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Republic Act No.

7691 March 25, 1994 AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980" Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: : Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. "(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; "(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; "(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00); "(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00); "(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations; "(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; "(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and "(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)." Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: "(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and "(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: "(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred 8thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; "(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and "(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such

assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots." Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts." Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00). Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be considered amended or modified accordingly. Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may be transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of the appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative procedure of transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. 1. [Manchester dev. Corp vs CA 149 SCRA 562] G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987 GANCAYCO, J.: Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the case for oral argument is denied. Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in the original complaint. The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that 1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages. While the present case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. However, in the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the

body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee. 4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted. On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and possession of real property. An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee. In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint. As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For a legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void. The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint. The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious. The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice. To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 2. [Sun insurance v. Asuncion 170 SCRA 274] G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989 GANCAYCO, J.:

Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid. On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant. On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints. On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate. On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated. Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70. On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00. On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order (a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and (b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00. Hence, the instant petition. During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.

The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, as follows: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed. On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected. In Lee vs. Republic, the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956. In Malimit vs. Degamo, the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed. Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same court. Then in Magaspi, this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00. The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing fee. The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional

docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must be based on the amended complaint. The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one, for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint. However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff. Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint as well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint. Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case and other cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted. Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and void. The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar toManchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void. In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same. Thus, the Court rules as follows: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 3. [Fedman Dev. Corp v . Agcaoile GR 165025 Aug 31 2011] BERSAMIN, J.: The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment. Fedman Development Corporation (FDC) appeals the decision promulgated on August 20, 2004, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on August 28, 1998 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City, in favor of the respondent. Antecedents FDC was the owner and developer of a condominium project known as Fedman Suites Building (FSB) located on Salcedo Street, Legazpi Village, Makati City. On June 18, 1975, Interchem Laboratories Incorporated (Interchem) purchased FSBs Unit 411 under a contract to sell. On March 31, 1977, FDC executed a Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions,3 and formed the Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation (FSCC) to manage FSB and hold title over its common areas. On October 10, 1980, Interchem, with FDCs consent, transferred all its rights in Unit 411 to respondent Federico Agcaoili (Agcaoili), a practicing attorney who was then also a member of the Provincial Board of Quezon Province. As consideration for the transfer, Agcaoili agreed: (a) to pay Interchem 150,000.00 upon signing of the deed of transfer; (b) to update the account by paying to FDC the amount of 15,473.17 through a 90 day-postdated check; and (c) to deliver to FDC the balance of 137,286.83 in 135 equal monthly installments of 1,857.24 effective October 1980, inclusive of 12% interest per annum on the diminishing balance. The obligations Agcaoili assumed totaled 302,760.00. In December 1983, the centralized air-conditioning unit of FSBs fourth floor broke down. On January 3, 1984, Agcaoili, being thereby adversely affected, wrote to Eduardo X. Genato (Genato), vice-president and board member of FSCC, demanding the repair of the air-conditioning unit. Not getting any immediate response, Agcaoili sent

follow-up letters to FSCC reiterating the demand, but the letters went unheeded. He then informed FDC and FSCC that he was suspending the payment of his condominium dues and monthly amortizations. On August 30, 1984, FDC cancelled the contract to sell involving Unit 411 and cut off the electric supply to the unit. Agcaoili was thus prompted to sue FDC and FSCC in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144 for injunction and damages. The parties later executed a compromise agreement that the RTC approved through its decision of August 26, 1985. As stipulated in the compromise agreement, Agcaoili paid FDC the sum of 39,002.04 as amortizations for the period from November 1983 to July 1985; and also paid FSCC an amount of 17,858.37 for accrued condominium dues, realty taxes, electric bills, and surcharges as of March 1985. As a result, FDC reinstated the contract to sell and allowed Agcaoili to temporarily install two window-type air-conditioners in Unit 411. On April 22, 1986, FDC again disconnected the electric supply of Unit 411. Agcaoili thus moved for the execution of the RTC decision dated August 26, 1985. On July 17, 1986, the RTC issued an order temporarily allowing Agcaoili to obtain his electric supply from the other units in the fourth floor of FSB until the main meter was restored. On March 6, 1987, Agcaoili lodged a complaint for damages against FDC and FSCC in the RTC, which was raffled to Branch 150 in Makati City. He alleged that the disconnection of the electric supply of Unit 411 on April 22, 1986 had unjustly deprived him of the use and enjoyment of the unit; that the disconnection had seriously affected his law practice and had caused him sufferings, inconvenience and embarrassment; that FDC and FSCC violated the compromise agreement; that he was entitled to actual damages amounting to 21,626.60, as well as to moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees as might be proven during the trial; that the payment of interest sought by FDC and FSCC under the contract to sell was illegal; and that FDC and FSCC were one and the same corporation. He also prayed that FDC and FSCC be directed to return the excessive amounts collected for real estate taxes. In its answer, FDC contended that it had a personality separate from that of FSCC; that it had no obligation or liability in favor of Agcaoili; that FSCC, being the manager of FSB and the title-holder over its common areas, was in charge of maintaining all central and appurtenant equipment and installations for utility services (like airconditioning unit, elevator, light and others); that Agcaoili failed to comply with the terms of the contract to sell; that despite demands, Agcaoili did not pay the amortizations due from November 1983 to March 1985 and the surcharges, the total amount of which was 376,539.09; that due to the non-payment, FDC cancelled the contract to sell and forfeited the amount of 219,063.97 paid by Agcaoili, applying the amount to the payment of liquidated damages, agents commission, and interest; that it demanded that Agcaoili vacate Unit 411, but its demand was not heeded; that Agcaoili did not pay his monthly amortizations of 1,883.84 from October 1985 to May 1986, resulting in FSCC being unable to pay the electric bills on time to the Manila Electric Company resulting in the disconnection of the electric supply of FSB; that it allowed Agcaoili to obtain electric supply from other units because Agcaoili promised to settle his accounts but he reneged on his promise; that Agcaoilis total obligation was 55,106.40; that Agcaoilis complaint for damages was baseless and was intended to cover up his delinquencies; that the interest increase from 12% to 24% per annum was authorized under the contract to sell in view of the adverse economic conditions then prevailing in the country; and that the complaint for damages was barred by the principle of res judicata because the issues raised therein were covered by the RTC decision dated August 26, 1985. As compulsory counterclaim, FDC prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages each amounting to 1,000,000.00, attorneys fees amounting to 100,000.00 and costs of suit. On its part, FSCC filed an answer, admitting that the electric supply of Unit 411 was disconnected for the second time on April 22, 1986, but averring that the disconnection was justified because of Agcaoilis failure to pay the monthly amortizations and condominium dues despite repeated demands. It averred that it did not repair the airconditioning unit because of dwindling collections caused by the failure of some unit holders to pay their obligations on time; that the unit holders were notified of the electricity disconnection; and that the electric supply of Unit 411 could not be restored until Agcaoili paid his condominium dues totaling 14,701.16 as of April 1987. By way of counterclaim, FSCC sought moral damages and attorneys fees of 100,000.00 and 50,000.00, respectively, and cost of suit. On August 28, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Agcaoili, holding that his complaint for damages was not barred by res judicata; that he was justified in suspending the payment of his monthly amortizations; that FDCs cancellation of the contract to sell was improper; that FDC and FSCC had no separate personalities; and that Agcaoili was entitled to damages. The RTC disposed thus wise: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and as against both defendants, declaring the increased rates sought by defendants to be illegal, and ordering defendant FDC/FSCC to reinstate the contract to sell, as well as to provide/restore the air-conditioning services/electric supply to plaintiffs unit. Both defendants are likewise ordered to pay plaintiff: a. The amount of 21,626.60 as actual damages; b. 500,000.00 as moral damages; c. 50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and d. 50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees. and to return to plaintiff the excess amount collected from him for real estate taxes. SO ORDERED.

