Naval Postgraduate School A Short Memoir.

Experiences from the NATO Humanitarian Mission for the 2010 Pakistan Floods DA4105 Special Topic: Airpower and Irregular Warfare Col Brian Greenshields 15 December 2011 by Michael Evans

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The 2010 Pakistan Floods In undertaking a short memoir, I fear perceptions of self-glorification. Field-Marshal Montgomery began his memoir with similar sentiments and like him I write this short history because of many suggestions that such a book of memoirs is needed.1 For almost thirteen years now, I have served my country through the U.S. Air Force. My career as a logistics officer has taken me to places around the world from South Korea to Europe and many locations in the Middle East. During the summer of 2010, I found myself at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joint force headquarters in the Netherlands working an air bridge operation to support coalition forces in Afghanistan. That same summer an incredibly strong monsoon season devastated Pakistan leaving the country flooded well into December. Not more than a moment after reading the first news reports on the floods, I received a phone call from our Allied headquarters in Mons, Belgium. That phone call began a venture that would throw me into a swirling mix of international humanitarian aid operations in Pakistan and lead me to consider the importance of personal leadership. My trip to Pakistan began when heavy monsoon rains started in northwestern Pakistan on 22 July 2010. Following continued rainfall, Pakistans rivers breached their banks and floods gradually moved from north to south along the Indus River. As late as 16 September, fresh flooding and subsequent displacements of people were still affecting southern Pakistan. By the time of my departure from Pakistan on 22 November, large tracks of land in the Sindh Province still remained under standing water. An estimated 20.2 million persons were affected, with an estimated 14 million receiving immediate humanitarian aid. The floods ravaged 50,000 square kilometers of land, an area larger than The Netherlands. Floods caused widespread damage to
1. Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshall the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1958), 15.

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public infrastructure, with roads submerged and hundreds of bridges swept away. Many schools (nearly 10,000) and hospitals were severely damaged. 1,032 temporary learning centers for 76,817 students operated in the many displacement peoples camps. At least 5.4 million acres of standing crops had been lost. An estimated 1.2 million livestock and 6 million poultry were lost, and more would die without proper feed and veterinary support. More than 533,000 people received winter wheat seeds and fertilizer to replace lost crops and prepare for the onset of winter.2 Even after witnessing the floods, the level of devastation is still not comprehendible. My first involvement with NATO support to Pakistan began with an early August phone call from NATOs Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC) located at the Allied headquarters in Mons, Belgium. A long time British colleague, Wing Commander Matt Carlton, called to discuss options for an air and sea bridge to Pakistan. The AMCC staff generally had good intelligence on upcoming operations, Pakistan being no different. They were well aware that senior political leadership at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels had offered to assist Pakistan in response to the Government of Pakistans 7 August communiqu for help. NATOs political leadership came from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) where the NATO member nations ambassadors sat. Through the NAC, NATOs level of ambition was set to be modest, providing support to Pakistan through a strategic resupply effort from Europe. Logistics operations were fairly straightforward. I already managed wide-ranging commercial strategic lift contracts and NATO maintained a standing military aerial port of embarkation in Germany. Our commercial contracts would provide for necessary logistics at international ports. Military operated lift requirements at Benazir Bhutto International Airport, Islamabad, were minimal as the airport maintained equipment and personnel for any aircraft
2. Michael Evans, After Action Report on NATO Operations, 2010 Pakistan Flood Relief (report presented to NATO HQ, November 24, 2010), 1.

