Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
05.05.B
Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers (C5) PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels (C5)
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SOMMAIRE
INTRODUCTION I - OBJECTIFS DE MATRISE DES INCENDIES ET DES FUMES
I.1 Introduction I.2 Travaux antrieurs de l'AIPCR I.3 Directives existantes I.4 Contexte et principes physiques I.4.1 Les diffrents types de risques I.4.2 Rayonnement I.4.3 Temprature, chaleur convecte I.4.4 Visibilit I.4.5 Toxicit I.4.6 Dure de fuite I.5 Recommandations I.6 Besoins en recherches
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ISBN 2-84060-064-1
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION I OBJECTIVES OF FIRE AND SMOKE CONTROL
I.1 Introduction I.2 Previous work by PIARC I.3 Existing guidelines I.4 Physical background and principles I.4.1 Different kinds of threat I.4.2 Radiation I.4.3 Temperature, convected heat I.4.4 Visibility I.4.5 Toxicity I.4.6 Escape time I.5 Recommendations I.6 Needs for research
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IV - STUDY METHODS
IV.1 Introduction IV.2 Previous work by PIARC IV.3 Full scale tests IV.3.1 Large research programmes IV.3.2 Tests in tunnels before or under operation IV.4 Small scale experiments IV.4.1 Objectives IV.4.2 The similarity theory IV.4.3 Techniques and examples IV.4.4 Limitations IV.4.5 Conclusions and recommendations IV.5 Computer simulations IV.5.1 General IV.5.2 Existing guidelines and experience IV.5.3 Background IV.5.4 Recommendations IV.5.6 Conclusions IV.6 Needs for further research work IV.7 Conclusion
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IX - REFERENCES
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IX - REFERENCES
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Ce rapport a t prpar sous les auspices et avec l'accord du Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers, par son groupe de travail n 6 "Incendie et dsenfumage". Ce groupe de travail comprend les membres suivants : Animateur Secrtaire Membres Didier LACROIX (France) Staffan BENGTSON (Sude) Finn H. AMUNDSEN (Norvge) Roberto ARDITI (Italie) Arthur G. BENDELIUS (tats-Unis) Eric CASALE (France) Anthony S CASERTA (tats-Unis) Patrick CHASSE (France) Alfred HAACK (Allemagne) Alex HAERTER (Suisse) Rudolf HRHAN (Autriche) Hideto MASHIMO (Japon) Karl PUCHER (Autriche) Norman RHODES (Royaume-Uni) Luuk SWART (Pays-Bas)
(rapporteur du chapitre I) (rapporteur du chapitre VI) (rapporteur du chapitre V) (rapporteur des chapitres VI et VII) (rapporteur du chapitre IV) (rapporteur du chapitre IV) (rapporteur du chapitre II) (rapporteur du chapitre V) (rapporteur du chapitre III) (rapporteur du chapitre III) (rapporteur du chapitre VIII) (rapporteur des chapitres VI et VII)
Durant l'tape de finalisation de ce rapport, le secrtariat a t assur par Norman Rhodes (Royaume-Uni), et de nouveaux membres ont rejoint le groupe : Alberto ABELLA (Espagne) Rudolf BOPP (remplaant Alex HAERTER - Suisse) Samuel ESTEFANIA (Espagne) Bernt FREIHOLTZ (Sude) Giulio GECCHELE (Italie) Marko JRVINEN (Finlande) Toshinori MIZUTANI (remplaant Hideto MASHIMO - Japon) Hans-Rudolf SCHEIDEGGER (Suisse) Chaque chapitre a t prpar par le(s) rapporteur(s) indiqu(s). Chacun a utilis des informations provenant de la bibliographie internationale et des membres du groupe. Les projets ont t rviss lors des runions successives du groupe, puis rassembls et harmoniss par Herv Biollay, Patrick Chass et Didier Lacroix (France).
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This report has been prepared under the auspices and with the approval of the PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels by its working group No. 6 devoted to "Fire and Smoke Control". This working group included the following members: Leader Secretary Members Didier LACROIX (France) Staffan BENGTSON (Sweden) Finn H. AMUNDSEN (Norway) Roberto ARDITI (Italy) Arthur G. BENDELIUS (USA) Eric CASALE (France) Anthony S CASERTA (USA) Patrick CHASSE (France) Alfred HAACK (Germany) Alex HAERTER (Switzerland) Rudolf HRHAN (Austria) Hideto MASHIMO (Japan) Karl PUCHER (Austria) Norman RHODES (United Kingdom) Luuk SWART (Netherlands)
(rapporteur for section I) (rapporteur for section VI) (rapporteur for section V) (rapporteur for sections VI - VII) (rapporteur for section IV) (rapporteur for section IV) (rapporteur for section II) (rapporteur for section V) (rapporteur for section III) (rapporteur for section III) (rapporteur for section VIII) (rapporteur for sections VI - VII)
During the finalisation phase of this report, the secretary was Norman Rhodes (United Kingdom), and the working group was complemented with the following new members: Alberto ABELLA (Spain) Rudolf BOPP (replacing Alex HAERTER - Switzerland) Samuel ESTEFANIA (Spain) Bernt FREIHOLTZ (Sweden) Giulio GECCHELE (Italy) Marko JRVINEN (Finland) Toshinori MIZUTANI (replacing Hideto MASHIMO - Japan) Hans-Rudolf SCHEIDEGGER (Switzerland) Each section has been drafted by the aforementioned rapporteur(s) using information from its country, literature and the other members of the group. The drafts have been reviewed at successive group meetings, then put together and harmonised by Herv Biollay, Patrick Chass and Didier Lacroix (France).
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INTRODUCTION
De plus en plus, des tunnels routiers sont construits pour traverser des zones montagneuses ou pour viter des difficults d'environnement, principalement en zone urbaine. En mme temps, la circulation augmente dans les tunnels existants. En consquence, la scurit dans les tunnels routiers devient une question importante. Parmi les risques possibles, les incendies de vhicules suscitent une inquitude particulire car ce ne sont pas des vnements si rares et leurs consquences peuvent tre bien plus graves en souterrain qu' l'air libre si les mesures appropries ne sont pas prises. galement, la baisse importante et constante des missions polluantes des vhicules est telle qu'aujourd'hui, les quipements de ventilation sont, dans de nombreux cas, dtermins par les considrations de dsenfumage en cas d'incendie. Depuis sa cration en 1957, le Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers a tudi les quipements de scurit relatifs aux incendies, puis quelques annes plus tard, la ventilation pour le dsenfumage. Des donnes ou des recommandations dans ces domaines figurent dans de nombreux rapports que le Comit a publis pour les Congrs mondiaux de la Route : Rio de Janeiro (1959), Tokyo (1967), Vienne (1979), Sydney (1983), Bruxelles (1987), Marrakech (1991). Jusqu'au Congrs de Marrakech, ces sujets taient traits parmi d'autres par des groupes de travail diffrents, plus spcialement les groupes "Exploitation, entretien, gestion" et "Pollution, environnement, ventilation". En 1992, le Comit des Tunnels routiers a dcid que l'importance du sujet justifiait la cration d'un groupe spcifique sur "Incendie et dsenfumage". Ce groupe de travail s'est runi deux fois lan depuis ses deux premires runions tenues l'occasion de deux programmes importants de recherche : les essais FIRETUN d'EUREKA en octobre 1992 en Norvge et le programme d'essai de ventilation d'incendie du Memorial Tunnel en juin 1993 aux tats-Unis. Trs rapidement, le groupe a ressenti le besoin d'tablir une vue densemble des connaissances actuelles sur tous les sujets touchant aux incendies en tunnel routier ; en effet, de nombreuses recherches et rflexions, y compris caractre rglementaire, taient menes de par le monde, mais aucune synthse nexistait. Les premiers rsultats ont t publis dans le rapport du Comit des Tunnels routiers pour le XXe Congrs mondial de la Route Montral (1995). Le prsent rapport fournit un tat de l'art complet prpar par le groupe de travail. Il est destin tous ceux qui sont concerns par la conception, la construction, l'exploitation ou la scurit des tunnels routiers : matres d'ouvrage, entrepreneurs, exploitants, chercheurs, autorits dictant les rglementations, pompiers, etc. Il devrait leur apporter une vue d'ensemble et des recommandations, ainsi que des indications sur la faon de fournir une protection efficace et rentable contre le feu et la fume dans les tunnels routiers. Il donne galement de nombreuses rfrences bibliographiques qui peuvent s'avrer utiles pour de plus amples informations.
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INTRODUCTION
More and more road tunnels are built to give way to new routes through mountainous areas or to avoid environmental difficulties, mainly in urban zones. At the same time traffic is growing through existing tunnels. As a consequence safety in road tunnels is becoming a major issue. Among the possible risks, vehicle fires give rise to particular concern because they are not very rare events and their consequences might be far larger underground than in the open if no appropriate measures were taken. Also the important and continuous decrease in vehicle pollutant emissions is such that nowadays ventilation equipment is in many cases determined by smoke control considerations in case of fire.
Since its creation in 1957, the PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels has been engaged in safety equipment related to fires and a few years later in ventilation for smoke control. Data or recommendations in these fields appear in most reports it produced for the successive World Road Congresses, namely: Rio de Janeiro (1959), Tokyo (1967), Vienna (1979), Sydney (1983), Brussels (1987), Marrakech (1991).
Until this last Congress these topics had been examined among other matters by various working groups, especially those devoted to Operation - Maintenance - Management and to Pollution - Environment - Ventilation. In 1992 the Committee on Road Tunnels decided that the prominence of this subject justified the creation of a specific group devoted to Fire and Smoke Control. This working group has met twice a year since the first two meetings it held on the scene of two major research programmes: the EUREKA 'FIRETUN' tests in October 1992 in Norway and the Memorial Tunnel Fire Ventilation Test Programme in June 1993 in the USA. From the very beginning, the group has deemed it necessary to draw up a state-of-the-art of the main subjects connected to fires in road tunnels, because many research works, reflections and even regulatory documents had been published world-wide, but a synthesis was lacking. Early results were published in the report prepared by the Committee on Road Tunnels for the XXth World Road Congress in Montreal (1995).
The present report provides the complete state-of-the-art prepared by the working group. It is intended for all those who are interested in road tunnels design, construction, operation or safety: owners, consultants, contractors, operators, researchers, regulators, fire brigades, etc. It should give them an overview, recommendations, as well as the background on the way to provide a reasonably efficient and cost-effective protection against fire and smoke in road tunnels. It also gives numerous literature references that should be useful to get further details.
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Cependant, une exprience et des recherches complmentaires sont toujours ncessaires car le domaine est vaste et les questions trs complexes : les incendies dans les tunnels impliquent de nombreux phnomnes physiques, varis et interactifs, qui sont particulirement difficiles tudier. Nous ne possdons pas encore une complte comprhension du comportement d'un incendie dans un tunnel, bien que nos connaissances augmentent rapidement grce aux nombreuses recherches. En consquence, d'autres travaux sont ncessaires pour aboutir des directives compltes, bien fondes et universellement acceptes. Le Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers continuera ses efforts dans ce sens. Afin de faire progresser tous les aspects de la rsistance au feu des structures de tunnel, il a tabli une coopration avec l'Association internationale des Travaux en Souterrain (AITES) : le groupe de travail "Incendie et dsenfumage" de l'AIPCR traitera plus spcifiquement des incendies de dimensionnement et des objectifs de rsistance, tandis que le groupe de travail "Entretien et rparation des ouvrages souterrains" de l'AITES examinera plutt les mthodes et matriaux de construction permettant d'atteindre ces objectifs. Un facteur de risque particulirement important vis--vis de la scurit incendie en tunnel est l'autorisation ou non des vhicules transportant des marchandises dangereuses. Les critres prendre en compte pour dcider si de tels transports doivent tre autoriss ne sont pas examins dans le prsent rapport. Le Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers a cr un groupe de travail spcialis pour traiter de ce sujet. Il a galement lanc un projet de rechercher conjoint sur le Transport des marchandises dangereuses dans les tunnels routiers avec l'Organisation de Coopration et de Dveloppement conomiques (OCDE). Les rsultats de ces travaux seront publis de faon spare. Le prsent rapport est compos de huit chapitres, rdigs par diffrents rapporteurs, mais qui sont bien sr interdpendants. Chaque chapitre rappelle en premier lieu les travaux antrieurs de l'AIPCR. Selon les cas, il dcrit ensuite des phnomnes physiques ou prsente de rcents rsultats de recherche. Chaque fois que possible, des recommandations sont donnes ; sinon, rfrence est faite aux pratiques suivies dans certains pays. Des propositions de recherches mener dans le futur sont faites. Des rfrences bibliographiques sont fournies au chapitre IX. Le Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers et son groupe de travail "Incendie et dsenfumage" seront heureux de recevoir tout commentaire et, plus spcialement, des propositions pour aller de l'avant.
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However, complementary experience and research are still needed because the field is quite vast and the issues very complex: fires in tunnels involve numerous, various and interacting physical phenomena, which are particularly difficult to investigate. We do not yet have a complete understanding of the behaviour of a fire in a tunnel, even though our knowledge is quickly improving through numerous research works. As a consequence further work will be needed to achieve complete, well-founded and universally accepted guidelines. The PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels will continue its efforts towards this aim. In order to advance all aspects of tunnel structures resistance to fire, it has established a co-operation with the International Tunnelling Association (ITA): PIARC Working Group on "Fire and Smoke Control" will deal with the design fires and resistance objectives more specifically, while ITA Working Group on Maintenance and Repair of Underground Structures will rather examine the construction methods and materials to meet these objectives.
A very important risk factor when dealing with fire safety in a tunnel is whether vehicles transporting dangerous goods are allowed or not. The criteria to decide when such transport should be allowed are not examined in this report. The PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels has established a specialised working group to deal with this issue. It has also launched a joint research project on Transport of Dangerous Goods through Road Tunnels with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The results of these works will be published separately.
This report is composed of eight sections, which have been drafted by different rapporteurs but are of course interdependent. Each section first mentions past work by PIARC. According to the case it may then describe physical phenomena or present new research results. Whenever possible, recommendations are drawn; in other cases reference is made to current practice in a few countries and subjects are suggested for future research. Literature references are given in section IX.
The PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels, and its working group on Fire and Smoke Control, will welcome all comments and especially proposals to go still farther.
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I.2
Les premires recommandations en ce domaine ont t prsentes dans le rapport du Comit des Tunnels routiers au XXe Congrs mondial de la Route [17].
I.3
Directives existantes
Jusqu prsent, il nexiste pas de directives exprimes en tant quexigences fonctionnelles pour les tunnels routiers.
I.4
Afin de comprendre et dinterprter les objectifs des rglements en matire dincendie, il est ncessaire de possder des connaissances de base sur la physique des incendies, les limites supportables pour les usagers en fuite et les pompiers, aussi bien que les critres de dgts pour la construction et lquipement des tunnels. Afin de juger si les personnes peuvent schapper en toute scurit, des donnes sont galement ncessaires sur leur vitesse de marche et sur le dlai entre le dbut de lincendie et celui de lvacuation qui est la somme des dlais de dtection, dalerte, de raction et dvacuation du vhicule.
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Ideally the objectives should be expressed as function-based requirements and not as detailed regulations. It is hoped that it will be possible to do so in the future. Presently, however, safety in tunnels is most generally based on detailed rules. This is mostly due to a lack of knowledge and well-recognised study methods and tools.
This section attempts to formulate qualitative as well as quantitative objectives for fire and smoke control. These objectives can be used to interpret the results of the various study methods described in section IV. They are the background for the recommendations made in the further sections of this report (sections IV to VIII). After a few words on previous work by PIARC and existing guidelines, the largest part of this section ( I.4) describes the physical background and principles. Finally ( I.5) recommendations are given.
I.2
First recommendations in this area have been presented in the report of the Committee on Road th Tunnels for the XX World Road Congress [17].
I.3
Existing guidelines
Up to now there are no existing guidelines expressed only as functional requirements for road tunnels.
I.4
In order to understand and interpret the objectives of fire regulations it is necessary to have basic knowledge in physics of fire, tenable limits for escaping people and firemen as well as damage criteria for tunnel construction and equipment. To judge if people can escape safely, data are also necessary on the walking speed and the time between fire start and beginning of evacuation, which consists of time for detecting, alerting, reacting and leaving vehicle.
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I.4.2 Rayonnement
Le rayonnement est cr par la temprature et peut tre exprim comme suit pour une couche infinie de fume dans laquelle la temprature est constante :
E f = 5,67 10 8 r T 4 W / m2
q. [1.4.2.1]
o r est lmissivit rsultante et T la temprature de la fume (en degrs kelvins). Le niveau du rayonnement dpend de la temprature et de lmissivit de la fume. Lorsque la temprature lintrieur de la couche de fume nest pas constante, une intgration est ncessaire pour calculer le niveau de rayonnement. Le rayonnement est produit par lincendie lui-mme et par la couche de fume chaude (figure 1.4.2.1). La ligne continue sur la figure 1.4.2.2 montre le rayonnement touchant une personne en fuite, calcul partir dune couche infinie de fume temprature constante dans toute la couche. La ligne pointille correspond un tunnel de 8 m de large et 6 m de haut dans lequel la fume est descendue 3 m au-dessus du niveau de la chausse. Dans les deux cas, une valeur de 0,8 est prise pour r. Prs du foyer de lincendie, il faut en outre prendre en compte la contribution des flammes.
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I.4.2 Radiation
Radiation is created by temperature and may be expressed as follows for an infinite layer of smoke in which the temperature is constant:
E f = 5.67 10 8 r T 4 W / m2
eq. [1.4.2.1]
where r is the resulting emissivity and T the temperature of the smoke (in kelvins). The level of radiation depends on the temperature and the emissivity of the smoke. When the temperature within the smoke layer is not constant an integration is necessary to calculate the radiation level. The radiation is produced by the fire itself and by the hot smoke layer (figure 1.4.2.1). The continuous line in figure 1.4.2.2 shows the calculated radiation affecting escaping people from an infinite smoke layer with a constant temperature in the whole layer. The dashed line corresponds to a tunnel 8 m wide and 6 m high in which the smoke layer has descended to 3 m above road level. A value of 0.8 is assumed for r in both cases. Near the fire site a contribution from the flames should be added.
corresponds to an infinite layer correspond une couche infinie corresponds to a tunnel 8 m wide, correspond un tunnel de 8 m de large, 6 m high and smoke ---------6 m de haut et de la fume at 3 m above floor 3 m au-dessus du sol Figure 1.4.2.2 - Heat radiation at floor level Figure 1.4.2.2 - Rayonnement de chaleur au niveau du sol
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La figure 1.4.2.3, daprs Hymes [7], montre la dure de rsistance avant blessure par brlure pour diffrents flux de chaleur, jusqu une dure dexposition de 100 s. Par exemple, pour une dure dexposition de 100 s, 11 kW/m provoquent 50 % de dcs.
Purser [13] montre, dans la figure 1.4.2.4, quil existe une limite dintensit relativement vidente de 2,5 kW/m2 pour la rsistance une chaleur rayonne constante. Dans cette figure, les lettres "a" "e" correspondent diffrentes valeurs observes dans la bibliographie et les recherches. A la figure 1.4.2.5, Danielsson [3] montre le moment o la douleur apparat diffrents niveaux de rayonnement constant. P est un facteur scurit pour diffrents vtements : P = 1 correspond la peau nue et P = 26 correspond des vtements de pompier.
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In figure 1.4.2.3, Hymes [7] shows tolerance times to burn injury levels for various incident heat fluxes up to an exposure time of 100 s. For example at a 100 seconds exposure time, 11 kW/m creates 50% lethality.
Figure 1.4.2.4 - Time to severe skin pain for exposure to radiant heat
Purser [13] shows in figure 1.4.2.4 that there is a fairly obvious intensity limit for tolerance of constant radiant heat at 2.5 kW/m2. In this figure letters "a" to "e" correspond to different observed values in literature and investigations.
In figure 1.4.2.5 Danielsson [3] shows time until pain occurs at different constant radiation levels. P is a safety factor for different clothes: P = 1 corresponds to naked skin and P = 26 corresponds to a fire-fighter clothes.
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Figure 1.4.2.5 - Rsistance la douleur pour diffrents niveaux de radiation et diffrents facteurs de scurit
Figure 1.4.2.5 - Time to pain for different radiation levels and safety factors
q [1.4.3.1]
Si la temprature nest pas constante, comme dans une situation normale, le concept de dose est introduit. Puisque la dure de rsistance prend la forme dune courbe exponentielle, il est possible de considrer la victime comme ayant absorb une dose de chaleur convecte. Par consquent, il est possible dutiliser le concept dune dose fractionnaire de chaleur absorbe chaque minute du point de vue de la mise en incapacit :
1
5.1849 0.0273 T
Flh = e
q. [1.4.3.2]
o T est la temprature en C durant cette minute. Lorsque la dose cumule est suprieure 1, la survie est menace.
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eq [1.4.3.1]
If the temperature is not constant, as in a normal situation, the "dose" concept is introduced. Since the tolerance time takes the form of an exponential curve, it is feasible to consider the victim as taking up a "dose" of convected heat. Thereafter it is possible to use the concept of a fractional incapacitating dose of heat acquired during each minute as follows:
Flh = e
5.1849 0.0273 T
eq. [1.4.3.2]
where T is the temperature in C during that minute. When the cumulative fractional dose exceeds unity, life threatening conditions have occurred.
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Un exemple est dcrit au tableau 1.4.3.1. La dose cumule est suprieure 1 entre 2,5 et 3 mn. La mise en incapacit due la douleur de lpiderme et aux brlures est ainsi prdite juste avant 3 mn, avec probablement de graves brlures irrversibles de lpiderme et, trs probablement, de lappareil respiratoire suprieur, particulirement durant la quatrime minute.
Tableau 1.4.3.1 - Exemples de tempratures et de prvision de "dose de chaleur" conduisant une mise en incapacit pendant un incendie donn Dure (mn) Temprature C Flh Flh 0,5 38 0 0 1,0 38 0 0 1,5 44 0,007 0,007 2,0 83 0,028 0,035 2,5 173 0,428 0,463 3,0 295 12,739 13,202 3,5 461 4,0 479
Ondrus [11] donne les valeurs suivantes de dure de rsistance temprature constante : 140 C 115 C 70 C 50 C 5 mn 20 mn 60 mn 3-5 h
Il est vident que des auteurs diffrents donnent des limites diffrentes de rsistance.
I.4.4 Visibilit
Les proprits de la fume sont gnralement exprimes en termes de facteur de transmission ainsi quen densit optique ou coefficient dattnuation (galement appel coefficient dextinction). Le facteur de transmission T de la fume est dfini comme suit :
T = Ix / Io q [1.4.4.1] o Io est lintensit de la lumire au dbut du trajet and Ix lintensit de la lumire qui subsiste aprs son cheminement.
La densit optique par unit de distance est relie au facteur de transmission par lquation suivante :
q [1.4.4.2]
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An example is shown in table 1.4.3.1. The cumulative fractional dose exceeds unity between 2.5 and 3 minutes. Incapacitation due to skin pain and burns is therefore predicted just before 3 minutes, with severe and probably fatal burns of the skin and upper respiratory tract being a strong possibility, particularly during the fourth minute.
Table 1.4.3.1 - Example of temperature and predicted fractional incapacitating heat dose during a specific fire Time (mn) Temperature C Flh Flh 0.5 38 0 0 1.0 38 0 0 1.5 44 0,007 0,007 2.0 83 0,028 0,035 2.5 173 0,428 0,463 3.0 295 12,739 13,202 3.5 461 4.0 479
Ondrus [11] gives the following values for tolerance time to a constant temperature:
140 C 115 C 70 C 50 C
I.4.4 Visibility
The properties of smoke are commonly expressed in term of transmittance as well as either optical density or attenuation coefficient (also called extinction coefficient).
T = Ix / Io eq [1.4.4.1] where Io is the intensity of light at the beginning of the path and Ix the intensity of light remaining after it has passed through the path length.
The optical density per unit distance is related to the transmittance by the following equation:
eq [1.4.4.2]
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Le coefficient dattnuation (ou dextinction) par unit de distance K est dfini de la mme manire que la densit optique, mais utilise des logarithmes npriens :
K = - (logeT) / x
q [1.4.4.3]
K = 2.303 q [1.4.4.4] Parfois, le pourcentage de perte de transmission est utilis. Il est dfini comme :
q [1.4.4.5]
q [1.4.4.6]
Le tableau 1.4.4.1 compare ces diffrentes mthodes dexpression de la perte de visibilit par la fume.
Tableau 1.4.4.1 - Comparaison des diffrentes mthodes dexpression de la perte de visibilit par la fume Facteur de transmission 1,00 0,90 % de perte de transmission 0 10 Longueur du trajet x (m) quelconque 1 10 40 1 10 70 1 10 90 1 10 99 1 10 Densit optique (m-1) 0 0,0458 0,0046 0,222 0,022 0,523 0,052 1,00 0,10 2,00 0,20 Coefficient -1 dattnuation K (m ) 0 0,1054 0,0105 0,511 0,051 1,204 0,120 2,30 0,23 4,61 0,46
0,60
0,30
0,10
0,01
La distance de visibilit D (m) peut tre calcule en utilisant le coefficient dextinction (ou dattnuation) K (m-1) du mlange air-fume :
D=A/K q [1.4.4.7] dans lequel A est une constante comprise entre 2 et 6 selon les panneaux qui doivent tre lus (rflchissants ou lumineux).
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The attenuation (or extinction) coefficient per unit distance K is defined in the same way as the optical density, but using neperian logarithms:
eq [1.4.4.3] eq [1.4.4.4]
eq [1.4.4.5]
eq [1.4.4.6]
Table 1.4.4.1 shows a comparison of these different methods of expressing smoke obscuration.
Table 1.4.4.1 - Comparison of different methods of expressing smoke obscuration Transmittance 1.00 0.90 Percentage obscuration 0 10 Path length x (m) any 1 10 40 1 10 70 1 10 90 1 10 99 1 10 Optical density (m-1) 0 0.0458 0.0046 0.222 0.022 0.523 0.052 1.00 0.10 2.00 0.20 Attenuation -1 coefficient K (m ) 0 0.1054 0.0105 0.511 0.051 1.204 0.120 2.30 0.23 4.61 0.46
0.60
0.30
0.10
0.01
The visibility distance D (m) can be estimated using the extinction (or attenuation) coefficient K (m-1) of the air-smoke mix:
D=A/K eq [1.4.4.7] where A is a constant between 2 and 6 depending on the signs to be seen (reflecting or illuminated).
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Fujimara [6] indique que K = 0,4 est une valeur critique du coefficient dextinction de la fume dans les tunnels routiers. La figure 1.4.4.1 montre la relation entre la visibilit des panneaux lumineux et le coefficient dextinction pour de la fume blanche irritante et non irritante.
I.4.5 Toxicit
La toxicit de la fume dincendie est principalement dtermine par un petit nombre de gaz qui peuvent agir de manire additionnelle, synergique ou antagoniste.
Par exemple, laddition des effets de CO et de HCN peut tre reprsente par :
A=
q [1.4.5.1]
LC50CO30 = 4 600 ppm (niveau de concentration auquel 50 % des personnes dcderont aprs 30 mn par le seul effet du CO), LC50HCN30 = 160 ppm (niveau de concentration auquel 50 % des personnes dcderont aprs 30 mn par le seul effet du HCN). Si A = 1, prs de 50 % des victimes dcderont. Si A est un peu plus grand que 1, il est probable que toutes les victimes dcdent. Il a t dmontr que cette relation tait valable pour des concentration de CO et HCN gales 25, 50 et 75 % de leur valeur respective LC50 30 mn. Lquation 1.4.5.1 a t appele "lapproche par somme de fractions". Une approche plus simple considre uniquement la concentration maximale admissible pour un feu donn. Klote et Milke [9] ont prsent des niveaux globaux de mortalit pour des dures dexposition de 5 mn et 30 mn (voir tableau 1.4.5.1). Il est clair que des auteurs diffrents proposent des valeurs diffrentes.
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Fujimara [6] indicates that K = 0.4 is a critical value for the extinction coefficient of smoke in road tunnels. Figure 1.4.4.1 shows the relation between visibility of light emitting signs and the extinction coefficient for irritating and non irritating white smoke.
I.4.5 Toxicity
The toxicity of fire smoke is determined mainly by a small number of gases, which may act additively, synergically or antagonis-tically.
Figure 1.4.4.1 - Relation between visibility of light-emitting signs and smoke extinction coefficient for irritating and non irritating smoke Figure 1.4.4.1 - Relation entre la visibilit des panneaux lumineux et le coefficient dextinction pour de la fume blanche irritante et non irritante
For example the addition of the influence of CO and HCN may be represented by:
A= [CO] [HCN] + LC 50 CO 30 LC 50 HCN 30
eq [1.4.5.1]
where
[ ] indicates the actual concentration, LC50CO30 = 4600 ppm (concentration level at which 50% of people will die solely by CO after 30 minutes), LC50HCN30 = 160 ppm (concentration level at which 50% of people will die solely by HCN after 30 minutes).
If A = 1, approximately 50% of the victims will die. If A is somewhat greater than 1, all victims are expected to die. This relation has been shown to hold for concentrations of CO and HCN equal to 25, 50 and 75% of their respective 30 minutes LC50 value. Equation 1.4.5.1 has been termed the fractional summation approach. An easier approach only considers the maximum allowable concentration for a certain fire. Klote and Milke [9] have presented comprehensive lethal levels for 5 minutes and 30 minutes exposure (see table 1.4.5.1). It is evident that different authors propose different values.
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Gaz
Rfrence
dioxyde de carbone actaldhyde acide actique ammoniac gaz chlorhydrique monoxyde de carbone bromure dhydrogne monoxyde dazote carbonyle sulfide hydrogne sulfur
Higgins et al. (1972) Kimmerle (1974) Sax (1984) ACGIH (1980) Sakurai (1988) Nishimaru (1985) Higgins (1972) Sax (1984) Kaplan et al. (1984) Sax (1984) Kimmerle (1974) ACGIH (1980) Sax (1984) Kimmerle (1974) Levin et al. (1987b) Higgins et al. (1972) Kimmerle (1974) Sax (1984) Kimmerle (1974) Sax (1984) Clayton & Clayton (1982) Sax (1984)
C3H5O
acroline
750
300
CH2O
formaldhyde
250
SO2
500
HCN
280
135
C9H6O2N2
100 50 28 90 6
COCl2 C4F8
Notes : EC =concentration pour effet, LC0 = concentration laquelle les premiers effets mortels sont observs, LC = LC50
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Gas
Reference
carbon dioxide acetaldehyde acetic acid ammonia hydrogen chloride carbon monoxide hydrogen bromide nitric oxide carbonyl sulfide hydrogen sulfide
Higgins et al. (1972) Kimmerle (1974) Sax (1984) ACGIH (1980) Sakurai (1988) Nishimaru (1985) Higgins (1972) Sax (1984) Kaplan et al. (1984) Sax (1984) Kimmerle (1974) ACGIH (1980) Sax (1984) Kimmerle (1974) Levin et al. (1987b) Higgins et al. (1972) Kimmerle (1974) Sax (1984) Kimmerle (1974) Sax (1984) Clayton & Clayton (1982) Sax (1984)
C3H5O
acrolein
750
300
CH2O
formaldehyde
250
SO2
sulfur dioxide
500
HCN
hydrogen cyanide
280
135
C9H6O2N2
100 50 28 90 6
COCl2 C4F8
Notes: EC is concentration for effect, LC0 concentration at which first lethal effects are observed, and LC stands for LC50
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I.5
Recommandations
Les objectifs des dispositions destines faire face aux incendies en tunnel sont par ordre dimportance dcroissante : sauvegarder les vies humaines en permettant lvacuation, rendre possibles les oprations de secours et de lutte contre lincendie, viter les explosions, limiter les dommages sur le gnie civil et les quipements du tunnel et sur les constructions voisines.
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I.5
Recommendations
In order of importance, the aims of fire and smoke control in tunnels are: to save lives by making users evacuation possible, to make rescue and fire fighting operations possible, to avoid explosions, to limit damage to tunnel structure and equipment and to surrounding buildings.
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Chacun de ces buts peut tre pondr diffremment, en fonction de la politique suivie par chaque pays, du type de tunnel (immerg, urbain, etc.) et de son mode dexploitation. Cela concerne tout particulirement la protection du tunnel lui-mme, qui peut tre considre comme plus ou moins ncessaire. Il est possible de donner des estimations approximatives des conditions qui doivent tre maintenues dans le tunnel pour les oprations dvacuation et de lutte contre lincendie. Le temps ncessaire pour lvacuation peut tre de plusieurs minutes, en fonction de la distance par rapport aux sorties et de la vitesse laquelle marchent les usagers. La vitesse normale daccs une issue de secours est de 1,5 m/s, mais elle peut tre rduite 1 m/s, ou mme moins (jusqu' 0,5 m/s), en prsence de fume.
Rayonnement maximal
Prs du foyer, le rayonnement rsulte du feu lui-mme et de la fume chaude. A plus grande distance du foyer, ce nest que la temprature de la fume qui peut donner lieu des conditions dangereuses. Pour que lvacuation soit possible, le niveau de rayonnement doit tre infrieur la limite provoquant une forte douleur sur la peau nue pour une exposition de quelques minutes : le seuil est approximativement de 2 2,5 kW/m. Les pompiers peuvent normalement supporter un niveau de rayonnement de 5 kW/m. Leur temps dintervention ne peut pas excder 30 minutes, avec le port dun respirateur.
Visibilit minimale
Une distance de visibilit dau moins 7 m est ncessaire pour marcher aisment dans une atmosphre enfume. Pour pouvoir lire les panneaux de signalisation, cette distance doit tre de 15 m. Il faut par consquent rechercher une distance minimale de visibilit de 7 15 m pour les oprations dvacuation et de lutte contre lincendie.
Toxicit
Aucune mthode fiable nest connue pour calculer la concentration en gaz toxiques ou irritants dgags par un incendie de vhicule. Des concentrations maximales ne sont donc pas donnes ici. Il est probable que, dans de nombreux incendies en tunnel, lobtention dune visibilit minimale maintiendra les concentrations en gaz dangereux en dessous du niveau admissible pour lvacuation.
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According to the policy of each country, the type of the tunnel (immersed, urban, etc.) and its mode of operation, different weights may be given to the above aims. This particularly concerns the protection of the tunnel itself, which may be considered more or less necessary. It is possible to give rough estimates of the tunnel conditions that must be maintained for evacuation and fire-fighting operations. Evacuation time can be several minutes, depending on distance to exits and walking speed. Whilst normal walking speed to emergency exits is about 1.5 m/s, it may be reduced to about 1 m/s or even less (down to 0.5 m/s) due to the presence of smoke.
Tolerable radiation
Near the fire, the radiation is created by the fire itself as well as the hot smoke. Further away it is only the smoke temperature which creates a dangerous condition.
To make evacuation possible, the radiation level must be under the limit which causes severe pain on bare skin for an exposure of several minutes: the threshold value is roughly 2 to 2.5 kW/m. Fire-fighters can normally withstand a radiation level of 5 kW/m. Their operation time is not longer than 30 minutes wearing a breathing apparatus.
Minimum visibility
A visibility distance of at least 7 m is necessary to walk smoothly in a smoky atmosphere. To read the signs this distance must be 15 m. Accordingly a minimum visibility distance of 7 to 15 m must be aimed at for evacuation and fire-fighting operations.
Toxicity
There is no reliable published method to calculate the concentration of the toxic or irritant gases released in a vehicle fire. Therefore tolerable concentrations are not given here. It is expected that in many tunnel fires, ensuring the minimum visibility will maintain the dangerous gases concentrations under the tolerable limit for evacuation.
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caillage du bton
Lcaillage du bton ne doit pas empcher les usagers de schapper, ni tre lorigine de blessures pour les pompiers. Le bton peut commencer scailler une temprature superficielle de 150 200C. Cette limite peut tre infrieure pour les tunnels sans revtement ou revtus d'une maonnerie en pierre naturelle. Lcaillage napparaissant gnralement quaprs quelques minutes, il ne pose gnralement pas de problme pour les usagers en fuite. Mais il peut reprsenter un danger pour les pompiers.
Chute dquipements
Les quipements lourds ne doivent pas tomber sur les personnes se trouvant lintrieur du tunnel. Cela signifie quaucun gros appareil ne doit tomber pour une temprature infrieure 400-450C pendant le temps ncessaire pour combattre lincendie (dans un tunnel, ces tempratures peuvent produire un rayonnement denviron 5 kW/m2 qui correspond la valeur maximale admissible pour les pompiers).
I.6
Besoins en recherches
De nombreux domaines noncs ci-avant ncessitent encore des recherches supplmentaires. Il est particulirement ncessaire d'amliorer les modles dvacuation. Il faut galement tenir compte des difficults des personnes handicapes.
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Spalling of concrete
Spalling concrete must not prevent people from escaping or injure firemen. Spalling of concrete may start at a surface temperature of 150-200C. For tunnels with no lining or with natural stone masonry, this limit can be lower. As spalling generally begins only after a few minutes, it will generally not be a problem for escaping people. However, it may be a danger for firemen.
I.6
Many fields connected with the above issues still require further research. More knowledge is especially needed with regards to evacuation models. Taking into account the problems raised by disabled people should also be considered.
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Il faut prendre en compte le transport des marchandises dangereuses dans le tunnel quand il est autoris (par exemple, camions citernes). Comme indiqu dans l'introduction gnrale au prsent rapport, la faon de dcider dans quelles conditions ce type de transport doit tre autoris n'est pas examine ici. Le Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers a mis en place un groupe de travail spcialis pour traiter de cette question. Il a aussi lanc un projet de recherche conjoint sur le sujet avec l'Organisation de Coopration et de Dveloppement conomiques (OCDE). Il sera rendu compte de ces travaux de faon spare. Le prsent rapport considre la dcision d'autoriser ou d'interdire les marchandises dangereuses comme une donne et propose des incendies de dimensionnement et des mesures de protection adaptes chaque cas. Ce chapitre traite galement des scnarios dincendie qui doivent tre utiliss pour : lingnierie de la structure du tunnel (par exemple, conception du ferraillage des lments en bton, viter des faiblesses structurelles des tunnels sous-fluviaux), lessai dincendie des lments structurels (par exemple, panneaux rsistant au feu), lessai dincendie des quipements du tunnel (par exemple, acclrateurs, prcipitateurs lectrostatiques, clairage, cbles).
Les futurs travaux sur la rsistance au feu des structures seront conduits conjointement avec lAITES (Association internationale des Travaux en Souterrain), car lAITES traite de lingnierie de la structure des tunnels. De nombreux pays ont inclus dans leurs recommandations des rgles de conception visant la scurit incendie ou travaillent actuellement sur la prparation de telles rgles. La plus grande part de ces travaux est fonde sur le rapport du Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers prsent Bruxelles en 1987 [19]. Depuis, des progrs ont t accomplis. Des essais dincendie, EUREKA en Norvge [20] et Memorial Tunnel aux tats-Unis [22], ont t raliss, ainsi que des incendies contrls de quelques vhicules dans de nouveaux tunnels avant leur ouverture la circulation (en France et en Espagne [23 ; 24]).
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This section deals with frequencies and intensities of fires in road tunnels. Recent results of statistical evaluations (chapter II.3) and fire experiments (chapter II.4) are used to update existing PIARC work. One important aim of this section is to specify design fires with regard to:
the engineering of the ventilation system (e.g. heat, toxic gas and smoke production rates), the training of people dealing with fires in road tunnels (e.g. fire brigades, supervising staff at tunnel sites).
This must take into account transport of dangerous goods through the tunnel (e.g. petrol tankers) when allowed. As stated in the general introduction of this report, the way to decide under which conditions such transport should be allowed is not examined here. The PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels has established a specialised working group to deal with this issue. It has also launched a joint research project on this subject with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These works will be reported separately. This report takes the decision concerning authorisation or banning of dangerous goods as a data and proposes design fires and protective measures adapted to each case. This section also deals with fire scenarios which should be used with regard to: the engineering of the tunnel structure (e.g. layout of the reinforcement of concrete elements, avoidance of structural weakness for tunnels beneath rivers), the fire testing of structural elements (e.g. fire-resistant panels), and the fire testing of tunnel equipment (e.g. jet fans, electrostatic precipitators, lighting, cables).
Further work on fire resistance of structures will be carried out together with the International Tunnelling Association (ITA), because ITA is dealing with the structural engineering of tunnels. Several countries have included principles for a fire-safe design in their tunnelling recommendations or are working on the preparation of such principles. Much work is based on the report of the PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels presented at Brussels in 1987 [19]. Since then further advances have been achieved. The EUREKA fire tests in Norway [20] and the Memorial Tunnel tests in the United States [22] have been performed, as well as a controlled burning of some cars in newly constructed tunnels (in France and Spain [23; 24]) before their opening to traffic.
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Ces expriences ont permis dacqurir des connaissances supplmentaires sur les modles de mcanique des fluides et les simulations numriques. Ces travaux sont encore en cours. Aussi ce chapitre ne peut-il comporter que des rsultats intermdiaires sur les risques dincendie et les incendies de dimensionnement. Au moment de la compilation des chapitres suivants, il est apparu quil existe des rapports dtaills sur les incendies dans les tunnels. Les descriptions des conditions que les incendies de dimensionnement doivent remplir (par exemple, comment tester la rsistance la chaleur des installations techniques des tunnels routiers) sont, elles, beaucoup plus rares. Les futurs travaux de lAIPCR devraient donc se concentrer davantage sur des scnarios dincendie appropris et, ensuite, dfinir des incendies de dimensionnement pour respecter ces scnarios (par exemple, en vue de raliser des essais ou la ventilation).
II.2
LAIPCR a ralis un travail important sur la ventilation dans les tunnels routiers. Initialement, ce travail tait ax sur la dilution des gaz dchappement, afin de limiter les niveaux de CO et dopacit. Le dsenfumage a t abord pour la premire fois au Congrs de Tokyo en 1967, suite aux essais dans le tunnel de l'Ofenegg (Suisse) [25]. Des recommandations plus prcises furent prsentes dans les rapports de Vienne (1979) [26], de Sydney (1983) [27] et principalement de Bruxelles (1987) [19]. Ce dernier synthtise les donnes sur la chaleur et la fume gnres par un incendie, et sur le mouvement de la fume dans le tunnel selon le courant dair longitudinal et lintensit de lincendie. De nombreux pays [28] utilisent toujours ces informations comme base de conception de leurs systmes de dsenfumage. Des tentatives ont galement t faites pour dterminer la frquence des incendies et valuer leurs causes. Des mesures supplmentaires, comme le contrle des systmes de ventilation, lutilisation dextincteurs et de sprinklers, ont t prsentes dans les mmes rapports et dans les suivants [18 ; 17]. Les pratiques actuelles pour la protection des structures et des quipements contre les incendies ont t rassembles et publies en 1991 [51]. Des statistiques sur les pannes, les accidents et les incendies dans les tunnels ont souvent t publies par le Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers, la dernire fois dans [33].
II.3
Ce sont gnralement les vhicules empruntant le tunnel qui sont impliqus dans les incendies ; les principales causes sont : des dfauts lectriques (le plus souvent pour les vhicules lgers), la surchauffe des freins (selon des statistiques franaises [29], environ 60 70 % des incendies impliquant des poids lourds), dautres dfauts conduisant ce qu'un vhicule prenne feu sans cause extrieure.
Dautres causes bien moins frquentes sont cites : collisions, dfauts techniques des quipements du tunnel (qui prennent feu d'eux-mmes), travaux dentretien dans les tunnels.
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Further knowledge was gained by experiments with fluid mechanics models and CFD computer simulations. This work is still in progress. So this section can only give interim results on fire risk and design fires.
When compiling the following chapters it showed up that there are detailed reports on tunnel fires. Descriptions of requirements that design fires should fulfil (e.g. testing the heat resistance of technical installations in road tunnels) are far more rare. Future PIARC work therefore should focus more on the definition of relevant fire scenarios and thereafter specify design fires to cover these scenarios (e.g. testing purposes, ventilation purposes).
II.2
Important work has been done by PIARC on the ventilation of road tunnels. Initially this was mainly directed towards the dilution of exhaust gases, in order to limit the CO and opacity levels. The issues of smoke control were approached first at the Tokyo Congress in 1967, following the fire tests in the Ofenegg tunnel (Switzerland) [25]. More accurate recommendations were given in the Vienna (1979) [26], Sydney (1983) [27] and principally Brussels (1987) [19] reports. This last summarises data on smoke and heat generation from a fire, and on smoke movement along the tunnel according to the longitudinal airflow and fire intensity. This information is still used as a basis to design smoke removal systems in many countries [28].
Also attempts were made to derive fire frequencies and to evaluate the causes of fire events. Further countermeasures like control of the ventilation system, use of fire extinguishers and sprinklers were discussed in the same and further reports [18; 17]. Current practice for fire protection of structures and equipment was reviewed and published in 1991 [51]. Statistics on breakdowns, accidents and fires in tunnels have often been published by the PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels, the last time in [33].
