A Response to Ezes critique of Wiredus consensual democracy

Bernard Matolino
School of Philosophy and Ethics University of KwaZulu-Natal Private Bag X01 Scottsville, 3209 South Africa Email: matolinob@ukzn.ac.za Abstract The question of what political system best suites post colonial/independent African states remain alive and ever more pertinent particularly in the face of failed attempts at democratisation. Kwasi Wiredu notes that the adversarial nature of Western democratic practices along party political lines may not be well suited for African politics. Instead he suggests that the practice of consensual democracy as practised in the traditional Ashanti society may be more appropriate. Emmanuel Eze raises three objections against Wiredus account of consensual democracy. This paper seeks to respond to Ezes objections and argue that consensual democracy may have more appeal than Eze is prepared to concede.

1. Introduction In this paper I seek to respond Emmanuel Chukwudi Ezes critique of Kwasi Wiredus theory of consensual democracy. I will argue that Ezes first and third objections outright do not succeed. I concede that Eze is correct to formulate his second objection in the manner that he has done but I propose to reformulate Wiredus position in the light of Ezes objection. If I succeed in reformulating Wiredus position, I contend, consensual democracy suffers no serious harm from Ezes objections. Although this paper touches on a number of themes that relate to democracy in general and consensus in particular I restrict my discussion only to Wiredu and Ezes debate. The reason for this restriction is that I seek to advance a debate on an African democratic system on its own merits. While some may think it worthwhile to compare consensual democracy with the Western style of representative democracy, this paper only seeks to address Wiredus comparison which is between majoritarian democracy and consensual democracy. I understand Wiredus concern to be that majoritarian democracy is one that has taken root in Africa yet seems ineffective. 2. Wiredus Consensual Democracy Wiredu argues that consensus played a crucial role in decision making and governance in traditional Africa. Most importantly it was not just a peculiarly political phenomena restricted to adjudicating political questions. Where consensus characterises political decision making in Africa, it is manifestation of an immanent approach to social interaction. Generally, in interpersonal relations among adults, consensus as a basis of joint

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action was taken as axiomatic (Wiredu: 1997; 303). Further, resolutions represented an attainment of reconciliation which is a form of consensus. It is a restoration of goodwill through a reappraisal of the significance of the initial bones of contention. It does not necessarily involve a complete identity of moral or cognitive opinions. It suffices that all parties are able to feel that adequate account has been taken of their points of view in any proposed scheme of future action or coexistences (Wiredu:1997; 304). Wiredus view is that consensus does not entail total agreement. It presupposes a diversity of opinion. Dialogue is always possible enabling the production of an outcome that is acceptable to all. Furthermore, where there is the will to consensus, dialogue can lead to a willing suspension of disagreement, making possible agreed actions without necessarily agreed notions (ibid). He traces how consensus could work by demonstrating how it functioned in the Ashanti traditional system. According to Wiredu, the basic political unit of the Ashanti system is the clan. Every such unit has a head, and every such head is automatically a member of the council which is the governing body of the town or village. The qualifications for lineage leadership are seniority in age, wisdom, a sense of civic responsibility and logical persuasiveness (1997; 305). According to Wiredu, most of these these qualities were found in the eldest non-senile member of the society which made the election of such a person routine. However, if these qualities could not be found in one person there would be a process to find that individual who possessed all these qualities. That person would remain in office unless physical, moral or intellectual degeneration set in. In Wiredus view that was the first point of consensus in the Ashanti political system. He emphasises that this process was not based on any acts of formal voting opining that there is no word in the local language which means the same as voting. The chief, whose position was hereditary, presided over the council and his word was not the final arbiter on matters brought before the council. On the contrary the word of the chief was an expression of the consensus reached by the councillors. Further, the position of the chief was also seen as a religious position on top of being a political position. The chief was the link between the people and the ancestors. According to Wiredu consensus was operative at all levels of government. What made it work was that the principle of consensus was a premeditated option. It was based on the belief that ultimately the interests of all members of society are the same, although their immediate perceptions of those interests may be different (1997; 306). He argues that humans have the ability to cut through their differences until they reach their rock bottom identity of interests. This is achieved through dialogue and the Ashantis valued rational discussion as logical persuasiveness was the key requirement to hold office. Consensus was a decision to go beyond decision by majority opinion by seeking to represent the will of the minority in the final outcome. This is what Wiredu calls consensual democracy which stands in contrast to majoritarian democracy. Majoritarian democracy simply seeks to secure the will of the majority and it is much easier to do that as opposed to reaching a consensual position. For Wiredu the attraction of consensual democracy is that it encompasses both formal and substantive representation. The representatives presence is the formal representation and the expression of the peoples will by the representatives is substantive. Majoritarian democracies on the other hand just seek to consolidate the power of the majority.