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services required. The same applied for the seaport at Karachi. With my assessments and a quick primer on commercial charter timelines, Matt developed a logistic concept of operations that would become his portion of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Operation Plan (OPLAN) 10307. The AMCC, lead by Matt, would coordinate movement from Europe and facilitate offload and delivery of humanitarian aid through a forward logistic control element, lead by myself, based in Islamabad. To allow coordination between NATO and the Government of Pakistan, the NAC activated the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). The EADRCCs primary role is to coordinate NATO member nations assistance to one another in cases of disaster.3 The EADRCC worked closely with Pakistans National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) to identify and validate humanitarian aid requirements. The EADRCC employed a similar operational concept as the AMCC. An EADRCC duty officer remained in Brussels to coordinate incoming donations and pass validated lift requirements to the AMCC while a forward EADRCC official represented NATO politically, validated humanitarian aid requirements, and generally coordinated with the Chairman of the NDMA, Retired Pakistan Army Lieutenant General Nadeem Ahmed. From these initial plans, planners at our NATO Joint Force Headquarters grew a massive set of operation plans and status of forces agreements well out of proportion to the requirements of the humanitarian aid mission and level of ambition set by the NAC. Many of the planning problems stemmed from previous NATO experience during the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake mission. Senior planners envisioned a brigade level deployment when instead this

3. Carsten Fausboll, NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP), Slide 22, Accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.difesa.it/SMD/CASD/Istituti_militari/CeMISS/Pubblicazioni/OSN/Documents/04_NATOCivilEmergen cyPlanning1.pdf.

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mission called for a small element forward to coordinate NATO humanitarian aid operations. The lack of NATO presence in Pakistan, especially logistics expertise, limited the ability to provide an updated assessment of the situation. Our command staff continued to envision a grand operation and a strong showing of the NATO flag that did not match the intent of the NAC. SACEURs staff quickly refocused our planners and on 16 August NATO deployed a civilmilitary assessment team to Islamabad. A level of discord, between the SACEUR planners and our joint forces staff would remain throughout the NATO mission to Pakistan. Despite these problems, the NAC would approve the final version of SACEUR OPLAN 10307 on 20 October and initiate the first humanitarian flight on 22 August.4 I arrived in Pakistan, on our first flight of 22 August, at an international airport and to my highest objections I did so in uniform, body armor and toting weapons. Painful remnant of my joint force leaderships planning. The weapons were confiscated and through help from the Danish Ambassador to Pakistan, the weapons and body armor would be returned to Europe on the next NATO mission. Our joint staff required the wear of uniforms to show the NATO flag. While a noble idea, the two NATO logisticians on the team were US Air Force officers and US Air Force regulations do not allow unit insignia on the uniform. The only other team military member was a Danish Naval Captain. The US Embassy Region Security Officer, our Pakistan Army liaison officer, and the humanitarian aid community would eventually prevail on our joint forces leadership, all military uniforms remained in hotel rooms for the remainder of the time in Pakistan. This small piece missed by our planners and our inexperience with the humanitarian aid community would open my eyes to an aspect of relief operations I would never have imagined.
4. Manfred Lange, OPLAN 10307 Situation Update on NATO Support to Flood Relief Efforts in Pakistan (report to the Director General of the NATO International Military Staff, November 21, 2010).

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The presence of military personnel during humanitarian relief work would exasperate existing tensions over the role of the military in humanitarian operations. Strangely enough this tension had been renewed during the world response to Pakistans 2005 Earthquake. The 2005 relief efforts generated large use of national militaries of which NATO deployed a brigade sized aid force. In response to the increasing use of military assets, the 1994 Oslo Guidelines were updated and republished in 2006. The guidelines reaffirmed that military and civil defense forces should be a last resort to fill gaps existing in the humanitarian aid communitys relief efforts.5 During the 2010 floods this concern also included the welfare of aid workers. They feared militant forces would target volunteers and local people for using military assets or accepting relief supplies from the military, Pakistani or otherwise. With this background NATO came to assist in the Pakistan floods with only strategic resources that did not meet the intent of the Oslo Guidelines, of which NATO is a signatory. No coordination had taken place with our NATO representative to the United Nations (UN) to prepare the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) for our operation. UNOCHA provides lead coordination for UN and member nation operations during humanitarian missions. Our arrival came as a surprise to the UN and they saw our operation as unnecessary. During the very first meetings of humanitarian aid groups, Senior UN representatives flatly refused to use NATO assets. Numerous discussions took place between our NATO political representative and the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ms. Valerie Amos. The discussion reached the highest levels of political leadership resulting in an exchange of letters between the UN Secretary General, BAN

5. The Oslo Guidelines, Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief, Revision 1.1 November 2007, 4. Accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 47da87822.html.

