SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-29146 August 5, 1985 APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE. BENITA SALAO, applicant-appellee, vs.

BENITO CRISOSTOMO, oppositor-appellant.

ESCOLIN, J.: This appeal, certified to Us by the Court of Appeals, poses the legal question of whether or not an applicant for a sales patent of a parcel of land has the legal personality to oppose the application for registration of the same land filed by a party under Act No. 496. Appellee Benita Salao applied for registration of two parcels of land, designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2, Psu-204034, situated in Bo. Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-4753, LRC Record No. N-26218 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The appellee's claim of ownership is based on Article 457 of the Civil Code. 1 She alleged inter alia that the land applied for was formed by accretion, having been deposited by the current of the Dampalit River which is contiguous to her property; and that she has occupied said land since time immemorial, exercising open, continuous and exclusive possession thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership. Appellant Benito Crisostomo filed an opposition to the registration of Lot 1, Plan Psu204034, with an area of 336 square meters. He alleged that said lot is part of the public domain and subject of his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-51054, which had been approved by the Bureau of Lands; that the lot was formed by filling up the land that was under water, not by alluvial accretion from the Dampalit River, as alleged by the appellee; and that he has been in actual possession of the said lot by authority of the Bureau of Lands. He further alleged that:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction to hear the instant application insofar as Lot I PSU204034, or for that matter the other lot shown in the same plan, is concerned, the same land is the object of an application filed by the herein oppositor with the Bureau of Lands which office having acquired an actual and prior cognizance over the same; (b) That the applicant has no right to file the instant application before the Honorable Court-the land being public in nature and the subject of an administrative investigationapplicant has not exhausted administrative remedies; (c) That the instant application was filed by the herein applicant merely to harass the herein oppositor and to sidetrack the issues involved, believing that she can do indirectly 2 what she can not do directly.

Appellee Salao filed a "Motion to Strike Out the Opposition from the Records of the Case," stating in support thereof that only the government may appear as oppositor to the application, and that Crisostomo himself has no legal personality to oppose the same, the latter's interest in the land in question being subordinate to, and dependent upon, the interest of the government. 3 After due hearing, the Land Registration Court issued a order granting the motion, which We quote:
Acting on the motion to strike out from the record of the case the opposition to oppositor Benito Crisostomo, dated December 5, 1966, filed by the applicant thru counsel as well as the opposition thereto and finding the reason in support of the said motion to welltaken, the Court hereby grants the same and the opposition Benito Crisostomo is hereby ordered striken off the records of this case. (pp. 36-37, Ibid).

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Crisostomo interposed the instant appeal. His main thesis is that his legal personality to oppose Salao's application for registration is distinct and separate from that of the government, and that the adjudication of the land in question in favor of Salao would prejudice his right under the approve Miscellaneous Sales Application. He invokes Section 34 of Act 496 which provides:
Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf.

The appellant's challenge to the jurisdiction of the lower court is untenable. It is legal truism in procedural law that what determines the jurisdiction of the court are the facts alleged in the complaint or petition, and not the facts averred in the answer or opposition of the adverse party. The appellee's application alleges:
That she has acquired ownership of the said land by operation of law, in that, because of the waters of the Dampalit River, alluvion was formed gradually and little by little along the bank of the said river adjacent to the property of the petitioner; that she has occupied the land in question since time immemorial and has since then, exercise open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the above mentioned 4 property under a bona fide claim of ownership thereto.

