9/11/2001 TOMORROW

What have we done? What should we do;

What happened?
State of the security system on Specifically, how have we How should we reform the
9/11. Precisely what happened altered the security system system to maximize security?
& what went wrong? since 9/11?

MAKEUP AND
QUALITY OF THE
AVIATION
SECURITY SYSTEM

What were they?

Were they followed? Laws, Regulations, * How should laws, regs, policies
Were they deficient? Policies, Priorities (Goals and priorities be reformed to
& Intentions) maximize security?

* What were they? * How should systems, processes

* Hid they comply with law? System, Processes and and procedures be reformed tc
•Were they followed? Procedures (to implement best implement the law and
* How and why were they the laws, regs, policies and maximize security?
defeated? priorities) (Methods)

* WhaLwere the $'s?

* What were the processes and Budget and Financing Ho-v should we reform the
mechanisms of budgeting and Systems to implement budget and financing system for
financing of the aviation programs. (Ways & aviation security to maximize
security system? Means). security?
*.Were they deficient?

Executive and Congressional How should executive and

* What was the nature and quality Governance to establish the Congressional leadership,
of leadership, management & laws, regulations, policies and management and oversight be
oversight? priorities. (Administration) reformed to maximize security?
* Was it deficient?

Applying these facts, findings and standards to other modes of

transportation, what measures can and should we take to maximize
security across modes?
 TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY)

PROPOSED TIMELINE

Based on the currently planned May 22 public hearing on commercial aviation security,
we propose the following preliminary work schedule.

1. On May 1, 2003 brief the Commissioners on work plan, provide essential background
information and receive commissioner's guidance on the future direction of the inquiry,
including plans for the May 22 hearing. Hearing preparation (including securing of
location, invitation of witnesses and media plan) should commence immediately upon
Commission approval

2. By May 15, 2003 complete briefing book for May 22 hearing, including background
information on subject matter and witnesses, as well as key questions.

3. On May 22, 2003 staff public hearing on commercial aviation security with an emphasis
on Work Plan Key Questions #1, #2, #3 (What happened?) and #5 (What's changed &
Where do we go?).

4. Between June and November, 2003 perform the main phase of the research with a
preliminary 6-month deadline. Work will include examination of resource material,
interviews, consultations, and investigation with respect to the issues central to answering
the Work Plan Key Questions.

5. Between July and September, 2003 provide quarterly update to Commissioners on work
of the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry.

6. Between November 2003 and January 2004 provide quarterly update to Commissioners
on work of the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry. This would
include a proposed second round of public hearings on transportation security: two days
of hearings (presumably in Washington, DC) in late January 2004 focusing on Work Plan
Key Questions #5 and #6, and the application of risk management to transportation
security issues across modes.

7. By end of December, 2003 present a preliminary report to the Commissioners on

commercial Aviation and other transportation security.

8. In January 2004 staff public hearings on transportation security with an emphasis on

Work Plan Key Questions #5 and #6 (Policies; priorities; budget & financing across
modes 9-11, today and tomorrow?).

9. Between February and March, 2004 provide final quarterly update to Commissioners on
work of the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry.

10. Between February and May, 2004 carry out additional investigation as directed by the
Commission, and assist Commissioners in preparation of the Final Report.
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS

UPON THE UNITED STATES

TEAM #7 WORKPLAN

COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Team Members: SamBrmkley

William Johnstone
John Raidt

Item 1 Key Questions of the Investigation

Item 2 Suggested Readings and Briefings

Item 3 Document Requests

Item 4 Interview Candidates

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM #7
Item 1: Key Questions

1. Prior to September 11,2001, what did the U.S. aviation security system know
about terrorist threats to civil aviation? How did the different elements of the
system respond to any such information in their possession?

2. What aviation security policies and procedures were in effect as of September 11,
2001? How did these measures comply with relevant laws and regulations?
What was known of the effectiveness of this system, and how was this measured?

3. What tactics and weapons did the 9/11 hijackers use to defeat the aviation security
system and procedures in place on September 11,2001? What was the cause of
the security failure or failures on that date: flaws in the design of the procedures;
in the transmittal (including dissemination and training); in the implementation;
some combination; or some other factor or factors?

4. What were the major policy and budgetary priorities for civil aviation security
prior to 9/11/01? How was security prioritized among other aviation policy
considerations? What risk management techniques were used in making aviation
security determinations? How did the financing of the aviation security system
impact that system?