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3. Ezes objections As a preliminary Eze notes that the merit of Wiredus project lies in that it eschews association with one party governments and dictatorships in the name of unity or consensus by exposing how undemocratic these governments are. However, Wiredus account, as an advocate of a return to the source1 fails to articulate the moral codes that sustained consensual democracy. 4. The political legitimation objection Ezes first objection concerns itself with, in his view, the obscure manner in which Wiredu outlines the source of legitimising political authority in the Ashanti system. Wiredu argues that political office was occupied by the eldest member who possessed the right qualities2. Eze correctly observes that in particular the chiefs office was not only political but scared as well. This means that the office of the chief was not only legitimated by a single political source. In Ezes view the legitimation of the political authority was dependent on other factors such as the religious factor since this office was both a religious and political position. In Ezes view the chief who could command and obtain consensus from his subjects would be one who embodied all key factors influencing arriving at consensus including the religious factor. However, according to Wiredu, the ultimately desired characteristic in the chief and one that secured consensus was his persuasive power. This persuasive power guaranteed the attainment of consensus through dialogue. For Wiredu the chiefs ability to reason and marshal persuasive arguments was the only crucial factor in attaining consensus. Eze argues that this was not the case. On the contrary he claims that Wiredu does not fully spell out the relationship between powers of persuasiveness and other factors which can prove to be crucial such as religious belief. Eze argues that religious and other beliefs should not be ignored for they could be very crucial to making people accept one idea over another; hence these religious beliefs should not be treated like mere scaffoldings. Wiredu suggests that the sole factor that determines the acceptance of an idea is the persuasiveness of the logical power behind it. Eze, on the other hand, does not believe that logical persuasiveness alone can serve as the source of the legitimation of political power. On the contrary he suggests that the exercise of public power heavily relies on mythologies such as God, the party, freedom, liberation and progress. For Eze these are notions that demand loyalty from those subjected to them. They are social, religious and cultural fantasies that achieve their objective of making people co-operate and see reason with each other with no recourse to reason. Eze calls on Wiredu to provide an inclusive account of the source of legitimation of power in the Ashanti system and what constituted the basis of consensual democracy. I am not convinced that Eze is correct in claiming that Wiredu fails and hence ought to outline the relationship between logical persuasiveness and religious beliefs as sources of legitimising authority. I read Wiredu as making a sufficient distinction between the exercise of real power and what can be called other functions of the chief. The sources of legitimising authority may be many but they may not command the same power in lending credence to the exercise of power. These sources play different
1 2 By return to the source Eze is referring to Wiredus project which attempts to retrieve what is considered to have been valuable in African traditional societies and apply it to present day Africa According to Wiredu these right qualities were obvious to everyone in that society and it was also quite obvious, to everyone, which individual possessed those qualities. That individual was then chosen to be the leader.

