. ..

t .
Thc Korean War was a limited II'llr, a civil wtlr and all epi .... ode in tile Cnld War. ' To w/,at extent dn you
agree with each part of this assertion?
A Limited War
Yes
-. - It was not a nuclear war - confined to a conventional war
It was limited in geographical extent - confined mainly to the Korean Peninsula
There was no direct confrontation I clash between the 2 superpowers
It was meant to be a limited war in Kim II Sung's intentions -his actions were not instigated by USSR - a
limited war with limited goals, i.e. only unify South Korea under his leadership; did not intend to & did not
think it will draw in the USA & 25 other countries under the flag of the UN. No plans to spread
communism beyond the peninsula.
When USSR did ultimately decided to lend support to Nonh Korea & China - it was a very limited.
minimal involvement to avoid the possibility of enlarging it e.g. Soviets planes not to fly into South Korea's
airspace; Soviet troops interrogating POWs to be in Chinese uniform
for the USA it was mainly to promote its Containment Policy (except for a very short time of roll-back
which was very quickly abandoned). Thus US goals were also limited in nature for the large pan of the war.
No
It cannot be tenned as a limited war if the Korean War very quickly spread beyond the 2 contending panies
- Nonh & South Korea I Kim vs Rhee. Very quickly 26 UN nations led by the USA joined in the fray. Then
China entered the war a few months later, USSR support from behind. Major powers were involved; hence
it should better be seen as a regional war, not a localised war limited to 2 Korean factions.
Because of the prevalence of the Cold War at this time as well as the developments in Asia in 1949 (fall of
China to communism; loss of atomic monopoly) the Korean War could not remain as a purely limited war.
USA feared the threat of communism in Asia as well as a more aggressive USSR armed with nukes
Kim's actions were seen by USA as directed and mastenninded in Moscow. USA believed in the
monolithic threat of communism radiating from Moscow across the world.
Hence US perception of such, transformed the Korean War inevitably into an episode of the Cold War
where its containment policy must be enforced; seen from the lenses of a Soviet-Communist-inspired
attempt to expand into Asia. with Korea being the first in its masterplan.
Thus US manipulated the UN into supporting an international force in its name as a means to promote
US containment policy in Korea.
A Civil War
Yes
To a large extent the origins I roots of the Korean War can be traced back to issues related to any civil war.
Kim & Rhee were the leaders of the 2 Koreas - Nonh vs South. They were competing for leadership of the
entire peninsula; there were already many skirmishes between the 2 along their border;
So in 1950, Kim decided to launch an attack on the South in an efTort to reunify the 2 Koreas under his sole
leadership. .
Again - stress the idea that it was purely Kim's own plan not instigated by USSR. Prove this by explaining
Stalin's initial lack of support for Kim's adventure - when Kim attacked the South, Stalin immediately
reealled all Soviet advisors from North Korea as well as recall the ships delivering military equipment back
to USSR.