5. What has changed with respect to civil aviation security policies and procedures
since 9/11/01? What further improvements are needed (including consideration
of arming commercial aviation and other pilots; "trusted traveler" and "trusted
shipper" programs; CAPPS II and other individual profiling systems; background
checks on transportation employees; missile defense for civilian aircraft; and
regulation of flight schools)?

6. Considering all transportation modes, what risk management process (or

processes) is (or are) utilized by federal agencies in determining the priority of
security vulnerabilities and the allocation of resources? What are the current
transportation security budget and policy priorities, and how does this compare
with the results of the risk management process? What should be the priorities
across all transportation modes?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM #7
Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefings

Congressional Research Service, Terrorism Briefing Book Summary on "Aviation

Security" March 2003,7 pages.

General Accounting Office, testimony before Senate Committee on Commerce, Science

and Transportation, "Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long-
Term Challenges," July 25, 2002, 28 pages.

National Academy of Sciences, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism. June 2002. See especially, "Chapter 7:
Transportation Systems," (pp. 210-237).

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Hearing on "Weak Links: How Should the
Federal Government Manage Airline Passenger and Baggage Screening!" September
25, 2001, 165 pages. See especially prepared testimony of FAA (pp. 65-73); DOT
Inspector General (pp. 74-86); GAO (pp. 87-104); Robert Baker, American Airlines (pp.
105-108); Paul Busick (pp. 109-114); and Leonard Griggs, Director of Airports for St.
Louis (pp. 115-124).

Timeline for 9/11/01 hijackers prepared by Miles Kara. (For more details see
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/ which includes hyperlinks to relevant media
accounts).

Final Report of White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("Gore
Commission"), 1997. See especially "Chapter Three: Improving Security for Travelers"
and "Appendix I: Commissioner Cummock Dissent Letter." Also, DOT Status Report on
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("One Year Later"), February
1998, 11 pages.

BRIEFERS FOR COMMISSIONERS

Secretary Norman Mineta, DOT (public briefing)

Admiral James Loy, TSA (public briefing)
Kenneth Mead, DOT Inspector General (public briefing)
Ray Kelly, Customs Service and Gore Commission member (public or private briefing)
Gerald Dillingham, GAO Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues (public or private
briefing)
Robert Baker, American Airlines and Mineta Task Force member (public or private
briefing)
Carol Hallett, former President, ATA (public or private briefing)
Stephen Flynn, Project Director for Hart-Rudman n (2002) (public or private briefing)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM #7
Item 3: Document Requests

1. Airport and Air Carrier Security Plans for Dulles, Logan and Newark airports,
and representative sample of others, pre- and post- 9/11 (TSA, FAA, relevant
airport authorities and airlines)

2. "After action" reports on 9/11 hijackings and immediate agency response (FAA,
TSA, other DOT, DOD, White House)

3. Flight recorder transcripts for 9/11/01 hijacked flights (FAA, TSA, NTSB); Air
Traffic Services Cell (ATSC) reports on 9/11/01 communications between FAA
and DOD (FAA, TSA); Flight Controller records on tracking of and
communications with hijacked planes (FAA); transcripts and other records of
cockpit communications from hijacked planes (FAA, TSA); transcripts and other
records of 9/11/01 phone calls from Flight 11 attendants Ong and Sweeney
(American Airlines); transcripts and other records of any other 9/11/01 phone
calls or other communications from passengers or crew on hijacked planes (FAA,
TSA, American Airlines, United Airlines); videotapes and any other material
(including logs, records and incident reports) about hijackers from airport and
airline security systems (FAA, TSA, American Airlines, United Airlines, security
chiefs from Dulles, Logan and Newark Airports; 9/11/01 screening companies for
Dulles, Logan and Newark)

4. Relevant TSA, FAA and DOT civil aviation security rules and regulations, pre-
and post- 9/11 (DOT, TSA, FAA)

5. Civil aviation security procedural and training materials for passenger and
baggage screening, access to aircraft and secure areas of airports, and airplane
hijackings, 2001-present (FAA, TSA)

6. Modal administrations' circulars and other communications on terrorist threats,

1995-present (FAA, TSA, FT A, Coast Guard, etc.)