II.3
Frequency of fires
Fires in road tunnels generally concern vehicles using the tunnel and are caused mainly by: electrical defects (most frequent for light vehicles), brake overheating (according to French statistics [29] in about 60% to 70% of the fire events for lorries), other defects leading to the self-ignition of a vehicle.
Other causes are mentioned but are far less frequent: collisions, technical defects (self-ignition) of tunnel equipment, and maintenance work in tunnels.
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Cependant, la plupart des incendies sont provoqus par la circulation traversant le tunnel et non par les quipements du tunnel ou des travaux dentretien. Certains des incendies les plus graves connus ce jour ont dmarr la suite daccidents (par exemple, collisions avantarrire). En thorie, la frquence des incendies dans les tunnels est lie la longueur du tunnel, la densit de circulation, le contrle de la vitesse et la pente de la route. Cela doit tre pris en compte lors de la comparaison de diffrents tunnels. Par consquent, la frquence des incendies est value non seulement en nombre par tunnel, mais galement en nombre par vh x km pour incorporer les effets globaux de la longueur du tunnel et de la densit de circulation. Bien que de nombreux incendies dans les tunnels soient connus, il nexiste que des statistiques limites couvrant totalement un intervalle de temps (par exemple, une anne civile). Les taux doccurrences et dincendies pour 45 tunnels sont donns, dans la limite des donnes disponibles, aux tableaux 2.3.1 et 2.3.2. Les taux sont calculs selon lexemple ci-dessus du Tunnel de lElbe [30] : priode dobservation : longueur du tunnel (avec bretelles) : nombre de vhicules traversant le tunnel : pourcentage de poids lourds : nombre dvnements concernant des voitures particulires pendant la priode dobservation nombre dvnements concernant des poids lourds durant la priode dobservation 2 ans 3,3 km 37 106 vh./an 15 % 13 9
A partir de ces donnes, des taux dincendie exprims en termes de cas dincendie par vh x km ont t calculs pour le Tunnel de lElbe Hambourg (Allemagne) : voitures particulires
VL = 13
6
cas
cas vh. km
cas vh. km
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Most fires, however, are generated by the traffic passing through a tunnel and not by tunnel equipment or maintenance work. So-me of the most serious fires known yet started due to accidents (e.g. frontback-collisions).
Photo 2.1 - Fire following an accident in the Velsen Tunnel (Netherlands) in 1978
Photo 2.1 - Incendie la suite dun accident dans le Tunnel de Velsen (Pays-Bas) en 1978
In theory the frequency of tunnel fires is related to items like tunnel length, traffic density, speed control and slope of the road. This has to be accounted for when comparing different tunnels. Therefore the frequency of fire is rated not only by number per tunnel but also by number per vehicles x kilometres to include the gross effects of tunnel length and traffic density. Although many fires in tunnels are known there are only limited statistics covering a time interval (e.g. a calendar year) completely. Number of occurrences and fire rates from 45 tunnels are given in tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 as far as available. Rates are calculated according to the example given beneath for the Elb Tunnel [30]: observation period 2 years tunnel length (with ramps) 3.3 km number of vehicles passing the tunnel 37 106 veh./year portion of heavy good vehicles 15% number of events with passenger vehicles in the observation period 13 number of events with heavy good vehicles in the observation period 9 From these data the rates of fire expressed as cases of fire per vehicle x kilometre were calculated for the Elb Tunnel in Hamburg, Germany: passenger vehicles
PV = 13 cases . 2 37 10 (1 0.15) 3.3 veh. km
6
heavy vehicles
HGV = 9 cases 2 37 10 0.15 3.3 veh. km
6
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Table 2.3.1 - Occurrence des incendies dans des tunnels urbains de plusieurs pays [18 ; 21 ; 29 ; 30 ; 31 ; 32 ; 33]
Cas dincendies Pays Tunnel Longueu r [m] Annes observes Trafic moyen annuel [106 vh/an] Voitures particulires nombre Poids lourds Tous vhicules taux [108 vh x km] 0,3 0,0 1,8 1,8 1,8 9,0
taux nombre taux nombre [108 vh [108 vh x km] x km] 0,0 2,0 1,8 2,0 6,3 0 0 1 0 9 0,0 0,0 1,9 0,0 24,6 0 6 8 6 22
Canada
- Ville-Marie - L.. Hippolyte Lafontaine - Croix Rousse - Fourviere - Vieux Port - Elbe - Bnlux - Coen - Oslo - Fredhall - Sder - Klara - Karlberg - Brooklyn Battery QueensMidtow n - Lincoln
2 800 1 400 1 800 1 800 600 3 300 (avec rampes) 1 300 1 200 1 800 200 1 100 500 500 1 700 3 200 2 800 2 500
1988 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1985 - 1991 1985 - 1991 1989 - 1994 1990 - 1991
0 6 7 6 13
France
1986 - 1988
1986 - 1988 1990 - 1993 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1992 1989 - 1991 1989 - 1991 1987 - 1991
25,0 30,0 18,3 36,8 25,6 9,6 9,6 9,7 21,0 26,4 38,3
0 0 0 0 -
0 0 0 0 -
0 0 0 0 -
0,0 0,0 2,0 0,0 0,7 15,5 0,0 25,0 23,0 14,0 15,0
Sude
Royaume-Uni - Tyne
tats-Unis
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Table 2.3.1 - Occurrence of tunnel fires in urban tunnels of several countries [18; 21; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33]
Cases of fires Length [m] 2800 1400 1800 1800 600 3300 (with ramps) 1300 1200 1800 200 1100 500 500 1700 3200 2800 2500 Years inquired 1988 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1985 - 1991 1985 - 1991 1989 - 1994 1990 - 1991 1986 - 1988 1986 - 1988 1990 - 1993 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1992 1989 - 1991 1989 - 1991 1987 - 1991 Average annual traffic 6 [10 veh/year] 28.5 40.0 29.4 34.9 23.9 37.0 25.0 30.0 18.3 36.8 25.6 9.6 9.6 9.7 21.0 26.4 38.3 Passenger cars Number 0 6 7 6 13 0 0 0 0 Lorries All vehicles Rate 8 [10 veh x km] 0.3 0.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 9.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.7 15.5 0.0 25.0 23.0 14.0 15.0
Country
Tunnel
Rate Rate 8 8 [10 veh [10 veh Number Number x km] x km] 0.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 1 0 9 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 24.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 6 8 6 22 0 0 0 0 -
Canada
- Ville-Marie - L.. Hippolyte Lafontaine - Croix Rousse - Fourviere - Vieux Port - Elbe - Benelux - Coen - Oslo - Fredhall - Sder - Klara - Karlberg - Tyne - Brooklyn Battery - Queens Midtown - Lincoln
France
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Table 2.3.2 - Occurrence des incendies dans les tunnels autoroutiers de rase campagne [18 ; 21 ; 29 ; 30 ; 31 ; 32 ; 33]
Cas dincendies Voitures Poids lourds particulires Trafic moyen annuel taux taux [106 vh/an] nombre [108 vh nombre [108 x km] vh x km] 7,3 4,8 6,0 6,0 7,6 7,7 7,7 4,0 3,0 5,4 3,6 5,8 8,5 0,2 0,3 1,1 0,9 1,6 1,7 3,9 4,5 1,0 1,9 7,3 3,7 4,2 1,7 11,0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 13 1,6 3,0 10,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 1,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,5 1,5 1,5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 17 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 40,0 22,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 12,7 12,9 Longueur [m] Tous vhicules taux nombre [108 vh x km] 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 21 1,3 2,0 8,0 8,1 0 0,0 0,0 19,0 0,0 0,0 0,7 1,1 6,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,5 0,0 0,0 8,6 5,4 3,0 2,0 5,0 1,0
Type de circulation
Pays
Tunnel
Annes observes
Dullin Vuache France Chatillon St.Germain de trafic uniJoux directionnel Aguas Santas Portugal Karra Sude Sorvik Askloster Perjen Autriche Amberg Pfnder Lpine France Chamoise trafic Hvaler bidirectionnel Flekkeroy Norvge Ellingsoy Valderoy Windo Sude Arlberg Autriche Katschberg Tauern Frejus tunnels France/Italie Mont Blanc daltitude avec trafic Kan-etsu Japon bidirectionnel Gothard Seelisberg Suisse San Bernardino Belchen
1 500 1 400 700 1 200 300 400 200 300 2 900 3 000 6 720 3 100 3 300 3 800 2 300 3 500 4 500 500 14 000 5 400 6 400 12 900 11 600 11 000 16 900 9 300 6 600 3 200
1984 - 1991 1990 - 1993 1990 - 1992 1990 - 1992 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1985 - 1988 1984 - 1991 1988 - 1992 1989 - 1990 1989 - 1990 1988 - 1990 1988 - 1990 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1980 - 1991 1985 - 1992 1985 - 1995 1981 - 1987 1981 - 1987 1968 - 1987 1978 - 1986
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Table 2.3.2 - Occurrence of tunnel fires in rural motorway tunnels [18; 21; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33]
Flow of traffic
Country
Tunnel
Length [m]
Years inquired
Aguas Santas Karra Sweden Sorvik Askloster Perjen Austria Amberg Pfnder L'Epine France Chamoise bidirectional Hvaler traffic Flekkeroy Norway Ellingsoy Valderoy Windo Sweden Arlberg Austria Katschberg Tauern Frejus mountain France/Italy Mont Blanc tunnels with bidirectional Kan-etsu Japan traffic Gothard Switzerland Seelisberg San Bernardino Belchen Portugal
1500 1400 700 1200 300 400 200 300 2900 3000 6720 3100 3300 3800 2300 3500 4500 500 14000 5400 6400 12900 11600 11000 16900 9300 6600 3200
1984 - 1991 1990 - 1993 1990 - 1992 1990 - 1992 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1985 - 1988 1984 - 1991 1988 - 1992 1989 - 1990 1989 - 1990 1988 - 1990 1988 - 1990 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1987 - 1991 1980 - 1991 1985 - 1992 1985 - 1995 1981 - 1987 1981 - 1987 1968 - 1987 1978 - 1986
Cases of fires Average passenger cars lorries annual traffic rate rate 6 8 [10 number [108 veh numbe [10 veh/year] r veh x km] x km] 7.3 1 1.6 0 0.0 4.8 1 3.0 0 0.0 6.0 1 10.4 0 0.0 6.0 0 0.0 1 3.4 7.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 7.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 7.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 4.0 3.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 5.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 3.6 5.8 1 0.6 1 40.0 8.5 1 1.5 5 22.6 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 1.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 1.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 1.7 3.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 4.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1.0 3 3.5 6 12.7 1.9 4 1.5 17 12.9 7.3 13 1.5 3.7 4.2 1.7 11.0 -
all vehicles rate number [108 veh x km] 1 1.3 1 2.0 1 8.0 1 8.1 0 0 0 0.0 0 0.0 19.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.7 2 1.1 6 6.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 8.6 21 5.4 3.0 2.0 5.0 1.0
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En comparant les taux des tableaux 2.3.1 et 2.3.2, il faut au moins conserver lesprit les conditions mentionnes ci-avant [18 ; 21 ; 31 ; 32] : en gnral, les incendies dans les tunnels routiers sont des vnements rares, aussi la signification statistique des taux dincendies est-elle limite ; un seul incendie peut considrablement modifier ces taux ; en Suisse, le poids des vhicules lourds est limit 28 tonnes, alors quaux PaysBas il est limit 50 tonnes ; les taux indiqus pour la Suisse (tableau 2.3.2) reprsentent le nombre dinterventions des pompiers ; dans le Tunnel de lElbe en Allemagne ainsi que dans les tunnels franais cits, chaque incendie dtect est comptabilis, cest--dire mme ceux qui sont teints par le conducteur du vhicule lui-mme ; la proportion de poids lourds varie, pour les diffrents tunnels, denviron 9 % jusqu 55 % (pour le Tunnel du Frjus) ; dans de nombreux tunnels, le transport de marchandises dangereuses est soumis des rglementations spciales (par exemple, passage autoris seulement pendant les heures creuses, guidage et contrle durant la traverse du tunnel). Dans un nombre important de tunnels, il est interdit.
Cependant, partir des taux indiqus dans les tableaux 2.3.1 et 2.3.2, les points suivants ressortent : le taux moyen dincendie dans les tunnels routiers ne dpasse en aucun cas 25 incendies par 108 vhicules x km ; selon les statistiques disponibles ce jour, les tunnels urbains semblent avoir un taux dincendie plus lev que les autres ; 40 % des tunnels observs nont jamais connu dincendie ; dans plusieurs tunnels (par exemple, Chamoise, Elbe, Frjus, Mont Blanc), le taux dincendie des poids lourds est bien plus lev que celui des vhicules particuliers ; une frquence vnementielle denviron un incendie par mois un incendie par an et par tunnel se rencontre seulement pour les tunnels qui sont soit trs longs, soit trs circuls, soit les deux ; une trs large majorit de tunnels ont beaucoup moins dincendies.
Comme indiqu par le taux dincendie plus lev, les incendies impliquant des poids lourds sont, dans certains tunnels, plus frquents malgr leur trafic peu lev. Ainsi, les donnes relatives au Tunnel de lElbe montrent quen moyenne, les poids lourds causent approximativement 30 % des incendies alors quils comptent pour seulement 15 % environ du trafic total en semaine [20 ; 34].
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When comparing the rates of tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 at least the conditions mentioned beneath should be kept in mind [18; 21; 31; 32]: in general fires in road tunnels are rare events, so the statistical significance of the rates of fires is limited; the rates can change considerably by only one fire event;
in Switzerland the weight for heavy vehicles is limited to 28 tons, whereas in the Netherlands it is limited to 50 tons; the rates quoted for Switzerland (table 2.3.2) represent the number of times the fire brigade had to intervene; in the German Elb Tunnel as well as in all the French tunnels mentioned every detected fire is counted i.e. including those which are extinguished by the vehicle driver himself; the proportion of heavy goods vehicles varies from about 9% to about as high as 55% (Frjus tunnel) for the different tunnels; in several tunnels hazardous transports are subjected to special regulations (e.g. restriction to times with low traffic, guidance and supervision during passing through the tunnel). In quite a number of tunnels they are prohibited.
Nonetheless from the rates for the tunnels quoted in tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 the following items show up: the average rate of fire in road tunnels does not exceed 25 fires per 108 vehicles x km in any of the cases; according to the statistics available up to now urban tunnels tend to have a higher fire rate than other tunnels; in about 40% of the observed tunnels no fire occurred; in several tunnels (e.g. Chamoise, Elb, Frjus, Mont Blanc) the rate for lorry fires is considerably higher than for private cars; an event frequency span of about 1 fire per month to 1 fire per year per tunnel applies only to tunnels which are either very long, or with much traffic, or both. A very large majority of tunnels have far less fires.
As indicated by the higher fire rate, fire events involving lorries are in some tunnels more frequent than inferred from their traffic rate. So the Elb Tunnel data show that, on average, lorries cause approximately 30% of the fire cases although they account only for about 15% of total traffic on weekdays [20; 34].
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Dans une tude franaise, mene sur 400 x 106 km parcourus en souterrain par des poids lourds, les incendies dans 26 tunnels ont t analyss et approximativement classs selon leur importance vis--vis de lenvironnement souterrain (tableau 2.3.3). La puissance thermique des incendies considrs comme causant quelques dommages au tunnel est estime tre infrieure 20 MW. Une puissance de plus de 20 MW est considre seulement pour les trs graves incendies [36]. Ainsi, les incendies graves sont des vnements trs rares, mme vis--vis du nombre total de poids lourds dans les tunnels (tableau 2.3.3).
Tableau 2.3.3 - Estimation des taux dincendie dans des tunnels franais [35 ; 36]
Classification des incendies Voitures Poids lourds sans marchandises dangereuses Poids lourds transportant des marchandises dangereuses
Incendies de toutes importances
Incendies trs graves Incendies de toutes importances Incendies impliquant les marchandises dangereuses
Selon les premires donnes dune tude franaise, le taux dincendie dun camion lair libre semble tre quelque peu infrieur au taux dincendie dans les tunnels [35 ; 36]. Mais ce rsultat devra probablement tre rvis lorsque plus dinformations seront rassembles et que les schmas de classification utiliss par les diffrentes institutions concernes seront ajusts. De plus, il est probable que tous les incendies lair libre qui auraient pu avoir des rpercussions importantes sur un tunnel nont pas t rpertoris. Le risque quun vhicule prenne feu tend augmenter en cas de surchauffe du moteur (voies du tunnel en pente raide, tunnels prcds dune longue cte) et de surchauffe des freins (grandes descentes) [18 ; 21]. Sur une courte priode aprs louverture dun nouveau tunnel, il peut galement y avoir une tendance plus dincendies ainsi quil a t observ dans le Tunnel de lElbe [30]. Lorsque les conducteurs deviennent plus familiers avec lenvironnement du tunnel, le taux dincendie se stabilise un niveau infrieur. Comparativement au nombre total de pannes et daccidents dans les tunnels, les incendies sont rares. Des donnes allemandes et suisses montrent que seule une panne sur 100 500 est accompagne dun incendie [30 ; 32]. Quant aux accidents, un incendie survient dans environ un sur 10 20 accidents. Dans deux tunnels franais Lyon (Tunnel de Fourvire, Tunnel de La Croix Rousse), environ 40 % des incendies ont t matriss laide dun extincteur (6 cas). Pour 60 % des incendies (8 cas), lintervention des pompiers fut ncessaire [21].
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In a French study representing 400 x 106 km run by lorries underground, lorry fires in 26 tunnels were analysed and roughly classified according to their importance with regard to the tunnel environment (table 2.3.3). The heat release for fires classified as causing some damage to the tunnel is estimated to be below 20 MW. Only for the very serious fires a heat release of more than 20 MW is considered [36]. So, major fires are very rare events even in relation to the whole number of lorry fires in tunnels (table 2.3.3).
Table 2.3.3 - Estimation of fire rates in French tunnels [35; 36]
Classification of fire Passenger cars Lorries without dangerous goods Lorries transporting dangerous goods fires of any importance fires of any importance fires with some damage to the tunnel
very serious fires
Cases of fire 8 for 10 veh x km 1-2 8 1 0.1 to 0.3 (estimation) 2 (estimation) 0.3 (estimation)
According to first data given in a French study the lorry fire rate on open roads seems to be somewhat lower than in tunnels [35; 36]. But, probably this result has to be revised when more information is gathered and the classification schemes used by the different institutions involved are adjusted. Furthermore, probably not all fires in the open that might have caused important consequences in a tunnel have been recorded.
The risk of a vehicle fire tends to increase in situations of intensified motor heating (steep uphill lanes of tunnels, tunnels after a long uphill slope) and intensified brake heating (long downward slopes) [18; 21]. Also for a short period since the opening of a new tunnel there can be a tendency to more fire events as it was observed in the Elb Tunnel [30]. As the drivers become more acquainted with the tunnel environment the fire rate will stabilise on a lower level. In relation to the whole number of breakdowns and accidents in tunnels, fires are rare events. German and Swiss data show that only about 1 of 100 to 500 breakdowns is accompanied by a fire [30; 32]. In comparison with accidents in about 1 of 10 to 20 accidents fire is involved. According to two French tunnels in Lyon (Tunnel Fourviere, Tunnel La Croix Rousse) about 40% of the fires were blown out by a fire extinguisher (6 cases). In about 60% of the events (8 cases) the help of a fire brigade was needed [21].
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De par le monde, il y a eu trs peu dincendies trs srieux avec de graves consquences pour les conducteurs, les passagers, les vhicules et le tunnel. Ces vnements rares, mais graves, sont rsums au tableau 2.3.4 qui couvre une vaste priode, prs dun demi-sicle, de 1949 1995. Ces 16 vnements majeurs dans plus de 80 pays membres de lAIPCR eurent les consquences suivantes : risques pour les personnes (par exemple, usagers du tunnel, pompiers), chaleur, fume, gaz, manque doxygne et perte de visibilit conduisant des intoxications, suffocations, brlures et mme dcs (fort heureusement dans seulement 7 des 16 incendies, et pas plus de 7 dcs par incendie jusqu prsent) ; dans la plupart des cas, lors de blessures ou dcs donnant lieu des rapports, ces derniers ne mentionnent pas clairement si cela est d lincendie ou un accident avant qu'il ne dgnre en incendie (sauf pour le tunnel de Pfnder en 1995 et le tunnel dIsola delle Femmine en 1996 [40 ; 41]), destruction d'quipements tlcommunications), du tunnel (par exemple, clairage, ventilation,
dommages la structure du tunnel : les principaux sont lcaillage du bton, la surchauffe des armatures du bton, leffondrement du faux-plafond et des gaines de ventilation, srieux dgts ou destruction des vhicules incendis et des biens transports, fermeture du tunnel en raison de lincendie lui-mme, des dommages structurels et des indispensables travaux de rparation.
Les impacts de ce dernier aspect ne doivent en aucun cas tre sous-estims. Dans certain cas, la remise en tat a pris des semaines, voire des mois [20 ; 34]. Pendant ce temps, les encombrements de circulation sur les routes adjacentes au tunnel ferm sont une consquence invitable, tout spcialement dans les agglomrations.
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World-wide only very few fire events developed into major fires with serious consequences for the drivers and passengers, vehicles and tunnel constructions involved. These rare, but severe events are summarised in table 2.3.4 which covers a time span from the year 1949 to the year 1995 - nearly half a century. These 16 major events in the more than 80 PIARC member countries were accompanied by: risks for people (e.g. tunnel user, fire brigade); heat, smoke, gases, lack of oxygen and loss of visibility led to intoxication, suffocation, burns and even death (fortunately in only 7 of the 16 events, and in none of them more than 7 fatalities up to now); when there are reports about injured or dead people, in most cases it is not quite clear whether this is due to the fire event or to an accident before it developed into a fire event (except for the Pfnder Tunnel in 1995 and the Isola delle Femmine Tunnel in 1996 [40; 41]); destroying of tunnel equipment (e.g. lighting, ventilation, telecommunication);
damage to the tunnel construction: main effects are spalling of concrete, overheating of concrete reinforcement, collapse of false ceilings and ventilation ducts;
severe damage or loss of the burning vehicles and their goods; close down of the tunnel due to the fire event itself, the structural damage and the necessary repair work thereafter.
The effects of this latter aspect should on no account be underestimated. In some cases, redevelopment can take weeks or months [20; 34]. During this time traffic congestion on the roads in the vicinity of the closed tunnel is an almost inevitable result especially in built-up areas.
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Tableau 2.3.4 - Incendies graves dans des tunnels routiers [20 ; 31 ; 34 ; 37 ; 38 ; 39 ; 40 ; 41]
Anne 1949 1968 1975 1976 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1984 1987 1993 Tunnel Holland L = 2 550 m Moorfleet L = 243 m Guadarrama L = 3.330 m B6 L = 430 m Velsen L = 770 m Nihonzaka L = 2 045 m Kajiwara L = 740 m Caldecott L = 1 028 m Frjus L = 12 868 m Felbertauern L = 5 130 m Gotthard L = 16 321 m Gumefens L = 340 m Serra Ripoli L = 442 m Gotthard L = 16 321 m Lieu et pays New York tats-Unis Hamburg Allemagne Guadarrama Espagne Paris France Velsen Pays-Bas Shizuoka Japon Japon Vhicules lorigine de lincendie
Cause probable
Dure de lincendie 4h
1 camion charg de 11 t chute de la charge du camion de bisulfure de carbone 1 camion remorque blocage des freins (14 t de sacs en polythne) 1 camion citerne charg de inconnue rsine de pin 1 camion charg de 16 t de inconnue paquets de polyester 2 camions + 4 voitures 4 camions + 2 voitures 1 camion (4 t) avec 3 600 l de peinture dans 200 bidons + 1 camion (10 t) 1 camion + 1 car + 1 voiture 33 000 l dessence 1 camion charg de matires plastiques 1 autobus collision frontale collision frontale collision contre et renversement collision frontale rupture de la bote de vitesses blocage des freins la paroi
Consquences sur Vhicules Tunnel par 10 camions Importants dgts sur 200 m de 13 voitures 1 remorque 1 camion 1 camion Importants dgts sur 34 m Importants dgts sur 210 m Dgts sur 150 m
1 h 30 2 h 45 1h
1 h 20 4 jours
12 blesss lgers par inhalation de fume 5 morts 5 blesss 7 morts 2 blesss 1 mort
Importants dgts sur 30 m Importants dgts 1 100 m Dgts sur 280 m sur
Oakland tats-Unis Modane France-Italie Autriche Goeschenen Suisse Bern Suisse Bologne Italie Goeschenen Suisse
2 h 40
3 camions + 4 Importants dgts sur 580 m voitures + 1 car 1 camion Importants dgts sur 200 m 1 autobus 1 camion 2 camions 1 camionnette 4 camions 11 voitures 1 camion + remorque Dgts au plafond et aux quipements sur 100 m Importants dgts sur 30 m Dgts lgers Importants dgts au revtement Importants dgts au plafond, la chausse et aux quipements sur 50 m, tunnel ferm pendant deux jours et demi Importants dgts au plafond et aux quipements, tunnel ferm pendant deux jours et demi Dgts au revtement du tunnel et aux appareils dclairage
1994
1 camion charg de rouleaux incendie au moteur de plastique 1 camion collision en chane sur route glissante 1 voiture + 1 camion charg perte de contrle dun vhicule de rouleaux de papier et collision 1 camion + remorque frottement des roues / charge de vlos emballs mauvais chargement de la de carton et de plastique remorque 1 camion, 1 camionnette, collision 1 voiture 1 camion citerne rempli de chausse humide, collision gaz liquide + 1 petit autobus dun autobus avec un camion citerne ( larrt en raison dune prcdente collision), explosion
1995
Autriche
1h
Italie (Sicile)
inconnu
1996
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Table 2.3.4 - Serious fires in road tunnels [20; 31; 34; 37; 38; 39; 40; 41]
Year 1949 1968 1975 1976 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1984 1987 1993 Tunnel Holland L = 2.550 m Moorfleet L = 243 m Guadarrama L = 3.330 m B6 L = 430 m Velsen L = 770 m Nihonzaka L = 2.045 m Kajiwara L = 740 m Caldecott L = 1.028 m Frjus L = 12.868 m Felbertauern L = 5.130 m Gotthard L = 16.321 m Gumefens L = 340 m Serra Ripoli L = 442 m Gotthard L = 16.321 m Place and country New York USA Hamburg Germany Guadarrama Spain Paris France Velsen Netherlands Shizuoka Japan Japan Oakland USA Modane France-Italy Austria Goeschenen Switzerland Bern Switzerland Bologna Italy Goeschenen Switzerland Vehicles at origin of fire 1 lorry loaded with 11 t of carbon bisulfur 1 lorry trailer (14 t of polyethene bags) 1 lorry loaded with tanks of pine resin 1 lorry loaded with 16 t of polyester in bundles 2 lorries + 4 cars 4 lorries + 2 cars 1 truck (4 t) with 3.600 l paint in 200 cans + 1 truck (10 t) 1 lorry + 1 coach + 1 car 33.000 l of petrol 1 lorry loaded with plastic materials 1 bus 1 lorry loaded with rolls of plastic 1 lorry 1 car + 1 lorry loaded with rolls of paper 1 lorry + trailer loaded with bikes wrapped in carton and plastic 1 lorry + 1 van + 1 car Probable cause load falling of lorry brakes jamming unknown unknown front-back collision front-back collision collision with side wall and overturning front-back collision gear box breaking blocking brakes fire in engine mass collision on slippery road vehicle out of control and collision friction wheel/ loading bridge Consequences on Vehicles Tunnel 4h 66 injured 10 lorries serious damage for 200 smoke inhalation 13 cars m 1 h 30 mn none 1 trailer serious damage for 34 m Duration of fire People (1) 2 h 45 mn none 12 slight injured smoke inhalation 1 h 20 mn 5 dead 5 injured 4 days 7 dead 2 injured 1 dead 2 h 40 mn 7 dead 2 injured 1 h 50 mn none 1 h 30 mn none 24 mn 2h none 2 dead 1h 1 lorry 1 lorry 2 lorries 4 cars 127 lorries 46 cars 1 truck (4 t) 1 truck (10 t) 3lorries+4cars + 1 coach 1 lorry 1 bus 1 lorry 2 lorries 1 van 4 lorries 11 cars 1 lorry + trailer serious damage for 210 m damage for 150 m serious damage for 30 m serious damage for 1.100 m damage for 280 m serious damage for 580 m serious damage for 200 m damage to ceiling and equipment for 100 m serious damage for 30 m slight damage serious damage to lining serious damage to ceiling, pavement and equipment for 50 m, tunnel closed for 2.5 days serious damage to ceiling and equipment, tunnel closed for 2.5 days damages to the tunnel lining and lighting equipment
1994
Austria
collision
1h
Italy (Sicilia)
wet road collision of a bus with a tanker (stopped because of a previous collision), explosion
unknown
1 lorry 1 van 1 car 5 dead (by fire) 1 tanker 20 injured 1 bus 18 cars
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II.4
Les matriaux qui brlent au cours dun incendie proviennent essentiellement des vhicules impliqus. Ce sont des lments des vhicules, tels que siges, pneus, matires plastiques utilises pour les finitions, voire pour la carrosserie elle-mme, le carburant contenu dans les rservoirs (dont le volume se monte des centaines de litres pour les camions), ainsi que le chargement transport, principalement en ce qui concerne les vhicules de transport de marchandises. La nature des marchandises transportes est extrmement variable et peut provoquer de multiples varits dincendies. Quelques exemples de charge calorifique sont donns au tableau 2.4.1.
Tableau 2.4.1 - Exemples de charge calorifique [20 ; 42]
Type de vhicule Voitures particulires Voiture particulire Voiture en matire plastique Autobus
Charge combustible d'un transport international routier
Des caractristiques diffrentes de lincendie sont ncessaires, selon que lon veut dimensionner la structure du tunnel ou les quipements de ventilation (dsenfumage) : le dimensionnement de la rsistance au feu des structures est fond sur la temprature de lair chaud (C) en fonction du temps ; le dimensionnement de la ventilation est fond sur la puissance thermique (en MW) ou sur le dbit de fume (mesur en m3/s la temprature des fumes chaudes) en fonction du temps ; lvolution en fonction du temps est trs importante pour valuer les conditions au dbut de lincendie, en prenant en compte la phase dvacuation (dlai darrive et dorganisation des pompiers).
Pour le dimensionnement, il est ncessaire de choisir des caractristiques types dincendie correspondant au trafic empruntant un tunnel donn. Des conditions telles que lautorisation des transports de marchandises dangereuses doivent tre prises en compte. Dans ce qui suit, les donnes sont communiques pour les vhicules particuliers, les autobus et les camions ; ces donnes sont fondes sur les essais dincendie EUREKA sur les vhicules routiers et le rapport de Bruxelles (Congrs AIPCR) [19 ; 20 ; 43 ; 44]. Pour les camions citernes, ce sont les donnes de KIVI [42] et du Tunnel dOresund [43] qui sont utilises.
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II.4
The materials which burn in a fire mostly come from the vehicles involved. They include elements of the vehicles such as the seats, tyres, plastic materials in the finishing, or even in the body work itself, the fuel from the vehicle tanks, which amounts to hundreds of litres for trucks, and the loading, principally for goods vehicles. This latter can be extremely varied and lead to many different sorts of fires. Some principle examples of combustion energy outputs are given in table 2.4.1.
Type of vehicle Private cars Private car Plastic car Public bus TIR fire load Heavy goods vehicle Tanker with 50 m petrol
Approx. energy content [MJ] 3 000 - 3 900 6 000 7 000 41 000 65 000 88 000 1 500 000
Different fire characteristics are needed depending on whether the purpose is to design the tunnel structure or the ventilation facilities (smoke control): The design of structures for fire resistance is based on the temperature of the hot air (C) versus time. The design of ventilation is based on the heat release rate (thermal power in MW) or the smoke release rate (flow at the temperature of the hot smoke in m3/s) versus time. The dependence upon time is very important to evaluate the conditions at the beginning of the fire, taking into account the evacuation phase (time for fire brigade to arrive and get organised).
For design purposes, it is necessary to choose typical fire characteristics corresponding to the traffic which uses a particular tunnel. Conditions like the allowance of hazardous transports have to be taken into account. In the following, data is given for passenger cars, buses and lorries which are based on the EUREKA fire-tests on road vehicles and the Brussels report of PIARC [19; 20; 43; 44]. For petrol tankers data from KIVI [42] and the Oresund Tunnel [43] are used.
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Il faut souligner que tous les rsultats EUREKA dpendent bien videmment des conditions dessais. Celles-ci incluent de basses vitesses de lair durant la plupart des essais et une section transversale sensiblement plus petite que dans les tunnels routiers habituels, ce qui survalue le rayonnement thermique renvoy par les parois. Lessai avec un poids lourd, par ailleurs, a t fait spcialement avec une vitesse longitudinale de lair de 6 m/s en avant de lincendie pendant les 15 premires minutes, ce qui donnait en moyenne environ 13 m/s autour du vhicule : une telle vitesse est significativement suprieure ce qui est gnralors des essais dincendie EUREKA lement rencontr dans les tunnels routiers et elle produit galement une combustion plus intense. En consquence, les essais EUREKA donnent des indications prcieuses sur les conditions durant un incendie, mais ils peuvent difficilement fournir par eux-mmes de nouvelles valeurs ralistes de dimensionnement. Aucune donne nouvelle nest disponible en ce qui concerne les incendies de marchandises dangereuses.
Photo 2.2 - Incendie de poids lourd Photo 2.2 - Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) fire in the EUREKA fire tests
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It must be emphasised that all the EUREKA results are of course dependent upon the test conditions. These include low air velocities during most of the tests and a cross-section significantly smaller than usual for road tunnels, which overestimates the heat radiation coming back from the walls. The test with a Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) on the other hand was specifically conducted with a longitudinal air velocity of about 6 m/s ahead of the fire during the first 15 minutes, which gave about 13 m/s on average around the vehicle: such a velocity is significantly higher than what is normally encountered in road tunnels and also produces a more intense combustion. As a consequence the EUREKA tests give valuable hints about the conditions during a fire event, but they can hardly provide new realistic design values on their own. No new experimental data is available concerning dangerous goods fires.
Poids lourd (HF1) Autobus (B11) Voiture en matire plastique (C21) Vhicule particulier (C11)
Figure 2.4.1 - Maximum temperatures in the cross-section of the tunnel during tests with road vehicles [20]
Figure 2.4.1 - Tempratures maximales dans la section transversale du tunnel lors dessais avec des vhicules routiers [20]
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Comme le montre la figure 2.4.2 dans les essais EUREKA, des tempratures potentiellement dangereuses pour les armatures du bton ont t enregistres jusqu environ 100 m en aval de lincendie et, en raison de la remonte de fumes, jusqu environ 30 m en amont. Ltendue de cette zone peut tre sensiblement diffrente selon les tunnels, en raison notamment de la ventilation, de la dclivit du tunnel, de la rugosit de la surface et des revtements rsistant au feu. Une nouvelle valuation des rsultats dEUREKA est ncessaire pour parvenir des spcifications plus globales des zones menaces.
plastique
Dans lensemble, les tempratures maximales suivantes au niveau des parois ou du plafond doivent tre considres en ce qui concerne la structure du tunnel et les rglementations du trafic poids lourds pour des tunnels spciaux :
voiture particulire 400 C autobus/petit camion 700 C poids lourd (HGV) avec matires combustibles (sauf essence ou autres marchandises dangereuses) 1 000 C camion citerne dessence (cas gnral) 1 200 C camion citerne dessence (cas extrmes : par exemple, aucun bnfice tir du drainage du tunnel et d'un dbit de fuite limit ; grande citerne ; viter linondation dun tunnel immerg) 1 400 C
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As can be seen by figure 2.4.2 in the EUREKA tests, temperatures which can be dangerous to the steel reinforcement of concrete were found till about 100 m downstream of the fire and because of back-layering till about 30 m upstream of the fire. The extension of this region in various road tunnels can be quite different from these values due to e.g. the ventilation, tunnel inclination, surface roughness and fire-resistant coatings. For a more general specification of endangered regions a further evaluation of the EUREKA results is necessary. On the whole the following maximum temperatures at the tunnels wall or ceiling should be considered with regard to the tunnel structure and the cargo-traffic-regulations for specific tunnels: passenger car 400 C * bus/small lorry 700 C * heavy lorry (HGV) with burning goods (not petrol or other dangerous goods) 1 000 C petrol tanker (general case) 1 200 C petrol tanker (extreme cases: e.g. no benefits due to tunnel drainage and limited leakage rate; large tanker; avoidance of the flooding of an immersed tunnel) 1 400 C
*: Higher if flames touch the walls.
Figure 2.4.3 - Time dependency of temperatures in Eureka tunnel fires and standard curves used in regulations upon fire protection [43; 44; 45]
Figure 2.4.3 - Tempratures en fonction du temps dans les incendies de tunnel Eureka et courbes standard utilises dans les rglementations pour la protection contre les incendies [43 ; 44 ; 45]
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Ce comportement nest pas couvert par la courbe standard de temprature de la norme ISO 834 (voir figure 2.4.3). Cest pourquoi plusieurs courbes de tempratures ont t proposes, qui se rapprochent plus prcisment des phases importantes dun incendie dans un tunnel. Ces spcifications sont incluses par exemple dans : les rglementations nerlandaises du Rijkswaterstaat ([43 ; 44] : courbe RWS, voir figure 2.4.3), les normes allemandes "ZTV-Tunnel" ([45], voir figure 2.4.3).
Un fort gradient de temprature en dbut dincendie est inclus dans la courbe hydrocarbone (HC) qui est dcrite, en plus dISO 834, dans le projet Eurocode 1 [46]. La temprature maximale de 1 100 C est quelque peu infrieure celle des courbes RWS ou ZTV. Jusqu prsent, aucune de ces courbes na rencontr de consensus au niveau mondial. Les discussions portent sur : les courbes en fonction du temps proximit des incendies, la fixation dune dure approprie pour les courbes de rfrence (ISO, HC).
Eu gard la probabilit des diffrents incendies, il devrait y avoir plus de souplesse dans le choix des tempratures maximales pour, par exemple, les essais de matriaux sur les revtements rsistant au feu ou les quipements de ventilation. Les hypothses sur la dure dun incendie devraient galement tre distingues selon quil sagit de lincendie dun camion ou dune voiture particulire. La dure de la phase chaude dun incendie couvre normalement un intervalle de temps denviron 30 60 mn aprs ltape de mise feu (figure 2.4.3), sauf en cas dincendie dune nappe dessence importante provenant dun camion citerne. Dans ce dernier cas, les rglementations nerlandaises [42] indiquent une phase chaude denviron deux heures. Si les pompiers peuvent effectivement arriver rapidement (en quelques minutes) sur les lieux, la dure de la phase chaude sera plus courte. Aprs la phase chaude, il faudra du temps avant que l'incendie ne steigne sil n'y a pas d'action pour l'teindre. Les normes allemandes ZTV admettent environ 110 mn de temprature linairement dcroissante. Les essais EUREKA ont confirm la dure des incendies, mais ont montr un plus rapide dclin des tempratures juste aprs la phase chaude (figure 2.4.3). D'un autre ct, lincendie de Nihonzaka a dur quatre jours (tableau 2.3.4).
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This behaviour is not covered by the standard temperature curve according to ISO Standard 834 (see figure 2.4.3). Therefore several temperature curves were put forward which model important phases of a tunnel fire more closely. Specifications are included e.g. in the Dutch regulations of Rijkswaterstaat ([43; 44]: RWS-curve, see figure 2.4.3), German "ZTV-Tunnel" ([45], see figure 2.4.3).
A similar steep temperature gradient at beginning of the fire is included in the hydrocarbon (HC) curve which is described besides the ISO 834 in the draft of the Eurocode 1 [46]. The maximum temperature of 1100 C is somewhat lower than given by RWS or ZTV. Up to now none of the curves has found general acceptance world-wide. Discussions focus on : time shape of curves close to the progress of tunnel fires, and setting of appropriate duration of standard curves (ISO, HC).
With regard to the probability of the different fire events there should be more flexibility in choosing maximum temperatures for the purpose of e.g. material tests on fire-resistant coatings or ventilation equipment. Also the assumptions about the duration of a fire should be split according to fires of lorries and passenger cars.
The duration of the hot phase of a fire covers normally a time interval of about 30 minutes to 60 minutes after ignition stage (figure 2.4.3) if no big pool fire due to a petrol tanker is involved. For a big petrol tanker the Dutch regulations [42] indicate a hot phase of about two hours. If fire brigades which can deal with the fire effectively arrive soon (within some minutes) on the scene, the duration of the hot phase will be shorter. After the hot phase it will take time for the fire to die away if it is not extinguished. The German ZTV-Tunnel assumes about 110 minutes of linear temperature decaying. The EUREKA tests confirmed the duration of fires but show a steeper decline of temperatures just after the hot phase (figure 2.4.3). On the other hand the Nihonzaka fire lasted four days (table 2.3.4).
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Depuis, des progrs ont t raliss. En regroupant les essais dincendie EUREKA en Norvge et en Finlande, les donnes AIPCR de Bruxelles et les rcentes propositions du CETU (France), on peut faire apparatre les donnes approximatives suivantes de puissance thermique pour une dure significative dun incendie dans un tunnel [19 ; 20 ; 36] (exemple : figure 2.4.4, camion citerne dessence : voir tableau 2.4.2) : 1 petite voiture particulire : 1 grande voiture particulire : 2-3 voitures particulires : 1 camionnette : 1 autobus : 1 camion avec matires combustibles (cas gnral) : 2,5 MW 5 MW 8 MW 15 MW 20 MW 20-30 MW
Les poids lourds plus importants transportant des matires combustibles, et plus spcialement des marchandises dangereuses, peuvent produire de fortes puissances thermiques. Les essais dincendie EUREKA sur poids lourd ont rvl une puissance maximale denviron 100 120 MW, mais seulement sur une trs courte priode. Les puissances maximales relles peuvent scarter de ces valeurs car elles dpendent du type de vhicule, du type de cargaison, de la ventilation, des vitesses de combustion, etc. Pour les camions citernes dessence, les fuites provoques par un accident et la capacit du systme de drainage du tunnel ont galement une grande influence.
Dbit d'nergie
En ce qui concerne la construction du tunnel, les scnarios KIVI [42] tiennent compte dun incendie de 300 MW pour les tunnels immergs. Une proposition franaise prconise un incendie de 200 MW si un camion citerne dessence est impliqu [47]. Une analyse de risque pour le tunnel dOresund [43] considre la possibilit dune fuite de carburant partir de brches de diamtre quivalent 15, 35 et 50 mm. Cela reprsente une dfaillance potentielle dun tuyau de carburant de petit diamtre ou un lger dgt sur une collerette de tuyau, mais ne reprsente pas la rupture complte dun tuyau de livraison, ce qui quivaudrait un orifice de 100 mm de diamtre. Le dbit de la fuite dpend du diamtre de lorifice et de la pression du liquide. Pour les orifices considrs, les dbits massiques sont respectivement de 0,5, 2,7 et 5,6 kg/s.
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Since then further advances have been achieved. In summarising the EUREKA fire tests in Norway and Finland, the PIARC data from Brussels and recent CETU proposals in France the following approximate maximum calorific power outputs may occur for a significant duration during fire events in tunnels [19; 20; 36] (example: figure 2.4.4; petrol tanker: see table 2.4.2): 1 small passenger car: 1 large passenger car: 2 - 3 passenger cars: 1 van: 1 bus: 1 lorry with burning goods (general case): 2.5 MW 5 MW 8 MW 15 MW 20 MW 20-30 MW
Larger vehicles (HGV) with burning goods and especially with dangerous goods may cause higher calorific power outputs. The EUREKA HGV fire test indicated a peak power output of approx. 100 to 120 MW, but during a very short period only.
Real peak powers will differ from the values given above because they depend on the type of vehicle, type of cargo, ventilation, burning rates, etc. For petrol tankers there is also a great influence due to the leakage opening produced by an accident and the capacity of the tunnel drainage system.
Table 2.4.2 - Effect of leakage diameter and drainage rate on the fire size of petrol tankers [43] Tableau 2.4.2 - Effet du diamtre de la fuite et du taux de drainage sur la taille dun incendie d un camion citerne dessence [43]
Calorific power [MW] Equivalent diameter of leakage [mm] 15 35 50 Leakage mass flow of petrol [kg/s] 0.5 2.7 5.6 Drainage mass flow of petrol 0 kg/s 22 120 245 1 kg/s 76 201 2 kg/s 33 158 5 kg/s 27
0 kg/s
1 kg/s
2 kg/s
5 kg/s
With regard to the tunnel construction, KIVI scenarios [42] take a 300 MW fire for immersed tunnels into account. A French proposal claims a 200 MW fire if a petrol tanker is involved [47]. A risk analysis for the Oresund tunnel [43] considers the possibility of fuel leakage from ruptures of 15, 35, and 50 mm equivalent diameter. These represent the potential failure of small diameter fuel lines or a small damage of a delivery hose flange. They do not represent the complete rupture of a delivery hose which would give a hole diameter of 100 mm. The leakage flow depends on the diameter of the hole and the fluid pressure at the hole. For the holes considered the mass flows are 0.5, 2.7 and 5.6 kg/s respectively.
