criticize secularism in public schools, and decry the lingering effects of the sexual revolution. Theological and cultural differencesremain betweentraditional Catholicsand evangelicalProtestants, to be sure,but many in each group unite in rejecting what they see as a secular assault on time-honored traditions and values.Thus a kind of cultural alliance now existg among conservative evangelicals, traditional Catholics, and some Orthodox and Ultraorthodox |ews.Activists call this alliance an ecumenism of orthodoxy.3 On the other side are liberal Protestants, progressiveCatholics, most |ews, and secularAmericans,who together constitute the progressivecoalition. Liberal Protestantsoften find that they have more in common with liberal catholics, Jews, and secular elites than they do with conservativeswithin their own denominations,{ They speaka common languageof peaceand justice,and they prioritize civil rights issues(around race,gender,and sexuality),economic inequality, and skepticismof military action, rather than the socio-moral matters that tend to resonatemost on the right. African American denominations often join the liberal alliance,but the fit is not alwayssnug.For example,some leadersof African American christian denomina. tions helped block the gay-majority Fellowship of Metropolitan Community churches from obtaining membership in the National council of churches. sim. ilarly, black Muslims join with progressiveson U.S.policy toward Israel, but on abortion, drugs,alcohol,and gay rights they agreewith evangelicalsand traditional Catholics. A similar fault line also separates the genders. conservative evangelicaland tra. ditional Catholic women often seethemselves deeplyat odds with their more liberal sistersin mainline churches,|ewish slmagogues, and even many catholic parishes, Many female proJife activistsjudge feminists as adversaries, despite sharing with them a confrontational style of political engagementthat feminists generally applaud, In churchesand outsidethem, progressive women believejust as strongly that their conservativesistersare a negativeforce at best and a group of traitors at worst. Severalscholarsadvanceevidenceof a culture war. fames Guth and his col. leagues havefound strongevidence that somethingalcinto a culture war split does,
in fact, divide Protestantclergy intro two groups.sRobert Wuthnow concludesthat a massiverestructuring of Americ:an religion occurred in the wake of World War II, which had the effect of polariziing Americans within their religious traditions. Not too long ago,he argues,denor.ninations meant something distinctive. To be a Methodist, Presbyterian,Catholic, Lutheran, or Baptist implied a shared religious and ethnic heritage with distinctiwe customs and beliefs. Today,however,a theological and cultural divide cuts across Christian church bodies.Politically speaking, it matters more whether one is a l-iberal Catholic or a conservativeCatholic, or a liberal Methodist or an evangelical Methodist, than whether one is a Methodist or a Catholic. Thus a liberal Methodiest might feel more comfortable with secularlibWe see clear erals than with fellow Christians rwzhocall themselvesevangelicals.6 evidenceof theseintradenominatioonal tensionsin the recent debatesabout homosexuality in mainline Protestantdenominations.T An even stronger caseis made by iames Davison Hunter. In his classicbook titled Culture Wars,Hunter articulates the culture wars thesis clearly and then explains how it plays out in a numb,er of areasof American life, including religion in specific and politics.8Hunter notesvarious divisions asthey manifest themselves skirmishesover school curricula, g;ay rights ordinances,state-levelabortion battles, and similar issues. Imagine two women who have certain things in common. Both are married, both are college graduates,both ane church members, and both are economically comfortable. One woman attends :a-n independent evangelicalchurch, views abortion as anathema,and is an avid rceader of the conservativereligious and political literature found in many Christianr, bookstores.Deeply alienated from the public ashaving low academicstandardsand aspromoting secular schools, which shesees and hedonistic values,shehas chorsen to homeschoolher children. Sheis an active member of a homeschool associat,ion,which provides her with information about by stateeducation authorities. Christian curricula and waysto avcoid being harassed in a comflict with the'dominant" culture,which includes Shesees that sheis engaged the movie and television industri,es, public education,"antifamily" feminists, gay activists,and the government. She:is a conservativeRepublican. The other woman seesthe defining experienceof her life asher participation in the civil rights movement andViettrtam war protests.Sheis now an active member of a United Methodist congregation known for its peaceand justice activism.A strong feminist and a supportcroff atrortionrights,shebelongsto several Progresthat suprrncl cl.r:nules to politicalaction committees sivepoliticalorganizations televisiott prcitchers anclfbarsfundamentalist Sheclinliluen port women candiclateri.
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influence in schoolboard elections.Shedeploreswhat shesees asreligious attempts to censor books and the arts. She has gay and lesbian friends and supports their struggle for equal rights. To her,the idea of a'dominant culture" equalswhite male businessmenwho belong to country clubs.Sheis a liberal Democrat. Even though the example of these two women illustrates the sometime reality of polarization within the world of religion, the truth is that scholarshave found that relatively few people are comfortable with either side of the culture war. Many are in fact unaware of any culture war. To be sure,many parents-from moderate Catholics to conservativeProtestants-view television as unhealthy and get angry when public schoolsuncritically embracethe latestcurriculum fad. They take their children to church and otherwise attempt to counteract the messages purveyed by the pop culture. But they do not necessarilyview these actions as battles in some cosmic conflict over the very soul of America. Whether more Americans will embrace the culture wars perspectivein the future remains to be seen.e There is also a self-fulfilling quality inherent in discussionof the culture wars. Mutual stereotlping, polarization, and inflamed passionsactually may help create culture wars where none previously existed.Moreover,talk of culture wars undermines the possibility that adversaries may discovercommon ground. Compromise, that stapleof American politics, is hard if one'sopponents are,or are perceivedas being, enemies bent on destroying one'svery way of life. The two hypothetical women describedabovemight in fact sharethe yiews that televisionis largelytrash, that public schoolsare too lax, or that pornography has an unhealthy influence,but they miss the chanceto work togetherto addresssuchfeelingsbecause of the blinding rhetoric of cultural conflict. Yetthere areunmistakablesignsof culture wars in the United States, particularly among political elites.The core question at stake in the culture wars is one of the appropriate characterof American society.And there is no longer just one culture war in American society. In a societycharacterized by ever-increasing religious pluralism, many newer groups wrestle with how to preservetheir traditional values, which often are deeplyintertwined with their religion, in the diverseand often hos. tile strands of American culture. This has been notably true for many Muslims as they struggle to reconcile their faith with American popular culture. For example, some interpretations of Islam demand that women's heads be covered,but most U.S.statelaws require that they remove those coveringsfor pictures on driver's Iicenses.r0 Traditional Muslim values also insist that women not touch or have any romantic relationships with men until marriage,whereas ordinary American cu$. toms arequite different.h-rfact,in someplacesin thc U.S., all-ll'maleMuslim high schoolprornsarehekl.rl
The examplesare numerous,as are the varieties and intensities of skirmishesin with American culture. This is why the culture the culture wars as religion clashes wars theory remains essentialto any understanding of religion and politics in the United Statestoday.By itself it is not a sufficient guide,but without it we would be at a loss.
