1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DOMINGO PANIS GR NO.

L5867477, JULY 11, 1990

FACTS: On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment COURT RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the CFIs Orders and reinstated all four information filed against private respondent. The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto.

Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.

2. BRIDGET BONENG Y BAGAWILI VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 133563, MARCH 4, 1999, THIRD DIVISION --- PURISIMA, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Bridget Boneng y Bagawili was charged with Illegal Recruitment before the Regional Trial Court. She pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial ensued, and after presenting the witnesses, the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence and rested its case. After the prosecution has rested, the accused presented a demurrer to evidence and manifested that she was waiving the right to adduce evidence and was submitting the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record. The trial court came out with its decision, finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged. It was appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the testimony of the complainant is perjured, hearsay and uncorroborated. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgement convicting petitioner for illegal recruitment. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its function to examine and determine the weight of the evidence supporting the assailed decision. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals which are supported by substantial evidence are binding, final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. So also, well-established is the rule that "factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court." Moreover, well entrenched is the prevailing jurisprudence that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies with greater force to the petition under consideration because the factual findings by the Court of Appeals are in full agreement with what the trial court found.

4. PEOPLE V. HU GR NO. 1822326 OCTOBER 2008

Chico-Nazario, J. FACTS: Nenita Hu is the President of Brighturn International Services, Inc. a landbased recruitment agency duly licensed by the POEA to engage in the business of recruitment and placement of workers abroad. Ethel Genoves, on the other hand, worked as a consultant and marketing officer of Brighturn. Aside from her stint at Brighturn, she was also connected with Riverland Consultancy Service, another recruitment agency. Brighturn was authorized to recruit, process, and deploy landbasedworkers for the period of 18 December 1999 to 17 December 2001. Genoves and Hu were charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large scale following the complaint from 6 people that they promised the latter employment abroad and collected fees from them However, when the job placements never materialized, the complainants demanded that the money they gave as placement fees be returned. Hu was not able to comply. Four of these complaints were promised employment during the validity of Brighturns license. Garcia applied on April 2002 when Brighturns license had already expired. She was referred to Best One, another recruitment agency but her placement fee was paid with Brighturn. For her defense, Hu cited that the receipts that the complainants showed her were issued buy Riverland. She denied knowing Genoves. ISSUE: W/N Hu was engaged in recruitment in large scale. DECISION: NO. A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that illegal recruitment was committed against three or more persons. The illegal recruitment was committed against only one person: Garcia, because Hu referred Garcia to another agency without the license or the authority to do so. Illegal Recruitment cannot successfully attach to the allegations of the others since they

testified that they accomplished their pre-employment requirements through Brighturn when the latters license was still in effect. However failure of the prosecution to prove guilt of Hu beyond reasonable doubt does not absolve her of civil obligation to return the money she collected from the complainants. Neither does her acquittal exempt her from subsequent criminal prosecution for estafa provided all the elements are present. Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the foregoing two elements concur, with the addition of a third elementthe recruiter committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant after an initial interview to a selected employer, placement or bureau, is included in recruitment. The absence of receipts in the case of Ill. Rec. does not warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is not fatal to the prosecutions case. As long as the prosecution was able to establish through credible evidence that the appellant had engaged in recruitment, a conviction for the offense can be justified.

5. PEOPLE VS. MELISSA CHUA G.R. NO. 184058, MARCH 10, 2010
Facts: Melissa Chua (appellant) was indicted for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale). Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Her co-accused Josie remained at large. The cases were consolidated, hence, trial proceeded only with respect to appellant. Of the five complainants, only three testified, namely, Marilyn D. Macaranas (Marilyn), Erik de Guia Tan (Tan) and Harry James King (King). Appellant denied the charges. Claiming having worked as a temporary cashier from January to October, 2002 at the office of Golden Gate, owned by one Marilyn Calueng, she maintained that Golden Gate was a licensed recruitment agency and that Josie, who is her godmother, was an agent.

Appellant was convicted thereof by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. She was also indicted for five counts of Estafa but was convicted only for three. The Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction. Issue: Is appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale? Ruling: Yes. For illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the accused undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the accused committed such illegal activity against three or more persons individually or as a group. In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a cashier from January to October 2002, was initially authorized to recruit workers for deployment abroad. Per the certification from the POEA, Golden Gates license only expired on February 23, 2002 and it was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on April 2, 2002. Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the complainants to part with their money upon the fraudulent representation that they would be able to secure for them employment abroad. In the absence of any evidence that the complainants were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of their credibility shall not be interfered with by the Court Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did not make her any less an employee to be held liable for illegal recruitment as principal by direct participation, together with the employer, as it was shown that she actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process. Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the illegal nature of the recruitment business of Golden Gate, that does not free her of liability either. Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under Republic Act No. 8042, or "The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," is a special law, a violation of which ismalum prohibitum, not malum in se. Intent is thus immaterial. And that explains why appellant was, aside from Estafa, convicted of such offense.