7. Executive Orders on transportation security, 1985-present (White House)

8. "Gore Commission" Final Report, and latest update (White House, DOT, TSA)

9. Administration requests and Congressional actions on aviation security program

budgets, 1995-present (OMB, CBO)

10. Threat and vulnerability assessments for airports (FAA, TSA), ports (Coast
Guard) and mass transit systems (Federal Transit Administration)

11. Evaluations and other reports on major proposed transportation security

initiatives, including CAPPS II, "trusted traveler," and "known shipper" proposals
(TSA, GAO)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM #7
Item 4: Interview Candidates

Kenneth Mead, DOT IG (federal response to transportation security threats pre- and
post-9/11)
Lt. Gen. Mike Canavan, former Assoc. Admin., Civil Aviation Security (lead-up and
aftermath of 9/11)
MGen. O.K. Steele, former Assoc. Admin, Civil Aviation Security (evolution of aviation
security system)
RAdm. Paul Busick, former Dir. Intell and Security for DOT (evolution of transportation
security system)
Adm. James Loy, TS A Administrator (same as for Mead)
Airline and Airport Security Officials for Dulles, Logan and Newark (9/11 events vs.
current system)
Flight Controllers who tracked hijacked 9/11/01 flights
FBI agents who interviewed 9/11 on-duty screeners and security personnel at Dulles,
Logan and Newark.
Representative of Air Traffic Services Cell (re 9/11/01 communications between FA A
andNORAD)
9/11 Victims/Family representatives
Key stakeholder representatives (airports, pilots, flight attendants, etc.)
Congressional staff for Appropriations, Senate Commerce and House Transportation
Committees
Stephen Flynn, Project Director for Hart-Rudman n (2002) (transportation security
priorities)
Steve Elson, former FAA "Red Team" member (agency shortcomings)
Bruce Butterworth, former Dir. of FAA Plans and Operations (agency risk management)
Lee Longmire, former Dir. of FAA Operations (agency security implementation process)
RAdm. Cathal "Irish" Flynn, former FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation
Security
Claudio Mano, Dir. of Intelligence for FAA Civil Aviation Security (same as for Mead)
Asa Hutchinson, DHS Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security (same as
for Mead)
Bob Stephan, DHS Undersecretary (Acting) (same as for Mead)
Secretary Norm Mineta, DOT (same as for Mead)
Gerald Dillingham, GAO (same as for Mead)
OMB Associate Director responsible for transportation security (transportation security
budgeting)
Jane Garvey, former head of FAA (aviation security system response to pre- and post-
9/1 1 threats)
Jim Hall, former NTSB and Gore Commission (work and implementation of Gore
Commission)
Bartholomew Elias, CRS Specialist on Aviation Security (current aviation security issues
and options)
Cathleen Berrick, GAO Dir. Homeland Security (current transportation security issues
and options)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Bogdan Dzakovic, FAA/TSA whistleblower (agency administrative shortcomings)

Lynne Osmus, former Dir. FAA Civil Aviation Security (evolution of transportation
security system)
Joe Lawless, MA Ports Authority and former head of security for Logan (airport
perspective)
Brian Jenkins, Kroll Associates (aviation security/terrorism expert)
John Hamre, former DOD and now head of CSIS (DOD preparation for 9/11-type
scenarios)
Mary Schiavo, former DOT IG and now attorney for 9/11 families (shortcomings in fed.
Security efforts)
John Fritelli, CRS Specialist on Maritime Security (current port security issues and
options)
Trixie Johnson, Research Dir. Mineta Transportation Institute (transit and rail security
issues)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 TEAM 7 WORK PLAN

9/11/2001 TODAY TOMORROW

What happened?
State of the security system on
9/11. Precisely what happened
& what went wrong?
What have we dome? What should we do?
Specifically, how have we How should we reform the
altered the security system system to mammi-re security?
since 9/11?

MAKE-UP AND
QUALITY OF THE
AVIATION
SECURITY SYSTEM

* What were they?

•Were they followed? Laws, Regulations, * How should laws, regs, policies
* Were they deficient? Policies, Priorities (Goab and priorities be reformed to
maximize security?

* What were they? * How should systems, processes

* Did they comply with law? System, Processes and and procedures be reformed to
* Were they followed? Procedures (to implement best implement the law and
* How and why were they the laws, regs, policies and maximize security?
defeated? priorities) (Methods)

•What were the $'s?

•What were the processes and Budget and Financing * How should we reform the
mechanisms of budgeting and Systems to implement budget and financing system for
financing of the aviation programs. (WayiS. aviation security to maximize
security system? Means). security?
* Were they deficient?

* How should executive and

• What was the nature and quality Governance to establish the Congressional leadership,
of leadership, management & laws, regulations, policies and management and oversight be
oversight? reformed to maximize security?
* Was it deficient?

