Ralph Mller

INTERACTION

IN

METAPHOR

There are two ways to approach metaphors: One emphasizes the infinite creativity of metaphor and its resistance to fixation of sense or meaning. The other one assumes that metaphor is a fairly common (and therefore fundamental) phenomenon in speech, which can be researched according to its principles of cognitive processing. Although the divide between these two approaches does not strictly follow the alleged opposition of the sciences and the humanities, we find many literary scholars among proponents of the first approach, and mostly psychologists and linguists among adherents to the latter. The first approach has much appeal for literary scholarship, as it fits very well the type of open-ended reading and the meticulous exploration of different meanings of a literary text of literary hermeneutics. However, if taken to the extreme, the unlimited creativity of interpretation may lead to awkward poststructuralist positions which proclaim and practice the impossibility of successful communication (e.g., Lacan). If you agree that, even if literary scholars typically strive for novel or most interesting readings of a text, there must also be some kind of minimal mutual consensus among philologists when interpreting a metaphor, then you might also accept that it is worthwhile to investigate the principles of cognitive processing that underlie such interpretations. In the following essay I will review some recent theories about metaphor processing from psychology and cognitive linguistics. Although the paper is written from the perspective of literary studies, it requires my venturing into other disciplines and, hence, an acceptance of research questions which may look at first sight remote from literary studies. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that knowing how we normally process metaphors allows a better understanding of what proficient readers of literature do when they are looking for best readings of a metaphor. Cognitive Poetics has contributed significantly in this respect (see Stockwell). Evolutionary Psychology (EP) is another promising source of information that explains mechanisms that are at work when all human beings consume fiction or poetry. At the same time, EP does not propose some kind of genetic determinism, but considers the possibility that evolved cognitive mechanisms may serve different purposes under modern conditions, and that such

Studies in the Literary Imagination 42.2, 61 Fall 2009 Georgia State University

Interaction in Metaphor mechanisms may even have become counterproductive for reproduction under modern conditions (see Tooby and Cosmides, Conceptual 1941; Eibl, Animal 1472). Consequently, EP is not confined to explaining sexual procreation. It might also offer explanations of why and when readers may engage in mind-boggling interpretations of poetic metaphors. This presupposes, as I will argue, a well-balanced reflection upon cognitive principles that guide the processes of understanding, plus an awareness of the possibility that some of these principles may be overridden for communicative purposes. The main idea is to adopt cognitive models of processing metaphorical meaning, but also to complement the models with an account of literary deviation which is in accordance with the interests of literary studies. As there are various definitions of deviation, I should emphasize that deviation is used here in the sense of functional deviations from regular ways of expressing oneself (e.g., writing in verse, using neologisms for communicative purposes; see Fricke). Deviation is, therefore, a neither necessary nor sufficient feature of literature: for instance, linguistic deviation is also frequently found in advertising; at the same time, it is difficult to imagine a piece of literature that has reached a level of absolute deviation.1 Nevertheless, deviation is a typical feature of literature, and it is typically in the center of interest of literary scholars. This is no coincidence: Since Mukaovsk we have known that deviation draws greater attention to the form of an utterance with beneficial results both for the content of the utterance and its producer.

THE BENEFIT

OF

METAPHOR

Looking at metaphors in terms of evolutionary adaptations is a new way of asking why we use them. The problem is not only that there is no obvious benefit attached to using metaphors. In fact, if we consider Thomas Hobbess critique of metaphor, we may even come to the conclusion that metaphor is something inherently treacherous: The generall use of Speech, he wrote in Leviathan, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse into Verbal (25). It seems that Hobbes believed that our thoughts represent real world objects in a direct way, and that our words can match our thoughts more (in literal and honest use of speech) or less (in figurative use of language or lies) adequately. Consequently, he criticized the use of metaphors in rational discourse, as metaphors (and other senseless and ambiguous words) are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities (36). Interestingly enough,