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La capacit de drainage (de leau) des avaloirs dans ce tunnel est normalement 10 fois suprieure, mais il a t admis que, lors dun accident, une obstruction peut limiter le dbit du drainage [43]. Les calculs pour diffrents scnarios dincendie ont donn des puissances thermiques comprises entre 22 et 245 MW (tableau 2.4.2). La variation de la puissance thermique en fonction du temps pendant les expriences EUREKA ressemble fort au dveloppement de la temprature (figures 2.4.2 et 2.4.3). Les modles mathmatiques doivent prendre en compte la puissance observe et les chutes de temprature.
Dbit de fume [m3/s] AIPCR 1987 Voiture particulire Voiture particulire en matire plastique 2-3 voitures particulires 1 camionnette Autobus / camion sans marchandises dangereuses Poids lourd Camion citerne 20 60 CETU Essais (proposition EUREKA ) 1996 30 50 - 60 30 50 80
Production de CO [kg/s]
100 - 200
300
6,0 - 14,0 -
0,306 - 0,714 -
Ltude compare de la perte de visibilit due la fume, mesure par la densit optique, et de la concentration de CO2 indique une corrlation linaire lorsquune correction est faite pour tenir compte de la temprature des gaz chauds [20 ; 43 ; 44 ; 48]. Lorsquun signal lumineux doit tre peru une distance denviron 10 m, la densit optique ne doit pas dpasser 0,13 m-1 [49]. Lors des essais EUREKA, cette valeur critique correspondait des concentrations de CO2 denviron 0,05 0,3 % seulement. Selon le matriau combustible, des valeurs maximales de CO2 de 2 16 % ont t enregistres. Ainsi, il y avait une production intense de fume qui engendrait une visibilit trs rduite en aval due la puissance de lincendie [48]. Dans une prochaine tape, ces calculs prliminaires seront poursuivis et les rsultats correspondants seront communiqus ds que possible.
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The drainage capacity (for water) of the gullies in this tunnel is normally 10 times greater but it was assumed that in an accident an obstruction could limit the amount of drainage [43]. The calculations for the different fire scenarios gave calorific power outputs between 22 MW and 245 MW (table 2.4.2). The time dependence of the heat release during the EUREKA experiments closely resembles the temperature development (figure 2.4.2, figure 2.4.3). Mathematical models should account for the observed power and temperature dips.
Table 2.4.3 - Smoke, CO2 and CO production [19; 20; 43; 44; 47; 48]
Smoke flow [m3/s] CETU PIARC EUREKA- (proposal) 1987 tests 1996 Passenger car Passenger van (plastic) 2 - 3 passenger cars 1 van Bus/lorry without dangerous goods Heavy goods vehicle Petrol tanker 20 60 100 - 200 30 50 - 60 30 50 80 300
The correlation of the smoke dependent visibility measured by the optical density and the concentration of CO2 indicates a linear relation when a correction for the smoke gas temperature is made [20; 43; 44; 48]. On the assumption that a lighted signal should be perceived over a distance of about 10 m the optical density must not exceed 0.13 m-1 [49]. During the EUREKA tests this critical value corresponded to CO2 concentrations of approx. 0.05% to 0.3% only. Depending on the burning material maximum values of 2% to 16% CO2 were observed. So, there was an intense smoke production leading to a very reduced visibility downstream from the fire load [48]. In a next step these preliminary calculations will be extended. Corresponding results will be reported when available.
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Des concentrations de CO de plus de 500 ppm ont t atteintes 10 15 mn aprs le dbut de lincendie ; elles ont dur environ deux heures pour lincendie de lautobus et environ 15 mn pour lincendie du poids lourd. Durant une exprience ralise avec une charge combustible mixte, des concentrations de CO de 500 ppm et plus ne se sont produites que 80 mn aprs le dbut de lincendie [49] et ont dur 90 mn. Les rsultats EUREKA dpendent trs largement du type de ventilation utilis dans le tunnel lors des essais dincendie. De plus, ils sont lis au type de matriau combustible. De fait, les rsultats EUREKA ne peuvent tre directement appliqus dautres tunnels. Cependant, ils indiquent quen aval des incendies, au moins pour les plus importants, il est besoin de prvoir la fuite et les secours en moins de 10 15 mn aprs le dbut de lincendie. On peut galement sattendre des concentrations dangereuses de CO dans la phase de progression dun incendie de vhicule [49]. En analysant les essais EUREKA, une corrlation linaire acceptable a t trouve entre les vitesses de production de CO2 et de CO [48]. Les rapports entre la production de masse de CO et la production de masse de CO2 stendent dapproximativement 0,015 0,073 lorsque l'on se limite aux incendies de vhicules et de leurs chargements [48]. Cela amne un rapport moyen de 0,051 pour un cart type de 0.015. Cette moyenne est utilise pour le calcul des vitesses de production de CO prsentes au tableau 2.4.3.
II.5
Les sections prcdentes prsentaient des informations importantes sur la probabilit des incendies et le dgagement de chaleur et de substances toxiques observs en ralit et au cours d'essais dincendie en vraie grandeur. Dans ce contexte, un certain nombre de scnarios dincendies doivent tre conus pour atteindre une stratgie optimale de prvention des incendies dans les tunnels. Jusqu prsent, seuls quelques sujets spcifiques sont dcrits dans les scnarios dincendies. Il devrait y avoir des scnarios dincendies pour : lingnierie de la structure des tunnels, les essais de matriaux pour la structure et lquipement du tunnel, le choix du systme de ventilation, lexploitation du tunnel, la formation du personnel devant affronter un incendie.
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CO concentrations of more than 500 ppm were exceeded from about 10 to 15 minutes from the start of the fire and lasted about 2 hours during the bus fire and about 15 minutes during the heavy goods vehicle fire. During an experiment with a mixed fire load CO concentrations of 500 ppm and more occurred not before about 80 minutes after the start of the fire [49] and lasted for 90 minutes. These EUREKA results depend very much on the different ventilation of the test tunnel during the fire tests. Further they are related to the type of burning material. So the EUREKA results may not be transferred directly to other tunnels. However, the EUREKA results indicate that downstream of fires there is, at least for bigger fires, a need for escape and rescue within about 10 to 15 minutes from the start of a fire. Harmful CO concentrations should be expected also in the progressive stage of vehicle fires [49]. When analysing the EUREKA tests, a reasonable linear correlation between the production rates of CO2 and CO was found [48]. The ratios of CO mass production to CO2 mass production cover a span from approx. 0.015 to 0.073 when restricting to vehicle and vehicle load fires [48]. This gives on the average a ratio of 0.051 with a standard deviation of 0.015. This average is used for the calculation of the CO production rates given in table 2.4.3.
II.5
The preceding chapters summarised important information about the probability of fires and the release of heat and toxic substances as observed in reality and 1:1 fire tests. Against this background a number of fire scenarios must be designed to get at an optimum fire prevention strategy for road tunnels. Up to now only special topics are covered by a description of fire scenarios. There should be fire scenarios for:
tunnel structure engineering, material testing for tunnel structures and equipment, the choice of ventilation systems, the operation of the tunnel, and the training of staffs dealing with a tunnel fire.
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Ces scnarios dincendies devraient inclure : des directives pour leur slection, une description du but du scnario, une dfinition trs prcise des paramtres dincendie (par exemple, puissance thermique en fonction du temps), les conditions de circulation, lorsque lon traite de la ventilation du tunnel et de son exploitation, des directives pour ltablissement des essais de matriaux, des spcifications pour les matriaux, les quipements et les structures par rapport aux stratgies de prvention des incendies.
Des exemples de spcifications sur les essais de matriaux existent entre autres dans les rglementations allemandes et nerlandaises (RWS-Curve [42], ZTV-Tunnel [45]). Un important paramtre de classement est la temprature des armatures du bton qui ne doit pas dpasser environ 300 C. En ce qui concerne la conception de la ventilation et lexploitation du tunnel, les paramtres les plus importants sont la taille et le nombre de vhicules impliqus (puissance de lincendie), les conditions de circulation au moment du dclenchement de lincendie (par exemple, circulation saccade), le type de circulation (uni- ou bidirectionnelle), la ventilation naturelle du tunnel et les possibilits de fuite pour les usagers en prsence de chaleur, fume et gaz toxiques. Parmi les diffrents types possibles dincendies, les suivants doivent tre examins : les incidents impliquant un seul vhicule (voiture, autobus, camion, citerne dessence), les collisions (de deux trois vhicules particuliers, dune voiture particulire avec un camion ou un autobus, dun autobus avec un camion).
Pour la conception, il ne parat cependant pas ncessaire denvisager les pires cas alors que leur probabilit de se produire est trs faible. Par exemple, trs rares sont les incendies qui rsultent dune collision alors que ce type dincident provoque les puissances thermiques et les tempratures les plus leves. Mais lorsque les consquences peuvent tre catastrophiques (par exemple, la rupture dun tunnel immerg), de tels scnarios doivent tre envisags lors du projet. Les consquences des incendies dans les conditions suivantes de circulation doivent tre approfondies selon les caractristiques du tunnel (par exemple, tunnel urbain) : trafic congestionn (par exemple, heures de pointe), embouteillage (d par exemple un autre accident), circulation dense, mais fluide (par exemple, probabilit accrue dincidents multiples entre vhicules).
Les plus mauvaises conditions ne sont gnralement pas prises en compte lors du dimensionnement, selon un quilibre entre les cots additionnels de construction et dexploitation, et limportance des risques (probabilit et consquences).
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These fire scenarios should include: guidelines for their selection, a description of the aim of the scenario, a thorough definition of the fire parameters (e.g. heat release versus time), the traffic situation encountered when dealing with questions about tunnel ventilation and operation, guidelines for the set-up of material tests, and specifications to be fulfilled by material, equipment and structure with regard to fire prevention strategies.
Examples of specifications about material testing are found in Dutch and German regulations for instance (RWS-Curve [42], ZTV-Tunnel [45]). An important rating parameter is the temperature at the concrete reinforcement which should not exceed approx. 300 C. With regard to the ventilation design and the operation of the tunnel the most important items are the size and number of vehicles (fire load) involved, the traffic situation at the time of the outbreak of the fire (e.g. a stop and go-situation), the mode of traffic flow (e.g. uni or bi-directional), the natural ventilation of the tunnel and the escape possibilities for people in the presence of heat, smoke and toxic gases. Among the possible fire loads the following vehicle fires should be examined: incidents with one vehicle (car, bus, lorry, petrol tanker), collision incidents (collision of two to three passenger cars, collision of a passenger car with a lorry or bus, collision of a bus with a lorry).
However, worst cases should not necessarily be considered for design when their probability is very low. For instance very few fires result from a collision whilst this case leads to the highest heat release rates and temperatures. If the consequences may be catastrophic (e.g. collapse of an immersed tunnel), such very severe scenarios should be taken into account for design.
The consequences of fire incidents in the following traffic situations should be investigated according to the characteristics of the tunnel (e.g. urban tunnel): congested traffic (e.g. rush hours), traffic jam (e.g. due to another accident), flowing dense traffic (e.g. increased probability of multiple vehicle incidents).
Also worst conditions are generally not considered in design, depending on a balance between extra construction/operational costs and importance of risk (probability and consequences).
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En ce qui concerne lefficacit des quipements d'vacuation et de secours, les points suivants doivent tre tudis : disponibilit dquipements de lutte contre lincendie (par exemple, extincteurs), disponibilit dquipements permettant de dtecter l'incendie et/ou d'informer l'exploitation du tunnel, dlai le plus court et dlai moyen darrive des pompiers, disponibilit des issues dvacuation, capacit du systme de ventilation en cas d'urgence, capacit de dsenfumage du systme de ventilation, gestion de la circulation pour permettre la sortie du tunnel aux vhicules non impliqus et qui se retrouvent en aval de lincendie.
Ces sujets sont rgulirement couverts dans les activits des bureaux d'tude pour des projets de tunnels spcifiques. Une plus grande normalisation serait trs utile pour dvelopper et prparer, par exemple, des stratgies de ventilation pour des situations durgence. Dans lensemble, un large ventail de scnarios dincendies de dimensionnement est possible selon lobjectif : construction de tunnel, quipement, exploitation. Cependant, le but des futurs travaux est de slectionner les incendies de dimensionnement les plus importants et de prparer une courte description des scnarios dincendie, comme le montrent les premiers exemples du tableau 2.5.1.
II.6
Selon les lments prsents dans ce chapitre, les futurs travaux sur le risque incendie devraient porter sur : analyses des incendies et essais pour spcifier de manire plus dtaille la production de CO et de suies et la zone visibilit rduite, dfinition plus prcise des scnarios dincendie, publication de directives pour les essais dincendie et leur valuation (par exemple, pour les revtements rsistant aux incendies).
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With regard to effective escape and rescue possibilities the following items should be considered: availability of fire fighting equipment (e.g. fire extinguishers), availability of equipment to detect the fire and/or inform the tunnel operator, earliest and average arrival time of the fire brigade, availability of emergency exits, emergency capacity of the ventilation system, smoke removal capacity of the ventilation system, traffic enforcement to get and keep not involved vehicles downstream of fire out of the tunnel.
These topics are regularly covered in consulting activities for specific tunnel projects. More standardisation would be very helpful for developing and preparing e.g. ventilation strategies for emergency situations. On the whole a broad spectrum of design fire scenarios is possible regarding their different aims (tunnel construction, equipment, tunnel operation). Therefore the intention of the further work is to select the most important design fires and to prepare a short description of the fire scenarios like the first examples in table 2.5.1.
II.6
According to the preceding chapters of this section further work on fire risk should be devoted to: analysis of fire events and tests to specify the production of CO, soot and lightabsorbing area more comprehensively, defining of fire scenarios in more detail, and issuing of guidelines for fire tests and their evaluation (e.g. with regard to fireresistant coatings).
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no.
Sujet Essai de matriau de construction pour des structures de tunnel immerg en bton arm, lorsque le transport de marchandises dangereuses, comme les camions citernes dessence, est autoris
- courbe temprature-temps dans le four dessai selon la courbe RWS - temprature maximale - la temprature des armatures mtalliques 1 350 C, dure du test : 2 ne doit pas dpasser 250 C. heures
Essai de matriau de construction La temprature des armatures mtalliques - courbe temprature-temps dans le four dessai selon la pour des structures de tunnel en ne doit pas dpasser 300 C. courbe ZTV-Tunnel bton arm, lorsque : - temprature maximale ZTV Tunnel, - les marchandises dangereuses 1 200 C, dure du test : Allemagne [45] sont autorises, 1 heure 50 mn (phase de - une rupture immdiate du tunnel refroidissement incluse) ou une arrive deau ne sont pas craindre Les acclrateurs et les quipements dalimentation lectrique doivent fonctionner Essai dacclrateurs pour les au moins 90 mn, lorsque lair chaud et la systmes de ventilation longitudinale fume (temprature : 250 C) les traversent et les entourent - suffisamment de puissance pour propulser la fume dans un sens du tunnel (par exemple, prise en compte de la perte de pousse des acclrateurs sous l'air chaud) - choix de lemplacement des acclrateurs le long du tunnel afin den placer suffisamment pour le dsenfumage dans les cas o certains dentre eux seraient endommags par lincendie - disponibilit dun mode de fonctionnement des ventilateurs qui permet de conserver des itinraires d'vacuation libres de toute fume
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Les quipements dessai doivent pouvoir produire de lair RABT 1994, Allemagn additionn de suies chaudes e [50] dune temprature de 250 C pendant au moins 90 mn. - donnes dincendie: voir n 2 - production de fume : environ. 60 m3/s ( une temprature de rfrence de 300 C) RABT 1994, Allemagn e [50]
Dimensionnement dun systme de ventilation longitudinale avec acclrateurs, capable de contrler un incendie de camion produisant une puissance calorifique denviron 20 MW.
AIPCR 72
Fire scenarios n.
o
Purpose
Description of the design fire - time dependence of the temperature in the test oven according to the RWS curve - maximum temperature 1350 C duration of the test burning: 2 hours - time dependence of the temperature in the test oven according to the ZTVTunnel - maximum temperature 1200 C duration of the test burning: 1 hour 50 minutes (decline phase incl.)
- temperature at the interface of heat insulation panels and the concrete of test of construction material for the tunnel structure may not exceed immersed reinforced concrete tunnel 380 C structures, when passing of dangerous goods like petrol tankers - temperature at the steel reinforcement of the tunnel structure may not exceed 250 is allowed C temperature at the steel reinforcement of the tunnel structure may not exceed 300 C test of construction material for reinforced concrete tunnel structures, when: - dangerous good are allowed and - an immediate tunnel collapse or water-intake is not anticipated the jet fans and their related equipment for the electrical power supply must work at least 90 minutes, when hot air and smoke (temperature: 250 C) is flowing through them and surrounding them
the test equipment must be able to deliver hot soot RABT 1994, Germany enriched air of a temperature of [50] 250 C for at least 90 minutes.
- enough power to push the smoke into one - fire data: see no. 2 - smoke generation: approx. direction of the tunnel (e.g. account for 60 m3/s (at a reference designing of a longitudinal ventilation thrust loss of fans in hot air) - choice of fan distribution along the tunnel temperature of 300 C) system with jet fans capable to for retaining enough fans for smoke control control a lorry fire event with a when some fans are damaged due to the calorific heat output of approx. fire 20 MW - availability of a fan operation mode which keeps emergency paths free from smoke
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III.2
Des informations concernant la production de fume et de chaleur lors dun incendie et les mouvements de la fume dans le tunnel ont t publies pour le XVIIIe Congrs mondial de la Route [19]. Des informations complmentaires sur les travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR sont donnes en rfrence [52].
III.3
Le dveloppement et la dispersion de la fume provenant dincendies dpendent principalement des facteurs suivants : alimentation ventuellement rduite en oxygne sur le site de lincendie, puissance thermique, chaleur convecte, pente longitudinale, type de ventilation, dimensions de lespace de circulation et obstructions possibles, pistonnement caus par tout vhicule en mouvement, influences mtorologiques (force et direction du vent).
Fondamentalement, on peut dire quen raison de la chaleur dgage au niveau du foyer, la fume est entrane au plafond et quelle se propage dans une direction lorsque la vitesse du courant dair longitudinal est leve (avec ou sans remonte en plafond), et dans les deux directions lorsque cette vitesse est faible. Il reste ainsi une couche dair relativement pur sur environ deux mtres au-dessus de la chausse, au moins pendant une courte priode.
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However, it has been deemed useful to include in this section some general information on smoke behaviour during tunnels fires. It can be a useful background to best understand the further sections of this report.
III.2
Information concerning smoke and heat generation from a fire and smoke movement along the tunnel was published at the XVIIIth World Road Congress [19]. Further information on past PIARC work is contained in the reference [52].
III.3
The development and dispersal of smoke resulting from fires depend mainly on the following factors: possibly reduced supply of oxygen to the fire site, heat release, heat convection, longitudinal slope, type of ventilation, dimensions of the traffic space and possible obstructions, thrust caused by any moving vehicles, meteorological influences (wind strength and direction).
Basically it can be said that due to the heat released around the fire site, the smoke is lifted up to the ceiling, and that it continues its flow in one direction when the longitudinal velocity is high (with or without backlayering), and in both directions when the longitudinal velocity is low. Thus there is a space without any smoke gases a couple of meters above the road surface - at least for a short period of time.
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Cependant, puisque la fume perd de la chaleur au niveau des parois du tunnel, elle se rafrachit et retombe le long des parois de chaque ct du tunnel. Par consquent, deux tourbillons se forment : ils entranent la fume vers le bas le long des parois froides et produisent un mouvement ascendant au milieu du tunnel. Si un vhicule se trouve dans le tunnel, deux tourbillons opposs se produisent [58]. En raison de la basse pression en aval du vhicule, la fume descend au milieu et remonte prs des pidroits. Tous ces tourbillons font que la fume redescend une certaine distance du foyer et envahit lespace auparavant libre de toute fume au niveau du sol. Les paragraphes suivants fournissent une description dtaille de la manire dont la fume se propage dans des incendies spcifiques de tunnels.
III.4
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However, since the smoke releases its heat at the tunnel walls, it cools down and flows down on both sides at the walls. Hence a pair of vortices develops: they bring the smoke down near the cold walls and produce an upward flow in the middle of the tunnel. If there is a vehicle in the tunnel, a pair of opposite vortices appears [58]. Because of the low pressure downstream the vehicle, the smoke flows down in the middle and streams upward near the tunnel walls. All these vortices make the smoke come down at some distance from the fire site and destroy the smoke-free ground zone. The following paragraphs provide a detailed description of how the smoke disperses in specific tunnel fires.
III.4
III.4.1 Fire tests using petrol as a fire source (Ofenegg and Zwenberg fire tests)
In order to gain at least a general insight into the temperature conditions and the amounts of smoke to be expected from a petrol fire, tests were performed very early in the Swiss Ofenegg tunnel [53] and the Zwenberg tunnel in Austria [54], both of them being abandoned railroad tunnels. The total cross-sectional area of the Zwenberg and Ofenegg tunnels was approx. 24 m2 which is much smaller than the cross-sectional area of normal road tunnels with two lanes, 2 2 which is between 45 m and 60 m .
In the Ofenegg tunnel as well as in the Zwenberg tunnel, petrol was poured into a concrete tub and then ignited. The petrol used was regular petrol (86% carbon and 14% hydrogen) with a 3 density of = 730 kg/m (at 15 C) and a lower calorific value of approx. 44 MJ/kg. The rate of burning of petrol in free air is a function of the fire area: first it increases as the fire site increases in size, then it remains constant when the fire site reaches an area of approx. 1 m2. 2 2 According to references [25] and [55], the rate of burning is 0.08 l/(m .s) to 0.1 l/(m .s) in the open.
In a tunnel, however, the conditions are much more complicated than in the open. The tunnel ceiling and the walls restrict the flow of the smoke. If there is no artificial fresh air supply sending air directly to the fire site, fresh air can only be supplied from two sides. In every possible ventilation case, the burning conditions are worse (less oxygen) than in the open. In the open, the flow of fresh air from the borders of the fire site into the centre of the fire is unhindered, and the smoke can easily flow off. The fire tests (in the Zwenberg tunnel) have shown that, depending on the test arrangement, the rate of burning in the tunnel was lower by the factor 0.52 to 0.65 compared to the fires in the open. When very large areas are covered with gasoline, this factor may be significantly lower. The area concentration (fuel amount per total tub area) in the Zwenberg tunnel was f = 29.4 l/m2, and in the Ofenegg tunnel it was only half as much.
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Schweiger [56] a ralis une valuation thermodynamique des essais du tunnel du Zwenberg pour une quantit de combustible de 200 l dessence ordinaire. Pour une flaque de 7 m2, lnergie totale disponible tait de 6 410 MJ. Une combustion stchiomtrique suppose cela aboutit une masse totale de produit de combustion (fume) de 2 322 kg (besoins en air et en essence pour la combustion). Une combustion stchiomtrique est le rsultat de la combustion de lessence avec le minimum dair ncessaire. Pendant lincendie du tunnel, il ny avait pas une combustion stchiomtrique.
Photo 3.1 - Exemple de dveloppement de fume pendant un essai dincendie dans un tunnel prs de Monaco
Photo 3.1 - Example of smoke development during a fire test in a tunnel near Monaco
En plus des composants CO2 et H2O rsultant dune combustion stchiomtrique, se sont galement forms du CO et du NOx. Cependant, la quantit de ces derniers tait faible (en concentration), ce qui signifie quil nest pas ncessaire de les prendre en compte lors de lquilibre thermodynamique. Lvaluation tait ensuite fonde sur lhypothse quil ne pouvait y avoir de condensation de vapeur deau dans la fume. La figure 3.4.1 montre la production par combustion stchiomtrique (CO2, H2O et N2 non brl) dans le tunnel en fonction de la dure de l'incendie pour 200 l dessence ordinaire. On peut observer que la totalit de lessence brle en 10 mn environ. Au dbut, les produits de combustion montrent un accroissement linaire rapide. Aprs 400 secondes, 2 100 kg de fume ont t produits. Ensuite, la production de fume dcrot fortement, et aprs 620 secondes, lessence est totalement brle. Durant les 400 premires secondes, la puissance thermique tait d'environ 15 MW. Lvolution de cet incendie tait pour l'essentiel indpendante du type de ventilation (transversale, transversale sans apport dair frais, semi-transversale, longitudinale avec une 3 vitesse de lair de 2 m/s). Le systme de ventilation tait conu pour fournir 30 m /s dair frais et aspirer 30 m3/s dair vici sur une longueur de 400 m. Ainsi, dans le cas de la ventilation transversale, il tait possible dextraire de lespace de circulation la totalit de la fume sur une distance denviron 200 m.
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Schweiger [56] made a thermodynamic evaluation of the fire tests in the Zwenberg tunnel for a fuel mass of 200 l of regular petrol. In a 7 m2 pool area the total available fuel energy was 6410 MJ. Based on an assumed stoichiometric combustion, this results in a total combustion product (smoke) amount of 2322 kg (fuel and air requirements for combustion). A stoichiometric combustion product amount is the result of the complete combustion of fuel with the necessary minimum amount of air. During the tunnel fire there was no stoichiometric combustion.
Figure 3.4.1 shows the stoichiometric combustion product mass (CO2, H2O and unburned N2) in the tunnel depending on the duration of the fire for 200 l of regular petrol. It can be seen that the complete fuel mass is burned within approx. 10 minutes. At the beginning, there is a rapid linear increase in the combustion product mass. After 400 seconds, 2100 kg of smoke have been produced. Then the production of smoke decreases greatly, and after 620 seconds the fuel is completely burned. During the first 400 seconds the thermal output amounted to approx. 15 MW. The progress of this fire was essentially independent of the type of ventilation (transverse ventilation, transverse ventilation without fresh air supply, semi-transverse ventilation, and longitudinal ventilation with an air velocity of 2 m/s). The ventilation system was designed to supply 30 m3/s of fresh air and to withdraw 30 m3/s of exhaust air over a length of 400 m. Thus it was possible in the case of the transverse ventilation to withdraw the complete amount of smoke produced from the traffic space within a distance of approx. 200 m.
In addition to the compo-nents CO2 and H2O resulting from a stoichiometric combustion, CO and NOx were formed as well. However, the amount of these components was small (within the ppm range), which means that they can be neglected in the thermodynamic balance. The evaluation was further based on the assumption that no condensation of the water vapour contained in the smoke took place.
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Pour convertir les masses de fume en volumes, il est ncessaire de connatre la temprature de la fume. Les tempratures thoriques de combustion stchiomtrique de lessence ordinaire sont denviron 2 000 C. Les tempratures relles en cas dincendie sont gnralement plus faibles, principalement parce que la combustion nest pas stchiomtrique, ou parce que la fume se mlange lair. Les essais raliss dans les tunnels de lOfenegg et du Zwenberg ont montr que les tempratures maximales le long du plafond au-dessus du foyer de lincendie variaient entre 800 et 1 200 C. La figure 3.4.2 montre la distribution gnrale de la temprature dans le tunnel en fonction du temps dans le cas dune ventilation longitudinale avec une vitesse longitudinale de 2 m/s. La temprature est la moyenne de toutes les mesures de temprature effectues sur une section test.
Temprature (C)
Figure 3.4.2 Distribution de la temprature mesure le long du tunnel une vitesse longitudinale de 2 m/s Figure 3.4.2 - Temperature progression measured along the tunnel length at a longitudinal velocity of 2 m/s
Site de l'incendie
Sortie nord
La figure 3.4.3 montre la situation avec une vitesse longitudinale un peu plus leve (4 m/s). Il est difficile de comparer directement les deux rsultats, puisque lvolution de la temprature est seulement disponible des laps de temps diffrents (ramener les chiffres aux mmes temps nest pas possible). De plus, le facteur suivant doit tre pris en compte : dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus basses, les flammes ne sont que modrment rediriges dans le sens du courant d'air. On peut noter une lgre remonte des fumes le long du plafond, contre-courant du flux principal. Cependant, dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus grandes, les gaz de fume sont totalement rediriges dans la direction du courant d'air. En gnral, on peut dire que les tempratures des fumes jusqu une distance denviron 200 m sont plus leves dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales de 4 m/s que dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus basses. A partir dune distance de 200 m, cependant, les tempratures sont plus faibles en raison de la vitesse longitudinale leve et de leffet de lchange thermique avec la paroi.
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In order to convert the smoke masses produced to smoke volumes it is necessary to know the smoke temperatures. The theoretical stoichiometric combustion temperatures of regular gasoline are about 2000 C. The real fire temperatures are usually much lower, mainly because the combustion is not stoichiometric, or because the smoke mingles with air. The fire tests performed in the Ofenegg tunnel and in the Zwenberg tunnel showed that the maximum local temperatures along the ceiling above the fire site were between 800 C and 1200 C. Figure 3.4.2 shows the main temperature distribution in the tunnel relative to time in the case of a longitudinal ventilation with a longitudinal velocity of 2 m/s. The temperature is the mean value of all temperature measurements performed in one measuring cross-section.
Figure 3.4.3 - Temperature progression measured along the tunnel length at a longitudinal velocity of 4 m/s
Figure 3.4.3 - Distribution de la temprature mesure le long du tunnel une vitesse longitudinale de 4 m/s
Figure 3.4.3 shows the conditions with a slightly higher longitudinal velocity of 4 m/s. It is not possible to directly compare the two measurement results with each other, since the temperature distribution is only available for different times (converting the figures to the same times is not possible). In addition, the following fact must be considered as well: in the case of lower longitudinal velocities, the flames are being redirected into the flow direction only to a small extent. There is still a minor backlayering of the flue gases along the ceiling, which is directed against the main flow. In the case of higher longitudinal velocities, however, the flue gases are completely redirected toward the flow direction. In general it can therefore be said that the flue gas temperatures up to a distance of approximately 200 m are higher in the case of higher longitudinal velocities of 4 m/s that in the case of lower longitudinal velocities. As of a distance of 200 m, however, temperatures decrease due to the higher longitudinal velocity and the resulting improvement in the heat transition into the rock.
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Lors de lutilisation dune ventilation semi-transversale rversible ou dune ventilation transversale, le systme de ventilation doit tre bascul aussi vite que possible de ltat de fonctionnement normal ltat de fonctionnement en mode dincendie (maximum dair vici, 0 25 % dair frais lintrieur de la zone dincendie ; voir V.5.4). Que ce soit dans le cas dune ventilation transversale ou dune ventilation semi-transversale rversible, la rduction de temprature dans lespace de circulation fut plus leve. Cela est d au fait qu'en s'loignant du foyer, de plus en plus de fume est aspire dans la gaine dextraction, librant ainsi lespace de circulation de toute fume. Les calculs [57] ont montr que si laspiration des fumes est effectue de manire concentre (plusieurs bouches d'extraction au-dessus de lincendie sont totalement ouvertes alors que les autres sont entirement fermes), la dispersion des fumes sera rduite au minimum.
Il nest pas possible de relater en dtails tous les rsultats des essais ; ce qui suit prsente donc uniquement les plus importants. Pour les dtails, voir [22].
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When using reversible semi-transverse ventilation or transverse ventilation, the ventilation system should be switched from normal operation to fire operation as soon as possible (max. exhaust air, 0% - 25% fresh air within the fire section; see V.5.4).
In both cases of a transverse ventilation and a reversible semi-transverse ventilation, the temperature reduction in the traffic space was much higher. This is because with increasing distance from the fire site, more and more exhaust fumes are sucked into the exhaust channel, thus clearing the traffic space of smoke. Calculation results [57] have shown that a concentrated flue gas withdrawal (several exhaust louvers above the fire are fully opened, while all others are fully closed) provides minimum dispersion of flue gases.
III.4.2 Fire tests using diesel oil as a fire source (Memorial Tunnel fire tests)
In the years 1993 to 1995, intensive fire tests were performed in an abandoned two-lane road tunnel (Memorial Tunnel) in West Virginia (USA). In contrast with the Zwenberg tunnel and the Ofenegg tunnel, the cross-section in this tunnel was representative of usual road tunnels (approx. 60.5 m2 without intermediate ceiling). Diesel oil was used as a fire source. The density 3 3 of diesel oil is between 815 kg/m and 855 kg/m (at 15 C), and the lower calorific value is 42.5 MJ/kg. In terms of weight percentage, diesel oil mainly consists of carbon (86%) and hydrogen (14%). The stoichiometric air consumption is 14.5 kg of air per kilogram of diesel oil. Except for the fact that diesel oil ignition qualities are not as good as those of petrol, there are no major differences between diesel oil and petrol in the case of a fire both in terms of smoke development and in terms of smoke dispersal. During the Memorial Tunnel fire test programme, a number of tests with different fire loads of 10 MW, 20 MW, 50 MW and 100 MW were performed in a 853 m long tunnel with a slope of 3.2%. The following ventilation systems were closely examined:
natural ventilation, longitudinal ventilation with jet fans, full transverse ventilation, partial transverse exhaust ventilation, partial transverse supply ventilation, two-zone partial transverse ventilation, partial transverse ventilation with single point extraction, partial transverse ventilation with oversized exhaust ports.
It is not possible to discuss all the test results in detail, so the following contains the most important results only. For detailed results see [22].
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1. Sans ventilation mcanique, la fume se propage par ventilation naturelle (effet de chemine) raison de 2,2 m/s (20 MW) ou 3,4 m/s (50 MW). Aprs 5 mn (20 MW) ou 3 mn (50 MW), la totalit de la section transversale de lespace de circulation est remplie de fume. 2. Des vitesses de lair de 2,5 (10 MW) 2,95 m/s (100 MW) furent suffisantes pour empcher la remonte de fume en plafond. Les effets thermiques des incendies ont considrablement rduit les dbits dair lintrieur du tunnel comparativement une situation normale (facteurs de rduction : 10 % (10 MW) 50 % - 60 % (100 MW)). 3. La ventilation transversale pure (air frais = air extrait) fut inefficace pour matriser les tempratures et la fume pour des incendies de 20 MW ou plus. 4. La ventilation transversale partielle avec soufflage, mais sans extraction d'air, ne permet pas une matrise efficace des tempratures et de la fume. La ventilation transversale partielle en deux cantons fut capable de contenir la fume et la chaleur dans des couches bien stratifies et proximit de lincendie. 5. La ventilation transversale partielle avec un seul point dextraction et la ventilation transversale partielle avec des bouches dextraction surdimensionnes sont comparables quant lextraction des fumes et se sont avres trs efficaces.
III.4.3 Essais avec des voitures et camions rels (projet EUREKA n 499 FIRETUN)
Lors de ces essais raliss en Norvge, une attention spciale a t porte la production et la dispersion des fumes provenant dincendie de vhicules (voitures et camions). La charge calorifique tait comprise entre 5 000 MJ (voitures) et 90 000 MJ (poids lourds) (voir chapitre II et [20]). Un des essais fut ralis avec de lheptane C7H16 (84 % C et 16 % H). La masse volumique de lheptane est denviron 680 kg/m ( 15 C) et sa capacit calorifique denviron 44,4 MJ/kg. Ainsi ce carburant est trs proche de lessence et du gasole. La valeur moyenne de la section transversale du tunnel tait dapproximativement 30 m 35 m. En comparaison avec les essais raliss avec de lessence, du gasole et de lheptane, il faut tout particulirement tenir compte de deux facteurs qui influencent considrablement la production et la dispersion des fumes lors dincendies impliquant des vhicules rels : les matriaux utiliss pour la construction du vhicule (sans chargement) ralentissent la propagation des flammes et sont difficilement combustibles ; les tempratures initiales aux parois du tunnel taient relativement basses ; de plus, les parois taient grossirement excaves et trs rugueuses, aussi le flux de chaleur se propageait-il rapidement vers le rocher.
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1. With no mechanical ventilation, the smoke spreads due to the natural ventilation (chimney effect) with 2.2 m/s (20 MW) or 3.4 m/s (50 MW), respectively. After 5 minutes (20 MW) or 3 minutes (50 MW), the whole cross-section of the traffic space is completely filled with smoke. 2. Air velocities of 2.5 (10 MW) to 2.95 m/s (100 MW) were sufficient to prevent backlayering. The thermal effects of the fires significantly reduced tunnel air flows compared to non-fire situation (reduction factors: 10% (10 MW) to 50% - 60% (100 MW)). 3. Full transverse ventilation (fresh air = exhaust air) was ineffective in management of smoke and temperatures for fire sizes of 20 MW or higher. 4. Partial transverse supply ventilation with no exhaust air did not provide effective temperature and smoke management. Two-zone partial transverse ventilation was capable of maintaining smoke and heat in well-stratified layers and in close proximity to the fire. 5. Partial transverse ventilation with single extraction and partial transverse ventilation with oversized exhaust ports are similar to concentrated smoke withdrawal and were very effective.
III.4.3 Fire tests with real cars and trucks (EUREKA project n 499 - FIRETUN)
In these tests performed in Norway, special attention was paid to the smoke development and the smoke dispersal resulting from the combustion of vehicles (cars and trucks). The fire load was between 5000 MJ (cars) and 90000 MJ (heavy goods vehicles) (see section II and [20]). One fire test was performed with n-heptane C7H16 (84% C and 16% H). The density of nheptane is about 680 kg/m (at 15 C), the calorific value is approx. 44.4 MJ/kg. So this fuel is very similar to gasoline or diesel oil. The mean value of the tunnel cross section was approx. 30 m - 35 m. As compared to fire tests performed with gasoline, diesel oil and n-heptane, special attention must be paid to two factors which heavily influence the smoke development and the dispersal of smoke in fires involving real road vehicles:
the materials used for the vehicle construction (without load) are flame-retardant and hardly combustible; the natural initial temperatures at the tunnel wall in the test tunnel were relatively low; in addition, the tunnel wall was roughly excavated and very rough, so that the heat released was rapidly conveyed to the rock.
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Ces deux facteurs ralentissent la production de chaleur et donc le dveloppement des fumes, et ils rduisent les tempratures par rapport aux incendies ayant du carburant comme source. Par ailleurs, ces incendies durent plus longtemps que ceux provoqus par du carburant. De plus, les tempratures des fumes baissent rapidement mesure quelles sloignent du foyer, de telle manire que les fumes retombent rapidement au sol. La section transversale du tunnel fut remplie de fume. A loppos dautres essais, o il y a normalement une zone libre de fume au-dessus du sol (au moins pendant un certain temps), cette zone nexistait pratiquement pas (sauf dans le cas dun incendie impliquant du bois). Ainsi, les conditions de cet essai furent sensiblement plus mauvaises que dans le cas dessais utilisant du carburant.
III.5
La dclivit a une influence importante sur la dispersion des fumes. Malheureusement, il nexiste pas encore aujourdhui de rsultats dessais comparables pour diffrentes dclivits de tunnels. Les essais correspondants sont encore raliser. Gnralement, on peut dire quen raison de leffet de chemine, la vitesse de dispersion des fumes augmente avec laccroissement de la dclivit du tunnel. Si les fumes sont refoules vers le bas avec une dclivit suprieure 3,2 %, comme ce fut le cas au Memorial Tunnel, et si lon veut viter la remonte des fumes, la vitesse longitudinale doit dpasser 3 m/s (100 MW).
III.6
Conclusion
La production et la dispersion des fumes dpendent dun certain nombre de facteurs et diffrent selon les incendies. En raison de l'effet thermique, la fume remonte vers le plafond prs du foyer et se propage dans le haut du tunnel, jusqu ce quelle refroidisse et retombe vers la chausse. A ce moment-l, la section transversale est en majeure partie remplie de fume. Dans de nombreux cas, une zone libre de fume se sera forme autour du foyer (au moins pendant un certain temps).
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Both factors retard the heat release and thus the smoke development, and they reduce the fire temperatures compared to fuel fires. On the other hand, these fires last much longer than fuel fires. In addition, the smoke temperatures decreased rapidly with increasing distance from the fire site, so that the smoke quickly cooled down and sank to the ground. The total tunnel crosssection was filled with smoke. In contrast to other fire tests, where there is normally a ground zone without smoke - at least for a certain period of time - there was no such free zone during these fires (except in the case of a wood fire). Thus the conditions were in this test significantly worse than in the case of fuel fires.
III.5
The slope of the tunnel has an important influence on the dispersion of the flue gases. Unfortunately, there are currently no comparable test results for various tunnel slopes available. Corresponding tests are still to be performed. In general it can be said that due to the chimney effect, the dispersion velocity of the flue gases increases with the increase in the tunnel slope. If the flue gases are to be pressed down against a tunnel slope higher than 3.2%, as was the case in the Memorial Tunnel tests, and if a backlayering is to be prevented, the longitudinal velocity should be higher than 3 m/s (100 MW).
III.6
Conclusion
The development and dispersal of smoke depends on a number of factors and is different from fire to fire. Due to the thermal buoyancy, the smoke is lifted up to the ceiling near the fire site and spread in the upper area of the tunnel, until it cools down and sinks back to the ground. From that point of time, the tunnel cross section is, for the major part, completely filled with smoke. In many cases, a ground-level zone free of smoke will - at least for a short period of time - be formed around the fire site.
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Puisque dans un tunnel, la capacit de ventilation est le seul paramtre capable de contrecarrer les effets dun incendie, le contrle de la vitesse longitudinale de lair apparat trs souvent comme le dnominateur commun de toutes ces tudes. Les moyens utiliss dans de telles tudes impliquent diffrentes mthodes (exprimentales ou numriques) et leur importance peut considrablement varier dune tude lautre. Ces tudes sont gnralement ralises pour des projets spcifiques de tunnel ou pour prparer des recommandations ou des rglementations. De nombreux rsultats exprimentaux et thoriques ont t obtenus ; la plupart dentre eux sont dun grand intrt. Les mthodes tant nombreuses, avec des cots, validits et rsultats diffrents, il nest pas toujours ais de reprer quel type dapproche est le plus appropri pour un problme donn. Un panorama gnral de ces tudes a donc sembl ncessaire pour classifier les mthodes disponibles selon leur intrt spcifique, et recommander le meilleur usage faire de chacune. Trois familles de mthodes ont t distingues : essais en vraie grandeur, essais chelle rduite et simulations numriques. Leur prsentation successive sera suivie de conclusions gnrales.
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Safety strategies: the investigations generally deal with the evaluation of opacity, toxic gases concentrations, air velocity fields, smoke movement, etc. Their results concern the definition of the ventilation rates, the geometric organisation of the flow rates, the emergency routes or the possibilities for fire brigades intervention. Influence of the fire on the tunnel structure and equipment: the walls and ceilings may suffer from the heat released by the fire. The situation may be dangerous in the case of an immersed structure or in the case of air ducts located above the ceiling of the tunnel. The fire may also cause severe damage to the equipment, and especially to the ventilation system.
As in a tunnel the ventilation capacity is the only parameter able to counterbalance the effects of a fire, the control of the longitudinal air velocity often appears of common interest for all these studies. The means used in such studies involve different methods (experimental or numerical) and their importance may significantly vary from one investigation to another. These studies are generally performed for specific tunnel projects or to prepare recommendations or regulations. Many experimental and theoretical developments have been performed and most of them are of great interest. With regard to such a number of methodologies with various costs, validity and results, it is not always obvious to know which kind of approach is best appropriate for a given problem. This is the reason why a general review of these studies seems to be necessary to classify the available methods according to their specific interest, and to recommend the best use of each one.
Three families of methods have been distinguished: full scale tests, small scale experiments and computer simulations. They will be examined successively before general conclusions are drawn.
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Les principales recommandations de lAIPCR, directement lies aux mthodes dtude, ont t publies dans le rapport de Bruxelles et, plus rcemment, dans le rapport de Montral [17]. Le rapport de Bruxelles [19] dfinit trois catgories dincendies de vhicules de dimensionnement (voiture particulire, autobus ou camion, marchandises dangereuses) et donne, pour chacune delles, des caractristiques relatives la source de lincendie (puissance thermique et production de fume maximales) et lextension de la couche de fume sous deux conditions de ventilation (vitesse faible et vitesse critique, qui est la vitesse longitudinale minimale de lair capable dviter le mouvement contre-courant, ou remonte, de la fume). Ces recommandations sont fondes sur les rsultats des importants essais en vraie grandeur mentionns prcdemment et ont t utilises de par le monde en vue de la dfinition des incendies de dimensionnement pour les systmes de dsenfumage. Le rapport de Bruxelles prsente galement les simulations numriques comme une nouvelle mthode de prvision dune situation dincendie dans un tunnel. Il est dit que "les outils informatiques permettent dutiliser la modlisation mathmatique pour comprendre les incendies dans les tunnels. Cela permet de mieux connatre linfluence de nombreux paramtres et donc, de rserver les essais en vraie grandeur au calibrage des modles". Le rapport de Montral [17] donne de nouvelles recommandations et les grandes lignes des thmes dvelopps dans le prsent rapport.
