Comment | Steve Kidd

Climate change is it still a good argument for nuclear?

Post-Fukushima and post-recession, nuclear powers low carbon green credentials have taken a back seat to more pressing short-term concerns in the energy markets. But forgetting about the environmental problems of fossil fuels will not make them go away.

affordability and reliability. Cleanliness encompasses the environmental advantages, both the possibility of clean air in the cities through avoiding the burning of fossil fuels and the longerterm advantage of reducing climate change by avoiding carbon emissions that heat up the atmosphere. Affordability brings in the economic dimension: once a nuclear power station is up and running, it should produce huge quantities of power at a predictably low production cost that, in many circumstances, will outweigh the penalty of high investment costs for the reactors. A nuclear facility should also run almost 24/7 for many years, providing very reliable power whose supply does not depend on large quantities of fossil fuel imports from potentially unreliable supplier countries. The increased interest in nuclear which occurred in the early years of the 21st century (and often became referred to as the nuclear renaissance) had its roots in each of these three positive arguments, depending on the particular country and their circumstances. It can be argued, however, that the environmental case was possibly the most powerful, particularly the potential role of nuclear in averting global warming. If we take the United Kingdom for example, it seems that Prime Minister Tony Blairs conversion from his previous policy (followed by most British politicians for decades) of sitting on the fence regarding nuclear energy was due to his chief scientific advisor David King convincing him that relying on renewable energy alone to meet carbon emission targets was simply not going to be sufficient. Many other people, including previous anti-nuclear environmentalists, went down the same road. A plausible weakness of this position was that it was rather a negative endorsementalmost as if weve tried everything else to combat climate change so we will favour nuclear as the last resortthat is potentially liable to be reversed once something better comes along, or once the perceived problem appears to be going away. Nevertheless, within the work of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in its successive annual World Energy Outlooks, more nuclear began to be seen as an increasingly viable way of preventing the carbon concentration in the atmosphere rising to what are believed to be dangerous levels. Operating nuclear reactors and their attendant fuel cycle create very low levels of greenhouse gases and so building large numbers of new nuclear plants remains a possible solution to an apparent global problem.

uclear proponents tend to advance three main advantages in its favour, which can be summarised as cleanliness,

The Fukushima accident should not have changed the advantages of the climate change argument in favour of nuclear. It has arguably had some impact on the economics of nuclear, through increased costs. And with all bar two of the Japanese reactors not operating, it has dented the reliability argument (even though it took a very rare major accident to do this). Other developments in the market may have conceivably weakened the case. First, the global economic recession in itself has arguably lessened the attention environmental matters are receiving. In a recession, people become more concerned about jobs, inflation and retirement dates than environmental matters. Second, there is

by Steve Kidd

now rather more cynicism about the merits (or more precisely the limits) of the climate science that originally motivated the global warming fears. This was a perhaps inevitable backlash against any new theory that postulates that the world as we know it will come to an end. Combined with the new concentration on money during an economic recession, it has inevitably pushed interest in averting global warming to one side. This is despite the huge publicity given to extreme climatic events such as hurricanes, which seem to be becoming perhaps more frequent and severe in intensity. A general concern about the funny things that are happening with our weather is being countered by the belief that climate change is very complex. The way this logic runs is, despite the efforts of many researchers, we still dont really understand very much about it, so a simple proscription of burning carbon in the atmosphere is unlikely to fit the bill. Third, another environmental argument for averting fossil fuel use, namely the build-up of dirty air in the cities of the developing world, has become more prominent than climate change. As well it should, because this problem now affects the lives of many millions of people today, causing high levels of respiratory disease and many premature deaths. For the Chinese, the prime reason for having huge programmes in nuclear and renewables is to clean up the air in the cities rather than curtail global carbon emissions. Although they recognise that burning coal is adding to the problem, as they see it, climate change has been caused by the developed world, so therefore Western countries are responsible for solving it. Nevertheless, many people still consider climate change a very worrisome problem and continue to see averting the emissions of greenhouse gases as the solution. But how can this be achieved? A recent book by Dieter Helm, The Carbon Crunch How Were Getting Climate Change Wrong and How to Fix it, provides much fertile food for thought. Helm, an Oxford University professor, is probably the

