Public Interest vs. ElmaG.R. no. 138965 March 5 2007 PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC., LAUREANO T.

ANGELES, and JOCELYN P.CELESTINO, vs. MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, and RONALDOZAMORA, asExecutive Secretary, Accused Appellant Facts: For consideration is the omnibus motion, dated 14 august 2006, whererespondent Magdangal Elma sought the following: 1. The reconsideration of the decision in the case Public Interest Center Inc., et al. vs. Magdangal Elma, et.al ( GR. NO. 138965), promulgated on30 June 2006; 2. The clarification of the dispositive part of the decision ; and 3. The elevation of the case to the court en banc.The solicitor general, in behalf of the respondent, filed an omnibus motion,dated 11 august 2006 with substantially the sameallegation.R e s p o n d e n t E l m a w a s a p p o i n t e d a s C h a i r m a n o f T h e P r e s i d e n t i a l Commission on Good Government (PCGG) ON 30 October 1998. Thereafter,during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidentiallegal counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived anyrenumiration that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have bothappointments declared as unconstitutional and therefore, null and void.In its decision, the court declared that the concurrent appointments of the respondents as PCGG chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that theconcurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of section 7(2) OF ARTICLEix-b of the 1987 constitution, since these are incompatible offices. The duties of CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the action of theh e a d s o f v a r i o u s e x e c u t i v e d e p a r t m e n t s a n d a g e n c i e s a n d r e v i e w i n g inves tigations involving heads of executive depart6mnets. Since the actions of thePCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subject to the review of theCPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.The court also decreed that the strict prohibition under section 13 Article VIIof the 1987 constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG chairman nor CPLC is a secretary, under sectary or assistant secretary.However, had the rule hereunder been applicable to the case, the defect of thesetwo incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section allows theconcurrent holding of position only when second post is required by the primaryfunction of the first appointments and is exercised in an exofficio capacity.Although respondent Elma waived receiving remuneration for the secondappointment, the primary functions of the PCGG chairman do not require his appointment as CPLC. Ruling 1.After reviewing the arguments propounded in respondents omnibusmotion, we find that the basic issues that were raised have already beenpassed upon. No substantial arguments were presented. Thus, the courtdenies the respondents motion for reconsideration. 2.In response to the respondents request for clarification, the court ruledthat respondents Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairmanand CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices. This rulingdoes not render both appointments void. Following the common-

law ruleon incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated hisoffice as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC. 3.There also is no merit in the respondents motion to refer the case toc o u r t e n b a n c . W h a t a r e i n q u e s t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e a r e t h e constitutionality of respondent Elmas concurrent appointments, and nott h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f a n y t r e a t y , l a w o r a g r e e m e n t . T h e m e r e application of the constitutional provisions does not require the case tob e h e a r d a n d d e c i d e d e n b a n c . C o n t r a r y t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e respondent, the decision of the court in this case does not modify theruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. It should be notedthat Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2 -89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides that the court en banc is not an appellate court towhich decisions or resolutions of a division may be appealed.WHEREFORE, the respondents motion for consideration and for elevation of thiscase of court en banc is hereby DENIED. http://www.scribd.com/doc/68607478/AttyDaraDigest-Public-Interest-vs-Elma

Flores vs. DrilonG.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993 FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint. ISSUE: Whether or not the provision Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 is constitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. RULING: The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of other governmental duties. The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice. http://talkaboutphilippinelaw.blogspot.com/2012/04/flores-v-drilon-223-scra-568.html

Sarmiento v. Mison Case Digest Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs. Issue: Whether the appointments of Mison et. al. in unconstitutional? Held: No. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President toappoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonelor naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in thisConstitution; (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are nototherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission. It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution, the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of horse- trading and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the

1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The word also could mean in addition; as well; besides, too besides in like manner which meanings could stress that the word also in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word also as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derivesignificance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the Presidentand appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word alone in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of heads of bureaus from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines,

Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972). RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as anappointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longerneeds the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. http://www.pinoycasedigest.info/2012/08/sarmiento-v-mison-case-digest.html

Calderon vs. Carale Facts: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows: The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission

onAppointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. Petitioner questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC, without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to RA 6715 as amended. Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity and which he contends that the law is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive as provided for in the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission

on Appointments ofappointments extended by the president to government officers, in addition to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution.