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roles in different functions and some of these roles and functions may not necessarily be an exercise of power per-se. They are just concomitant to authority but do not necessarily constitute that authority. Thus a distinction can be drawn between the role of the chief as a political authority and a religious authority. Although both offices are resident in one authority/person neither has to, as a matter of essence, depend on the other. I propose a distinction between procedural and substantive requirements and exercise of public office within the Ashanti system and consequently consensual democracy. The procedural requirements would constitute the execution of those functions that go with the office of king/chief. These functions do not represent an actual exercise of power but only show that the chief/king is the leader. In particular these functions serve to identify who the chief/king is. They are merely there to indicate that with the person who is performing these acts lies great power. They are not that power. They just say there is power, legitimate power. These functions say something about power, they may even say something about themselves (that they are closely connected to power) but they play a negligible role in legitimising that power. We can say they are political authority indicators and indicators are not constitutive of what they indicate. I propose two senses in which we could interpret the chiefs office as being religious as well. In the first, the person chosen for that office ought to have sufficiently demonstrated a high degree of moral integrity3. This person is free of scandal and will not likely occasion it. He is morally worthy to occupy the office. The second sense in which the office can be religious is that the chief performs functions akin to priestly functions. These functions will necessarily include interceding with the ancestors on behalf of the people or leading the people in ceremonies that involve communication with the ancestors. The justification of the performance of these religious functions lies at the initial stage of the selection of the leader which Wiredu has cited as the beginning of consensus-where the most worthy person ought to be the occupant of the office. That individual worthiness will later translate into capability to perform religious acts on behalf of others. However these religious performances do not have a direct bearing to legitimising political authority for they do not influence the crucial requirement of ones ability to marshal logically persuasive arguments in the arena of political debate. An individuals moral worthiness and performance of religious rites, as a leader, does not as a matter of course diminish or enhance his prowess in constructing logical and persuasive arguments. Eze has trouble accepting Wiredus assertion that the chiefs office was not only political but religious as well yet the source of the chiefs power only lay in his logical persuasiveness. He particularly wants to show that the Ashanti consensual system did not merely rely on the kings logical persuasiveness but on religion as well. Further he doubts the efficacy of such a system for modern day Africa where secularisation has taken over. I read his point to be that a shared religion and other beliefs bound people together in accepting the logical persuasiveness of certain ideas over others. Simply, his point is that the Ashantis lived within a certain system that was informed by certain
3 I do not think it is important to articulate what that moral integrity is as Eze wants Wiredu to do. Whatever moral codes each society has are generally known by everyone and consensual democracy can work in different societies with different moral codes. Consensual democracy does not necessarily align itself with certain moral codes at the exclusion of others, unless if there is a fundamental and irreconcilable disagreement about the moral codes that ought to inform the process of consensus.

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beliefs to the exclusion of others. Hence he is led to dismiss the claim that rationality and persuasiveness alone were what mattered in political discourses in consensual democracies. In the end, in his view, the Ashantis did not accept a political opinion on the basis of the merit of its contents and logical persuasiveness but on a certain set of beliefs they held. On this account, if my reading of Eze is correct, no matter how brilliant, coherent and persuasive a political opinion was-the Ashantis could not see its cogency unless it aligned itself with their religious beliefs. I think Ezes position, at the very least, is condescending. It supposes that for any opinion, particularly political opinions, for the Ashantis (who used consensus) logical persuasiveness was lost on them. His position is that any political position is not appealing in itself unless it shows itself to be deeply immersed in all other beliefs that participants adhere to. I do not think it is controversial to opine that the merit of a political idea or lack thereof can be seen without recourse to religion, ancestors or many other sources of power or functions of the person in power. The Ashanti would have known the difference between a brilliant, articulate and perceptive chief and a slow thinking, foolish chief when it comes to articulating and arbitrating on political issues and seeking to find consensus among divergent opinions. There is no need of the intervention of the religious factor in attempting to use ones persuasive powers as a chief in search of arriving at consensus. Ezes assertion that the exercise of public power relies on mythologies such as God, the party, the flag which are cultural, religious and social fantasies that require loyalty from adherents without offering any reason for the need of that loyalty to those adherents is hard to accept. Ezes position renders people incapable of engaging in rational debate and political discourse. It is built on the assumption that people lack the ability to see the merit of notions such as justice, liberty and equality for their own sake in the absence of God, the party and a flag. It reduces human beings to a mindless lot that is fanatical and ready to cheer on any mythical symbol of unity without bother to inquire about fundamental questions such as liberty, justice and right. Ezes claim is more telling when he argues that: If the traditional mythological origins and justifications origins of consensual politics can no longer hold today (due to secularisation and religious pluralisms, for example), and it is determined that what we need today is a form of consensual politics, then we may have to (re)invent usable-even as we discard unusable-mythologies. For, even-and especially a secular political institution, if it renounces brute force as a mode of mobilisation, needs some sort mythology-Platos truthful lies, or various forms of utopia-in order to endure (1997: 318). The above quote firmly exposes Ezes belief, which I think is erroneous, that all political system, traditional or modern, religious or atheistic, ought to be based on some mythological foundation which ties people together and magically makes positions and arguments acceptable to all. Eze is wrong to assume that there is a need for that kind of utopia with every political system. He undermines the severity of the founding differences of different political systems. Whereas a theocracy may have the need to rely on some myths or beliefs to support certain practices and inform certain political arguments as more acceptable than others this is not necessarily true in a secular mod-