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Ralph Mller Hobbess critique of metaphor demonstrates how difficult it is to talk about certain cognitive phenomena such as reasoning without using metaphors (e.g., ignes fatui, wandering amongst). Nevertheless, metaphor seems to be a problematic way of communicating unambiguously and reliably about the world. Just take a simple word such as fire. It has a surprisingly large number of meanings both literal and metaphorical. The difference between yelling fire! during a theater performance and speaking of the holy fire of love is important, and misunderstanding this difference could even be fatal. Of course, it is always an entire organism that is selected by evolutionary pressures, and not its singular features. Therefore, it could be conceivable that mankind survived despite frequent use of metaphor (just as procrastination is a frequent, though problematic human behavior). However, the view that metaphor is a by-product of evolution is at odds with observations that metaphor, far from being a marginal phenomenon, is universal in human speech: (1) Metaphors occur very frequently in written and spoken language, and they occur across all genres including poetic genres and everyday conversation (pervasiveness or ubiquity of metaphor, see Paprott and Dirven; Lakoff 3). (2) Most metaphors seem to rely on more abstract metaphorical systems or mappings which suggests a close relationship between metaphorical thinking and metaphorical language (see Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors). (3) Theoretical reflection about metaphor can be traced back over a long period of time in different cultures: The first explicit theoretical definition of metaphor can be found in the influential works of Aristotle, but we can find theoretical reflections about metaphor or related phenomena independent of Aristotle in other cultures, such as Arab and Chinese culture (see Leezenberg 4356; see Feng 57f). (4) Finally, linguists, anthropologists and others have identified metaphorical use of words in ancient texts (as in Mesopotamian texts) and various non Indo-European languages (see Katz 199f; see Leezenberg 16f). These observations suggest that metaphor is neither an embellished nor an absurd way of expressing thoughts, but emerges from integral features of the human mind. Consequently, we would also expect a sound evolutionary explanation of this phenomenon. However, such an explana-

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Interaction in Metaphor tion will probably differ according to the definitions of metaphor.2 For instance, each of the following examples has been considered to be metaphorical by at least one researcher: Juliet is the sun My surgeon is a butcher Things took a turn for the worse Im in trouble In the following I will adopt I. A. Richardss suggestion to understand metaphor as the product of the interaction of two ideas. More specifically, I will differentiate between vehicle, which denotes the metaphorically used word with its literal content, and topic, which denotes the contextually coherent new content of a metaphorically used expression (see Kittay 2428). Note that metaphor understood in this way is not identical with a metaphorically used word.3 It only depends on the metaphorical expression, as it requires the presence of at least one metaphorically used word which carries a marked difference between the basic (literal) meaning of the vehicle and the contextual meaning of the metaphorically used word based on the interaction between topic and vehicle.4

METAPHOR

AND THE

INDUCTIVE INSTINCT

An explanation of the benefit of metaphor in terms of EP has to consider the conditions under which our hunting and gathering Pleistocene ancestors survived and reproduced (see Tooby and Cosmides, Psychological Foundations and Conceptual Foundations). In this context, Karl Eibl has proposed that metaphor can be explained by the inductive instinct (Kuh 46). Induction is a not very reliable, but nevertheless useful mechanism by which we are able to generalize singular experiences. Eibl illustrates this benefit with the considerable advantages a hunter and gatherer may have gained from drawing analogies between cows and goats. In this respect, the inductive instinct provides a powerful answer to the adaptive problem of finding food or avoiding predators by drawing analogies among members of the same category. According to Eibl, metaphors would also use this inductive mechanism, although metaphorical induction remains incomplete in that it does not lead to complete categories with a hyponym such as cloven hoofed animals for cows and goats. Eibls explanation shows convincingly how experience with one animal could be made available via induction to understand another animal, but

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Ralph Mller he uses an example which is not metaphorical: If you compare goats and cows (or apples and oranges) then you are still drawing analogies among members of the same category. However, there are considerable differences between drawing analogies within one category and drawing analogies across categories (or experiential domains). On the one hand, the literal comparison Cows are like goats and its reversed form Goats are like cows can both be explained by the same features (e.g., they have horns, fur, hooves; they can give milk). Metaphorical comparisons, on the other hand, relate different domains of experience and therefore produce different comparisons if they are reversed. For instance, if we compared cows with fire (e.g., This cow is like fire), we would highlight a different set of analogous features than if we reversed the same comparison (see Mooij 58; Ortony 345f; Glucksberg and Keysar 4). Eibl does not explain this difference between literal and metaphorical comparison, but with the help of the work by Glucksberg and Keysar, it is possible to reformulate Eibls inductive instinct. Glucksberg and Keysar started from the observation that metaphorical comparisons can be reformulated as metaphors (e.g., This cow is a fire), but that literal comparisons are false if they are reformulated in the form A is a B (for example This cow is a goat). Glucksberg proposes a simple explanation for this phenomenon by assuming that metaphors are class-inclusion statements (Glucksberg 38). Class-inclusion suggests that terms in a metaphorical utterance of the form A is a B are not on the same level of abstraction.5 In fact, the vehicle would merely suggest an ad hoc category under which we are invited to subsume the topic of the same metaphor. Thus, stating This cow is like fire invites us to assume an ad hoc categorylets call it *fireunder which we should subsume a particular cow and some fire (which is at the same time the prototypical category member that characterizes all category members). This view of metaphor as a class-inclusion statement would fit Eibls view of the inductive instinct. In fact, it fits the mechanism of induction better than Eibl supposes, as metaphor would not entail analogy on the same level of abstraction, but constitutes a contextual subsumption of something under an ad hoc category.