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Ki-moon and the NATO Secretary General, Andres Fogh Rasmussen. The letters provided a public acknowledgment by the UN that NATO was in Pakistan by request and then provided a gentle reminder to NATO that the Oslo Guidelines still applied.6 The NDMA Chairman, Lt Gen Nadeem apologized to our team and made every effort to have aid agencies utilize our assets. Even with the Government of Pakistans support, our efforts had been undermined. After our first NATO mission on 22 August, we only accomplished 23 additional flights delivering 1,024.27 metric tons of relief supplies. Between 21 October and 20 November no additional NATO mission took place. At mission end on 22 November, I would give back unused the donation of three cargo container ships, one US C-17, and six NATO military B707 cargo flights. Additionally, 220,511.00 in German MoD donations for strategic lift would be returned while humanitarian aid supplies sat awaiting transportation. Our last NATO political leader in Pakistan was a retired Canadian Army Special Forces officer and Naval Postgraduate School Defense Analysis alumni, Tim Lannan. My assignment to Monterey provided for an instant friendship and easy working relationship. Before Tim took the lead, our team had seen four different senior leaders rotate through his position. Tims leadership and continuity provided opportunities for me to attend senior level meetings within the Government of Pakistan. Those meetings revealed a struggle between the Government of Pakistan and the UN over management of the relief effort. The UNs undermining of the NATO mission was one aspect of a larger problem that pitted the UN against the NDMA and the authority of Pakistan. The NDMA and its provincial counter parts had matured greatly since the last UNOCHA operation in Pakistan; however, the UN and UNOCHA approached the 2010 flood relief operation as if a sovereign Pakistan did not exist. Because of our common issues
6. Evans, After Action Report, Attachment 1.

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with the UN, Lt Gen Nadeem and his staff shared very frank conversations about the UN with Tim and I. This relationship would assist me on numerous occasions when I need help negotiating the various parts of Pakistans Government. After experiencing first hand the UN leadership in action, I will be hard pressed to ever see the UN in the same light again. Lt Gen Nadeem would later publish his concerns with the UN in a lessons learned report.7 As I watched these events transpire, I could only shake my head because a whole other world of professional logisticians were daily executing a mission to meet the needs of Pakistan and the people who were suffering. Despite setbacks, a small group of professional aid workers, foreign military members, and Pakistani officials would assemble at Chaklala Air Force Base, adjacent to Benazir Bhutto International Airport, Islamabad. Until Pakistans road system began to recover in mid-November, the Chaklala would provide the major lifeline to millions of people affected by the floods. This group would form the Joint Aviation Coordination Cell (JACC) led by Pakistans Army Aviation Command Commander, Major General Raja Muhammad Arif Nazir. The longstanding relationship between Lt Col Elliot Evans from the US Office of Defense Representative to Pakistan and Lt Gen Nadeem, would prove instrumental in standing up the JACC under Pakistani leadership. Pakistan leadership would be key to legitimizing the aid effort and provided international airmen with a single leader to direct air operations. While politicians discussed aid efforts and took stands on principle, the JACC organized and acted for the benefit of Pakistan. The JACC provided a central hub for all airlift activities. International flights were tracked to prevent overloading airfield operations and port capacity. The body provided direct
7. Nadeem Ahmed, Pakistan 2010 Flood Relief: Learning from Experience Observations and Opportunities April 12, 2011, Accessed December 15, 2011, http://www.ndma.gov.pk/ Documents/flood_2010/lesson_learned/Pakistan%202010%20Flood%20Relief-Learning%20from%20 Experience.pdf, 3.