Applying these facts, findings and standards to other modes of

transportation, what measures can and should we take to maximize
security across modes?
WORK PLAN QUESTIONS Page 1 of 4

TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY) WORK PLAN

PART ONE: KEY QUESTIONS

1 . Between June 22, 200 1 (date of a relevant FAA security circular) and September 1 1 , 200 1 , what
did the FAA know about: a) security threats to civil aviation; b) threats from al-Qaeda; and c)
information on the 9/1 1 hijackers? What did the airports and airlines know from the FAA, and
other sources, about these subjects? How did the FAA, airports and airlines respond to the
information in their possession?

2. What civil aviation security procedures were in effect in the period between the enrollment of the
9/1 1 hijackers in flight schools and me grounding of civil aviation on September 11, 2001 at
Dulles, Logan and Newark airports; American and United airlines; and flights AA 1 1, AA 77, UA
93 and UA 175? What relevant policies and procedures were in effect within the Department of
Defense during the same period? Did all of the above policies and procedures comply with
relevant aviation security laws and regulations?

3 . What tactics and weapons did the 9/1 1 hijackers use to defeat the aviation security system and
procedures in place on September 1 1, 2001? What was the cause of the security failure or failures
on that date: flaws in the design of the procedures; in the transmittal (including dissemination and
training); in the implementation; some combination; or some other factor or factors?

How was the civil aviation security system in place on 9/1 1/01 financed, and how did that impact
the governance, design, efficacy and operation of the system? What has changed since then with
respect to system financing and governance and what have been the results? What further
changes, if any, should be considered?

With respect to budgets and policy focus, what were the major priorities for civil aviation security
prior to 9/1 1/01 : of the Congress; of the Executive Branch; of tile airports; and of the airlines?
How was security prioritized among other aviation policy considerations? What about since
9/1 1/01? Are these the right priorities?

6. What has changed with respect to civil aviation security procedures since September 11, 2001?
What further improvements are needed?

/ 7. Looking at the entire field of aviation security, how does the security of civil aviation compare to
General Aviation and Air Cargo? How do you measure this, and how should it be measured? Is
the current budget and policy focus for all aviation security the optimal one? If not, how should
\__ these priorities be reordered?

8. With respect to transportation modes other than civil aviation, how was the security system in
place on 9/1 1/01 financed, and how did that impact the governance, design, efficacy and operation
of the system? What has changed since then with respect to system financing and governance and
what have been the results? What further changes, if any, should be considered?

9. Considering all transportation modes, what are our greatest security vulnerabilities in priority
order? Is the current budget and policy focus for security measures among the various modes the
optimal one? If not, how should transportation security priorities be re-ordered?

10. What are the status, costs and benefits of various transportation security measures that are being
implemented or considered, including: arming commercial aviation and other pilots; "trusted
traveler" and "trusted shipper" programs for various transportation modes; CAPPS n and other
\l profiling systems; transportation security research and development; background

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmaiyimp/view.php?mismailbox=INBOX&index=:45&id=.. . 4/1 8/2003

WORK PLAN QUESTIONS Page 2 of 4

checks on transportation employees; remote inspection of cargo; and missile defense for civilian
aircraft?

PART TWO: BRIEFING PLAN

COMMISSIONERS READING LIST

9/11/01 Airport and Air Carrier Security Plans for Dulles International, Boston Logan and Newark
International airports (to be obtained).

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, 2002. See especially Bojinka
conspiracy (pp. 20-26); Clinton Administration response on aviation security (pp. 247-250); FBI
awareness of threats to aviation (pp. 298-299).

Congressional Research Service, Selected Aviation Security Legislation in the Aftermath of the
September 11 Attack,"November 11, 2001,29 pages. See especially Table 1: Side-by-side Comparison
of Selected Provisions from Aviation Security Legislation" (pp. 10-29).

Congressional Research Service, Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress,
February 5, 2003, 27 pages.

Congressional Research Service, Terrorism Briefing Book Summary on "Aviation Security" March
2003, 7 pages.

General Accounting Office, testimony before Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, "Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and Lang-Term
Challenges,"My 25, 2002, 28 pages.

General Accounting Office, Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System,
December 2002. (on order).