FDC appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC.20 Hence, FDC comes to us on further appeal. Issues FDC claims that there was a failure to pay the correct amount of docket fee herein because the complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees; that the payment of the prescribed docket fee by Agcaoili was necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case; and that, consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over this case. FDC also claims that the proceedings in the RTC were void because the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pertained to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB); and that both the RTC and the CA erred in ruling: (a) that Agcaoili had the right to suspend payment of his monthly amortizations; (b) that FDC had no right to cancel the contract to sell; and (c) that FDC and FSCC were one and same corporation, and as such were solidarily liable to Agcaoili for damages. Ruling The petition has no merit. I The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee are the acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim. 23 In an action where the reliefs sought are purely for sums of money and damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount being claimed. Ideally, therefore, the complaint or similar pleading must specify the sums of money to be recovered and the damages being sought in order that the clerk of court may be put in a position to compute the correct amount of docket fees. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient in relation to the amounts being sought, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the plaintiff will be required to pay the deficiency. The non-specification of the amounts of damages does not immediately divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no bad faith or intent to defraud the Government on the part of the plaintiff. The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription.27 The "prescriptive period" that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in which a specific action must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period, as provided in the applicable laws, particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of actions. In Rivera v. Del Rosario, the Court, resolving the issue of the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees due to the inadequate assessment by the clerk of court, ruled that jurisdiction over the complaint was still validly acquired upon the full payment of the docket fees assessed by the Clerk of Court. Relying on Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the Court opined that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vested a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim, and although the docket fees paid were insufficient in relation to the amount of the claim, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy retained the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the party filing the action could be required to pay the deficiency, without jurisdiction being automatically lost. Even where the clerk of court fails to make a deficiency assessment, and the deficiency is not paid as a result, the trial court nonetheless continues to have jurisdiction over the complaint, unless the party liable is guilty of a fraud in that regard, considering that the deficiency will be collected as a fee in lien within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 141 (as revised by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC) The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not fair if the party has acted in good faith. Herein, the docket fees paid by Agcaoili were insufficient considering that the complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Agcaoili paid the assessed docket fees. Such payment negated bad faith or intent to defraud the Government. Nonetheless, Agcaoili must remit any docket fee deficiency to the RTCs clerk of court. II FDC is now barred from asserting that the HLURB, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. As already stated, Agcaoili filed a complaint against FDC in the RTC on February 28, 1985 after FDC disconnected the electric supply of Unit 411. Agcaoili and FDC executed a compromise agreement on August 16, 1985. The RTC approved the compromise agreement through its decision of August 26, 1985. In all that time, FDC never challenged the RTCs jurisdiction nor invoked the HLURBs authority. On the contrary, FDC apparently recognized the RTCs jurisdiction by its voluntary submission of the compromise agreement to the RTC for approval. Also, FDC did not assert the HLURBs jurisdiction in its answer to Agcaoilis second complaint (filed on March 6, 1987). Instead, it even averred in that answer that the decision of August 26, 1985 approving the compromise agreement already barred Agcaoili from filing the second complaint under the doctrine of res judicata. FDC also thereby sought affirmative relief from the RTC through its counterclaim.