T H E S E C U L A R I Z A T I O NT H E S I S Whereas the culture wars thesis focuseson today's struggles,the "secularization' that we look awayfrom thesistakesa longer view of religion in America. It suggests the eventsdirectly before us to analyzebroader historical developmentsthat have servedto condition culture, religion, and politics. Proponents ofthe secularizationthesisargue that religion has declined as secresult They contend that this developmentis an inescapable ularism has advanced. of modernity, which has alreadygreatly influenced Western Europe and,to a lesser secularism spreadsin its wake, As modernity advances, degree,the United States. eroding the social and cultural significanceof religion. With religion's gradual decline, secularizationtheorists conclude,we can expectto seereligious involvement in the long run, both in the United Statesand elsewhere.l2 with politics decrease However,the short-run picture can be different, and we sometimes seetemposome religious rary surgesin religio-political involvement.Losing out to secularism, groups might turn to politics in an attempt to stem the tide. Such efforts represent a sort of dying gaspon the part of religious forces.For some secularizationtheorists, Assorted relithis perspectivedescribesthe current situation in the United States. into Amergious groups with different-even opposing-agendas hurl themselves perceived decline that threatens to halt a life, trying desperately political ican traditional American religion, values,and culture.l3 Some classicadvocatesof the secularization thesis were giants of nineteenthcentury Europeanthought.Karl Marx (1818-1883)was among them. He was certain that classstruggle resulting in the triumph of socialism would be the story of modern life-a tale in which religion would be relegatedto "the dustbin of historyl' was another classicsecuthe greatGerman sociologist, Max Weber (1864-1920), larization theorist.He believedthat with modernity would come forcesof ratioorganizedreligion,if not entirely that woulclclefeat nalism and bureaucratizirtion ( 1856* lrre'ud 1939), the fcrunder of psychopeople, Sigttttttttl eliminatereligious llrcrrtlwrtsr;trilcinterestecl in rcligionitncl secrrlsr'l;ulhrir. alsoarddressed analysis, lltnl t r e r " tlc clt t c w religious t r a d i t i o n sc ,s p c c i n l lt yh o s eo f l t l x l e l L r wf e w s . ' [ ' l r r t u gl h lte ltopetlllrrrl"tlrr' lirturcol'nn*illtrsiott" religlort wrrrtld faele, lhcrcwirsno l{uilriullce
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would prove poor aspeople cameto seethat the modern world gavethem a chance to be free of religion.ta secularizationtheorists take modernization to be the key to the decline Because need to have some senseof what they mean by the term "modernreligion, we of izationl'Among the factors analystsusually include in defining this concept are afi complex embrace of scientific ways of thinking, modern technological advances, economic life, contemporary forms of mass communication and entertainment, and public education.Secularization and the growth ofgovernment bureaucracies theorists note that in modern societiesrational, scientific approachesdominate, In modern soreligious worldviews take precedence. while in traditional societies, cieties public policy is dominated by clashesof self-interested individuals and groups pursuing their rational interests.Education becomesan engine ofsecularization as it teachesscientific explanations of earthly phenomena. The capitalist marketplacealso mutes religious enthusiasmasit directs people to a consumer culture and the workaday corporate world. There is ample support for the secularizationthesis.Religion governsthe United Statestoday much lessthan it does,say,a traditional African tribe, or than it did in earlier erasof American history. There is no doubt eventhat many religious Americans compartmentalize their faith today and do not manifest it in many areasof their lives.'5Moreover, many of the major institutions of the United States-giant television corporations,public schoolsand universities,government bureaucracies, Often these networks-now operate on the basis of secular concerns and logic.16 institutions ignore the religious and spiritual dimensions of life; a few arepositively hostile toward them. Yet in recent yearsthe secularizationthesishas come under fire. It has lost a bit of its luster, in large part becauseof the continuing resilienceof religious faith in the face of secular forces. In recent decadesthere has been a notable growth of a resurgenceof religious practice in evangelicalcommitment in the United States, Russiaand Eastern Europe, and a major increasein religious energy in many Islamic countries.Religionbdemise,once predicted so confidently,hasjust not taken placein most parts of the world, nor is there evidencethat religion is going to vanish anytime soon.rT Moreover, in recent years religion has not alwaysbeen content to remain in a narrow compartmentalizedrealm. Religion has been busy in the larger,public many African countries, world, challengingsecularauthorities in the United States, Although religion may not be as tightly all over the Muslim world, and elsewhere. livesas it once was,it clearlylras not disintegrated, interwoveninto most people'.s
Indeed, it may be that the secularizationthesis somehow reversesreality. Perhaps the "unsecularization'-or even sacralization-of the world is one of the characteristicsof our modern age.18 The responseof those who havebeen impressedwith the secularizationview is that religion'scurrent health may be temporary. To them, religious vitality today is progressthrough the world-no more than a temfurther proof of secularization's porary reaction to the inevitable.Perhapsthey are right; perhapssecularizationwill succeedin the long run. But as of now there are many reasonsfor doubt, including the fact that the death of religion now seemsvery much overdue.Modernity has infused many cornersof the world,butbillions of peopleoften havechosento retain their religious faith. The secularizationthesishas severalvariants that are as intriguing as the main theory itself. One such variant is the "elite secularizationthesisl'In this view even though religion continues to speakto most human beings,elites and elite institutions have become highly secular.The idea is that the larger secularization thesis appliesto one (crucial) sector of the population only: elites.In the United Statesa number of theorists advancethis analysis.The late Richard fohn Neuhaus,for example,used the metaphor of a "naked public square"to describehow elites largely banished faith-based,moral arguments from American politics. According to Neuhaus,the languageof rights, efficiency,and practicality crowded out considerations of moral obligation and timeless spiritual truths.le This view is echoed by Stephen carter in The culture of Disbelief,in which he takes elites in American media, law, and education to task for trivializing faith'2o As we saw in our chapter on elitesand religion and politics (Chapter 6), there is evidencethat someAmerican elites,such asmedia elites,are more secularthan the reporters,media elites,political leaders,and population at large.Some academics, government bureaucratsprofessa religious faith, but relatively few are comfortable traditional catholicism, orthodox fudaism, or rewith born-again evangelicalism, vivalist Islam.2rA serious problem with the elite secularization thesis,however,is the unevennessof the phenomenon. To be sure' many national news media elites are highly secular.So are a fair number of the people who dominate the entertainment media, such as television,movies, and popular music. But electedofficialsnot to mention presidents-better reflect membersof Congressand statelegislators, Moreover,the remarkablegrowth the religious diversity of the population aIlatge.z2 on religion and societybeliesthe notion and intellectuulclisconrse of scholarship 'l'lrercnre now scvcrirlwidely citeclelitejournals publishing of totally hostilc elites. to lhitlr. fo r t h e i rl r o n t i l i t y c r i t i c i s no t f o t h e re l i ( c s
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Another yariant on secularizationis sociologist David Yamane's neosecularization thesis.Yamanepointedly arguesthat it is erroneous to claim that religion is disappearingfrom American life and that the secularizationthesisis simply incorrect asa description of the contemporary United States.YetYamane insiststhat secularization is occurring nonethelessin individual American lives, institutions, and the culture as a whole. The key is to understand that religion, even as it continues to be very much alive, is receding steadily into private realms of American life and culture. For Yamane, the true test of secularizalionis not whether religion is disappearing but whether its role is diminishing in ordinary lives and institutions, as well asin the broader culture.AndYamane arguesthat it is clearwhen one observes the United Statesand its culture from a historical perspectivethat religion'sinfluencehas declined.23