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ern democratic state-be it consensual or majoritarian4. It is not absolutely necessary that every political system should find its justification in some utopia or other. It is just possible that a political system can be built on certain truths such as justice, civil liberty and equality without resorting to mythologies and utopia. Eze is either sceptical or cynical of humanitys ability to see reason and build enduring political systems that are not imprisoned by myths and utopia. I think a distinction ought to be introduced between the ceremonial and the substantive functions and requirements of the chief. The ceremonial functions of the chief would include, among other things, leading religious celebrations and performing other functions such as receiving visiting chiefs or officiating at clan ceremonies. The requirements for such activities could range from decorum to moral worthiness. However these acts are not constitutive of or essential to legitimising political authority. The substantive requirement of office for the Ashanti which ensured consensus was the ability of the individual to provide leadership in adjudicating over competing arguments in search of a consensual position. One who had the logical rigour and analysis of arguments as well as articulation of positions adopted would be best suited to perform the functions of chief. This was the real exercise of power which was legitimated by the incumbents logical persuasiveness. From the sitting of the council were political debates were carried and consensus sought-political positions were reached and these were subsequently communicated to everyone. In this realm there was no recourse to religious or other beliefs. 5. The identity of interests objection Ezes second problem with Wiredu lies in the way that Wiredu seeks to guarantee the attainment of consensus by claiming that at the rock bottom all members of the societys interests are the same although they may have differing perceptions about what those interests are. Eze says this view is controversial and Wiredu fails to take into account actual and existing social conditions as well as competing interests among people. Eze sees no reason to accept Wiredus assertion. On the contrary he questions what identity of interests exists between some members of society who may seek the total domination of others and those who do not. How do the commercial interests of a Texan oil company, or the Anglo-Dutch Shell oil company, in Nigeria simply to get oil out of the soil as quickly and as safely as possible, coincide with the political and survival interests of comparatively speaking, a few thousand people called the Ogonis? (Eze 1997: 318). In Ezes view Wiredus position that people desire the same thing and only their perceptions of that desire differs-brings forth two problematic ideas. The first is that there is a rock bottom identity of interests and secondly that what we need to act harmoniously is good knowledge of our long term interests. The problem with the second idea is that it conflates right knowledge with right action. Eze argues that unless conditions of absolute justice can be guaranteed human struggles and antagonistic politics would be manifestly rational. He sees no self evident truth in the claim that at the rock bottom all interests of humans are the same. This rock bottom level at which all human interests may be same, I would argue, could not possibly be a human bottom, or at least not in the ordinary human world, where humans experience themselves as individuals (1997: 320). For Eze it cannot be the case that it is merely misperception that hinders us from seeing that rock bottom iden4 The South African constitution and democratic practices, for example, do not rely on some form of utopia for its acceptability. They are a result of a negotiated settlement.

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tity of interests. He asks what if that identity of interests is a misperception in itself, or what if it has been conjured by those who benefit from the social and political arrangements. I think Ezes claim that competing and divergent interests are characteristic of human nature is correct. I also think that some interests pursued by some members of society could never be reconciled with the interests of the whole society e.g. domination. I also agree with him that Wiredu is mistaken in claiming that at the rock bottom there is an identity of interests and it is only misperception that hinders us from reaching that bottom. However, this does not mean that there can be no possibility of consensus between two groups whose interests are as divergent as the oil companies and the Ogoni people as Eze has pointed out above. I am of the view that consensus is possible even in such situations. The possibility and attainment of consensus lies in the process of dialogue which is at the heart of consensus. The dialogue is not aimed at removing misperception with the aim of reaching a certain rock bottom identity of interests. On the contrary, my formulation would claim, the dialogue is aimed at rendering bare the opposing views, understanding their contents and aims; and most crucially the dialogue would be directed at building bridges between the disparate opinions. The dialogue is aimed at reaching a certain consensus but that outcome is not prescribed or known before the completion of the process. The outcome of the dialogue which is a consensual position need not be informed by the existence of an identity of interests. I think consensus might just as well be informed by the realisation that a situation characterised by competing and divergent interests that do not take each other into consideration will not promote the pursuit of any interests at all. That realisation is not a realisation that all have same interests; it mere is a realisation akin to this declaration: If I am to successfully pursue my interests, I ought to take sufficient regard of others interests. Thus the oil companies and the Ogoni people find themselves bound in the same fate and their divergent interests have to find a negotiated tolerable co-existence. That outcome is consensus and the differences may remain but those differences do not prevail over the consensual position It is self-evident that directly competing and conflictual interests obstruct, hinder and eventually destroy each other. In a never ending series of conflicts and competitions no interest will triumph outrightly hence the urgency of dialogue with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable outcome will not be lost to the parties. In this case I do not take consensus to mean unanimity or total agreement. I do not even take it to mean a total conversion from one position to the other. I only take it to mean that a party to the dialogue recognises that its adversarys position is serious enough to cause it to adjust its own position; and the other party recognises the same. I think it is not an exaggeration to point out that where there are two competing interests a consensual position is attainable provided the will is found. This brings me to what I believe are the crucial requirements to the attainment of consensual democracies. I believe every political system, to function properly, has certain inviolable canons5 that keep it intact. An intolerable dictatorship, for example, ensures that it eliminates dissent, suppresses opposing views and promotes its own propaganda. All its social and political institutions are built to attain this end. A multiparty democracy on the other hand promotes the realisation of values such as freedom in all its manifestations and the protection of rights. Those who promote values con5 These canons need not be built on religious beliefs as Eze contemplates.