FDC invoked HLURBs authority only on September 10, 1990, or more than five years from the time the prior case was commenced on February 28, 1985, and after the RTC granted Agcaoilis motion to enjoin FDC from cancelling the contract to sell. The principle of estoppel, which is based on equity and public policy, dictates that FDCs active participation in both RTC proceedings and its seeking therein affirmative reliefs now precluded it from denying the RTCs jurisdiction. Its acknowledgment of the RTCs jurisdiction and its subsequent denial of such jurisdiction only after an unfavorable judgment were inappropriate and intolerable. The Court abhors the practice of any litigant of submitting a case for decision in the trial court, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking the judgment for lack of jurisdiction if it is not. III In upholding Agcaoilis right to suspend the payment of his monthly amortizations due to the increased interest rates imposed by FDC, and because he found FDCs cancellation of the contract to sell as improper, the CA found and ruled as follows: It is the contention of the appellee that he has the right to suspend payments since the increase in interest rate imposed by defendant-appellant FDC is not valid and therefore cannot be given legal effect. Although Section II, paragraph d of the Contract to Sell entered into by the parties states that, "should there be an increase in bank interest rate for loans and/or other financial accommodations, the rate of interest provided for in this contract shall be automatically amended to equal the said increased bank interest rate, the date of said amendment to coincide with the date of said increase in interest rate," the said increase still needs to [be] accompanied by valid proofs and not one of the parties must unilaterally alter what was originally agreed upon. However, FDC failed to substantiate the alleged increase with sufficient proof, thus we quote with approval the findings of the lower court, to wit: "In the instant case, defendant FDC failed to show by evidence that it incurred loans and /or other financial accommodations to pay interest for its loans in developing the property. Thus, the increased interest rates said defendant is imposing on plaintiff is not justified, and to allow the same is tantamount to unilaterally altering the terms of the contract which the law proscribes. Article 1308 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1308 The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them." For this reason, the court sees no valid reason for defendant FDC to cancel the contract to sell on ground of default or non-payment of monthly amortizations." (RTC rollo, pp. 79-80) It was also grave error on the part of the FDC to cancel the contract to sell for non-payment of the monthly amortizations without taking into consideration Republic Act 6552, otherwise known as the Maceda Law. The policy of law, as embodied in its title, is "to provide protection to buyers of real estate on installment payments." As clearly specified in Section 3, the declared public policy espoused by Republic Act No. 6552 is "to protect buyers of real estate on installment payments against onerous and oppressive conditions." Thus, in order for FDC to have validly cancelled the existing contract to sell, it must have first complied with Section 3 (b) of RA 6552. FDC should have refund the appellee the cash surrender value of the payments on the property equivalent to fifty percent of the total payments made. At this point, we, find no error on the part of the lower court when it ruled that: "There is nothing in the record to show that the aforementioned requisites for a valid cancellation of a contract where complied with by defendant FDC. Hence, the contract to sell which defendant FDC cancelled as per its letter dated August 17, 1987 remains valid and subsisting. Defendant FDC cannot by its own forfeit the payments already made by the plaintiff which as of the same date amounts to 263,637.73."(RTC rollo, p. 81) We sustain the aforequoted findings and ruling of the CA, which were supported by the records and relevant laws, and were consistent with the findings and ruling of the RTC. Factual findings and rulings of the CA are binding and conclusive upon this Court if they are supported by the records and coincided with those made by the trial court. FDCs claim that it was distinct in personality from FSCC is unworthy of consideration due to its being a question of fact that cannot be reviewed under Rule 45. Among the obligations of FDC and FSCC to the unit owners or purchasers of FSBs units was the duty to provide a centralized air-conditioning unit, lighting, electricity, and water; and to maintain adequate fire exit, elevators, and cleanliness in each floor of the common areas of FSB. But FDC and FSCC failed to repair the centralized airconditioning unit of the fourth floor of FSB despite repeated demands from Agcaoili. To alleviate the physical discomfort and adverse effects on his work as a practicing attorney brought about by the breakdown of the airconditioning unit, he installed two window-type air-conditioners at his own expense. Also, FDC and FSCC failed to provide water supply to the comfort room and to clean the corridors. The fire exit and elevator were also defective. These defects, among other circumstances, rightly compelled Agcaoili to suspend the payment of his monthly amortizations and condominium dues. Instead of addressing his valid complaints, FDC disconnected the electric supply of his Unit 411 and unilaterally increased the interest rate without justification. Clearly, FDC was liable for damages. Article 1171 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review; AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals; and DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, or his duly authorized deputy to assess and collect the

additional docket fees from the respondent as fees in lien in accordance with Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED. 4). [Tappa, GR 181303, Sept. 17 2009] CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders 1 dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007, and 31 October 2007, rendered by Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, which dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the Complaint of petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, Leticia Danao, Maria Danao Accorda, Evelyn Danao, Fermina Danao, and Leonora Danao, against respondents Benigno Tappa, Jerry Reyna, Saturnino Cambri, Francisco Ligutan and Maria Ligutan, in Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-127937 situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it. Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members, continued to occupy the subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand. Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title. Petitioners additionally sought in their Complaint an award against respondents for actual damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, resulting from the latters baseless claim over the subject property that did not actually belong to them, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code on Human Relations. Petitioners likewise prayed for an award against respondents for exemplary damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, since the latter had acted in bad faith and resorted to unlawful means to establish their claim over the subject property. Finally, petitioners asked to recover from respondents P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, because the latters refusal to vacate the property constrained petitioners to engage the services of a lawyer. Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691, amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC decreed in its 4 May 2007 Order that: The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving a real property with assessed value less than P20,000.00 and hereby dismisses the same without prejudice. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court 13 states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint, citing Rumarate v. Hernandez. And even if the two causes of action could not be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of action was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.