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Steve Kidd | Comment

best-known energy economist in Europe and has served on numerous bodies involved in energy policy and the environment. His book is well worth consideration. Lets start with the premise that curtailing carbon emissions is at least advisable from the precautionary principle, even if we dont necessarily fully accept the relationship between the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and global temperatures. In that case, Helm paints an alarming picture. Despite all the international negotiations over the past few decades, the Kyoto Protocol and the switch towards renewable energy in many countries, emissions continue to rise and coal has begun to play a more, rather than less, important role in world energy. Helm makes a particularly devastating critique of energy and climate change policy in the European Union (EU). It has involved a huge amount of useless posturing by politicians claiming the moral high ground, backed by foolish environmental NGOs who have advocated muddle-headed policies. This incestuous nature of the policy-making process in the EU has led to serious errors, so little has been achieved. Germany is probably the worst case: it has shut down nuclear power stations and replaced them with dirty coal stations rather than renewable energy (which was going to expand rapidly anyway). The much-cited Stern Review that argued that climate change could be averted at relatively little economic cost also comes in for strong criticism. Helm emphasizes that changing the way people produce and consume energy is a difficult transformation to make but can be achieved with sufficient will. Our biggest error, according to Helm, is that we have tried to curb the production of carbon rather than its consumption. Thus the EU has succeeded in cutting carbon emissions in Europe overall, but only by shutting down industry and switching production to China and the developing world. So carbon emissions have simply transferred to another area of the world, where dirty coal is the predominant energy source. The number one challenge for the future, as the IEA keeps emphasizing, is to curb the use of coal (particularly in China and India) and to switch to less environmentally-damaging alternatives. Helms near-term solution is somewhat controversial but also in keeping with current IEA thinking. He emphasizes the magnitude (and expansion flexibility) of fossil fuel reserves (contrary to the peak oil hypothesis) and particularly of gas, buoyed by the ability now to exploit unconventional reserves such as shale gas. He forsees and advocates a worldwide dash for gas, with gas substituting for coal in power generation (and also for oil in the transportation sector) as the best way of curtailing carbon emissions over the next 20 years. This should be backed by carbon taxes at appropriate levels targeted at the consumption rather than the production side. Unlike many economists, he can see the disadvantages of emissions trading but the key point is to penalise carbon consumption. This runs the risk of becoming a bureaucratic nightmare and would need the imposition of border taxes to encourage exporting countries to change their generation mix. His vision seems a more feasible way of going forward than trying to achieve international agreements; it is bottomup rather than top-down. Ultimately, however, Helm puts his faith in technological advances in the energy sector, emphasizing the amount of experimentation and ingenuity that will likely bring better longterm solutions in renewables and elsewhere (maybe even workable carbon capture and storage). On the negative side, Helm doesnt see a major role for nuclear energy in all of this. Its role is rather marginal, as it is in some of the IEA scenarios and the EU Energy Roadmap nuclear power is

The Unit

Alexey Kovynev

All the same I cant get rid of the pleasant thought that Western countries are responsible for all this.

