Asymmetries in Risk Communication

Asymmetries in Risk Communication Author(s): Madeleine Hayenhjelm Source: Risk Management, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Feb., 2006), pp.
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Article
ASYMMETRIESIN RISK COMMUNICATION

of Philosophy andthe History of Technology, Institute of Department Royal Sweden Stockholm, Technology,
Madeleine of Philosophy andthe History ofTechnology, Correspondence: Hayenhjelm, Department of Technology, Institute Sweden. 78B,100 44 Stockholm, Royal Teknikringen E-mail: mhay@infra.kth.se
Madeleine Hayenhjelm
Abstract
Theconceptof riskcommunication has come to comprise morethanconveying technical or scientificinformation to the public. It can also includenewerformssuch as and two-waydialogueforums.Previous publicparticipation, joint decision-making, discussions on riskcommunication havedistinguished betweentwo different approachversusthe technicalone. Inthe presentpaper,it is argued es, namelythe democratic thatdespitethese recentattemptsto widenthe scope andobjectives of riskcommuniis primarily, in mostcases, a relationship betweenunequal cation,riskcommunication This is a distinction parties. inequality analysedthrough threefold of asymmetries in terms of communicative initiative,informational privilege,and riskinfluence.A modelfor understanding the different in the riskcommunicapreliminary inequalities tionsituationis developed.
Keywords riskcommunication; democratic approach; two-waycommunication; influence; asymmetry Risk Management(2006) 8, 1-15.
doi: 10.1057/palgrave.rm.8250002
Introduction
Risk
communication includes a wide range of practices such as
health campaigns; doctor-patient conversations; referenda on nuclear power; Community Advisory Committees; newsletters;
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surveys; stakeholder decision groups; public hearings, etc. Much risk communicationresearchand theoryhas primarilycome to focus on large-scale technologicalrisks, and communicationabout these from expertsto the general public. Risk communicationin this context is often framedas a responseto the gap in risk perceptionbetweenthe experts and the generalpublic (see e.g., Fischhoff, 1989, p 282; Renn, 1992; Leiss, 2004). This can roughly be done in one of two ways: either as an attempt to bring the attitudes of the public closer to that of the experts or to engagethe public in a dialoguevaluingtheir contribution as an important complementarycontribution to decision-making (see e.g., Slovic, 1987; Renn, 2003; WesterHerber,2004). These different approachesto risk communicationhave beencategorizedas eithertechnicalor democratic,dependingon whether the communicativefocus has been public acceptanceof risks or joint decision-making(Fiorino, 1990; Rowan, 1994). Another distinction between risk communicationapproachesmuch along the same line is that between one- and two-way communication,depending on whetherinformationhas been disseminated primarilyto the public or commuet al., 2005). nicated in dialogue with them (see e.g., Renn, 2003; Gurabardhi In the literature,these distinctions, and others, are often used more or less to roughly mark out the differencebetween older and newer interchangeably forms of risk communication(see e.g., National ResearchCouncil, 1989, p 21; Rowan, 1994; Covello and Sandman,2001, p 175). "One-way"or "technical", on the one hand, is used to denote more traditionalapproachesto risk communicationof public persuasionand expert-to-laydisseminationof information. "Two-way", "democratic",and expressionssuch as "risk dialogue" and "publicparticipation",denote newer forms of communicationfrom open In the following house activitiesto citizen panels and shareddecision-making. all attemptsof risk communicationcomprisingsome element of participatory inclusiveof amateurswill be referredto as democraticand all decision-making communicationefforts seekinga dialogue as two-way. Grunig (1984) made an early distinctionin public relations studies between the directionsof communication,on the one hand;that is, one- and two-way, and the purposeof communicationson the other;that is, asymmrespectively, etrical and symmetricalcommunicationsdependingon whether the intended effect of communicationis a change in the public or effects "benefitingboth organizationand publics" (Grunig, 1989, p 29). Asymmetricalcommunications, accordingto Grunig, seek to "manipulatethe behavior of the publics for the assumed, if not actual, benefit of the manipulatedpublics as well as communicationby conthe organization"(Grunig,1989, p 29). Symmetrical trast "use bargaining,negotiating,and strategiesof conflictresolutionto bring about symbiotic changes in the ideas, attitudes, and behaviors of both the organizationand its publics" (Grunig, 1989, p 29). The ideal, according to Grunig, is the "symmetrictwo-way communication"combining a symmetric purposewith a two-way process.