Although the causes of the Korean War had its roots in nationalism; subsequent developments almost
immediately escalated it to a Cold War Conflict.
As a result of USA interpretation of the motivations behind Kim's endeavours, the Korean War took on
more significance than a mere civil war.
US Containment Policy of communism in Asia was officially launched.
As a result of US's initial 'roll-back' policy which brought her forces so close to the Chinese border,
making C h i ~ feel threatened enough to cross the Yalu River to assist North Korea as a means to safeguard
her own border security added an ideological element to the entire war .
For China, it was a war again.c;t capitalist aggression and encirclement.
Similar argument can be stated for the USSR's subsequent change of policy to indirect support of her
allies China & North Korea
,
An Episode in the Cold War
Yes For the USA .
Although the Korean War started off not as a Cold War; although there were no systematic plan from
Moscow for this event; US perception that it was Soviet instigated meant that it became an in the
Cold War.
USA's involvement was laden with numerous Cold War related considerations ..... .
Because of the prevalence of the Cold War at this time as well as the developments in Asia in 1949 (fall of
China to communism exposed the whole of Asia to threat of communism; loss of atomic monopoly)
USA now feared the threat of communism in Asia as well as a more aggressive USSR armed with
nukes
Kim's actions were seen by USA as directed and masterminded in Moscow. USA believed in the
monolithic threat of communism radiating from Moscow across the world.
Because of the Republican criticisms back home on Truman being soft on communism as well as the
McCarthy witch hunt, Truman had to show his toughness against the communist - Korea thus provided the
opportunity to right the wrongs & disarm his critics.
Korea also became part of this Cold War politics as it was the chance to resist communism & implement
NSC-68 - something he hesitated earlier as it required huge sacrifices of his people just when WWII was
just over - in tenns of spending on military build-up and overseas commitments.
So for USA, the Korean War went beyond merely a limited, civil war. It has far more implications for her.
Yes for USSR & China
Although Kim's actions were not instigated by its communist allies; although it was not expansionism for
USSR ot China, their subsequent involvement was due to actions of USA, their ideological foe and threat
Once USA decided to adopt 'roll-back' of communism - this immediately threatened the security of USSR
&China - since the Cold War just started and the mentality of not only rivalry but a believe that the other is
bent on their destruction - sharing a common border with a pro-American Korean regime would only
fatally undermine USSR & China's security.
Thus this necessitated drastic measures I retaliatory moves. In an effort to safeguard her security, China
joined in the fray against USA. USSR followed suit very quickly, albeit via indirect assistance.
Subsequently when the war came to a stalemate and negotiations began for an armistice, Stalin saw an
opportunity to prolong the fighting and delay possible armistice as it would serve to drain US resources and
manpower since the latter was personally engaged in the fighting unlike USSR.
such a mentality demonstrates Cold War calculations - kcep the US occupied whilst USSR plays catch-
up.
USA joined the war backing South Korea against the communist North. USSR (indirect) & China thus
joined in the war on the side of communist Nonh Korea.
Thus very clearly the superpowers had taken sides in this conflict - and the North & South has become
like proxies in t,he superpower struggle for supremacy.
More than Merely An Episode in the Cold War....: A Turning Point in the Cold War
Korean Warhad certain effects on the development of the Cold War, especially for US policy
A turning point
Militarisation of the Cold War - implementation ofNSC-68; enlarge USA means of fighting the Cold
War - no longer only just financial aid - also military intervention
Start of the Globalisation of the Cold War - as US saw a need to curb Soviet attempts at expansionism
around the world
Changed US policy towards Japan
Introduced military alliance in Asia
Affected US policy in Europe - strengthening the existing areas of the West to forestall
Soviet probing along the weak spots
To what extent was the Korean conflict of 1950 to 1953 It 'turning point' in the Cold
War?
The beginnings of the Cold War. the period between 45 and 1949. were fraught with a
mutual tension and distrust sustained chiefly by bold. economically expansion' policies
of the USA and the defensive. albeit retaliato , responsl!s of the Soviet Uni . ntil 1950.
America had relied upon her own currency in curtailing what she perceived as the spread of
communist influence. The start of the Korean War, \,ever, saw the revampment of
American policy and the globalisation. as well Ie exacerbation. of the existing superpower
tension. As such, to a large extent. the Korean contlict was a departure fro previous trends
in the American-Soviet conflict. In reaffirmation of my stand is the ti that the battlefield
had expanded beyond the borders of continental Europe into the vironmentally hostile
regions of Korea, and that the participant fthis 'new' Cold War were no longer confined to
the superpowers themselves. At the: e time, though only to a slight degree, the Korean
War was still reminiscent of the European Cold War. as manifested by Truman's citing of
the Domino Theory in the fac f an invasion of South Korea by the communist North, a
typical instance of American failure to fully grasp the situation with which they are dealing.
Of fore st importance to the turning point of the superpower enmity is the implementation
\lfN. . 68. As aforementioned, before the conflict extended 10 Asia, the USA had
up I its financial power by channelling economic aid to clienl slales in combating Sovjd'
communism. This policy of economic expansion was no Ion r adhered to in Korea. as
demonstrated hy the NSC 68 which marked the militaris Ion of the ('old War in essence.
(Inder intemal pressure. the Truman administmtion propounded an expansion of American
mililary forces and atomic stockpile, as well as the haslencd dcvdopment ofa thermonuclear
homb to remain a step ahead of the Soviets in the nuclear field. This new policy of'rollbacV
is evident from the period of 1950 to 1953, during which the USA had increased its miHt1UY
output sevenfold and was in a state of preparedness for war. Believing in the necessity for the
US military to outnumber or be on par with the large Soviet army ill tenns of number.
Truman advocated an increase in military spending to extract billions of dollars
from Congress to be spent on the expansion of armed forces. the rendering of
military succour to potential allies, and the development of the hydrogen bomh.
president's belief in the importance of anned and nuclear supremacy IIlso
Washington as a whole. In addition, in response t North Korean invasion of the democratic
South, Truman had called for international in vement in the regional c flict in forming an
attack force consisting of the South Kore army, as well as conting s from fifteen other
countries not including America herself.
The expansion of the North At ntic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was also a deviation from
American action in post-wa urope. NATO was immediately given a larger secretariat and a
more unified command cturc. A total of four US divisions were sent to EuroR 0 act as
reinforcements and. in 1951, the organisation was enlarged to accommodate n ' members,
namely Turkey and Greece. Acting opportunistically tq..(hreaten the USSR, t e USA had
made use of Turkey. which lay in close proximity Soviet Russia. as a military base on
which American Jupiter missiles could be established. Due to Ihe excellent geograpl . al
location of Turkey, these missiles could be aimed and fired at the Soviet Union d acted as a
deterrence against the Soviet invasion Middle Eastern oilficlds. To strengthen NATO and
assist its member allies, the USA h been in fc1Vour of an increase in military. pending and
had channelled economic aid to' s allies. Previously, in 1949, before the su rpower conflict
expanded beyond its regional borders. the organisation was set up with 0 the intention of
acting as a disincentive against a comm=nist ttack on the c pitalist West. While it was still
meant to deter potential communist aggre' Ion, the new. e panded NATO had also posed a
direct military threat to the Soviets. as monstrated by e placing of US Jupiter Missiles in
Turkey and American exhortation of increasing milita spending. and had thus contributed to
the militarisation of the conflict as a whole.
American advocacy for West German reanna f and sovereignty differed significantly from
earlier policy as well. In the past, after G an defeat in World War II, the USA had feared
the recrudescence ofGennap aggress' n. With the outbreak of the Korean War, however. the
fear of a revived Germany was transcended by an intense paranoia of communist
The rcarmament and procurement of full-tledged inde ndence of West Germany
deemed a necessity as a result; the resurrection 0 ussia's fonner wartime adversary \\-ould
rekindle old fears of German expansion and ter Soviet aggression. After the occurrence of
war in Korea, in hopes of putting up a stronger attack front agaillst the Soviets, the USA
begun to favour the idea of West Gennan rearmament, which the French strongly
Ultimately, to dispell French fears, the USA agree Ed 0 the F ench Plevcn Plan to allow West
Germany to be part of a European Defence Communit. his, however. was met with
disapproval from the Gennans, most of whom wer opposed to the idea of military
rearmament and preferred instead to be independent of foreign control. the
political and economic reconstruction of West Germany was a long-term USA
agreed to remove all occupation controls and grant Ge any full statehood. The Korean War
was indubitably a tuming point in the Cold War, een in the fact that its occurrence
galvanised the Americans to rearm and gran' ependenee to Germany. scyrething that
would previously have been regarded with doubt and apprehension. /
American signing of the ANZUS pact and recognition of Japan as a post-war ally varied from
previous policy too. Like in the case of G lany. the USA had erstwhile been wary of future
Japanese expansion and was not Iikel {) grant Japan freedom from foreign supervision. The
Korean War had changed Amcric attitude entirely and had accelerated the politica!,..a1ld
economic recovery ofJaplIn, which was confirmed in the signing of the San pellce
treaty in 1951. The treaty restored Japanese sovereignty and cnded American occupation in
Japan in the following year. In exchange for independence, Japan had to sign a Mutual
Security Agreement. under which the Japanese isl s were to act as a against the
of communist expansion. The USA 11' also signed the ANZUS pact witl]..bJew
Zealand and Australia and. in so doing, agreed to defend Asia and Australia frofnJapanesc
aggression. In retum. the two countries would assist in the deterrence of communist
expansion in the Pacific. Similarly in the case 0 ermany. Japan would not have received its
sovereignty if it were not for the Korean V especially since the granting of Japanese
independence might have been at the expense of the security of
American policy in Southl!8st Asia revealed he sudden central importance of the continent to
the USA and this, in itsclf. was another parture from existing Cold War trends. In the early
years prior to the start ofwar in K the scope to which American policy
limited only to continental Europe and parts of the Middle East. Howevcr.
globalisation of the connict, American operations in favour of confining the spectre of
communist influence within the sphere from which' originated spanned from Europe to Asia.
The USA provided relentless economic and mi' ry support to the French in their war with
the Vietminh led by communist Ho, whom the Americans viewed as an agent
In American eyes, both the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia and of J'
pivotal significance in guaranteeing prosperity and hence freedom from communist influence. _ J\'Y
Before 1950, American intervention in com 1st acivities were confined only to Europe. \JPJ ,
However. with the outbreak of war in K a, the scope of its policy had e. lded across the .\
oceans to a foreign continent. This is revelatory ofthc far-reaching i ,cts of the Korean .!'
War on the superpower conflict. c.I X
. . . ,\('"
To an extent of lesser slglllficance, however, the Korean War was an aflirmation of the trends .I'
of the European Cold War. For instance, had intervened in the regional c fliet f'to\)'. {t"
th!nking that ,,:orth Korean crossing parallel was premeditated by in. Such Off
misrepresentations of global communist activities as being a result of the s e manipulation of '\.
the SO\:icl kader, a!ld 110t 11 1'0ci. 1 k adlTS '!H:msc1 vcs_.arC:l of
paranOia and ovcrs igi rUl1wn had al so rl1l sn.'lId the sItuat i ons 111 Grccct:)l nd I !lrkc). l 'n\.
UrI \\ :!\'cring. in his CrWII I!\)U, \ i e\\ of COIllIllIIIl i sm as inherentl y ilIOn ffrli C. Trum;m's
of th..: :; ituati ull in Korea \\ as fi lrthcr rcinforc ' hi s cit ing of the DOlllino
theor) in response to K. orean invasion. The president staled Ihal Asia \\ould fall to
$0\ iel communism s hould then.: be no acti(lll taken by ;\ merica. As com be seen frOTll lhi ..
Il l i " illl crpn:tati olllll Ol t \\;\ ... ",{l I) picat o ft nfrali o ll al fear o f tIle USA. the
prove to be a contirma l ion of d War Irends lha\ wcre alrcady in ex istence in 1'0 ... 1-\\ af
Europe.
I\ l1l cri c:m n.:spoIIS": to tht.! t.! stahli shl11ent or he Peuple's Republic or Chiua was anotil er typical
installc,,: oft hl.! trends o r the Cold War are 1953. 0 11 11 basis of reasoning th:tt \\as
gratuitous by nature. Truman surm cd that the Chinese cmnmullists \\ ere agents ofjvlo \\.
sent by Stalin \0 COrtlnHllli se the Asiml periphery. rdcrring to the comnHulist take ' r :tS the
' jhll' of e hina. Atm:ri ca had responded arnbivnlelltly II) the forma ti on oflhe Chincse
C(lI.nllHlIlist Purty: OUl\\ Ihe fO;l1lu.ti on relations wi.th the n(: \\
regime, yet ordering the c..: s:. atlOIl of ccononllc aid to Cu.;.mlg Knl Shck. Iknec II \\ Quld seem
tlwI Truman had 1101 ani) inlteri !d'Rooscvclt' s title as president of Ameri ca hut al so hi s
intrim;ie UlH.;cna;nlY :rnd <Ii ambiguity displayed at Yal ta in 1945 Trut11al1's
ambiguous I"esponsc to the 'fall' ur China refl ected an inconsistency i l merican polic) Ihat
\\ as already exhibi ted enrl ier in Ih..: days when the Cold War \\as II fined onl y 10 conti ncntal
Ell rop..: .
b..:n so. the e\entS in Korca trom 1950.!JYf953 largely marked a turning I>l.l irn in the Cold
\\ar. This is seen in tir e cxtenl of chau(c in American poli cy th..:n::dicr, as \\cli a:. th l.: fact of
11l1crnalionul ill\ otv..: tIl eli t in the connie\. Though onl y rl.:gioFwl hy 11;1lL1re. tll e K(ln.:nn \\'al"
had had far-reaching clT!;c\:.-. llll fOI"!; ign politics. tiI.. c those of JapHn and (lcrrnany. pl .. rg a
major rolc in inllucncillg American decisio 0 grant full -fledged iudcpendclI' th..: sc
cotllHries. Also. tir e Kor..:;tn War rn ar!"c Ie gluoalisation of what was once a regional
cOll fli;.: \. well as a dcp: trlur..: frill art icr Am..: ri can poli cy, frum tIF..: prO\ i<: ioll of ctOl1olll i
succour to Ihe up of anned f(m: . ..:s and. mililar;. and nusJear arse11:' 1. As sit ch. t
large e,XIlnl. the Korean War \\;1 " a turning pornt for the