Plainly, the court below has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for registration. If the above averments are true, then title to the property was vested in the appellee under Article 457 of the Civil Code from the time the alluvial deposit was formed. Accordingly, the registration court could properly declare "title thereto registered and confirmed in her (appellee's) name. The lower court, however, erred in dismissing the opposition of Benito Crisostomo to the application for registration of Benita Salao covering Lot No. 1 of Plan Psu-204034. His opposition is predicated on the fact that he is the actual possessor of the lot. He claimed

that the lot was formed by filling up the land that was under water and not by alluvial accretion from the Dampalit River, as pretended by applicant Salao. On February 15, 1958, Benito Crisostomo filed with the Bureau of Lands Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-51054 for the purchase of said lot, a residential lot, whereas Salao filed her application for registration only on June 16, 1964 for two lots of which Lot No. 1 is claimed by Benito Crisostomo. On January 6, 1967, the Director of Lands, after due investigation, awarded Lot No. 1 to Benito Crisostomo for P187.50 to be used for residential purposes. 5 As an awardee of said lot, he has sufficient interest to oppose Salao's application for registration. He is an adverse claimant within the meaning of Section 34 of Act 496.
SECTION 34. Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or some person in his behalf.

It appears that Lot No. 2, the other land applied for Salao, was also sold by the government to Norberto Crisostomo, the father of Benito, to whom Original Certificate of Title No. 111 was issued. 6 The records further disclose that applicant Salao had sued the brothers Menandro and Melquiades Crisostomo for the recovery of a parcel of land with an area of 2,400 square meters, on the theory that the land was an accretion to a fishpond bordering the bank of the Dampalit River. After trial in that case, 7 Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma dismissed Salao's action and sustained the claim of the Crisostomo brothers that they filled up the said land which used to be under water and then occupied it. That decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, but whether the appellate court has already resolve this appeal is not shown in the records. Benito Crisostomo is the brother of Menandro and Melquiades Appellee Salao relies on the doctrine laid down in Leyva vs. Jandoc, 8 where this Court upheld the following ruling of the Court of Appeals:
Although Section 34 of Act 496 apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, the opposition should be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent, of, and not at all subordinate to the rights of the Government. Where, as in the present case, the petitioners' right, that of being foreshore lessees of public land, is completely subordinate to the interests of the government, and must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the public domain, it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representative of the Government to represent its interests as well as private claims intrinsically dependent upon it. Hence, petitioners have no right to appear as independent oppositors, but may collaborate with the provincial fiscal.

The above ruling is not applicable to the case at bar because the oppositors therein, who opposed the application for registration independently of the Director of Lands,

were lessees under a foreshore lease executed between them and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It was held therein that inasmuch as their interest to the land in question was subordinate to the interest of the government, their lawyer could just collaborate with the provincial fiscal but could not examine the witnesses over the fiscal's objection. Here, the records do not show that the Director of Lands has filed an opposition to Salao's application. Such lack of opposition may be due to the fact that one lot is already covered by a Torrens Title, while the other lot, Lot No. 1, has already been awarded to Benito Crisostomo under his sales application. The rule is that once a sales application is approved and entry is permitted, the land ceases to be part of the public domain. 9 WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside, and the opposition of Benito Crisostomo is given due course. Let the records be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against the appellee Benita Salao. SO ORDERED.

TEODORO DE LOS REYES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMINO PATERNO, administrator of the estate of Tomas G. del Rosario deceased, defendant-appellant. A. Cruz Herrera and Ramon Muyot for appellant. Ramon Salinas for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 7th of February, 1914. The purpose of the action on the part of the plaintiff was to be declared the owner of one-half of two lots or parcels of land located in the district of Santa Cruz in the city of Manila, to require the defendant to render an account of the administration of said lots or parcels of land, and to obtain a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for whatever amount said rendition of accounts shows the plaintiff was entitled to. To the petition the defendant filed a general and special answer. In his general answer he denied each and all of the material allegations alleged in the complaint. In his special defense he alleged that the said Tomas G. Del Rosario, at the time of his death, was the sole and only owner of said lots or parcels of land. Upon the issue thus presented and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the court a quo rendered a judgment in which he ordered the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff one-half of one of said parcels of land, together with the one-half of the rent which it produced or might produce until the delivery of the same, and to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P8,000 and the half of the rent which the other piece of property may have produced or may produce up to the time of the death of the deceased, Tomas G. del Rosario. From that conclusion the defendant appealed to this court and made several assignments of error the most important of which, and the one which is our judgment shows that the lower court committed an error in its conclusions, is assignment No. 5. Said assignment is that the lower court "erred in not holding that the decree of the Court of Land Registration, copied in plaintiff's Exhibit C, is res judicata against the plaintiff; and that the two certificates of title of the properties that are the subject matter of the complaint, issued in behalf of Tomas G. de Rosario by virtue of said decree, are conclusive and decisive proof against the plaintiff." If it is true that during the lifetime of Tomas G. del Rosario he obtained a Torrens title for the lots or parcels of land in question, and if that judgment or decree of the Court of Land Registration became final, or if more than one year had elapsed after the decree then his title is unimpeachable and can not be annulled or set aside, even for fraud. As was noted above, the present action was commenced on the 7th of February, 1914. During the trial of the cause the defendant presented as proof Exhibit C. An examination of Exhibit C shows the following facts:

First. That the said Tomas G. del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration on the 24th of April, 1909, for the registration under the Torrens system of two parcels of land. There is no dispute that the two parcels of land described in said petition for registration are exactly the same parcels of land in litigation in the present action. Second. Said Exhibit C further shows that on the 21st of September, 1909, the judge of the Court of Land Registration, after considering the petition, rendered the following decree, ordering said parcels of land to be registered in the name of Tomas G. del Rosario, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 496: Two properties are described in the application, both urban; the first is a parcel of land situated on Calle Curtidor, district of Santa Cruz, city of Manila, and includes the building thereon constructed of strong materials; and the other is a piece of land on Calle Asuncion, district of San Nicolas, city of Manila, which includes the building, also of strong materials, thereon. The applicant has presented documentary and parol evidence, the former consisting of the documents, all of which are public, on file in this case, and the latter, of the testimony of witnesses. From the said documents and from the certified copy issued by the register of deeds of Manila on July 17, 1907, of the entry made in the old property registry, it is deduced that these properties have been the subject of successive and legal conveyances since the year 1879, until they were acquired by the applicant in August and September, 1891, by purchase, during his conjugal partnership, now dissolved, with his wife, Juana Reyes y Reyes, and that the ownership of both properties was recorded in the said property registry in the name of the aforementioned Tomas G. del Rosario, as the representative of the said partnership. Upon the death of Juana Reyes y Reyes, who died intestate, Concepcion Crispina Dorotea Severina del Rosario y Reyes, a daughter of the marriage of the deceased with the applicant, Tomas G. del Rosario, was declared to be the sold heir of decedent by the Court of First Instance of the district of Quiapo in a decree of February 20, 1892. On June 3, 1900, the said Concepcion del Rosario y Reyes also died, at the age of nine years, according to the death certificate Exhibit F, and was succeeded in all her rights and actions, and in respect to one-half of the property, by the said applicant, Tomas G. del Rosario, who was already the owner of the other half of the property. After general notice of default, the adjudication and registration of the property in question is decreed (10 a. m.) in the name of the applicant, Tomas G. del Rosario. Let a translation be made of the stenographic notes taken of the testimony of the witnesses, and attached to the record of the proceedings. In the margin of the entries of registration, which, on folio 34 of volume 4 of the section of Quiapo, and 9 of the register, property No. 131, registration No. 3, and folio 115 of volume 7 of the section of Binondo, property No. 314, appears in the names of Tomas G.