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access to Pakistans government when customs or air traffic control issues interfered with relief efforts. NDMA representatives provided Pakistans priority of effort. The UNs World Food Program (WFP) lead, John Clements, organized the UN logistic effort providing a consolidated daily movement requirement. The WFP and NDMA provided requirements and the civil and military representative of the JACC provided the aviation assets to move the cargo. The UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) head, Michael Whiting, brought years of airlift experience to the JACC and helped focus the groups efforts into accomplishing a daily air tasking order (ATO) for the operators. Aircraft services at Chaklala played a vital role in keeping the air operations running. A menagerie of organization came together to execute reception, staging and onward movement operations. The JACC provided a source of information on inbound international flights and provided a daily ATO for preparation of aircraft and helicopter loads. With a published ATO, NGOs and the Pakistan Army could call forward relief cargo only when they had chalked flights. This allowed relief agencies to create a minimal storage footprint airside and freed ramp space to bring in additional aircraft. Cargo movement operations centered on a team thrown together from the NDMA, the international airport staff, DHL, the US Air Force Contingency Response Element (CRE), and the Pakistan Air Force. Their efforts organized mountains of incoming relief supplies and in coordination with the Pakistan Army, the WFP and organizations like the US Agency for International Development (USAID) continually moved supplies through Chakala to the people in need. While the JACC grew and operations at Chaklala coalesced, my partner, US Air Force Captain Hank Moon, and I continued to manage NATOs forward logistic element. Hank was a logistics officer working for the NATO Air Wing in Germany. The NAC had authorized his air

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wing to fly fifteen B707 flights in support of the flood relief efforts. He provided a vital link into the NATO Air Wing and brought instant reassurance to NATO aircrew members flying into Chaklala. The NATO effort was extremely small when compared to the massive efforts of USAID or the WFP. Understanding our role in the greater scheme and the tensions NATO brought to the aid community, we maintained a low profile far away from the politics. As a team we spent a great deal of time at Chaklala building personal relationships with the international airport staff and ensuring are host nation partners were ready to receive our relief supplies. Because of our low profile and those personal relationships our flight operations were extremely successful. Our operation had two distinct advantages, we were patient and we paid in cash. We invested many hours in drinking tea with the owner of the aircraft services company, retired Pakistan Air Force Colonel Malik. Col Malik had recently been the commander of Chaklala Air Base. He became a good friend and assisted us at every turn. We likewise assisted him in little things like securing European gifts for his daughter and new grandson. We followed his office procedures and always kept him informed of our flight details, as JACC information flow to civil companies could be inconsistent. We arrived early before flights to have tea and talk, and we stayed well after operations to take a meal with the Colonel and his workers, also recently retired Pakistan Air Force members. While we may have taken the time to honor local traditions and assisted Col Malik, we also promptly paid for his services in cash. I do not claim to be a cultural expert but I have spent enough time in the Middle East to understand the impact small things can have on business relationships. I really did not give great thought effort to what Hank and I did at Chaklala until a young US State Department official interrupted a tea we were having with Col Malik. The young diplomat had arrived late to the

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airfield and was expecting a very important aircraft. He was not rude but was rather demanding of the airport staff. Col Malik assured him that everything would be taken care of and continued taking his tea with us. Our NATO B707 arrived shortly after the diplomats C-17. Col Maliks crew marshaled our aircraft first, took care of our crew, cargo and fueling as we watched the US C-17 crew and diplomat struggle to get Col Maliks attention. Again and again scenarios like this played out as our NATO missions received preferential treatment from Col Maliks company. As a twenty-seven year old second lieutenant, I did not give much thought to the numerous leadership books, touted by my first three services schools to make me a better officer. That said Major General Newmans writings on leadership came back to me while I was sitting at a hotel in downtown Islamabad. His stories emphasize the human element in leadership and the importance of gaining every bit of life experience that you can through observing and studying the past. Only with this understanding, based on innumerable small things, can we meet unexpected command and leadership situations (large and small) with confidence and good judgment.8 As much as I hate to admit the wisdom of my father, he instilled in me many of the traits Maj Gen Newman portrays though his leadership stories. My father convinced me to complete my education before going into the service. He had wisdom to see that life experience and age would only make me better. My training as a historian and anthropologist only add further fuel to Maj Gen Newmans statement. When presented with a mission like Pakistan, I am grateful that I was able to complete my tasks despite the hurdles placed in front of the NATO team. In having the opportunity assist with the NATO mission to Pakistan, I had a freedom of movement and operation not normally accorded to me in US Air Force logistic organizations.
8. Aubrey Newman, Follow Me I: The human Element in Leadership (Novato: Presidio Press, 1997), 5.