,
History 3 tutorial
Asia: Korea '
2. To what extent did the Korean War prove to be a turning point in US
policy- in the Cold War?
Thesis Statement .
To a certain extent, the Korean War proved to be a point in
US policy in the Cold War. There was a significant change in U.S'
/ containing communism. Initially US used its economic strength to provide
. economic aid to build up the economy of countries 'in Western Europe.
Korean War however, US intervened mi!!fSrilY in the defence of South Korea.
There was also a huge increase in defence spending, something that was .
/unheard of in US quring peacetime.:Furthennore, US .who had previously seen
. Asia as secondary to Western Europe, now, Saw,it as:the core of communist , '
/ expansion,' focusing much of its,resources there. Despite an these changes in the
./ US policy, the eventual aim of US towards communism remained unchanged ,
communism to where it as the main objective . . ,
, point was that the turning point in US policy was due to a .
combination of ever:rt,s inCluding the faU of China; the- Korean War arld-the loss of
nuclear monopoly, not due to Korean War only. Therefore, Korean thoUgh
did played a part in causing certain changes in US poliCy was not the solei cause / ....
and it merely caused an acceleration not.a total ci1ange'. in the US policy. ,,', -./
Main Body:
What remained the same:
Eventuar aim of US policy towards' Cord War and Soviet Union
US policy towards-Cold,War and Soviet Union conlinued to revolve around
containment of communism even with the Korean War . ,
Policy of containment merely enlarged with Korean War ,
Before Korean War
Kennan's Long Telegramme .
/
- objective to prevent spread of communism beyond those areas where it
already existed '
I
Korean War
": NSC-68 April 1950
- reappraisal of US policy
- demonstrated underlying continuity of US policy
- exemplified consistency of objectives of US diplomacy
i) confining of communism to those areas where it already existed
ii) gradua.1 erosion of Soviet influence land 'power within Soviet sphere
and ultimately downfall and transformation of Soviet system
B. Methods employed " t '.
- The methods employed by US to contain communism before and after the
/ start of Kor:ean War 1950 both .included economic aid to needy countries to
combat the spread of communism. . .' . .; ..'.
- Before Korean war .. ;
/.
Truman Doctrine
announced that US would 'support free people who are. resisting .
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'
made' it dear that US had no intention of retuming to isolation as sl:te
had after world war; committed to policy. of containing .spreac.f of
comniunisrri, not just 'in Europe but throughout the world, including .
Korea and Vietnam "
/ Marsharr plan - ". ' .
" 5 June 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall announced .
programme of economic assistance, which propose:d large dollar grants .,
for needy purchase food; raw materials and industrial:'
machinery from US, . ..". ,
as USbelieV'ed best antidote to communism was prosperity, ..
".'transfusion of dollars necessary to stimulate'coal production, rais'e
. industriar output and'create 'employment ." "'.
Korean War ". '.: ,
/
.' By early US spending-$1 billion a year in military assistance to, .
, French to combat communists inVietnam '. ," . .;
Resumption of economic aid to Taiwan to !:Jelp it resist possible invasion
by Mao's forces
. Helped to build up economy of Japan, through economic aid ' .-
C. US definition of communist threat ,",",
/
.; US definition of communisnhrealbeing expansionist in nature 'remained
unchanged before and after the start of ,Korean War .
Before' Korean War
Kennan's Long Telegramme
taught that communist states could not
/
peacefully with capitalist states
. thus justified continuation of historic state of conflict between Soviet
Union and western neighbours and foreign policy of extending Soviet "
power to western limit
- so communist Soviet Union' inherently aggressive, inevitably
expanSionist and hostile to West
Korean' War ' ' .
NSC-68'
- definition of Soviet threat differed little from Kennan's in Long '.
/
' Telegramme
- believed that expansionist nature of communism demonstrated in
formation of People's Republic of China and eruption of Korean War
I "
'I
, . ..,'
TUPling Point:
bf. Militarisation of US Cold War policy
/- The Korean War resulted in a change in the method used to contain
communism in the containment policy from economic warfare to military
intervention. ".
Before Korean War
Fighting Cold war with economic aid like dollar dip.lomacy with .
/
' implementation of Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan whicb involved
giving econorpic aid to vulnerable countries for economic reconstruction
so as to prevent them from falling into hands communists .
Had very .small armed force as no hiStorY in US. or large annies ln-
,I peacetime and relied upon position as world's dominant economy to wage
Cold War, channelling dollars to strategically. vital areas . .
AvoidanCe of committing grouncHroops to war in Asian landmaSs was
axiom of US diplo.macy. .'.
/
- 1945-50 adopted evenhanded manner in Chinese Civil and did not
give troops.to help Chiang fight against Mao '. '. " ...
. -no formal plans to help Chiang resist invasion by Mao's forces atter
defeat of 'Nationali$ts . .. ....
- Pacific Defense 'Perimeter strategically designed sO as to use as few
/ . soldiers as possible, mostly needed navy and airforce' since areas within'
perimeter mostly .
- Korean war . . . .
. Willing to deploy troops anyWhere in order to defend 'free .
. /. - believed it showed 'Soviet Union's aim to expand. it was Soviel's
first inspired step towards expansion and it would do so anywhere
- threw weight behind French in war against Vietminh to eliminate .'
communism in Vietnam and then helped.South.Vietnamese to combat
Vietcong . . .
/
- June 1950 Truman ordered 7
th
fleet to Taiwan Straits to defend island
against possible communist invasion
- implementation of NSC-68
Necessitated substantial rise in US defence production
/
Output in 1953 7 times greater than in 1950 within matter of 2 years
Pennanent expansion of US armed forces and constant state of
military readiness as US believed it must achieve near-parity. in
conventional forces with Soviet Union and maintain nuclear
superiority
Massive increase in US defence capabilities as US must be ready' to
fight series of limited wars against communism around glgbe
B. Increase in defence spending
/
- the change from economic warfare to using military'intervention to curb the
spread of cOmmunism resulted in a great increase in the -defence spending
for the maintenaneeof a large army
/
- before Korean War
unwillingness to implement NSC-68
politically unpopular as enlargement of US armed forces would require
higher taxes and massive cuts in welfare programmes when people
expeCted lowering of taxes and improvement of welfare of people just after
world war 2 .
massive military spending in peacetime unaccepted by public as .no .
history in US of .huge defence' spending in peacetime . '. . .' .
/
already diffiCult to get money for economic' feconstruction of.Western
Europe,'would be. WOrse for-Asia which was regarded to be too far away to
. be unimportant .
Korean War .,
US public willing to. endorse' ma$Sive military spending .that
/
would"'beoome 'permanent feature in US budget ...... . . ,.'
1950 Truman asked Congress for $10 billion to'spend 'on US armed '. ,
forces, '$260 million for hydrogen bomb project and $4 billion ir:t military aid
'for US alnes' , . " :.'.
1950 defence spending stood at $13.1 billion .' .: i.: ,
/ ., reached high of $5QA billion and was never less than $40 billion a yearfor
/ . 1950s " " ...,
.' marked 'start of pefri'lanent ,huge spending"on military :. .'
$150 milliorispent by end of Vietnam War" " ' ..
(. ,to arms race, Cold War
. .
C. Change in US policy towards Asia