important in a few countries but not so much overall. His chapter on nuclear is rather cursory and tends to concentrate on the obstacles rather than the opportunities, particularly in an era where big capital investment projects are not easy to carry out. He mentions the significant Chinese nuclear programme but doesnt consider whether it could be several times its current magnitude: if France could build a reactor for each million of population in the late 1970s and 1980s, why cant China do the same by 2030 and build 1400 reactors? Despite the fact that any conceivable worldwide solution would have to put China and India at the centre, Helm doesnt seem to know very much about them. Hydropower is hardly mentioned, although it remains central to the Chinese clean energy plans and there remains plenty of potential for it in other developing countries that may otherwise use coal. It is therefore still important for nuclear advocates to emphasize a bigger potential role for nuclear in avoiding carbon emissions and to overcome the objections we are only too familiar with. The economic challenge is currently the most pressing, stemming from rising nuclear construction costs, low gas prices in some markets (which could become more widespread) and the realisation that high levels of carbon taxes are not going to come very quickly. The Chinese nuclear programme has suddenly become even more crucial for the international industry as a whole, and it is good that the approvals process for additional new reactors there has at last opened up again. The limitations of current renewables (as opposed to the advancements that Helm expects to come eventually) are well-understood in a country that needs huge quantities of reliable power in specific localities (lots of big cities) and hydro will eventually become site-limited. So assuming the (almost) 30 reactors under construction are built on time and operate safely, a huge programme in the 2020s is not inconceivable. Then the advantages of large-scale production of standardized reactors should flow to other countries too.

Steve Kidd is deputy director-general of the World Nuclear Association, where he has worked since 1995 (when it was the Uranium Institute). Any views expressed are not necessarily those of the World Nuclear Association and/or its members.

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EPR | Instrumentation & control

The UK EPRTM digital I&C system

The I&C architecture of the AREVA/EDF UK EPR reactor follows defence-in-depth and diversity principles that ensure adequate robustness in compliance with UK regulatory expectations. This architecture was submitted to the UK safety authorities in the frame of the Generic Design Assessment, accepted in principle in 2010, and received Design Acceptance Certification in December 2012.
Level 2 Unit supervision and control

Safety information and control system

Main centre room + Remote shutdown station
Severe accident (SA) controls and indications DAS controls and indications Protection system controls and indications Process automation system (PAS) controls and indications

Process information and central system

Main control room Remote shutdown station QDS Plant overview panel (2 OWP-5 screens+ mini con g) TCS NSS Waste I&C engineering work stations (1 OWP-5 screens) Technical centre station Nuclear steam supply Teleperm XS I&C Centre system

Safety automation system (SAS) controls and indications

(4 OWP-5 screens) Quali ed display system

Level 1 System automation

Risk reduction line

Plant bus
Severe accident I&C (CI 3) Noncomputerized safety system (NCSS) (CI 2) Protection system (CI 1)

Main line
Gateway Plant bus Gateway

Preventive line
Gateway

Safety automation system (CI 2)

Reactor central surveillance & limitation system (CI 2)

Process automation system (CI 3)

Turbine generator I&C (NC)

Switch gear

Switch gear

SAS NCSS Switch gear

SAS PAS NCSS SA I&C

Level 0 Process interface

Digital central rod drive control system (Class 2)

Switch gear

RT devices

Signal conditioning (and distribution when needed)

Teleperm XS SPPA T2000/S7 Other technology

Note: Bus connections are shown in principle and does not reect the actual physical conguration

Non-computerized

he I&C architecture comprises all of the automation and safety systems for nuclear power plant safe operation by allowing continuous monitoring and control of the plant parameters. The I&C architecture basically comprises sensors to transform physical data into electrical signals, and programmable controllers to process these signals, provide actuator control and monitoring, and means of control used by the plant operators. The overall design of the I&C system and associated equipment must comply with process, nuclear safety and operational requirements.