huge portion of the United Statesas "spiritual, but not religiousi' reflecting this seekermovement. He contendsthat as many as 20 percent of the American public has spiritual concerns,sometimesvery serious ones,which they do not pursue in traditional religious institutions or forms. All sorts of mystical, healing, holistic' feminist, Eastern,and other spiritualities arevery much part of the American landscapenow as culture shift analystswould predict. For Fuller, everywhere we look we seethe prevalenceof this "seekerspiritualityl"? Sociologist Phillip Hammond arguesthat American religion is actually undergoing a major'disestablishment" that demonstrateshow widespread the culture shift has been.As Hammond describesit, American culture now honors choice,expressivism,and individualism in religion just asit doesin other sectors.Traditional that focus on duty,institutions, and collectivepractices religions in the United States face a tremendous challengeand are slowly losing out. Mainline Protestantismin particular is suffering,though it is far from alone in its predicament.All established are threatenedby the movement toward individualistic churchesand synagogues spirituality.28 remain within the realm of traditional organized reliTo be sure,many seekers gions,where they are bringing about major change.For example,one excellentrecent study ofevangelical Protestantchurchesthat reflect this"new paradigm'(and are booming as a result) notes that members of such churchesinsist on expressive and contemporary music and other meansof worship that allow them to move beyond what they see as rather staid, traditional experiencesin order to achieve a Suchreligious practitioners also emphasize deeply felt, individualistic spirituality.2e the importance of a personal relationship with fesusChrist, support the institution participation in small groups at church,and radiate of the nuclearfamily, encourage a decidedly unstuffu aura.The overall result is something very different from traFor their part, many ditional Catholic and mainline Protestantworship experiences. aspects implementing have been Catholic and mainline Protestantcongregations of evangelicalworship in special"seeker"servicesdesignedfor those who desire a religious experience.30 more emotional, expressive of the experiencesof It remains to be seenwhat the long-term consequences American religion is politics. If the seekerphenomenon will be for religion and transformedfurther into individualistic spiritualiry its impact on political life might anclunified.Thus the politics of religion may become organizecl, be lessfocused, (albeit for quite thesissuggests lessimportant over time, just as thc scrculariz,atit'rtr After all,if spirituality ll'-cviclent. Orr tlrcollrerlltrttl,tlrisis not se reasons). dil'fbrerrt iLis Atnericans, rllll(ttlgtrt<lre tlee;tlyvrtltrctl rltrdrrrot'e nt6re irnprlrlrurl beconrcs
THE CULTURESHIFT THESIS Ronald Inglehart has pioneeredanother approachto understanding secularization today that has gained substantialnotice among scholars.His'tulture shift" thesis dovetailswith the secularizationthesisin holding that the influence of old-time religion is dying. Inglehart explains this death by arguing that cultures, especiallyin the Western world, are changing in responseto modernization. Old institutions, the old politics of classand economics, and old modes of thinking are receding (despiteoccasionalrevivals).24 The result,however,is not what the standard secularization thesis would predict. Spiritual concerns have not disappeared,nor will they disappear. If anything,spiritual concernsaregrowing, but this concern is made manifest lessthrough formal institutions than through individual journeys of the spirit. It follows for the culture shift analysisthat formal religious involvement in politics will decline over time, but that does not mean that the spiritual concerns of individual citizens will decline in their impact on politics and elsewhere. Thus, according to this view, what looks like secularizationaround us actually may be a shift in the nature of spiritual life from the organized and public to the individual and private. It is not the end of the influence of spiritual concerns but rather a changein how they work.2s There is plenty of evidencethat something like a culture shift has taken placein the United States. WadeClark Roof hasportrayed a resultingba\ boom "generation of seekers" who look in a wide variety of places-some of them unconventionalfor spiritual fulfillment; subsequent studieshavedemonstratec{ that the samephenomenon applies to Ceneratiorrs X anclY, "'Sirnilnrly,ltoberl lrullerclcscribers a
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bound to affect their political outlooks and behavior,possibly more intensely-and more widely-than ever before.
with somevariant of the phrase"God bless ican presidentto end all major speeches you, and God blessthe United Statesof America." Historian Sidney Mead approachesthe idea of civil religion by documenting how a "national religion'grew steadily during the early years of the Republic and there had establisheditself firmly by the time of the Civil War. As Mead observes, are really two forms of faith in the United States-first, the faiths of specificreligious groups and denominations, and second,what he terms "the American faithl'or the civil religion. Both religious forms, he realizes,are intertwined and mutually supis palpable,as anyone who portive. Patriotism in some churchesand synagogues has seenthe American flag in housesof worship or heard a spirited singing of "God BlessAmerica" can attest.In turn, religious Americans gain affirmation of the importance of their faith when they hear political leaderspublicly call on God, when they use currency that reads"In God We Trustl'and when they repeat the Pledge of Allegiance,which proclaims the existenceof one nation "under Godl'3'z In the end,the ultimate question is how to evaluatethe civil religion thesis'Does the United Stateshave a cMl religion? Some evidencedoes support the assertion. From Abraham Lincoln'ssublimevision of the nation asthe "last,besthope of earth' 'tity on a hilli' metaphor,civil religious invocation of the Puritan to Ronald Reagan's images abound of America as an agent of the divine with special duties on Earth. And this is a view that many religious leaderslike to echo; for decadesevangelist Billy Graham has invoked Godt blessingon the nation's leaders,institutions, and purPoses. And ever)'whereare signs of civil religious rituals, such as Fourth of July cereand everything surrounding that most dismonies, Memorial Day observances, tinctly civil religious holiday, Thanksgiving. Each yearly ritual marks the calendar with its own blend of religion and patriotism, faith and political history. American cMl religion has its own sacredplacestoo, such as the majestic Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC, and the hallowed battleground of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Somedocuments have symbolic sacredstatusaswell, such as the original Declaration of Independenceand the Constitution. At the National Archives in Washington, visitors wishing to view thesetwo documentsencounter a reverent atmosphere not unlike that of a grand house of worship. The areais softly lit and so quiet that people start whispering upon entering.They walk up a narrow, semicircular corriimpervious even to nuclear dor until they enter the roonr containing glasscases, Guardspreventvisitors war,that hold thesedocumcntslirr thc lirithful to venerate. clcscencl lrelowthe groundfor safeirrrrl tlrecascs to theglrrss, lrorrrgetting too close l<ccpirrg cvcry n igltt.