The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners Motion. It clarified that their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places. The dispositive part of the 31 October 2007 Order of the RTC reads: This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not dispute the assessed value of the property at P410.00 under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386. Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the action. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion is hereby denied. Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the sole issue of: I WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS MOTU PROPRIO. Petitioners statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem that they are only challenging the fact that their Complaint was dismissed by the RTC motu proprio. Based on the facts and arguments set forth in the instant Petition, however, the Court determines that the fundamental issue for its resolution is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Court rules in the negative. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder. Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit: Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.) As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that: An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.) The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect. To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended. It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus: Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.) As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC. Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title. Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones recovery of possession over the real property as owner. Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only atP410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction. As for the RTC dismissing petitioners Complaint motu proprio, the following pronouncements of the Court inLaresma v. Abellana proves instructive: It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31 October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868, without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal Trial Court or the court of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED. 5). [BF Citiland v, Otake, GR 173351] July 29, 2010 CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition for review of the Resolutions dated 28 July 2005 and 5 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88995. The 28 July 2005 Resolution dismissed the petition for review filed by petitioner seeking the reversal of the 29 December 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 257) of Paraaque City. The 5 July 2006 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Antecedent Facts Petitioner BF Citiland Corporation is the registered owner of Lot 2, Block 101 situated in Brisbane Street, Phase III, BF Homes Subdivision, Paraaque City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52940. Based on the tax declaration6 filed in the Office of the Assessor, the lot has an assessed value of P48,000.00. On 24 February 1987, respondent Merlinda B. Bodullo bought the adjoining Lot 1, Block 101 covered by TCT No. 77549.8 However, records show respondent occupied not just the lot she purchased. She also encroached upon petitioners lot. On 13 October 2000, petitioner filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 77) of Paraaque City a complaint foraccion publiciana praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to vacate the subject lot. Petitioner also prayed that respondent be ordered to pay P15,000.00 per month by way of reasonable compensation for the use of the lot. The Ruling of the MeTC In its 25 April 2003 Decision, the MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and the latter, including any and all persons claiming rights under her is ORDERED: 1. To VACATE Lot 2, Block 101 subject lot in this instant case and SURRENDER peaceful possession to the plaintiff; 2. To PAY the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 per month by way of reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject lot from the filing of this case until the defendant shall have fully vacated the same; 3. To PAY the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and 4. To PAY the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 12 claiming she was a lawful possessor and buyer in good faith of the disputed lot. In its Order dated 20 June 2003, the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for lack of the requisite notice of hearing. The MeTC then issued a writ of execution. Respondent filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over accion publicianacases. In its 30 January 2004 Order, the MeTC denied the motion to quash the writ of execution. It held that under Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act 7691, the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions involving title to or possession of real property with assessed value not exceeding P50,000.00. Petitioner filed a motion for special order of demolition alleging that the lot subject of execution contained improvements introduced by respondent. Respondent opposed the motion for being premature and moved for reconsideration of the 30 January 2004 Order of the MeTC. Respondent argued that even if the MeTC had jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases, the total value of the lot together with the residential house she built on it exceeded P50,000.00. In its 23 July 2004 Order, 21 the MeTC ruled that since the subject lot had an assessed value of P48,000.00, it had jurisdiction under Section 33 of BP 129, as amended. The MeTC held that since the action was only for the recovery of the lot, the residential house respondent built on it should not be included in computing the assessed value of the property. Thus, the MeTC granted petitioners motion for demolition and denied respondents motion for reconsideration of its 30 January 2004 Order. Respondent filed in the Regional Trial Court (Branch 257) of Paraaque City a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking dismissal of the accion publiciana case for lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC. The Ruling of the RTC In its 29 December 2004 Decision, the RTC held that accion publiciana was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts. The RTC further explained that BP 129, as amended, did not modify the jurisprudential doctrine that a suit for accion publiciana fell under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. It disposed of the petition for certiorari in this wise: WHEREFORE, the preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court in the Order dated September 8, 2004 enjoining the court a quo and its sheriff from implementing the Writ of Execution is hereby made permanent. Since the court a quo has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11868, a suit for accion publiciana filed by BF Citiland Corporation against petitioner, the said case is dismissed. Consequently, all Orders and the Decision rendered on the said case by the court a quo are deemed void or without force and effect.