The design of a NPP relies on different safety levels for systems, structures and components, in compliance with general IAEA guides and in line with the local regulations. For I&C functions, this safety categorization is complemented by additional design requirements applicable to the I&C system class associated to an I&C function-specific category based on IEC61226. The structure of the EPR instrumentation and control system is characterized by three main levels of organisation: Level 0 corresponds to sensors and actuators Level 1 carries out the automation

functions: it comprises the reactor control and protection systems, the turbogenerator control and protection system, and the system performing all other automation functions (plant control and protection) Level 2 carries out functions related to the human-machine interface that allow the plant to be operated and monitored. The I&C level 2 systems are principally located in the main control room (MCR) and remote shutdown station (RSS). These systems can be broken down into two distinct groupings; computerised and conventional systems. There are two level 2

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Instrumentation & control | EPR

computerised systems; the process information and central system (PICS) and the protection system (PS) operation terminal (PSOT) and one level 2 conventional system: the safety information and control system (SICS). Plant operations generally take place on PICS, direct control of PS takes place on PSOT and a diverse and non-computerised SICS is used when PICS or PSOT is unavailable. The data exchanges between the level 1 I&C systems and the PICS take place over the plant network. The plant network crosses the divisions and extends through the nuclear island safeguard and electrical buildings, the

effluent treatment building, the diesel buildings and the electrical building on the conventional island. The plant network is Class 3 with a SC1 seismic requirement and, for availability reasons, is designed to withstand a single failure as well as internal hazards within a division. I&C functions and equipment are categorized depending on their importance to safety. I&C functions are thus implemented using components with the appropriate quality level for their safety class. The concept of Defence-in-Depth and Diversity (DiD) ensures the effectiveness of the protective barriers by identifying the threats to their integrity and by providing

The benefits of digital I&C

The use of digital I&C systems in nuclear power plants corresponds to a general trend. Its appeal is due to multiple factors: Digital I&C hardware components are suitable to withstand harsh environmental conditions. The use of modified packaging hardware allows withstanding accelerations such as those due to an earthquake or an aircraft crash. Appropriate shielding measures for the cabinets ensure that the stringent requirements on electromagnetic compatibility are also met Digital I&C systems have been shown to be generally more reliable than their analogue-based predecessors. In particular, digital I&C is more compact than analogue-based platforms to implement the same functions. Components have low failure rates and are more resistant to drift effects as evidenced by the available experience feedback Digital I&C is suitable to embed failure monitoring features. Digital I&C systems include comprehensive self-testing features, thus minimizing the possibility of failures remaining undetected until the system is called on to act, significantly reducing the need for periodic tests. Such features minimize maintenance interventions and significantly reduce human factors errors resulting in a decrease of the plant availability Digital I&C benefits from the power of software tools to easily modify, test and simulate implemented functions and to detect and replace failed components. Forward support documentation, which ensures the consistency between the description of system requirements and the implemented functions over the whole lifecycle of a system, is also easier to issue and to update Digital I&C provides a much higher degree of freedom in the implementation of functional needs, in particular of a user-friendly Human-Machine Interface (HMI). The capacities offered by computerized HMI enable the development of support functions for the operators, minimizing the possibilities for human error in plant operation. In particular, alarms are categorized and are filtered depending on plant conditions, which significantly reduce the amount of alarms displayed to the operators in case of an event, compared with analogue-based HMI. The implementation of computerized operating procedures also provides support to the operators. All these features minimize the workload of the operators in stressful conditions The capacity offered by computerized HMI also eases maintenance operations when a failure is detected or when preventive maintenance is required. One good example of the power of digital systems is that, in case of a malfunction, they can prioritize the error messages so as not to confuse the operator with the sheer mass of data generated by that malfunction Last but not least, the new generation of plant operators is less familiar with analogue systems than digital ones through familiarity with many computer-based applications. Nevertheless, as with every innovation, digital systems raise questions amongst the safety authorities. Most concerns about digital systems are related to their intrinsic complexity compared to analogue systems, due to more complex electronic boards, embedded components, and the increased probability of common cause failure (CCF) with digital systems, in comparison with more simple analogue modules where CCF can generally be ruled out. Safety authorities have also recognized the real benefit of using digital systems, but require that I&C architecture design shall be robust and consider CCF as a basis of the design. In countries where the diversity between two digital I&C platforms is not considered sufficient, non-computerized technologies (analogue or based on Programmable Logic Devices or Field Processing Gate Arrays) are used to reach the expected levels in the defence-in-depth and diversity approach to design of modern I&C architecture in new nuclear power plants.