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Hearing on " Weak Links: How Should the Federal
Government Manage Airttne Passenger and Baggage Screening?" September 25,2001,165 pages.
See especially prepared testimony of FAA (pp. 65-73); DOT Inspector General (pp. 74-86); GAO (pp.
87-104); Robert Baker, American Airlines (pp. 105-108); Paul Busick (pp. 109-114); and Leonard
Griggs, Director of Airports for St. Louis (pp. 115-124).

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Hearing on "Riding the Rails: How Secure Is Our
Passenger and Transit Infrastructure?" December 13,2001,136 pages. See especially prepared
testimony of Federal Transit Administration (pp. 52-59); Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (pp. 60-74); and Amtrak (pp. 81-85).

Final Report of White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("Gore Commission"),
1997. Chapter Three: Improving Security for Travelers. Also, DOT Status Report on White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("One Year Later"), February 1998,11 pages.

Timelines for 9/11 Flights at http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/

BRIEFERS FOR COMMISSIONERS

Secretary Norman Mineta, DOT (public briefing)

Admiral James Loy, TSA (public briefing)

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/view.php?tlusmailbox=INBOX&index:::^5&id=... 4/18/2003
WORK PLAN QUESTIONS Page 3 of4

Kenneth Mead, DOT Inspector General (public briefing)

Ray Kelly, Customs Service and Gore Commission member (public or private briefing)

Gerald Dillingham, GAO Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues (public or private briefing)

Robert Baker, American Airlines and Mineta Task Force member (public or private briefing)

Carol Hallett, former President, ATA (public or private briefing)

Stephen Flynn, Coast Guard and Council on Foreign Relations fellow (public or private briefing)

PART THREE: KEY AGENCY DOCUMENT CATEGORIES

1. Airport and Air Carrier Security Plans for Dulles, Logan and Newark airports, and representative
sample of others, pre- and post- 9/11 (TSA, FAA)

2. Relevant TSA, FAA and DOT rules and regulations, pre- and post- 9/11 (DOT, TSA, FAA)

3. Agency reports, intenrtal menios and other materials on 9/11 hijackings and immediate agency
response (FAA, TSA, other DOT, DOD, White House)

4. Transportation security agencies' procedural and training materials, 1995-present (DOT, DHS and
relevant components thereof)

5. Transportation security budget information, 1995-present (OMB, DOT, DHS, CBO)

6. Flight recorder transcripts for 9/11 hijacked flights (FAA, TSA, NTSB)

7. Modal administrations' circulars and other communications on terrorist threats, 1995-present

(FAA, TSA, FTA, Coast Guard, etc.)

ri^l985^pfesent (White!

3rt(CoH^ressiona1>IiitellJKence Conir

10. "Gore Commission" Final Report, and latest update (DOT, TSA)

11. Relevant GAO Reports and Testimony (GAO)

12. Relevant DOT IG Reports and Testimony (DOT IG)

13. Relevant CRS Reports and other documents (CRS)

14. Relevant Public Laws, with legislative history (CRS)

15. Relevant hearings by Senate Committees on Commerce and Governmental Affairs, and House
Committee on Transportation j

16. Relevant judicial records (including U.S. v. Ratnzi Ahmed Yousef, et at) (CRS)

PART FOUR: PROPOSED STAFF INTERVIEWS

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WORK PLAN QUESTIONS Page 4 of 4

Secretary Norm Mineta, DOT (federal response to transportation security threats pre- and post- 9/11)

Adm. James Loy, TSA Administrator (same as for Mineta)

Kenneth Mead, DOT IG (same as for Mineta)

Gerald Dillingham, GAO (same as for Mineta)

OMB Associate Director responsible for transportation security (transportation security budgeting)

Jane Garvey, former head of FAA (aviation security system response to pre- and post- 9/11 threats)

Mike Canavan, former Assoc. Admin., Civil Aviation Security (immediate lead-up and aftermath of
9/11)

O.K. Steele, former Assoc. Admin., Civil Aviation Security (evolution of aviation security system)

RAdm. Paul Busick, former Dir. Intell and Security for DOT (evolution of transportation security
system)

Jim Hall, former NTSB and Gore Commission (work and implementation of Gore Commission)

Congressional staff for Appropriations, Senate Commerce and House Transportation Committees

Bartholomew Elias, CRS Specialist on Aviation Security (current aviation security issues and options)

John Fritelli, CRS Specialist on Maritime Security (current port security issues and options)

Cathleen Berrick, GAO Dir. Homeland Security (current transportation security issues and options)

Trixie Johnson, Research Dir. Mineta Transportation Institute (transit and rail security issues)