Held: No. The provisions of first paragraph Art. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution is exclusive and cannot be expanded by mere act of legislation. Even the Solicitor-General stated that the provision of that law appertaining to the confirmation by the Commission on Appointmentstransgresses the Constitution and is therefore, without any legal basis. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of RA 6715, Sec. 13 is unconstitutional because: 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding theretoappointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments onappointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. The Court further stated that the legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a constitutionalprovision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. Thus, the Supreme Court said the appointment to NLRC positions do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, as the provision in RA 6715 isdeclared unconstitutional. The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners are among those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/calderon-vs-carale.html

Manalo vs Sistoza Facts: On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquinosigned into law Republic Act 6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contents that: (1) RA 6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointmentsis acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues: 1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation 2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP

3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 areconstitutional

Held: 1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whoseappointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointmentsare not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission onAppointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation ofappointments of other

government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. 2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State. On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission onAppointments.

3.

Sections

26

and

31

of

Republic

Act

6975

which

empower

the

Commission not

on Appointments to confirm the appointments ofpublic

officials whose appointments are

required by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided sections. (Manalo vs. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999) http://eightsubjects.blogspot.com/2012/10/manalo-vs-sistoza.html

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYOG.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002 FACTS: On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the ComelecsEID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. OnMarch 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman tog ether witho t h e r c o m m i s s i o n e r s i n a n a d i n t e r i m a p p o i n t m e n t . W h i l e o n s u c h a d i n t e r i m appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandumaddress transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo tor e c o n s i d e r h e r r e l i e f a s D i r e c t o r I V o f t h e E I D a n d h e r r e a s s i g n m e n t t o t h e L a w Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o n A p r i l 1 8 , 2 0 0 1 , c i t i n g C O M E L E C R e s o l u t i o n N o . 3 3 0 0 d a t e d November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC enbanc. S h e a l s o f i l e d a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d c r i m i n a l c o m p l a i n t 16 w i t h t h e L a w Department 17 against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h)o f t h e O m n i b u s E l e c t i o n C o d e , C O M E L E C R e s o l u t i o n N o . 3 2 5 8 , C i v i l S e r v i c e Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil servicelaws, rules and regulations.During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed theinstant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo,Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violatethe constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC. ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim a p p o i n t m e n t s i s s u e d b y t h e P r e s i d e n t a m o u n t s t o a t e m p o r a r y appoint ment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. RULING: We find petitioners argument without merit. An ad interim a p p o i n t m e n t i s a p e r m a n e n t a p p o i n t m e n t b e c a u s e i t t a k e s e f f e c t immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee hasqualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makesan ad interim a p p o i n t m e n t p e r m a n e n t i n c h a r a c t e r b y m a k i n g i t e f f e c t i v e u n t i l di sapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. http://www.scribd.com/doc/100733694/Matibag-vs-Benipayo-Digest

Pimentel vs. Ermita Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional theappointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting secretaries of their respective departments. On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interimappointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.

Issue: Is President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session, constitutional?

Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with theexercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidentialappointments.

Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a

permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancyin an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that *t+he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance ofappointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that actingappointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission onAppointments.

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished fromappointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointmentsare extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.

Actingappointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/pimentel-vs-ermita.html

Rufino vs. Endriga Case: Section 16 Article 7: Facts: Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure.First case, GR No. 139554, represented by the Solicitor General, collectively known as the RUFINO group seeks toset aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Resolution denying the motion for the reconsideration. 1. Declaring petitioners, ENDRIGA group to have a clear right to their respective offices elected by the CCPboard up to expiration of 4-year term2. Ousting respondents, Rufino group, except respondent Tantoco, from their respective offices andexcluding them therefrom3. Dismissing case against TantocoSecond case, GR No. 139565, the Endriga group, seeks to assail the Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals insame case insofar as it denied their Motion for Immediate Execution of the 30 oard of Trustees of 7 members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trusteeswere all pointed municipalpublic corpor members to 9. EO 1058 issuedin 1985 increased 9 to 11.Aquino - 1986, after People Power Resolution, Aquino asked incumbent CCP trustees for courtesy resignation andappointed new trustees to the of 4 years to replace the Endriga group, except forTantoco. Thus Rufino group took respective oaths of office and assumed performance of their duties in 1999.Endriga vs. Estrada Y Endriga group files Petition for memberof CCP board. y election by majorityvote entirely vacant may the Presidentof the Phil. fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with ranking officers of CCP. In the case at bar, only n term. Y 4-year term can onlybe wasunnecessary because 10 incumbent trustees had the statutory power to fill up by election any vacancy of the board. Y Y eclared Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees and ousting Rufinogroup from board. Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is free from ambiquity.supervision and control over governmentcorporations restrict or modify application of CCP Charter. Y that the law could onlydelegate to the CCP board the power to appoint officers lower in rank