successive lines of defence to protect them from failure. The I&C architecture relies on three main lines of defence: Preventive line, whose goal is to control the main plant parameters within their expected operating range and control potential deviations. It includes hazards protection Main line of protection (class 1 I&C safety features, called safe path I&C safety features, providing a back up in case of loss of the Protection System) used to prevent core melt functions to protect against hazards Risk reduction line used to prevent core melt in case of common cause failure of digital I&C systems preventing the main line of protection to operate and mitigate the consequences of severe accidents with a dedicated I&C system. The preventive line includes: Process Automation System (PAS), whose main role is the monitoring and control of the plant in all normal operating conditions. In addition, the PAS performs sufficient monitoring and control of sub-functions related to risk reduction Reactor Control, Surveillance and Limitation System (RCSL) that processes Category B, Category C and noncategorised I&C functions related to core control and monitoring, including core control functions and the automatic limiting conditions of operation (LCO) functions and limitation functions for core parameters and for the reactor coolant circuit requiring control rod actuation The turbine generator I&C system. The main line of protection includes: A Reactor Protection System (PS) that monitors the safety parameters in all plant condition categories, and for all initiating events, enables the automatic Category A protection and safety I&C functions, the automatic Category A control I&C functions of the safety support systems and the manual Category A I&C functions Safety Automation System (SAS) whose main functions include: post-accident management I&C functions (manual and automatic) necessary to bring the plant from the controlled state to the safe shutdown state after an initiating event (Category B), Category A & B I&C functions preventing significant radioactive release including those that are the diverse line of protection in the main line of defence, as well as other actions. The risk reduction line includes: Non-Computerised Safety System (NCSS) that provides protection and control in case

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EPR | Instrumentation & control

of total loss of computerised I&C functions (that is, those performed by systems based on the SPPA-T2000 and TELEPERM XS (TXS) platforms) Severe Accident I&C system that provides the necessary commands and information in the event of a severe accident coupled with, or due to, a Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP), loss of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) and Ultimate Diesel Generators (UDG).

Other AREVA TELEPERM XS Instrumentation and control platform installations

Ongoing and future developments ensure the long-term availability of hardware and software for those TELEPERM XS digital computer-based applications already installed. This provides the basis for a sustainable system with a service life guaranteed for the long term. Since the first TELEPERM XS installation in 1998, 74 nuclear units worldwide built by different vendors have installed or ordered these systems as part of upgrade packages and new-build projects. The TELEPERM XS system is designed to interface with most existing reactor types. AREVA I&C systems are also being employed to modernize reactors in Argentina (Atucha 1, a Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor), Germany (eight units), The Netherlands (Borssele), Spain (Santa Maria de Garoa), Sweden (four units), and Switzerland (three units). In April, a consortium comprising AREVA and Siemens Energy was selected to supply TELEPERM XS I&C systems for units 3 & 4both VVERsat the Mochovce NPP under construction in Slovakia. Unit 3 is scheduled to be operational by the end of 2012 and unit 4 in 2013. This is the latest in a series of contracts to supply AREVA I&C systems for VVER reactors. Other countries that have awarded similar contracts include Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, as well as China for the Tianwan plant. AREVA and Siemens are also modernizing I&C systems at the Loviisa plant in Finland, which has two VVER reactors. It has also supplied a TELEPERM XS for a VVER unit to be built at phase II of Russias Novovoronezh NPP. The plant is scheduled for grid connection in 2014. A similar contract was signed with Russian Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation (VNIIAES a subsidiary of Rosatom Corp) in 2008 to supply TELEPERM XS for modernization of the Kola NPP in northern Russia.