Airline and Airport Security Officials for Dulles, Logan and Newark (9/11 events vs. current system)

Bogdan Dzakovic, FAA/TSA whistieblower (agency administrative shortcomings)

Lynn Osmus, former Dir. FAA Civil Aviation Security (evolution of transportation security system)

Joe Lawless, MA Ports Authority and former head of security for Logan (airport perspective)

Brian Jenkins, Kroll Associates (aviation security/terrorism expert)

John Hamre, former DOD and now head of CSIS (DOD preparation for 9/11-type scenarios)

Mary Schiavo, former DOT IG and now attorney for 9/11 families (shortcomings in fed. Security
efforts)

9/11 Victims/Family representatives

Key stakeholder representatives (airports, pilots, flight attendants, shippers, etc.)

htrp://ldnesis.swishmail.cx)m/webmail/imp/view.php?tUsmailbox=INBOX&index==45&id=... 4/18/2003
TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY) Page 1 of 2

TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY)

PROPOSED TIMELINE

APRIL 22, 2003

Based on the currently planned May 22 public hearing on commercial aviation security, we propose the
following preliminary schedule.

1. By April 28, 2003 provide a brief, written overview of the proposed May 22 hearing, including
major themes and questions, and proposed witnesses.

2. On May 1, 2003 be prepared to brief the Commissioners on the preceding overview. This would
provide essential information to the Commissioners as expeditiously as possible, and afford an
early opportunity for the Commissioners to offer guidance on the future direction of this inquiry,
including plans for the May 22 hearing. Hearing preparation (including securing of location,
invitation of witnesses and media plan) should commence immediately upon Commission
approval

3. By May IS, 2003 complete briefing book for May 22 hearing, including background information
on subject matter and witnesses, as well as key questions.

4. On May 22, 2003 staff public hearing on commercial aviation security.

5. Between June and November, 2003 perform the main phase of the research, with a preliminary 6-
month deadline. The proposed order of work is as follows:

a. Commercial Aviation Security

b. Cargo and General Aviation Security

c. Port Security

d. Rail Security

e. Highway Security

f. Other Transportation/Relevant Infrastructure Security

g. Summary of Findings

h. Recommendations

6. Between July and September, 2003 provide quarterly update to Commissioners on work of the
Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry.

7. Between November 2003 and January 2004 provide quarterly update to Commissioners on work
of the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry. This would include a proposed
second round of public hearings on transportation security: two days of hearings (presumably in
Washington, DC) in late January 2004 covering all transportation modes other than commercial
aviation (day one) and transportation security priorities and policy alternatives (day two).

ifl— 4/22/2003
TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY) Page 2 of 2

8. By end of December, 2003 present a preliminary report to the Commissioners on Commercial

Aviation and Other Transportation Security.

9. In January 2004 staff public hearings on transportation security.

10. Between February and March, 2004 provide final quarterly update to Commissioners on work of
the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry.

11. Between February and May, 2004 carry out additional investigation as directed by the
Commission, and assist Commissioners in preparation of the Final Report.

x=S2#.id=... 4/22/2003
TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY) Page 1 of 1

TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY)

RESEARCH NEEDS

APRIL 22, 2003

In order to meet the proposed timeline, Team 7 members make the following requests (hi descending
order of priority):

• Authorization for contacts with DHS/TSA and DOT/FAA. In terms of the investigative part of
our effort, access to individuals and documents hi these two clusters is absolutely essential. The
May 22 hearing date makes this an urgent priority for us.

• Access to all relevant information currently in possession of the Commission. We are aware of
the necessary limitations on our access until we have received security clearances and/or officially
joined the staff, but it would be helpful if we could, at an early date, get copies of any non-
classified information on transportation security received by the Commission to date.

• Authorization for contacts with 9/11 families. We are aware of plans for a staff liaison to handle
such contacts but, again with the approach of the May 22 hearing, which will certainly be of great
interest to this constituency, we ask for authorization to initiate such contacts as soon as possible.

• Interns or volunteers to assist with clerical work. As soon as we all are settled in our new
workspace, we will have an immediate (and probably ongoing) need for some form of clerical
assistance. A large initial task will simply be to make multiple copies of the large number of
materials we have acquired individually (to share with each other, staff leadership and
Commissioners). Being aware of the budgetary constraints facing the Commission and the
uncertainties of what support we can anticipate from GSA, if we are authorized to do so, we
believe we can identify a small group of interns or volunteers to assist us.