IV.3.1.2 Moyens
Ces programmes exprimentaux sont gnralement mens dans des tunnels dsaffects et requirent dimportants moyens financiers. Les principaux programmes dj raliss sont les suivants : tunnel de l'Ofenegg (Suisse, 1965) [59] : ces essais furent conduits afin dtudier les capacits de la ventilation en cas dincendie, dans le cadre des grands projets suisses des annes soixante. Linstallation tait un tunnel ferroviaire se terminant en cul-de-sac 190 m de la tte. Environ onze incendies furent provoqus laide de bacs dessence de 6,6 m 95 m. Les mesures portrent sur la temprature, la vitesse de lair, les concentrations en gaz (CO et O2) et la visibilit. tunnel du Zwenberg (Autriche, 1975) [60] : ce programme fut dcid en liaison avec deux importants projets dautoroutes en Autriche. Les systmes de ventilation longitudinale et semi-transversale furent tests. Les essais portrent sur un total de 30 bacs dessence. Les surfaces dessence enflamme taient de 6,8 m et 13,6 m. Les mesures portrent sur la temprature, les concentrations en gaz (CO, CO2, NOx, O2), lopacit et le taux de combustion.
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The major PIARC recommendations which are directly connected with the study methods have been published in the Brussels report and more recently in the Montreal report [17]. The Brussels report [19] defines three types of design road vehicle fires (private car, bus or truck, dangerous goods) and gives for each one some characteristics on the fire source itself (maximum heat release rate and smoke production) and the spread of the smoke layer under two ventilation conditions (low velocity and critical velocity - which is the minimum longitudinal airflow velocity able to avoid the backward propagation, or backlayering, of the smoke). These recommendations are based on the results of the large fire tests mentioned previously and have been used world-wide to define the design fire for smoke control systems. The Brussels report also mentions the computer simulations as a new method for predicting fire situation in a tunnel. It is said that "computer facilities also allow fire problems in a road tunnel to be solved on the basis of mathematical modelling. This will give further insight on the influence of many parameters, so that full scale tests must only be made to calibrate the mathematical models".
The Montreal report [17] gives new updated recommendations and outlines the topics developed in the present report.
IV.3.1.2 Means
These experimental programmes are usually held in disused tunnels. They require important financial means. The main programmes performed in the past are the following: Ofenegg tunnel (Switzerland, 1965) [59]: these tests were carried out in order to study the ventilation capacities in the case of a fire under the large Swiss tunnel projects of the sixties. The facility was a railway tunnel with a dead end located 190 m from the portal. About 11 fires were performed using petrol pools from 6.6 m to 95 m. The measurements concerned temperature, air velocity, gas concentrations (CO and O2) and visibility. Zwenberg tunnel (Austria, 1975) [60]: this programme was decided in connection with two major motorways projects in Austria. Longitudinal and semi-transverse ventilation systems were tested. The tests concerned a total of 30 pool fires. The ignited petrol areas were 6.8 m and 13.6 m. The performed measurements were: temperature, gas concentration (CO, CO2, NOx, O2), opacity and combustion rate.
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expriences PWRI (Japon, 1980) [61] : les essais japonais en vraie grandeur utilisrent une galerie de 700 m de long construite par lInstitut de Recherche des Travaux publics (PWRI) et un tunnel de 3 300 m de long. Seize exprimentations furent ralises dans la galerie et huit dans le tunnel. On utilisa comme foyers des bacs dessence (dix essais avec 4 m, deux essais avec 6 m), des vhicules particuliers (six essais) et des autobus (six essais). Les conditions physiques mesures dans le tunnel furent corrles aux capacits de secours. Linfluence de la vitesse longitudinale de lair fut dmontre.
tunnel de Repparfjord (Norvge, 1990-1992) [62] : ces essais furent conduits dans une ancienne galerie minire dune longueur de 2,3 km (parois non revtues et section transversale allant de 30 40 m). Ils rassemblrent neuf pays europens et constiturent la base du projet EUREKA 499 "Firetun". Un total de 21 essais fut men sur des wagons de train et de mtro, des vhicules particuliers, des poids lourds et des feux calibrs (bacs dheptane et palettes en bois). Prs de 400 capteurs furent installs le long du tunnel et lintrieur des foyers. Les mesures por-taient sur la temprature de lair et des parois, la vitesse, lopacit, la concentration des gaz, le mouvement des fumes (par vido), etc.
Photo 4.3.1 - Fire test in Repparfjord tunnel
Memorial tunnel (tats-Unis, 1993-1995) [63] : ce programme fut financ par la Federal Highway Administration et ltat du Massachusetts pour le projet de tunnel/artre centrale de Boston. Les expriences furent ralises dans un tunnel routier dsaffect de 850 m de long en Virginie occidentale. Prs de 91 essais furent mens avec des bacs de gasole. Les puissances thermiques obtenues variaient de 10 MW (4,5 m) 100 MW (44,4 m). Les systmes de ventilation transversale et longitudinale furent tests. 1 450 capteurs furent installs dans le tunnel, fournissant ainsi prs de 4 millions de donnes par essai.
Les rcents programmes de recherche sont fonds sur des systmes complets de mesures. Les capteurs sont nombreux et sont organiss en rseaux tout fait semblables ceux utiliss dans les simulations numriques par modle de champ.
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PWRI experiments (Japan, 1980) [61]: the Japanese full scale test programmes used a 700 m long gallery built by the Public Works Research Institute (PWRI) and a 3300 m long road tunnel. 16 experiments were performed in the gallery and 8 in the tunnel. The fire sources were fuel pools (10 tests with 4 m, 2 tests with 6 m), passenger cars (6 tests) and buses (6 tests). The physical conditions measured in the tunnel during the fires were connected with the emergency capacities. The influence of the longitudinal airflow velocity was shown. Repparfjord tunnel (Norway, 1990-1992) [62]: these experiments were performed in an abandoned 2.3 km long mining gallery (rough wall surfaces and cross-section varying from 30 to 40 m). They gathered 9 European countries (these experiments were the base of the EUREKA 499 "Firetun" project). A total of 21 tests were performed using rail and metro vehicles, passenger cars, heavy goods vehicles and calibrated fires (heptane pools and wood cribs). About 400 captors were installed along the tunnel and inside the fire loads. The measurements dealt with air and wall temperature, velocity, opacity, gases concentration, smoke motion (video network), etc. Memorial tunnel (USA, 1993-1995) [63]: this programme was financed by the Federal Highway Administration and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the Boston Central Artery Tunnel project. The experiments were performed in an abandoned 850 m long road tunnel located in West Virginia. About 91 tests were performed with diesel oil pool fires. The obtained heat release rates vary from 10 MW (4.5 m) to 100 MW (44.4 m). The transverse and longitudinal ventilation configurations were tested. 1450 captors were installed in the tunnel, providing about 4 millions data per experiment.
The recent research programmes are based on complete measurement systems. The captors are numerous and they are organised in networks quite similar to the mesh used in CFD models.
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IV.3.1.3 Rsultats
Lune des caractristiques de ces expriences est quil ny a pas daccs au site de lincendie. Aucune observation visuelle nest possible (sauf si une camra vido est installe sur le site). Dans certains cas, les oprateurs pouvaient tre prsents dans les sections situes en amont de lincendie (figure 4.3.1). Cet emplacement ne peut permettre une vue densemble de lexprience.
Figure 4.3.1 Front de la remonte de fume lors d'un essai avec un wagon de mtro (EUREKA 499) Figure 4.3.1 - Front of backlayering during a rail vehicle experiment in EUREKA 499
Dans ces conditions, le grand nombre de donnes recueillies est utile pour construire des interpr-tations concernant les phnomnes se dveloppant lors dun incendie (figure 4.3.2). La localisation des capteurs sur un maillage 3D apparat fondamentale pour lanalyse. Si certains phnomnes peuvent tre correctement identifis, il est plus difficile de dduire des lois gnrales partir des expriences en vraie grandeur. Cela est d au peu dexpriences conduites dans chaque programme. Il faut noter que leur objectif nest pas daboutir des lois gnrales. Par exemple, les essais japonais ont t en partie raliss pour recueillir des informations qualitatives sur les sorties de secours sous diffrentes conditions de vitesse de lair. Ce but ne semble pas tre compatible avec lutilisation des rsultats dans des modles scientifiques. Lune des caractristiques des essais EUREKA 499 est lutilisation de vrais vhicules routiers et ferroviaires comme charge combustible. Comme la puissance thermique de tels incendies est lun des paramtres du risque encore inconnus, les oprateurs ont saisi cette occasion pour raliser les mesures correspondantes. Le confinement de la chaleur semblait accrotre les taux de combustion. En ralit, les interprtations des rsultats obtenus avec des mthodes diffrentes conduisent des rsultats diffrents [65].
En raison des incertitudes des rsultats de mesure, les interprtations concluent gnralement que la puissance thermique calcule est lie la mthode utilise pour son valuation. Nanmoins, certaines des conclusions tires des essais sur les incendies de poids lourds (essai EUROTUNNEL) semblent en relative contradiction avec les informations disponibles dans les prcdentes recommandations de lAIPCR. Dans le rapport de Bruxelles [19], on mentionnait 20 MW pour la puissance thermique dun poids lourd en flammes. Les rsultats EUREKA montrent des valeurs plus leves : certaines dpassent 100 MW pendant quelques minutes.
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IV.3.1.3 Results
One of the characteristics of these experiments is the fact that no access is possible in the fire area. No visual observation is then possible (except when a video camera is installed in that zone). In some cases, operators could be present in the sections located upstream from the fire (Figure 4.3.1). This situation cannot provide an overview of the experiment. In these conditions, the great number of recorded data is helpful to build interpretations concerning the phenomena developed during the fire (Figure 4.3.2). The location of the captors on 3D mesh appears fundamental for this analysis work. If some phenomena can be correctly identified, it is more difficult to deduce general laws from the full scale experiments. This is due to the relatively low number of experiments performed in each programme. It is to be noticed that their aim is not the research of such relations. For example, the Japanese tests were partly planned to give qualitative information about the escape routes in different air velocity control conditions. This target does not appear to be compatible with the use of the results in scientific models. A characteristic of the EUREKA 499 experiments is the use of real road and rail vehicles as fire loads. As the heat release rate of such fires is one of the unanswered questions concerning the risks, the operators took this opportunity to perform the corresponding measurements. The heat confining seemed to increase the burning rates. Actually, the interpretations of results performed with different methods show different results [65].
Figure 4.3.2 - Deux tourbillons (dus la conjugaison de la force hydrostatique et de la trane de lincendie) peuvent tre dduits des courbes isothermes calcules partir des mesures (section transversale situe 20 m en aval de lincendie lors de lessai lheptane H32, EUREKA 499 [64])
0 16
14 0
0 12
14
0
0 10
100
80
60
120
16
Because of the uncertainties on the measurement results, the interpretations generally conclude that the calculated heat release rate is linked to the method used for its evaluation. Nevertheless, some of the conclusions drawn from the heavy goods vehicle fire (EUROTUNNEL test) appear in a relative opposition with the information available in previous PIARC recommendations. In the Brussels report [19], the heat release rate of a burning HGV was mentioned as 20 MW. The EUREKA results show higher peak values: some were found above 100 MW during a few minutes.
60
12 0
Figure 4.3.2 - Two vortices (induced by the combination of buoyancy and fire drag effects) can be deduced from the isothermal curves calculated from the measurements (cross-section located 20 m downstream the fire in EUREKA 499 heptane test H32, [64])
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Les essais en vraie grandeur fournissent gnralement dintressantes observations qualitatives. Par exemple, certaines situations dopacit apparaissent clairement comme une combinaison de la puissance thermique, de la nature de lobjet en flammes (densit de la fume) et de la vitesse longitudinale de lair. Malheureusement, comme prcis plus haut, le faible nombre dexpriences ne permet pas de tirer des lois gnrales partir des analyses des mesures (cette remarque ne vaut pas pour le programme du Memorial Tunnel en raison du grand nombre dessais raliss). Ces observations peuvent tre utilises comme rfrence pour des recherches plus spcifiques avec les moyens appropris (essais chelle rduite ou simulations numriques). De manire gnrale, les mesures ralises durant les essais peuvent tre utilises comme base pour des simulations et, particulirement, pour les simulations numriques par modle de champ. La qualification dun outil de simulation doit suivre quelques rgles :
la thmatique : une exprience de rfrence doit traiter des incendies dans les tunnels ; la fiabilit : la qualit des rsultats doit tre correcte ; la reprsentativit : les mesures doivent dcrire de manire aussi complte que possible les phnomnes devant tre caractriss par la simulation numrique ; ladaptabilit : mme si les exigences prcdentes sont remplies, lexprience de rfrence doit tre adapte une comparaison avec la simulation ; par exemple, les comportements incohrents lis des incendies incontrls comme les incendies de vhicules ne sont pas faciles apprhender et intgrer comme conditions limites.
Ainsi, ces rgles aboutissent une complte connaissance des expriences de rfrence. En considrant cette remarque, aucune exprience en vraie grandeur dincendie dans un tunnel ne prsente les caractristiques d'une rfrence. Cela ne signifie pas que la validation des outils de simulation nest pas possible, mais quen raison de la difficult dobtenir une parfaite connaissance des phnomnes, la qualification doit tre considre comme relative des rfrences exprimentales spcifiques.
IV.3.1.4 Limitations
Le nombre dessais est limit en raison des cots normes de ce genre de programme (environ 10 millions USD pour EUREKA 499 et 40 millions USD pour le programme du Memorial Tunnel). Ces cots conduisent donc limiter la dure du programme et, par consquent, le nombre dessais possibles. La plupart de ces programmes ont t raliss dans des tunnels dsaffects. Pour les applications routires, des extrapolations sont souvent ncessaires en raison de la taille plus rduite de la section transversale et de sa forme diffrente (en fer cheval au lieu de rectangle par exemple).
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The full scale experiments generally provide interesting qualitative observations. For example, some opacity situations appear clearly as a combination of the heat release rate, the nature of the burning object (smoke density) and the longitudinal air velocity. Unfortunately, as mentioned before, the relatively low number of experiments does not allow to draw general laws from the analysis of the measurements (as an exception, such a remark may not be true for the Memorial Tunnel programme because of the large number of tests). These observations can be used as a reference for more specific research works using appropriate tools (small scale or numerical models).
In a general manner, the measurements made during the experiments can be used as a basis for simulations and particularly for computational fluid dynamics (CFD). The qualification of a simulation tool must respect some rules:
the reliability: the quality of the results must be correct; the representativity: the measurements have to describe as completely as possible the phenomena that have to be characterised by the numerical simulation; the adaptability: even if the previous characteristics are satisfied, the reference experiment must be adapted to a comparison with simulation. For example, chaotic behaviours linked to uncontrolled fires such as vehicle fires are not easy to understand and to integrate as boundary conditions.
So, these rules lead to the complete knowledge of the reference experiments. Considering this remark, no full scale experiment relative to fires in tunnels has the characteristics of a reference. This does not mean that the simulation tools validation is not possible, but due to the difficulty of getting a perfect knowledge of the phenomena, the qualification is to be considered as relative to specific experimental references.
IV.3.1.4 Limitations
The number of experiments is limited because of the huge costs engaged in such programmes (about 10 millions USD for EUREKA 499 and 40 millions USD for Memorial Tunnel programme). These costs lead to limit the duration of the programme, and, as a consequence, the number of the affordable experiments. Most of these programmes were performed in abandoned tunnels. For a road application, extrapolations are often necessary because of the reduced cross-section and its different shape (horse shoe instead of rectangular shape for instance).
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Photo 4.3.3 - Un exercice de lutte contre lincendie dans un tunnel autoroutier au Japon
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The second aim of these tests is to show to the operators how to react in case of a fire. The tests may be completed with fire brigade exercises and intervention evaluations.
These two aspects are treated in the report of the PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels to the Marrakech World Road Congress [18]. This document proposes to perform tests before opening the tunnel in order to establish instructions for fire situations. The second kind of tests is proposed during operation, to train operators and fire brigades. This means that the tunnel must be closed specifically for these tests. One of the report recommendations is to organise such tests regularly.
In the present presentation, only the first kind of tests is studied because the second one does not bring fundamental information about the fire developments in the tunnel.
Photo 4.3.4 Essai dincendie dune petite voiture dans un tunnel prs de Monaco
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IV.3.2.3 Rsultats
Lefficacit du systme de ventilation peut tre dmontre, mais elle est bien videmment lie une exploitation correcte de lextraction des fumes [67]. Les consignes dexploitation sont particulirement difficiles tablir dans le cas de ventilation semi-transversale, car lefficacit du systme est directement lie la stratification de la fume. Les essais mens dans des tunnels routiers franais dots dune ventilation semi-transversale ont montr que le manque defficacit est partiellement d des paramtres non contrls, comme la vitesse longitudinale naturelle de lair lintrieur du tunnel [23 ; 67 ; 69]. Les essais dans les tunnels du Puymorens et de Chamoise [67 ; 69] ont t effectus avec des bacs dheptane. De nombreux tats stationnaires ont t caractriss. Ces rsultats ont t utiliss pour dterminer des consignes de ventilation. Ils ont galement t analyss dun point de vue scientifique afin de dterminer des lois gnrales rgissant les mouvements des fumes et autres comportements thermo-mcaniques.
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The tests can also use small cars to be more demonstrative. The experiments show that the heat release rate of such fires is quite chaotic. The tunnel ventilation system effect is better characterised when the thermal situation is stabilised. The use of cars as fire loads may be recommended to complete fire pool tests.
During the tests, the ventilation control must be available, so that no transposition is necessary between the experiments and a real fire situation in the tunnel, except for the heat release rate. Some measurements can be performed. The heaviest systems include more than 100 sensors organised in the same manner as for research programmes (thermocouples, anemometers and radiation measurements) [67]. It has been shown that such systems give correct information for the tunnel protection during the fire, and for phenomenological interpretations after the fire. Many tests can be performed in a rather short period. In Puymorens tunnel [67], the fire duration was about 30 min, and it required one hour to record the data, to check the measuring system, to wait for the pool to be cooled, and to fill it again with heptane. It is estimated that about 20 fires can be performed in one week, assuming a correct safety level.
IV.3.2.3 Results
The efficiency of the ventilation system can be demonstrated, but it is of course linked to a correct operation of smoke extraction [67]. Operating instructions are especially difficult to establish in the case of semi-transverse ventilation because the system efficiency is directly linked to the smoke stratification. The tests performed in French road tunnels using semi-transverse ventilation have shown that the lack of efficiency is partly linked to non-controlled parameters such as the natural longitudinal air velocity inside the tunnel [23; 67; 69]. The Puymorens and Chamoise tunnels tests [67; 69] have been based on heptane pools fires. Many different steady states have been characterised. These results have been used to determine ventilation instructions. They have also been analysed on a scientific point of view in order to determine the general laws governing smoke motions and other thermo-mechanic behaviours.
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Par exemple, lors des essais du tunnel de Chamoise, il a t possible de mesurer la distance de remonte des fumes dans chaque situation (figure 4.3.3). Lanalyse com-plte des diffrents paramtres montre que la distance de remonte peut tre dcrite comme une fonction de Ri, le nombre de Richardson (voir IV.4.2) :
l
remon .
= l 0 . Ri
(IV.1)
Une telle analyse est gnralement difficile raliser partir des donnes fournies par les diffrents programmes de recherche ; en effet, la plupart du temps, les situations observes ne correspondent pas des tats stationnaires, ou bien ne sont pas suffisamment nombreuses. Puisque la puissance thermique est limite, il est possible dobserver les phnomnes dans des endroits diffrents du tunnel, mme prs du foyer. Ces observations peuvent tre corrles aux mesures (mouvements de la fume compars aux champs de tempratures, volution de la remonte de fume, stratification en aval de lincendie, etc.).
Figure 4.3.3 Distance de remonte des fumes en fonction de la vitesse longitudinale de lair pour deux surfaces de bac dheptane (dclivit du tunnel = + 0,5 % - essais de Chamoise [69])
o l0 et a dpendent des caractristiques du tunnel. Le nombre de Richardson doit prendre en compte la densit des gaz dans la zone dimpact du panache de fume sous le plafond (voir IV.4.2).
IV.3.2.4 Limitations
Linstrumentation est relativement limite, mais lvolution de ces essais tend accrotre le nombre de capteurs. Bien videmment, leur nombre total sera limit car cette sorte dexprience est diffrente des programmes de recherche. En particulier, il sera difficile de caractriser les phnomnes qui se produisent de grandes distances du foyer de lincendie. La taille de lincendie doit aussi tre limite car ces essais sont non destructifs. Il est ncessaire de limiter le produit puissance thermique x dure. Des essais impliquant des foyers de 20 MW ont t raliss, mais cette valeur doit tre considre comme une exception [23]. Gnralement, les incendies raliss ne dpassent pas 5 MW. Pendant les essais avec des vhicules particuliers, des pointes de 7 8 MW ont t enregistres, mais sur des priodes trs courtes.
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For example, during the Chamoise tests, it has been possible to measure the backlayering distance in each situation (Figure 4.3.3). The complete analysis of Backlayering distance the various parameters shows that Air velocity the backlayering distance may be written as a function of Ri, the Richardson number (see IV.4.2): Heptane pool fire
Backlayering distance (m)
350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 -50 -100 -150 -3 -2 -1 0 1
lbackl. = l 0 . Ri
(IV.1)
where l0 and a depend on the tunnel characteristics. The Richardson number must consider the gases density in the plume impact zone under the ceiling (see IV.4.2).
Such an analysis is generally difficult to perform on the data given by the different research programmes because generally the observed situations do not correspond to steady states, or are not numerous enough.
Figure 4.3.3 - Backlayering distance vs. longitudinal air velocity for two heptane pool surfaces (tunnel slope = 0.5 % - Chamoise fire tests [69])
As the heat release rate is limited, it is possible to observe the phenomena in different zones of the tunnel, even near the fire. These observations may be correlated with the measurements (smoke motions compared with temperature fields, backlayering evolution, stratification of downstream the fire, etc.).
IV.3.2.4 Limitations
Instrumentation is quite limited, but the evolution of these tests tends to increase the number of sensors. Of course, the total amount will be limited because this kind of experiment is distinct from research programmes. Particularly, it will be difficult to characterise the phenomena occurring at large distances from the fire zone.
The size of the fire must also be limited because these tests must be non-destructive. Actually, it is necessary to limit the product "Heat release rate x Duration". Tests involving 20 MW sources were performed, but this value is to be considered as an exception [23]. Generally, the performed fires do not exceed 5 MW. During passenger cars tests, peaks of 7 to 8 MW were observed, but during very short periods.
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IV.4
IV.4.1 Objectifs
IV.4.1.1 Application un projet de tunnel
Les exprimentations chelle rduite sont destines reprsenter un incendie dans un tunnel en projet. Cette mthode est fonde sur des lois de similitude qui sont en fait le lien entre la situation en vraie grandeur et la situation modlise. Le but de telles expriences est de reprsenter les phnomnes survenant lors dun incendie se dclarant lintrieur du tunnel. Par rapport des essais en vraie grandeur, cette mthode permet de grandes conomies de temps et dargent. Un autre de ses atouts est de bien montrer les phnomnes car il est possible de visualiser la fume en utilisant, par exemple, de la lumire laser ou des flux colors. Cependant, on mentionne trs peu dexemples dexpriences chelle rduite pour la conception des tunnels [70].
IV.4.1.2 Recherche
Les travaux de recherche peuvent aussi utiliser les maquettes chelle rduite pour des raisons scientifiques. Sil est besoin de caractriser des comportements spcifiques, la meilleure solution peut consister les visualiser en utilisant des mthodes compltement contrlables. Des essais complmentaires peuvent tre raliss avec des installations en vraie grandeur. La connaissance des lois obtenues avec les maquettes chelle rduite est utile pour planifier les expriences en vraie grandeur. Les maquettes chelle rduite ont t utilises pour mesurer lefficacit des trappes daspiration de la fume situes au plafond [71] ou pour dterminer les lois non dimensionnelles rgissant lexistence d'une remonte de fume [72].
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IV.4.1.2 Research
Research works can also use small scale models for scien-tific reasons. If some specific behaviours have to be charac-terised, the best solution can be to show them using totally controllable methods. Complementary tests may be perfor-med with full scale facilities. The Photo 4.4.1 - Small scale model Photo 4.4.1 Maquette chelle rduite used to study ceiling trap doors utilise pour tudier les trappes knowledge of the laws daspiration en plafond obtained with the models is useful to plan the full scale experiments. Small scale models have been used to characterise the efficiency of ceiling trap doors for smoke extraction [71] or to determine of the non-dimensional laws governing the existence of backlayering [72].
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Afin de reprsenter des caractristiques semblables du flux longitudinal, il apparat ncessaire de respecter le nombre de Reynolds Re :
Re = U. Dh
(IV.2)
o Dh reprsente le diamtre hydraulique et la viscosit cinmatique du fluide. Les forces hydrostatiques sont partiellement reprsentes par le nombre de Froude Fr :
U Fr = g. Dh
2
(IV.3)
o g reprsente lacclration de la pesanteur. En ralit, le nombre de Froude doit absolument tre combin avec les diffrences de densit reprsentatives des effets de gravit sur le mouvement des fluides. Gnralement, le nombre de Richardson semble tre un paramtre mieux appropri :
Ri = g. Dh . 2 U
(IV.4)
Dautres paramtres peuvent tre utiliss pour tudier les phnomnes sur les maquettes chelle rduite. Par exemple, le nombre de Grashof est une combinaison des nombres de Reynolds et de Richardson :
Gr = g. Dh
3
(IV.5)
De nombreuses tudes ne prennent pas en compte la similitude de Reynolds, spcialement dans le cas des maquettes arauliques. Une telle contrainte conduit utiliser des valeurs trop leves de vitesse de lair. En ralit, on se limite gnralement vrifier que les nombres de Reynolds dans le modle sont suffisants pour assurer le caractre turbulent du courant dair longitudinal.
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In order to represent the same characteristics of the longitudinal flow, it appears necessary to respect the Reynolds number Re:
Re = U. Dh
(IV.2)
where Dh represents the hydraulic diameter and the fluid cinematic viscosity. The effect of buoyancy forces are partially represented by the Froude number Fr:
U Fr = g. Dh
2
(IV.3)
where g represents the gravity acceleration. Actually, the Froude number must necessarily be combined with the density differences to be representative of the gravity effects on fluid motions. Usually, the Richardson number appears as a more appropriate parameter:
Ri = g. Dh . 2 U
(IV.4)
Other parameters may be used to study phenomena on reduced scale models. For example, the Grashof number is a combination of the Reynolds and the Richardson numbers:
Gr = g. Dh
3
(IV.5)
Many studies do not take into account the Reynolds similarity, especially in the case of air models. Such a constraint should lead to use too high air velocities values. Actually, the Reynolds condition is generally limited to checking that the Reynolds numbers in the model are sufficient to ensure the turbulent character of the longitudinal airflow.
The relation between the backlayering distance, the local slope, the heat release and the thermal exchanges with the walls has been clearly shown in such models.
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IV.4.4 Limitations
Lutilisation dune maquette chelle rduite pour la conception dun systme de ventilation peut rencontrer des limites et ce, pour deux raisons principales : les conclusions techniques dpendent des lois de similitude utilises ; un incendie est un phnomne trs complexe et sa reprsentation ne peut se limiter une ou deux quations ; la reprsentation de la puissance thermique reste un problme non rsolu ; une reprsentation suppose bonne aboutit gnralement des situations physiques irralistes (en ce qui concerne les tempratures et lopacit) lintrieur de la maquette ; par consquent, les lois dfinies laide de la maquette ncessitent une tape intermdiaire avant dtre appliques des situations en vraie grandeur.
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In the first studies, the analysis of the source terms was performed on simple assumptions (complete combustion): the control of the density should represent the temperature and the vertical velocity the production of burned gases. A second analysis has shown that most of the situations represented by the isothermal source do not take into account the physics of fires. In realistic situations, the combustion temperature is connected to the vertical velocity, and in the experiments, these two parameters are not dependent (for example, it is possible to represent cold fires).
A similar technique has been used to study the efficiency of the smoke extraction based on remote controlled trap doors [71]. In this case, the similarity preserves the Froude number.
The liquids most used are generally salted water or alcohol injected into water. Salted water leads to inverse the geometry of the model (the heaviest liquid is injected at the top of the model to represent the fire).
IV.4.4 Limitations
Using a small scale model to design a tunnel ventilation system may be limitative for two main reasons: the technical conclusions are relative to the similarity law(s) used in the application; as a fire is a complex phenomenon, its representation cannot be limited to one or two global relations. the heat release rate representation remains an unsolved problem; a representation supposed to be correct generally provides unrealistic physical situations (temperature and opacity fields) inside the modelled tunnel; as a consequence, the laws established with the model need an intermediate step to be applied to full scale situations.
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On ne peut cependant pas en conclure que le manque de similitude parfaite conduit des rsultats irralistes. En effet, les conclusions tires dexpriences chelle rduite sur des navettes dans le tunnel sous la Manche ont ensuite t confirmes par des essais en vraie grandeur [70]. Une autre caractristique de ces essais est le nombre relativement faible de capteurs installs sur la maquette. Cette situation peut se justifier par les deux raisons suivantes : un capteur plac lintrieur de la maquette peut perturber l'coulement ; le but de ces essais nest pas dobtenir des informations prcises sur la physique se dveloppant lintrieur de la maquette, mais de caractriser des situations globales.
Une bonne solution consiste placer les capteurs aux extrmits de la maquette pour obtenir des informations correctes sur les conditions limites.
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It is difficult to conclude that the lack of total similarity leads to unrealistic results. For example, the conclusions drawn from small scale experiments performed for the Channel Tunnel shuttles have been confirmed by full scale tests performed later [70].
Another characteristic of these experiments is the relatively low number of sensors installed in the model. Two main reasons can be mentioned to justify this situation: a sensor placed inside the model may disturb the flow; the aim of these experiments is not to get precise information about the physics that develop in the model, but to characterise global situations.
A good possibility is to place the sensors at the limits of the model so that they can give correct information about the boundary conditions.
The second case is the use of small scale models for research. The conclusions of such studies are generally limited to the studied model. The transposition of the established laws to full scale situations needs reference experiments. So, the interest of these models is to show that general laws can be drawn from the study of specific situations, and they give the analytic form for these laws (example: existence of backlayering vs source characteristics and longitudinal air velocity). In a general manner, the validity of a study based on the use of models is directly linked to the interpretation of the similarity law.
Computer simulations have become more and more popular to study fire behaviour in tunnels since the 80's [77]. The main reasons are the very fast development of computer capacities and the comparatively reasonable cost of the calculations compared to real fire tests. They also give many detailed data which are unattainable by other means.
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Ce chapitre traite principalement des simulations numriques par modle de champ, bien quil existe dautres simulations pouvant tre utilises pour tudier les incendies, comme les modles de zone ou les modles unidimensionnels.
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Figure 4.5.2 - Temperature field calculated with a CFD model for a tunnel with smoke exhaust shafts
Figure 4.5.2 Champ de temprature calcul l'aide d'un modle de champ pour un tunnel dot de puits d'extraction
This chapter will be mainly focused on CFD codes, even though there are also other models which can be used to study fire situations in tunnel, as zone models or one-dimensional models.
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Ces modles ne peuvent tre appliqus au voisinage de lincendie puisquils ne peuvent prendre en compte le phnomne de stratification. Cependant, leurs principes semblent suffisants pour ltude des conditions loin du foyer de lincendie dans un rseau routier souterrain ou un trs long tunnel ; ils semblent galement suffire pour dfinir les conditions limites des simulations numriques par modle de champ, dans le cas o celles-ci ne modlisent pas le tunnel dans sa totalit.
Modles unidimensionnels
INERIS, France US Bureau of Mines, tatsUnis Parsons Brinckerhoff, tatsUnis TNO, Pays-Bas BRI, Japon NIST, tats-Unis University of Leeds, Royaume-Uni CSTB, France TNO, Pays-Bas
INERIS, France VTT, Finlande Parsons Brinckerhoff, tatsUnis TNO, Pays-Bas Plus du tout utiliss (1988) VTT, Finlande NIST, tats-Unis Non utiliss dans les tunnels University of Leeds, Royaume-Uni CSTB, France Utiliss pour les btiments TNO, Pays-Bas En cours de dveloppement Delft Univ. Techn, PaysPlus du tout utiliss Bas Univ. Graz, Autriche INERIS, France VTT, Finlande Fire Research Station, Dvelopps sur la Royaume-Uni base de PHOENICS Univ. Lund, Sude AEA Consultant, RoyaumeUni HSE, Royaume-Uni Mott Mac Donald, Royaume-Uni CETU, France Univ. Graz, Autriche FOA, Sude SCETAUROUTE, France Univ. Graz, Autriche Univ. Sydney, Australie
Modles de zone
CHAM, Royaume-Uni
JASMINE
FLOW3D
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As they cannot take the layering phenomena into account, they cannot be applied in the fire vicinity. Nevertheless these principles seem sufficient for studying the conditions far from the source in an underground road network or a very long tunnel, and for providing boundary conditions to a CFD code in the case where the whole tunnel is not modelled by this latter model.
VENDIS-FS
INERIS, France US Bureau of Mines, USA Parsons Brinckerhoff, USA TNO, NL BRI, Japan NIST, USA University of Leeds, UK CSTB, France TNO, NL CHAM, UK
INERIS, France VTT, Finland Parsons Brinckerhoff, USA TNO, NL VTT, Finland NIST, USA University of Leeds, UK CSTB, France TNO, NL Delft Univ. Techn, NL Univ. Graz, Austria INERIS, France VTT, Finland Fire Research Station, UK Univ. Lund, Sweden Authority, AEA Consultant, UK HSE, UK Mott Mac Donald, UK CETU, France Univ. Graz, Austria FOA, Sweden SCETAUROUTE, France Univ. Graz, Austria Univ. Sydney, Australia Developed on the base of PHOENICS Used in buildings Under development Out of use Not used in tunnels Out of use (1988)
1D models
Zone models
JASMINE
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Les rponses font apparatre que les simulations numriques sont de plus en plus utilises pour lanalyse du risque incendie. Plusieurs raisons expliquent ce phnomne : tout dabord, la difficult et le cot des expriences en vraie grandeur ; ensuite, la vaste gamme dinformations fournies par les simulations numriques ; enfin, le dveloppement de diffrents codes et les nouvelles performances des ordinateurs qui permettent de raliser des calculs importants et complexes en un temps raisonnable. Les utilisateurs des codes sont gnralement conscients que les simulations numriques peuvent conduire des rsultats irralistes si aucune prcaution nest prise. Il existe donc un consensus sur le besoin dune validation fonde sur des expriences relles avant dutiliser les simulations numriques pour la conception des systmes de dsenfumage. De plus, lexprience des utilisateurs dans le domaine de la modlisation des incendies ne peut tre nglige si lon veut assurer la qualit des rsultats. La figure 4.5.3 donne quelques lments de validation obtenus par le CETU sur les essais du tunnel de lOfenegg [79].
Temperatures C 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 Time in minutes
Temperatures at 124.25 m from fire measurement L measurement M measurement H prediction L prediction M prediction H
3.5
4.5
5.5
Time in minutes
Figure 4.5.3 Comparaison entre valeurs prvues et mesures la sortie du tunnel de lOfenegg
Malheureusement, peu dessais en vraie grandeur raliss de par le monde fournissent des mesures pouvant tre utilises pour valider les simulations numriques. Dune part, les essais ne sont pratiquement jamais effectus dans cet esprit. Dautre part, peu d'essais impliquent une grande gamme de conditions de ventilation (les essais du Memorial Tunnel peuvent cet gard apporter des rponses intressantes). La dure du calcul peut apparatre comme une limite la taille des modles tudis avec les modles de champ. Gnralement, les tunnels de plus de quelques centaines de mtres ne peuvent tre modliss en trois dimensions sur une station de travail. Par consquent, quelques hypothses doivent tre faites pour fixer les conditions limites dans le cas o seulement une partie du tunnel est modlise.
IV.5.3 Principes
Afin dapprhender la complexit du problme, les quations fondamentales et les mthodes numriques sont succinctement prsentes ci-aprs. Dans une premire tape, si l'on considre l'coulement transitoire et anisotherme dun gaz considr comme homogne, le problme consiste dterminer six fonctions scalaires inconnues : les trois composantes ux, uy et uz de la vitesse, la densit , la pression p et la temprature T. Elles dpendent de quatre variables indpendantes : les trois variables d'espace x, y, z, et le temps t.
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From all the available answers, it appears that CFD codes are more and more popular for fire risk analysis. Several reasons explain this evolution. The first one is the difficulty and the cost linked to full scale experiments. The second one is the large range of information given by CFD codes. The last reason is the development of various CFD codes and the new performances of computers which allow large and complex calculations to be performed in a reasonable time. The CFD users are generally aware that numerical simulations may lead to unrealistic results if no precaution is taken. There is a consensus on the need for a validation based on real experiments before using CFD codes for designing smoke control systems. Also the experience of users in the field of fire modelling cannot be neglected to ensure the quality of results.
Figure 4.5.3 presents some elements of a validation work carried out by CETU on the Ofenegg tunnel fire experiments [79].
Temperatures C 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 Time in minutes Temperatures at 124.25 m from fire measurement L measurement M measurement H prediction L prediction M prediction H
3.5
4.5
5.5
Time in minutes
Figure 4.5.3 - Comparison between predicted and measured values at the free exit of the Ofenegg tunnel
Unfortunately, few full scale fire experiments over the world provide measurements that can be used for CFD codes validation. On one hand, the tests are generally not performed to meet this objective. On the other hand, few experiments involve a wide range of ventilation conditions (the Memorial Tunnel fire tests may bring valuable answers as far as this question is concerned). The calculation duration may appear as a limitation to the size of the models treated with CFD codes. Generally, tunnels longer than some hundred meters cannot be modelled in three dimensions on workstations. Therefore some assumptions must be done to set the boundary conditions if only a part of the tunnel is modelled.
IV.5.3 Background
In order to give an idea of the problem complexity, the fundamental equations are outlined. Then the computational methods are rapidly presented. In a first step, if the anisothermal and transient flow of a gas assumed to have a homogeneous composition is considered, the problem is to determine six unknown scalar functions: the three components ux, uy and uz of the velocity, density , pressure p and temperature T. They depend on four independent variables, the three space variables x, y and z and time t.
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La mcanique des fluides et le premier principe de la thermodynamique fournissent lquivalent de cinq quations scalaires diffrentielles, dduites de la conservation de la masse, de la quantit de mouvement et de lnergie. Elles sont gnralement dcrites sous la forme gnrale dune quation de transport :
H H (. ) + div .u. + J = S t
(IV.6) (IV.7)
avec
J = . grad
H
o reprsente une proprit gnrale du fluide et , u , J , S reprsentent respectivement la densit, le vecteur de vitesse, le vecteur flux de diffusion et le terme source par unit de volume. reprsente le coefficient effectif dchange par diffusion de . La thermodynamique fournit lquation manquante pour rsoudre le problme, gnralement lquation d'tat des gaz parfaits :
.T . T = 0 0 P0 + p P0
(IV.8)
o 0, P0 et T0 reprsentent respectivement les valeurs de rfrence de la densit de lair, de la pression et de la temprature. Le systme des six quations diffrentielles non linaires fortement couples six variables inconnues doit tre complt par des quations supplmentaires dcrivant la turbulence. Ces quations incluent les fluctuations de chaque scalaire transport. Le modle le plus frquemment utilis est le modle k- (k : nergie cintique de la turbulence ; : taux de dissipation de k). Une simulation plus complte peut introduire une ou plusieurs quations de transport pour les gaz gnrs par la combustion (la fume est la plupart du temps assimile un gaz, ce qui vite un calcul diphasique). Un modle de rayonnement peut tre utilis pour complter l'organisation des transferts thermiques. Enfin, un modle de combustion peut tre envisag pour valuer la dynamique des ractions chimiques dans la zone dincendie. Ce systme trs complexe ncessite manifestement lutilisation de mthodes numriques. La mthode des lments finis peut tre applique. Cependant, celle des volumes finis, comparable aux diffrences finies, est plus souvent utilise. Elle impose un maillage structur, qui nest pas trop gnant compte tenu de la gomtrie trs simple du tunnel, et conduit des dures de calcul gnralement plus courtes. De plus, elle est trs physique, dans la mesure o les diffrentes quations de conservation sont vrifies dans chaque cellule. La dure du calcul par ordinateur reste toujours longue avec les ordinateurs actuels. Une simulation 3D dun incendie de quelques minutes sur plusieurs centaines de mtres demande plusieurs heures CPU sur un gros ordinateur et un jour ou plus sur une station de travail.
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Fluid mechanics and the first principle of thermodynamics provide the equivalent of five scalar differential equations, deduced from the conservation of mass, momentum and energy. These have the general form of the following transport equation:
H H (. ) + div .u. + J = S t
(IV.6) (IV.7)
with
J = . grad
H
where stands for a general fluid property and , u , J , S are density, velocity vector, diffusive flux vector and source rate per unit volume, respectively. denotes the effective diffusive exchange coefficient of .
Thermodynamics supply the missing equation to close the problem, this one being generally the state equation of ideal gas:
.T . T = 0 0 P0 + p P0
(IV.8)
with 0, P0 and T0 the reference air density, pressure and temperature. The system of six strongly coupled, non linear differential equations with six unknown variables obtained by this method have to be completed by additional equations describing turbulence. These equations involve the fluctuations of each transported scalar. The most commonly used model is the k- model (k: turbulence kinetic energy; : dissipation rate of k). A more complete simulation may introduce one or several transport equations for the gases produced by combustion (smoke is usually assimilated to a gas to avoid diphasic calculation). A radiative model may be used to complete the organisation of the thermal transfers. Lastly, a combustion model may be considered to evaluate the dynamics of the chemical reactions in the fire zone.
This very complex system obviously requires to use computational methods. The finite element method can be applied. However, the finite volume method, similar to the finite differences, is more often used. It imposes a structured grid, which is not too annoying due to the rather simpler geometry of a tunnel, and leads to generally shorter computation times. In addition it is very physical, for it ensures that the various conservation equations are observed in each cell.
The computation duration still remains lengthy with the current computers. A 3D simulation of a several minutes fire in a several hundreds meters long tunnel requires several CPU hours on a mainframe, and one day or more on a workstation.
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IV.5.4 Recommandations
Comme indiqu prcdemment, il existe diffrentes manires de modliser les incendies avec les codes numriques. Le nombre de variables inconnues et la dure de calcul varient selon les hypothses. Il y a au moins 8 quations rsoudre pour des simulations 3D, les variables inconnues tant , p, T, ux, uy, uz, k et , et 7 quations rsoudre pour des simulations 2D. Des quations complmentaires peuvent tre ncessaires afin de prendre en compte le transfert de chaleur par rayonnement, le processus de combustion ou le transfert de chaleur par conduction lintrieur des parois. Puisquil existe diffrentes faons de modliser un incendie, chacune sera commente selon lexprience des membres du groupe de travail. Ces commentaires ne doivent pas tre considrs comme des recommandations, mais plutt comme des conseils aux personnes qui dbutent dans le domaine de la modlisation des incendies ou qui sous-traitent de tels calculs.
Modle de combustion Le modle Eddy-Break-Up est le plus gnralement utilis. Cette mthode peut tre intressante si les informations que lon veut obtenir partir de la simulation portent sur la zone dincendie. Les limites de cette mthode concernent la charge combustible de lincendie. Il nest en effet pas toujours possible de fournir une quivalence en termes de consommation de carburant. Puissance thermique fixe dans un volume Dans ce modle, le foyer est reprsent par une puissance thermique fixe lintrieur dun volume donn. Cette valeur nest pas influence par la ventilation. Cette mthode aboutit une distribution dnergie assez correcte lintrieur du tunnel. Lexprience montre que par cette mthode, on obtient des tempratures tout fait ralistes, sauf proximit immdiate de lincendie. Flux de chaleur fix travers une surface horizontale Cette technique impose un flux thermique ou un dbit de masse temprature fixe afin dobtenir la puissance thermique de dimensionnement. La deuxime mthode conduit crer un dbit dair qui nest pas toujours compatible avec la production de gaz brls (il doit alors tre combin un puits de masse). La distribution de lnergie nest pas aussi bonne que dans le cas prcdent. Les rsultats ne sont donc pas aussi fiables. Temprature fixe dans un volume Lavantage de cette mthode est de pouvoir contrler la temprature maximale atteinte l'intrieur de lincendie. Linconvnient est que le flux de chaleur dpendra des conditions de ventilation.
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IV.5.4 Recommendations
As explained previously, there are different ways to model fire with CFD codes. The number of unknown variables and the calculation duration vary according to the hypotheses. There are at least 8 equations to solve in 3D simulations, the unknown variables being , p, T, ux, uy, uz, k and , and 7 equations to solve in 2D simulations. Additional equations may be required in order to take into account the radiative heat transfer, the combustion process or the heat transfer by conduction inside the walls.
Because there are different ways to model a fire, some comments will be given on each one, according to the experience of the members of the working group. They should not really be considered as recommendations, but more as an advice for people who would start in the tunnel fire modelling field or sub-contract such calculations.
Combustion process The Eddy-Break-Up model is generally used. This method may be interesting if the information required from the simulation concerns the fire zone. The limitation concerns the fire load. It is not always possible to give an equivalence in terms of fuel consumption.