RiskManagement 3 Following the two different approaches, risk communication can be defined in two different ways. It can either be defined in terms of dissemination of information about risks, that is, as a one-way communication, or in terms of an "interactive process of information and opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions" (National Research Council, 1989, p 21) alternatively "purposeful exchange of information about health and environment risks between interested parties" (Covello et al., 1986, p 172). The latter type of definition allows also for a two-way approach (for a discussion, see, Gutteling and Wiegman, 1996, pp 31-33). In between these two, there are ideas of a responsibility for risk managers and experts to communicate "responsibly and effectively" about risk factors but also "to promote a reasoned dialogue among stakeholders", including the task of working "with interested parties towards a shared understanding of risk factors" (Leiss, 2004, pp 401-402). Granger Morgan et al. (2002), Gutteling and Wiegman (1996), and Rowan (1994) also suggest in-between models of expert authority that involve the public at an early stage. It can be noted that two-way communication can refer to two different models, both in contrast to one-way communication (see also Grunig and Hunt, 1984, p 23). First, two-way communication can refer to gathering information about the public, through research or feedback, in order to evaluate and plan communication efforts with the needs of the target audience in mind (e.g., Grunig, 1989, p 29; Grunig and Grunig, 1996, p 288; Gutteling and Wiegman, 1996, p 33). Two-way communication on this reading refers to putting the audience's needs and interests in focus when forming risk messages. Secondly, it can refer to the communicatively active role of both parties, that is a mutual communicative process and exchange of information (e.g., Slovic, 1987; National Research Council, 1989; Grunig and Grunig, 1996, p 289). Put differently, two-way communication can both be described as a planned "audience-oriented" (Gutteling and Wiegman, 1996, p 33) activity, with the information needs of the public in focus, or as making the public communicative partners in a dialogue. Following the two different definitions of risk communication as either dissemination of information or a dialogue, the involved parties can be understood in two different ways. The participants can thus be described either in communicative terminology such as "sender" and "receiver", or in participatory terminology as "interested" or "affected" parties or stakeholders (for a similar point see Grunig and Hunt, 1984, p 24). The first terminology describes the internal relations between the parties in terms of communicative direction and initiative. The second terminology is neutral on the internal relations between the parties, but indicates a relation to the risks discussed or to the company responsible for risk exposure and communications. This latter neutrality is unfortunate, since it covers a wide range of relations that may be anywhere between equal stakeholders to far-reaching asymmetry between the parties. This becomes even more apparent in the professional risk communication
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between a communicating organization and different publics (rather than, for example, between experts or colleagues), where a particular organization tries to identify which stakeholders to communicate to. Not only do different publics vary in terms of claims, influence, and urgency in relation to the communicating organization (see Mitchell et al., 1997) but also relative to each other. This becomes even more apparent when those affected are not part of the discourse, as is the case of inactive publics (Hallahan, 2000). When these two different terminologies are used interchangeably, this makes the relations, direction, and purpose of communications opaque. This article will explore the inequality between the participants in terms of asymmetry. It should be noted that "asymmetry" should in the following be understood as a simple notion, implying imbalance of influence between different parties. It is thus a different, although related, concept from that of Grunig's, which is referring to an approach, indicating a complex set of presuppositions, or as he puts it "a worldview" (Grunig, 1989).
Asymmetry in risk communication