CIVIL RELIGION Another theoretical perspectivethat seeksto illuminate the relationship between religion and politics in America is the'tivil religion'thesis. This view contendsthat the most important religion in the United Statesactually has nothing to do with specificdenominations or religious traditions. Instead,the predominant American religious dimension is a sharedbut vaguepolitical religion-a religion that broadly celebrates America and its culture-the civil religion. Civil religion in the United States emphasizes America'sunique,"blessed'status among the nations of the world and inspiresin its followers a senseof American patriotism. The quick appearance of American flags and signs reading "God BlessAmerica" in the days and weeks immediately following the terrorist attacksof September 11, 2001,provides clear evidence of the civil religion. Those attractedto this perspectiveagreethat the civil religion existsright alongside sectarianreligions in the United States without challengingthem. Civil religion is nonsectarianin its assumption that God has blessedthe United States, endowed it with specialopportunities,and assigned it responsibilities to do good in the world. Civil religion is important, analystssuggest, becauseit enhancesnational stability, governmental legitimacy, and a feeling of shared purpose among citizens. Every nation has a vague"faith' of sorts,a belief in itsell a civil religion-and in the United Statesthis civil religion is infused profoundly with a sensethat God has provided Americanswith specialblessings. The civil religion thesisdownplaysthe importance of various (perhapspassing) eventssuch as culture wars or evidenceof secularization.Instead,it points toward enduring connectionsbetweengovernmentand religion (despitethe constitutional separationof church and state) and warns that the "religion'that matters most in political terms may not be practiced in conventional housesof worship. The idea of the civil religion first receivedextensiveattention in a 1967essay by prominent sociologist Robert Bellah.In a comparison of the inaugural addresses of Abraham Lincoln and |ohn F.Kennedy,Bellah notesthat thesetwo seminalAmerican leaders from different erasboth assertedthat the nation had a divine purpose and called upon God to blessthe country.3rOther scholarssincehaveobservedthat presidential inaugurationceremonies aresteeped in religiousimagery;incoming presidents almostalways make reference to God. Moreover, it is rrowclcrigueur lbr an Amer-
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Finally, there are the symbolic prophets and saviors of the American civil religion. In Washington, DC, one can read prophetic words carved in stone at the fefferson Memorial or starein awe at the soaring monument to GeorgeWashington. At the very center of the civil religion is Lincoln, "the martFred Christ of Democracy's passion play'':: The story of his presidency,remarkable maturation, singleminded senseof purpose, and tragic assassination invokes religious images of Christlike sacrificeand death for the nation'srebirth. In short,we feelthat the United States doesembracesomethingof a civil religion, but this conclusion is far from universally shared.3a There is evidence of it in the culture,however thinly it may be worn in theseincreasinglymulticultural and fractious times. Perhapsthe larger question is whether the civil religion thesishelps us understand religion and politics in the United States.Civil religion does tell us something about what still binds manyAmericans together politically. Eventhough it may appearto some scholarsthat civil religion is declining in the faceof cultural pluralism and political cynicism, expressions of national unity after the September 11,2001,attacksraise doubts about this assumption.In any case, the civil religion thesisdoesnot help us understandmuch about how specificreligiou s traditions interact with politics. It tells us nothing about how individual citizens'religiousbeliefs affect voting behavior,or the agendasof religious interest groups, or church-state conflicts in the boiling pot of religion and politics in America.
An early variant of this theory was put forward by the French statesman-author Alexis de Tocqueville. Observing conditions in America in the early nineteenth century, Tocqueville noted that in his native France the "spirits of religion and of freedonf'marched in opposite directions. Not so in America, where he found that the spirit of liberty and the spirit of religion marched together,supporting and reinforcing eachother.Tocquevillewas impressedwith the extent of political freedom enjoyed by American citizens (then defined as white males).But his European experience taught him that such freedom easily could degenerateinto anarchy and then despotism.Moreover, even if such perils were avoided,maximum individual freedom,when left to itself, could promote a materialistic society of individual strivers isolated from their fellow citizens. To his amazement,this was not what Tocqueville discoveredto be the casein the United States. He concluded that the explanation for the symbiotic relationship between religion and politics in America was the crucial role that religion played in instilling moral self-restraint,combined with the way congregationallife helped people overcome their isolation. \A/hen political freedom implied that a nineteenth-century religion taught him he should not do things that were man could do as he pleased, destructive to his family or the community. Thus religion made liberal democracy possibleby instilling the inner mores that preventedAmerican society from plunging into chaos.In turn, religion (in general) and congregations(in particular) they were left relatively free from persecution because thrived in the United States and unencumberedby the debilitating government paternalism found in Europe.36 developedbetweengovernmentand religion, each Thus an unintentional s1'rnbiosis sustaining the other. is a far cry from the still-developing Of course,the contemporary United States In many waysAmerican culture today is country Tocquevilleobservedin the 1830s. and focusedon individuals than was the casein the far rnore materialistic,skeptical, early yearsof the Republic.However,the intensification of American individualism has servedonly to strengthenthe continuing partnership betweenreligion and culture.In its presentform, organizedreligion helpsto sustainan individualistic society in a paradoxicalway: by offering people a temporary refugefrom the more isolating aspects of the culture.Indeed,evidenceaboundsthat peoplewho turn to organized religion do so because they seeksomething different than the reality in which they live and work. They want il relirgc ltorn the enormous burden of living in a society olterrirreconfusingor missingaltogether. wheremeaning, morality,arrdcorrrrrrurrity partners thesis sees tlrrrt thc rrrtcorrvcntional it is crucinllo rrrrrlt'rslrrrtrl Fk>wcver, t'eligiott lirr lcrttporary rclirgconly,not as a irr orgottlzerl pcoplegctting irrvolvctl
THE UNCONVENTIONAL PARTNERS THESIS Another perspectiveon the relationshipsamong culture, religion, and politics is the "unconventional partners" thesis.Though this theoretical perspectivetakes some inspiration from the civil religion thesis,the unconventionalpartners framework is broader,looking beyond the periodic rituals of ciyil religion to deeper,day-to-day manifestationsof religion's relationship to American culture. The unconventional partners thesisposits that religion plays a significant political role becauseit helps to sustain America'sindividualistic political culture and its governmental institutions. Religion accomplishesthis task not through active engagementin politics but by offering a sourceof meaning,morality, and community that neither the culture nor the government can provide. In doing so, it relieves pressure on-and strengthens-both the culture and the government. In turn, the government and the culture promote broad religious freedom,allowing the religious sectorto thrive. But this symbiotic relationship is largelyunintentional-hence the "unconventional partners"label.3s
J)z
Culture, and American Politics Theoriesof Religion,
JJJ