Korean 'War not only changed US perception of Asia as being' ': .

, insignificant and only secondary to US' national security as.comparep.to,
. Europe, but also its initial passive containment policy in Asia to an active one.
/
"'/
I
Before Korean War '
'Comml.inism on Asian periphery countered not by policy of direct military
intervention but by policy of economic aid to existing
forces' '. . , . . '
Deployment of US troops on Asian m'ainland never contemplated
. Formed Asia-Pacific Perimeter including Japan, Philippines, Guam and
KyukYu Islands outside Asia land mass as,first line of defence, excluding
Korea which was thought unnecessary in defence of US, that perimeter
would be sufficient to protect US interests in Asia and protect US against
communist attacks from Asia
Containment policy specifically targeted at Europe as Europe seen as
most important and most vulnerable to communist expansion which
directly threatened US' national security with its proximity so resulted in
European Cold War (Europe-first policy)
....
' . I .
- Korean War

Saw Asia as centre of communism with countries in SEA being extremely
vulnerable to communism with presence of two great communist powers:
Soviet Union and China in region (current communist menace)
Afraid that if allowed SOuth'Korea to fall to communism, communists
might use Korea as steppiAg stone to spread communism to rest of Asia.
".- especially Japan where US had mifltary bases and whom 'US needed as
UN ally
"
I
/
so Asia no 10hger periphery, seen ascore area protecting security
interests of US
contemplated if Japan fell, there would be a vaCuum gap and teared
Soviet Union trying to fill up power vacuum in Asia'through North Koreans
so US wanted to fill up vacuum before them and foCused anti-cominunist
efforts in Asia ' . . .
hastened tareengage its powerto likelihOOd Of Asia becoming
communist
- organlsationof.SEATO and ANZUS to extend military protection to non-
/' communist-countries' :. . . .' .
I
/
/
i) ANZUS: to align. Australia and New Zealand behind policy of :
promoting Japan and help US defend Pacific agaihst Communist. .
incursions, with US' promise to protect them. against resurgent Japan
ii)SEA TO:' regic;mal arrangement that committed US and other
countries to defence of Laos and Cambodia'against communiSt
aggression as well as defence of-South Vietn.am again'st' North .
Vietnam .
- signed 'defence with Philippines to secure air and
military bases
- in return for independence secured dapan'ssignature1oMutual:Security ..
Agreement negotiated at same time as peace treaty, which gu'aranteed .
US military bases both in Japan and on island ,of Okinawa .
- islands fanned major bulwark against'further .
communist expansion in Far East' .
- Ordered 7
th
fleet to Taiwan Straits to defend island against possible
communist invasion
- Took over French as anti-communist bastion in South Vietnam after
French defeat by Vietcong . ,
Controversy: '
- Korean War actually marked an not a reorientation of US ..
policy, . , ./
- Measures included:
resumption of aid to Taiwan
- due to domestic policy whereby .congress accused US government of
being soft towards communism causing US to have to adopt tougher
stand, US could not befriend communist China .
. .
' :' ..: :; -.: .. ::.'. ": . .... ... . ;': :.: :" ! .. :",
.. ;' .:';: ':: ': :;:G.;'/",

" i' NATO' .:; : ::-: -; '. '.
- US NATO partners to increase milit$ry spending'in attempt
t9: was .,
/ ' in 1947-8 rearmament put forwar:d to NAT.OY'i;jj,
..; NA.TO::8,S. SOOn.:8$ war.:,broke out
Kor:ea-c: .. :;; :;'! ':-'i :." ;: .-:!.; .. ,
/ : .: ,,:,:.,;:: ",;\' .
. " . y reversal policy in ar:ad r: , ,
/ .':' ."
. . . '- Japan seen as main outpost to stop China communism. friendly:state to
. ".:' .ef(ecti'{ene$.S:of. Pacific ,
- Afraid that Japan might be'economically in '
/ forjt:bejng aOially. :and .asset In
.
,-co:.; of fflat Japan must be
. ' j .
/
(igJ;ttat3their tleart;.<. ,., ' ... '. .
- So"$.a{l date:which cOnfirmed' political
reConstruction of Japan ;' :: .. ::;: ,;
. - political ,and. -of West beea long-
/
term objective of US ' ;-; ',: .'
'. : of;.West:German state ::-" " : '. : .:' ' .; ; :";; .
. '.' contro's and .. ,recognised
Germany ., ... .. ... : :: '. '-:;: '. ': '
- rearmamenUqok placejo 19955;'Korean War-.and to
, rearm Germany no doubt aCcelerated end
- /'
they othe.rwise would have.done as
a'result of the Koreali War . '. .... . .... ,. :,. . "', .'
- it was not Korean War alone that resulted in Changes and readjustments of