Influence is, as noted above, seldom shared equally among the participants in a risk dialogue. It is not likely that the local community exercises the same influence over the operations as the operator, or that the industry has the same influence over regulations as the regulator. The roles of the participants in the risk communication process are often asymmetrical. It is however not sufficient to explain the participants' roles toward each other in the risk communication context solely in terms of their influence over the hazardous activities and the mitigations of negative impacts. With the risk communication process itself follows a new set of relations in terms of information and knowledge and in terms of the communicative situation as such. The participants are likely to play different roles also in terms of access to information, agenda setting, and initiative to the communication. These relations can also be asymmetrical. Not all parties are likely to have the same amount of information in all risk communication situations, nor will they simultaneously be initiating the communication. Hallahan (2000, p 509) points out that while the two-way symmetrical model in Grunig's sense may make sense in describing a large organization communicating to a large activist group, it makes less sense in describing corporate-to-person communication. Referring to Coleman (1982, cited in Hallahan, 2000, p 509), he points to three factors making the individual citizen and the corporation very unequal parties: "(1) corporate actors typically have large resources, (2) nearly always control the conditions surrounding the relationship, and (3) control much of the information relevant to the interaction". According to Hallahan (2000, p 509) "...the rank-and-file members of many publics are never likely to share the same level of knowledge and involvement about a topic as the organization that seeks to communicate with them about
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it." These differentaspects of influentialasymmetryneed to be distinguished in the risk comin orderto be addressed.The differentroles of the participants munication context could, this article suggests, be explained in terms of the following three factors: The communicativerole: Influencein terms of definingthe agendaof what is to be debated, includingthe power to withhold informationand not raise an issue, and the initiativefor the communication. The informationaland epistemologicalrole: Influencein terms of expertise and knowledge about the hazardous activities, about the possible negative consequences,or about the mitigationof such consequences. The risk role: Influenceover the hazardousactivitiesand decisions concernand mitigatingactions. ing them and over precautionary The different participantsin the risk communicativesituation can take on differentroles in relation to each other. Rather than suggestingthat one participatingparty takes on a communicativerole and another an informational one, the idea is that differencesbetweenthe participantsshould be understood on three scales of more or less influencein the differentroles. One party may have more influencethan another in terms of decidingthe agenda and therefore has a strongercommunicativerole in relationto the other.Anotherparty may have more risk role influencethan the other.The three dimensionsabove could thereforealso be said to representthree differentfields of influencefor relationsbetweenthe parties.A distinctionbetween (potentiallyasymmetrical) three types of asymmetrycan thus be made in accordancewith the three role dimensionsintroducedabove:communicative asymmetry, informationalasymmetry, and risk role asymmetry. Communicativeasymmetryrefers to differentcommunicativeroles, that is, difference between the communication parties in terms of defining the risk topic to be discussed, the initial perspectiveto adopt, and the initiative for communication.For example, such an asymmetrycould be assumedto prevail between a professionalrisk communicatorand his or her intendedaudience. Informationalasymmetryrefers to differencesin knowledge concerningthe perceivedrisk in terms of impact, probability,the risk-causingactivities, and measures that can be taken, etc. For example, such an asymmetrycould be assumedto prevailbetween a scientificexpert and the generalpublic. Risk role asymmetryrefers to influence over the hazardous activities, and influenceover decisionsand policies regardingpossible negativeimpacts.Such an asymmetrycould, for example, be assumed to prevail between industry, on the one hand and the generalpublic regulators,and other decision-makers on the other. All cases of asymmetryindicatean inequalityin the risk communication,but these roles need not fall to the same parties. It is not always the party with a more dominatingrisk role that is also the initiator of risk communication.It is also not necessarilythe party with the most influenceover the hazardous
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activitiesor over the mitigationof risksthat is also privilegedin termsof knowledge. This three-foldasymmetryis intendedto be applicableto formal as well as informal risk communications,among as well as between nonexperts and experts, and regardingindividualrisk taking as well as large-scalerisks. Each of the three asymmetrydimensionswill now be explainedin turn.
Communicative asymmetry
Communicativeasymmetrycan roughly be divided into two separatebut related aspects:that of communicative initiative,and hence planningand agenda skills. That there is an asymand that of communicative setting, professional metry in communicativeroles in the first of these aspects may seem trivially necessaryto risk communication,or indeed any communication.It is hard to think of a situationwhere two partiesintroducethe same topic to the agenda But that there can be, at least in theory,cases of equal or symsimultaneously. metriccommunicativeroles, is indicatedin an articleby Earleand Cvetkovich (1994). They sketch a dilemmascenariowhere two people with matchingvalues and a willingnessto cooperatefail to do so due to a lack of trust and a mistaken perceptionof the others'values, a dilemmathat could be solved through trust-creatingcommunication.Despite their example being an illustrationof symmetricsilence ratherthan communication,it implies a situationwhere the interestsand objectivesfor communicationare the same and where the quesOtherexamplesof tion of who raisesthe questionfirstis more of less arbitrary. on the same roles would be two scientists communicative working symmetric in or several an people facing the same already on-going dialogue, problem risk, such as having their gardensattackedby vermin,among whom a spontaneous communicationevolves. In most cases of risk communication,one party rather than another brings the issue up for communication,or initiates that particularseminar,leaflet production, makes that particularphone call, etc. This initiativecan also give that party a numberof additionalprivilegessuch choosas definingthe agenda;settingup the objectivesfor the communication; and communication to be the addressed; deciding partners selecting ing topics their role in the decisionmakingprocess;choosing which media and forms the communicationshould include;selectinginformationalmaterialand expertise; decidingthe dates, times, intervalsand length of process;etc. The other aspect of the communicativerole that of communicativeskills is prominent only in professional risk communication and almost exclusively in relationto publics.Karlberg(1996) points to a bias within pubasymmetric lic relationsresearchto focus almost exclusivelyon the communicativeneeds of the state and the commercialinterests and only to address the public as recipient,and not as potentialinitiatorsof communication.Thus, accordingto researchagendain publicrelations Karlberg(1996, p 271), even the symmetric still reinforces rather than rebalances asymmetriesbetween the public and organizations.Althoughprofessionalcommunicationskills and theoriesare, in