than trustees of Board officers of equal y decision. Y Hence the consolidated petitions. MAIN ISSUE OF 1 St case: Whether or not Section 6 paragraph B of PD 15 in which gives authority to CCP trustees toelect or appoint fellow officers of equal rank, is unconstitutional (as it is against Sec.16 of Article 7, that only thePresident has the appointing powers of appointing heads of executive departments)Important Issues related to lesson:1. Consti2. on over CCPMAIN ISSUE OF 2 Nd ase: whether or not a writ of quo warranto involving public office such as CCP should bedeclared a self-executing judgment and deemed immediately executor under Rule 39, Section 4 of the rules of court.Section 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15: has the power and authority of the corporation. Vacancies shall be filled by election of majorityvote by the trustees. Only can the President exercise his/her power to appoint if the board becomes entirelyvacant. ate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the Pres. Makes CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the Pres. SUCH and of control.Section 16 of Article 7 of Consti:-source of

gives President legislature authority to delegate power to appoint- However, Congress may, by law, vest upon the appointment of other officers lower in President appoints 5 groups of officers:1. Heads of Executive department (with consent from Commission of Appointments)2. Those whom President may be authorized by law to appoint (and 3. without consent of Comm of App)3. Officers of the Government (if the law is silent or head appointing declared unconsti)4. Lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may, by the law, vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.5. Appointments vested by Consti in Supreme Court and Constitutional CommissionAppointment of Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions, and Boards:Appointing powers belong to President, with: oCongress o Batasang Pambansa can also appoint inferior officers- Power to appoint to heads is a matter of legislative grace. -executing vested by Consti thus not subject to legislative limitations orconditions. Others such power are the Supreme Court en banc and Consti Com Chairperson of CCP Board is Head of CCP:Chairperson, with confirmation from the Board, has the power to appoint all officers, staff andpersonnel of the Centersamerights and privileges and obligations as Exempted from coverage of Civil Servi -

Appoint, remove, discipline all officers and personnelPerform duties until Board, by majority vote, shall elect another Chairperson Y Chairperson and has power to appoint lower ranked officers Y Under PD 15, CCP is a public corporation governed by the Board thus not an agencySec. 6 (b) (c) vs. Sec. 16 of Article 7:HOLDING: Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 are unconstitutional.While Sec. 6 empowers remaining trustees to fill vacancies of Board, allowing them to elect fellowtrustees... Sec. 16 allows only the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards to appointonly officers lower in rankSec. 6 talks about independent appointing powers which conflicts with the Presid two system of appointing powers are recurring anomalies and controversies inappointment every time new President assumed office.What is the CCP?agency, notplaced or order creating them under President controls CCP-judicial functions. Control:Applies to acts or decision of all officers in the Executive Branchexercise of discretionact directly whenever a specific function is entrustedby law or regulation of subordinateExecutive branch is unitary thus only the Presindet had executive power exercising control over entireExecutive Branch.Presindent.Limitations: o -judicial bodies, since proceedings and decisions are judicial in natureand subject to judicial review, only admin power of Pres. o supervision HOLDING: Wherefore, we grant the petition of the 1stcase wherein we find Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it authorizes remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies of the Board. And wefind it unnecessary to rule 2ndcase.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/39099671/Rufino-vs-Endriga-to-Be-Reported-Case

Aytona vs Castillo Case Digest FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that time, made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day. At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately. On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillos right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post, therefore making Castillos appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytonas appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal.

ISSUE: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified.