Fixed heat release rate in a volume In this model, the fire source is represented by a heat release rate fixed inside a given volume. This value is not influenced by the ventilation. This method leads to a rather correct energy distribution inside the tunnel volume. The experience shows that this method leads to quite realistic temperatures except very near the fire.
Fixed heat flux through a horizontal surface This technique imposes a heat flux or a mass flow rate at a fixed temperature in order to get the design heat release rate. The latter method leads to create a mass flow rate which is not always in agreement with the production of burned gases from the combustion (it must then be combined with a sink of mass). The volume energy distribution is not as good as in the previous case. The results are not as reliable.
Fixed temperature in a volume The advantage of this method is to control the maximum temperature reached inside the fire. A disadvantage is that the heat release rate will depend on the ventilation conditions.
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La deuxime mthode (puissance thermique fixe dans un volume) devrait gnralement avoir la prfrence car elle est moins coteuse (en temps CPU) que la modlisation du processus de combustion, et prsente moins dinconvnients que les autres mthodes. Le chapitre II de ce rapport donne des informations sur les puissances thermiques de dimensionnement qui peuvent tre utilises directement avec cette mthode.
Modle de rayonnement thermique coupl avec lquation de conservation de lnergie Cette technique conduit rsoudre une quation supplmentaire. Deux sortes de modles de rayonnement peuvent tre utiliss. Le premier consiste en la rsolution de lquation de transfert thermique par rayonnement selon un maillage spcifique. Dans le second, on rduit la discrtisation de lespace six directions, ce qui permet de dfinir lquation de transfert thermique par rayonnement sous une forme similaire celle des autres quations de conservation. La plus grande difficult provient de la faible connaissance des proprits radiatives de la fume, ce qui explique que des recherches soient encore menes ce sujet. Contrle des flux thermiques aux parois sans modlisation du transfert thermique par rayonnement Cette solution consiste regrouper les coefficients de flux thermique par rayonnement et par convection en un coefficient empirique de transfert local. Aucune autre quation nest ncessaire. Cette mthode, utilise par certains auteurs [77], a t applique au CETU pour simuler lessai dincendie lheptane H32 ralis durant lexprience EUREKA 499 [78]. Les rsultats obtenus avec cette mthode sont convenables (figure 4.5.4).
Figure 4.5.4 Profils en long des tempratures prvues et mesures 2 et 5 m au-dessus de la chausse (essai dincendie H32, EUREKA 499 [78])
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The second method (fixed heat release rate in a volume) should generally be preferred because it is cheaper (CPU time) than modelling the combustion process and presents less disadvantages than the other methods. In addition, section II of this report gives information on design heat release rates, which can be directly used with this method.
Radiative heat transfer model coupled with the conservation equation of energy This technique leads to solve an additional equation. Two kinds of radiative models may be used. The first one consists in solving the radiative heat transport equation according to a specific mesh. The second one consists in reducing the space discretisation to six directions, which allows to set the radiative heat transport equation in a similar form as the other conservation equations. The greatest difficulty comes from the poor knowledge of the radiative properties of the smoke which explains that some research works are currently carried out on this topic.
Control of the heat fluxes at the walls without modelling the radiative heat transfer This solution consists in lumping the radiative and convective heat transfer coefficient together in a local empirical transfer coefficient. No additional equation is required. This method, used by some authors [77], has been applied by CETU to simulate the heptane fire test H32 carried out during the EUREKA 499 experiments [78]. The results obtained with this method are reasonable (Figure 4.5.4).
1100 Temperatures C
Temperatures C
100 0 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Distance from fire (m)
Figure 4.5.4 - Longitudinal profiles of predicted and measured temperatures at 2 m and 5 m above the floor (EUREKA 499 fire test H32 [78])
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Rduction la source de la puissance thermique de lincendie La dernire solution consiste rduire la puissance thermique du foyer rellement injecte dans le modle en dduisant la portion rayonne. Elle est mentionne dans de nombreuses publications et le pourcentage dnergie perdu par rayonnement au foyer de lincendie est estim entre 20 et 50 % de lnergie thermique totale produite par la combustion. La principale difficult de cette mthode rside dans le fait que la perte dnergie par rayonnement vers les parois due aux gaz chauds quelque distance de lincendie nest pas prise en compte.
La deuxime mthode (globalisation des coefficients de flux thermique par rayonnement et par convection) est recommande lorsque les transferts thermiques par rayonnement ne sont pas modliss. Elle peut tre combine avec la troisime mthode (rduction la source de la puissance thermique de lincendie pour prendre en compte les pertes par rayonnement cet endroit).
Conditions limites en quantit de mouvement Une surface lisse est gnralement la condition par dfaut aux parois. Cependant, lutilisateur peut dfinir des surfaces rugueuses en modifiant les paramtres de la loi logarithmique de couche utiliss par les codes pour reprsenter la zone tout contre les parois. Lutilisation de surfaces rugueuses dpend des objectifs de la simulation. Si lon veut arriver lanalyse de lquilibre des forces ou la vitesse de propagation du front de fume, les hypothses faites sur les surfaces influenceront les rsultats. Conditions limites du transfert thermique - Temprature ou flux de chaleur fixs. Dans ce cas, les tempratures aux parois ou les flux de chaleur travers les parois sont fixs une valeur constante. Lusage de tempratures fixes aux parois est prfrable, spcialement en combinaison avec des coefficients de transfert thermique par rayonnement et par convection aux parois. - Combinaison de tempratures et de flux de chaleur fixs. Cette technique peut tre utilise afin de modliser approximativement le processus de conduction de la chaleur lintrieur de la paroi. En fait, ce processus nest pas ainsi directement pris en compte. - Conduction de la chaleur lintrieur de la paroi. Cette mthode se rvle tre la meilleure interprtation physique du problme. Le transfert thermique aux parois peut avoir des effets apprciables, tout particulirement dans le cas des incendies de longue dure. Cependant, il conduit des maillages plus importants et des calculs plus longs ; souvent, cela nest pas ncessaire.
Pression fixe aux deux extrmits Cette solution reprsente directement les effets atmosphriques. Linfluence de l'emplacement des conditions limites a t tudie [80]. Il apparat que la taille critique de la zone externe modliser doit tre comprise entre 3 et 5 diamtres hydrauliques [80]. Cependant, des rsultats convenables peuvent tre obtenus sans domaine extrieur, si certaines prcautions sont prises, ou mme des corrections apportes.
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Reduction of the heat release rate at the fire source The last solution consists in reducing the actual heat release source injected in the model by deducing the radiative part. It has been used in several publications and the percentage of energy lost by radiation at the fire source is estimated to be in the range of 20% to 50% of the total heat energy released by combustion. The major problem of this method is due to the fact that the radiative energy lost by the hot gases to the walls farther from the fire is not taken into account.
The second method (lump radiative and convective heat transfer coefficient at the walls) is recommended in the case where the radiative heat transfers are not modelled. It can be combined with the third method (lump reduction of the heat release source to take into account radiative losses at the fire site).
Momentum boundary conditions Smooth surfaces are generally the default condition at the wall. However, the user may generally define rough surfaces by modifying the parameters of the logarithmic layer law used by the codes to represent the zone very near the walls. The use of rough surfaces depends on the objectives of the simulations. If they concern the analysis of the forces balance or the propagation speed of the smoke front, the assumption made on surfaces will influence the results. Heat transfer boundary conditions - Fixed temperature or heat fluxes. In this case, the temperature at the walls or the heat fluxes through walls are fixed to constant values. The use of fixed temperatures at the walls is nevertheless preferable, especially in combination with a lump radiative and convective heat transfer coefficient at the walls.
-
Combination of fixed temperature with heat fluxes. This technique may be used in order to roughly model the heat conduction process in the rock. Actually, it does not directly take it into account. Heat conduction inside the rock. This method appears as the best physical interpretation of the problem. The heat transfer to the walls may have noticeable effects especially in the case of long fires. However, it leads to larger meshes and longer calculation and is often not necessary.
Fixed pressures at both ends This solution directly represents the atmospheric effects. The influence of the boundaries location has been studied [80]. It appears that the critical size of the outside zone to be modelled should be comprised between 3 and 5 hydraulic diameters [80]. However, acceptable results can be obtained with no outside domain provided that some precautions or even corrections are used.
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Proprits des fluides fixes une extrmit et pression fixe l'autre extrmit Cette solution peut se justifier par lanalyse des conditions rgnant dans le tunnel sous des effets connus de ventilation. La condition en amont semble tre quelque peu limitative car elle force l'coulement aller dans un sens, spcialement si les composantes de la vitesse sont imposes. Utilisation de modles simplifis Cette technique peut tre applique dans le cas de tunnels longs, qui ne peuvent tre entirement modliss et pour lesquels les conditions limites sont difficiles fixer. Il est recommand dutiliser un modle simplifi ( une dimension par exemple) afin destimer globalement l'coulement dans tout le tunnel et d'en dduire les conditions limites imposer aux deux extrmits du maillage.
Qincendie est identique en 2D et en 3D S tunnel o Qincendie est la puissance thermique et Stunnel la section transversale du tunnel. Ces contraintes agissent sur la gomtrie et la gravit. Des validations ont t entreprises partir des expriences du tunnel de lOfenegg [79] (figure 4.5.5). Certaines limites importantes doivent tre mentionnes. Par exemple, cette technique ne dcrit pas correctement la stratification lorsque la vitesse longitudinale est plus basse que la valeur critique [80]. De fait, les simulations en 2D ncessitent des prcautions spcifiques et ne peuvent tre utilises que dans certains cas.
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Given fluid properties fixed at one end and fixed pressure at the other end This solution may be justified for the analysis of the conditions inside the tunnel with known ventilation effects. The upstream condition appears to be quite limitative because it forces the flow to one direction, especially if the velocities components are imposed. Use of simplified models This technique may be applied in the case of long tunnels, which are not entirely modelled and for which the boundary conditions are difficult to describe. It is recommended to use a simplified model (1D model for instance) in order to estimate globally the flow in the complete tunnel and derive the boundary conditions to impose at both ends of the mesh.
to take into account the reduction of the friction forces, some authors introduce additional volume forces [81]; another solution based on similarities may also be used and is based on the Reynolds (equation IV.2), Froude (equation IV.3), and energy non-dimensional parameters. The energy non-dimensional parameters represent the energy released by the fire or the quantity of fuel injected per square meter of tunnel cross-sectional area to respect the analogy with the actual tunnel, that is
where Q fire is the heat release rate and Stunnel the tunnel cross-sectional area. These constraints influence the geometry and the gravity terms. A validation work has been performed on the basis of Ofenegg tunnel experiments [79] (Figure 4.5.5). Some important limitations must be mentioned. For example, this technique does not describe correctly the stratification in the case when the longitudinal velocity is lower than the critical value [80]. Consequently 2D simulations require specific precautions and can be used in specific situations only.
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IV.5.6 Conclusions
Le principal avantage des simulations numriques par modle de champ est de permettre dtudier des cas pour lesquels aucune donne exprimentale nest disponible. Si une validation prliminaire a t ralise partir d'essais en vraie grandeur, ils peuvent servir simuler de nombreux autres cas. Cette technique fournit une description gnrale des divers phnomnes et est la seule capable doffrir de telles possibilits, mme si les rsultats doivent plutt tre considrs comme des ordres de grandeur. Les principales limites de cette technique sont le temps ncessaire au calcul et la complexit de son usage : de ce point de vue, la mthode n'a pas encore atteint le degr de maturit des calculs de structure par lments finis par exemple. Des validations prliminaires plutt longues et des utilisateurs expriments sont ncessaires ; sinon les rsultats risquent dtre tout fait trompeurs. Les modles de champ sont donc principalement adapts certains usages spcifiques :
tablir des rgles gnrales de dimensionnement en simulant des cas types, explorer des situations nouvelles ou spcialement complexes, approfondir la comprhension des incendies rels et les analyser (comme cela a t fait, par exemple, pour la catastrophe de la station londonienne de mtro Kings Cross [82]).
De plus, un certain nombre davantages peuvent tre tirs de lutilisation de ces modles en les associant dautres mthodes dtude. Par exemple, quelques simulations numriques prliminaires et, si besoin est, trs imprcises seront profitables aux essais en vraie grandeur afin dvaluer les phnomnes prvus et leur ordre de grandeur. De plus, un programme dessais sur des maquettes chelle rduite pourrait gagner tre prpar par calcul dvaluation de la qualit des similitudes et des ordres de grandeur. Les maquettes chelle rduite permettraient alors dtudier le phnomne en faisant varier les paramtres intressants. Enfin, de nouveaux calculs pourraient tre raliss pour, dans un premier temps, caler le code numrique et, dans un deuxime temps, comprendre, voire extrapoler, les mesures.
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6 5 4 Height (m)
Temperatures at 124.25 m from fire at 60 s 3D with symetry plane 2D without similarities 2D with similarities
Velocities at 124.25 m from fire at 60 s 3D with symetry plane 2D without similarities 2D with similarities
6 5 4
2 1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Temperature (C)
Height (m)
3 2 1
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Velocity (m/s)
Figure 4.5.5 - Comparison between 2D and 3D simulations (fire test No.1 [79])
IV.5.6 Conclusions
The main advantage of the CFD models is to allow the study of cases for which no experimental data are available. If a preliminary validation has been made from full scale tests, they should be able to simulate many other situations. This technique provides a general description of the various phenomena. This is the only method that offers such possibilities, even if the results must rather be considered as orders of magnitude.
The major restriction is the time needed for the calculation and the complex utilisation: from this point of view the method has not yet come to the same maturity as for instance the structure calculation by finite elements. Rather lengthy preliminary validations and skilful users are necessary; otherwise the obtained results may be quite misleading.
The CFD models are therefore adapted principally to certain specific uses:
to set up general design rules by simulating typical cases; to investigate new or specially complex situations; to get a thorough understanding of actual fires and to analyse them (as it has been done for instance for the disaster at the Kings Cross underground station in London [82]).
Moreover there are a lot of advantages that can be drawn from their use in conjunction with other study methods. For instance, full size testing will profit from some preliminary computational simulations - if necessary very approximate - in order to assess the expected phenomena and their orders of magnitude. Also, a test programme on scale models would advantageously be prepared by calculations aimed at evaluating the quality of similarities and orders of magnitude. The reduced scale model will then allow to make the study by varying the useful parameters. Lastly, new calculations can be made in order to calibrate the computational code in a first step, and in a second step to understand - even extrapolate - the model measurements.
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Afin de simuler les incendies dans de grands tunnels ou dans des rseaux souterrains complexes, il pourrait tre utile de combiner une simulation 3D avec dautres simulations plus simples, comme la 2D ou la 1D, pour dterminer les conditions limites. Cette technique apparat potentiellement intressante pour le dveloppement des simulations numriques [80]. Les modles de champ comprennent de nombreux modles physiques qui ont t valid sur quelques expriences fondamentales, mais peu de validations globales ont t ralises sur des essais d'incendie en vraie grandeur. Ainsi, les bases de donnes tires des essais EUREKA 499 et du Memorial tunnel devraient-elles tre trs utiles pour la validation des modles numriques. Ces travaux ont dj commenc dans divers pays, mais ils ncessitent beaucoup de temps. Lespoir de mettre au point un modle numrique, pouvant facilement tre utilis par des personnes non averties qui auraient juste appuyer sur un bouton (car ce modle aurait t cal et les nombreux paramtres auraient tous t ajusts) est probablement utopique. Des travaux prliminaires de validation doivent comparer, la fois qualitativement et quantitativement, les rsultats et mesures afin de dfinir des rgles de conduite des simulations dincendie ; mais cela ne doit pas amener ajuster tous les paramtres sans raisons physiques, car de tels calages de modles ne pourraient pas tre transposs dautres configurations.
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In order to simulate fires in long tunnels or complex underground networks, it may be useful to couple a 3D simulation with simplified ones such as 2D or 1D models in order to determine boundary conditions. This technique appears as a potential development of the numerical simulation [80].
The CFD models include several physical models which have been validated against fundamental experiences, but few global validations have been made on full scale fire tests. In this way, the data bases drawn from the EUREKA 499 and the Memorial Tunnel experiments should be very useful for validating CFD models. This work has already started in different countries but requires much time.
The hope to set up a CFD model which could be easily used by unskilled users who would have to only press a button, because the model would have been calibrated and all the numerous parameters would have been fitted, is probably unrealistic. A preliminary validation work must compare qualitatively and quantitatively calculated results and measurements in order to define rules for running fire simulations, but it must not lead to fit all the parameters without physical reasons because such calibration could not be transposed to other configurations.
The CFD codes are already largely used to study fire situations in tunnels and should go on developing in the future, but research and validation works are required to ensure the validity of their results. Some research works are required to improve existing models, such as turbulence or combustion models, but they are not specific to tunnels and concern fluid dynamics modelling. These research works are generally done by universities and laboratories, the activity of which deals with fundamental fluid dynamics phenomena and development of CFD codes.
Some other research works are more specific to tunnels and consist in adapting or calibrating physical models for fire modelling. Such research work has been done for example to improve the standard k- model which might not correctly estimate the length of backlayering [83].
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Des donnes exprimentales sont ncessaires la validation des codes numriques ; ces donnes ne sont pas toujours disponibles car beaucoup de grands essais d'incendie mens dans le pass taient raliss pour dautres objectifs. Les programmes dessais incendie EUREKA 499 et du Memorial Tunnel ont t raliss en prenant cet objectif en compte ; ils ont ainsi pu permettre de crer des bases de donnes trs intressantes pour la communaut internationale et ce, afin de valider les codes numriques. De nouvelles exprimentations, que ce soit chelle rduite ou en vraie grandeur, doivent tre entreprises lavenir, en ayant pour objectif principal de valider et caler les modles physiques. Cela peut porter sur la comprhension des coulements gnrs par lincendie, tout comme sur les mesures de certaines proprits physiques de la fume, qui font dfaut aux modles (par exemple, proprits de rayonnement de la fume, gnration de suie). Manifestement, les diffrentes approches prsentes dans ce chapitre sont complmentaires. Le choix dune approche pour tudier la situation des incendies dans les tunnels, aussi bien pour la recherche que pour la conception dun tunnel, dpend des objectifs poursuivis dans chaque situation.
IV.7 Conclusion
tudier le problme dun incendie dans un tunnel requiert des moyens spcifiques. Ces dernier doivent tre adapts aux objectifs et aux ressources financires qui peuvent raisonnablement tre dpenses compte tenu des enjeux de ltude. Le tableau 4.7.1 prsente une synthse du point de vue de la conjugaison des moyens et des objectifs de recherche pour la scurit incendie dans les tunnels.
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The validation of CFD codes requires experimental data which are not always available because many large fire experiments carried out in the past had other objectives. The EUREKA 499 and Memorial Tunnel fire tests programmes have been performed taking into account this objective, so that they provide very interesting databases for the international community to validate CFD codes.
New small or large scale experiments should be undertaken in the future with the priority objective of validating and calibrating physical models. It may concern the understanding of flow generated by fire as well as measurements of some physical smoke properties which are missing for models (i.e. radiative smoke properties, generation of soot).
Obviously the different approaches which have been presented in this section are complementary. The choice of one approach for studying fire situation in tunnels, as well as for research or tunnel design, depends on the objectives which are sought in each case.
IV.7 Conclusion
Studying the problem of a fire in a tunnel requires specific means. They have to be adapted to the aims and the amount of money which can reasonably be spent in the study with respect to its stakes. Table 4.7.1 gives a synthetic point of view about the combination of the means and the objectives of investigation in fire safety in tunnels.
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Essai dincendie avant ou pendant lexploitation (pour optimiser les consignes de ventilation) Essais dincendie avant ou pendant lexploitation (pour la formation des exploitants et des pompiers)
Avantage : - Observations visuelles possibles Inconvnient : - Manque dinformations d labsence de capteurs Conclusion : - Inadapt
Avantage : - Essai ralis avec de vrais systmes de ventilation Inconvnient : - Analyses limites en raison du manque de mesures Conclusion : - Pas bien adapt
Avantages : - Montre aux exploitants comment la ventilation ragit - Pompiers trs intresss par ce quils auront combattre en ralit Inconvnient : - Pas dexploitation possible pendant les essais Conclusion : - Bien adapt Avantage : - Situation reprsentative Inconvnient : - Pas dexploitation possible pendant les essais Conclusion : - Bien adapt
Avantages: - Nombreux essais possibles - Possibilit dtudier des lois globales rgissant des situations spcifiques Inconvnient : - Besoin dessais de rfrence en vraie grandeur pour les transposer aux situations relles Conclusion : - Mthode utile pour la recherche Avantages : - Possibilit dtudier plusieurs situations diffrentes - Informations sur structures d'coulement qui ne pourraient tre obtenues par dautres mthodes Inconvnient : - Les conclusions doivent tre corrles avec des donnes exprimentales existantes Conclusion : - Mthode utile pour la recherche
Avantage: - Moins onreux que les essais en vraie grandeur Inconvnient : - Li aux limitations induites par les lois de similitude Conclusion : - Trs difficile de conclure que les rsultats sont reprsentatifs de situations en vraie grandeur Avantage : - Possibilit dobtenir une optimisation partir de diffrentes hypothses Inconvnient : - Le modle doit tre utilis par des personnes qualifies Conclusion : - Mthode utile pour les projets, si elle est valide
Avantage : - Cot Inconvnients : - Li aux limitations induites par les lois de similitude - Aucun respect des contraintes de temps Conclusion : - Certainement peu raliste, mais dmonstratif Avantage : - Possibilit de dcrire les conditions physiques en plusieurs endroits du tunnel Inconvnient : - Rsultats thoriques conduisant des conclusions thoriques Conclusion : - Ladaptation dpend de lutilisation du modle
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Use for: Research Advantages: - Direct interpretation - Complete results Disadvantages: - Cost Full scale - Limited number of tests fire tests Conclusions: programmes - Well suited
Means
Tunnel fire tests before or under operation (aimed at optimising the ventilation instructions) Tunnel fire tests before or under operation (aimed at operators and fire brigades training)
Advantages: - Partial results with full scale facilities - Numerous different situations Disadvantages: - Lack of information due to the limited number of sensors Conclusions: - Useful but partial results Advantages: - Visual observations possible Disadvantages: - Lack of information due to the absence of sensors Conclusions: - Not suited
Use for: Design Advantages: - Direct interpretation - Possibility of using real road vehicles Disadvantages: - Cost - Limited number of tests - Geometry of the test facility Conclusions: - This solution depends on the importance and specific problems of the project (ex: Memorial Tunnel) Advantages: - Accumulation of experience useful to choose a system - Test performed with real ventilation systems Disadvantages: - Limited number of tests Conclusions: - Useful
Advantages: - Test performed with real ventilation systems Disadvantages: - Limited analysis due to the lack of measurements Conclusions: - Not well suited Advantages: - Cost lower than full scale tests. Disadvantages: - Linked to the limitations induced by the similarity laws Conclusions: - Very difficult to conclude that the results are representative of full scale situations Advantages: - Possibility to get an optimisation by the use of different assumptions Disadvantages: - The model requires qualification Conclusions: - Useful method for projects, if validated
Use for: Operation Advantages: - Direct interpretation Disadvantages: - Cost - Limited number of tests Conclusions: - Unrealistic if not associated with other objectives
Advantages: - Shows to the operators how the ventilation reacts - Fire brigades very interested in what they will face for real Disadvantages: - No operation possible during the tests Conclusions: - Well suited Advantages: - Representative situation Disadvantages: - No operation possible during the tests Conclusions: - Well suited
Advantages: - Many tests possible - Possibility to study global laws governing specific situations Disadvantages: - Needs full scale reference tests for transposition to real situations Conclusions: - Useful method for research Advantages: - Possibility to study many different situations - Information on flow structures unattainable with other methods Disadvantages: - The conclusions must be correlated to existing experimental references Conclusions: - Useful method for research
Advantages: - Cost Disadvantages: - Linked to the limitations induced by the similarity laws - No respect of time basis Conclusions: - Possibly unrealistic but demonstrative Advantages: - Possibility to describe the physical conditions in several points of the tunnel Disadvantages: - Theoretical results lead to theoretical conclusions Conclusions: - The adaptation depends on the use of the model
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dilution des polluants ( l'intrieur du tunnel), respect de l'environnement ( l'extrieur du tunnel), matrise des fumes en cas d'incendie.
Ce chapitre donne des dfinitions et des critres pour lvaluation des niveaux de scurit et le dimensionnement des systmes de ventilation selon les critres de matrise des incendies et des fumes. Un systme de ventilation conu uniquement partir des critres environnementaux et de dilution donnera souvent des rsultats insatisfaisants du point de vue de la matrise des fumes. De plus, les normes environnementales forcent les constructeurs de vhicules, aujourdhui plus quhier et probablement de plus en plus lavenir, amliorer la technologie de rduction des missions des vhicules ; ainsi, le dbit dair requis pour le critre de dilution est de plus de plus rduit, de mme que la puissance lectrique ncessaire. Puisque la matrise des fumes est indpendante des amliorations technologiques, ses critres seront lavenir dcisifs pour un nombre toujours croissant de projets (voir figure 5.2).
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dilution of air pollutants (inside tunnels), environmental issues (outside tunnel), smoke control in case of fire.
Figure 5.1 shows a possible logical flow of ventilation design. This section aims at giving the definitions and criteria for the assessment of the safety levels, and for the dimensioning of the ventilation system according to fire and smoke control criterion. A ventilation system designed only according to dilution and environmental criteria will often be unsatisfactory from the smoke control point of view. Furthermore the environmental standards force new vehicle producers (now more than in the past and more and more, probably, in the future) to upgrade their technology to reduce the emissions of the new vehicles; consequently the air flow required to meet the dilution criterion is more and more reducing, and therefore also the required mechanical power. As smoke control is independent of the aforementioned technological upgrading, the smoke control criterion will be, in the future, the decisive one for an increasing number of projects (see figure 5.2).
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Le paragraphe V.1 donne un court aperu des questions de ventilation avec quelques rfrences aux problmes de dilution et denvironnement, alors que le reste de ce chapitre ne traite que des recommandations en matire de matrise des fumes et des questions qui y sont lies. Des informations gnrales sont donnes sur des travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR ( V.2), les directives et expriences existantes ( V.3), de nouveaux rsultats de recherches ( V.4), les objectifs de ventilation pour la matrise des incendies et des fumes ( V.5). Cependant, la majeure partie de ce chapitre est consacre des informations dtailles et des recommandations sur la matrise des incendies avec les principaux systmes de ventilation : naturelle ( V.6), longitudinale ( V.7), transversale et semi-transversale ( V.8).
V.1
Introduction la ventilation
Une valuation doit tre ralise en tenant compte du volume dair ncessaire la dilution des polluants ainsi que dautres facteurs comme la longueur du tunnel, sa situation, le type de circulation, les lois sur lenvironnement et, facteur non ngligeable, la scurit. Un systme de ventilation peut alors ensuite tre choisi pour chaque tunnel. Les systmes possibles de ventilation sont :
la ventilation naturelle qui peut tre :
- induite par la temprature de lair et les conditions mtorologiques, - induite par la circulation ;
la ventilation mcanique qui peut tre :
Les principes de chaque mthode sont brivement dcrits ci-aprs. Les mthodes ne sont pas toujours indpendantes, des combinaisons sont possibles et, dans certains cas, invitables.
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Paragraph V.1 is a short overview of the ventilation matters with a few references to dilution and environmental issues, while the remaining part of the section only deals with smoke control recommendations and related issues. Some general information is given of previous work by PIARC ( V.2), existing guidelines and experience ( V.3), new research results and physics ( V.4), objectives of ventilation for fire and smoke control ( V.5). However, the largest part of the section is devoted to detailed information and recommendations regarding fire control with the main ventilation systems: natural ( V.6), longitudinal ( V.7), transverse and semi-transverse ( V.8).
V.1
Introduction to ventilation
Taking into account the volume of air required for the dilution of pollutants as well as other factors, such as tunnel length, location, type of traffic, environmental laws, and not least, fire safety considerations, an assessment can be performed and the ventilation system can be chosen for each particular tunnel. The possible ventilation systems are:
natural ventilation which can be:
- longitudinal, - fully transverse, - semi-transverse (and reversible semi-transverse), - partial (pseudo) transverse;
air cleaning combined with mechanical ventilation.
The principles of each method are shortly described below. The methods are not always distinct; combinations are possible and, in some cases, unavoidable.
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Du point de vue du critre de dilution, la ventilation est considre satisfaisante lorsque le systme est capable de maintenir la concentration de polluants dans le tunnel en dessous de certains seuils, qui sont videmment infrieurs aux niveaux nocifs pour les usagers qui traversent le tunnel ou qui sont contraints d'y rester arrts pendant un certain temps. Un systme de ventilation conu uniquement en fonction du critre de dilution pourrait suffire du point de vue de la matrise des fumes, mais cela savre insuffisant la plupart du temps. Le projet doit alors tre complt afin de prendre en compte les critres de matrise des fumes numrs au V.7.2.
Dans les tunnels ventilation longitudinale, la concentration en substances nocives saccrot dans la direction du flux dair et diminue avec le dbit dair pur. La concentration maximale augmente selon la longueur du tunnel. Dans tous les cas, la production de polluants varie avec le volume de circulation, sa vitesse, la dclivit de la chausse et laltitude du tunnel. Ainsi, en calculant le dbit ncessaire pour la ventilation de deux tunnels ayant le mme trafic, on trouvera le dbit le plus lev pour le plus long tunnel et pour celui avec la plus grande pente ascendante. La vitesse longitudinale de lair possde une limite suprieure pratique ; par consquent, pour une circulation et une dclivit donnes, la longueur du tunnel pour laquelle une ventilation longitudinale est possible est galement limite. En premire estimation, la limite suprieure peut tre value par la connaissance de la section transversale du tunnel et de la vitesse maximale de lair (aujourdhui denviron 8 10 m/s 1), qui est rentable et ne perturbe pas les vhicules et le personnel travaillant lintrieur du tunnel. De plus, la puissance mcanique du systme de ventilation augmente en ralit avec la puissance trois de la longueur du tunnel dans les tunnels circulation bidirectionnelle. Pour les tunnels qui ncessitent un courant dair suprieur aux seuils dj cits, la ventilation longitudinale est toujours possible, mais elle doit tre complte par des puits assurant des changes massifs entre air vici et air pur.
1 Par exemple, les autorits franaises recommandent une vitesse maximale de lair de 8 m/s pour des tunnels bidirectionnels et 10 m/s pour des tunnels unidirectionnels.
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From the point of view of the dilution criterion, the ventilation is considered satisfactory when the system is able to keep the concentration of pollutants in the tunnel air below certain thresholds, which are obviously under the noxious levels for people who travel throughout the tunnel or who are forced to be stationary within for a while. A ventilation system designed only according to the above-exposed dilution criterion, could be satisfactory also from the smoke control point of view, but is often not; thus the project has to be verified to take into account the smoke control criteria exposed in V.7.2. In tunnels with longitudinal ventilation, the concentration of noxious substances increases in the direction of the airflow and decreases with the fresh air rate. The maximum concentration increases according to the tunnel length. In any cases, the production of pollutants varies with the traffic volume, its velocity, the roadway gradient and the tunnel altitude. Therefore, if we compute the required airflow for the ventilation of two tunnels with the same (flowing) traffic, we would find the greater flow rate for the longer one and for the tunnel with the greater upward slope. The longitudinal airflow velocity has a practical upper limit; consequently, for a given traffic and slope of the roadway, the tunnel length for which longitudinal ventilation is possible has a maximum limit too. As a first estimate, this upper limit could be evaluated knowing the cross2 sectional area of the tunnel and the maximum air velocity (today considered to be about 8 to 10 m/s) which is cost effective and does not disturb vehicles and the staff operating within the tunnel. Moreover, the mechanical power of the ventilation system increases, in fact, with the third power of the tunnel length in tunnels used bi-directionally. For tunnels that require an overall airflow over the aforementioned threshold, the longitudinal ven-tilation is still possible, but it has to be supplemented with shafts for massive exchange of exhaust with fresh air.
2 For instance, the French authorities recommend a maximum air velocity of 8 m/s for two-way tunnels and 10 m/s for oneway tunnels.
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La ventilation longitudinale est gnralement ralise laide de ventilateurs hlicodes appels acclrateurs ou ventilateurs de jet (figure 5.1.2.1) rpartis le long du tunnel et en dehors de lespace de circulation. La taille et la rpartition des acclrateurs le long du tunnel nont pratiquement aucun effet sur la vitesse de lair condition quun minimum de rgles techniques soit observ. Parfois, la ventilation longitudinale par injection est aussi utilise, dans laquelle leffet Saccardo est le moyen de transmission de la pousse. Il est moins onreux de concentrer les acclrateurs prs des entres. De cette faon, la longueur des cbles est la plus courte possible. Cependant, dun point de vue arodynamique, si les acclrateurs sont trop proches de la sortie, leur efficacit est rduite. Par consquent, la premire et la dernire srie dacclrateurs sont installes au moins 80 100 m lintrieur du tunnel.
Systmes de ventilation non longitudinale transversal pur transversal partiel 3 semi-transversal semi-transversal rversible - en exploitation normale - en cas dincendie
Air frais 100 % 100 % (ventuellement intermdiaire) 100 % 100 % 0 % dbit 100 %
3 Le type le plus commun des systmes de ventilation transversaux partiels nvacue quune fraction de lair vici par rapport
au total dair frais fourni (100 %) par des gaines supplmentaires. Par consquent, une certaine quantit dair vici est vacue par les ttes du tunnel. Par exemple, lorigine, chaque moiti du tunnel du Mont-Blanc tait quipe dun systme 3 3 de ventilation capable dinjecter 600 m /s (100 %) dair frais et dextraire seulement 300 m /s (50 %) dair vici. Les 50 % restants taient chasss par les ttes du tunnel. Plus tard, le systme fut modifi en systme semi-transversal rversible, 3 avec une injection de 900 m /s (100 %) et aucune extraction en conditions normales dexploitation.
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Longitudinal ventilation is generally performed by axial-flow fans called "jet fans" or "boosters" (Figure 5.1.2.1) distributed along the tunnel and outside the traffic gauge. The size and distribution of the jet fans along the tunnel have practically no effect on the overall tunnel air velocity provided that a few technical rules are observed. Sometimes also the longitudinal ventilation by injection is used, where the Saccardo effect is the way of transmission of the thrust. The cheapest criterion for the installation is the concentration of fans near the portals. In this way the length of cables is the shortest possible. From the aerodynamics point of view, if the fans are too close to the exit their efficiency is reduced. Consequently the first and last sets of fans are usually installed at least 80-100 m within the tunnel.
Non-longitudinal ventilation systems Fully transverse Partial (pseudo) transverse4 Semi transverse Reversible semi transverse - in normal operation - in case of fire
Fully-transverse system
In fully-transverse ventilation systems there is one or more fresh air ducts that lay parallel to the traffic tube. The fresh air is supplied through louvers distributed all along the tunnel; the exhaust air is removed in the same way from the opposite side of the tunnel by using one or more exhaust ducts. In this system, the amount of exhausted air per metre of tunnel length equals the amount of supplied air. In some cases of cut-and-covers, there are no ducts: the fresh air is injected directly from outside through small fans, and the exhaust air is discharged in the same way directly to the outside. The two air streams (injected fresh air and extracted exhaust air) create a flow in the main tube, the direction of which is transverse to the longitudinal axis of the tunnel.
4 The most common type of pseudo-transverse ventilation system is the one with an intermediate value for the exhaust air
evacuated through additional ducts and the full amount of fresh air (100%) supplied. Consequently a certain amount of exhaust air is evacuated through the portals of the main tunnel. As an example, we can consider that originally each half of 3 the Monte Bianco tunnel was equipped with a ventilation system able to perform the inlet of 600 m /s (100%) while extracting 3 only 300 m /s (50%) of exhaust air. The remaining 50% was blown out through the tunnel portals. Later the system was 3 turned to reversible semi-transverse system, with an injection of 900 m /s (100%) and no extraction under normal operation.
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Un tel courant d'air est perturb par dautres facteurs (diffrences de pression du vent aux ttes du tunnel, diffrences de pression atmosphrique, incendie dans le tunnel, etc.), qui crent un courant dair longitudinal. Cela signifie quen pratique, un courant d'air purement perpendiculaire laxe longitudinal du tunnel sera peu probable. Un deuxime aspect noter est que le courant dair longitudinal est difficile contrler, mme si la capacit du systme de ventilation transversale est grande, car il nexiste pas de forces compensatrices dans le sens longitudinal. La manire la plus rpandue davoir un quelconque contrle sur ce courant dair longitudinal est de crer des cantons de ventilation indpendants et successifs dans lesquels linjection et lextraction dair peuvent tre ralises sparment. La concentration de pollution dans lair est constante tout au long du tunnel (sil ny a pas de courant dair longitudinal). Ce systme est donc applicable dans les grands tunnels. En principe, il ny a pas de limite la longueur du tunnel en ce qui concerne lvacuation de la pollution, mais des restrictions conomiques et techniques entrent bien sr en ligne de compte. Lair ventil est amen et extrait grce des gaines construites cet effet. Le volume total dair ventil ncessaire est considrable, spcialement dans les grands tunnels. De fait, les gaines sont grandes et bien videmment onreuses. La capacit des ventilateurs est en grande partie dtermine par la vitesse de lair dans les gaines. Dans les grands tunnels, les gaines sont donc divises longitudinalement en cantons, lair est fourni en des endroits diffrents afin de restreindre la vitesse de lair dans les diffrents cantons. Des vitesses de 15 25 m/s dans les gaines dair lorsquelles sont pleine charge sont frquentes. Comme dj mentionn, crer plusieurs cantons de ventilation indpendants permet galement davoir un certain contrle du courant dair longitudinal. Les ventilateurs sont gnralement installs prs des entres du tunnel pour une meilleure accessibilit, ou dans des usines souterraines. En cas dincendie, la gaine daspiration de lair vici dans la zone de lincendie fonctionne en aspiration totale et les cantons de ventilation voisins sont contrls de manire ce que la vitesse longitudinale de lair au cur de lincendie pousse les fumes dans le bon sens. Cependant, lexprience montre que, dans les petits tunnels et sous linfluence du vent et de leffet de chemine des fumes chaudes, il nest pas ais de contrler la direction et la vitesse de lair dans la zone de l'incendie.
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Such flow is perturbed by other factors (differences in wind pressure on tunnel openings, atmospheric pressure differences, traffic, fire in the tunnel, etc.) which create a longitudinal airflow. This means that, in practice, a flow which is purely transverse to the longitudinal axis of the tunnel will hardly ever occur. A second aspect which attracts the attention is that the longitudinal airflow is difficult to control even if the transverse ventilation system has a large capacity because there are no compensating forces present in the longitudinal direction. The most usual way to get some control on this longitudinal airflow is to create successive independent ventilation sections in which fresh air injection and/or exhaust air extraction can be operated separately. The concentration of pollution in the air is constant all over the tunnel (if there is no longitudinal airflow). This system is therefore suitable for application in long tunnels. In principle there is no limit to the tunnel length as far as the pollution removal is concerned; but of course technical and economic restrictions apply.
The ventilating air is generally supplied and extracted through purpose built air ducts. The total volume of ventilating air required is considerable, especially in long tunnels. As a result the ducts are large and therefore expensive. The air velocity in the ducts determines the required capacity of the fans to a significant extent. In long tunnels the ducts system is therefore longitudinally divided into sections and the air is supplied at various places in order to restrict the air speed in the various sections. Speeds of 15 to 25 m/s in the air ducts under full load conditions are usual. As already mentioned, creating several independent ventilation sections also provides a means to have some control on the longitudinal airflow. The fans are usually installed near the tunnel portals in order to be easy to reach, or in underground plants.
In case of a fire, the exhaust air duct in the fire area is turned on to full exhaust and the neighbouring ventilation sections are controlled in such a way that a longitudinal air velocity in the fire zone can move the smoke in a suitable way. However, experience shows that, in short tunnels and under the influence of the wind and chimney effect of the hot smoke, it is not easy to control the air direction and speed in the fire zone.
Normal operation
Exploitation normale
Fire
Incendie
Figure 5.1.2 - Example of a transverse ventilation system (without secondary supply ducts to pavement level)
Figure 5.1.2 - Exemple dun systme de ventilation transversale (sans carneaux descendant au niveau du sol)
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diminuer le volume dair ncessaire la ventilation, rduire la pollution globale aux ttes et aux chemines.
Les installations actuelles sont principalement fondes sur des prcipitateurs lectrostatiques capables dextraire les poussires et les suies de lair du tunnel. En raison de la forte proportion de camions dans les tunnels japonais, le premier paramtre qui y atteint le seuil critique de pollution est la visibilit. Cest pourquoi cest au Japon qua t appliqu pour la premire fois un systme capable de rduire la concentration des particules solides lintrieur du tunnel.
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Remark: In Switzerland, there are some tunnels with only exhaust shafts.
to lessen the airflow rate required for the ventilation of the tunnel, to reduce the overall pollution released at tunnel portals and shafts.
The present applications mainly rely on electrostatic precipitators able to collect dust and soot from the tunnel air. Given the high proportion of trucks within the Japanese tunnels, the visibility is the pollution parameter that first reaches the relevant threshold. For this reason, first in Japan, a system able to reduce the concentration of solid particles within the tunnel air has been applied.
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Plusieurs tunnels Oslo (Norvge) sont aussi quips dun systme pour le traitement de lair, car il existe une forte concentration de poussire dans les tunnels en hiver lorsque les vhicules sont quips de pneus clous. Des programmes complmentaires de recherche sont en cours dans ces deux pays et galement en Autriche (tunnel de Plabutsch) et en Allemagne (tunnel de lElbe). Certains dentre eux ont pour but lenlvement du CO, du NO x et des hydrocarbures. Le plus rcent porte sur le traitement biologique de lair des fins de protection de lenvironnement. Une voie intressante a t ouverte par la recherche sur les filtres lectrostatiques capables dextraire la poussire et la suie des fumes chaudes dun incendie afin damliorer la visibilit. Les rsultats sont encourageants et montrent que la visibilit peut tre amliore en prcipitant les particules de fume. Cependant, cette technologie na jamais t applique comme moyen unique de lutte contre lincendie.
V.2
Pratiquement tous les rapports du Comit des Tunnels routiers aux Congrs mondiaux de la Route ont trait du problme de la ventilation des tunnels, de ses lois physiques, des taux dmission des polluants, des niveaux maximaux admissibles des polluants, etc. Les rapports numrs ci-aprs traitent galement de la ventilation en cas dincendie :
tunnels routiers : missions, ventilation, environnement [84], rapport au XXe Congrs mondial de la Route [17], (p. 60-79), rapport au XIXe Congrs mondial de la Route [18], (p. 43-57), rapport au XVIIIe Congrs mondial de la Route [19], (p. 67-74), rapport au XVIIe Congrs mondial de la Route [27], (p. 68-70, p. 81), rapport au XVIe Congrs mondial de la Route [26], (p. 48-52).
V.3
De nombreuses directives sur la ventilation des tunnels, la scurit et la gestion des incendies existent de par le monde.
LAssociation routire du Japon a publi des directives de ventilation (en japonais [85]) ; les plus importantes sont reprises dans un mmorandum technique du PWRI [86]. En Allemagne, les concepteurs se rfrent aux directives du RABT [50]. Aux Pays-Bas, les concepteurs suivent les recommandations nerlandaises [87]. En France, les concepteurs appliquent les directives de ventilation du CETU [88; 89]. En Autriche, les concepteurs se rfrent aux directives de la FVS [90] Dans les Pays nordiques, les concepteurs suivent leurs directives de ventilation [91] En Norvge, les concepteurs se rfrent aux normes de ladministration publique des routes [92]. En Sude, les concepteurs appliquent les spcifications techniques gnrales [93].
Dans de nombreux autres pays, seuls les rapports AIPCR servent de rfrence.
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Several tunnels in Oslo (Norway) are also equipped with a system for air cleaning because a high concentration of dust affects the tunnel air in wintertime when vehicles are equipped with studded tires. Complementary research programmes on the topic are under development in these two countries and also in Austria (Plabutsch tunnel) and Germany (Elbe tunnel). Some of them aim at removing CO, NOx and hydrocarbons. The latest research programme deals with the use of biological cleaning of the air for environmental purposes.
There is an interesting line of research on electrostatic filters able to collect dust and soot from the hot smoke of a fire, to improve the visibility. There are encouraging results that show that the visibility can be improved by precipitating the particles from the fire smoke. However, this technology has never been applied as the only fire control measure.
V.2
Every report of the Committee on Road Tunnels for the successive World Road Congresses has dealt with the problem of tunnel ventilation, its physics, the pollutants emission rates, maximum allowed pollutant levels, etc. The reports listed below deal with the problem of ventilation in case of fire also:
Publication on Road Tunnels: Emissions, Ventilation, Environment [84], Report for the XXth World Road Congress [17], (p. 60-79), Report for the XIXth World Road Congress [18], (p. 43-57), Report for the XVIIIth World Road Congress [19], (p. 67-74), Report for the XVIIth World Road Congress [27], (p. 68-70, p. 81), Report for the XVIth World Road Congress [26], (p. 48-52).