METAPHOR

AND

MAPPING

The class-inclusion theory shows how the inductive instinct might work. In terms of an evolutionary explanation we should also determine whether the inductive instinct can explain the metaphorical systems that

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Interaction in Metaphor have been the focus of cognitive linguistics over the last thirty years. The idea that important parts of cognition are structured metaphorically was proposed most famously by Lakoff and Johnson in their monograph Metaphors We Live By. Research in the vein of the Theory of Conceptual Metaphor (TCM) has demonstrated that metaphors are very frequent when we communicate about emotions (see Kvecses et al). We tend, for instance, to use journey-metaphors to talk about love relationships: Look how far weve come. Its been a long, bumpy road. We cant turn back now. (Lakoff 206) This systematic use of metaphors to talk about abstract phenomena and complex experiences points towards the adaptive problem: How to talk about things about which we lack the words (new discoveries) or even the immediate percepts (e.g., time, love relationships). The TCM claims that most abstract concepts are not only metaphorically expressed, but also metaphorically understood. If the TCM is correct, metaphors would project or map concrete embodied experience of a source domain onto an abstract target domain. Moreover, its account of embodiment, according to which conceptual metaphors arise from bodily experience, is compatible with an evolutionary perspective (see Carroll 104). However, it is important to note that combining TCM with EP is difficult because of the different views of the modularity of mind endorsed by the two approaches. The modularity debate is essentially about what kinds of cognitive ability and content are innate (as modules) or acquired when cognitive mappings become entrenched by frequent activation (by learning). TCM belongs to a tradition of holistic cognitive linguistics, and its self-image is at least partly defined by an opposition to Noam Chomskys modular view of language (see the lengthy refutation of Chomskyan ideas in Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy 469512), whereas Chomsky is still the major point of linguistic reference within EP (see Pinker). For outsiders it is difficult to take sides in this debate, as both positions are supported by valid and important arguments. For instance, modules explain why babies can mimic faces in the first months of their lives, and the fast progress of language development. Finally, modules could provide an explanation of why the mind can process complex situations with infinite possibilities and take decisions to achieve desirable outcomes without suffering from combinatorial explosion:

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Ralph Mller What counts as good performance for one task (e.g., depth perception) is completely different from what counts as good performance for other tasks (e.g., incest avoidance, immune regulation, avoiding contagion, imitating, eating). The only unifying element in discriminating success from failure is whether an act promotes fitness. Consequently, our evolved psychological architecture needs substantial built-in content-specific structure to discriminate adaptive success from failure. There needs to be at least as many different domain-specific psychological adaptations as there are evolutionarily recurrent functional tasks with different criteria for success. (Tooby and Cosmides, Psychological 111) This view leads to a position also labeled massive modularity, which is based on the assumption that the human capacity for adaptive flexibility and powerful problem-solving is so great precisely because of the number and the domain-specificity of the mechanisms we have (Tooby and Cosmides, Psychological 113). This view, however, is contested.6 In particular, metaphor is, as it happens, a good example of the human faculty of drawing analogies across different domains (e.g., by using tactile perception to think about abstract thinking when we say that we grasp an idea). It is not conceivable how domain-specific or content-specific modules can account for all the metaphors we use without reaching a level of complexity that borders on holism. In fact, metaphor is a strong argument against massive modularity, as it demonstrates the permeability of various domains of thinking and perception (see Chiappe 140). Therefore, it seems adequate that Eibls inductive instinct is not content-specific. Nevertheless, such a general inductive instinct could still have evolved through evolution if one agrees that innateness is not necessarily connected to content-specific modularity (see Fodor 6870; Dunbar and Barrett 5f). A weaker version of EP (and a moderate account of modularity) could propose that the ability to draw analogies across domains constitutes a successful adaptation, which, for instance, allows humans to communicate about abstract planning or understanding of the seasons.