RULING: Upon the ground of separation of powers, the court resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, canceling such midnight or last-minute appointments. Case dismissed. http://www.mylegispinoy.com/2009/06/aytona-vs-castillo-case-digest.html

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The saidconstitutional provision prohibits the President from making anyappointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments toexecutive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice publicservice or endanger public safety. Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointmentsimposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitutiontwo months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term the President is neither required to makeappointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacanciesin the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of theprohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointmentsduring the period of the ban

http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/in-re-appointments-of-hon-mateo.html

De castro vs JBC FACTS: The movants present their arguments on the main issue at several levels. Some argue thatthe disputed constitutional provisions Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) are clear and speak for themselves on what the Constitution covers in banningappointments during the election period.23 One even posits that there is no conflict becauseboth provisions can be given effect without one detracting against the full effectiveness of the other,24 although the effect is to deny the sitting President the option to appoint in favorof a deferment for the incoming Presidents action. Still others, repeating their originalarguments, appeal to the principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove their point. Issues: Whether or not Section 15, Article VII of the Phil Consti. does not lead to an interpretationthat exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments RULING: The court denies the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters beingthereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, andaccordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela ruling,It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolvingthat because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbentPresident, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successorof the retiring Chief JusticeHad the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to theappointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. Theycould not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easilyand surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equallyapplicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, mostlikely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that theprohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within twomonths before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or ActingPresidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended pointin order to suit the purposes of any quarter http://www.scribd.com/doc/34622389/De-Castro-vs-JBC-Digest

PAGUITA vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (2010) NOT AVAILABLE ON THE INTERNET

Lacson-Magallanes Co. vs Pao & Executive Secretary Pajo FACTS:

Political Law Delegation of Control Power to the Executive Secretary

Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor ofPao. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter. ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Exec Sec and may it be further delegated by the Exec Sec. HELD: The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the Presidents power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/lacson-magallanes-co-vs-pano-executive-secretary-pajo/

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-25373 July 1, 1976 IRENEO ROQUE, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE HONORABLE, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS; THE HONORABLE, THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT and JOSE FACUN, respondents appellees. Antonio M. Orara for petitioner-appellant. Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for respondents-appellees The Director of Lands, et al., etc. Cipriano A. Tan for respondent-appellee Jose Facun. FERNANDO, J.: The appealed decision of the lower court, 1 dismissing a certiorari petition against the Assistant Executive Secretary of the President for sustaining the award by the Director of Lands of a homestead application and thus overruling the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, has in its favor conformity with the policy of the law as reiterated in a host of cases. Petitioner, himself a previous beneficiary of the statute, would seek to add to his holding by a sales application. The prevailing party, private respondent Jose Facun, on the other hand, had applied for the disputed lot as a homesteader as far back as 1935, and had submitted his final proof in 1948. To put the matter thus is to indicate the fate in store for this appeal. There would be no justification both in law and in conscience for a reversal. To contend that the Office of the President, through respondent Assistant Executive Secretary, lacks the power to overrule the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources is to betray lack of awareness of the implications of what Justice Laurel referred to in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior as 2 the establishment [in the Philippines] of a single, not plural, Executive." 3 As was further stressed by him: "Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. 4 What was asserted then by petitioner, now appellant, is, to put it at its mildest, highly unorthodox We affirm. The nature of the case was set forth in the decision thus: "This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by Ireneo Roque, as petitioner, v. the Honorable Director of Lands, the Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary to the President and Jose Facun, as respondents, praying that, after due hearing, the order of the respondent Honorable Director of Lands ... and the decision of the respondent Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary, ... be set aside on the alleged ground that the said order of the Director of Lands was issued with grave abuse of discretion, consisting of unqualified reliance and the biased report and recommendation of the Assistant Public Land Inspector Andres V. Arias, ... and on the factual allegation that the said decision of the Honorable Executive Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrarily disregarding the sales award of the land in question in favor of the herein petitioner having already paid is for the price of the same, and praying further that the decision of the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be sustained. ... Respondent Jose Facun, through Atty. Cipriano