V.3
Several guidelines dealing with tunnel ventilation, fire safety design and fire management exist all over the world.
The Japan Road Association wrote ventilation guidelines (in Japanese [85]). The most important points are reported in a Technical memorandum of PWRI [86]. In Germany designers refer to the guidelines from RABT [50]. In the Netherlands designers refer to the Dutch Recommendations [87]. In France designers refer to the ventilation guidelines of CETU [88 ; 89]. In Austria designers refer to the guidelines from FVS [90]. In Nordic countries designers refer to the ventilation guidelines [91]. In Norway designers refer to the standards of the Public Roads Administration [92]. In Sweden designers refer to the general technical specification [93].
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V.4
Lannexe de ce chapitre dcrit lexprience des Pays-Bas sur la rsistance lincendie des acclrateurs. Dautres rsultats intressants sur les questions abordes ont t dcrits dans les chapitres III et IV. Il est conseill de se reporter ces chapitres pour plus de dtails sur les nouvelles recherches en matire de ventilation pour la matrise de lincendie et des fumes.
V.5
Du point de vue de la scurit en cas dincendie, les critres suivants doivent tre appliqus lors de la conception : 1. Lobjectif du contrle de la propagation de la fume est de maintenir le plus longtemps possible les personnes dans une zone libre de toute fume ; cela signifie que soit la stratification de la fume doit tre conserve intacte, laissant une zone plus ou moins claire et respirable sous la couche de fume (cela est prfrable dans des tunnels circulation bidirectionnelle ou circulation unidirectionnelle congestionne) ; soit la fume doit tre totalement refoule vers un ct de lincendie (cela sera de prfrence appliqu dans des tunnels circulation unidirectionnelle non congestionne lorsquil ny a normalement aucun usager en aval de lincendie). 2. Dans tous les cas, les usagers doivent pouvoir atteindre un lieu sr en un temps et sur une distance suffisamment courts (voir chapitre I) ; par consquent, des sorties de secours ou des abris ventils rsistant au feu doivent tre installs o cela est ncessaire (voir chapitre VI). 3. Le systme de ventilation doit pouvoir maintenir les ouvrages non touchs par l'incendie libres de toute fume (sorties de secours, deuxime tube dun tunnel, etc.). 4. Le systme de ventilation doit tre capable d'assurer de bonnes conditions pour la lutte contre lincendie. 5. En cas dincendie dessence, il faut viter les explosions secondaires dues une combustion incomplte. Le systme de ventilation doit alors pouvoir fournir suffisamment dair pour une combustion ou dilution complte des gaz explosifs. Il faut galement un bon systme de drainage afin de rduire la zone dvaporation de lessence.
V.6
La ventilation naturelle repose sur des phnomnes naturels et sur la circulation. Ce systme de ventilation peut savrer trs efficace pour la dilution des polluants (principalement pour les tunnels unidirectionnels) ; mais du point de vue scurit, il nest pas possible de se fier ce systme. En fait, lors dun incendie en tunnel, la circulation est gnralement interrompue et la ventilation provient uniquement de phnomnes naturels qui ne peuvent tre que partiellement dterministes (comme leffet de chemine) ; mais le principal composant de la ventilation reste inconnu (comme les composants mtorologiques) et n'est, bien videmment, pas fiable.
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V.4
The appendix of this section describes the experience of the Netherlands on heat resistance of jet fans. Other interesting results are related with the issues discussed in sections III and IV. Please refer to these sections for further details on new research on ventilation for fire and smoke control.
V.5
From the point of view of safety in case of fire, the following criteria have to be applied in the design: 1. The purpose of controlling the spread of smoke is to keep people as long as possible in a smoke-free part of the traffic room. This means that either the smoke stratification must be kept intact, leaving more or less clear and breathable air underneath the smoke layer (this is applicable to bi-directional or congested unidirectional tunnels) or/and to completely push the smoke to one side of the fire (this should preferably be applied to non-congested unidirectional tunnels where there are normally no people downstream of the fire).
2. People must, in any cases, be able to reach a safe place in a reasonably short time and covering a reasonably short distance (see section I). Therefore facilities such as emergency exits or fireproof shelters should be provided whenever necessary (see section VI). 3. The ventilation system must be able to keep clear of smoke the air in unharmed structures (escape routes, twin traffic tube, etc.) 4. The ventilation system must be able to produce good conditions for fire fighting.
5. In case of a petrol fire, secondary explosions due to incomplete combustion have to be avoided. The ventilation system must therefore be able to deliver enough air for the complete combustion or dilution of explosive gases. A suitable drainage system should be provided in order to minimise the area where fuel evaporation takes place.
V.6
Natural ventilation relies on natural phenomena and traffic to renew the air in the tunnel. This ventilation system can be very effective for the dilution of pollutants (especially for one-way tunnels), but it is not possible to rely upon the natural ventilation for safety purposes. In fact in the event of a fire in the tunnel, the traffic will probably stop and the ventilation is only provided by natural phenomena that could be only partially deterministic (as chimney effect), but the main component of the ventilation will be quite uncertain (as meteorological components) and therefore unreliable.
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Pour cette raison, plusieurs pays ont publi des directives pour limiter lapplication de la ventilation naturelle. Quelques-unes dentre elles sont prsentes ci-aprs.
Allemagne : les normes RABT de 1994 [50] estiment quun tunnel de 350 m de long (et jusqu 700 m) est suffisamment sr en cas dincendie sans sorties de secours ni ventilation mcanique. France : les tunnels sur le rseau national [89] ncessitent des mesures de contrle des fumes au-del des longueurs suivantes :
tunnels urbains : 300 m tunnels non urbains : 500 m (gnralement) tunnels non urbains : jusqu 800-1 000 m (si trafic < 2 000 vh/jour par sens de circulation).
Royaume-Uni : la longueur de tunnel avec ventilation naturelle peut atteindre 400 m, mais il faut apporter des justifications. Pays-Bas : les mesures sont dcides aprs analyse des risques. tats-Unis : la ventilation naturelle peut tre utilise pour un tunnel de longueur maximale de 240 m (800 ft) (directive NFPA 502).
Recommandations
En raison du nombre de paramtres qui interfrent sur le choix de ventiler ou non un tunnel (longueur, situation, circulation, type de vhicules traversant le tunnel, etc.), il nest pas possible lheure actuelle dexprimer des recommandations universelles sur les limites de la ventilation naturelle, tout spcialement la longueur admissible sans ventilation mcanique. Les lecteurs de ce rapport pourront utiliser comme rfrence les recommandations nationales numres ci-dessus.
V.7
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For this reason several countries issued guidelines to limit the application of natural ventilation. Some of the above-mentioned guidelines are outlined hereafter.
Germany: the RABT standards of 1994 [50] regard a tunnel length of 350 m (and up to 700 m) as safe enough in case of fire without emergency exits and mechanical ventilation. France: tunnels in the French national network [89] need smoke control measures beyond the following lengths:
urban: 300 m not urban: 500 m (generally) not urban: up to 800-1000 m (if traffic < 2000 veh/day per traffic direction).
United Kingdom: the tunnel length with natural ventilation can reach 400 m, but requires justification. Netherlands: the measures are decided by a risk analysis. United States: natural ventilation can be used for a tunnel length up to 240 m (800 ft) in the current NFPA 502 guideline.
Recommendations
Because of the number of different parameters which interfere in the choice to ventilate or not a tunnel (length, location, traffic, type of vehicles using the tunnel, etc.), it is not possible at this moment to express universal recommendations about the limits of the natural ventilation, especially the allowable length without mechanical ventilation. The reader of this document can use the above-mentioned national recommendations as a reference.
V.7
In case of fire inside the tunnel, generally, the only feasible way to evacuate smoke is pushing it through the tunnel to the portal. However, the airflow velocity necessary for such operation is the cause of turbulence and affects the smoke stratification downstream of the fire. This phenomenon is the more evident the higher the air velocity. The smoke stratification can also be upset by the longitudinal slope of the tunnel (especially when air flows downwards) and by vehicles.
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La fume dincendie dans un tunnel sans dclivit aura naturellement tendance se propager dans les deux directions en raison de la pousse hydrostatique. Si la ventilation est en fonctionnement, la fume aura alors tendance suivre la direction du courant d'air de ventilation. A de faibles vitesses de lair, le mouvement hydrostatique induit nest pas entirement matris et un peu de fume scoulera en amont, ce qui est souvent appel "remonte de fume". La distance de remonte des fumes peut tre dfinie comme la distance de lincendie laquelle la vitesse de la fume en amont est annule par le dbit de ventilation du tunnel. Ainsi, une distance de remonte des fumes gale zro signifierait quil ny a aucune fume en amont. La vitesse de lair ncessaire pour remplir cette condition est appele vitesse critique. Une quation simple a souvent t utilise pour dfinir la vitesse de lair ncessaire pour viter la remonte de fume :
Vc = K 1 K 2
gHQ
C p A
Q C AVc p
+ T
1/ 3
o VC est la vitesse critique, K1 et K2 sont des constantes, g est lacclration de la pesanteur, H est la hauteur du tunnel, Q est la puissance thermique de l'incendie, A est la section transversale du tunnel, Cp la chaleur massique de lair, et T sont la masse volumique et la temprature de lair ambiant. La vitesse de lair permettant d'viter la remonte de fume dpend donc de la puissance Q de la section A du tunnel et de la hauteur H. Cela est indiqu sur la figure 5.7.1 en fonction de Q pour des paramtres donns. On peut voir que la vitesse augmente avec la taille de lincendie, mais se stabilise mesure que la puissance augmente.
2.5
1.5
Figure 5.7.1 - Predicted critical velocity (Vc). The formula is used with height = 4.2 m; section = 37.8 m
0.5 0 20 Q (MW) 40 60
Ce comportement gnral a t confirm par des simulations numriques [94] : certains des rsultats sont prsents la figure 5.7.1 (prvisions). On peut constater quil existe une certaine variation entre la simulation et lquation empirique. Les analyses numriques en 3D prennent en compte des facteurs comme la largeur de lincendie, dont linfluence a t dmontre.
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Smoke from a fire in a tunnel with no slope will naturally tend to propagate in both directions due to buoyancy effects. If the ventilation is in operation, then the smoke will tend to be driven in the direction of the ventilation airflow. At low tunnel airflow speeds, the buoyancy induced flow is not entirely overcome, and some smoke will flow upstream, which is often termed "backlayering". The backlayering distance may be defined as the distance from the fire where the upstream smoke velocity is cancelled by the tunnel ventilation flow. Hence a backlayering distance of zero would imply that no smoke flows upstream. The tunnel air velocity required to achieve this condition is termed the "critical velocity". A simple equation has often been used to determine the tunnel air velocity required to prevent backlayering:
Vc = K 1 K 2
gHQ
C p A
Q C AVc p
+ T
1/ 3
where VC is the critical velocity, K1 and K2 are constants, g is the acceleration due to gravity, H is the tunnel height, Q is the fire heat release rate, A is the tunnel cross-sectional area, C p the specific heat of air, and T are density and temperature of ambient air. So the air velocity to prevent the backlayering depends on the fire heat release rate Q, the tunnel area A and height H. It is plotted in Figure 5.7.1 against variable Q for fixed tunnel parameters. It can be seen that the velocity increases with fire heat release rate, but levels off as the heat release rate increases.
2.5
Figure 5.7.1 - Vitesse critique prvue (Vc). La formule est utilise dans le cas dune hauteur de 4,2 m et dune section de 37,8 m
1.5
0.5 0 20 Q (MW) 40 60
This general behaviour has been confirmed by computer simulation [94]: some of the results are also shown in Figure 5.7.1 ("prediction"). It can be seen that there is some variability between the simulation and the empirical equation. The three-dimensional computer ana-lysis takes into account factors such as the width of the fire, which is shown to have an influence.
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Rcemment, des rsultats trs intressants ont t obtenus partir dessais dincendie raliss sur maquettes [95] ou en vraie grandeur au Memorial tunnel [22]. Ils montrent quau-del dun certain seuil de puissance thermique (dpendant probablement de la section transversale et de la dclivit du tunnel), la vitesse critique dpend moins de la puissance que dans lquation mentionne ci-avant. Tous ces rsultats tendent montrer que pour une puissance ne dpassant pas 100 MW et une pente infrieure 4 %, une vitesse de lair de 3 m/s est suffisante pour empcher la remonte de fume. Le dimensionnement et lexploitation des systmes de ventilation doivent tenir compte du fait que, en raison de la prsence du courant d'air longitudinal, la zone en aval de lincendie est expose aux fumes et aux gaz de combustion, avec un danger de suffocation ou de brlure si les usagers du tunnel se trouvent cet endroit. Toute mesure destine faciliter la fuite des usagers de la zone dangereuse (en aval ou dans la zone dincendie) doit tre prise. Pour cette raison, les recommandations formules ici tiennent compte des cas suivants.
A) Tunnel unidirectionnel, non conu pour les embouteillages (zone non urbaine)
Dans ce cas, la conception de la ventilation doit tenir compte de ce que les usagers en aval de lincendie pourront fuir avec leur propre vhicule alors que ceux qui se trouvent en amont ne le pourront pas. Les tunnels situs dans les zones non urbaines ne sont gnralement pas sujets de frquentes situations de congestion. Leur systme de ventilation nest donc pratiquement jamais conu dans cette optique. Les tunnels non urbains, qui sont frquemment congestionns, doivent eux tre dimensionns en fonction des embouteillages (voir paragraphe suivant). Un incendie provoqu par un vhicule impliqu dans un accident avec dautres vhicules bloqus en aval est possible, mais sa probabilit est faible (voir chapitre II). Ce cas n'est pratiquement jamais pris en compte lors du dimensionnement. Si ncessaire, le risque dun tel vnement peut tre rduit par une dtection automatique dincident et par un systme de contrle de la circulation (voir chapitre VI).
C) Tunnel bidirectionnel
Dans le cas dun tunnel circul dans les deux sens, il faut penser que, en cas dincendie, des personnes ne pouvant fuir avec leur vhicule se trouveront gnralement situes de part et dautre de lincendie.
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Recently very interesting results have also been obtained from fire tests performed in scale models [95] or in full size in the Memorial Tunnel [22]. These show that above a given level of heat release (probably depending on tunnel cross-section and slope) the critical velocity depends less on heat release rate than in the above equation. All these results tend to show that for a heat release rate not exceeding 100 MW and a slope lower than 4%, an airflow velocity of 3 m/s is sufficient to prevent backlayering. The design of the ventilation system and its operation must take into consideration that, due to the presence of the longitudinal airflow, the zone downstream of the fire is exposed to smoke and hot combustion gases with the danger of suffocation or burning if tunnel users are in this zone. Any possible design measure aiming at a safe fleeing of users from the dangerous section (fire area or downstream) must be taken. For this reason the present recom-mendations take into consideration the following cases:
A) Tunnel with one-way traffic not designed for queues (non-urban area) The ventilation design, in this case, can assume that drivers downstream of the fire are free to escape by their own cars whilst drivers upstream will not. Tunnels located in non-urban areas are generally not liable to frequent congestion situations. Therefore the relevant ventila-tion systems are generally not desi-gned for queues. Nonurban tunnels which are frequently congested have instead to be designed for queues (see follo-wing paragraph). The event of a fire ignited by vehicles involved in a secondary acci-dent in the pre-sence of others vehicles trapped downstream is possible, but the relevant probability is low (see section II); this case is nearly never taken into account in the design Figure 5.7.2 - Design Figure 5.7.2 Hypothses phase. If necessary the assumption de circulation tudier risk of such an for the traffic occurrence can be reduced by an automatic incident detection and a traffic control system (see section VI). B) Tunnel with one-way traffic designed for queues (urban area) The ventilation design must take into consideration that people prevented from escaping with their own vehicles can likely stand on both sides of the fire. In urban areas it is quite usual to find stop and go traffic situation, therefore this case applies generally to urban tunnels of sufficient length. C) Tunnel with two-way traffic In case of tunnels used by vehicles running in both directions, it must be taken into consideration that, in the event of fire, people prevented from escaping with their own vehicles will generally be located on both sides of the fire.
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vhicules particuliers autoriss seulement, vhicules particuliers et camions - sans marchandises dangereuses- autoriss, camions avec marchandises dangereuses autoriss.
Il n'y a pas de limitation gnrale quant l'utilisation de la ventilation longitudinale. La dcision s'appuie sur une analyse des risques qui prend en compte l'exploitation normale et les situations d'incendie. Les principaux facteurs de cette analyse sont l'interdistance des issues de secours et le danger potentiel du tunnel. Si la ventilation longitudinale est utilise avec une circulation bidirectionnelle, les quipements suivants sont ajouts pour la rgulation et l'exploitation de la ventilation : contrle de la direction et de la vitesse du courant d'air, dtection incendie, circuit de tlvision.
Allemagne
La ventilation longitudinale par acclrateurs est applicable pour les tunnels jusqu 2 km de long si la circulation est bidirectionnelle (dans ce cas, certains quipements et issues de secours sont obligatoires). Dans le cas dune circulation unidirectionnelle, la ventilation longitudinale peut tre utilise jusqu 4 km.
France
Pour les tunnels bidirectionnels non urbains, la ventilation longitudinale est autorise jusquaux longueurs suivantes :
Pour les tunnels bidirectionnels urbains, la ventilation longitudinale est toujours interdite.
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The level of risk within a tunnel, and therefore the design fire size, depend on the type of traffic allowed; the relevant cases (see II.4) are:
passenger cars allowed only, passenger cars and trucks allowed, only without dangerous goods, trucks with dangerous goods allowed
There is no general limitation in the use of longitudinal ventilation. The decision is based on a risk analysis which takes into account normal operation and fire situations. The main factors for the analysis are the distance between emergency exits and the potential danger of the tunnel. If longitudinal ventilation is used with two-way traffic, the following additional equipment is implemented for the regulation and operation of ventilation: monitoring of the direction and velocity of the airflow, fire detection, CCTV.
Germany
Longitudinal ventilation by jet fans is applicable to tunnels up to 2 km if the traffic is bidirectional (in this case a certain set of equipment and safety exits are required). In case of oneway traffic, longitudinal ventilation can be applied up to 4 km.
France
For two-way tunnels in non-urban areas, longitudinal ventilation is authorised up to the following lengths:
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Pour les tunnels unidirectionnels, la ventilation longitudinale est autorise jusquaux longueurs suivantes :
La longueur limite pour les tunnels unidirectionnels peut tre dpasse si une extraction massive est prvue tous les 4 000 m dans les tunnels non urbains et tous les 800 m dans les tunnels urbains.
tats-Unis
Auparavant, aucun tunnel ntait ventil longitudinalement aux tats-Unis. Actuellement, cette mthode est utilise pour des tunnels infrieurs 900 m.
Recommandations
Gnralement, on saccorde pour considrer que les systmes de ventilation longitudinale doivent tre utiliss dans les conditions suivantes :
A)Tunnel unidirectionnel, non conu pour les embouteillages (zone non urbaine)
La ventilation longitudinale peut toujours tre utilise, condition que les vhicules circulant en aval de lincendie puissent sortir du tunnel et que les vhicules bloqus en amont se trouvent dans le courant dair frais de la ventilation longitudinale.
C) Tunnel bidirectionnel
La ventilation longitudinale peut tre utilise dans les tunnels bidirectionnels, si une analyse montre que le risque est compatible avec les normes nationales de scurit. Lanalyse du risque doit prendre en compte tous les facteurs de dimensionnement et les conditions limites, et au moins :
le volume de circulation, le type de trafic autoris, la gomtrie du tunnel, les facteurs de risques admis au niveau national.
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The length limit for one-way tunnels can be overcome if massive extraction is provided at such distances (every 4000 m in non-urban tunnels and every 800 m in urban tunnels).
USA
In the past there was no tunnel longitudinally ventilated in the USA. Nowadays the application of this method is used with tunnels up to 900 m.
Recommendations
It is generally agreed that longitudinal ventilation systems should be used under the following conditions:
A) Tunnel with one-way traffic not designed for queues (non-urban area)
Longitudinal ventilation is always applicable under the assumption that the traffic downstream of the fire site can leave the tunnel and the stopped traffic upstream is in the fresh air stream of the longitudinal ventilation.
design volume of traffic, type of traffic allowed, geometry of the tunnel, admissible national risk factors.
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Vitesse de dimensionnement de lair [m/s] Type de trafic vhicules particuliers autobus et camions camions citernes Incendie (MW) 2,5 - 8 <100 >100 France 2 3 4 Pays-Bas 3 5 Sude pas de rgles gnrales (voir ci-aprs)
En Sude, il nexiste pas de rgles gnrales relatives la vitesse de lair en cas dincendie. Pour le boulevard priphrique de Stockholm, lincendie de dimensionnement est de 100 MW et la vitesse correspondante de dimensionnement de lair est fixe 3 m/s. Le transport de liquides inflammables qui senflamment plus facilement que le gasole est limit dans ces tunnels.
Recommandations
Durant lincendie de dimensionnement, le systme de ventilation doit pouvoir produire une vitesse longitudinale de lair suffisante pour pousser toutes les fumes dans une direction (le sens de circulation dans le cas dun tunnel unidirectionnel). Une vitesse de dimensionnement de lair de 3 m/s est recommande pour tous les incendies qui nimpliquent pas de poids lourds transportant des marchandises dangereuses trs inflammables. Il nest pas possible aujourdhui de donner des recommandations prcises en ce qui concerne les incendies de camions citernes. Ceux-ci peuvent produire une puissance thermique de plusieurs centaines de mgawatts. Les vitesses de lair recommandes par quelques pays et mentionnes ci-avant peuvent tre utilises comme rfrences.
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Table 5.7.1 shows the design velocities more recently recommended by several countries further to new research results.
Table 5.7.1 - Examples of longitudinal velocity used in different countries
Air design speed [m/s] Type of traffic Passenger cars only Buses and trucks Petrol tanker Fire (MW) 2.5 - 8 <100 >100 France 2 3 4 Netherlands
-
3 5
In Sweden, there are no general rules concerning air velocity in case of fire. For the Stockholm Ring Road the design fire is 100 MW and the corresponding air design velocity is set to 3 m/s. Transports of flammable liquids that are ignited more easily than diesel oil are restricted in these tunnels.
Recommendations
During the design fire, the ventilation system must be able to produce a longitudinal airflow velocity sufficient to push all smoke to one direction (the direction of traffic in the case of a oneway tube). A design airflow velocity of 3 m/s is recommended for all fires which do not involve a heavy goods vehicle carrying very flammable dangerous goods.
It is not possible at present to give precise recommendations for the case of a petrol tanker fire which can produce a heat release rate of several hundreds megawatts. The above-mentioned design velocities recommended by several countries can be used as a reference.
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Hypothses de dimensionnement
La vitesse longitudinale de dimensionnement doit tre obtenue selon les hypothses nonces ci-aprs :
paramtres mtorologiques : les paramtres mtorologiques ont une influence certaine sur la performance des systmes de ventilation, tout particulirement longitudinale. Le systme de ventilation doit avoir une capacit suffisante pour produire la vitesse de lair requise, en dpit d'une pression fixe du vent. La diffrence de pression peut tre value en utilisant lquation simplifie de Bernoulli suivante :
p = k 1 2 w 2
o p reprsente la pression induite par le vent, la densit de l'air, w la vitesse du vent, k un paramtre de dimensionnement qui dpend de la configuration des ttes. Lorientation des deux ttes du tunnel, en ce qui concerne les vents dominants, est un paramtre trs important ; en effet, la rsistance effective du vent (ou pousse) est une fonction de langle entre la direction du vent et la direction du courant dair entrant ou sortant du tunnel.
trafic arrt : en valuant la pousse ncessaire en cas dincendie, il faut envisager quun certain nombre de vhicules peuvent tre bloqus dans le tunnel et que leur prsence rduira l'efficacit de la ventilation. Le nombre de vhicules bloqus peut tre valu selon la composition du trafic (pourcentage de vhicules particuliers et de poids lourds), le niveau et l'efficacit du systme dexploitation routire et de contrle du trafic utilis dans le tunnel. effets de lincendie sur le courant dair : plusieurs aspects doivent tre pris en compte :
en cas d'incendie important, les hautes tempratures induisent un accroissement du volume dair et, par consquent, de sa vitesse, et provoquent ainsi des pertes de charge croissantes par frottement de lair ; la densit, en effet, baisse, la vitesse de frottement augmente et, au global, la perte de charge totale augmente localement ; leffet de blocage de lincendie sur le courant d'air longitudinal produit une perte de charge localise supplmentaire ; selon la dclivit du tunnel, leffet chemine peut atteindre des valeurs notables ;
la diminution de la densit de lair conduit une baisse de la pousse des acclrateurs qui travaillent dans lair chaud.
AIPCR 166
05.05.B - 1999
Design hypotheses
The design longitudinal velocity must be obtained under the hypotheses discussed below:
Meteorological parameters: meteorological parameters have an appreciable influence on the performance of the ventilation systems, especially longitudinal. The ventilation system must have a sufficient capacity to produce the required air velocity against a stated wind pressure. The difference of pressure can be evaluated using the following simplified equation of Bernoulli:
p = k
1 2 w 2
where p represents the pressure induced by wind, the air density, w the wind speed, k a design parameter which depends on the configuration of the portals. The orientation of both tunnel portals with respect to the prevailing winds is a very significant parameter; in fact the effective wind resistance (or thrust) is a function of the angle between the direction of the wind and the direction of the air flow entering/exiting the tunnel.
Standstill traffic: while evaluating the necessary thrust in case of fire, it must be assumed that a certain number of vehicles can be trapped in the tunnel and their presence reduces the performance of the ventilation system. The number of vehicles trapped can be assessed according to the design mix of traffic (% of passenger cars and heavy vehicles), the level and the performance of the current road operation and traffic control system available for the tunnel. Effects of fire on the air flow: several aspects must be taken into account:
in the event of a big fire, the high temperature induces an increase of air volume and therefore of air speed, as a result of which the air friction losses increase. The density, in fact, decreases, the friction velocity increases and, on balance, the overall local losses increase;
the blockage effect of the fire on the longitudinal airflow produces a supplementary local head loss; according to the grade of the tunnel, the chimney effect can raise to appreciable values; the decrease of air density results in the lowering of the driving force of the boosters that work in the hot air.
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Rversibilit du systme
La rversibilit du systme peut tre utile dans plusieurs situations durant la phase de lutte contre lincendie, spcialement si le tunnel possde des accs de secours en plus des deux ttes. Lorsque lon prvoit la rversibilit, il faut tenir compte du fait quune telle opration peut prendre du temps (jusqu 10 mn), selon le systme de ventilation, la gomtrie du tunnel, le type dacclrateurs utiliss et dautres conditions limites. Par ailleurs, il faut observer que les acclrateurs nont pas toujours la mme pousse en direction inverse. Par exemple, il existe des acclrateurs spcialement conus pour une direction ; leur pousse dans la direction inverse peut tre infrieure de 50 % leur pousse nominale. Dans le cas de tunnels bitubes, linversion du courant d'air dans le tunnel intact peut empcher la recirculation des fumes vacues par la tte de l'autre tube. Une telle recirculation de la fume peut galement tre vite par des travaux de gnie civil (dcalage entre les deux ttes, mur de protection entre les ttes, etc.).
la rsistance dune pale en aluminium chute rapidement haute temprature ; cela dpend du type dalliage utilis ; lorsque de fortes tempratures de lair ne peuvent tre vites, il faut choisir des pales en acier ;
AIPCR 168
05.05.B - 1999
When planning the reversing of the air, it must be taken into consideration that such operation can take a long time (up to 10 minutes), depending on the ventilation system, the tunnel geometry, the fans used and other boundary conditions. Besides it should be observed that fans do not give the same thrust in the reversed direction. For instance there are jet fans specially designed for one direction, whose thrust in the reversed direction may be lower than 50% of the nominal one. In the case of twin tunnels the reversing of the flow in the unharmed tunnel can prevent the circulation of smokes evacuated through the portal of the twin tunnel. Such circulation of smoke can also be prevented by civil engineering works (distance between the twin portals, protection walls between portals, etc.).
the strength of a normal aluminium blade falls quickly at high temperatures. It depends on the type of alloy. When high air temperatures cannot be avoided, steel blades have to be chosen;
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sous tempratures leves, les pales se dilatent en longueur plus rapidement que le carter ; les pales tendent alors bloquer la rotation ; on peut soit utiliser des extrmits de pales en matriau abrasif, soit mnager un plus grand espace entre les pales et le carter ; un moteur dacclrateur doit tre refroidi par lair extrieur pour rpondre aux exigences de refroidissement ; cependant, certains moteurs suffisamment rsistants peuvent fonctionner sans refroidissement extrieur ; tous les quipements auxiliaires, de mme que le cblage des acclrateurs, doivent galement remplir certaines exigences quant aux tempratures.
Pour toutes ces raisons, les ventilateurs doivent tre conus et construits afin de rsister de fortes tempratures ; de nombreuses normes nationales existent pour la rsistance au feu des acclrateurs, de 250 C pour 1h (Autriche, tats-Unis, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni), 250 C pour 1h30 (France), 300 C pour 1 h (Norvge, Sude), 400 C pour 1h30 (France, Suisse).
Rsistance au feu des acclrateurs Pays France Tunnel > 500 m Pays nordiques [90] Pays-Bas Temprature Dure de rsistance
Destruction de tous les acclrateurs sur une distance de : sans marchandises dangereuses 70 m 100 m 500 m 150 - 300 m en aval de lincendie Voir annexe avec marchandises dangereuses 200 m 400 m (interdit)
AIPCR 170
05.05.B - 1999
the length of the blades grows quicker than the housing enlarges due to high temperatures. The blade tips tend to block the rotation. Abrasive tips may be introduced or a larger distance between blades and housing provided;
a normal fan motor has to be cooled by outside air to meet the cooling requirements. However, there are motors available which have a very high resistance without external cooling; all the auxiliary equipment as well as the wiring of the fan have to meet the air temperatures also.
For these reasons, fans must be designed and built in order to withstand high temperatures; there are several national standards for the heat resistance of fans ranging from 250 C for 1 hour (Austria, Netherlands, United Kingdom, USA), 250 C for 1.5 hours (France), 300 C for 1 hour (Norway, Sweden), 400 C for 1.5 hours (France, Switzerland).
Fans distribution
As mentioned above, the cheapest criterion for the installation is the concentration of fans near portals. In this way the length of cables is in fact the shortest possible.
Should the fire take place in the portal area, and adopting the above-reported fan distribution, a full set of fans may be put out of order. If the mechanical power of a single group of fans is sufficient to control the smoke during the evacuation and fire-fighting phases the above criterion can be adopted, otherwise it is recommended to divide fans in several sets that will be distributed all along the tunnel.
In case of fans distribution all along the tunnel, a limited fan redundancy is recommended and can avoid the use of fireproof fans: in fact in case of fire the temperature decreases rapidly when the distance from the fire spot increases, and it may be cost-effective to envisage the destruction of a few machines rather than protecting all the fans. Table 5.7.2 gives some examples in different countries.
Fireproofing of jet fans Country France Tunnel > 500 m Nordic countries [90] Netherlands Temperature Endurance
Destruction of all jet fans on the following distance without dangerous goods 70 m 100 m 500 m 150 - 300 m downstream of fire See appendix with dangerous goods 200 m 400 m (forbidden)
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AIPCR 172
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The tunnel operation in case of fire, since the ignition to the extinction, can be characterised using the following four phases (that generally overlap): 1. ignition phase: this phase starts with the ignition of the fire and includes both the detection (manual or automatic) and the consequent intervention on the ventilation regime; 2. evacuation phase 1 (self rescuing): during this phase the users are escaping from the fire area and the fire brigade is not yet on the spot;
3. evacuation phase 2 (assisted): during this phase the fire brigade assists injured or handicapped users to escape from the fire area; 4. fire-fighting: during this phase the control of operation is (generally) already passed from the tunnel operator to the fire brigade; the fire brigade has already checked that all users have already escaped (or have already been rescued) from the fire area (all of them are out of the tunnel, upstream of the fire or in other safe places).
The ventilation action during an evacuation phase must be such that optimal conditions for the fleeing person in the tunnel are established. When the evacuation phase is concluded, fire fighting must be facilitated by proper smoke handling. A basic requirement is a smoke free access to the fire from one side. Preferably the direction of smoke flow should not be changed from the situation during evacuation. In any case, upon the arrival of the fire-fighting brigade, it can be decided on site which better fan control should be used to facilitate fire fighting.
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05.05.B - 1999
Linversion des acclrateurs nest gnralement pas recommande durant la phase dvacuation, mme si lincendie est situ prs de la tte dentre. Pendant le dlai entre la mise feu de lincendie et linversion des acclrateurs, la fume peut avoir dj couvert plusieurs centaines de mtres. Si l'coulement de la couche de fume est invers, elle se rpandra dans toute la section transversale alors que, durant la phase dvacuation des usagers, il est trs important de maintenir de bonnes conditions de visibilit. Ainsi une inversion de la direction de lair est seulement possible lorsque tous les usagers sont sortis du tunnel. Linversion peut tre utilise en cas dembouteillage, mais elle doit tre dcide par lhomme et ne doit, en aucun cas, tre dclenche automatiquement. Le tableau suivant dcrit les recommandations en matire dexploitation de la ventilation en cas dincendie :
Ventilation longitudinale Phases dvacuation La stratification de la fume ne doit pas tre perturbe : - vitesse longitudinale de lair relativement faible, - aucun acclrateur en fonctionnement dans la zone enfume. Phase de lutte contre l'incendie La remonte de la fume doit tre vite :
- vitesse longitudinale plus leve,
Circulation fluide normale : La remonte de la fume doit tre vite : vitesse longitudinale de lair suffisante dans la mme direction que la circulation. Circulation congestionne, ou incendie en fin dembouteillage derrire un accident, ou un tube utilis de faon bidirectionnelle : Identique un tube avec circulation bidirectionnelle pour les deux phases.
V.8
AIPCR 174
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The reversal of jet fans is generally not recommended during the evacuation phase, even if the fire is located near the entrance portal. In the period between the ignition of the fire and the reversal of the jet fans, the smoke can have travelled several hundreds metres already. When the smoke layer flow is reversed, it will be spread over the whole cross section whilst during the phases of people evacuation it is important to maintain good visibility conditions.
So a possible reversal of the air flow direction should only take place when all people are out of the tunnel. The reversing can be evaluated in the case of traffic jam inside the tunnel, but it must be a human choice, not an automatic configuration.
The following table sums up the recommended ventilation operation in case of fire:
Longitudinal ventilation
Evacuation phases
Fire-fighting phase
The smoke stratification must not Avoid backlayering of smoke: be disturbed: - higher longitudinal velocity - longitudinal air velocity quite - direction of airflow adaptable small - no jet fans working in smoke zone Normal fluid traffic: Avoid backlayering of smoke: sufficient longitudinal air velocity in the same direction as traffic flow Congested traffic, or fire at the end of the queue behind an accident, or one tube used bi-directionally: Same as one tube with bi-directional traffic for the two phases.
V.8
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Pour extraire une couche de fume stratifie de lespace de circulation sans perturber la stratification, une mthode efficace est lextraction continue par une gaine d'vacuation de l'air. Cependant, les conditions suivantes doivent tre remplies :
La vitesse longitudinale de lair doit tre infrieure 2 m/s dans le tunnel, selon les observations faites lors des essais japonais en vraie grandeur. A des vitesses plus grandes, la turbulence verticale l'interface entre la fume et lair frais refroidit rapidement la couche suprieure et la fume se mlange dans toute la section transversale. Avec des vitesses longitudinales de lair proches de zro, la couche de fume se rpand des deux cts de lincendie. La fume se propage sous forme stratifie pendant une dure qui peut aller jusqu' 10 mn, mme sans extraction. Aprs cette premire phase, la fume commence se mlanger dans toute la section transversale moins que, ce moment, le systme dextraction soit compltement oprationnel. Avec une vitesse de lair denviron 2 m/s, la plupart des fumes dun incendie de taille moyenne se rpandent dun ct de lincendie (faible remonte de fume) et commencent se mlanger dans la section transversale une distance de 400 600 m en aval du foyer. Ce mlange dans la section transversale peut tre vit si lextraction de la fume commence suffisamment tt.
Les vhicules se tenant dans le courant d'air longitudinal accroissent fortement la turbulence verticale et favorisent le mlange vertical de la fume. Dans un systme de ventilation transversale, lair frais inject dans lespace de circulation au niveau du sol provoque une rotation du courant dair longitudinal, qui tend ramener la couche de fume vers la chausse. Cest pourquoi il est recommand de ramener le dbit dair frais environ 1/2 - 1/3 du plein rgime, cela dpendant de la quantit initiale du jet dair frais. Dans un espace enfum, il ne faut pas injecter dair frais partir du plafond car cela augmenterait la quantit de fume et tendrait dtruire la stratification. Dans une ventilation semi-transversale rversible avec les gaines au plafond, lair frais, en fonctionnement normal de ventilation, est inject par des ouvertures au plafond. Si un incendie se dclenche, tant que lair frais est fourni par ces ouvertures, la quantit de fume augmente dans les mmes proportions et des jets puissants tendent ramener la fume vers la surface de la chausse. Le passage de l'injection dair lextraction doit tre ralis aussi vite que possible.
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05.05.B - 1999
To remove a stratified smoke layer out of the traffic room without disturbing the stratification, a continuous extraction into a return air duct is efficient. However, the following conditions must be fulfilled:
The longitudinal velocity of the tunnel air must be below 2 m/s. These were the observations in the Japanese full scale tests. With higher velocities the vertical turbulence in the shear layer between smoke and fresh air quickly cools the upper layer and then the smoke mixes over the whole cross-section.
With practically zero longitudinal air velocity, the smoke layer expands to both sides of the fire. The smoke spreads in a stratified way during up to 10 minutes, even without smoke extraction. After this initial phase smoke starts to mix over the whole cross-section unless by this time the extraction is in full operation.
With an air velocity around 2 m/s, most of the smoke of a medium size fire spreads to one side of the fire (little backlayering) and starts mixing over the whole cross section at a distance of 400 - 600 m downstream of the fire site. This mixing over the cross section can also be prevented if the smoke extraction is activated early enough.
Vehicles standing in the longitudinal air flow increase strongly the vertical turbulence and encourage the vertical mixing of the smoke. In a transverse ventilation system, the fresh air jets entering the traffic room at the floor level induce a rotation of the longitudinal airflow, which tends to bring the smoke layer down to the road. That is the reason for the recommendation to throttle the fresh air rate to 1/2 - 1/3 of the full capacity, depending on the initial fresh air jet momentum. No fresh air should be injected from the ceiling in a zone with smoke, because this increases the amount of smoke and tends to suppress the stratification.
In a reversible semi-transverse ventilation with the duct at the ceiling, the fresh air is added through ceiling openings in normal ventilation operation. If a fire occurs, as long as fresh air is supplied through ceiling openings, the smoke quantity increases by this amount and strong jets tend to bring the smoke down to the road surface. The changeover of the duct from supply to extraction must be done as quickly as possible.
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Capacit dextraction
Ds quun incendie de dimensionnement a t choisi, ainsi que son dbit de production de fume, une longueur admissible sur laquelle la fume peut se propager doit tre fixe. Selon le type d'ouvertures (fixes ou tlcommandes), la capacit dextraction par mtre de longueur du tunnel dans la zone dincendie est calcule. En gnral, un systme dextraction a besoin dun moindre volume global d'aspiration lorsquil y a des clapets tlcommands que lorsque les ouvertures sont fixes. Cependant, il faut tenir compte du fait que pendant la premire phase, entre le dbut de la propagation de la fume et le plein fonctionnement du systme dextraction avec de grands clapets, la fume peut stre propage sur un kilomtre, et peut-tre plus, partir du foyer de lincendie. Il nest donc pas suffisant douvrir seulement quelques clapets proches de lincendie, mais un dbit minimum dextraction le long de toute la section de ventilation est aussi recommand. Une stratgie dextraction doit tre mise au point selon le type de tunnel et son systme de ventilation.
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Extraction capacity
Once a design fire and its amount of smoke production have been chosen, a permissible length over which the smoke may spread has to be fixed. Depending on the type of exhaust openings (fixed or remote-controlled), the extraction capacity per metre of tunnel length in the fire zone is derived. In general an extraction system needs less total exhaust volume when remotecontrolled flaps are installed than with fixed openings. However, it has also to be considered that in the first phase between start of the smoke spreading and full operation of the exhaust system with large flaps, the smoke may have spread over 1 km and more from the fire site. Thus it is not sufficient to only open a few exhaust openings near the fire, but a minimum exhaust rate along the whole ventilation section is recommended also. A suction strategy has to be developed depending on the type of tunnel and its ventilation system.
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La capacit dextraction sur la longueur o il est accept que la fume se propage, doit quelque peu dpasser le dbit de fume gnr par lincendie, car les ouvertures ne vont pas seulement aspirer de la fume, mais, invitablement, galement de lair frais. Il semble que 80 m3/s soit une valeur trop faible pour des poids lourds sans marchandises dangereuses, mais il nexiste pas de consensus pour recommander une nouvelle valeur.
AIPCR 180
05.05.B - 1999
The extraction capacity over the length which is permissible for smoke to spread must somewhat exceed the smoke rate generated by the fire, because the openings will not only suck smoke but inevitably some fresh air too. It seems that 80 m3/s is too low for a heavy goods vehicles without dangerous goods, but there is no consensus to recommend a new value.
The exhaust capacity and the longitudinal velocity created by the jet fans in the tunnel section filled with smoke have to be matched as well as controlled under operation. It does not matter whether the smoke is stratified or spread over the whole tunnel cross section. The recommended extraction value is based on cross-sectional area longitudinal velocity. It must be able to take out a longitudinal airflow of 3 to 4 m/s and furthermore a small air velocity in the following ventilation section towards the exhaust opening in order to prevent the spreading of smoke beyond the suction point.
In this way the mixing of smoke into the fresh air layer can be minimised and the smoke eddies being torn into the fresh air layer are continuously diluted. A large tunnel fire creates strong longitudinal airflows to supply the oxygen to the fire. With a continuous fresh air supply along the tunnel this longitudinal velocity is reduced, which again minimises the air exchange with the smoke layer.
Fresh air jets entering from ceiling openings are unfavourable. When they enter the traffic room vertically, they pierce the smoke layer, induce smoke into the jet and thus pump smoke into the fresh air layer. A strong jet also induces a rotation of the whole tunnel air volume what tends to bring the smoke layer down. Therefore the exit velocity of such ceiling jets should be small. Fresh air jets entering from the ceiling should be stopped immediately after fire alarm in the ventilation section where the fire is located. For longer tunnels it is recommended to position the fresh air outlets near the road surface.
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AIPCR 182
05.05.B - 1999
The situation is very different for an open system where tunnel air is taken directly out of the traffic room by large exhaust openings and the fans are positioned near the extraction openings. In the case that such fans are placed at the end of a shaft, the shaft has a favourable cooling effect.
The most usual way to control the longitudinal velocity is to provide several independent ventilation sections. When a tunnel has several ventilation sections, a certain longitudinal velocity in the fire section can be obtained by a suitable operation of the individual air ducts. By reversing the fan operation an exhaust air duct can also be used as supply air duct and vice versa.
Whatever the means of controlling the longitudinal air velocity are, their operation has to be preprogrammed according to the location of the fire in the tunnel.
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0 79 62 50 43 37 31 25
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Reduction in the density of flue gases at an increasing temperature (*: extrapolated values)
Temperature Flue gas density in C in kg/m 20 1.2 100 0.95 200 0.75 300 0.61 400 0.52 500 * 0.45 * 600 * 0.38 * 700 * 0.30 * Effective density in % (rounded off) 0 79 62 50 43 37 31 25
The density of the flue gases at 400 C is still only 43% of the value at 20 C. At higher temperatures, the density is reduced even further in direct proportion to the available thrust of the fan. So even if we were able to develop a fan suitable for 600-700 C, this would only have a slight effect on the operation of the tunnel ventilation system, in view of the fact that the available thrust decreases to 25% of the value at 20 C. In America, fans are being installed which are suitable for temperatures in excess of 600 C. These require steel blades and kinds of technical provisions which heavily increase the cost per fan. The fans installed to date in the Netherlands are only suitable for 250 C for 1 hour.
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La capacit finale dun systme de ventilation lors dun incendie est dtermine par la localisation du cur de lincendie. Les ventilateurs jet proximit de lair frais fonctionnent parfaitement. Les acclrateurs en aval de lincendie cesseront de fonctionner selon la distance laquelle ils se trouvent du cur de lincendie, sa dure et la temprature ambiante. On peut prvoir que les tempratures vers le cur de lincendie seront si leves quil sera virtuellement impossible de concevoir des acclrateurs suffisamment rsistants et, de plus, cela serait inutile comme mentionn prcdemment.