US policy .,:: :." . '.: ,
- rattler it.wasthecorpbined result of ceinforceinent.ofbelief that communism : ./
was aggressive and the containment policy through fall of China, outbreak' of
Korean War and Soviet successful testing of atomic bomb. -,'. , .;: .... , ..
..
. '
" . .
. . . " . 0 "
. ',: .:, '.:' .
'.;.
-.
"111 Korea, the U(1ited States acteo to cur/) an international Marxist onslaught. .... Is this an
o/)jective sta"iement?
Pedagogy
Examine the for war and the '::1ctuaJ thre;.)t of the spread of communism and relate the
analysis to the statement. .
Key words
The quotation. objective.
Thesis Statement
The statement contains an element of truth but by and large, the Korean issue was a nationalist
one. The threat of an international Marxist onslaught, perceived by the US, was lel?s than real,
.. md caused oy other events and circumstances such as the fall of China to the communists and
the end of the US atomic monopoly as well as the paranoia of communism within theUS.
Main BOdy
A good discu[:sion should examine both sides of the issue and relate to the issue whether the
North Karesn invasion of the South in 1950 represented an "international Marxist onslaught.
The analysis :;ilould bea,. on the reas')ns fOi war and the US perception of the communis:
threat, not so much the course of the Weir.
Bv tb(l of war, one can determine the extent of tll/-: (If the spread of
':Yr: ti1:;' .:)118 hand. as by the US perception. f:-:e communisl elelner:,
itiS streng i", ':::t;l r.'!ean war :\ (.!Oliti Korea that ..... ti'lC :'lggress)!'.
:n i;le 39ainst 'J;\! late -:
ut:atinQ tr:);":, of a tinitea to :-< ..
... ' . ..
",":1, ':.hila was ():'1 :j':0 lear of the domino :;,,::0,Y. 'j (.iNs 2cti(m t,,:
";01"'1 ./ ,:-,. ... ';'.-. i'lV=''''',oc' .:\1,,(, .. .... It uk>(';" the blam- .. -I ,.,,-.,.1
1
-: '''na t:"l'"
.. '. . . \ '. ........ 1;. l ... ", z ... r ..... Q, ...') . J r..-, . '0 , t:: ' .. I' ...... , .1 ";" r ... ,=,. '. c:. .. l. I ....
.so/ie!. corm",: ... ;-AaHr. was -3lin ir, l.ne '2
:< '\;:'':: !.) ;.>- t ,\/. ;:." :1:1 Kiln :,:1 fl"lOfc (;clf1ce:;sions from UN ..s
fn 'j ..:(:cea:1 "Va ... B l.;ivB \-'var U1an a !ij sr!re4'-.ld GomnlLJ::h:;i
";'.;'! '"r,"":. '",.,' ." t,'.'" .... ..... 1 '
fr
1r'::' 01 .-' 'h'"" ro' \,\/>/1111 'It 1 he' ;:II'f:) .. 2 iI()"", ... ,
_tl" ....... \ ... l' ...... ,.).:"UII. '10. ... "\.It} '.It ."" , ..... t.'t :. . , "'... \""4 V" , ,,/.,.,Q .... 1... .-;;11. .... ..
t ..; t', !: ;,rv:! the b8Sj;; (j( .. ! w8i, since
-:-Illf :;),': OL 1':>. of the perlin5ui8 ','V8S bound to anse. y ,Jaily !lnd
:.;{:::;:.,if':d si,.::;':; .: .. jetween the 2 rienGI:! lhe war can be Seer: as a miii!ury soiution ,Jf
S t til t) t ,
';'n::! US belief \;1 an expansionist W::1S sr,apec. by facts than by circumstances
'11.'1 !iGh to its fears of The UN resolution was (} condemnation of
", .. as valid enouh. but t:-'3! simply til(:} Of
mersi':' ,hE'. rr.:)r,:: ,irnitsd .. of KII"r1 t\imseli. US fears elf
:1;.ld been enhanced by thE' ["ii of j.:, in ',)ci 1949 and HIE:
;:;,,;viets' mJc:.essf:Ji of their rnJda:' bomb in Sept :949. In particular, first event made
::l.;: US lB,;:;!)' to events in Korea as an exteilsion of C0rn:rlunism i:) tn.: region, promoted
: ... 1oscow. although in both cases, the ascen:.1ance of communism was due to local ractors ratller
:r,<.:n the manipulalion of Sta!in. Nevertheless 2 events of 1949 placed the Truman
" 1-
?dmi;listratior: em the defensive fiCm hawkish ReRub!!car:s (who blamed hirn fer the oss or
,:,:",;na") 3r.d less to see an event as the Korean War in an objecUve light. The
138 proposals ofi already signified IInIJaCI cf H1SS/? events on the Truli1(j1l administration
a more militant stance towards the llSSR the paranoia of
01l01es it': the US governr:lent - off by McCarihyislJ1. intensified the fear of
cornrl'uniSr:1 8;',(; r/1aced further pressure CrI T njmafl. Korean thus placed U8
credibility at stake and Truman had to act firmly to deflect accusations that he was "soft" on
communism.
In addition although communist China was involved in the war, two important qualifications have
to be noted. One. in the first instance. what China did had little to do with Moscow wanted. In
other words, communism was not a single monolithic bloc. The domino theory. held by
Washington, and which promotes the idea of an expansionist communism, thus does not hold.
Although both sides cautiously gave limited to Kim's plans, both China and
USSR were not responsible for the North Korean invasion - Stalin did not want to be involved in
a direct confrontation while Mao was more concerned with establishing secure control over the
mainland and capturing Taiwan. Second, the Chinese involvement in the middle pf the war was
a result of similar nationalist concerns. rather than a desire by Beijing to spread communism.
Mao was fearful that the push of the UN forces beyond the 38
th
parallel would push a security
menace to China and destabilise the CCP's control of the newly-won country. Thus China's aim
was to keep the UN forces from the Yalu river, rather than establish a Marxist regime in the
Korean peninsula. Even in this phase of the war, Stalin was careful to avoid war - he gave
limited assistance (e.g. air cover and supplies) to the Chinese forces and warned Soviet planes
not to engage the US forces.
2
i I
'.
'Ideology formed the primary motivating forcefor the US.soviet global conJlicL' Discuss tl,e validity of this statement on
tl'e glob!zlisatlon Cold War from tl,e 1950s to 1980s.
1. Ideological Differences I Contest of Ideas