permanent or radical alternativeto the broader society.Most people want religion to give them just enough communal sharing and spiritual sustenanceto enable them to persist in the broader culture. Without this kind of refuge,the unconventional partners thesisargues, societymight find itself wracked by radical challenges from both the right and the left. Thus religion sustainsthe social order by providing what that very order lacks. The unconventional partners thesis identifies a number of ways in which religion aids American culture. First, for many citizens,religion provides meaning-a grounding for valuesin a culture in which such meaning is far from automatically available.Second,it helps provide moral values for a culture in which skepticism and clmicism are pervasive.Finally,it encourages community in a culture wracked by anomie. Study after study demonstratesthe extent to which people understand religion in preciselytheseways:as a place to go in searchof meaning, morality, or community. When a religion or a congregation can offer people these things, it flourishes;when it cannot,people drift away.37 Community and meaning may come in a variety of forms within the capaciousrealm of American religion. There is no singlevoice,to saythe least,but this very fact is an immense plus for the culture. It means that American religion can and does serve many more people in this pluralistic agethan it would were there only one religion in the land. The other side of the unconventional partnership is, of course,the ironic fact thatAmerican culture and governmentserveto assistreligion. There aremanyways in which they do so,despiteillusions of a high wall of separationbetween church and statein America, Perhapsthe most important form of assistance comesin the generousprotection of religious free exercise.The First Amendment is alive and well. The fact that both government and culture have some sympathy for religion is essentialto the viability of organized religious life in the United States. Moreover, the American legal system sometimeshas shown a proclivity to extend the government'sprotective role to minority religions,even when their beliefs or practicesare controversial.Though the courts'attitudes vary from caseto case and from time to time, they havebeen forced to respond to the reality of religious pluralism in the United States. This is a tremendousgift not onlyto specificreligions but to religion in generalthroughout the nation. It confirms that religion is important, no matter what form it takes. At another level, organized religion has reaped extraordinary financial advantagesfrom both governmentand the culture on which government rests. As we discussedin Chapter 8, the United Statesdemonstratesa great deal of "multiple establishmentl'which resultsin all sclrtsof concretefirrnncial benefits, from aid to
church hospitals to freedom from property taxesfor housesofworship. No precise figures are availablefor how much direct or indirect aid religious institutions rematters,but ceive,but it is certainly many billions of dollars.This sort of assistance so too does the climate of broad religious freedom. It constitutes the other side of the partnership from which both religion and culture benefit. The unconventional partnership between religion and culture has existed for a Government may provide more aid today,but that long time in the United States. is mainly a reflection of the overall growth of government through American history. Religious freedom today has a broader range than was the casein previous eras,but it is an extension of more than two centuries of determination, initially in the First Amendment, to guaranteereligious freedom. expressed The unconventional partners thesis also offers some Perspectiveon legal conflicts between church and state and on the activities of religious interest groups. The occasional sound and fury of conflict should not drown out the reality of a continuing partnership between religion and American culture. This is not to say that the ordinary aspectsof religion and politics-interest groups,voting, reform efforts, and court cases-are meaningless;far from it' They are an important part of the religion and politics story. But the unconventional partners thesis reminds us that their significance must be tempered in light of the deep affinity between religion and culture in the United States.That relationship will remain secure, for better or for worse, as long as organized religion does not transform itself from a temporary refuge into a permanent enemy of American culture, and as Iong as those who seeka total separationof religion and government do not fully succeed. What remains to be seenis what the effect of the rising number of citizens in the United Stateswho are either not interested in religion or are hostile to it will have. There is little doubt, as we have seen,that these numbers, though encompassingwell lessthan a quarter of the population, neverthelessare increasing.For them, religion and the government do not necessarilywork together in ways that are beneficial,however they may be intended. For the larger group, those with no no interest in religion, the intertwinings of religion and religion and in many cases government are likely to be of scant importance and therefore the maintenance of this partnership of equally modest value. For those who are determinedly religion the traditionirlpartnershipis a perniciousreality that shouldcome against grow if they do,perand antireligiotts to an end.As the numbcrsol'tht' irrdil'lc'rcnt in our ltelwccn religiorr and government pttrltte't'rlrip" lrapsthe "unconvctttionul rrrtkttrtwalrlc conseqLtences. rrrrrl ul l)r'r'H('nl cultrlrcwill ladc with urrkrtowrr _
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Theories of Religion, Cullurc,and AmericanPolitics
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legal abortion, and similar issues, turning many of their of discipline in schools, POPULISM The unconventional partners thesistends to discount the importance of direct religious participation in politics, but this view is not shared by those who are impressedwith the frequency and power of religiously basedpopulist movements in American politics. American politics has seen a great deal of religious energy throughout its history. Some observersstressthe role of populist movements in generatingmuch of the resulting political activism.38 The link between populism and religion flows in part from the nature of relicongregationsoperatein a highly competitive religious life in America. Because gious marketplace,they live or die on the basisof popular support. Only churches that tap into the deepestneeds,frustrations, and anxieties of their members will thrive. Moreover, unlike the elite membership of most interest Sroups' congregational membership is extremelybroad and diverse.There is no other institution or activity in which Americans of all socioeconomic strata participate in such large numbers. Especiallyin a highly individualistic and mobile society'religious institutions representone of the few settingsin which many people meet-and someIn spite of some skittishnessabout times discover common political grievances.3e of church-basedpolitical movementshaveallowed segments political engagement, their to register voice political find a to unable are the population that otherwise and mosques become the focal point of discontent. Local churches,slmagogues, They are placesin which to otganize, sorts. of all to threats community responses developleadership,and call upon members for sacrifice.a0 At the national level,the church-basedpolitical mobilization of African Amerarethe most prominent Protestants of evangelical icansand the political emergence movementsare undeBoth intersection. populist-religious recent examplesof this niably expressionsof populism that have achieveda far-reaching impact on political party platforms, voter alignment, and presidential politics. That the same theory can accommodatesuch different movements illuminates its broad utility. From the civil rights movement of the 1950sand 1960sto the two presidential campaignsof |essefackson in 1984and 1988,black churcheshave provided most money,and moral support for African Amerleadership, of the organizationalbase, ican political mobilization. In doing so,black congregationschanneledaspirations and voiced discontinued the struggle in the 1960s, for equal rights in the 1950s, content with lingering economic disparities in the 1990sand beyond.atSimilarly' havecapturedthe growing discontentof churches evangelical sincethe late 1970s, loss littnilybreakup, stafeof Americanctllture, with the'tlecaying" their members members toward political activism as a result. By 1988thesetwo populist movements had gained enough steamto propel the presidential candidaciesof fessefackson and Pat Robertson, two ministers who had never held elective office but who each enjoyed a strong church base and a both candidatessharedmuch loyal following. Despitetheir ideological differences, prophetic outrage ofthe traditional populist view ofthe world. |ackson expressed at what he viewed as the economic abandonment of working-class and impoverished Americans; Robertson vented his anger against cultural elites, who in his view were undermining traditional values. Both candidates used their religious charisma to champion "the people" and to castigateelites.Moreover, both emphasized to some degreethe historic populist blend of economic progressivism and social conservatism. |acksonbeconomic and civil rights platform drew on a strong dose of religious fervor and moral traditionalism. He admonishedhis followers to heed the Ten RobertCommandmentsand to shun illegal drugs,sexualpromiscuity,and laziness. sont moral conservatism,on the other hand, was mixed with a populist