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principle,open to all, it is in practicemostly the governmentand commercial interests who have the experience and the economical resourcesrequiredto make use of such research(Karlberg,1996, p 267). All persuasivemodels of risk communicationimply a communicativeasymmetry;the risk communicatorbeing the privilegedparty in terms of the initiative to communicate,the privilegeto decidewhat is to be communicated,how and to whom. Wheneverthere is a decision to communicate,whether to involve a targetaudiencein a dialogueor to informthem, thereis an asymmetric relationshipin this sense. The activistgroup occupyinga plant or distributing leafletsare risk communicatorsin this sense as much as an industryrepresentanewslettersor startingfocus groups tive or governmentalagencydisseminating or public hearings.
Informational asymmetry
Informationalasymmetrycould manifest itself in different ways: one party may have more informationthan the other;more knowledge and competence than the other; better access to informationthan the other;more accurateinformationthan the other or more control over informationthan the other.It is this informationalasymmetrythat is the motivatingforce behindthe technical risk communication approach or any one-way approach, whether the goal is public information, persuasion, change of behaviour,acceptanceof risks, or public education. In short, informationalasymmetryrefersto a privileged access to, or better means for interpreting,informationthan other parties in risk communication. From the technical point of view, it is this asymmetry in technical competence and knowledge that legitimatize an asymmetry in decision-making. Several circumstancesenforce informationalasymmetrybetween organizations and the public. First,researchand informationcost money.Governments and the industryhave the resourcesthat enable them to conduct researchthat activistsgroupsseldom have (Karlberg, 1996). They also have greateraccessto the researchresults of others through a closer contact with the researchcommunity and the skills to interpretthose results (National Research Council, 1989, p 114f). Grunigmentions the problemsof subsidizedinformationfrom influentialsourcesreinforcingthis imbalancein influence(Grunig,1989, p 36). Hallahan (2000, p 507) speaks of severalasymmetriesin processinginformation for the "novice"in contrastto the expert:they have to "exertmore effort to make sense of information";they have more "difficultyin placing information in context"; they are more likely to misinterpretinformation;they are more prone to accept argumentswith less discriminationand less likely "to challengethe validity"of information. In some of the two-way and democraticapproachesto risk communicationin which the exchange of informationis stressed,there is an idea that both parties have somethingto learn from each other (see e.g., Slovic, 1987). Technical
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Risk Management informationon risk assessmentmay not be the most important,if, for instance, the objectiveis social trust from a communityratherthan an understanding of scientificgroundsfor technicaldecisions.The entranceof NGOs into the industrial risk communication context often indicatesdiversityin the framingof the risk situationand conflictinginterpretations of what is in fact the case. "Whoever controlsthe definitionof risk controlsthe rationalsolutionto the problem at hand"(Slovic,1999, p 411). It seemsreasonable to assumethat the value of a is closelyrelatedto the agendaand objectivefor risk specifickind of information since these definewhich kind of informationis relevant. communication, All cases of risk communicationneed not include an informationalasymmetry. There can be symmetryfor example when two equallyinformedscientists (in the same or in different fields) discuss how to proceed with that information, or when an organizationhas an informationalprivilegeregardingits releaseswhereas scientistshave more informationon their impact. Risk role asymmetry Risk role asymmetryrefersto one partyhaving a more influentialrole regarding the potentiallyhazardousactivityand/or control over its impactsthan the other.For instance,in most cases, the operatorof an industrialplant has a risk role privilegeover the generalpublic. In the case of a referendum on the justification of such a potentiallyhazardousactivity,these roles may be reversed: the more influence over the decision than the Risk generalpublic having industry. role asymmetryhas to do with the operationaldecisions for hazardousactivities as in the case of technicalrisks, or carryingout risky actions as in the case of individualrisk taking, or makingdecisionsconcerningalternativecauses of action, preventivemeasures,mitigations, regulations,etc. When it comes to stakeholderinvolvementin the decision makingprocessthis can change or rebalancethe risk role relationship,but a partialinfluentialinput is not the same as creating risk role symmetry.Even the more participatoryforms of public involvementssuch as Citizen Advisory Committeesvary in terms of risk role from resemblingthose of a "vehiclefor persuasion"to being very asymmetry: close to a negotiatingprocess (Lynnand Busenberg,1995). All risk communicationdoes not entail risk role asymmetry.There can for examplebe communicationon an unavoidablerisk that is not man-made,such as a tornado, in which cases no party have more influenceover the cause of events than the other. In such a case, risk communicationmay spring from a communicativeasymmetryon the one hand, and one party raises the issue, and an informationalasymmetryon the other, and one party possesses more knowledge of the implications of such a disaster,but not a risk role asymmetry. However, even in such cases, there may be asymmetriesin terms of and emergencyplanning. In cases of industrialor technological preparedness the risk and the risks,thereis often an unequaldistributionof power regarding decisionsmade to deal with it.
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Typology of asymmetries and risk communications