0 -
Temprature en C selon la distance de lincendie (en m) 50 100 200 300 400 350 500 650 1 000 1 200 360 480 600 800 900 350 425 500 550 550
300
< 300 < 350 < 400 < 400 < 400
AIPCR 186
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The final capacity of the ventilation system during a fire is determined by the location of the seat of the fire. The number of boosters in the vicinity of cool air works perfectly. The fans downstream of the fire will stop working depending on the distance to the seat of the fire, the duration of the fire and the ambient temperature. It should be expected that the temperatures close to the seat of the fire will be so high that it will be virtually impossible to build fans which can resist, and furthermore this would be pointless, as described above.
The temperature evolution is not experimental, but computed (by the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research - TNO) in a "standard" tunnel with the large and medium-sized fire using the VESTA program. Unfortunately, this programme has still not been validated, and until this is the case, it is assumed that the results are valid. In order to also be able to say something about the temperature course in the small fire scenario behind the fire, the Netherlands Ministry proposes reducing the temperatures in proportion to the fire capacity. However, as is evident from the tables below, in this scenario there are hardly any temperature problems for fans, so no further investigations have been undertaken.
The tables below demonstrate that the temperatures which occur behind the fire are determined to a great extent by the air speed of ventilation. For example, a 300 MW fire with a 10 m/s air speed gives temperatures lower than 360 C, but reducing the air speed to 5 m/s gives 650 C as the maximum. This results in the following table, whereby a stationary situation and a heating-up time of 10 minutes is assumed. It is assumed that within this time the fire is fully developed and the full power is being released. This situation will continue as long as the fire has fuel and sufficient oxygen to burn.
0 -
Temperature in C at meters from the seat of fire 50 100 200 300 350 500 650 1000 1200 360 480 600 800 900 350 425 500 550 550 300 350 400 400 400
400 < 300 < 350 < 400 < 400 < 400
5 3 2
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0 -
Temprature en C selon la distance de lincendie (en m) 50 100 200 300 400 230 360 500 600 230 340 400 410 200 260 300 250 175 200 200 150 < 175 < 200 < 200 < 150
3* 2 1
AIPCR 188
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0 -
Temperature in C at meters from the seat of fire 50 100 200 300 230 360 500 600 230 340 400 410 200 260 300 250 175 200 200 150
Medium-sized fire
7. With a medium-sized fire and at a ventilation speed of 5 m/s, all fans from 50 m behind the seat of the fire will remain in operation if these are suitable for temperatures > 230 C. 8. With a medium-sized fire and ventilation speeds greater than 3 m/s, all fans from 50 m behind the seat of the fire will remain in operation if these are suitable for ambient temperatures > 360 C. 9. At ventilation speeds below 2 m/s, the critical distance is 100 m at > 410 C or 250 m at > 250 C.
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Application of clusters
Another possibility is that the fans are placed in clusters. Two or more fans are placed alongside one another on the ceiling in cross-section. The number of clusters is usually limited to two or three clusters. The consequence of such a construction method is that, in the event of a fire immediately in front of a cluster, all the fans in this cluster are lost. And if the following cluster is less than 300 m away, the fans here too will be in a critical temperature area. If we take the example of the ventilation of the 2nd Benelux tunnel, we see 3 clusters with 3 fans per cluster. The distance between the clusters is 340 or 280 m. In the event of a fire immediately in front of cluster 1, the next cluster will be lost if the temperature-resistance is 250 C. At a temperature-resistance of 400 C the cluster remains in operation. It is to be expected that the temperature at the following cluster at 620 m has dropped to below 250 C, so this will remain in operation. In this example therefore, 2/3 of the number of fans is lost at a temperature-resistance of 250 C. At 400 C this becomes 1/3. If the fans are placed separately along the tunnel, the centre-to-centre distance is 620/8 = 77.5 m. The number of fans which is lost in this situation is 300/77.5 = 3.8 4 fans at 400 C and 600/77.5 = 7.7 8 fans. At larger cluster distances, it is clear that fewer clusters are lost, so the situation is more favourable from a fire safety point of view. At smaller distances between the clusters, the difference between the number of fans lost with each system is less. However, the example shows that, at the distances commonly applied in the Netherlands, the cluster situation is a little more vulnerable than the separate situation if the temperature-resistance is not increased to 400 C.
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VI.
SORTIES DE SECOURS
ET AUTRES EQUIPEMENTS DE SECURITE
VI.1 Introduction
Ce chapitre traite des accs durgence pour lvacuation et les secours, et des autres quipements de scurit ncessaires en cas dincendie dans les tunnels. Ces installations font partie intgrante de tous les tunnels routiers modernes. Le type et la quantit dquipements sont gnralement fonds sur le type et la longueur du tunnel, le trafic, etc. De nombreux pays utilisent un systme de classification des tunnels qui les catgorise en groupes, et qui spcifie les quipements de scurit ncessaires pour chaque groupe. LAIPCR a publi un rapport spcial sur ce sujet [96]. Les quipements de scurit recouvrent toutes les installations ncessaires en cas dincendie ou dautre accident. Au dpart, un systme est ncessaire pour dtecter l'incendie ou laccident (tlphone durgence, dtection dincident, tlvision en circuit ferm, boutons dalarme, dtecteur dincendie, etc.). Ce systme alerte le personnel du tunnel qui, le cas chant, prvient les quipes de secours ou les pompiers. La prsence dextincteurs est importante, car ils permettent souvent de circonscrire rapidement un dbut dincendie. Des conduites et des poteaux fournissent leau aux pompiers. De plus, des quipements doivent permettre de fermer le tunnel le plus rapidement possible et dempcher les automobilistes de pntrer lintrieur. Dans les grands tunnels, les conducteurs peuvent tre informs par transmission radio, hautparleurs ou panneaux message variable. Enfin, il doit y avoir des issues de secours, des galeries de retournement, ou bien des accs directs d'autres tubes ou lair libre. Les mthodes utilises varient bien sr dun tunnel lautre, et selon les pays. Il est trs important de dvelopper une stratgie pour sauvegarder les usagers et protger la structure et les quipements du tunnel et, partant, de planifier les quipements, les mesures de protection et les oprations de secours. Dans certains pays o le trafic est faible, la stratgie retenue est de construire des garages et des galeries de retournement afin de permettre aux conducteurs de faire demi-tour et de quitter le tunnel. Dans les tunnels urbains, il est gnralement possible de permettre aux usagers de s'chapper directement lair libre ou par des caves ou autres installations souterraines. Dans le pass, il arrivait frquemment quune brigade de pompiers soit affecte un tunnel. Mais cela est onreux et les nouveaux tunnels dpendent gnralement de la collaboration des brigades voisines. Dans ce chapitre, sont rsums les expriences ou les guides de dimensionnement existant en Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, tats-Unis, France, Italie, Japon, Norvge, Pays-Bas, Sude, Suisse et Royaume-Uni. Tous ces pays possdent de nombreux tunnels, courts ou longs, avec diffrents niveaux de circulation. Ils couvrent donc un ventail intressant de tunnels.
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VI.
VI.1 Introduction
This section deals with emergency accesses for evacuation and rescue, and other safety equipment necessary in case of fire in tunnels. These facilities are an integral part of all modern road tunnels. The type and amount of equipment is usually based on tunnel type and length, traffic, etc. Many countries use a tunnel classification system that categorises tunnels into groups, and specifies the necessary emergency equipment for each group. A special report has been published by PIARC on this subject [96].
Safety equipment covers all facilities necessary in case of fire or some other accident. Initially, a system is needed to detect the fire or accident (emergency telephone, incident detection, closed circuit television, alarm buttons, fire detectors, etc.). This equipment will alert the tunnel personnel who will call upon the rescue teams or the fire brigade as necessary. Fire extinguishers are important, as many fires can easily be extinguished in their early stages. Hydrants and water mains will supply water to the firemen. Furthermore there should be equipment to close the tunnel as fast as possible and stop drivers before they enter the tunnel. In major tunnels drivers can be informed by radio transmissions, loudspeakers or variable text signs. Then there should be emergency exits, turning galleries, or direct accesses to other tunnel tubes or the open. Methods used may vary from tunnel to tunnel, or from country to country.
It is very important to develop a strategy for saving people and protecting tunnel equipment and structure, and consequently plan the equipment protection and rescue operations. In some countries where the traffic is low, the chosen strategy is to build lay-bys and turning galleries so as to make drivers turn and drive out of the tunnel. In city tunnels it is usually possible to let people escape to the open directly or through cellars or other underground facilities. Earlier tunnels often had their own fire-fighting brigade. This is costly and new tunnels usually depend on co-operation with nearby fire brigades.
In this section experience or design guides from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States are summarised. All these countries have many tunnels both short and long, with varying amounts of traffic. They should therefore cover an interesting spectrum of tunnels.
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La plupart de ces pays possdent de nouvelles directives, ou des directives rcemment rvises, sur les quipements de scurit. Elles sont diffrentes selon les pays, mais conduisent souvent au mme type dquipement si lon compare tunnel par tunnel. Il existe cependant des diffrences importantes quant aux systmes de dtection d'incendie et d'extinction automatique. Cette diffrence peut tre attribue des expriences spcifiques ou des diffrences de rglementation. Des recommandations dtailles sont donnes concernant les sorties de secours et les quipements spcialement destins la scurit incendie comme la dtection des incendies, les extincteurs, lalimentation en eau (poteaux) et les systmes d'extinction automatique. Seules des recommandations gnrales sont donnes en ce qui concerne les tlphones durgence et les boutons dalarme, les circuits ferms de tlvision (CCTV), les haut-parleurs et les systmes de radiocommunications puisquils sont galement destins dautres utilisations.
galeries transversales dbouchant sur lextrieur ou dans le tube adjacent pour les pitons et/ou les vhicules, galeries transversales conduisant des galeries de scurit pour les pitons, salles sres spcialement quipes (abris, aussi appels refuges), galeries de retournement pour les vhicules.
Il na pas t possible de donner des recommandations gnrales sur la distance entre les sorties de secours. Cela doit tre fix au cas par cas, par une tude soigneuse des conditions qui prvalent.
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Most of these countries have new or newly revised guidelines on safety equipment. The guidelines are different but give almost the same type of equipment if compared tunnel for tunnel. There are however some major differences when fire detection systems and sprinklers are discussed. This difference can be due to special fire experience or differences in regulations.
Detailed recommendations are given concerning emergency exits and equipment specially devoted to fire safety such as fire detection, extinguishers, water supply (hydrants) and sprinklers. Only general recommendations are given as concerns emergency telephones and alarm push buttons, closed circuit television (CCTV), loudspeakers and radio communication systems since they are also designed for many purposes other than fires.
cross connections leading to the open or to the adjacent tunnel tube for pedestrians and/or vehicles; cross connections into safety tunnels for pedestrians; especially equipped safety rooms (shelters - also called refuges); turning galleries for vehicles.
It was not possible to give general recommendations for the distance between escape exits. This must be decided for each individual case by a careful study of the prevailing conditions.
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Test
Puissance thermique atteinte nominale en pointe (MW) (MW) 20 15,5 50 52,1 Nominal Actual Peak (MW) (MW) Heat Release Rate
La fume remplit La couche de fume commence l'espace de descendre (mn) circulation (mn) 5+ 3 Smoke Layer begins Descent (mn) 6+ 4
Smoke Fills Carriageway (mn)
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In underwater tunnels these accesses are located at the portals and may be equipped with escalators or lifts.
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des galeries de service construites le long du tube du tunnel, ou, dans le cas de deux tubes sans galerie de service, l'autre tube grce des intercommunications.
Pour viter de mettre lusager en danger en raison de la circulation dans la voie la plus rapide du tube adjacent, il est parfois dusage de conserver close (par exemple, par verrouillage lectrique) la porte de communication entre deux tubes jusqu ce que la circulation soit interrompue. Dautres pensent que le risque de piger les usagers en bloquant la porte est trop grand. Dans les deux cas, un sas dans la galerie entre les deux tubes est utile. Quelle que soit la solution adopte, il faut que la procdure ait fait ses preuves et soit bien rode pour parer toute ventualit.
VI.2.3 Recommandations
VI.2.3.1 Tunnels circulation bidirectionnelle
On peut utiliser les possibilits dvacuation suivantes :
tunnel lui-mme pour lvacuation pied (ou avec le vhicule dans les tunnels faible trafic) ; communication directe avec lextrieur ; couloir ou galerie spare d'vacuation ; abris (appels aussi refuges ou cabines de scurit).
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service galleries constructed alongside the tunnel tubes, or the other tube through cross passages in the case of two tubes with no service gallery.
To avoid endangering the road user because of the traffic in the fast lane of the adjacent tube, some authorities keep the communicating door between the two tubes closed until the traffic is stopped (e.g., by electric lock). Others believe that the risk of trapping people by locking the door is too great. An airlock in the gallery between the two tubes is useful in both cases. Whatever solution is adopted there must be a well-tried and rehearsed procedure to deal with the eventuality.
Shelters
In long one-tube tunnels with no parallel safety gallery, some countries provide ventilated safety rooms at intervals, to be used as shelters during a fire.
In a few tunnels, a duct provided for artificial fresh air ventilation is fitted out to take in escaping users and give them temporary protection in case of fire.
VI.2.3 Recommendations
VI.2.3.1 Tunnels with bi-directional traffic
The following evacuation possibilities exist:
tunnel tube on foot (or by car in low traffic tunnels); direct communication to the open; escape corridor or separate escape gallery; shelters (also called refuges, or safety boxes).
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Lvacuation des tunnels se fait gnralement pied. Dans certains tunnels, un service spcial de secours est mis en place pour les conducteurs bloqus.
3m 12 - 24 m
Certains pays prvoient des galeries de retournement pour les vhicules dans les tunnels longs (plus de deux km) faible circulation (moins de 2 000 3 000 vh/jour). Les vhicules particuliers peuvent faire demi-tour dans un garage traditionnel (3 m x 12 m) et les petits camions dans un garage un peu plus grand (3 m x 24 m). Pour les poids lourds et les bus, des galeries de retournement sont ncessaires. Elles font gnralement 4 m x 17 m, parfois plus, et doivent tre situes tous les un deux kilomtres. Dans les tunnels fort trafic, le retournement des vhicules pour lvacuation nest pas recommand, car cela peut crer des difficults de circulation pouvant provoquer une panique. Un pays prvoit ce genre dinstallations uniquement pour les vhicules de secours. Lorsquil ny a pas de fume, les usagers pied prfrent quitter le tunnel par le tube lui-mme. Dans les tunnels superficiels, spcialement dans les villes, lorsque la circulation est intense, des galeries dvacuation vers lextrieur doivent tre construites. De telles galeries doivent pouvoir permettre de quitter le tunnel intervalles rguliers, par exemple tous les 100 200 m en ville. Ces galeries peuvent dboucher sur dautres installations souterraines, comme des parcs de stationnement ou des caves. Dans les tunnels profonds, des galeries dvacuation spares ne sont habituellement pas prvues en raison de leur cot lev. Cependant, si elles ont t construites pour des raisons techniques, elles doivent tre quipes de manire fournir un itinraire sr en cas d'urgence. Les abris sont des enceintes spcialement quipes dune alimentation spciale et indpendante en air frais et dun tlphone de secours. Les abris doivent rsister aux tempratures qui rgnent proximit immdiate dun incendie. Cependant, leffet psychologique sur les personnes sy rfugiant nest pas bien connu. Si les abris sont utiliss, ils doivent tre placs au niveau des garages et conus de manire accueillir les personnes jusqu larrive des quipes de secours (plusieurs heures). Ils doivent tre suffisamment vastes pour accueillir le nombre maximum de personnes pouvant se trouver entre deux abris.
AIPCR 200
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Tunnels are usually evacuated on foot. In some tunnels a special rescue service is provided for blocked drivers.
17 m
4m
Some countries provide turning bays for vehicles in long tunnels (more than 2 km) with low traffic (less than 2000-3000 vehicles per day). Private cars can turn in a regular lay-by (3 m by 12 m) and smaller trucks in a larger lay-by (3 m by 24 m). For heavy goods vehicles and buses, turning galleries are needed. These are usually 4 m by 17 m or larger. When they are used, they should be placed every 1-2 kilometres. In tunnels with heavy traffic, the turning of vehicles for evacuation is not recommended, because of the possibility of creating traffic problems which may result in panic. A country provides turning facilities which can be used by safety vehicles only.
When there is no smoke, tunnel users on foot prefer to leave the tunnel through the tube itself . In shallow tunnels, especially in cities, where the traffic is generally high, escape corridors to the open should be built. Such corridors should give an exit possibility from the tunnel at regular intervals, for example 100 - 200 metres in cities. Such escape corridors may run into other underground premises, such as car parks or cellars.
In deep tunnels, separate escape tunnels are usually not built, because they are very costly. However, if they are built for technical reasons during the construction of the tunnel, they should be equipped to provide a safe evacuation route during an emergency. Shelters are specially equipped enclosures with a separate special fresh air supply and an emergency telephone service. Shelters should withstand the temperatures that exist very near a fire. However, the psychological effect of making people use them is not well known. If shelters are used, they should be placed at lay-bys and designed to hold people as long as needed by the rescue team (several hours). They should be large enough to take in the number of persons expected to be between two shelters.
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tube du tunnel pour lvacuation pied ; passage (galerie de communication transversale) entre les tubes du tunnel ; communication directe avec lextrieur ; couloir ou galerie spare dvacuation.
Litinraire dvacuation le plus frquent dans les tunnels deux tubes est une communication transversale entre les deux tubes. La distance entre les intercommunications dpendra de la densit de la circulation et des scnarios de secours durgence, par exemple 100 200 m en ville. Cette distance doit permettre aux usagers datteindre la plus proche sortie avant que la fume ne rduise la visibilit. Lorsque de telles communications transversales sont utilises, lexploitant du tunnel doit prvoir que des personnes pntreront dans le deuxime tube. En consquence, la circulation dans lautre tube doit tre immdiatement interrompue. Des communications directes vers lair libre sont galement possibles dans les tunnels superficiels deux tubes et les bretelles d'accs au tunnel. De longues bretelles doivent tre quipes de communications avec d'autres tubes ou avec lextrieur. Dans les ouvrages immergs et en tranche couverte, un couloir spcial dvacuation peut tre plac entre les deux tubes. Ce couloir de secours doit tre clair et possder un systme spcial de ventilation.
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tunnel tube on foot; passage (cross-connection) between tunnel tubes; direct communication to the open; escape corridor or separate escape gallery.
Direct communications to the open are also possible in shallow two-tube tunnels and tunnel ramps. Long ramps should have connections to other tubes or to the open. In cut-and-cover and immersed structures, a special escape corridor can be placed between the two tubes. This emergency corridor should be lighted and have a special ventilation system.
The most common escape route in twotube tunnels is a connection (cross passage) between the two tubes. The distance between connections should depend on traffic density and emergency rescue scenarios, for instance 100 - 200 m in cities. This distance should be designed so that people can walk to the nearest exit before smoke reduces visibility. When such cross-connections are used, the tunnel operator must consider that people will walk into the second tube. As a consequence the traffic in this other tube must be stopped immediately. Photo 6.2 - Galerie de retournement
dans un tunnel faible circulation en Norvge
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Tous les systmes dvacuation doivent tre maintenus clairs pour rassurer les automobilistes et leur indiquer quils sont en tat de fonctionnement.
Environ 5 % de la population sont affects d'une forme ou d'une autre de handicap [97]. Prs de la moiti utilisent des fauteuils roulants, des cannes, des bquilles, etc. La vitesse de dplacement de ces personnes est denviron 0,5 1 m/s. Tous les itinraires dvacuation et autres quipements doivent faire l'objet d'une tude permettant de dcider s'ils doivent pouvoir tre utiliss par les personnes handicapes sans aide extrieure. Si non, un plan d'vacuation de secours appropri doit tre prvu et mis en uvre.
Les incendies peuvent tre dtects par lusager du tunnel, par un quipement spcial ou par le personnel dexploitation. Des circuits ferms de tlvision sont particulirement utiles et ils peuvent tre complts par des quipements comme une alarme active par lenlvement dun extincteur et, dans les grands tunnels, par une dtection automatique dincendie se dclenchant en fonction soit d'une temprature maximale, soit d'une vitesse d'lvation. En outre, il existe habituellement des capteurs pour mesurer le trafic.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Il est de plus recommand davoir une alarme sonore dans la salle de contrle pour attirer lattention sur lusage dun bouton dalarme ou dun extincteur.
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All evacuation systems should be kept always lighted to educate drivers and show that the systems are in working order.
Around 5% of the population have one or another kind of disability [97]. Of these, around 2.5% use wheel chairs, sticks, crutches, etc. The speed of movement for these people will be about 0.5 - 1.0 m/s. All evacuation routes and other facilities should be evaluated to decide whether they should be used by disabled persons without outside help. If not, an appropriate evacuation and rescue plan should be developed and implemented.
Fires may be detected by the tunnel user, by appropriate equipment or by the tunnel operational staff. Closed circuit television is particularly useful in this respect and it may be complemented by equipment such as an alarm activated by the removal of a fire extinguisher and, in long tunnels, by automatic fire detection through either maximum temperature or rate of rise.
It is further recommended that there be a sound alarm in the control room to draw attention if an alarm button or a fire extinguisher are used.
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Lincendie doit tre dtect le plus tt possible. Les recommandations suivantes sont faites pour dtecter un incendie :
dtecteurs de temprature - une alarme sonore se dclenche lorsque la temprature : - dpasse une valeur prdtermine, - slve plus rapidement que la normale ; - pour rduire le risque de fausse alerte, lalarme doit tre situe suffisamment haut. dtecteurs de fume - une alarme sonore se dclenche lorsque la visibilit tombe en dessous dun niveau prdtermin ; mme de petits incendies peuvent produire des quantits dangereuses de fume. critres pour les dtecteurs dincendie - ils doivent pouvoir dtecter la combustion de 20 litres dessence. - ils doivent tre installs dans les tunnels o circulent de nombreux poids lourds et o le transit de marchandises dangereuses est autoris. conclusions - il est important que linstallation des dtecteurs couvre tout le tunnel. - bien que lefficacit de ces dtecteurs ne soit pas reconnue par tous les exploitants, ils sont cependant gnralement placs dans les grands tunnels forte circulation. - les deux types de dtecteurs devraient tre utiliss en combinaison et, pour viter une fausse alerte, tre relis au circuit de tlvision.
Les dtecteurs dincendie doivent tre installs dans les tunnels o il existe un risque rel (tunnels connaissant une intense circulation de poids lourds, tunnels o le transit de marchandises dangereuses est autoris, tunnels immergs). Les dtecteurs dincendie sont conus de manire transmettre un signal au centre de contrle lorsque la temprature dpasse un certain niveau, ou bien lorsquelle augmente une vitesse suprieure une valeur prdtermine. Les dtecteurs doivent pouvoir dtecter 20 litres dessence en combustion. Un dtecteur peut tre constitu dun tube de mtal dans lequel lair ou le gaz augmentent de volume mesure que la temprature augmente (dtecteur linaire), ou bien dquipements individuels espacs au maximum de 25 m (dtecteurs isols).
Congrs de Montral, 1995 [17]
La dtection automatique dincidents connat un large dveloppement. Elle peut utiliser la tlvision en circuit ferm pour dtecter des incidents. Les systmes de dtection dincendie peuvent tre installs dans les tunnels qui sont de grande longueur, de configuration complexe ou emprunts par des vhicules transportant des marchandises dangereuses, o il est ncessaire dtre alert rapidement ou de connatre de faon prcise lendroit o lincendie sest dclar.
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Early detection of a fire is required. The following recommendations are made to detect fires:
Temperature activated detectors - An alarm sounds when the temperature: - exceeds a predetermined value, - rises more quickly than normal. - To minimise false alarms the set point of the alarm must be high enough.
Smoke detectors - An alarm is sounded when the visibility falls below a predetermined level. Even small fires can produce dangerous quantities of smoke. Criteria for fire detectors - Detectors should be able to detect the burning of 20 litres of petrol; - Detectors should be installed in tunnels with much heavy goods traffic, and where dangerous materials are allowed.
Conclusions - It is important that the detector installation covers the entire tunnel. - Although the effectiveness of these detectors is not recognised by all operators, they are usually placed in long and heavily-trafficked tunnels. Both types of detectors should be used in combination and, to avoid false alarms, they should be linked to the television installation.
Fire detector installations should be provided in tunnels where there are significant risks (tunnels carrying a lot of heavy goods traffic, tunnels where the transit of dangerous materials is permitted, underwater tunnels). Fire detectors are designed to transmit a signal to the control centre when the temperature rises above a certain level, or increases at a rate in excess of a predetermined value. They should be able to detect the burning of 20 l of petrol.
The installed detector can consist of a metal tube in which the enclosed air or gas expands as the temperature increases (distributed detector) or of individual devices spaced not more than 25 m apart (isolated detectors).
Montreal 1995 Congress [17]
There is a large ongoing development with automatic incident detection. Detection can be simplified to detect incidents by means of close circuit television (CCTV) monitoring. Fire detection systems can be used in tunnels that are long, complicated or driven through by vehicles carrying dangerous goods, and where it is necessary to have a quick alarm or to know exactly where the fire is.
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Les dtecteurs sont galement trs utiles dans les tunnels non surveills pourvus dune ventilation transversale ou semi-transversale car, si un incendie se dclare dans un tunnel de ce type sans tre dtect, les capteurs de CO et dopacit utiliss pour la ventilation normale dclenchent automatiquement le soufflage maximal dair frais, alors que la raction approprie est de rduire ou de stopper le soufflage dair frais et de dmarrer laspiration de la fume. De tels systmes sont actuellement utiliss dans de nombreux pays.
Des expriences en Autriche ont montr que la combinaison de dtecteurs dincendie et dun circuit ferm de tlvision est trs utile. Dans le cas o le systme de dtection met une fausse alerte, celle-ci peut tre vrifie par le circuit de tlvision.
Belgique Deux tunnels (Liefkenshoek et Tijsmans) sont quips de dtecteurs dincendie. Ce sont des dtecteurs ponctuels qui dtectent des variations anormales de temprature. Seuls les tunnels emprunts par des transports de marchandises dangereuses possdent des dtecteurs. Ces derniers alertent la police qui dclenche les actions ncessaires. Danemark Dans le tunnel de Guldborgsund, des dtecteurs dincendie sont situs au plafond tous les 10 m. Le systme est dclench par la temprature. Les alarmes provoquent la fermeture du tunnel et les pompiers sont alerts. Les dtecteurs dincendie ne sont pas considrs aussi importants que les alarmes dincendie qui peuvent tre actives partir de panneaux durgence dans le tunnel, ou que les appels durgence des automobilistes par lintermdiaire de tlphones mobiles. France Aucun tunnel en France nest quip de systme de dtection dincendie. A lheure actuelle, les incendies sont dtects par des capteurs de CO et dopacit qui dclenchent automatiquement le rgime le plus fort de ventilation ds que la fume les atteint. Les incendies sont galement dtects laide de tlvision en circuit ferm ou par tlphone durgence.
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Fire detectors are also very helpful in unmanned tunnels with transverse or semi-transverse ventilation, because if a fire occurs in such a tunnel and is not detected, the CO and opacity sensors used for normal ventilation will automatically put maximum fresh air blowing into operation whilst the proper measure is to reduce or stop fresh air and start smoke extraction. Such systems are currently used in many countries.
Austria All tunnels with a length more than 1500 m are equipped with a fire detection system. Usually a linear heat detection is installed.
Experiences in Austria showed that a combination of fire detection and CCTV system is very useful. In case of false alarms of the detection system, it can be checked by the CCTV system.
Belgium Two tunnels (Liefkenshoek and Tijsmans) are equipped with fire detectors. The detectors are point detectors that detect abnormal temperature variations. Only tunnels that are designed to carry dangerous goods have detectors. The detectors alert the police to take the necessary actions. Denmark The Guldborgsund Tunnel has fire detectors located in the ceiling every 10 m. The system is of a temperature-activated type. Alarms will cause a closing of the tunnel and the fire department will be alerted. Fire detectors are not considered as important as fire alarms which can be activated from emergency panels in the tunnels and emergency calls from motorists in the tunnels using mobile telephones.
France No tunnel in France is equipped with fire detection systems. Today fires are detected by CO and opacity metres that automatically switch on the highest ventilation regime once smoke reaches them. Fires are also detected by closed circuit television (CCTV) if any and by emergency telephones.
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La France prvoit dutiliser les dtecteurs dincendie dans des tunnels ventilation semitransversale qui ne sont pas surveills 24 heures sur 24. Si des incendies sont dtects dans ces tunnels, le systme actuel souffle de lair frais par le plafond et dstratifie la fume. Lusage de dtecteurs dincendie est galement envisag dans des tunnels emprunts par des transports de marchandises dangereuses, spcialement si ce sont de longs tunnels deux voies. Les dtecteurs dincendie localiseront lincendie de telle faon que louverture tlcommande des bouches adquates daspiration de la fume soit active. Les systmes de dtection dincendie doivent dclencher immdiatement le systme de dsenfumage. Si le tunnel est surveill, le personnel sera alert par le systme. Si le tunnel nest pas surveill, les dtecteurs devront dclencher la fermeture du tunnel et lalerte des pompiers.
Allemagne Les alarmes automatiques dincendie sont utilises dans tous les tunnels de plus de 350 m. Les dtecteurs doivent pouvoir dtecter la combustion de 20 litres dessence. Italie En Italie, certains tunnels possdent des dtecteurs dincendie. Les tunnels sont quips dun cble rsistance variable. Ce systme est utilis dans le tunnel du Frjus et dans des tunnels sur la M5 et la M24. Les dtecteurs dincendie sont installs dans les longs tunnels deux voies et dans les tunnels deux voies plus courts, mais avec une circulation intense. Il est important que le systme dclenche une squence prprogramme de ventilation.
Un systme de dtection par fibre optique a t test dans une station souterraine de chemin de fer Genoa-Principe.
Japon Au Japon, on utilise des dtecteurs de flamme. Ils dtectent une combustion partir de caractristiques de distribution spectrale et de frquence variable qui sont typiques dune flamme. Les dtecteurs sont utiliss dans tous les tunnels de plus de 10 000 m et dans des tunnels plus courts forte circulation. Lorsque les dtecteurs sont activs, les exploitants ferment le tunnel, alertent le personnel et les pompiers, passent le systme de ventilation en mode incendie et indiquent litinraire dvacuation aux usagers. Toutes les installations sont testes avec un incendie de 0,5 m dessence dans un bac ouvert. Norvge Aucun tunnel nest quip de dtecteurs dincendie ; ces quipements sont jugs trop coteux compte tenu du faible volume de circulation dans les tunnels. Un systme de dtection dincendie est en cours dvaluation pour le nouveau tunnel de Laerdal de 24 km. Suisse Les tunnels longs sont quips de dtecteurs linaires dincendie. Le tableau 6.3.1 donne les rsultats dune tude portant sur six types de dtecteurs dincendie. Lessai a t conduit dans le tunnel de Mosi en Suisse (1992). Les huit tests ont couvert diffrentes superficies dincendie, avec de lalcool et de lessence comme combustible.
AIPCR 210
05.05.B - 1999
France contemplates using fire detectors in semi-transverse tunnels that are not manned 24 hours a day. If fires are detected in such tunnels, today the system will start blowing fresh air from the ceiling and delayering the smoke. Fire detectors are also contemplated in tunnels with dangerous goods, especially if they are two-way long tunnels. The fire detectors will locate the fire so that the appropriate remote-controlled smoke openings can be activated.
Fire detection systems should start the smoke control system immediately. If the tunnel is manned, the system should alert the personnel. If the tunnel is not manned, the detectors should close the tunnel and alert the fire brigade.
Germany Automatic fire alarms are required in all tunnels longer than 350 metres. Detectors must be able to detect fire of 20 litres of petrol. Italy Some tunnels in Italy have fire detectors. The tunnels are equipped with a cable with variable resistance. This system is used in the Frejus tunnel and tunnels on M5 and M24. Fire detectors are installed in long two-way tunnels and shorter two-way tunnels with heavy traffic. It is important that the system activates a pre-set ventilation strategy.
The Italian railroads have tested an fibre optic detection system in the underground railway station in Genoa-Principe.
Japan In Japan flame detectors are used. The detectors detect burning from the variable frequency and spectral distribution characteristics that are typical of a flame. Detectors are required in all tunnels longer than 10000 m and in shorter tunnels with heavy traffic. When the detectors are activated, the tunnel operators close the tunnel, alert the tunnel staff and the fire department, activate the ventilation system on fire mode and designate the evacuation route for people in the tunnel. All installations are tested by using a 0.5 m gasoline fire in an open pan.
Norway No tunnel has fire detectors. These systems have not been considered because of their high cost and the low traffic volume in tunnels. A system of fire detectors is being evaluated for the new 24 km long Laerdal tunnel.
Switzerland Long tunnels are equipped with linear fire detectors. Table 6.3.1 shows the results from a test of six different types of fire detection systems. The test was made in the Mositunnel in Switzerland (1992). The eight tests cover different fire areas and include both alcohol and petrol as the fire source.
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Tableau 6.3.1 - Tests sur dtecteurs dincendie dans le tunnel de Mosi (Suisse) : temps (mn/s) avant lalarme dans des essais avec alcool (Alc) et essence
ESSAI no Combustible Superficie de lincendie (m) Dtecteur ponctuel de temprature - pr-alarme - alarme Dtecteur de chaleur par cble coaxial Capteur linaire de temprature Cble linaire de dtection de fume Capteur fibre optique
7 Alc 1
8 Alc 2
9 Alc
3
10 Alc 4
11
Essence
12
Essence
13
Essence
14
Essence
0,6
1:35
0:63
1:03
3:34
Royaume-Uni / Pays-Bas Dans ces pays, il ny a pas de dtecteurs dincendie dans les tunnels. En raison du cot des systmes de dtection dincendie et de leur manque de fiabilit, la surveillance vido en circuit ferm, les quipements de contrle de la visibilit et les capteurs de trafic sont utiliss en combinaison pour dtecter les incidents. tats-Unis La dtection dincendie dans les tunnels routiers utilise un certain nombre dquipements : surveillance vido en circuit ferm, capteurs de trafic et dtecteurs dincendie. Les capteurs de trafic identifient les modifications de la circulation, la vido en circuit ferm est ensuite utilise pour vrifier un incident. Lorsque des dtecteurs dincendie sont utiliss, il sagit de dtecteurs linaires.
VI.3.1.3 Recommandations
Un certain nombre de systmes de dtection dincendie sont disponibles : dtecteurs de chaleur (temprature et vitesse daugmentation), de fumes, de flammes. De plus, il existe des dtecteurs ponctuels de chaleur et des dtecteurs linaires, ce dernier type tant prfrable. Des questions se posent pour lutilisation des dtecteurs dincendie vis--vis des fausses alarmes et des alarmes tardives. Ces dernires sont lies au temps ncessaire un incendie bord dun vhicule pour avoir un impact sur lenvironnement du tunnel. Les systmes de dtection dincendie peuvent tre utiles dans les tunnels qui sont de grande longueur, de configuration complexe, et plus spcialement lorsque le transit de marchandises dangereuses y est autoris, ou lorsque quil ncessaire de connatre de faon prcise lendroit o lincendie sest dclar. Les dtecteurs sont galement trs utiles dans les tunnels non surveills pourvus dune ventilation transversale ou semi-transversale. Les dtecteurs dincendie demandent un entretien rgulier.
AIPCR 212
05.05.B - 1999
Table 6.3.1 - Fire detector tests in the Mositunnel (Switzerland): time (mn:s) before alarm from tests with alcohol (Alc) and petrol fires
TEST no Fire source Fire area (m) Temperature point detector - pre alarm - alarm Coaxial heat detector cable Linear temperature sensor Linear smoke detector cable Optic fibre sensor
7 Alc 1
8 Alc 2
9 Alc 3
10 Alc 4
11 Petrol 2
12 Petrol 0.6
13 Petrol 1
14 Petrol 2
1:35 3:34
1:25
0:69
United Kingdom / Netherlands There are no fire detectors in tunnels in these countries. Due to the unreliable and expensive nature of fire detection systems, a combination of CCTV, visibility monitoring equipment and traffic detectors are used to indicate when incidents have occurred. United States Fire detection in road tunnels utilises a number of systems including CCTV, traffic detectors and fire detectors. The traffic detectors identify the change in traffic flow; the CCTV is then used to verify an incident. Where fire detectors are employed, the linear type is used.
VI.3.1.3 Recommendations
There are a number of fire detection systems available. These include detectors of heat (temperature and rate of rise), smoke, and flame. In addition, there are spot and linear heat detectors, the latter being preferable. There are concerns regarding the use of fire detectors related to false alarms and delayed alarms. The delayed alarms relate to the time required for a fire in the interior of a vehicle to have an impact on the tunnel environment.
Fire detection systems can be useful in tunnels that are long or complicated, especially when dangerous goods are allowed or when it is necessary to precisely determine the location of the fire. Detectors can also be helpful in unmanned tunnels with transverse or semi-transverse ventilation.
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05.05.B - 1999
De faon alternative, un systme de dtection automatique d'incident peut tre utilis pour dtecter rapidement un incendie. La dtection automatique d'incident est de plus en plus souvent mise en uvre dans les tunnels importants (de par leur circulation, leur longueur ou cause de risques particuliers). Les installations rcentes utilisent gnralement les camras de tlvision du tunnel et un systme de traitement ddi pour dtecter les vhicules arrts, une circulation ralentie, etc. Si une surveillance humaine de la tlvision est assure en permanence, de tels systmes assurent une dtection indirecte trs rapide des incendies : le vhicule qui brle est dtect comme un incident de circulation ds qu'il s'arrte, la camra de tlvision est automatiquement montre au centre de contrle, et l'oprateur peut alors facilement reconnatre l'incendie.
VI.3.2 Extincteurs
VI.3.2.1 Travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR
Congrs de Vienne, 1979 [26]
Des extincteurs portables doivent tre disponibles. De petits incendies sont gnralement circonscrits laide dextincteurs main. A mesure que lincendie augmente, la lutte devient ingale avec des extincteurs. Les flammes peuvent tre teintes, mais la temprature de lessence nest pas suffisamment rduite. Lvaporation qui sensuit dgage des vapeurs, qui peuvent tre charries par un courant dair longitudinal et propages en diffrents endroits du tunnel.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Les extincteurs sont jugs trs utiles pour les incendies de petits vhicules. Il faut cependant mentionner quavec une ventilation longitudinale, leffet de la poudre peut tre rduit car elle est entrane par le courant dair. Pour les automobilistes, lextincteur portable reprsente le premier quipement de lutte contre lincendie. Lenlvement dun extincteur de son support doit provoquer une alarme sonore au centre de contrle. Cette alarme a deux objectifs : signaler le vol ventuel d'un extincteur et signaler l'utilisation d'un extincteur pour un incendie.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
La taille dun incendie est toujours limite au dpart ; il peut alors tre facilement circonscrit. Cest pourquoi une intervention rapide est de la plus haute importance. Les extincteurs sont le meilleur moyen de matriser un incendie ds le dpart. Lexprience a montr que les usagers eux-mmes savent utiliser un extincteur de manire efficace. Deux extincteurs contenant 6 kg de poudre sont normalement installs dans chaque niche de secours. Il faut sassurer quun extincteur vide na pas t replac sur son support. Seul le personnel dexploitation du tunnel est autoris remplacer un extincteur vide par un plein. L'enlvement dun extincteur doit produire la transmission dune alarme la salle de contrle.
Rapport AIPCR, 1995 [96]
Les extincteurs sont ncessaires, mais dans de nombreux pays, ils font souvent lobjet de vols, mme dans les tunnels sous surveillance vido.
AIPCR 214
05.05.B - 1999
An effective automatic incident detection system can be used as an alternative way to detect fires quickly. Automatic incident detection is more and more often implemented in important tunnels (i.e. with high traffic, or length, or special risks). State-of-the-art equipment generally uses the CCTV cameras and a devoted data-processing system to detect stopped vehicles, slow traffic, etc. If round the clock CCTV human surveillance is available, such systems ensure a very fast indirect detection of fires: the burning vehicle is detected as a traffic incident as soon as it stops, the corresponding CCTV camera is automatically displayed at the control center, and the operator can then recognise the fire easily.
Portable fire extinguishers should be provided. Small fires are usually dealt with by the hand extinguisher. As the fire increases in size, fire-fighting with extinguishers becomes doubtful. The flames may well be stopped but the temperature of the petrol is not sufficiently reduced. Fumes are given off by subsequent evaporation. They can be carried by a longitudinal airflow and expelled at different points in the tunnel.
Fire extinguishers are considered very useful in small car fires. It is, however, mentioned that with longitudinal ventilation the effect of the powder can be reduced because the powder is carried away by the air stream. The portable fire extinguisher is the first aid fire-fighting equipment available to the motorists. Removal of the extinguisher from its support should sound an alarm in the central monitoring facility. This alarm serves two purposes, signalling the potential theft of an extinguisher and signalling the use of an extinguisher on a fire.
Brussels 1987 Congress [19]
The size of a fire is always limited at the beginning with and while it is small it can easily be extinguished. Thus rapid intervention is most important. Fire extinguishers are the most appropriate means for bringing a fire under control when it begins. Experience has shown that even tunnel users know how to make an effective use of fire extinguishers. Two 6 kg powder fire extinguishers are normally installed in each emergency recess. Facilities must be provided to ensure that an empty fire extinguisher is not replaced in its holder. Only the tunnel operating personnel are allowed to fit a full fire extinguisher to its holder in place of an empty one. The removal of an extinguisher should result in the transmission of an alarm signal to the control room.
PIARC Report 1995 [96]
Fire extinguishers are necessary, but in many countries they are frequently stolen even in tunnels with CCTV control.
PIARC 215
05.05.B - 1999
VI.3.2.3 Recommandations
Puisque la plupart des incendies de vhicule commencent par un feu de petite taille qui peut tre facilement teint laide dun extincteur portable, des extincteurs doivent absolument tre disponibles dans les tunnels routiers. Les extincteurs portables doivent tre situs dans des coffrets ou des niches trs bien signals intervalles rguliers.
AIPCR 216
05.05.B - 1999
Netherlands Two powder extinguishers (9 kg) are provided every 50 m on each side of the roadway. Norway Fire extinguishers are required in all tunnels, located every 150 m in booths. Removal of extinguishers should give alarm.
Photo 6.5 A fire extinguisher box with a push button fire alarm in a tunnel in Japan Photo 6.5 Coffret dextincteurs avec un bouton-poussoir dans un tunnel au Japon
United Kingdom For all tunnels, emergency panels at about 50 m regular intervals contain 2 x 3 kg dry powder extinguishers or 9 litre AFFF foam, and 45 m hose of 19 mm internal diameter.
United States Portable fire extinguishers are required in tunnels of 240 m long or more. Each location must have at least one 9 kg multipurpose fire extinguisher placed on both sides of the tunnel in wellmarked cabinets at spacing of not more than 90 m.
VI.3.2.3 Recommendations
Since most vehicle fires start as a small fire which can be readily extinguished with a portable fire extinguisher, extinguishers should be provided in road tunnels. The portable fire extinguishers should be located in conspicuously marked boxes or recesses at uniformly spaced intervals.
PIARC 217
05.05.B - 1999
Lenlvement dun extincteur de son support doit provoquer une alarme au centre de contrle. Les extincteurs doivent avoir une contenance minimale de 6 kg (lorsque la circulation est surtout compose de vhicules particuliers) et une contenance maximale de 9 kg (lorsqu'il y a de nombreux poids lourds). Ils doivent pouvoir teindre des incendies dorigines diverses : quipements lectriques, graisses, liquides.
Des poteaux dincendie avec des drouleurs de tuyaux doivent tre installs de faon permanente intervalles rguliers.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Les poteaux dincendie doivent tre relis une conduite deau ou des citernes deau lgre (une mulsion qui produit de la mousse recouvrant lincendie et qui permet leau qui se trouve en dessous de refroidir lobjet en combustion). La longueur de tuyau doit correspondre la distance sparant les poteaux. Les tuyaux peuvent tre placs sur des drouleurs dans les niches de scurit ou stocks ailleurs. Des vhicules spcialement quips pour la lutte contre lincendie, lusage de lexploitant du tunnel, doivent tre stationns ct du tunnel.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
Les poteaux dincendie doivent tre situs dans les niches de scurit ou leur proximit. Ils doivent fournir de leau sous pression (1 000 1 200 l/mn 0,6 MPa). La canalisation amenant leau doit tre protge contre le gel. Leau doit tre amene partir des deux ttes du tunnel. Les poteaux ne doivent tre utiliss que par lexploitant du tunnel ou les pompiers. Ils peuvent galement servir des travaux de nettoyage. Un tuyau souple peut tre fix au poteau (tuyau permanent). La longueur dun tel tuyau ne devra pas tre infrieure la distance dun poteau lautre, de telle manire quil soit possible de combattre un incendie nimporte quel endroit du tunnel : durant lincendie dans le tunnel de Velsen, un poteau situ en face de lincendie na pu tre utilis.
Rciproquement, les poteaux peuvent ne pas tre munis de tuyau demeure et, dans ce cas, lexploitant du tunnel ou les pompiers doivent, en cas dincendie, fixer manuellement aux poteaux un tuyau de longueur approprie.