A. Tan, filed an answer to the petition denying specifically the allegation of paragraph 6 of the petition, and specifically denying petitioner's aforequoted allegations Re: abuse of discretion, arbitrariness and excess of jurisdiction. The Honorable Director of Lands, through his counsel Atty. Ernesto B. Llaguno submitted an answer specifically denying paragraphs 3 and 12 of the petition and its averments concerning abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, and excess of jurisdiction. The Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary to the President, through Assistant Solicitor General Pacifica P. de Castro, and then Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo, recently promoted as Assistant Solicitor General, filed an answer denying specifically the alleged paragraphs 3, 10, 12 and 13 of the petition, and likewise denying emphatically and specifically petitioner's assertion of abuse of discretion, arbitrariness and lack of . jurisdiction. They alleged the following affirmative defenses: (1) Petition states no cause of action; and (2) Assuming arguendo that it states a cause of action, the decision of the Assistant Executive Secretary is perfectly valid." 5 The contention of petitioner was then set forth: "Petitioner's counsel maintains that the order of the District Land Officer had already become final and executory, hence, the order of the Director of Lands reversing the order of the District Land Officer is in violation of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 ." 6 The appealed decision, after taking note of the conclusion arrived at by respondent Director of Lands, quoted from the order of respondent Assistant Executive Secretary This is the relevant portion: "It is noteworthy that Lands Inspector Cruz who investigated the case in 1948 was the same investigator, who inspected appellant's entire homestead a year earlier and recommended the issuance of a patent herefore. If it is true that the appellee [Petitioner Roque] had been in occupation of the disputed portion since 1937, then the investigated would not have recommended the issuance of a patent to the appellant for the whole of Lot No. 4507. Likewise, it is significant to note that the appellant [Respondent Facun] filed his homestead application in 1935 and submitted the final proof therefore in 1939. On the other hand, the appellee [Roque] submitted his sales application for the disputed portion in 1948, only during the course of the investigation of his protest. If it were true that he had occupied the disputed portion since 1937, he could have filed his application earlier, it appearing that he is also the applicant of another lot adjoining Lot No. 4507. Moreover, it was verified during the reinvestigation of this case that the appellee [Roque] entered upon the disputed portion in 1951 only. " 7 There should then be conclusiveness of such finding, according to the appealed decision, "when approved by the Office of the President, through his Executive Secretary, or Assistant Executive Secretary, [representing] the Highest Magistracy of the Land, and the personification of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines." 8 As set forth at the outset, there is no justification for a reversal. The facts argue against it and the law, in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution no less, is on the side of private respondent Facun. 1. It would be a plain defiance of the settled policy of the law if the homestead application of private respondent Facun would not be honored and the sales application of petitioner Roque sustained. Justice Malcolm, asponente, in Aquino v. Director of Lands, 9 decided in 1919, stressed that homestead applicants, 44 poor men with a legitimate ambition to acquire homes are [not to be discouraged." 10 If it were otherwise, the result would be agrarian troubles and internal strife 11 because of the natural discontent of the masses. "The object and purpose of the homestead law," according to him, "is to encourage residence upon and the cultivation and improvement of the public domain." 12 That "paramount public purpose 13 should not be nullified by the courts. That approach has commended itself to this Tribunal in all subsequent cases." 14 This Court has even gone so far as to rule in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Franco, 15 speaking through Justice Street: 'There is indeed some authority for this point of view, but the better doctrine, revealing the drift of the later cases is to the contrary; and it is now held, by the better considered decisions, that a person who takes possession of land in the erroneous belief that it is public land, with the intention

of holding and claiming it under the homestead law, may acquire title thereto by adverse position as against the true owner." 16 Earlier, in Balboa v. Farrales, 17 it was held: "A perfected valid appropriation of public lands operates as a withdrawal of the tract from the body of the public domain and, so long as such appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. A perfected homestead, under the law, is property in the highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the effect of a grant of the right to present and exclusive possession of said land. A valid and subsisting perfected homestead, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statute, has the effect of a grant of the present and exclusive possession of the land. Even without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the Government. Such land may be conveyed or inherited." 18 The strength of the claim of private respondent Facun is thus quite obvious if deference be paid to previous authoritative pronouncements of this Court. That was all that the lower court did. 2. With such formidable, not to say insurmountable, obstacle confronting petitioner Roque, it is understandable why he would seize on what could be a legal loophole, however tenuous as an avenue of escape Unfortunately for him, he came out with the theory that can only be characterized as a constitutional heresy. It is his contention that respondent Assistant Executive Secretary, acting for the President, could not reverse a derision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The doctrine so clearly and emphatically announced by Justice Laurel in the aforecited Villena decision 19 is precisely the opposite. Thus: "After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and Promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." 20 Clearly then, there is nothing to prevent the President to disapprove or reprobate the act of a department head. That was what happened in this case. What was said in a 1970 decision, Tecson v. Salas, 21 concerning the broad executive authority is still good law; "the Villena ruling applies with undiminished force." 22 It cannot be otherwise, considering the plain and explicit command of the 1935 Constitution that the President has "control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, ...." 23 What is signifies was enunciated in categorical language by former Chief Justice Concepcion in Pelaez v. Auditor General: 24 "The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers." 25 This is not to dabble in generalities. Neither is it to rely merely on logical inferences to a constitutional concept of major dimension. There is quite a number of cases where precisely from a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, an appeal was taken to the Office of the President. 26 To argue as petitioner Roque did then is to indulge in a futile endeavor. 3. That is all there is then to his case, if it may be called that. There is, in addition, one other error assigned. It can also be disposed of quite easily. He would impress finality on the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversing the award made in respondent Facun's favor by the Director of Lands. No such error could possibly be imputed to the lower court as no such question was therein raised As noted in the opening paragraph of the appealed decision