The dimensions of asymmetryin risk communicationcan now be explored Threedimensionsof influencein risk communicationhave been identifurther. fied: the communicative,the informationaland the risk role dimensions, respectively.Asymmetrieshave been analysed along the same dimensions.This enables a further analysis of the relationship between the participantsin a risk communicationcontext. The asymmetriescan namely tilt to a singular party's advantage or in a more distributedway. Drawing upon the discussion above, three differenttypes of risk communicationalsituations can now be distinguishedbased on the involved parties'differentpositions in terms of knowledge or information,communicativeinitiative,and risk influence.These will be referredto as: symmetricalrisk communication,scatteredasymmetry, and clusteredasymmetry. The symmetricrelationshipindicatesa balancebetweenthe parties;they have the same amount of communicativepower, information,knowledge, and operationalinfluence.Examplesof the symmetricrelationshipcould be two scientists discussinghow to proceed with a particulartask; they have the same amount of knowledge (possibly from differentfields) and the same influence over it. It could also be the informalcommunicationof two neighbourshearing on the news of a meteorite that may hit the earth, that neither of them has much knowledge of or any influence over. These symmetricconditions are the preconditionsfor an equal exchange of ideas, and mutual debate in case knowledge is shared. In such cases, the purpose of communicationmay be the exchange of knowledge from differentfields wideningthe scope for understandingand action, or to complete the others' knowledge about relevant matters.This would also be an ideal startingpoint for democraticapproaches to risk communication.The symmetricrisk communicationpoints thus to two differentkinds of communication:these can be called mutual exchange of expertise and informalrisk communication.Commonlynone of these two kinds of communicationconcerningrisk is referredto as risk communication. Scatteredasymmetryindicates a risk communicativesituation where one of the partieshas a relativeadvantageover the other party (or parties)in at least one dimension, whereas the other(s) has (have) an advantagein at least one of the other dimensions. In the simplest cases, one party has more knowledge and the other more direct influenceover the risk taking. This could be the governmentinforming the public on the health hazards of sun bathing. Such a case would representone partywith more influenceand the other with more informationand communicativeinitiative. Most campaignsin order to change public risk behaviour,whether concerningusing seat belts or bicycle helmets, consuming saturatedfat, or concerningthe effects of using the toilet as a waste, bin are examplesof scatteredasymmetry. In such cases, those with the informationalprivilege are also the ones to initiate the communication,
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perhaps most often in the form of one-way information campaigns. In other cases, those with influence over the risk taking seek out information from what they perceive as reliable and trustworthy sources. Sources perceived thus by an individual risk taker may not primarily be official or even expert knowledge, but what is at hand through the usual channels of information. For example, I may seek the advice of someone more experienced than myself, my local doctor, a specialized Internet forum on the topic, specialized magazines on the topic, the books in my local library, etc. Similarly, the management of an industry may seek expert knowledge or information from other industries. The purpose of communication in these two cases is often different: in the first case information is judged to be important to spread to risk takers in order for them to avoid such risks or minimizing them. In the second, information is often sought out by someone who wants to be better prepared and make better choices concerning a risk. In yet other cases, the person who initiates the communication may neither have the informational nor the risk role privilege. A concerned neighbour living next door to a chemical factory may ask the management to explain what the discharges causing bad odours are all about, or send an upset letter to the local newspaper or even start a campaign to shut the factory down. It may also be a reporter or a local NGO reacting to emissions or waste programs from pieces of information that they have gathered. In such cases, the party with a communicative privilege starts the communicative process with those with influence or knowledge. Hence, three different kinds of scattered asymmetric risk communication have been discussed: advice to the public, personal inquiry, and public reactions. Most typically it is only the first of these that is referred to as risk communication. The clustered asymmetric relationship can indicate one of two possible asymmetries. First, all privileges can be clustered with only one party leaving the other with no privileges. Second, as above, there is one party without any privileges, but in relation to two (or more) parties sharing the clustered privileges. The internal