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trary to what is institutionally tolerable are severely punished. All this is done to ensure that the political system preserves itself and that the tenets on which it is built actually survive to perpetuate it. The same applies to a system conceived as a consensual democracy. The crucial and defining aspect of consensus is that it is a democracy. As a democracy, consensus ought to admit of all free activity as long as it does not harm others. I propose two requirements that ought to characterise the nature of institutions and process of dialogue. Firstly, the institutional arrangements must allow the will of the participants to prevail. Participants must be able to freely express themselves without any inducement or coercion. If the will of the participants is allowed to prevail freely; they would then be able to claim ownership of the outcome of the process and consensual democracy would have prevailed. Secondly the interlocutors in the process enter this process in good faith. It is crucial that values as openness, justice, fairness and equality should be held as fundamental and inviolable conditions under which the dialogue is conducted. In the absence of these fundamentals there is no point in entering into any dialogue. If this is our new understanding of how consensus works or of what informs consensus as opposed to Wiredus claim that at the rock bottom there is an identity of interests; then Ezes objection loses its initial force. What we merely need to acknowledge is that serious differences do exist but there are mechanism of arriving at consensus that takes those differences seriously. In this way we change consensual democracy from a system that essentially searches for an identity of interests to one that seriously addresses a myriad of differences. 6. The democracy objection Ezes third and final objection pertains to Wiredus use and understanding of the term democracy. Eze is of the view that democracy is yet another social framework which mediates conflicts and struggles that arise as a result of the competitive nature of individuated identities and desires. He sees democracys nature and role as having nothing to do with consensus. A democracys raison detre is the legitimation-and management-of this always already competitive (i.e., inherently political) condition of relativised desires. In this sense, consensus or unanimity of substantive decisions cannot be the ultimate goal of democracy, but only one of its moments (Eze 1997: 320). Eze claims that democracy has its own end which is expressed in a social compact that says: We will agree or agree to disagree, and here are established mechanisms or rules according to which we shall secure and maintain as long as necessary each of these possibilities (Eze 1997: 321). He says this is the spirit of democracy by any name not the elevation of the moment of substantive agreement, reconciliation, or consensus to the axiomatic (ibid). Thus Eze is opposed to the characterisation of democracy as consensus. I am of the opinion that this objection does not succeed and Eze is grossly wrong to formulate it in the way he has done. His idea of a democracy seems to be embedded in his conception of the nature of political activity. He essentially holds that there is always a vast difference in political desires and these are always competitive. He appears not to want to tolerate the possibility that humans as political entities might want to co-operate and do so willingly. I believe that is a wrong assumption for we know of numerous cases where even political rivals suspend their rivalry and competing desires in favour of co-operation. From his insistence that human beings are essentially competitive and irreconcilable Eze proceeds to; quite wrongly, argue that there is only one

