The OSCE's uncertain future

The credibility of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a regional security provider is increasingly in doubt. With a mandate covering hard security issues and conflict, as well as economic and human security, it is the only organisation in Europe to embody the concept of comprehensive security. Its 56 members include the United States, all west European countries, Russia and all states of the former Soviet Union, including five central Asian nations, but its very inclusiveness means that it is hampered by disagreements among its members. And it cannot be a normative body on human rights and democratic freedoms as long as its membership includes undemocratic regimes in postSoviet Eurasia. The OSCE's broad mandate should allow it to play an important role in tackling the challenges of a globalised world facing transnational threats and economic problems. But NATO's new Strategic Concept published in November 2010 makes no mention of the OSCE even though it places significant emphasis on partnerships. Meanwhile, other institutions such as the European Union seem better placed to attend to economic problems and to deal with issues such as energy security and the environment. Astana summit The challenges facing the OSCE came sharply into focus at its first summit since 1999, held in December 2010 in Astana, Kazakhstan. Many member states strongly believed it should not be held, given disagreements on regional issues and how unlikely it was to produce clear deliverables. Others argued that a meeting was necessary to revitalise the OSCE and to boost its reputation, given growing perceptions of its ineffectiveness and marginalisation. Kazakhstan, the first post-Soviet state to hold the OSCE chairmanship, saw the meeting as a way to advance itself as an emerging economy and regional power. The sceptics were ultimately correct. Despite hours of high-level negotiations and months of preparation, members were unable to agree on an action plan to have been called the Astana Framework for Action to revitalise the OSCE. The heads of government of the US, France and the United Kingdom did not attend. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a short stop and left the conference immediately after delivering his speech. It was a very different picture from the 1999 Istanbul summit, at which Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed on the adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and on the Charter for European Security.

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In Kazakhstan, the only document to emerge was the Astana Commemorative Declaration, which went little further than simply reaffirming commitments to the founding documents of the OSCE, such as the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. It was in reality a face-saving gesture for both the OSCE and Kazakhstan, advancing an ill-defined vision of a European security community. With the chairmanship now The security falling to Lithuania (2011), Ireland (2012) and Ukraine (2013), it is questionable whether confidence in the regime along the OSCE can be rebuilt. administrative boundaries between No breakthrough on OSCE reform Georgia and the A key item on the Astana summit agenda was reform of the OSCE itself. To ensure its future credibility, the territories of Abkhazia OSCE needed to reaffirm its comprehensive character and rebalance priorities across its three dimensions and South Ossetia is often called 'fractured'. hard security, economics and human rights. The summit failed to reconcile the contradictory visions of European peace the OSCE's role presented by its members: Russia and some of its neighbours argued that the OSCE monitors patrol only the should pay more attention to hard security while doing much less on democracy, human rights and election Georgian side, with monitoring; Western countries argued strongly in favour of reinforcing human security, for example by Russian/ Abkhazian paying more attention to media freedom. and Russian/South Ossetian forces on the One positive step, in article six of the declaration, was a reaffirmation that 'commitments undertaken in the other. field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned'. The fact that countries such as Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan agreed to such a statement, in spite of their strongly held positions on non-interference in internal affairs, provided a potential basis for enhancing the legitimacy of international actors on issues such as human-rights violations. The second reform task was to rebuild confidence in the OSCE's capability to deal with conflicts. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the meeting that it 'needs to be empowered to respond more effectively to crises within the OSCE itself like those we have seen in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan'. The Astana Framework for Action was supposed to outline ideas for strengthening the OSCE's capacity to act Cross-border detentions are common, water and energy supplies vulnerable, and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) agreed at peace talks in Geneva not yet fully effective.