People v. Laogo G.R. No. 176264, January 10, 2011

FACTS: Susan Navarro invited Teodulo dela Cruz, Billy dela Cruz, Jr., Dante Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, Rogelio Enriquez, and Gary Bustillos and several individuals to her house in Bulacan, Bulacan to celebrate the town fiesta. Teresita Tessie Laogo, the proprietor and manager of Laogo Travel Consultancy, was among the several guests in Susans house during the said occasion. During the fiesta, Gary introduced Teodulo to Susan as somebody who could help him find work abroad. Since Susan was Garys aunt, Teodulo immediately trusted Susan. Susan told him he can apply as assistant cook and can work in Guam, USA. Upon Susans instruction, Teodulo filled out an application form and gave her P3,000.00 after the latter promised to process his application to work abroad. After several months, Susan accompanied Teodulo to Tessies travel agency office in Ermita where he paid an additional P15,000.00 for his placement fee. A receipt bearing the logo and name of Laogo Travel Consultancy was issued to him signed by Susan. Months later, when Susans promise to send him abroad remained unfulfilled, Teodulo, along with several other applicants, went to Tessies office and to Susans house to follow up their application, but the two always told them that their visas have yet to be released. Similarly, Billy also met Susan through Gary, who himself was seeking help from Susan to work in Guam. At Susans house, Billy saw Dante, Edwin, and Rogelio. Like him, the three were also seeking Susans help to work abroad. Susan introduced Billy to Tessie, who promised him that she will send them abroad within three months. After the meeting, Billy issued to Susan two Metrobank checks, dated March 11 and May 10, 2000, bearing the amounts P23,000.00 and P44,000.00, respectively, as partial payment for his placement fee. Billy also went to Tessies travel agency in Ermita and personally handed an additional cash of P6,000.00 to Susan, who thereafter gave the money to Tessie. Tessie issued a corresponding receipt for the P6,000.00 cash bearing her signature and the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy. After several months, no word was heard from either Susan or Tessie. Sensing that something was wrong, Billy decided to report the matter to the authorities in Bulacan, Bulacan and filed a complaint against Susan and Tessie. Dante was also introduced by Gary Bustillos to Tessie and Susan. Susan identified herself as an employee of Tessies travel agency. The two told him that they can send him and his companions to Guam within the span of three months. Dante paid both Susan and Tessie P6,000.00 to process his papers, covered by a receipt dated May 19, 2000 showing Tessies signature. Tessies promise, however, turned sour after three months. When he confronted Tessie, the latter told him that he would be sent to a different country. Left without a choice, Dante waited. Again, the promise remained unfulfilled. Rogelio also met Tessie during the town fiesta when Susan invited him to cook for her guests. Susan introduced Tessie as someone who could send him to work abroad. Eager about the prospect, Rogelio immediately gave his P3,000.00 cash to Susan for the processing of his visa and employment documents. He saw Susan hand the money to Tessie. A week later, Rogelio gave an additional P900.00 to Susan. No receipts were issued on both payments since

Rogelio failed to complete the required P6,000.00 placement fee. Months passed but Rogelio heard nothing from either Susan or Tessie. Apprehensive, Rogelio verified the status of the Laogo Travel Consultancy with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). From the POEA, Rogelio learned that Susan, Tessie, and Laogo Travel Consultancy did not have any license to recruit workers for employment abroad. Aggrieved, Rogelio, together with his six companions, filed a complaint against Susan and Tessie. Edwin also paid P12,000.00 to Susan as processing fee for his application to work in Guam. Tessie and Susans husband were present when he gave the money to Susan during the town fiesta. Susan issued a receipt dated May 16, 2000 to Edwin. The receipt contained the logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy and was signed by Susan with a description which says Payment was for Placement Fee. ISSUE: Was large scale illegal recruitment committed? RULING: Recruitment and placement refers to the act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. When a person or entity, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, that person or entity shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. And when the illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic sabotage. But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. It is important that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad. In this case, Teodulo, Billy, Dante, Edwin, and Rogelio were promised to be sent abroad by Susan and Tessie as cooks and assistant cooks. The follow up transactions between Tessie and the five persons were done inside the said travel agency. Moreover, all four receipts issued to the said persons bear the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy, with two of the said receipts personally signed by Tessie herself. Tessie and Susan could thus be said to have acted together in making them believe that they were transacting with a legitimate recruitment agency and that Laogo Travel Consultancy had the authority to recruit them and send them abroad for work when in truth and in fact it had none as certified by the POEA. The Supreme Court here ruled in the affirmative. Large scale illegal recruitment was thus committed.

7. CLAUDIO S. YAP, Petitioner, vs. THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011 Facts: Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited for a duration of 12 months. On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold. Yap, along with the other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of their vessel that the same was sold and wile scrapped. ap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed from employment. He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made. The Labor Arbiter Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA). On July 26, 2004, the LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have been constructively and illegally dismissed by respondents. LA opined that since the unexpired portion of petitioners contract was less than one year, petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a period of nine months. The NLRC Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the LAs findings that petitioner was indeed constructively and illegally dismissed . However, the NLRC held that instead of an award of salaries corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled to salaries for three months as provided under Section 108 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,9 as enunciated in our ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.

Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Finding merit in petitioners arguments, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision, holding that "there can be no choice to grant only three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpi red term because there is no full year of unexpired term which this can be applied." The Court of Appeals The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC that petitioner was constructively and illegally dismissed. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LAs interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In this regard, the CA relied on the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. Issues: Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. 8042, to the extent that it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of "salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional. YES Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired term" threshold. - YES The Supreme Court In the meantime, while this case was pending before this Court, we declared as unconstitutional the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 in the case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. on March 24, 2009. This case should not be different from Serrano. The said provision of law has long been a source of abuse by callous employers against migrant workers; and that said provision violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution because, while illegally dismissed local workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of reinstatement with full backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld from them up to their actual reinstatement. It imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment.

Respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that our pronouncement of unconstitutionality should not apply in this case because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is a substantive law that deals with the rights and obligations of the parties in case of Illegal Dismissal of a migrant worker and is not merely procedural in character. Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code, there should be no retroactive application of the law in this case. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included in the aforementioned exception. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law. Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker allowance should be excluded from the definition of the term "salary." Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this question. Matters not taken up below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. A close perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was not categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence, forming part of the basic salary of petitioner. A final note. We ought to be reminded of the plight and sacrifices of our OFWs. In Olarte v. Nayona, this Court held that:

Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them with our laws.

what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the sanction on an offending recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant obligation to repair the injury caused to its victims. Though some of the cases were filed after the expiration of the surety bond agreement between J&B and Eastern Assurance, notice was given to J&B of such anomalies even before said expiration. In this connection, it may be stressed that the surety bond provides that notice to the principal is notice to the surety. Besides, it has been held that the contract of a compensated surety like respondent Eastern Assurance is to be interpreted liberally in the interest of the promises and beneficiaries rather than strictly in favor of the surety.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

9. SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO 8. EASTERN ASSURANCE VS SECRETARY OF LABOR

Labor Standards Liability of Sureties POEA Rules Overseas Employment J&B Manpower is an overseas employment agency registered with the POEA and Eastern Assurance was its surety beginning January 1985. From 1983 to December 1985, J&B recruited 33 persons but none of them were ever deployed. These 33 persons sued J&B and the POEA as well as the Secretary of Labor ruled in favor of the 33 workers and ordered J&B to refund them (with Eastern Assurance being solidarily liable). Eastern Assurance assailed the ruling claiming that POEA and the Secretary of Labor have no jurisdiction over non-employees (since the 33 were never employed, in short, no employer-employee relations). ISSUE: Whether or not Eastern Assurance can be held liable in the case at bar. HELD: Yes. But only for the period covering from January 1985 when the surety took effect (as already held by the Labor Secretary). The Secretary of Labor was given power by Article 34 (Labor Code) and Section 35 and 36 of EO 797 (POEA Rules) to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies, but also to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions governing said activities. Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the respondent agency or contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may have been fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such money, goods or services imposed and accepted in excess of G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990 Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code

Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.

persuaded to submit to a downgraded contract as Second Officer, on the assurance of eventual promotion to Chief Officer by the end of the following month. Having wandered around respondents ship for more than two months without being granted any promotion whatsoever, he refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated back to the Philippines, with still nine (9) months and twenty- three (23) days left unserved. Sailor Serrano afterwards filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter, charging respondents with constructive dismissal and demanding that he be paid the salary as corresponds to the remaining term of his contract. The Arbiter ruled for him, concluding that there was illegal dismissal; however, Sailor Serrano was only awarded with salary equivalent to 3 months. The Arbiter relied on Section 10, parag. 5 of R.A. 8042 (the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995), which puts forth that In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less . Gritty, our man now condemns the provision as unconstitutional, wailing how it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process. SC Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

11. ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC. 59
[GR No. 167614 March 24, 2009] Facts: Sailor Antonio Serrano entered into a 12-month overseas employment contract with respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd., initially signing up for the position of Chief Officer. Sailor Serrano, however, was

Though it scoffed at the argument that the law unduly impairs their contract enacted in 1995, the law is thus deemed read into the agreement forged between the parties in 1998 the Court, with straitlaced hesitation, declared the assailed clause for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less unconstitutional, in that it did deny workers in similar situations (particularly OFWs) the right to equal protection and due process. the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs** those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.

Further magnifying the clauses incompatibility with the right to equal protection of laws is the fact that it deprives overseas workers of a benefit granted without exception to domestic workers (the right to recover in cases of illegal dismissal the salary for the entire unexpired portion of the contract), with the government not being able to prove any compelling state interest warranting such damaging discrimination. As a matter of fact, before the laws enactment, both domestic and overseas workers enjoyed the same right. ...the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.