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Being able to operate as I did just reaffirmed the importance of personal relationships in the accomplishment of any mission. My relationship with Col Malik was not unique. I shared a great deal of time with the Defense Attach Corps of Islamabad. The attach officers especially those from the US and Germany provided key support to NATO. NATO does not have an embassy and we did not enjoy the benefits of a diplomatic corps. The Islamabad Attach Corps would provide us assistance at every turn even through they did not have to support NATO. I was not required to help the German Embassy, but when their Oktoberfest shipment of beer and sausages had not arrived, the Embassys attach officer, Klaus asked for our help. I arranged for an emergency shipment on the next NATO flight from Germany. This gesture cost me nothing and displaced no humanitarian cargo. Klaus would pay me back ten fold when our first team leader was dramatically injured after falling through a plate glass window. The German Embassy assisted us in securing medical transport and hospital support that would save my colleagues life. These personal relationships grew from taking time to have a drink and socialize with colleagues. While professional courtesy is generally applied in operations, the level of effort is often determined by the personal relationship among colleagues. As a logistician, especially within airlift operations, I have certain skills and perceived extra benefits that allow me to help people. But this is a double-edged blade. Everyone loves the transportation officer who secures him or her that important flight but in that same turn when that flight is canceled the logistician is scorned. The key is to balance your abilities and resources while not abusing your power over airlift, always remembering your purpose as a logistician, to support the mission. In the case of the NATO mission, our role was to support the Government of Pakistan and the efforts of the NDMA for the people. When our airlift mission was derailed, I began working at the NDMA. I assisted Lt Col Ali from the Pakistan Army with distribution of

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excess relief supplies. Much of the need did not stem from lack of goods but rather from knowing where the aid needed to go. Simple conversations with relief workers at the Marriot Hotel bar allowed me to connect Lt Col Ali with agencies in need. Instead of allowing food and water items to remain sitting in storage warehouses, Lt Col Ali was able to transfer excess supplies to agencies that could meet the needs of the people. My time in Pakistan confirmed long-standing thoughts on leadership. Good leadership comes from personal humility, expertise in your profession, and the ability to build personal relationships. Personal humility follows that you do not know everything and must be ready to admit this about yourself. This is why Maj Gen Newman emphasized the importance of continued learning from history and the observation of leaders both good and bad to make us better leaders. Humility also requires understanding your place in the overall mission, and then executing that task without aggrandizing your importance. I believe expertise goes without saying. Professional expertise in your career field builds respects and credibility that can never be gained through fakery or bluffing. But the most important aspect of leadership is the ability to build personal relationships. Time and again I have seen how small gestures and taking time to talk to people can open doors. I am not talking about self-serving gestures, these are easily seen through, but true friendship and offers of assistance with out expectation of a return. A good leader embraces these three ideas and becomes greater for it.

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Bibliography Evans, Michael. After Action Report on NATO Operations, 2010 Pakistan Flood Relief. Report presented to NATO Joint Force Command Brunssum, November 24, 2010. Fausboll, Carsten. NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). Accessed December 15, 2011. http://www.difesa.it/SMD/CASD/Istituti_militari/CeMISS/Pubblicazioni/OSN/Document s/04_NATOCivilEmergencyPlanning1.pdf. Lange, Manfred. OPLAN 10307 Situation Update on NATO Support to Flood Relief Efforts in Pakistan. Report to the Director General of the NATO International Military Staff, November 21, 2010. Montgomery, Bernard Law. The Memoirs of Field-Marshall the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1958. Nadeem Ahmed. Pakistan 2010 Flood Relief: Learning from Experience Observations and Opportunities. April 12, 2011. Accessed December 15, 2011. http://www.ndma.gov.pk/ Documents/flood_2010/lesson_learned/Pakistan%202010%20Flood%20ReliefLearning%20from%20 Experience.pdf. Newman, Aubrey. Follow Me I: The human Element in Leadership. Novato: Presidio Press, 1997. The Oslo Guidelines, Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief. Revision 1.1, November 2007. Accessed December 15, 2011. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 47da87822.html.