You need to take the perspective that aU the conflicts were laced with the irreconcilable ideological difference where both
sought to annihilate the other's way of life, values and beliefs. .
Use Trumall Doctril,e of 1947 as basis for your argument - i.e. US committed itself to defend the free world and free
people struggling against armed minorities trying to impose their way of life on others
Take the stand that all wars and communist I left-wing nationalist movements were masterminded by Moscow with the
intention to spread communism worldwide through revolutions.
Korea" Example


Fall of China in 1949 meant a vast new communist state now exist in Asia; US saw Chinese communist as agents of
Moscow & believed that Stalin would exploit friendship with Mao to promote communism in Indochina & SE Asia.
The implication was the continent of Asia now lay exposed to the communist threat.
Thus, the US perceived Kim II Sung as a stooge of USSR & North Korea's invasion of South Korea as directed from
Moscow. The crossing of the 38
111
parallel was interpreted as thus a clear instance of communist expansionism. The
invasion of Korea, made real all the previous predictions I fears that US policy-makers were postulating after Oct
1949.
US followed the belief that if they did nothing in Korea, then neighbouring states would fall to Soviet
communism too. 'If we let Korea down, the Soviets will keep right on & swallowing up one piece of Asia after
another. If we let then the Near East would collapse & no telling what would happen to Europe.'
Vietnam Example .'
With the.IQss of China & the outbreak of the Korean War, results in Indochina no longer seen as a scene ofa purely
local conflict but an integral part of the global battle to contain Soviet communism.
US thus invested Indochina with great strategic importance in the ideological struggle against Soviet communism
US perception o(Ho Chi Minh being a puppet of Moscow & Beijing was further reinforced by the decision of Red
China & the USSR to grant diplomatic recognition to the Vietminh in 1950. US this being the VietriUnh was used to
help USSR spread communism into Southeast Asia. A victory for the communist in South Vietnam would in turn tilt
the global balance of power in favour of USSR & China who were seeking to replace capitalism and democracy with
communism everywhere around the world.
speech on Indochina - saw SE Asia as a line of dominoes - if Indochina fall to communist insurrection,
the remainder of non-communist Asia would be' greatly threatened (especially so after France lost at Dien Bien Phu).
In .this sense, Vietnam was truly a ideological war.
Otlter Possible Examples
Latin America - events in Guatemala (Arbenz), Chile (Allende), Cuba before 1961 Bay of Pigs (Castro), DoIpinican
Republic 1965, Grenada 1982,
2. Geopolitics - supremacv I world leadership; establishing positions of power I inOue.lce
Tile Middle East - both USA & USSR sought to replace British & French influence here;
Geo-strategic importance oftl,e region


Position traversing the Mediterranean Sea, Suez Canal, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean; Oil;
Southern Oank of USSR - securing its southern flank from the USA vs USA containing USSR along its southern
flank (e.g. Baghdad Pact, CENTO) etc.
Examples of US-Soviet rivalry I jockeying for influence in Egypt
Nasser, US$ for Aswan Dam and Czech Arms Sales
Examples of supporting of client states - Egypt & Syria (USSR) vs Israel & conservative Arab monarchies (USA)
Slier. Crisis, 1956 - attempts by USSR to gain capital out of British-French-Israeli actions by coming to the defense
of Egypt (& so championing the cause of the Arabs); attempts by USA to distant itself from its 3 allies to keep the
friendship and its credibility in the eyes of its new Arab friends.
Eisenilower Doctrille, 1957; instigating Turkey'S military exercises I manoeuvres <llong Syrian borders; sending in
US marines and US 6
111
Fleet to the Mediterranean to defend its Arab allies (Lebanon; Jordan)
USSR key supplie! of arms, training and economic aid to Egypt & Syria from 1956 to 1972
Soviet illvolvemellt ill Vietllam after 1965
Vietnam was never really a strategically vital area of Soviet interest. USSR's subsequent decision to get actively
involved in support of Ho Chi Minh after 1965 was due in part to the opportunities posed by US problems in .
Vietnam,
It was hoped that by propping up the North Vietnamese government, the latter would be able to tie-down USA in a
long, expensive, endless war leaving her little energy, power or will to check, challenge the Soviet attempts to
establish her influence in other parts of the world (e.g, Horns of Africa - Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Middle East etc.)
J. Security Concerns


For USA .... Cuban Missile Crisis - presence of Soviet nuclear launch pads with nukes so close to US shores greatly
reduced the warning time as well as exposed the whole of America to possible Soviet nuke attacks - all major US city or
state was within reach of Soviet nukes.
Led to a major confrontation between the two over the presence of Soviet nukes in Cuba.
For USSR -[lIvasion 01 Afglranistall to insulate its Muslim-dominated Asian Soviet republics from the fundamentalist
influences coming out from Iran.
Led to indirect conflict with USA who accused USSR of making the flfSt aggressive step, attempting to use
Afghanistan as a bridgehead for expansion into the rest of the oil-rich Middle Eastern states
USA supplied the Mujaheddin rebels in its war against USSR
4. Reluctantly Drawn In by Satellites, Clients, Allies




Although both superpowers tried on many occasions to restrain their client states as they did not want to be drawn into
their personal conflicts, fearing that it will unravel the recently established relaxation in relations - detente in Europe.
Post-1961's 6 Day War .
Egypt & Syria sounded defeated; USSR in order to keep its position here, had to provide massi\'e military assistance
to replace the lost hardware .
'"
Arab-Israeli Wars - e.g. 1973 Yom Kippur War
CaMot allow self to be by proxy thus airlifted weapons to clients during the war
In order to prevent its client state from being destroyed ...
GOt dragged in to the extent of a near confrontation with each other .
USSR suggested joint US-Soviet military intervention to end the war; US rejected idea as she feared consequences of
Soviet troops in Middle East;
Brezhnev threatened to intervene unilaterally to defend Egypt; US counter by putting its entire worldwide nukeS on
the highest peacetime alert - DEFCON III
S. Misunderstanding I Misinterpretation or Events I Developments
USA ;'Ivolvemelll ill Vietnam & Korea driven by misinterpretation of local events; mis-association of the protagonists
with USSR instigation I mastermind for world expansion when it was driven more by local politics
e.g. nationalism, stnlggle for leadership of the peninsula between 2 nationalist leaders; drive for unification etc.
USA support oltl,e Mujalleddill Muslim Fundamentalist rebels in Afghanistan against USSR, again a nUsperception of
Soviet foreign policy there
USA accused USSR of making the first aggressive step, attempting to use Afghanistan as a bridgehead for expansion
into the rest of the oil-rich Eastern states
In reality it was driven more by Soviet needs for security of its borders & the territorial integrity of its union; to
insulate its Muslim-dominated Asian Soviet republics from the fundamentalist influmces coming out from Iran.
. .
6. Domestic Politics I Polilicill Expedience
Koreall War
Republican accusations of Democrats being soft on communism, having lost China & its nuclear monopoly - accused
the government or having many communist sympathizers in its midst - as an explanation of why the USA could
possible have lost
Hence a need by Truman administration to show its toughness; that it can contain communism; to silent its critics at
home and shore up sagging political support I credibility at home
So when Kim II Sung invaded South Korea - golden opportunity for Truman to right the previous mistakes
Cuban Missile Crisis
Politburo's unhappy with Khrushchev's performance I record; the series of confrontations he had with.USA either
ended in stalemate, a draw or a humiliating compromise
Berlin Crisis of 1958 when Khrushchev threatened to handover control all communication routes into West
Berlin to the East German government; USA did not cave-in; Khrushchev gave up threat
Berlin Crisis of 1961; same threats; Khrushchev settled with a Wall- seen by Politburo as too soft and cowardly
China's accused of Khrushchev of selling out to capitalism & thus had no right to lead the communist world
Thus Khrushchev for these 2 reasons had to find a way to gain a diplomatic victory against USA, silent its critics at
home all at one swipe - Castro & Cuban gave him the opportunity
Could leapfrog the entire US nuclear defence system surrounding USSR in Europe, challenge USA in its own
backyard, by placing Soviet nuclear launch pads in Cuba.
Victllam
USSR's subsequent decision to get actively involved in support of Ho Chi Minh after 1965 was due in part to Sino-
Soviet rivalry for leadership of the Communist world.
Thus cannot allow Beijing to become the sole supplier of military aid to North Vietnam.
Thus USSR was jockeying for influence in North Vietnam was for political expedience
.,
I
t
.
I
!I
.' "JJ
7. Economic Domination I Expansion
USA saw the revival of Japan as the key to containing in Asia. With the fall of China to the communist,
Japan had lost an important source of market for her manufactured goods as well as source of raw materials - the key to
her industrial and hence economic revival. From then on Indocl,ina became USA's next centre for Japan's markets and
source of raw materials and food. establishing USA's influence in Indochina was a priority - economic
expansionism.