relationship between the two privileged parties may range from dependency to open conflict; the point is that there is one party who is also part of the communication process but without any of the influential advantages that the two others have. In such a case, one may say that it is the disadvantages rather than advantages that are clustered. In the first case, this would mean that the party who initiates the communicative process is also the party with the most knowledge and influence over the situation or activities that may cause unwanted effects. An example of this would be a risk inducing industry or a regulating governmental agency informing the local community or general public. In the second case, influence, knowledge, and communicative initiative is scattered between several parties, leaving one party without any influential privilege. For example, media or scientists reporting on industrial hazards to the general public. If the risk role influence is separated from the inMadeleine Hayenhjelm
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formationaland communicative can influence,this type of risk communication in that sensebe calledindependent; this does not mean that could not it however, be biased. Clusteredasymmetrycan thus be dividedinto these two subgroups: informationfrom the decisionmakerand informationfrom a thirdparty.Both kinds are comprisedin the common understanding of risk communication. seven kinds of of information Hence, exchange concerningrisks have been identified:mutual exchangeof expertise,informalrisk communication,advice to the public, personalinquiry,public reactions,informationfrom the decision maker,and informationfrom a thirdparty.Theremay well be others.It is neverthelessinterestingto note that only three of the seven are commonlyreferred to as risk communication;namely advice to the public, informationfrom the decision maker,and informationfrom a third party.It is interesting,however, that of those three kinds that are commonlyreferredto as risk communication two are also those where the input from the public is least influentialaccording to our three-dimensionalanalysis. These are the two kinds of clustered asymmetricrelationships.Advice to the public is, on the other hand, not an example of clusteredasymmetrydue to the public'sinfluenceover its own risk behaviour,but this kind of risk communicationis on the other hand the prime example of one-way communicationfrom expert to the general public. This seems to imply that most commonly there is little room for risk communication to be two-way in a substantialway. Does asymmetry matter?
These asymmetry/symmetry types are of course simplificationssince one of these role aspectsmay prove much more influentialthan the others. This typoNor does it logy does not distinguishbetween trivial and crucialasymmetries. take into account when one-way informationbased on solid knowledge is to be preferredto a democraticdialogue. It is thereforenot obvious that asymmetryin risk communicationvariesin severitydependingon its kind, with the most severe inequalityalways being in the cases of clusteredasymmetry.Nor is it obvious that asymmetricrisk communicationis always a problem. It is, however, noteworthy that the typical cases of technical risk communication fall into this category,especiallyif the differencesin terms of educationamong the population are very large. If the sole purpose is to change the behaviour of the disadvantagedparty or change its attitude, the audience' dependence on the informationand risk performanceof the communicatingparty is quite extensive. In such cases, it seems likely that clusteredasymmetryis significant for understanding the risk communicationprocess. Most of the practicesusually referredto as risk communicationabout technologicalrisks are examples where the initiative,the informationand the risk of full three-foldasymmetry, influenceconstitute an advantageto one party;the "sender",in relation to a disadvantaged"audience".More interesting,however,is that most attemptsat
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democratic approaches to risk communication in terms of two-way dialogue or participatory forums also seem to fall into this category. There is a slow but steady trend towards more stakeholder involvement and more democratic risk communication procedures (Chess et al., 1995; Gurabardhi et al., 2005). Different approaches to risk communication are often normatively ordered in the literature. Democratic and two-way approaches are described as more ethical, effective and conflict resolving than more technocratic approaches (see e.g., Slovic, 1987; Fiorino, 1990; Grunig and Grunig, 1996). Fischhoff (1995) describes risk communication efforts in several developmental stages where traditional methods of informing about risk assessment and risk management decisions and risk comparisons are followed by dialogue and partnership with the audience. Slovic (1987, p 231) maintain that "risk communication and risk management efforts are destined to fail unless they are structured in a two-way process" and Sandman that "effective risk communication is a two-way activity". Similarly, Grunig and Grunig (1996) describe the symmetrical approach