SO ORDERED. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that accion publiciana was the civil action involving title to or possession of real property referred to in Section 33 of BP 129, as amended. Petitioner also claimed respondent was already estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MeTC because of respondents participation in all the proceedings in the MeTC coupled with respondents failure to timely object to the jurisdiction of the MeTC. In her comment, respondent reasoned that while Section 33 of BP 129, as amended, explicitly qualified the courts jurisdiction depending on the assessed value of the real property, accion publiciana conferred jurisdiction on regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property. Respondent further argued that lack of jurisdiction could be raised anytime. Upon the RTCs denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court contending that the RTC erred in ruling that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. Petitioner maintained respondent was already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC. In her comment, respondent stressed that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. Respondent reiterated the argument that lack of jurisdiction could be raised anytime. In its reply, petitioner cited Refugia v. Court of Appeals in claiming that the MeTC had limited original jurisdiction in civil actions involving title to or possession of real property depending on the propertys assessed value. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its 28 July 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review holding that appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction should be by way of a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that appeal by way of petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court could be resorted to only when what was appealed from was a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In its 5 July 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for review. The Issues The issues for resolution are (1) whether a petition for review under Rule 42 is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and (2) whether the RTC correctly ruled that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. The Courts Ruling The petition is meritorious. Petitioner posits that even if the RTC rendered the judgment in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals still erred in dismissing the petition for review because a petition for review contains all the requisites of a notice of appeal. Petitioner argues the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review on technicality without considering the merits of the case. Petitioner maintains the MeTC has jurisdiction since the assessed value of the lot subject of accion publiciana is only P48,000.00. Respondent counters that the decision of the RTC was rendered in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, unmistakably an original action. Respondent maintains that a petition for review cannot be treated as a form of a notice of appeal because of the inextendible nature of the latter. Respondent further argues that the RTC correctly ruled the MeTC has no jurisdiction in accion publiciana cases. Respondent claims she is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states: (a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. x xx (b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42. (Emphasis supplied) xxxx The Rule is clear. In cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction , appeal to the Court of Appeals is taken by filing a notice of appeal. On the other hand, in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of itsappellate jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is by a petition for review under Rule 42. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from further proceeding has been issued against the public respondent. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, without a doubt, an original action. Since the decision of the RTC in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal from the said RTC decision to the Court of Appeals should have been made by filing a notice of appeal, not a petition for review under Rule 42. However, in numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon. It is better to excuse a technical lapse rather than dispose of a case on technicality, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. 37 In the present case, a dismissal on a technicality would only mean a new round of litigation between the same parties for the same cause of action, over

the same subject matter. Thus, notwithstanding petitioners wrong mode of appeal, the Court of Appeals should not have so easily dismissed the petition. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the plenary action of accion publiciana must be brought before regional trial courts. 38 With the modifications introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the jurisdiction of regional trial courts has been limited to real actions where the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 if the action is filed in Metro Manila. If the assessed value is below the said amounts, the action must be brought before first level courts. As so amended, BP 129 now provides: Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (Emphasis supplied) Under BP 129, as amended, jurisdiction even in accion publiciana cases is determined by the assessed value of the property. The Court recently explained in Spouses Alcantara v. Nido that assessed value is the worth or value of the property as fixed by the taxing authorities for the purpose of determining the applicable tax rate. The assessed value does not necessarily represent the true or market value of the property. In the present case, the complaint, which was filed after the enactment of R.A. 7691, contained a statement that, based on the tax declaration filed in the Office of the Assessor, the lot subject of the accion publiciana has an assessed value of P48,000.00. A copy of the tax declaration was attached as Annex "B" of the complaint. The subject lot, with an assessed value below the jurisdictional limit of P50,000.00 for Metro Manila, comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MeTC under BP 129, as amended. Thus, the RTC erred in holding that the MeTC had no jurisdiction in this case. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated 28 July 2005 and 5 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88995. We REINSTATE the 25 April 2003 Decision and the 20 June 2003 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 77) of Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 11868. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. 6) [Alcantara v. Nido GR 165133] April 19, 2010 CARPIO, J.: The Case Spouses Antonio and Joselina Alcantara and Spouses Josefino and Annie Rubi (petitioners) filed this Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (appellate court) Decision 2 dated 10 June 2004 as well as the Resolution3dated 17 August 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78215. In the assailed decision, the appellate court reversed the 17 June 2002 Decision 4 of Branch 69 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal (RTC) by dismissing the case for recovery of possession with damages and preliminary injunction filed by Brigida L. Nido (respondent), in her capacity as administrator and attorney-in-fact of Revelen N. Srivastava (Revelen). The Facts Revelen, who is respondents daughter and of legal age, is the owner of an unregistered land with an area of 1,939 square meters located in Cardona, Rizal. Sometime in March 1984, respondent accepted the offer of petitioners to purchase a 200-square meter portion of Revelens lot (lot) at P200 per square meter. Petitioners paid P3,000 as downpayment and the balance was payable on installment. Petitioners constructed their houses in 1985. In 1986, with respondents consent, petitioners occupied an additional 150 square meters of the lot. By 1987, petitioners had already paid P17,500 before petitioners defaulted on their installment payments. On 11 May 1994, respondent, acting as administrator and attorney-in-fact of Revelen, filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioners with the RTC. The RTCs Ruling The RTC stated that based on the evidence presented, Revelen owns the lot and respondent was verbally authorized to sell 200 square meters to petitioners. The RTC ruled that since respondents authority to sell the land was not in writing, the sale was void under Article 1874 of the Civil Code. The RTC ruled that rescission is the proper remedy. On 17 June 2002, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, by 1. Declaring the contract to sell orally agreed by the plaintiff Brigida Nido, in her capacity as representative or agent of her daughter Revelen Nido Srivastava, VOID and UNENFORCEABLE. 2. Ordering the parties, upon finality of this judgment, to have mutual restitution the defendants and all persons claiming under them to peacefully vacate and surrender to the plaintiff the possession of the subject lot covered by TD No. 09-0742 and its derivative Tax Declarations, together with all permanent improvements introduced thereon, and all improvements built or constructed during the pendency of this action, in bad faith; and the plaintiff, to return the sum of P17,500.00, the total amount of the installment