del Rosario y Tongco and his daughter, Concepcion Crispina Dorotea Severina del Rosario y Reyes, let record be made by the register of deeds of the city of Manila, that the properties to which said entries refer have been adjudicated to Tomas G. del Rosario, in accordance with Act No. 496. MANILA, September 21, 1909. From the 21st of September, 1909, until the 7th of February, 1914, much more than one year elapsed. The title, therefore, of Tomas G. del Rosario was absolute and complete. The failure of the plaintiff, if he ever had any interest or title in said land, to appear and oppose the registration of the same in the name of Tomas G. del Rosario or to question the registration in his name during a period of one year after the certificate of title had been issued, operates to exclude him forever from questioning the title granted under the Torrens system. (Sec. 38, Act No. 496; Cuyugan and Lim Tuico vs. Sy Quia, 24 Phil. Rep., 567; Maloles vs. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. Rep., 548.) The plaintiff having lost his right to claim any interest in the lots or parcels of land in question, by virtue of his (a) failure to present any opposition to the registration of the same under the Torrens system in favor of Tomas G. del Rosario, or (b) to question the validity of such registration within a period of one year thereafter he has forever lost his right therein, if he ever had any. Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed and the defendant is absolved from all liability under the complaint, and without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

G.R. No. 179987

April 29, 2009

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences. xxx The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business transactions. If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize. - Hernando De Soto1 This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems. I.

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.5 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco."6 The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982."7 On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision8 reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.9 Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,11 which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree. The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit: 1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier? 2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code? 3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the

Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription? 4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?13 Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions. With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,14 promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.18 With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been "converted" into private property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19 The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable. Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof. II. First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.

A. Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.21 May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial legalization."22 Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.23 This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands." Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." The Court in Naguit explained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads: SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case. The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison: Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: xxx

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title. Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title. There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus: Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.24 Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020. B. Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.25 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia. Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained: [T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date. Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn

Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter. It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession" That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit. We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals27 since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land.... Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.29 Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle. III. We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The provision reads: SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: xxx (2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus: Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31 ] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision. A. The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads: All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands. There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,32 or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,34 as well as just title.35 When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription. The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.36 Yet if we ascertain the source

of the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule. The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxxxxxxxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)37 This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942. The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith." Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirtyyear possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,38 similar to

our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference. Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1). B. Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1). The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full: Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.39 Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth". Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government. Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.," is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.41 The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part.42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties."43

From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic.44 Such purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion. C. Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative. The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code. In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code. It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration

Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1). IV. One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property. The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription," and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,45 provisions that more or less speak for themselves. On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right." Dr. Tolentino explains: Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.46 The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of possession."47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code. It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.48 Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073). The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration.50 Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now. V. We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows: (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.51

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. B. We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar. It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment. The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties.52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits. There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial. Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171514

July 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent. DECISION REYES, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision1 dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456. On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu an application3 for land registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525 square meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his application, which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property, which is more particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the latters other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and (c) he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years. Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-0008934 to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation on the advance survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibaez, Chief of the Map Projection Section, stating that "CONFORMED PER L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. 2545 Project No. 28 certified on June 25, 1963, verified to be within Alienable & Disposable Area".5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabels name Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137 to prove that she had been in possession of the property since 1965. To support his claim that he had been religiously paying the taxes due on the property, Espinosa presented a Certification6 dated December 1, 1998 issued by the Office of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax declarations for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 Tax Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and 010717.8 Petitioner opposed Espinosas application, claiming that: (a) Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosas predecessor-in-interest possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the tax declarations do not prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest are in the character and for the length of time required by law. On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment9 granting Espinosas petition for registration, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering for the registration and the confirmation of title of Espinosa over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New),

situated at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of 5,525 square meters and that upon the finality of this decision, let a corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor of the herein applicant in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529. SO ORDERED.10 According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the property is alienable and disposable and that he complied with the requirements of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically: After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the above-entitled case, the Court is convinced, and so holds, that Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and possession over the subject lot which is within the area considered by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, public, continuous, adverse and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec. 14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with the Land Registration Act.11 Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosas failure to prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest were for the period required by law. As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516, Isabels possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of the PLA. On the other hand, Espinosa came into possession of the property only in 1970 following the sale that transpired between him and his mother and the earliest tax declaration in his name was for the year 1978. According to petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in possession for more than thirty (30) years is inconsequential absent proof that such possession began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.12 Petitioner also claimed that Espinosas failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy thereof is fatal to his application. Citing Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines13 and Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the submission of the original tracing cloth is mandatory in establishing the identity of the land subject of the application.15 Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance survey plan is not the evidence admissible to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable.16 By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled that possession for at least thirty (30) years, despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to private. Thus: The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the following grounds:

a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has successfully established valid title over the subject land and that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, adverse, public and undisturbed possession of said land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years before the filing of the application. Established jurisprudence has consistently pronounced that "open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same into private property (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vests title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 41); and b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 is the latest amendment of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141), but a strict implementation of the law would in certain cases result in inequity and unfairness to Espinosa. As wisely stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567: "Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-ininterest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more."17 The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other documentary evidence, not necessarily the original tracing cloth plan, as the identity and location of the property can be established by other competent evidence. Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without merit. While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes may be the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission, the court may sufficiently order the issuance of a decree of registration on the basis of the blue print copies and other evidence (Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70594, October 10, 1986). The said case provides further: "The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant sufficient to justify the registration and confirmation of her titles and did not find it necessary to avail of the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission for purposes of comparison, should not militate against the rights of the applicant. Such is especially true in this case where no clear, strong, convincing and more preponderant proof has been shown by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of said plans which were found both by the lower court and the Court of Appeals as conclusive proofs of the description and identities of the parcels of land contained therein." There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic, supra the Supreme Court pronounced that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement, and that failure to comply with such requirement is fatal to ones application for registration. However, such pronouncement need not be taken as an iron clad rule nor to be applied strictly in all cases without due regard to the rationale behind the submission of the tracing cloth plan.

x x x: xxxx As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be established by other competent evidence like a duly approved blueprint copy of the advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and technical description of Lot 8499, containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area and location of the lot, the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be excused.18 Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property is alienable and disposable: Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and disposable. In the duly approved Advance Survey Plan As-07-0000893 (sic) duly approved by the Land Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, it is certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the alienable and disposable area of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain.19 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its Resolution20 dated February 13, 2006. Petitioners Case Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CAs assailed decision and attributes the following errors: (a) Espinosa failed to prove by competent evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable; (b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan identifies the property in preparation for a judicial proceeding but does not convert the property into alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to determine the exact metes and bounds of the property; and (d) a blueprint copy of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the property only if it bears the approval of the Director of Lands. Issues The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy of confirmation and registration is hinged on the determination of the following issues: a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially complies with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529; and b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the geodetic engineer who conducted the survey sufficed to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable. Our Ruling

The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosas application is anchored on Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA and the grant thereof is warranted in view of evidence supposedly showing his compliance with the requirements thereof. This Court is of a different view. Based on Espinosas allegations and his supporting documents, it is patent that his claim of an imperfect title over the property in question is based on Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed under the two (2) latter provisions. On the contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for thirty (30) years, or through prescription. Therefore, the rule that should have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states: Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: xxxx (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts disposition of this case stemmed from their failure to apprise themselves of the changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent over the years. Section 48(b) of the PLA originally states: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was since July 26, 1894 or earlier.

On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Thus: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession and occupation for a period of thirty (30) years to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073 states: Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the requirement for possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier was adopted under Section 14(1) thereof. P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications under Section 48(b) of the PLA filed after the promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested rights may have been acquired under Section 48(b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 1073. That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who had already been in possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years at the time P.D. No. 1073 was promulgated be denied because their possession commenced after June 12, 1945? In Abejaron v. Nabasa,21 this Court resolved this legal predicament as follows: However, as petitioner Abejarons 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law, then upon Abejarons satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for

judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.22 (Citations omitted) Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable land of the public domain on the basis of a thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must be demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947 and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest that it provides for two (2) modes of acquisition. It is not the case that there is an option between possession and occupation for thirty (30) years and possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is neither contemplated under Section 48(b) that if possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it is still possible to acquire an imperfect title if such possession and occupation spanned for thirty (30) years at the time of the filing of the application. In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa complied with the requirements of Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 based on supposed evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property for at least thirty (30) years prior to the time he filed his application. However, there is nothing on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and occupation of the property for thirty (30) years. On the contrary, the earliest tax declaration in Isabels name was for the year 1965 indicating that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve (12) years had lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into possession. The CAs reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court23 is misplaced considering that the application therein was filed on October 20, 1975 or before the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. The same can be said with respect to National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals.24 The petition for registration therein was filed on August 21, 1968 and at that time, the prevailing rule was that provided under Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 the applicants therein entered into possession of the property on June 17, 1978 and filed their application on February 5, 1987. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the individuals from whom the applicant purchased the property, or their predecessors-ininterest, had been in possession since 1937. Thus, during the effectivity of Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942, or while the prevailing rule was possession and occupation for thirty (30) years, or prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073, the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period was already completed. Thus, assuming that it is Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply in this case, as the lower courts held, it was incumbent upon Espinosa to prove, among other things, that Isabels possession of the property dated back at least to June 12, 1945. That in view of the established fact that Isabels alleged possession and occupation started much later, the lower courts should have dismissed Espinosas application outright.

In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA. That there were instances wherein applications were granted on the basis of possession and occupation for thirty (30) years was for the sole reason discussed above. Regrettably, such reason does not obtain in this case. Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it follows that the subject property being supposedly alienable and disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2) categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of national wealth, are considered private. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,26 this Court held that there must be an official declaration to that effect before the property may be rendered susceptible to prescription: Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth." (Emphasis supplied) Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.27 Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied the property for an aggregate period of thirty (30) years, this does not operate to divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property is not held by the State in its private capacity, acquisition of title thereto necessitates observance of the provisions of Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. For prescription to run against the State, there must be proof that there was an official declaration that the subject property is no longer earmarked for public service or the development of national wealth. Moreover, such official declaration should have been issued at least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the case may be, prior to the filing of the application for registration. The period of possession and occupation prior to the conversion of the property to private or patrimonial shall not be considered in determining completion of the prescriptive period. Indeed, while a piece of land is still reserved for public service or the development of national wealth, even if the same is alienable and disposable,

possession and occupation no matter how lengthy will not ripen to ownership or give rise to any title that would defeat that of the States if such did not commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier. At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that would overcome the presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable public domain. All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.28 In Republic v. Sarmiento,29 this Court reiterated the earlier ruling in Menguito v. Republic30 that the notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed is alienable and disposable is not the positive government act that would remove the property from the inalienable domain. Neither it is the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property is inalienable: To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry." Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain. "To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13000227). This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. . . ." For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains

part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable. In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."31 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied) Therefore, even if Espinosas application may not be dismissed due to his failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan, there are numerous grounds for its denial. The blueprint copy of the advanced survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the subject property if: (a) it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land Management Services (LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is accompanied by a technical description of the property which is certified as correct by the geodetic surveyor who conducted the survey and the LMS of the DENR. As ruled in Republic v. Guinto-Aldana,32 the identity of the land, its boundaries and location can be established by other competent evidence apart from the original tracing cloth such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and technical description: Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the propertywhich may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered.33 However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan may be offered as evidence of the identity, location and the boundaries of the property applied for, the notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of alienability and disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,34 this Court enumerated the documents that are deemed relevant and sufficient to prove that the property is already outside the inalienable public domain as follows: In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared

by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the Presidents proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of such official record.1wphi1 These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.35 (Citation omitted) Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the benefits of either Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA or Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529. Applying Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit improper, Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and disposable. On the other hand, applying Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation and that of Isabel were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's application for registration of title over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New) located at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.