METAPHOR

AND

CATEGORIZATION

So far, we have seen that metaphors and metaphorical comparisons differ from literal comparisons in the way that metaphorical thinking draws on different domains or categories. At this point I am not yet con-

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Interaction in Metaphor cerned with the issue of whether this happens by conceptual mapping (as proposed by the TCM) or by class-inclusion. On the contrary, in order to determine the difference between literal induction and metaphorical analogy it is necessary that we take a closer look at the cognitive ability to cross domains. It seems indeed that metaphor presupposes some kind of a calculated category mistake (see Goodman 73). This suggests that abstract (de-contextualized) categorization may interfere with metaphorical understanding of metaphors, but there is here an additional complication, which is in particular relevant for EP: Leezenberg reviews some evidence that members of preliterate, unschooled, non-urbanized societies show difficulties in handling schematic and rigid classifications (1527): Let me start with the remark pa e-do nabure (we are parrots) uttered by the Brazilian Bororo Indians. This sentence is uttered in rituals where Bororo males adorn themselves with feathers of the bird in question. Even there, however, it is asserted only of males, outside of this specific context, the Bororo seem less inclined to assent to it. To Karl von Steinen, the ethnologist who first noted this usage, and to Durkheim & Mauss it suggested that the Bororo could not distinguish between men and animals, and more in general had difficulties in categorizing the world around them. [However] the most salient fact to be noted here is that the Bororo do not appear to consider it false, deviant or inappropriate given the linguistic and actional context of the ritual. (1617) Leezenberg concludes that some societies (typically preliterate and unschooled) may lack the skill of abstract, de-contextualized categorization, and, consequently, show difficulties in identifying metaphorically used words as figurative, special, or deviant (25). Leezenbergs argument might lead to the conclusion that decontextualized categorization and drawing the difference between the metaphorical and literal use of words is a culturally acquired competence. However, from an evolutionary point of view it is helpful to remember that induction entails a future dimension: Comparing cows and goats may lead to an abstract category of cloven hoofed animals if the inferences from this category are reliable in the future. Metaphors, on the other hand, are only contextually acceptable categorizations, and it seems that the Bororo are well aware of it, as they show no belief that they will be parrots after the ritual (in the near future).7 The fact that the Bororo are not aware of the contextual figurative use of parrot is only a problem if one insists that language users

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Ralph Mller are always aware of the metaphoricity of their utterances. Metaphors, however, often go unnoticed in communication acts. In fact, there are many reports by metaphor analysts that they were the only ones among all discourse participants to realize the potential metaphoricity of certain comments. For instance, Rumelhart reports how he witnessed the creation of a new metaphor: One day I was driving down a freeway with my wife and two children when one of my sons, age eight, remarked: Hey, Mom, my sock has a hangnail. My wife, quietly, and without special note, responded: Dont worry about it, Ill fix it when we get home, and the topic was dropped. I was the only one of the four who even noticed anything unusual in this interchange. Here, a new metaphor was created, produced, and comprehended without the slightest awareness by either of the primary participants. (72) These considerations suggest several important conclusions: U Understanding metaphors does not seem to presuppose a conscious awareness of the difference between the metaphorical and literal meanings of metaphorically used words. U At the same time, it seems that the awareness of literal meaning is a particular way of appreciating language which is usually confined to certain contexts (reading poetry) or particularly trained discourse participants (e.g., literary scholars and linguists). The consequence is that many aspects of meaning, of interaction between vehicle and topic, which are often in the center of literary interests, only appear after prolonged processing (see Schumacher).