herein cited, petitioner Roque objected to the order of the Director of Lands, asserting that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion, characterizing it as the result of an "unqualified reliance [on the] report and recommendation" of a certain public lands inspector. 27 Apparently, during the trial, he raised as one of the legal questions the finality of the order of a district land officer, which was reversed by the Director of Lands, who made the award in favor of respondent Facun: 'Petitioner's counsel maintains that the order of the District Land- Officer had already become final and executory, hence, the order of the Director of Lands reversing the order of the District Land Officer is in violation of Lands Administrative Order No. 6." 28 The lower court, after considering the matter, found against him: "All the exhibits of the petitioner do not show when Jose Facun and Ines Yarcia received copies of the said order. Hence, they do not show that the said order has become final." 29 How then could it be plausibly contended that the lower court was in error in not according finality to the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources when that was never an issue before it? There can be no relevance therefore to that portion of petitioner's brief making reference to the dates as to when such decision was all received by respondent Facun. Even if such were not the case, however, what he cited was Section 14 of Lands Administrative Order No. 6, which would allow the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to relieve the party or his legal representative from a decision, order, or other proceeding if there be a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default, or executive neglect, with the proviso that the application for that purpose should be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding one year. From his own computation, only two months elapsed from the date the appeal was taken to the Office of the President. He still had then a period of ten months within which to k a reconsideration of the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, when matters are seen in their true light, it becomes apparent why, as was made clear at the start, a reversal of the appealed decision cannot in law or in conscience be justified. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner Ireneo Roque.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1976/jul1976/gr_25373_1976.html

Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL) v Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority

Facts

Petition to suspend or hold in abeyance the conduct of SBMA of a rebidding. SBMA advertised an invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop and operate a modern marine container terminal within Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Out of 7 bidders, 3 were declared as qualified: 1) ICTSI 2) RPSI and 3) HPPL SBMA-PBAC first awarded to HPPL. However, ICTSI filed an appeal with SBMA and also before the Office of the President. In a memorandum, the President ordered SBMA Chairman Gordon to revaluate the financial bids together with the COA. Again, the SBMA Board issued another reso declaring that HPPL is selected as winner, since it has a realistic business plan offering the greatest financial return to SBMA and the most advantageous to the government. Nothwithstanding the SBMAs board recommendations, then Exec Sec Reuben Torres submitted a memorandum to the Office of President recommending another rebidding. Consequently, the Office of Pres. Issued a memorandum to conduct a rebidding. On July 7, 1997, HPPL filed a complaint against SBMA before the RTC and alleged that a binding and legally enforeceable contract had been established between HPPL and SBMA under Article 1305 of the civil code, considering that SBMA had repeatedly declared and confirmed that HPPL was the winning bidder. During the pre-trial hearing, one of the issues raised and submitted for reso was whether or not the Office of the President can set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of HPPL and if so, can the Office of the President direct the SBMA to conduct re-bidding of the proposed project.

Issue: Can the President set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of HPPL? If so, can the Office of the President direct SBMA to conduct rebidding of the proposed project?

Held:

Yes HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it a has a clear and unmistakable right to be declared the winning bidder. Though SBMA Board of Directors may have declared them as winner, said award is not final and unassailable. The SBMA Board of Directors are subject to the control and supervision of the President. All projects undertaken by SBMA require the approval of the President under Letters of Instruction No. 620 Letters of Instruction No. 620 mandates that the approval of the President is required in all contracts of the national government offices, agencies and instrumentalities including GOCCS involving P2M and above, awarded through public bidding or negotiation. The President may, within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable reasons. When the President issued the memorandum setting a side the award previously declared by SBMA in favor of HPPL, the same was within authority of the President and was a valid exercise of his prerogative. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/38289115/Hutchison-Ports-Philippines-Limited-v-SBMA