as superior to the asymmetrical one, being both more ethical, more effective and hence an example of "excellent" communication management. But democratic or participatory approaches to risk communication can take many forms and seek different goals. What is sought after in between the lines of democratic expressions such as "joint decision making", "shared values", and "cooperation" can be several objectives, such as mutual understanding, community input into decision making, or an ideal of symmetry. Symmetry can again be of different kinds: symmetry in communicative roles (equal two-way communication, public initiatives), symmetry in informational roles (educated mutual understanding), symmetry in risk roles (shared power), or a combination of these. There are several arguments for the value of keeping asymmetry; such as that decisions made by elected officials and experts are better (see Fiorino, 1990, p 227) or that sharing power is detrimental to accountability for decisions (see National Research Council, 1989, p 10, 145, 155). On the other hand, as Grunig (1989, p 32) pointed out, the decisions that the public are expected to accept sometimes include negative effects on health, environment, social rights, etc., indicating a need for public involvement in such decisions rather persuasion from an expert elite: Although the asymmetricalperspectivemay sound like a reasonable position, keep in mind that organizations often expect publics to accept strange things as a result of "cooperation":pollution, toxic waste, drinking, smoking, guns, overthrow of governments, dangerous products, lowered salary and benefits, discriminationagainst women and minorities,job layoffs, dangerousmanufacturingplants, risky transportationof products,higherprices,monopoly power, poor product quality, political favouritism, insider trading, use of poisonous chemicals, exposure to carcinogens,nuclearweapons, and even warfare.
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The democraticresponse to this problem is more involvementof the public, but this involvement can be regardedas a continuum from public hearings, open houses, public surveysto negotiations between parties that are as equal as possible. Asymmetryas such need not be a problem. If the sole concern of risk communication is to provide the public with impartial information concerning risks they may face, as a public agency providingimpartialinformationabout levels of dischargesin the atmosphereor risks of radon, the informationaland communicativeasymmetriesbetween experts and public are not a problem.In such a case informationalasymmetrycan be an asset, since its opposite would not be two partieswith similaramount of informationbut two partieslacking information. The mere fact that someone who has influenceand knowledge also takes an initiativeto communicateneed not, in itself, be a problem.But in cases of decision-making processesor in legitimacyquestions,the asymmetries in ordernot to bias the expectaneed to be handledwith care and discernment tions, processes,and outcomes of the communication.
Conclusions
Risk communication is often framedin termsof beingtechnicaland one-wayor andtwo-waycommunication democratic andtwo-way.In this context,democratic mutualtrustbetween,for example, is oftenpreferred eitheras an idealfor building is regarded as a an industry and the local population,or two-waycommunication of this or a more form communication. even However, developed complementary in is far from the referred ideal democratic communication often practice two-way of equal participants exchangingideas. Often the initiativefor the dialogue,the andthe influence overthe communication background knowledge, processandthe This in termsof is can be understood riskinducing activity asymmetric. asymmetry threeaspects: communicative and risk roles. These initiative,information, aspects orcounteract theasymmetry on howtheinfluence can,however, strengthen depending is distributed betweenthe parties.The most commonasymmetry and information betweenthe communicative distribution partiesis probablyclustered asymmetry, with communicative and risk role influence influence, information, tiltingto one Thisclustered influence distribution does not only markout the advantage. party's for existingriskcommunication, but also pointsout a directionfor preconditions of riskcommunication further linesin orderto developments alongthe democratic realizethe idealsof jointdecisionmakingand two-waycommunication.
References
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Asymmetries in Risk Communication

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Asymmetries in Risk Communication Author(s): Madeleine Hayenhjelm Source: Risk Management, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Feb., 2006), pp.

ASYMMETRIESIN RISK COMMUNICATION

communication includes a wide range of practices such as

Risk Management2006, 8, (1-15) 2006 PalgraveMacmillanLtd 1460-3799/06 $30.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/rm

Asymmetry in risk communication

Typology of asymmetries and risk communications

Asymmetries in Risk Communication

Asymmetries in Risk Communication

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