distrust of and elite foreign policymakers. |ackson and large banks,economic conglomerates, Robertsonboth evokeda populist stylein their politics and a characteristicpopulist This populist style continues to appear,albeit in mix of ideological perspectives.a2 somewhat different forms, in the appeal of contemporary politicians from Barack Obama to Mike Huckabeeto SarahPalin. As we can see,the populist thesis emphasizesnot only the ways in which religious traditions can vent their discontent but also how they can infuse the political systemwith a politics that may not fit neatly into the left-right political spectrum. Moreover, events in other countries-from Afghanistan to Northern Ireland to Sudanto the Philippines-suggest that this link between religion and populist uprisings may be a global phenomenon. As such, the populist thesis helps us to untlerstand the ways in which religion sometimestaps sentiments that elites do not notice or acknowledge. Two cautions are in order. First, given the importance of charismatic leadership irr mobilizing populist discontent,one must questionwhether such leadersreflector in fact create-popular concerns. Critics assert that both |acksonand Robertson with the concernsof the cxhibiteda tendencyto cunlhlc thcir personalaspirations nt,:r (endency t orrrrnunities that limited their ability to work they claimcr{lo rrprt'se sy$tuu.lt,rltitpsthe populiststylein general expresses withirrthc cxistingpuliticrrl ' t ' u l i s l irtr ' t t t e c l i c s . rliseorrtcu b lc t t c rt h n r r i t l h n l t k r t tta
fi6
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Second,one must resist taking the populist thesis too far. Most congregations are neither positioned nor inclined to sustain major political efforts. Even if individual Americans experiencefrustration with current politics, they may not be able Finally,and perhapsmost imto vent that frustration through their congregations. portant, it is not clearhow often the populist thesishelps us define the link between religion and politics in American life.
however,that this growth has been posa variety ofreligious groups.They observe, with particular religious sibleonlywhen governmentshaveabandonedold alliances groups;such arrangementsinevitably restricted or even forbade competition.aa Market theorists note that in much of Western Europe, religion is weak and in its political impact has also diminished. They explain seriousdecline;consequently, these developmentspartly as the result of limited competition fosteredby the exThe Church of England,for exchurches. istenceof long-standing state-established ample, is the United Kingdom's official state church. One of Queen Elizabeth II's official roles as monarch is her constitutional position as "Defender of the Faith': Supreme Governor of the Church of England. Yet many of England's majestic churchessit virtually empty most Sundays,and most researchshows that Britons are no longer a particularly religious people.a5 for souls whenever religious groups that lack the fire to compete aggressively evangelicalism price. Competitive dominate, all religions pay a steepand inevitable of any religious group, accordappearsto be an essentialingredient for the success in ing to market theorists.Tired, insular religions that some countries are propped up by governmentfaceseriousdecline and an attending loss of political influence.6
T H E M A R K E T T H E S I S ,R E L I G I O U SP L U R A L I S M ,A N D P O L I T I C S The most controversialtheoretical approachto the study of religion and politics in the United Statesis the "market" thesis.Its proponents argue that religion'srelative strength in every society is largely a function of how much competition is present betweenand among religious traditions, and the degreeto which that competition is unfettered. According to the market thesis,which draws heavily on economic theory, religion in the United Statesis and should remain very strong, which has obvious implications for the continuing political relevanceof American religion.a3 First, we know that there is intensecompetition in the American religious marketplace.This competition draws people in and provides them with an almost unbelievable variety of religious niches from which to choose.And congregations just like secularbusinesses do,via billboards,advertisements, advertisetheir services the Internet-and even with free gifts. Some congregationsmarket themselvesas friendly placeswhere it is not necessaryto dress up on Sunday morning. Others promote themselves asoffering a distinctive theological,social,or political outlook. Still others attempt to meet members'everyneed,offering everything from a range of worship experiencesto small-group friendship networks to sports leaguesto healthcareclinics. This diversity suits Americans'pluralist tastes.Market theorists believethat congregationsthat fare poorly are simply not competing hard enough. Second, although plenty of traditional "establishment" religion exists in the United States,the fact is that there is no single official American religion. This meansthat religious freedom is broadly extendedto all groups.The implication for us, of course,is that becauseAmerican religion is like this-strong, competitive, and free-it is able to exert political force. Market theorists compare and contrast the enduring strength of religion in the in other countriesto illustratetheir thesismore fully. with its relevance United States For example,market theoristsnote that the intensereligious competition that exists todayin LatinAmerica and much of Africa is resultingin tremendousgrowth among
TOWARD THE FUTURE Which of thesetheories,alone or in combination with others,will best serveto illuminate the relationship between religion and politics in the United Statesin our twenty-first century remains to be seen.Perhapsnone of them will prove especially useful.None ofthem can explain everlthing, even though eachoffers a useful perMoreover,what the future will produce in terms of the theory and practice spective. of religion and politics in the United Statesmay surprise all of us. After all, who \ /ho expectedthat an African predictedthe rise of the Christian Right in the 1980s? emerge in the 1950sto King would American minister named Martin Luther changefundamentally how we view race and civil rights in America? Who could have known in 1960 that Catholics and evangelicalProtestantsone day would be And who thought that Mormons, Muslims, and a host forming political alliances? of other small religious groups would havebegun to emergeas important Political playerstoday? The subject of religion and politics in America, becauseit is so dyBut that should namic, defiesany singletheury with which to captureits essence. to the life and culture of not deter us from trying to uurlcrslrrntlits contribr,rtion the United States.
338
339
Press of Kansas, 1997). See also fohn C. Green, fames Guth, Corwin Smidt, and Lyman FURTHER READING Bruce, Steve.God Is Dead: Secularization in the West.Oxford: Blackwell.2002. A contemporary application of secularization theory. Finke, Roger,and Rodney Stark. The Churching of America, i776-2005: Winners and Losersin Our ReligiousEconomy.New Brunswick, Nf: Rutgers University Press,2005. A recent restatement of the market model from its two leading proponents. Fowler, Robert Booth. UnconyentionalPartners: Religion and Liberal Culture in the United States. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989.A contemporary account of the unconventional partners thesis. Hertzke, Allen . Echoesof Discontent:lesseJackson, Pat Robertson,and the Resurgence of Populism.Washington, DC: CQ Press,1993.Leading statement of the populist thesis. Hunter, Iames Davison. Culture Wars: The Struggleto Define Amedca. NewYork Basic Books, 1991.Classic articulation of the culture wars argument. Inglehart, Ronald. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society.Princeton: Princeton University Press,1990.Best statement of the culture shift theory. Richey,Russell,and Donald |ones, eds.Az erican Civil Rellgion.New York Harper and Row 1974.Interesting views on civil religion theory. Smith, Christian, ed. The SecularReyolution: Power,Interests,and Conflict in the Secularization of American Life.BerkeIey: University of California Press,2003.A set of provocative arguments about the reasonsfor American secularization. Wuthnow, Robert. The Restructuring of American Religion: Societyand Faith Since World War Two. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1988.Essential theorization on religion in the United States. Kellstedt, eds.,Religion and the Culture Wars: Dispatches from the Front (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996). 