on the land paid by defendant; the fruits and interests during the pendency of the condition shall be deemed to have been mutually compensated. 3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus P15,000.00 as actual litigation expenses, plus the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. The Appellate Courts Ruling On 5 January 2004, petitioners appealed the trial courts Decision to the appellate court. In its decision dated 10 June 2004, the appellate court reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the civil case. The appellate court explained that this is an unlawful detainer case. The prayer in the complaint and amended complaint was for recovery of possession and the case was filed within one year from the last demand letter. Even if the complaint involves a question of ownership, it does not deprive the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Petitioners raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in their Motion to Dismiss and Answer before the RTC.11 The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and assumed jurisdiction over the case because the issues pertain to a determination of the real agreement between the parties and rescission of the contract to sell the property. The appellate court added that even if respondents complaint is for recovery of possession or accion publiciana, the RTC still has no jurisdiction to decide the case. The appellate court explained: Note again that the complaint was filed on 11 May 1994. By that time, Republic Act No. 7691 was already in effect. Said law took effect on 15 April 1994, fifteen days after its publication in the Malaya and in the Time Journal on 30 March 1994 pursuant to Sec. 8 of Republic Act No. 7691. Accordingly, Sec. 33 of Batas Pambansa 129 was amended by Republic Act No. 7691 giving the Municipal Trial Court the exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000 or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed P50,000, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs. At bench, the complaint alleges that the whole 1,939- square meter lot of Revelen N. Srivastava is covered by Tax Declaration No. 09-0742 (Exh. "B", p. 100, Records) which gives its assessed value of the whole lot of P4,890.00. Such assessed value falls within the exclusive original prerogative or jurisdiction of the first level court and, therefore, the Regional Trial Court a quo has no jurisdiction to try and decided the same. The appellate court also held that respondent, as Revelens agent, did not have a written authority to enter into such contract of sale; hence, the contract entered into between petitioners and respondent is void. A void contract creates no rights or obligations or any juridical relations. Therefore, the void contract cannot be the subject of rescission. Aggrieved by the appellate courts Decision, petitioners elevated the case before this Court. Issues Petitioners raise the following arguments: 1. The appellate court gravely erred in ruling that the contract entered into by respondent, in representation of her daughter, and former defendant Eduardo Rubi (deceased), is void; and 2. The appellate court erred in not ruling that the petitioners are entitled to their counterclaims, particularly specific performance. Ruling of the Court We deny the petition. Petitioners submit that the sale of land by an agent who has no written authority is not void but merely voidable given the spirit and intent of the law. Being only voidable, the contract may be ratified, expressly or impliedly. Petitioners argue that since the contract to sell was sufficiently established through respondents admission during the pre-trial conference, the appellate court should have ruled on the matter of the counterclaim for specific performance. Respondent argues that the appellate court cannot lawfully rule on petitioners counterclaim because there is nothing in the records to sustain petitioners claim that they have fully paid the price of the lot. Respondent points out that petitioners admitted the lack of written authority to sell. Respondent also alleges that there was clearly no meeting of the minds between the parties on the purported contract of sale. Sale of Land through an Agent Articles 1874 and 1878 of the Civil Code provide: Art. 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void. Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases: xxx (5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration; xxx