throughout all phases of conflict, from early warning and prevention through to resolution and rehabilitation. Instead, members discussed the balance of powers to act between the chair, council and secretariat. The third task was to define the OSCE's role in deliberations over the modernisation of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. These discussions were initiated by Medvedev when he called in 2009 for a new European Security Treaty. In response, and in its capacity as OSCE chairman, Greece began the Corfu Process, a series of informal ministerial meetings that showed some promise of giving the OSCE a new raison d'tre. But the Astana summit did not result in the formalisation of the Corfu Process, which would have served as a platform for negotiating a new document to codify the principles of comprehensive, indivisible and cooperative security in Europe. The summit did, however, open the way for negotiations on modernising the CFE Treaty and updating the Vienna Document, under which member states gather in Vienna every year to exchange military information. The CFE regime has been on the brink of collapse since Russia's decision in 2007 to suspend its implementation and the subsequent refusal of NATO states to ratify the adapted treaty because of Russia's failure to withdraw armed forces from Georgia and Moldova. The deadlock deepened after the war in Georgia in 2008 and Russia's deployment of more troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Caucasus conflicts In the absence of the structural changes that could have made the OSCE more effective and relevant, it was hoped that the summit could at least confront the urgent security challenges facing Europe and Eurasia, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniestr conflicts, as well as the confrontation between Russia and Georgia.

How matters could be improved is discussed in the latest Caucasus Security Insight, part of the IISS's EU-funded Georgian-Russian Dialogue programme. Read more __________________ Between East and West: Explaining Russia's Foreign Policy

Profound shifts in the global balance of power have begun to influence Russias approach to foreign policy. The rise of Asia is the most obvious of the geopolitical shifts In Nagorno-Karabakh, an increasing number of violent clashes along the line of contact between the that have taken place Armenian and Azerbaijani sides has heightened fears of escalation. There had been hopes that a since the end of the breakthrough on a road map for peace could be achieved in Astana. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Cold War; new challenges from South Lavrov said the goal of the Minsk Group co-chairs Russia, France and the US was the signature of a and East Asia have document on the basic principles for settling the conflict. While Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar focused Russia's Mammadyarov suggested that a road map covering the return of territories and a political settlement could attention on be signed, Armenia played down such expectations, but expressed the hope that the summit would developments in the prevent Azerbaijan from attempting to impose a military solution. While no plan was agreed and no face-to- East. face meeting was held, a joint statement calling for a negotiated settlement to the conflict was issued by In the latest IISS the Minsk Group co-chairs and the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Based on previous statements Eurasia Security made by the Minsk Group co-chairs 2009 and 2010, this new statement would refocus efforts to establish Seminar Fyodor a comprehensive settlement plan. Lukyanov, Editor-inchief of Russia in Global Affairs, Meanwhile the continuing tension between Russia and Georgia was evident. Russia, which is alone among OSCE member states in recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, refused to examined how the rise of China poses a support any statements which could in any way imply that these territories remained within Georgia. difficult dilemma for Moscow: how to Central Asian role strengthen its position Kazakhstan's chairmanship had offered to provide a new focus on Central Asia and Afghanistan which in the East, while appealed to many OSCE members, including the US. A key test for the OSCE and Kazakhstan's maintaining its chairmanship had been the inter-ethnic clashes which broke out in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. Though it had European identity and its strategic maintained a mission in Kyrgyzstan for many years, the OSCE failed to prevent the violence in Osh. Its relationship with proposal to deploy a 52-strong civilian Police Advisory Group following the violence was rejected by the Europe. Kyrgyz government, and was replaced by a plan for a longer-term community security initiative employing 31 international staff and 27 locals. The crisis reinforced the continuing mistrust between the two biggest Listen to the discussion Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan has become an increasingly important issue for the OSCE. Many of Afghanistan's neighbours have expressed concern over the future withdrawal of foreign combat troops and the destabilising impact it will have on them. Tajikistan, which shares a long border with Afghanistan, could be particularly vulnerable. Though Afghan President Hamid Karzai attended the Astana summit and an agreement was reached on the expansion of OSCE programmes which have trained over 100 Afghan customs officers and border guards, it would be hard to argue that this marked a qualitative expansion of the OSCE's role in Afghanistan. Poor prospects As Lithuania takes over the OSCE chairmanship, the organisation's future looks more uncertain than ever. With no new conflict-prevention and response capabilities, it faces the danger of conflict escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Its role in Central Asia and Afghanistan is unlikely to be enhanced, and its effectiveness is hampered by divisions which cannot be resolved in the near future. Undemocratic

elections in Belarus and the brutal suppression of protests by the authorities there have served as a grim reminder of the authoritarian consolidation now under way in some post-Soviet member states. However, it is too early to write the OSCE off altogether. With NATO and EU enlargement on hold, it remains the only prototype for a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security community. But it may only be useful in this regard as an illustration of how much more work needs to be done. Volume 17, Comment 7 February 2011
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