6. Wuthnow The Restructuring of American Religion. T.Wendy Cadge,"Vital Conflicts: The Mainline Protestant Denominations Debate Homosexualityi' in The Quiet Hand of God: Faith-BasedActivism and the Public Roleof MainIine Protestantism, eds. Robert Wuthnow and john H. Evans (Berkeley: University of California Press,2003). 8. Hunter, Culture Wars. Seealso |ames Davison Huntet Before the Shooting Begins: Searchingfor Democracy in America\ Culture War (NewYork Free Press,1994). 9. Paul DiMaggio, |ohn H. Evans, and Bethany Bryson, "Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?"American Iournal of Sociology102 (1996),690-755; John H. Evans,"'Culture War' or Status Group Ideology as the Basis of U.S. Moral Politicsl'Inand SocialPolicy 16 (1996),15-34; John H. Evans,"Have ternationallournal of Sociology Americans' Attitudes Become More Polarized?-An Updatei' Social ScienceQuarterly 84 (2003),7 L-9};Morris P.Fiorina, Culture Wars?The Myth of Polarized Amedca (NewYork: Longman, 2006); Alan Wolfe, One Nation, After AII (New York Penguin, 1998); Robert Wuthnow,"DividedWe 1988,395-399. 10. SusanMartin Taylor,'A Fight for Religion or Something More?" The St.Petersburg Times,ltlne 15,2003,24. 11.Patricia Leigh Brown,"For the Muslim Prom Queen, There Are No Kings Allowedi' The New York Times,Iune 7, 2003,A1. 12.For a general discussion of secularization theory, seeSteveBruce, God Is Dead: Sec' ularization in the West (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), chap.l; and Steve Brtce, Religion and Modernization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). See also Pippa Norris and NOTES 1. |ames Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New york: BasicBooks, 1991). 2. Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War Two (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1988). 3. On the growing political affinity between evangelical Protestants and traditional Catholics,seeCarin Robinson,"Doctrine, Discussion,and Disagreement:EvangelicalProtestant Interaction with Catholics in American Politics" (PhD dissertation, Georgetown Universiry 2008). 4. Wuthnow The Restructuring of American Religion. 5. james L. Guth, fohn C. Green, Corwirr Ii. Smidt, Lyman A. Kcllstedt,and Margaret M. Pofonra,"l'he Bully Pulltit:'l'hcl\ililics ol'ItrotL,stnnt Oltgy (l,lwr.crrcc, l(S: Univcrsity Ronald Inglehart, Sacredand Secular:Religion and Politics Worldwide (New York Cambridge University Press,2004). 13. SeeAndrew R. Murphy, Prodigal Nation: Moral Decline and Divine Punishment from New England to 9/ 1I (New York Oxford University Press,2009). 14.SeeKarl Marx's "Economic and Philosophic Manuscriptsi' "Critique of Hegel'sPhilosophy of Right," and"Critique of the Gotha Programl'inThe Marx-Engels Readers,2nd Ethic ed.,ed.Robert C. Tucker (NewYorkW.W Norton, 1978);MaxWebet TheProtestant and the Spirit of Capitalisnr (New York: Scribner's, 1958); Sigmund Freud,The Future of an Illusion (Garden City, NY: I)otlblcdrry,1964). faith today, ol'tlrerrrtttilicrtt ionsol'lrow young peopleexperience l5. For a rich analysis Are llow'lwanly^ and'l'hirty-S(ttnethings see ltolrcrt Wulhnow A.lterlfu llnlty lloottrrt's: (llirrr rlorr: Irirrr'elolrtlnivcrsity lircss, 20i)7). lteltgnm Shnpiryi lht l)ulttt ul Attre,rhlm Fall: America's Two Civil Religionsi' Christian Century,ApriI20,
34L
16.See,for example,George Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to EstablishedNonbelief (NewYork: Oxford University Press,1996); and christian smith, ed., The secular Revolution: Power,lnterests,and conflict in the secularization of American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press'2003). 17. SeeNorris and Inglehart, Sacredand Secular. 18. See,for example, Peter Berger et al., The Desecularization of the world: Resurgent Religion andwoild Polifics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999); and Samuel P.Huntington!r.,The Clash of Civitizations and the Remaking of World Order (NewYork Simon & Schuster,1998). lg. Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids,MI: Eerdmans'1984). 20. Stephen Carter,The Culture of Dkbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Devoflon (NewYork Basic Books, 1993). Religious For a fascinating look at the religious orientations of one elite sector of American 21. society,seeElaine Howard Ecklund and Christopher Scheitle,"ReligionAmongAcademic Scientists:Distinctions, Disciplines, and Demographicsl' Social Problems 54 (2007)'289307. 22. A description of the nature of religion among members of congress is found in Peter L. Benson and Dorothy L. Williams, Religion on Capitol HiII: Myths and Realities (NewYork: Oxford University Press' 1982). 23. DavidYamane,"secularization on Trial: In Defense of a Neosecularization Paradigmi Mark Chaves, lournalfor the Scienffic Study of Religion36 ()anuary 1997),109-122.Seealso "secularization as Declining Religious Auth orityi' social Forces72 (1994),7 49-774. 24. SeeGeoffrey C. Layman and Edward G. Carmines,'Cultural Conflict in American politics: Religious Traditionalism, Postmaterialism, and U.S.Political Behaviorl'/outnal of Politics59 (August 1997),75l-777. 25. Ronald Ingl ehart,Culture Shift in AdvancedIndustrial Society(Pinceton: Princeton University Press,1990). Seealso Norris and Inglehart, Sacredand Secular;Robert Wuthnow,Afier Heayen: Spirituality in America since the 1950s (Berkeley: university of california Press,1998). 26. on the baby boom generation, seewade clark Roof, A Generation of seekers:The Spiritual lourneys of the Baby Boom Generation (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993); and Wade Clark Roof, Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1999). On Generations X and y, seeRichard Flory and Donald E. Miller, Finding Faith: The spiritual Quest of the Postchristian smith, (New Brunswick,NJ: RutgersUniversity Press,2008); BoomerGeneraflon (New Ytrrk Oxfclrd and Spiriluall,ivcsof Anrcrican'lbenugers Searching'fhe Religious Soul Wutlrpow Al'tu lfu llalty llootwrl Seeitlso l{obert N, llelluh, University prcss,2(X)5);
RichardMadsen,WilliamM.Sullivan,AnnSwidler,andStevenM.Tipton,Habitsofthe Lifu (Berkeley:university of california Heart: Indiviilualism anil commitment in American Press,1985). IJnchurchedAmerica 27. Robert c. Fuller, spiritual But Not Religious:understanding of the Heart' etd"'Habits (NewYork Oxford University Press,2001)' Seealso Bellah 28.PhillipHammond,ReligionandPersonalAutonomy:TheThirdDisestablishment (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press' 1992)' 2g.DonaldE.Miller,ReinventingProtestantism:ChristianityintheNewMillennium (Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress'1997);KimonHowlandSargeant'Seeker way (New Brunswick' NJ: churches: Promoting Traditional Religion in a Nontraditional 2000)' RutgersUniversitY Press' Churches' 30. SeeRoof, Spiritual Marketplace; Satgeant'Seeker 3l.RobertN.Bellah,.CivilReligioninAmerica]'Daedalus96(1967),I-2|. Harper and Row 1975)' 32. Sidney Me ad,The Lively Experimenf (NewYork (Baltimore, MD: |ohns Hop33. Clinton L. Rossiter,The American Presidency,rev.ed. kins UniversitY Press,1960)' 102' 34.Forexample,seeJohnWilson,PublicReligioninAmericanCulture(Philadelphia: Temple UniversitY Press' 1979)' (JnconventionalPartners:Religion and Lib35. For this thesis,seeRobert Booth Fowler, Eerdmans' 1989)' eral Culture in the IJnited Sfates(Grand Rapids' MI: (Garden Ciry NY: DoubleddAnchot Democracy in America 36.Alexis de To cqrreriille,
re69).
3T.Onthesepoints,seealsoRogerFinkeandRodneyStark,TheChurchingofAmerica N|: Rutgers (New Brunswick, Economy in our Religious winnersand Losers 1776-2005: 2005). UniversityPress, and theResur. PatRobertson, lackson, of Discontent: Iesse 38.Allen D.Hertzke,Echoes 1993)' DC: CQ Press' (Washington' of Populisru gence 2009)' UniversityPress' York Cambridge
3g.SeePaulA.DjupeandChristopherP.Gilbert,ThePoliticallnJluenceofChurch(New
40.Ibid.SeealsoPaulA.DjupeandLauraR.Olson,eds.,ReligiouslnterestsinCom
munityConflict(Waco,TX:BaylorUniversityPress'2007);AldonD'Morris'TheOrigin organizingfor change(NewYork:Free Blackcommunities Movement: of thecivil Rights 1984). Press,
4l.FredrickC.Harris,somclhingWithin:ReligioninAfrican-AmericanPoliticalAc c' Harris' ll. Drew smith andFredrick 1999); l)rcss, tivisn (NewYork oxford urrivcrsity ()lrrgylnllucncc,organizationalPartnerships'and Lorrtlt\tlltitt: churt:hcsarrtl lllack eds.,
( ) i v i t ,! l m p o w a r n c f l / ( l , l l t l I l q I t l . M | ) : l l r l w i t t i t t r r r l r t | | . i t t I c f ic l d ' 2 0 ( ) 5 ) . 42. f lertzltt', li'ltott ol Itlxonlent'