US also saw the Middle East as a key source of economic interest - oil, was a vital strategic resource for the West and
which fuelled the industries and economic growth I expansion of the West. Control and access to Middle Eastern oil
formed the. imperative key to maintaining an expanding international economy. If oil supplies were disrupted for
American allies & trading partners (she herself is not reliant on ME oil as she had sufficient domestic supplies), it would
have a massive knock-on effects on US economy as all her trading partners' economies will be affected.
Africa - importance source of copper, magnesium, and other semi-precious metals
e.g. US-Soviet rivalry through proxies in Angola
8. Superpower Credibility and Defense of Allies
US Credibility
Need to show Amer:ican willingness, resolve to stand up against communism or else lose of allies and they
will drift to USSR instead; this was exhibited in Korea & later Vietnam (formed the rationale on US refusal to
withdraw and detenllination to stay the course in the I 960s even when it was not winnable) .
US allies
South Korea (Sungnan Rhee)
South Vietnam (Diem)
Iran in 1953 (Shah oflran) against possibility ofMossadeq's communist tendencies;
Chiang Kai Shek in Taiwan
USSR Credibility
Examine this in the context of the Sino-Soviet rivalry
USSR nllies
Egypt (Sadat) against Israel in 1973
Egypt (Nasser) against Br-Fr-Isr in 195G Suez Crisis
North Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh - a fellow communist brethren)
Defending Castro & Cuba from US covert operations to unseat him I his regime?

la's the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as important a tuming point in the history of the Cold War
as it is often claimed to be? " .
Pedagogy
Examine both sides of the issue by assessing the real impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis and
comparing with the state of the Cold War before and after the crisis. Make use of ideas from the
students' readings & research.
Keywords
Was, an important, turning point
Thesis Statement
The CMC did have a significant impact on East-West relations as it shewed the threat of nuclear
war and the dangers of the policy of brinkmanship on either side. It did pave the way for a less
confrontational conflict and promoted detente and arms control. However the continued
existence of tensions ar;td mistrust between both sides meant that confrontation and Cold War
crisis remained a threat lor the remainder of the CWo .
Main Body
A good discussion needs to assess the impact of the CMC from both sides and relate to the
idea whether it was a real "turning point" and to the concept of the "long peace" that emel"ged
after the crisis. Mere narration of the crisis will receive little credit, and students have to relate to
events 'and developments in other aspects of the globalisation of the CW.
On the one hand, undeniably, the crisis brought the world close to nuclear conflagration and
thus prompted an examination of the policies of the superpowers. The haste with which
Khrushchev installed missiles on Cuba, and the threat implied in Kennedy's quarantine of Cuba
and his initial refusal to budge over the withdrawal of missiles from the country compelled the
US and SU to explore new, less confrontational ways of conducting. their competition. In the
wake of the crisis, a secret hotline between Washington and Moscow was installed to allow
better communication of their intent between the leaders of the two countries, to 'prevent a
whereby misunderstanding can lead to an irretrievable scenario.
In addition the crisis also showed the necessity to reduce the threat of nuclear war. The ideas of
peaceful co-existence and, subsequently in the 1970s, detente arose to build stable relations
between the 2 sides by reducing issues of tension. One tangible, if unwritten, code of conduct
was that both sides would refrain from interfering in areas where the other side is established or
directly involved. This meant that the US would limit its policy in Europe to the containment
rather than the rollback of communism, a policy that could be seen in its non-interference In
cases of Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe, e.g. Czechoslovakia in 1968. Similarly the issue
of Berlin and of the postwar boundaries of Europe were resolved diplomatically in the 1970s
through detente, culminating in the Helsinki Accords. In Vietnam, similarly, the 'SU limited its
involvement in the civil war. The conduct of the CW, increasingly, was conducted through
proxies, especially in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America in the 1970s as the rivalry also
moved to the Third World. In addition, trading relations grew between the 2 sides, especially in
the sale of US grain to Russia.
In terms of-arms control, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons during the crisis gave a major
boost to ongoing In 1963, the crisis, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed,
which reduced the capacity of the nuclear powers to develop their weapons. It can also be said
that the crisis contributed to the desire to manage the arms race which led to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the control of strategic weapons, the SALT I Treaty of 1972.
Thus both in diplomatic and nuclear doctrines. the Cold War continued but came increasingly to
be bound within a set of rules. both written and unwritten.
1
.. ') .
..
' ,- .
On the other hand, it is easy to exaggerate the impact of the CMC and Ignore both what it did
not achieve and also.long-standing precedents which'led to some of its alleged achjevements, It
is probably too much to attach such importance to a single event. It might be said that the
realisation for the need for peaceful co-existence came about as a result also of other 'events
such as the Berlin Wall crisis of and the mutual desire to avoid a general war, In
Hungary, the US also did not intervene in the Soviet'crushing of the uprising of 1956, while in
the late 1970s, the deployment of INFs jncreased the likelihood of a limited nuclear war on the
continent. Also, the policies of the German leader Willy Brandt - ostpolitik, helped to' ease
tensions between West Germany and the SUo
Arms control, although shaped somewhat by the pOlitical climate, had its own dynamic and was
affected by a number' of factors; If viewed critically, the arms control efforts (PTBT, NPT and
SALT) were mere efforts to make the arms race safer, not to end it, and it did little to control the
grOwing threat of nuclear war even in the 1.9705 -with the development of MIRVs and the
deployment of INFs in Europe, Thus the supposed rules of the arms race were not 'as foolpro,of
as they appeared 'to be. Nuclear proliferati'on continlied and the PlBT did not end nuclear
testing, hence development, underground. Such failings were due to the remaining fundamental
mistrust and rivalry between the stJperpowers and. also, in proliferation issues, to the desire of
smaller states to ,dominate regional politics. Thus the CMC's impact is because of the
difficulty of effective arms control during th,e CW. Furthe,rmore the retreat from brinkmanship
p'olicies was as much shaped by the increasing ' Soviet nuclec;tr 'strength - which. reached
strategic parity in the 1970s, which caused MAD to become a reality and made confrontational
polities an' easy , reCipe for disaster. the' crisis did its part to reduce the teflsions of the
CW; it also increased the conflic\ in other ways. The crisis showed the Soviet leadership the
weakness of its naval strength and pushed the SU into an extended, arms race,
In the,last instance, the CMC was a'turning point in way the CW was
conducted, but it did not change the inlensity or the basic nature, the conflict. American
. leaders, safe Carter, continued to beliq in containment, while Soviet leaders, were primarily
concerned with catching up militarily with the US and placing domestic economic problems as
second priC)rity. Competition via proxy still ' was competition, while' the set which
governed its conduct weFe not always effective,