Article 1874 of the Civil Code explicitly requires a written authority before an agent can sell an immovable property. Based on a review of the records, there is absolutely no proof of respondents written authority to sell the lot to petitioners. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, petitioners admitted that at the time of the negotiation for the sale of the lot, petitioners were of the belief that respondent was the owner of lot. Petitioners only knew that Revelen was the owner of the lot during the hearing of this case. Consequently, the sale of the lot by respondent who did not have a written authority from Revelen is void. A void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone and cannot be ratified. A special power of attorney is also necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired for a valuable consideration. Without an authority in writing, respondent cannot validly sell the lot to petitioners. Hence, any "sale" in favor of the petitioners is void. Our ruling in Dizon v. Court of Appeals 21 is instructive: When the sale of a piece of land or any interest thereon is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void. Thus the authority of an agent to execute a contract for the sale of real estate must be conferred in writing and must give him specific authority, either to conduct the general business of the principal or to execute a binding contract containing terms and conditions which are in the contract he did execute. A special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration. The express mandate required by law to enable an appointee of an agency (couched) in general terms to sell must be one that expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of the act mentioned. For the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell real estate, a power of attorney must so express the powers of the agent in clear and unmistakable language. When there is any reasonable doubt that the language so used conveys such power, no such construction shall be given the document. Further, Article 1318 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites for a valid contract, namely: 1. consent of the contracting parties; 2. object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; 3. cause of the obligation which is established. Respondent did not have the written authority to enter into a contract to sell the lot. As the consent of Revelen, the real owner of the lot, was not obtained in writing as required by law, no contract was perfected. Consequently, petitioners failed to validly acquire the lot. General Power of Attorney On 25 March 1994, Revelen executed a General Power of Attorney constituting respondent as her attorney-in-fact and authorizing her to enter into any and all contracts and agreements on Revelens behalf. The General Power of Attorney was notarized by Larry A. Reid, Notary Public in California, U.S.A. Unfortunately, the General Power of Attorney presented as "Exhibit C" in the RTC cannot also be the basis of respondents written authority to sell the lot. Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record . An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. In Teoco v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,23 quoting Lopez v. Court of Appeals, we explained: From the foregoing provision, when the special power of attorney is executed and acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official in a foreign country, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is certified as such in accordance with the foregoing provision of the rules by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept of said public document and authenticated by the seal of his office. A city judge-notary who notarized the document, as in this case, cannot issue such certification. Since the General Power of Attorney was executed and acknowledged in the United States of America, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is certified as such in accordance with the Rules of Court by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the United States of America. Hence, this document has no probative value. Specific Performance Petitioners are not entitled to claim for specific performance. It must be stressed that when specific performance is sought of a contract made with an agent, the agency must be established by clear, certain and specific proof. To reiterate, there is a clear absence of proof that Revelen authorized respondent to sell her lot. Jurisdiction of the RTC Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,27 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 provides: Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxx (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: xxx In Geonzon Vda. de Barrera v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, 28 the Court explained: Before the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the plenary action of accion publiciana was to be brought before the regional trial court. With the modifications introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action is filed in Metro Manila. The first level courts thus have exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed the aforestated amounts. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property. Assessed value is understood to be "the worth or value of property established by taxing authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied. Commonly, however, it does not represent the true or market value of the property." The appellate court correctly ruled that even if the complaint filed with the RTC involves a question of ownership, the MTC still has jurisdiction because the assessed value of the whole lot as stated in Tax Declaration No. 09-0742 is P4,890. The MTC cannot be deprived of jurisdiction over an ejectment case based merely on the assertion of ownership over the litigated property, and the underlying reason for this rule is to prevent any party from trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit. The general rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law. The lack of jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action; otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make the courts decision a "lawless" thing.31 Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed, all the proceedings as well as the Decision of 17 June 2002 are void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78215. SO ORDERED. 7) [Bernardo v. Heirs of Villagers, GR 183357, March 15 2010] PEREZ, J.: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to assail the validity of the Decision1 dated 21 April 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal in Civil Case No. R-00-035. This controversy stemmed from a Complaint dated 14 November 2000 for accion publiciana filed by respondent Heirs of Eusebio Villegas against petitioner Honorio Bernardo, Romeo Gaza (Gaza) and Monina Francisco (Francisco). Respondents had earlier filed an ejectment case against the trio, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-065 with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, which case was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for having been filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period for filing a forcible entry case. Respondents alleged in the Complaint that their father, Eusebio Villegas, is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 46891 with an area of 18,369 square meters and situated in Barangay Pag-asa, Binangonan, Rizal; that petitioner, by stealth and in the guise of merely grazing his cattle, surreptitiously entered into possession of a portion of respondents land; that petitioner conspired and confederated with Gaza and Francisco by illegally constructing their own houses on the subject land; that the issue of possession was brought to the barangay for conciliation but no settlement was reached by the parties; and that petitioner, Gaza and Francisco had forcibly, unlawfully and unjustly possessed and continue to possess the subject property and had refused to vacate the same. In his Answer, petitioner denied taking possession of any portion of the property of respondents. He argued that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the ejectment case. He claimed that he had been in possession of his land since the early 1950s. As he did before the MTC, petitioner also alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. Gaza alleged that he has been occupying an abandoned river bed adjacent to the property allegedly owned by respondents.4 Gaza averred that he entered into a written agreement with petitioner, who claimed to own the land and allowed him to build a nipa hut thereon. An ocular inspection was conducted by the trial court judge. On 5 March 2007, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents and ordered petitioner, Gaza and Francisco to vacate the subject land covered by TCT No. 46891 and to pay jointly and severally respondents the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and the cost of suit. The trial court held that the suit, being an accion publiciana, falls within its jurisdiction. It found that the houses of petitioner and Gaza were inside the titled property of respondents. Its findings were based on the testimony of one of the respondents, Estelito Villegas; the relocation plan prepared by Engineer Rico J. Rasay; and the Technical

Report on Verification Survey submitted by Engineer Robert C. Pangyarihan, petitioners own witness. 7 The trial court noted that petitioner failed to present any title or tax declaration to prove ownership or possessory right. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. In his appeal, petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and argued that in their complaint, the respondents failed to state the assessed value of the property in dispute. The appellate court ruled that petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction because he failed to file a motion to dismiss on such ground and, instead, actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. With respect to the argument that being indispensable parties, all of the heirs of Eusebio Villegas should have been impleaded as parties, the appellate court disagreed and invoked Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. The appellate court construed said provision to cover all kinds of actions for recovery of possession. The appellate court sustained the trial courts finding that the portions of the land occupied by petitioner and Gaza are owned by respondents. The appellate court likewise ruled that respondents could not be guilty of laches considering that Estelito Villegas, upon seeing for the first time in 1996 that petitioner was already building his house on the premises, verbally asked him to discontinue the construction. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action for failure of respondents to allege the assessed value of the property involved in their complaint. Petitioner belies the ruling of the appellate court that he failed to raise objections before the trial court. Petitioner reiterates that he raised the defense of lack of jurisdiction as early as in his Answer filed before the trial court. Moreover, he argues that even if he did not raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction, the trial court should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio. Petitioner disputes the application to him of the doctrine of estoppel by laches in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Petitioner avers that unlike in Tijam, he raised the issue of jurisdiction, not only in his answer, but also in his appeal. Respondents defend the ruling of the Court of Appeals and maintain that petitioner is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court. The issue presented before this Court is simple: Whether or not estoppel bars petitioner from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the plenary action of accion publiciana must be brought before the regional trial courts. With the modifications introduced by Republic Act No. 7691 14 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts was limited to real actions where the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00, and P50,000.00 where the action is filed in Metro Manila, thus: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxxx (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Under the law as modified, jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property. A reading of the complaint shows that respondents failed to state the assessed value of the disputed land. The averments read: xxxx 3. EUSEBIO VILLEGAS, deceased father of hte plaintiffs, is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Pag-asa (formerly Barangay Tayuman), Binangonan, Rizal with a land area of 18,369 square meters. The same is covered by and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 46891 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. x x x. 4. Plaintiffs are the legal heirs of EUSEBIO VILLEGAS and succeeded to the subject parcel of land by virtue of their inheritance rights as compulsory heirs of said deceased Eusebio Villegas and upon his death, immediately took over and were enjoying the peaceful possession of the said parcel of land and exercising said rights of possession and ownership thereof; 5. That sometime in 1996, defendant Honorio Bernardo, by stealth and in guise of merely grazing his cattle, without the consent of the plaintiffs, surreptitiously entered into the possession of a portion of the subject parcel of land. Employing threats and intimidations, he claimed later that the area he illegally occupied is purportedly not part and parcel of the land owned by the plaintiffs predecessor, Eusebio Villegas, and forcibly fenced and built his house on the portion of land he illegally occupied; 6. Not being content with his own forcible and unlawful invasion, usurpation and incursion into the plaintiffs parcel of land, and in furtherance of his desire to forcibly exclude the plaintiffs of their lawful and for possession of the subject portion of plaintiffs parcel of land, defendant Bernardo, conspired and confederated with defendants Romeo Gaza and Monina Francisco by surreptitiously and illegally constructing their own houses on the subject parcel of land through stealth and intimidation; 7. That the issue of the possession of the subject parcel of land was brought under the Barangay Justice System in 1996 for conciliation but, no settlement was reached by the parties. Copies of the Certifications issued by the Barangay for that matter is hereto attached and marked as Annex "B";

