Agan Jr. Vs. PIATCO Case Digest Agan Jr. Vs. PIATCO 402 SCRA 612 G.R. No.

155001 May 5, 2003 Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investing in the new NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to the government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to the concessionaire, development of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contract with several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that they would lose their job, and the service providers joined them, filed and entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. Filed for motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void. Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its amendments for being contrary to the constitution.

Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon. The amendments present new terms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they know that such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void. The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement as their livelihood is to be taken away from them. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEESASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004.

Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum recommended to the CSCCentral Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSCRegional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights FACTS: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin HELD: CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the CHRs alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions therein. The CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.as the laws designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. Automotive industry workers v Romulo Facts: Petitioners, composed of ten (10) labor unions, call upon this Court to exercise its power of judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an executive order assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715 declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination only while the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, was turned over to the NLRC Chairman. The subject E.O. No. 185, in authorizing the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the preRep. Act No. 6715 set-up, amending the latter law which only Congress can do. Issue: Rights and interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March 2003 whereby administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Held: All things considered, whether or not E.O. No. 185 is indeed unconstitutional will have to await the proper party in a proper case to assail its validity. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

petition dated 27 March 2003 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Ratio: Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions. 13 Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find themselves the subject of the Secretary of Labors disciplinary authority, conferred by Section 1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to have a direct and specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein. The subject matter of E.O. No. 185 is the grant of authority by the President to the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and all its personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters. Its impact, sans the challenge to its constitutionality, is thereby limited to the departments to which it is addressed. Takingour cue from the early case of Olsen v. Herstein and Rafferty, 18 the subject executive order can be considered as nothing more or less than a command from a superior to an inferior.