2
....... -.
1 .
I,., : I
I I
'More ollen Il,all not, superpowers, ratlter Iha.n regional conflicts, reluctantly drawn ,into
them.' How far does your study ojtl,e Cold War In tl,e period 1950-80 support thIS v,ew? '
Examples or being Reluctantlv Draw" into regional conflicts
In the Middle East - Suez Crisis; Yom Kippur War 1973
Suez Crisis
- causes:- look at the regional powers' player - Egypt's actions towards the following powers:- Israel over
Egyptian support of Palestinian terrorist attacks; Britain & France over the Suez Canal; Israel, France &
Britain's retaliatory actions
_ - USA Drawn in Reluctantly:- because USSR at the UN threatened to send in Soviet troop:. to help Nasser
It) c. if Britain and France did not withdraw from the Suez Canal area
So USA forced to act through the UN to compel his traditional allies to leave

I War .
6L - explain the regional conflict , between Israel vs Egypt & Syria;, their ,JifTerences was
deep-rooted even before the Cold War
_ Why reluctantly drawn in:- they were the client states of USA & USSR had been supplying
them with anns,l weapons; when the war l!tarted they were not & were caught off guard;, but
. forced to continue to airlift weapons to clients because did not want to 'be defeated by proxy; . ,
- When Egypt & Syria was about to be routed by Israeli forces, Brezhncv was forced to act to'save his
client - prop.osed a joint Soviet-US intervention to separate the warring parties; USA refused to aUow'
S<;)Viet'troops to enter Middle East; USSR threaten to send in her'troops UnilateraUy; US retaliated 'by
putting aU her nuclear force on the highest alert' state of readiness (DEFCON III).
- Hence can see how because of their desire to support their client & not be defeated by proxy, they had be
I reluctantly.! & unknowingly drawn into their .client's disputes and came close to a direct
confrontation
Examples or being Drawn into regional conflicts but not Reluctalltiv. but instead went into it Voluntarily,
or Enthusiasticallvl WillinglY
May not have caused these regional conflicts; but defmitely not drawn into it reluctantly; but went in
willingly' saw the need to go in because of National Interests I Cold War policy
- A Political' Ideological Necessity to go in ,
- Containment of Communism worldwide (after the fall of China to communism, lost of atomic monopoly
and the Korean War)' .
- Saw' believe that communist threat was globalising, hence obligated to & necessary to stop it from
spreading - thus drawn into the'regional conflicts in Asia, Latin America & the Middle East '
- As a not causing the regional conflict, but prolonged, escalated, deepened the 'existing
conflict
Examples: Korean War
- Causes:- local factors; desire of Kim II Sung to reunify Korea; Ambitions of Kim; conflict pre-dated the
Cold War
- Stress that it is not'masterminded or directed by Moscow' Stalin; stress Stalin's ambivalence to Kim's
scheme;
- USA not drawn in reluctantly - check its NSC-68 after the fall of China to communism & lost of nuclear
monopoly - stress USA govt looking for opportunity to launch NSC-68 and justify its huge expenses to
the US public whose mood soon after WWIl was still one of retrenchment , keeping off expensive,
endless entanglements overseas (peace dividend). ,
- Stress how Korea offered the Democrats opportunity to show the Republicans that they were not soft on
communism; convince their allies that USA can be tough on communism and is reliable - US credibility
at stake here; McCarty Era - communist-witch hunt = cannot be Seen to be soft on communism.
- Stress how US involvement, although did save South Korea from being turned into a communist state
controlled by North Korea - US inevitably lengthened, prolonged and even expanded the conflict to
include China (explain why China was reluctantly drawn in - see General MacArthur's policy ofrolling-
back communism beyond Korean peninsula)
. .
,
"
I




. Examples: Vietnam War
Causes:- local factors; Ho Chi Minh a local communist nationalist, freedom fighter; desire to free
Vietnam completely from foreign control I dominance; reunify the 2 Vietnams; the conflict pre-dated the
Cold War
- Stress that it is not masterminded or directed by Moscow / a.
USA not drawn in reluctantly - check its Cold War policy of Containment in Asia I NSC-68; check its
Domino Theory = involvement was consistent with US policy; "-....
Details of US involvement since 1955; Americanisation of the Vietnam War from 1965
- Show how US involvement prolonged and escalated the level of the conflict & destructiolL (
- tel.udP.AU... o!)"
.:t Examples of Calts/lle regional conflicts
Examples of USA I USSR causing the conflict to ignite I clash to take place in the fll'St place
t





\
UJ. (,
f'I!,,:Wll
-/--"-)
:


t.;':\U'e.-t(Ql""" .$'b
USA:- Latin America - activities in Guatemala 1954; Chile 1972 . : .
(debatable whether these can be considered as regional conOicts - because: they were
Internal problems; there was no war)
- Causes:- US economic interests vs actions of the nationalist leaders in those countries
- Stress US either misread the signs (saw it as a communist movt inspired from Moscow) or chose to use
the Soviet bogeyman to justify its actions I convert intervention I sponsorship of coup d'etat
USSR:- Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
- Causes:- USSR decision to take up Cuba's request for help I defence as a means to challenge to USA in .
her oWn backyard
Stress the context for Khrushchev to adopt such a risky policy - failures in Berlin crisis (failed to force
Western Powers out of West Berlin); accused by Communist Bloc I China of being soft on Capitalism
and forgetting the communist mission, Thus a need to regain the initiative from USA, to regain prestige
and to score a strategic and diplomatic victory against the USA by installing Soviet missiles on USA's
backyard
- Details of the Cuban Missile Crisis .... ..
01 Alg/,a"ista" 1980
- Causes: USSR's security at stake; national interest; talk about the potential threats in Afghanistan, The
pro-Soviet regime about to collapse to a Muslim Fundamentalist group - fearful that its influence might
spread to USSR's border republics in Central Asia - share a long stretch of common botder with
- Afghanistan - these Soviet Republics here were predominantly Muslim communities - fear Afghanistan
might later sponsor separatist movts in the Soviet republic
- Show Soviet invasion'
Show US indirect involvement through sponsoring the Mujaheddin fighters -eliot

-ll1 ll"'-t,..s c,. Vl.

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