8. That the defendants have forcibly, unlawfully, and unjustly dispossessed and still continues to forcibly, unlawfully, and unjustly dispossesses the plaintiffs of their lawful rights of possession and ownership on a portion of the subject property since 1966 up to the present; 9. Because of the unjust refusal of the defendants to vacate the premises, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of counsel to protect their interest on the property for an agreed attorneys fee of P50,000.00, and have incurred litigation expenses[;] 10. By reason of the unlawful and forcible invasion by the defendants of the property of the plaintiffs which was accompanied by threats and intimidation, the plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer anxiety and sleepless nights for which the defendants should be made to indemnify by way of moral damages in the amount of at least P100,000.00; 11. To serve as an example to others who might be minded to commit similar wanton and unlawful acts, defendants should be held answerable for exemplary damages of not less than P50,000.00. 15 This fact was noted by the Court of Appeals in its Decision but it proceeded to rule in this wise: Records show that at the time plaintiffs-appellees filed their complaint below, R.A. No. 7691 which amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was already in effect. However, the complaint failed to allege the assessed value of the real property involved. Although appellant indeed raised the issue of jurisdiction in his answer, he had not filed a motion to dismiss on this ground nor reiterated the matter thereafter but actively participated in the proceedings after the denial of his demurrer to evidence anchored on the failure of the plaintiffs to identify in their complaint all the heirs of the registered owner and supposed lack of technical description of the property in the certificate of title. Indeed, appellant is now estopped to question the trial courts jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the case having actively pursued throughout the trial, by filing various pleadings and presenting all relevant documentary and testimonial evidence, his theory that the portion occupied by him is not covered by the torrens title of Eusebio Villegas. We agree. As already shown, nowhere in the complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned. There is no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has jurisdiction exclusive of the MTC. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot readily be determined which of the two trial courts had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. However, estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. In Tijam, the Court held that it is iniquitous and unfair to void the trial courts decision for lack of jurisdiction considering that it was raised only after fifteen (15) years of tedious litigation, thus: The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting. The principle of justice and equity as espoused in Tijam should be applied in this case. The MTC dismissed the ejectment case upon its ruling that the case is for accion publiciana. It did not assert jurisdiction over the case even if it could have done so based on the assessed value of the property subject of the accion publiciana. And there was no showing, indeed, not even an allegation, that the MTC was not aware of its jurisdictional authority over an accion publiciana involving property in the amount stated in the law. Moreover, petitioner did not bring up the issue of jurisdictional amount that would have led the MTC to proceed with the trial of the case. Petitioner obviously considered the dismissal to be in his favor. When, as a result of such dismissal, respondents brought the case as accion publiciana before the RTC, petitioner never brought up the issue of jurisdictional amount. What petitioner mentioned in his Answer before the RTC was the generally phrased allegation that "the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the nature of the action in the above-entitled case." This general assertion, which lacks any basis, is not sufficient. Clearly, petitioner failed to point out the omission of the assessed value in the complaint. Petitioner actively participated during the trial by adducing evidence and filing numerous pleadings, none of which mentioned any defect in the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was only on appeal before the Court of Appeals, after he obtained an adverse judgment in the trial court, that petitioner, for the first

time, came up with the argument that the decision is void because there was no allegation in the complaint about the value of the property. Clearly, petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. We note that the decisions of the RTC and of the Court of Appeals discussed extensively the merits of the case, which has been pending for nearly ten (10) years. It was handled by two (2) judges and its records had to be reconstituted after the fire that gutted the courthouse. If we were to accede to petitioners prayer, all the effort, time and expenses of parties who participated in the litigation would be wasted. Quite obviously, petitioner wants a repetition of the process hoping for the possibility of a reversal of the decision. The Court will not countenance such practice. Significantly, the Technical Report on Verification Survey by Engineer Robert C. Pangyarihan, which was attached to and formed part of the records, contained a tax declaration indicating that the subject property has an assessed value of P110,220.00. It is basic that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency. Under Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC in fact has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Taking into consideration the decision of the MTC proclaiming that the case is one for accion publiciana and the assessed value of the property as evidenced by the case records, jurisdiction pertains, rightfully so, with the RTC. Perforce, the petition should be denied. T WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 April 2008, affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal dated 5 March 2007, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

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