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brand of democracy-one which only seeks to manage different competing desires. To him that is the sole role of any political system described as a democracy-a mere management of competing desires; setting a framework of agreements and agreements to disagree. He claims that consensus is just one moment of democracy and not its ultimate aim. I propose that the management of competing desires is equally also just one moment of democracy and not its ultimate aim. A democracy by any name will not just concern itself with managing competing desires. It will probably not state this as its most important function. On the contrary it will state the protection of rights such as liberty and equality as its fundamental aim. I think that Eze is mistaken in thinking that there can only be one aim of democracy which means that there is only one type of democracy. I think it is quite possible that there could be a number of democracies. For example, what makes majoritarian democracy and consensual democracy both democracies is that they are underpinned by values such as freedom and the protection of human rights. Although Eze praises Wiredu for making it explicit that consensual democracy does not align itself with dictatorship-it appears as if Eze does not shake off the suspicion that the very act and process of arriving at consensus involves coercion and does not give full cognisance to competing desires. This comes from the way he characterises the aim of democracy and his insistence on humans as monolithically and essentially ever ultra competitive. What he fails to fully acknowledge is that consensual democracy asks a crucial question of action which his own version of democracy shies away from. Consensual democracy asks: In the face of these competing desires and differences what is the best way to proceed from here? The participants to consensual democracy will respond: We shall sit and dialogue until we reach a consensus on the best conceivable way to proceed. This is what consensual democracy strives for. It does not get rid of strife and competing ends-it urges interlocutors to find a position acceptable to them albeit their originally divergent aims. 7. Conclusion In this paper I have sought to respond to Ezes objections to Wiredus idea of a consensual democracy. I have argued that Ezes first and third objections fail suffer outright failure. I have argued that his second objection appears to be cogent but with a simple reformulation of Wiredus position its efficacy disappears. Bibliography Eze, E.C. 1997. Democracy or Consensus? A Response to Wiredu, in Eze, C. (Ed), Postcolonial African philosophy: a critical reader, 313-323. Cambridge: Blackwell. Wiredu, K. Democracy and Consensus in Traditional African Politics: A Plea for a Non-Party Polity in Eze, C. (Ed), Postcolonial African philosophy: a critical reader, 303-312. Cambridge: Blackwell.

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brand of democracy-one which only seeks to manage different competing desires. To him that is the sole role of any political system described as a democracy-a mere management of competing desires; setting a framework of agreements and agreements to disagree. He claims that consensus is just one moment of democracy and not its ultimate aim. I propose that the management of competing desires is equally also just one moment of democracy and not its ultimate aim. A democracy by any name will not just concern itself with managing competing desires. It will probably not state this as its most important function. On the contrary it will state the protection of rights such as liberty and equality as its fundamental aim. I think that Eze is mistaken in thinking that there can only be one aim of democracy which means that there is only one type of democracy. I think it is quite possible that there could be a number of democracies. For example, what makes majoritarian democracy and consensual democracy both democracies is that they are underpinned by values such as freedom and the protection of human rights. Although Eze praises Wiredu for making it explicit that consensual democracy does not align itself with dictatorship-it appears as if Eze does not shake off the suspicion that the very act and process of arriving at consensus involves coercion and does not give full cognisance to competing desires. This comes from the way he characterises the aim of democracy and his insistence on humans as monolithically and essentially ever ultra competitive. What he fails to fully acknowledge is that consensual democracy asks a crucial question of action which his own version of democracy shies away from. Consensual democracy asks: In the face of these competing desires and differences what is the best way to proceed from here? The participants to consensual democracy will respond: We shall sit and dialogue until we reach a consensus on the best conceivable way to proceed. This is what consensual democracy strives for. It does not get rid of strife and competing ends-it urges interlocutors to find a position acceptable to them albeit their originally divergent aims. 7. Conclusion In this paper I have sought to respond to Ezes objections to Wiredus idea of a consensual democracy. I have argued that Ezes first and third objections fail suffer outright failure. I have argued that his second objection appears to be cogent but with a simple reformulation of Wiredus position its efficacy disappears. Bibliography Eze, E.C. 1997. Democracy or Consensus? A Response to Wiredu, in Eze, C. (Ed), Postcolonial African philosophy: a critical reader, 313-323. Cambridge: Blackwell. Wiredu, K. Democracy and Consensus in Traditional African Politics: A Plea for a Non-Party Polity in Eze, C. (Ed), Postcolonial African philosophy: a critical reader, 303-312. Cambridge: Blackwell.