METAPHOR

AND INTERACTION

The considerations above suggest that a reader/hearer may entertain a metaphorical meaning without being aware of it. The question is now whether the literal meaning of the vehicle plays any role in the understanding of a metaphor at all. It might be useful to start with an outdated account of how we may come to a metaphorical meaning. There is still a widespread opinion that the understanding of utterances follows a sequence of different steps: In a first step we would understand utterances literally, and if we perceive an incongruity between the literal meaning and the context of the expression

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Interaction in Metaphor we may activate a metaphorical processing (e.g., Searle 102f). Such a view of metaphorical meaning provides a powerful tool to explain why and when certain expressions may be considered to be metaphorical. However, measurements of reading times (see Gibbs 109) suggest that readers do not need additional processing time to yield an understanding of a metaphorical utterance. As a consequence, it seems unlikely that readers would first process a statement literally, before accessing its metaphorical meaning. On the contrary, it seems that, even if a metaphor is unconventional, the non-literal (contextual) meaning is available as quickly as the equivalent literal meaning. These findings suggest that readers can access an apt contextual meaning of a metaphor directly without developing a full-fledged metaphorical meaning (with an awareness of a difference between vehicle and topic). As a consequence, normal, direct understanding of metaphors seems to be very different from the philological interpretation of metaphors, which typically shows explicit awareness of vehicle and topic. However, a direct understanding of metaphors is not necessarily proof that the literal meaning of the vehicle has become obsolete in the process of understanding a metaphor. Studies by Rachel Giora, based on her graded salience theory, have shown that there is evidence that the literal meaning of an expression is retained for subsequent processing (see Giora 121). In general, this is good news for literary scholars: Our way of reconstructing the meaning of metaphors may be different from the usual immediate contextual interpretations; nevertheless, it seems to be based on some kind of exhaustive processing of metaphors which is not entirely detached from immediate processing. This is at this point mere speculation, as most empirical studies have focused on immediate processing. Nevertheless, many studies on immediate processing of metaphors explain metaphorical meaning in terms of interaction between vehicle and topic, and may, therefore, serve as starting points for an improved description of the literary understanding of metaphor.8 Moreover, these theories provide principles of typical metaphorical processing which may explain how metaphors can become special by deviating from the regular uses of metaphors, and how understanding of metaphors in literature could deviate from immediate processing.

THE PRINCIPLES

OF

UNIDIRECTIONALITY

AND

CLASS-INCLUSION

According to Glucksbergs class-inclusion theory, metaphorical meaning is the result of an interaction between a vehicle offering a set of features

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Ralph Mller and a topic selecting the contextually relevant dimensions (see Glucksberg and Keysar; Glucksberg). This leaves vehicle and topic with precisely defined roles in such a way that the topic seems to exploit selectively the features of the vehicle. Moreover, Glucksberg considers the structure of class-inclusion (in which the vehicle designates an ad hoc category under which the topic is contextually subsumed) as evidence that they can normally only be formulated in one direction: Thus, just as literal classinclusion assertions are, in principle, nonreversible, so are metaphorical class-inclusion assertions; sermons are sleeping pills makes sense, but sleeping pills are sermons does not ( 45). Glucksberg considers these kinds of reversed metaphors to be anomalous. Interestingly enough this idea looks similar to what has been labeled the unidirectionality principle in the TCM, which claims that conceptual mappings are typically directed from a more concrete source domain to a more abstract target domain (see Kvecses 6). Thus, the unidirectionality principle posits that we tend to use more accessible or more concrete domains of experience (journeys, sleeping pills) to understand more complex and abstract domains (life, sermons). From the perspective of EP unidirectionality makes sense, as the concrete percepts and experiences with the environment offer natural domains for further metaphorical exploitation. However, from a perspective of literary studies such views seem too constraining: a metaphor is not necessarily a one-way-street. I can easily imagine a context in which somebody could describe the quick effect of a sleeping pill by drawing analogies to last Sundays sermon. Moreover, it seems that the principle of unidirectionality may be overridden for rhetorical or poetical purposes (e.g., because metaphors may attract more attention if they deviate from familiar patterns). The poetic potential of reversing the direction of metaphorical comparisons has been described by the Austrian writer Robert Musil in his memorial address to the poet Rainer Maria Rilke: Say a writer compares a particular November evening he is talking about with a soft woollen cloth. Another writer could just easily compare a particular woollen cloth to a November evening. In all such cases, the charm consists in the reinvigoration of a somewhat worn-out area of feelings and ideas by the addition of elements from a new area. (Musil 245) Musil does not only discuss the possibility of reversing the direction of metaphorical analogies, thus overriding the principle of unidirectionality. He emphasizes in particular the possibility that vehicle and topic (or what