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RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Lqtino and African American Religionand Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Latino and African American Religionand Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Latino and African American Religionand Politics

I{IiI,I(;IONAND POLITICS IN AMERICA

and Politics Latino and African American Religion

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Latino and African American Religionand Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Latino and African American Religionand Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Latino and African American Religionand Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Latino and African American Religionand Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Latino and African American Religion and Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Latino and African American Religionand Politics

itself. The religious pluralism we observe among Hispanic Americans

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Latino and African American Religion and Politics

5. George E. schultze, strangers in a Foreign Land: Theorganizingof catholicLatinot

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Latino and African American Religion and Politics

The "Invisible Institution"in theAntebellum Soutlr(New York Oxford University 1978).

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Theoriesof Religiom, Culture, and American Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Theoriesof Religion,Culture, and American Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Culture,and Arnt:ricanI'olilir:s of Religion, Theories

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Theoriesof Religion,Culture, and American Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Theoriesof Religion,Culture, and American Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Theoriesof Religion,Culture, and American Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Culture, and American Politics Theoriesof Religion,

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Theories of Religion, Cullurc,and AmericanPolitics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Theoriesof Religion,Culture, and American Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Theoriesof Religion,Culture, and American Politics

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Theoriesof Religion,Culture, and American Politics

munityConflict(Waco,TX:BaylorUniversityPress'2007);AldonD'Morris'TheOrigin organizingfor change(NewYork:Free Blackcommunities Movement: of thecivil Rights 1984). Press,

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