Redundancy, separation, diversity

The EPR I&C systems and equipment comply with the principles of redundancy, diversity and separation applied in the design of the EPR reactor safety-related systems. For example the Safety Injection System and the Emergency Feedwater System, which each consist of four redundant and independent trains, also have four redundant and independent I&C channels. The EPR reactor system uses three technical platforms: the AREVA TXS platform, the Siemens SPPA-T2000 digital I&C system, and the AREVA UNICORN platform for the non-computerised safety system. Each safety and safety-related I&C system is designed to be able to satisfactorily fulfil its functions even if one of its channels is not available due to a failure and a second one is unavailable for preventive maintenance reasons. The level of availability of the I&C systems performing safety functions is specified so as to comply with the probabilistic safety targets adopted in the EPR reactor design. Common cause failure is taken into account in the design of the I&C architecture, from the sensors level up to the humanmachine interfaces for the operators. The design also deals with the main and diverse backup means to cope with CCF of the modern computerized operators workstations. In short, the UK EPR I&C architecture offers: A quadruple-redundant digital safety I&C Diverse digital I&C systems to cope with a complete failure of the Protection System (PS) A non-computerized safety system. For example, the RCSL and PS are both implemented on the TXS platform, and both systems act upon the control rods. The RCSL acts upon the control rods in normal operation and is designed to support the limitation functions in order to avoid demands for protection action. The PS trips the reactor if protection limits are reached. If a common cause failure of the RCSL and PS were to occur, it could lead to an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS), as both systems could fail to send the signal to insert control rods when necessary. In this case, the

SAS, which is implemented on the SPPAT2000 platform, would recover the situation and enable the controlled state to be reached. The reactor trip equipment and the boration systems (the Safety Injection System and the Extra Boration System) are initiated by multiple I&C signals. The implementation of these I&C functions and signals in the I&C systems depends on which line of defence the function and signal belong to. The reactor trip equipment and the boration systems are both actuated by the same I&C system (PS / TXS platform) as they belong to the main line of defence. However, because the reactor trip, SIS initiation and EBS initiation are also required in the diverse line of protection within the main line of defence, which protects against RRC-A multiple failure events, they can also be actuated by the diverse SAS (SPPA-T2000). Therefore, in the event of unavailability of the PS, the Reactor Trip, SIS and EBS functions would still be available. The main NCSS automatic functions are reactor and turbine trip, main feedwater isolation and emergency feedwater system actuation. These actions leave the plant in a stable steady-state condition. Other automatic functions such as reactor cooling pump trip, component cooling water system isolation, or chemical and volume control system (CVCS) isolation take care of specific dominant events and sequences.

Non-Computerized Safety System

Following the requirements from the UK regulators to ensure a complete independence of the organization for the design of the digital safety I&C platform and the non-computerized

system, AREVA decided together with EDF in 2012 to launch the development of a new safety platform via its subsidiary AREVA TA located in Aix-en-Provence, France. AREVA TA has a long experience in designing digital and non-computerized safety I&C for the purpose of propulsion and research reactors. This new platform will be primarily developed for the UK EPR reactor and be further extended to address the larger world market. The safety modules are designed as simple components, such as discrete elements (transistors, transformers), TTL logic gates or operational amplifiers, and the logic is performed with the already-proven and failsafe Magnetic Dynamic Logic technology. This technology uses dynamic signals combined together through magnetic transformers. When the plant and its safety systems are operating normally, the signals received by the NCSS are always dynamic. In case of malfunction, the signal(s) will become static and the output of the NCSS will be driven to 0, automatically indicating to the plant operators that an action is required on the concerned safety systems. With this design, any failure mode of the electronic components of the modules can be demonstrated to lead to a zero-level output. This intrinsic safety feature is based on transformers and transistors, combined with a dynamic clock signal. Using transformers also ensures electrical isolation between inputs and outputs, which is needed to avoid fault propagation in safety systems. AREVA has a long and solid experience with this technology; it has been designing and installing this type of modules on nuclear propulsion and research reactors since the late 1970s.

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