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Interaction in Metaphor Lakoff and Johnson call source and target domain) may be interwoven in such way that they transcend the unidirectional relationship between vehicle and topic: But now I ask you: Instead of saying the November evening is like a cloth or that the cloth is like a November evening, could one not say both at the same time? What my question is asking is what Rilke was perpetually doing. In his poetry, things are woven as in a tapestry. If one observes them, they are separate, but if one regards the background, it connects the things with each other. (Musil 246)

THE PRINCIPLE

OF INVARIANCE

The kind of reciprocal interaction between topic and vehicle, where neither has a clearly defined role, as described by Musil, is in contrast to another principle: the invariance principle. This principle is called the invariance principle because the conceptual material that is mapped from the source preserves its basic structure in the mapping (Kvecses 103). More importantly, invariance means also that knowledge from the source domain which is not coherent with the target domain is blocked out. As a consequence, if we talk about love or life in terms of a journey, we will still acknowledge that we cannot walk back in time. On a smaller scale, the same principle is proposed by the class-inclusion theory, as it claims that the vehicle offers a set of features which are filtered by contextually relevant dimensions of the topic (see Glucksberg and Keysar; Glucksberg).9 Thus, invariance indicates that metaphorical meaning is developed under certain restrictions which are contextually imposed by the topic (respectively by a conventional invariant conceptual mapping). From an evolutionary point of view such restrictions seem a reasonable way of blocking out unnecessary inferences. For instance, by understanding a cow in terms of a fire, it is probably not relevant to take into account that we can cook beef on a fire. In a similar way, if we call a sermon a sleeping pill the topic will emphasize contextually the effect of a sleeping pill, and not its shape or the habit of swallowing it with a glass of water. Nevertheless, it might appear witty if somebody said of a sermon that he found it difficult to swallow last Sundays sleeping pill without a drink. In fact, exploring the potential analogies between vehicle and topic is a successful technique of probing conventional metaphors or eliciting humor. The same is not only true for the production of literature, but also for its reception, as

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Ralph Mller many readers increase their appreciation of the quality of a metaphor by exploring its potential analogies (see Sperber and Wilson 23137). These kinds of explorations may help to motivate an authors choice of a metaphorical expression, although such explorations may easily go beyond what an author could possibly have intended by using a metaphor. As a consequence, it is difficult to predict the outcome of such an exploration, which is why metaphor interpretations run the risk of becoming impressionistic (even by the standards of literary studies). Nevertheless, such explorations of analogies are often part of the effect of literature, as Musils address has shown. If the interaction of vehicle and topic is taken to its extreme, as in the open interaction of cloth and November evening, then it might lead to a process in which the reader not only understands the topic (such as a sermon), but the vehicle and the experiential (source) domain of the metaphor better.

CONCLUSION
I would like to finish by looking at one of Rilkes most famous poems: Der Panther. Jardin des Plantes, Paris. The poem was published in 1907 as part of Rilkes Neue Gedichte. Sein Blick ist vom Vorbergehn der Stbe so md geworden, da er nichts mehr hlt. Ihm ist, als ob es tausend Stbe gbe und hinter tausend Stben keine Welt. Der weiche Gang geschmeidig starker Schritte, der sich im allerkleinsten Kreise dreht, ist wie ein Tanz von Kraft um eine Mitte, in der betubt ein groer Wille steht. Nur manchmal schiebt der Vorhang der Pupille sich lautlos auf. Dann geht ein Bild hinein, geht durch der Glieder angespannte Stille und hrt im Herzen auf zu sein. (Werke 469) (His tired gazefrom passing endless bars has turned into a vacant stare which nothing holds. To him there seems to be a thousand bars, and out beyond these bars exists no world.

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Interaction in Metaphor His supple gait, the smoothness of strong strides that gently turn in ever smaller circles perform a dance of strength, centered deep within a will, stunned, but untamed, indomitable. But sometimes the curtains of his eyelids part, the pupils of his eyes dilate as images of past encounters enter while through his limbs a tension strains in silence only to cease to be, to die within his heart. [Selected Poems 110]) A full analysis of this poem ought to include its form, in particular its rhymes. For reasons of space I will focus on the figurative language used in this poem, and in particular on a metaphorical comparison in the second stanza. In the first stanza metaphors and metaphorical comparisons seem to play a minor role. In fact, metonymy seems more prominent, as it represents the object of this poem (the panther) by a part of it (his gaze, Sein Blick), which has been exhausted by the passing bars (metaphorical animation). The metonymic (indirect) reference to the panther is continued in the second stanza: his steps move in a circle. It is also the second stanza that offers an uncommon metaphorical comparison of the circular movement of the panther to a dance of force around a paralyzed mighty will (ist wie ein Tanz von Kraft um eine Mitte, / in der betubt ein groer Wille steht). The structure of this comparison conflicts with the unidirectionality principle: The more concrete circular movement of the panther is described by a very abstract and vague vehicle (dance of force), and this vehicle cannot fulfill the typical role of making the topic more vivid or accessible. On the contrary, interpreters are tempted to break up the typical patterns in which the vehicle is selectively exploited to make the topic more accessible. The vagueness of the vehicle tempts the reader to understand the vehicle in terms of the panther; it opens the process of interpretation and might, thereby, induce symbolic readings. Rainer Maria Rilke is, as Musil pointed out, a good example of how a poet can use metaphors in such a way that the roles of vehicle and topic become exchangeable. Rilke did not necessarily use new metaphors or extremely uncommon metaphorical comparisons. Rather, he used conventional metaphors in a way that activates a process of understanding that is par-

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Ralph Mller ticularly instructive about the linguistic and experiential structure of both source and target domains (see Mller).

University of Fribourg NOTES

1 In this respect, I agree with Boyd that art is the attempt to engage attention by transforming objects and/or actions to appeal to species-wide cognitive preferences for the sake of responses this evokes (Boyd 8). Every work of art (even the most deviant) has to appeal to such preferences to a significant degree; however, art also tends to be special or deviant in comparison to daily forms of communication which appeal to the same preferences. 2 For an overview of metaphor theories see Leezenberg. 3 I do not have the space to provide a complete account of what might be considered metaphorical in the following. For the identification of metaphorically used words I refer to the work of the Pragglejaz group (MIP). Their procedure of metaphor identification is aimed at identifying words used metaphorically in discourse, which provides a useful basis for reconstructing metaphors; metaphors (as interaction of vehicle and topic) are, however, not necessarily explicit in the text. 4 We cannot equate the topic with the metaphorical meaning, otherwise we could not make the distinction between a metaphorical expression and a word that literally denotes the topic. 5 Glucksberg uses the vehicle/topic terminology to describe A is a B statements. His usage is, however, slightly different from the useful differentiation that has been proposed by Kittay (see above). 6 For example, see Fodors criticism. However, the debate is further complicated by various conceptions of modularity, see Carrutherss defense of moderate massive modularity. 7 One could, however, imagine a culture in which there is a widely held belief that death is sleeping (for the bodies will wake up in a distant future). If a member of this culture points at a graveyard, saying this is where my ancestors are sleeping, it will be difficult to convince that member that he or she has just been using a metaphor, as the proof is deferred to a distant future. 8 However, not all theories are useful for a stylistic account of metaphorical meaning. The TCM, although it provides a good account of why we use metaphors, is to a large degree not concerned enough with the description of particular metaphorical meanings (see Mller). 9 The assumption of a rigid relation between vehicle and topic (or source and target domain) has been criticized by Blending Theory (BT). A basic claim of BT is that the mapping process is not necessarily constrained by the principle of invariance. This has often been illustrated with the example This surgeon is a butcher. BT insists that this metaphor also implies the feature of incompetence which is absent from the literal meanings of both surgeon and butcher. Therefore, scholars working within the framework of BT propose an understanding of metaphorical meaning as a blending in which a target input space and a source input space feed into a common blend in which new features (such as incompetence) may emerge (see Coulson). It is apparent that BT proposes a more dynamic picture of metaphorical understanding than the TCM and Glucksbergs class-inclusion theory. The

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central issue is, however, whether we really need a theory that explains any deviant outcome of a metaphorical construction. I personally believe that literary studies are better off with theories that make predictions about everyday language, from which language users (intelligent human beings) can deviate consciously. These theories may not be able to predict any deviant use of language (who can?), but at least they can explain why some metaphors might be perceived as deviant.

WORKS CITED
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