AIPCR 218
05.05.B - 1999
The removal of a fire extinguisher from its holder should result in an alarm transmission to a central monitored location. The fire extinguishers should have a minimum content of 6 kg (when the traffic includes mainly passenger cars) and a maximum of 9 kg (when heavy goods vehicles are numerous). They should be rated for liquid, grease and electrical equipment fires.
Permanently installed wall hydrants with hose reels located at intervals should be provided.
Sydney 1983 Congress [27]
Hydrants are connected to the water main or to tanks of light water (an emulsion which produces a foam to cover the fire and enables the water underneath to cool the burning object). The hose length should cover the distance between hydrants. Hoses may be located on reels in the emergency recesses or stored elsewhere. Specially equipped vehicles, including fire fighting equipment, for use by tunnel operator may be provided at the tunnel site.
Fire hydrants should be provided in the emergency recesses or in the vicinity of such recesses. They should be supplied with water under pressure (1000-1200 l/min at 0.6 MPa). The pipe carrying the water must be protected against freezing conditions. The water should be supplied from both ends of the tunnel. Fire hydrants should be used only by tunnel operators or fire station personnel. They can also be used for cleaning operation. A flexible hose can be attached to the fire hydrant (permanent fire hose point). The length of such a pipe should not be less than the distance from one fire hydrant to the next one so that it would be possible to deal with a fire at all points along the tunnel: during the fire in the Velsen tunnel, a hydrant located opposite to the fire could not be used. Conversely, the fire hydrants may not be provided with permanently attached pipe and in this case the tunnel operator or fire station personnel must manually attach suitable type of pipes of appropriate length to the hydrants when dealing with a fire.
PIARC 219
05.05.B - 1999
Un accs leau est ncessaire pour refroidir les vhicules aprs que lincendie aura t circonscrit. En effet, il faut viter un nouvel incendie ou une explosion et il faut nettoyer les lieux. Les manires de fournir leau sont trs nombreuses ; certains pompiers prfrent une citerne plutt que des poteaux. Les poteaux et les canalisations d'eau peuvent reprsenter un problme dans des tunnels soumis des conditions hivernales rigoureuses.
AIPCR 220
05.05.B - 1999
Access to water is necessary to cool the vehicles after the fire is extinguished to prevent the start of a new fire, to avoid an explosion and to clean up after a fire. How the water supply is arranged may vary; some fire brigades prefer a water tank instead of hydrants. Hydrants and water mains can be a problem in tunnels with severe winter conditions.
PIARC 221
05.05.B - 1999
Pays-Bas Des poteaux d'incendie et des tuyaux installs en permanence et aliments en mousse AFFF sont prvus sur le pidroit gauche tous les 50 m. tats-Unis Tous les tunnels routiers de plus de 90 m doivent avoir une canalisation fixe d'alimentation en eau avec un poteau tous les 85 m. Ces systmes de canalisations fixes sont conus pour fournir 960 l/mn (16 l/s) une pression rsiduelle minimale de 0,45 MPa la valve de tuyau la plus loigne. Les canalisations peuvent tre sches ou humides.
VI.3.3.3 Recommandations
Il est recommand que tous les tunnels routiers dune longueur suffisante (200 1 000 m selon les cas) soient dots dune canalisation d'alimentation en eau sur toute la longueur du tunnel. Cette canalisation doit avoir un dbit minimum de 1 000 l/mn 0,5 MPa. Les canalisations peuvent tre sches ou humides. Les poteaux doivent tre placs une interdistance de 100 200 m.
Les dispositifs darrosage (systmes d'extinction automatique) sont fixs au plafond ou sur les pidroits ; ils sont destins refroidir instantanment la source dun incendie ds quil se dclare. Ils doivent pouvoir dverser de grandes quantits deau ou de mousse. Ceux installs dans les immeubles sont moins bien adapts aux tunnels que ceux utiliss dans les hangars daviation. Les dispositifs darrosage prsentent certaines difficults :
leau peut disperser le carburant en feu ; le contact de leau avec certains matriaux peut provoquer des ractions dangereuses ; la vapeur produite peut rduire la visibilit ; mme si les flammes sont teintes, les parties mtalliques des vhicules ne refroidissent pas rapidement ; lessence continue svaporer et peut dgnrer en mlange explosif ; les surfaces chaudes peuvent enflammer lessence vaporise ou le GPL.
En raison de ces facteurs dfavorables, et mme dangereux, linstallation de dispositifs darrosage nest pas recommande dans les tunnels routiers.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
Les dispositifs darrosage sont installs le long du plafond ou des parois du tunnel. Ils sont conus pour dverser une certaine quantit deau ou de mousse.
AIPCR 222
05.05.B - 1999
Netherlands Hydrants and permanently installed water hoses with AFFF foam are provided at the left hand wall every 50 m. United States All road tunnels longer than 90 m are recommended to have a water supply standpipe with hydrants spaced at 85 m. These standpipe systems are to be designed to provide 960 l/min (16 l/s) at a minimum residual pressure of 0.45 MPa at the most remote hose valve connection. Standpipe systems may be wet or dry.
VI.3.3.3 Recommendations
It is recommended that all road tunnels of sufficient length (200 to 1000 m according to the case) be provided with a water supply standpipe installed through the length of the tunnel. This standpipe should have a minimum capacity of 1000 l/min at 0.5 MPa. The standpipes can be either wet or dry. Hydrants should be placed at a spacing of 100 to 200 m.
VI.3.4 Sprinklers
VI.3.4.1 Previous work by PIARC
Sydney 1983 congress [27]
Sprinklers are fixed to the ceiling or the walls and are intended to cool the source immediately when a fire starts. They must therefore be capable of discharging large quantities of water or foam. The types installed in buildings are less suitable than those used in aircraft hangars.
water can disperse burning petrol; with some materials, contact with water can produce dangerous reactions; the steam which is produced can reduce visibility; even if the flames are extinguished, the metal in the vehicle does not cool quickly; petrol continues to vaporise and may produce an explosive mixture; hot surfaces may ignite vaporising petrol or LPG gas.
In view of these adverse and even dangerous factors the installation of sprinklers is not recommended in road tunnels.
Brussels 1987 Congress [19]
Sprinklers are installed along the roof or walls of the tunnel. They are designed to distribute a certain quantity of water or foam.
PIARC 223
05.05.B - 1999
Cependant, en l'tat des connaissances actuelles, lutilisation de dispositifs darrosage dans les tunnels routiers nest pas recommande car :
leau peut provoquer la dispersion de liquides combustibles sur une grande tendue ; leau peut occasionner des ractions dangereuses lorsquelle entre en contact avec certains produits ; mme si les flammes sont teintes, les parties mtalliques des vhicules ne refroidissent pas rapidement et les produits inflammables peuvent continuer produire des gaz, crant ainsi des mlanges explosifs ; leau (ou la mousse) qui est dverse, comme dans le cas d'un incendie de citerne d'essence, peut ne pas suffire pour teindre lincendie dun vhicule transportant une grande quantit de carburant.
Aucun pays europen nutilise des dispositifs darrosage de faon rgulire. Au Japon, ils sont utiliss dans les tunnels de grande longueur ou fort trafic, pour refroidir les vhicules en feu. Les dispositifs darrosage ne sont gnralement pas recommands pour les raisons suivantes :
lentretien peut tre coteux, ils sont difficiles manuvrer manuellement, leur efficacit est faible sur les incendies lintrieur des vhicules, leau peut provoquer une explosion en prsence dessence et dautres substances chimiques si on ne lui ajoute pas des additifs appropris, la vapeur deau peut blesser les personnes, la visibilit est rduite, la couche de fume est refroidie et dstratifie, si bien quelle peut recouvrir lensemble du tunnel, par consquent, les dispositifs darrosage ne doivent pas tre utiliss dans la zone dincendie avant que toutes les personnes en aient t vacues.
AIPCR 224
05.05.B - 1999
Given our present knowledge of the subject, however, the use of sprinkler systems in road tunnels is not recommended for the following reasons:
the water can result in the dispersion of burning liquids over a large surface area; water can cause dangerous reactions when it comes into contact with certain products; even if the flames are extinguished, the metal parts of vehicles do not cool very quickly and inflammable products can continue to give off gases leading to the presence of explosive mixtures; the water (or foam) that is distributed may, as in the case of a petrol tanker fire, be insufficient to extinguish the fire on a vehicle carrying a large quantity of fuel.
No European country uses sprinklers on a regular basis. In Japan, sprinklers are used in tunnels with important length or traffic to cool down vehicles on fire.
Sprinklers are normally not recommended in road tunnels for the following reasons:
maintenance can be costly, sprinklers are difficult to handle manually, the efficiency is low for fires inside vehicles, water can cause explosion in petrol and other chemical substances if not combined with appropriate additives, vaporised steam can hurt people, visibility is reduced, the smoke layer is cooled down and de-stratified, so that it may cover the whole tunnel, as a consequence, sprinklers must not be used in the fire area before all people have been evacuated.
Belgium No sprinklers are installed in road tunnels. Denmark No tunnels are equipped with sprinklers.
PIARC 225
05.05.B - 1999
France A ce jour, aucun tunnel nest quip de dispositif darrosage. Le seul argument pouvant modifier cette position serait la preuve que ces dispositifs peuvent sauver des vies. Or, jusque l, rien na t dmontr. En France, la ventilation longitudinale est utilise dans la plupart des tunnels unidirectionnels. Le flux dair protge alors de la fume les usagers bloqus derrire lincendie. Dans les tunnels ventilation transversale ou semi-transversale rversible, la fume est aspire par des ouvertures au plafond ou en haut des pidroits. Dans ce cas, les dispositifs darrosage refroidiraient la fume qui serait dstratifie.
La France craint galement les problmes dentretien causs par ces dispositifs.
Italie Aucun tunnel nest quip de dispositif darrosage. Japon Les dispositifs darrosage sont prconiss pour tous les tunnels de plus de 10 000 m et pour ceux de plus de 3 000 m qui supportent un fort trafic.
Au Japon, 82 tunnels sont quips de dispositifs darrosage. Ils dversent gnralement de leau et sont constamment sous pression. Cependant, ils sont difficiles grer et la vaporisation deau peut rabaisser la fume dans le tunnel. Avant denclencher larrosage, le personnel du tunnel doit sassurer quil ny a plus personne dans la zone concerne. Parfois, la visibilit est si mauvaise quil est difficile dtre sr que la zone est dgage. Les principales raisons dutiliser ces dispositifs sont dabaisser la temprature dans le tunnel, protger la structure du tunnel et fournir de meilleures conditions pour lvacuation.
Pays-Bas Les dispositifs darrosage ne sont pas utiliss aux Pays-Bas, car leurs inconvnients sont plus nombreux que leurs avantages. De plus, les cots dinstallation et dentretien sont levs.
Mais le facteur qui joue le plus en leur dfaveur est que leur fonction dextinction est incontrlable. Puisque le systme est soit en marche, soit arrt, la quantit deau dverse ne peut tre rgule. Dans le cas dun incendie provoqu par un liquide, cela peut aboutir une situation dlicate quant la propagation ventuelle de lincendie.
Norvge En Norvge, deux tunnels sont quips de dispositifs darrosage. Dans les deux cas, ils utilisent de leau et sont maintenus secs en raison du gel en hiver. Dans le tunnel de Vlreng (800 m, TMJA 37 000, deux tubes), ces dispositifs sont conus pour arroser le revtement du tunnel (polyurthanne). Il y a eu des problmes de fuites. Dans le tunnel de Flyfjell (3,2 km, TMJA 26 000, deux tubes), les pompiers ont propos deux solutions aux autorits routires : recouvrir le revtement en thaphome avec du bton projet ou installer un dispositif darrosage. Elles ont choisi la seconde solution, mais ont rencontr des problmes de gel. Rcemment, sur une priode de six mois, le systme darrosage a provoqu 70 fausses alertes.
Dans les directives norvgiennes, les dispositifs darrosage ne font pas partie des quipements exigs pour les tunnels.
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France There are no tunnels with sprinklers in France today. The only reason to change this policy would be if sprinklers could be proven to save lives. So far this has not been proven. In France longitudinal ventilation is used in most unidirectional tunnels. The airflow will then protect the users jammed behind the fire from smoke. In tunnels with transverse or reversible semitransverse ventilation, smoke is extracted through openings in the ceiling or at the top of sidewalks. In this case sprinklers would cool the smoke so that it would not remain stratified.
France also notes that they would be afraid to depend on the sprinkler because of possible maintenance problems.
Italy No tunnels in Italy are equipped with sprinklers. Japan Sprinklers are required in all tunnels of length greater than 10000 m and in shorter tunnels (longer than 3000 m) if heavy traffic.
In Japan there are 82 tunnels equipped with sprinkler systems. The sprinklers normally use water, and are standing with water under pressure. Sprinklers are, however, difficult to manage and the water spray causes the smoke to drop down in the tunnel. Before starting the sprinklers the tunnel staff must be certain that there are no people in the water shower area. Sometimes the visibility in the tunnel is so bad that it is difficult to be sure that no one is in the area. The main reasons to use sprinklers are to lower the temperature inside the tunnel, protect the tunnel structure and make the conditions for escaping persons more suitable.
Netherlands Sprinkler systems are not applied in tunnels in the Netherlands. The disadvantages of sprinkler systems are greater than the advantages. In addition the installation and maintenance costs are high.
The most important reason for not using sprinkler systems is that the extinguishing function is not controllable. Since the system is either on or off the amount of water dispensed cannot be regulated. In the case of a liquid fire, this can result in undesirable situations regarding potential spread of the fire.
Norway In Norway two tunnels are equipped with sprinklers. In both cases the sprinklers are kept dry because of temperatures below zero during winter. Both systems use water. In the Vlreng tunnel (800 m, AADT 37000, two tubes) the sprinklers are designed to spray on the lining material (polyurethane). There have been problems with leakage in the system. In the Flyfjell tunnel (3.2 km, AADT 26000, two tubes) the Fire Department gave the road authorities two alternatives, to cover the ethaphome lining with shotcrete or to sprinkle the tunnel. The road authorities decided to install sprinklers. There have been problems with freezing water in the system. During a recent six-month period there have been 70 false alarms registered from the sprinkler systems.
Sprinklers are not mentioned in the Norwegian guidelines for required tunnel equipment.
PIARC 227
05.05.B - 1999
Sude A ce jour, des dispositifs darrosage ne sont utiliss que dans le tunnel de Tegelbacken. Linstallation na servi quune seule fois et a bien fonctionn. Mme avec un dispositif darrosage, le transit de marchandises dangereuses nest pas autoris dans ce tunnel. Ces dispositifs, actionns par des dtecteurs de chaleur, dversent leau en pluie diluvienne. Aucun problme particulier dentretien na t signal. Royaume-Uni Il ny a pas de dispositifs darrosage dans les tunnels. tats-Unis De manire gnrale, il ny a pas de tels dispositifs dans les tunnels routiers aux tats-Unis. Cependant, des systmes mousse sont actuellement installs dans les tunnels de CANA, Mt. Baker Ridge et Mercer Island car il est prvu que le transit des marchandises dangereuses y soit autoris.
VI.3.4.3 Recommandations
Aucun pays europen nutilise rgulirement de dispositifs darrosage (systmes d'extinction automatique). Des dispositifs darrosage ont t utiliss dans certains tunnels, en Europe, dans des buts particuliers. Au Japon, les dispositifs darrosage sont utiliss dans les tunnels de grande longueur ou fort trafic pour refroidir les vhicules en feu. Aux tats-Unis, seuls quelques tunnels autoriss aux marchandises dangereuses sont dots dun certain type de sprinkler. La raison pour laquelle la plupart des pays nutilise pas ces dispositifs dans les tunnels est que la majorit des incendies prennent naissance dans un compartiment ferm et que les dispositifs darrosage ne sont daucune utilit tant que lincendie y reste confin. Ils peuvent cependant tre utiliss pour refroidir les vhicules, empcher le feu de se propager aux autres vhicules (cest--dire rduire la zone dincendie et les dommages provoqus sur les biens) ou pour stopper des incendies secondaires dans les tunnels revtement en matire plastique. Lexprience du Japon montre que les dispositifs darrosage sont efficaces pour refroidir la zone autour du foyer et rendre ainsi plus efficaces les oprations de lutte contre le feu. Cependant, lusage des dispositifs darrosage pose un certain nombre de difficults qui peuvent tre rsumes comme suit :
leau peut provoquer une explosion en prsence dessence et dautres substances chimiques si on ne lui ajoute pas des additifs appropris, un risque existe que le feu soit teint, mais que des gaz inflammables soient produits et provoquent une explosion, la vapeur deau peut blesser les personnes, leur efficacit est faible sur les incendies lintrieur des vhicules, la couche de fume est refroidie et dstratifie, si bien quelle peut recouvrir lensemble du tunnel, lentretien peut tre coteux, les dispositifs darrosage sont difficiles manuvrer manuellement, la visibilit est rduite.
Par consquent, les dispositifs darrosage ne doivent pas tre utiliss dans la zone dincendie avant que toutes les personnes en aient t vacues.
AIPCR 228
05.05.B - 1999
Sweden Today sprinklers are only used in the Tegelbacken tunnel. The installation has been used once, and performed well that time. Even if sprinklers are installed, no dangerous goods are allowed through the tunnel. The sprinklers use water and are of a deluge type that is activated by heat detectors. There have been no special maintenance problems. United Kingdom There are no sprinklers in tunnels within the United Kingdom. United States In general there are no sprinklers in road tunnels in the United States; currently, however, there are foam suppression systems installed in the CANA, Mt. Baker Ridge and Mercer Island Tunnel due to the proposed authorised transport of hazardous goods through these tunnels.
VI.3.4.3 Recommendations
No European country uses sprinklers on a regular basis. In some tunnels in Europe sprinklers have been used for special purposes. In Japan sprinklers are used in tunnels with important length or traffic to cool down vehicles on fire. In the United States only a few tunnels carrying hazardous cargo have some form of sprinkler. The reason why most countries do not use sprinklers in tunnels is that most fires start in the motor room or in the compartment, and sprinklers are of no use till the fire is open. Sprinklers can be used, however, to cool down vehicles, to stop the fire from spreading to other vehicles (i.e. to diminish the fire area and property damage) and to stop secondary fires in lining materials. Experiences from Japan show that sprinklers are effective in cooling down the area round the fire, so that fire fighting can be more effective.
However, the use of sprinklers raises a number of problems which are summarised in the following points:
water can cause explosion in petrol and other chemical substances if not combined with appropriate additives, there is a risk that the fire is extinguished but flammable gases are still produced and may cause an explosion, vaporised steam can hurt people, the efficiency is low for fires inside vehicles, the smoke layer is cooled down and de-stratified, so that it will cover the whole tunnel, maintenance can be costly, sprinklers are difficult to handle manually, visibility is reduced.
As a consequence, sprinklers must not be started before all people have evacuated.
PIARC 229
05.05.B - 1999
Les dispositifs darrosage ne peuvent donc tre considrs comme des quipements utiles pour sauver des vies. Ils peuvent seulement servir protger le tunnel aprs lvacuation. En ne tenant compte que de ce facteur conomique (protection des biens et non scurit), les dispositifs darrosage ne sont gnralement pas considrs comme rentables et ne sont pas recommands dans les tunnels courants. Cependant, ils peuvent tre utiliss, lorsque ncessaire, dans les salles annexes aux tunnels et dans dautres installations.
Dans les grands tunnels, des rseaux dappel durgence et des alarmes incendie sont frquemment installs.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Bien que trs fiables, les tlphones sont rarement utiliss car les conducteurs essaient de se dpanner par leurs propres moyens et les incidents sont la plupart du temps dtects par la tlvision. Pour tre utiliss, ces quipements doivent tre attrayants. Ils doivent donc tre bien entretenus et, si possible, encastrs dans un botier impermable et hermtique la poussire. Tout comme la tlvision, le tlphone est une pice essentielle des quipements de scurit dans un tunnel ; des tlphones doivent, tout le moins, tre installs aux entres.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
Lorsque l'utilisation de boutons-poussoirs dalarme est envisage, il est recommand de nen installer quun seul ; en effet, lorsque plusieurs sont disponibles avec des significations diffrentes, de nombreuses personnes ont tendance appuyer soit sur le mauvais bouton, soit sur tous la fois. Dans les tunnels circulation bidirectionnelle, les tlphones durgence doivent tre placs en vis--vis sur les parois. Dans le cas de circulation unidirectionnelle, les tlphones sont fixs seulement du ct des arrts durgence, cest--dire sur la paroi adjacente la voie rserve au trafic lent. Les tlphones durgence ne doivent pas se trouver lentre ou la sortie : des postes durgence doivent plutt se trouver lextrieur du tunnel. Les tlphones durgence lintrieur du tunnel doivent tre installs dans des cabines insonorises ou dans des niches de secours claires et correctement signales. Louverture de la porte de la niche doit provoquer un flash de couleur jaune au-dessus de la niche.
AIPCR 230
05.05.B - 1999
Based on these facts, sprinklers cannot be considered as an equipment useful to save lives. They can only be used to protect the tunnel once evacuation is completed. Taking into account this exclusively economic aim (protection of property and not safety), sprinklers are generally not considered as cost-effective and are not recommended in usual road tunnels. However, sprinklers can be used in ancillary rooms in tunnels and other tunnel facilities, where appropriate.
In long tunnels, emergency call network and fire alarms are usually provided.
Although very reliable, telephones are not much used because drivers try to help themselves and are usually detected by television.
If it is to be used, the equipment must appear attractive. It must therefore be kept clean, and if possible enclosed in a water and dust tight box.
Like television, the telephone is an essential item of safety equipment in a tunnel; as a minimum telephones should be provided at the tunnel portals.
When alarm push buttons are installed, it is recommended to use one button only because when several are provided with different meanings, many people push the wrong button or all buttons.
In two-way traffic tunnels the emergency telephones should be placed on the tunnel walls opposite one another. With one-way traffic the telephones are provided on the side of emergency stops only, that is on the tunnel wall adjacent to the slow traffic lane. Emergency telephones should not be in the entrance or exit zones: emergency posts should be provided outside the tunnel instead. Emergency telephones inside tunnels should be installed in sound proof cabins or in illuminated and clearly designed emergency recesses. The opening of the door to the telephone recess should result in the flashing of a yellow light above the recess.
PIARC 231
05.05.B - 1999
VI.3.5.3 Recommandations
Il est recommand que tous les tunnels routiers, partir dune certaine longueur ou dun certain trafic, soient quips dun systme de tlphones durgence le long du tunnel. Les boutonspoussoirs dalarme sont facultatifs.
AIPCR 232
05.05.B - 1999
Sweden Emergency telephones are provided in all tunnels and push button alarms in some tunnels. Switzerland SOS telephones are installed in booths spaced every 150 m. United Kingdom All tunnels have emergency telephones at 50 m intervals in lay-bys and at tunnel portals on the approach road. United States All road tunnels longer than 240 m are recommended to have emergency communications and alarm systems.
VI.3.5.3 Recommendations
It is recommended that all road tunnels with a sufficient length or traffic be equipped with a system of emergency telephones located through the length of the tunnel. Push button alarms are optional.
PIARC 233
05.05.B - 1999
La tlvision en circuit ferm est particulirement utile pour dtecter un incendie ; elle peut tre complte par des quipements tels quune alarme active par lenlvement dun extincteur, ou dautres dispositifs.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
La tlvision en circuit ferm permet une surveillance continue de la circulation, une dtection rapide de toutes les anomalies et une vrification de lefficacit de toutes les dispositions prises pour amliorer la scurit. Elle est reconnue comme lquipement le plus utile dans lexploitation des tunnels, et est le seul qui puisse donner une ide prcise de la situation dun incendie. Les camras doivent rpondre certaines caractristiques :
les camras directionnelles munies de lentilles de 200 mm doivent tre places aux entres ; lintrieur du tunnel, la distance entre camras dpend de la stratgie retenue et des caractristiques du tunnel : il peut tre appropri davoir une vision de toute sa longueur ou seulement des endroits risque (virage, bifurcation) pour une apprciation gnrale de la circulation, un espacement de 200 m suffit ; pour avoir une vue plus dtaille des vhicules et mme des conducteurs en difficult sur le trottoir, les camras ne doivent pas tre espaces de plus de 150 200 m ; l'emplacement des camras doit permettre une surveillance visuelle des points durgence.
La tlvision en circuit ferm est un dispositif trs efficace pour observer les conditions de circulation lies une urgence incendie. Pour une bonne couverture du tunnel, lespacement entre les camras doit tre de 150 200 m. Les camras situes en dehors du tunnel (routes daccs, plates-formes, stations de page, entres et sorties) doivent tre quipes dun zoom et doivent pouvoir tre actionnes dans toutes les directions.
Congrs de Montral, 1995 [17]
Le rseau de tlvision doit couvrir la totalit du tunnel. Lusage de camras et dcrans couleurs permet de dtecter trs rapidement un incendie.
AIPCR 234
05.05.B - 1999
Closed circuit television is particularly useful for fire detection and it may be complemented by equipment such as alarm activated by removal of a fire extinguisher and other devices.
Sydney 1983 Congress [27]
CCTV will give a continuous surveillance of the traffic flow, a rapid detection of all traffic abnormalities and a verification of the effectiveness of all actions taken to improve safety. CCTV is recommended as the most useful equipment in tunnel operations, and is the only one that gives an accurate idea of a possible fire situation.
cameras which are directional and fitted with 200 mm lenses should be installed at the portals; inside the tunnel the distance between cameras depends on the strategy adopted, and on the character of the tunnel: it may be appropriate to have vision throughout its length or merely at potential trouble spots (curves, bifurcation); for a general appreciation of the traffic, a spacing of more than 200 m will suffice; for a detailed view of cars and perhaps drivers in difficulty on a footway, the spacing should be no more than 150 m to 200 m; the sitting of the cameras should permit visual surveillance of the emergency points.
Closed circuit television is a very effective facility for observing traffic conditions as related to a fire emergency. The spacing between the closed circuit television cameras should be 150-200 m for the best coverage of the tunnel. Television cameras located outside the tunnel (access roads, platform, toll stations, entries and exits ) should be fitted with a zoom lens and with the means for pointing the camera in any direction.
Montreal 1995 Congress [17]
The television network must cover the whole tunnel. The use of colour cameras and monitors allows a fire to be detected very quickly.
PIARC 235
05.05.B - 1999
AIPCR 236
05.05.B - 1999
Austria Austria has guidelines that make CCTV mandatory in all tunnels longer than 1500 m with a staffed control centre. France The need for CCTV in a tunnel is based on a study taking into account among other factors tunnel length, traffic, route type and operation mode.
Germany CCTV is optional in tunnels over 1050 m in length. Camera spacing is 100 to 300 m.
Japan CCTV should be installed for all tunnels beyond 3000 m in length and in shorter tunnels with heavy traffic. Spacing is 200 m in two-lane tunnels.
Netherlands CCTV is required. Norway CCTV is optional in tunnels with an average daily traffic of 10000 and more, and in tunnels longer than 2500 m with a lower traffic. Sweden An analysis is required to determine if there is a need for CCTV. United Kingdom CCTV is installed in all tunnels as part of the incident monitoring equipment. It ensures a 100% coverage of the tunnel interior and approach roads.
United States Detection systems should include TV cameras with traffic monitoring.
PIARC 237
05.05.B - 1999
VI.3.6.3 Recommandations
Il est recommand que tous les grands tunnels routiers, quils soient surveills en permanence ou partiellement, soient dots dun rseau de surveillance par tlvision couvrant lintrieur du tunnel et ses ttes. Toute la longueur du tunnel doit tre couverte, ce qui permet la dtection rapide et la vrification de tout incident de circulation et, plus spcialement, des incendies.
VI.3.7 Haut-parleurs
VI.3.7.1 Travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR
Congrs de Vienne, 1979 [26]
Les haut-parleurs sont gnralement prvus dans les grands tunnels pour donner des instructions aux automobilistes.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Lutilisation des haut-parleurs doit tre envisage pour conseiller un automobiliste en panne repr par tlphone. Les haut-parleurs ne peuvent fournir des informations que lorsque le conducteur se trouve en dehors de son vhicule, ou lorsque les vitres sont ouvertes. Il faut prvoir plus dune langue. Les parois et le plafond du tunnel doivent tre insonoriss par des panneaux dabsorption phonique. Il ne faut pas accorder une grande priorit aux haut-parleurs dans les systmes de scurit. Ils doivent seulement tre prvus si le tunnel est surveill en permanence et que fonctionne un systme de tlvision en circuit ferm.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
Les haut-parleurs permettent l'exploitant du tunnel de transmettre des informations et des instructions un usager ou un groupe dusagers. Selon les circonstances, les messages peuvent tre transmis au moyen dun seul ou de plusieurs haut-parleurs. Les messages peuvent galement tre prenregistrs sur bande magntique. Les haut-parleurs rencontrent cependant quelques limites ; ainsi, il faut prvoir les messages en plusieurs langues si le tunnel peut tre emprunt par des usagers de diffrentes nationalits. De plus, les conducteurs gardent souvent leurs vitres fermes. De fait, en raison dun environnement bien plus bruyant qu lextrieur du tunnel, on ne peroit pas clairement les messages diffuss par les haut-parleurs. De meilleurs rsultats sont obtenus dans les tunnels insonoriss (panneaux d'absorption phonique), mais mme dans ce cas, il nest pas toujours possible dviter des difficults lies la rflexion et aux perturbations des ondes sonores. Limportance dun systme de hautparleurs pour la scurit nest pas insignifiante et des recherches sont en cours pour en amliorer les performances, particulirement sur la possibilit pour les automobilistes dentendre lintrieur de leur vhicule.
AIPCR 238
05.05.B - 1999
VI.3.6.3 Recommendations
It is recommended that all important road tunnels that are manned full or part-time be provided with closed circuit television coverage at the portals and inside the tunnel. The installation should cover the whole tunnel length, which permits the rapid detection and verification of any traffic incident, and especially fire emergencies.
VI.3.7 Loudspeakers
VI.3.7.1 Previous work by PIARC
Vienna 1979 Congress [26]
The use of loudspeakers should be considered to advise a stranded motorist located by a telephone. Loudspeakers will only give information to drivers outside their car, or when car windows are open. More than one language should be provided. Walls and roof of tunnel should be sound-proofed with absorbing panels. Loudspeakers are not given a high priority in tunnel safety systems. Loudspeakers should only be considered if the tunnel is permanently staffed and there is an operating CCTV system.
Loudspeakers enable a tunnel operator to transmit information and instructions to a tunnel user or a group of users. Depending on the circumstances, messages can be transmitted by means of one or a number of loudspeakers. Also messages can be pre-recorded on a magnetic tape. Loudspeaker installations do, however, have some limitations; thus the use of more than one language is necessary in tunnels where the users can be of different nationalities. In addition to this, drivers often proceed with all windows of their vehicle closed. Given an environment where the noise level is very much higher than it is outside the tunnel, the loudspeakers are not heard very clearly. Better results are obtained in tunnels where there has been some sound-proofing treatment (absorbing panels), but even in these cases it is not always possible to avoid difficulties due to the reflection and interference of sound waves. The importance of a loudspeaker system with regard to safety is not insignificant and research is in progress with a view to improving the performance of such a system, particularly as related to the ability of motorists to hear inside their vehicle.
PIARC 239
05.05.B - 1999
VI.3.7.3 Recommandations
Un fort besoin existe en matire de fourniture dinformations aux usagers en cas durgence dans un tunnel. Cependant, les haut-parleurs ne sont en gnral pas recommands dans les tunnels routiers cause des difficults suivantes :
lusage dune seule langue peut tre un problme pour les trangers ; la communication est normalement seulement possible dans les tunnels ayant reu un traitement acoustique ; le bruit des vhicules et de la ventilation peut poser problme.
A partir du moment o ces difficults sont rsolues, il est possible d'utiliser des haut-parleurs.
AIPCR 240
05.05.B - 1999
Austria The Austrians refer to some good results obtained in the Bosvuck Tunnel on the A9 motorway (Pyhrnautobahn). France Loudspeakers are considered as unadvisable because of their ineffectiveness. Germany In Germany loudspeakers are optional in tunnels longer than 1050 m and are then usually used in tunnels with CCTV. Japan Loudspeakers are required in all tunnels longer than 3000 m and shorter tunnels with heavy traffic. Netherlands Loudspeakers are required. They are used in case of an incident or emergency. Sweden Loudspeakers are optional in all tunnels based on a specific analysis. United Kingdom Loudspeakers are not the preferred option due to their ineffectiveness (echo, car noise, etc.). United Kingdom is looking at providing visual signs, variable message signs for controlling traffic on approach roads and inside tunnels.
United States There are no loudspeakers installed in road tunnels in the United States.
VI.3.7.3 Recommendations
There is a strong need to give information to people inside the tunnel in case of an emergency. However, loudspeakers are generally not recommended in road tunnels because of the following problems:
the use of a single language makes it difficult for foreigners; communication is normally only possible in tunnels with acoustic treatment; the noise from the vehicles and fans can be a problem.
PIARC 241
05.05.B - 1999
VI.3.8 Radiocommunications
VI.3.8.1 Travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR
Congrs de Vienne, 1979 [26]
Dans les grands tunnels, les communications radio sont utilises par le personnel du tunnel.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Il est tout fait possible de fournir un systme qui assure les retransmissions radio lintrieur dun tunnel et la possibilit, pour le personnel de surveillance, de communiquer avec les automobilistes. Quelques limitations existent, notamment du point de vue linguistique, technique et lgal.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
Les signaux radio peuvent tre fournis par des cbles metteurs ou des antennes (tunnels courts). Des panneaux peuvent informer les conducteurs sur les frquences couter.
Rapport AIPCR 1995 [96]
Le premier objectif dune retransmission des radiocommunications est la scurit, le deuxime est daccrotre le confort de lautomobiliste. La diffusion radio dans le tunnel permettra lexploitant ou lquipe de secours de donner des instructions aux automobilistes lors dune urgence.
AIPCR 242
05.05.B - 1999
It is feasible to provide a system which will ensure the retransmission of radio inside a tunnel and the capability for control personnel to communicate with motorists. Some limitations exist due to language, technical and legal issues.
Radio signals can be provided by radiating cables or antennas (short tunnels). Signs should provide drivers with information regarding frequencies.
The first goal of radio rebroadcast is safety and the second goal is to increase the motorists comfort. Radio rebroadcast in tunnels will enable the tunnel operator or the rescue team to give instructions to the motorists during an emergency.
Austria All tunnels longer than 1000 m or tunnels with heavy traffic have radio communication providing continuous reception for the traffic information channel. If possible, a service that relays messages to drivers from the control room should be provided.
PIARC 243
05.05.B - 1999
France Dans les tunnels de plus de 800 m, il faut obligatoirement avoir un systme permettant les communications entre tous les services durgence lintrieur du tunnel et avec leurs QG. Lorsque des stations radio grand public sont retransmises, il faut pouvoir les interrompre pour diffuser des messages durgence, condition qu'il existe un centre de contrle avec prsence humaine. Allemagne Tous les tunnels de plus de 1 000 m doivent possder leur systme de radiocommunications. Japon Des appareils de retransmission radio sont installs dans les tunnels de plus de 10 000 m dans certaines circonstances.
Pays-Bas Les systmes de retransmission radio sont recommands. Norvge En Norvge, les tunnels recevant un trafic moyen journalier annuel (TMJA) suprieur 5 000 et les tunnels de plus de 2 500 m doivent tre dots de systmes de radiocommunications. Royaume-Uni Tous les tunnels sont munis dinstallations de retransmission radio pour tous les services de secours. Rien nest prvu pour les radios commerciales ou les tlphones mobiles, sauf exception : les tunnels de Mersey sont quips d'une retransmission pour tlphones mobiles. tats-Unis La plupart des tunnels routiers amricains sont quips de systmes de retransmission radio.
VI.3.8.3 Recommandations
Un systme de radiocommunications est recommand dans les tunnels importants (de grande longueur ou circulation dense). La premire priorit est de permettre les communications des services de secours et de lexploitant. La retransmission des radios commerciales donne la possibilit, en cas durgence, de transmettre des messages de scurit aux automobilistes. Cependant, certaines difficults doivent tre prises en compte :
lusage dune seule langue peut causer des problmes aux trangers ; seuls les conducteurs dots dune radio et, parmi eux, seuls ceux qui l'ont allume et ont slectionn les bonnes stations peuvent entendre les messages de scurit ; dans certains pays, lutilisation de la radio sous cette forme peut prsenter un problme juridique.
AIPCR 244
05.05.B - 1999
France In tunnels longer than 800 m, a system is compulsory to ensure the communication of all emergency services inside the tunnel and with their headquarters. When radio channels are rebroadcast for the general public, it must be possible to interrupt them to give emergency messages, provided that there is a manned control centre. Germany: in Germany all tunnels longer than about 1000m have a radio communi-cation system. Japan: radio rebroadcast apparatus is installed in tunnels longer than 10000 m in special circumstances.
Figure 6.7 - Equipment in a tunnel in France,including safety recess with telephone and extinguishers (on the left) and radio leaky feeder (on the top of the right sidewall)
Figure 6.7 - quipements d'un tunnel franais, comprenant une niche de secours avec tlphone et extincteurs ( gauche) et un cble de retransmission (en haut droite du pidroit)
Norway: in Norway, tunnels with Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) over 5000 or tunnels longer than 2500 m have radio communication systems. United Kingdom: radio rebroadcast facilities for all emergency services are provided in all tunnels. There is no provision for commercial radio or mobile phones except in special cases, e.g. Mersey Tunnels have mobile phones transmitters. United States: radio rebroadcast systems are installed in many road tunnels in the United States.
VI.3.8.3 Recommendations
A radio communication system is recommended in important tunnels (long or with much traffic). The first priority is to allow the communication of the emergency and operation services. Rebroadcasting commercial radios gives the opportunity to pass on safety messages to the motorists in case of an emergency. However, the following difficulties must be taken into account:
the use of a single language makes it difficult for foreigners; only drivers who have a radio have switched it on and set to the proper channels can listen to the safety messages; in some countries the use of radio in this form may present a legal problem.
PIARC 245
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Comment les conducteurs et les passagers de voitures et dautobus ragiront-ils en cas dincendie ou daccident ? Tenteront-ils de schapper pied ou essaieront-ils de fuir avec leur vhicule ? Sils choisissent de fuir pied, utiliseront-ils les sorties de secours ou quitteront-ils le tunnel par lune de ses ttes ? Dans la panique, penseront-ils utiliser les abris (ou refuges) ? Comment les exploitants du tunnel peuvent-ils les aider atteindre l'air libre ou les endroits srs du tunnel ?
Les rponses certaines de ces questions doivent tre trouves pour rendre les tunnels aussi srs que possible. Aujourdhui, de nombreux pays investissent beaucoup pour accrotre la scurit dans les tunnels routiers, mais rien ne leur prouve que ces investissements sont rentables, ni quils font le meilleur usage des moyens engags. Divers quipements et stratgies de secours ont t dvelopps et utiliss en pratique. Un autre domaine intressant de recherche serait de recueillir et dvaluer les expriences en la matire.
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Another need is to find better means to communicate with motorists during an emergency and let them know whether they should leave their cars, which evacuation route they should use, etc. Even more interesting is behavioural research. We need to know more about many aspects of people behaviour during an emergency:
How will drivers and passengers in cars and buses react to fires and other accidents? Will they evacuate the tunnel on foot or try to turn their car and drive out? If on foot, will they use the emergency exits or walk in the tunnel towards the portal? Will people, often in panic, use shelters (or safety boxes)? How can tunnel operators help them to reach the open or safe places in the tunnel?
These are some questions that should be answered to make tunnels as safe as possible. Today many countries invest large sums to increase the safety in road tunnels, but they are not sure that the investments have a favourable benefit/cost ratio and they make the best possible use of the money invested. Different kinds of equipment and rescue strategies have been developed and used in practice. Another research field of great interest would be to collect and evaluate experiences with these different types of equipment and rescue strategies.
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la raction au feu dun matriau est reprsente par sa capacit participer lincendie auquel il est soumis, y compris par sa propre dcomposition (par exemple, combustion) ; la rsistance au feu dune structure ou dun quipement caractrise sa capacit continuer remplir sa fonction en dpit du dveloppement d'un incendie.
Le prsent chapitre fournit des informations et des recommandations sur les deux sujets. Il est bien sr intimement li au chapitre II qui traite des incendies de dimensionnement. Le concepteur dun tunnel doit acqurir une connaissance des critres dincendie remplir par les structures et les quipements, pour pouvoir satisfaire aux exigences pratiques et de scurit. Ce chapitre peut galement apporter des informations aux gestionnaires de tunnels dans le domaine de lentretien et de la matrise des grandes catastrophes. Enfin, les services de secours pourront aussi en tirer des informations intressantes sur le comportement des structures de gnie civil et des quipements en cas dincendie, et ajuster en consquence leurs mthodes de lutte contre les incendies. La rsistance au feu des ventilateurs utiliss pour la ventilation des tunnels a dj t voque au chapitre V ( V.7.3 et V.8.4, et annexe au chapitre V).
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the reaction to fire of a material characterises its ability to take part in a fire to which it is exposed, including by its own decomposition (e.g. combustion);
the resistance to fire of a structure or a piece of equipment characterises its ability to keep on fulfilling its function despite the development of a fire.
This section provides information and recommendations on both these subjects. It is of course linked to the design fires studied under section II. The designer of a tunnel should gain insight into the fire criteria to be fulfilled by civil engineering structures and equipment in order to comply with the safety and practical requirements. Tunnel managers too can gain information from this section in the area of maintenance and the control of major disasters. Finally, the emergency service departments will also be able to obtain useful information on the behaviour of the civil engineering structure and the equipment in the event of fire, and adjust their fire-fighting response accordingly. The fire resistance of the fans used for tunnel ventilation are dealt with in section V ( V.7.3 and V.8.4, and appendix to section V).
Most recommendations appear in the reports of the Committee to the successive World Road Congresses.
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la temprature et sa variation dans le temps sont les seuls critres dterminants pour la rsistance dune structure lincendie ; pour la rsistance au feu des lments porteurs, les caractristiques de rsistance des matriaux employs sont dune importance dcisive ; quelques exemples sont donns ; les rsultats d'essais autrichiens sur de petits incendies sont prsents ; les tempratures dans les gaines dair vici sont prises en compte ; des recommandations sont donnes sur les lments de construction, les quipements lectriques et mcaniques, et sur la dtection et la lutte contre les incendies.
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the temperature and its development is the only criterion for structural fire resistance; the temperature strength characteristics of the materials of the structural elements are of decisive importance. Some examples are given; the results of an Austrian test with a small fire are shown; temperatures in the exhaust air duct are considered; recommendations for structural, electrical and mechanical equipment, fire detection and fire-fighting are given.
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la premire, et la plus grave, est la propagation de lincendie par le matriau en feu ; bien sr, il nest pas possible dviter tout dgt au tunnel proximit dun incendie ; il est cependant impratif dviter que les matriaux, en brlant, ne propagent un incendie localis vers une autre partie du tunnel ; une autre consquence dangereuse est laugmentation de la production de chaleur due au matriau en combustion : les matriaux ne doivent pas produire une forte quantit de chaleur lorsquils brlent ; mme si un matriau ne propage pas lincendie, ni ne produit trop de chaleur, il peut gnrer des fumes dangereuses lorsquil brle ou est expos la chaleur, et peut ainsi faire peser des menaces sur les personnes prsentes dans le tunnel, cest-dire les usagers et les quipes de secours, sur la structure du tunnel (corrosion chimique) et sur lenvironnement.
Les consquences sur les personnes et la structure seront traites dans les deux prochains paragraphes. Celles sur lenvironnement ne sont gnralement pas prises en compte ; les exigences en la matire sont en effet faibles, car un incendie est un vnement rare, et il y a peu de diffrence pour lenvironnement si lincendie se dclare dans un tunnel ou lair libre. Les deux derniers paragraphes sont consacrs des matriaux particuliers : matriaux de chausse et peintures.
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the first and worst one is the spreading of fire by the burning material: of course it is not possible to avoid any damage to the tunnel in the vicinity of a serious fire, however, it is imperative that no tunnel material can burn in such a way that it brings a local fire to other parts of the tunnel; another possible dangerous consequence is that the material combustion strongly increases the heat output of the fire: tunnel materials must not be able to produce a significant amount of heat if they burn; even if the material does not spread the fire nor produce much heat, it may generate dangerous smoke when burning or strongly heated. This can raise several threats: to the people present in the tunnel, i.e. evacuating users and rescue teams, to the tunnel structure by chemical corrosion, and to the environment.
The threats to people and the structure will be examined in the next two paragraphs. The consequences for the environment are generally not considered, because the corresponding requirements are lower, taking into account that a fire is a rare and unwanted event and it does not make much difference for the environment if the same fire takes place in a tunnel rather than in the open. The last two paragraphs are devoted to particular materials: those used for the road construction, and paints.
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En Norvge, par exemple, le polyurthanne a t, jusqu fort rcemment, utilis comme barrire contre lhumidit dans les tunnels creuss dans la roche. Cependant, des essais dincendie ont montr que ce matriau prsentait un risque inacceptable pour le public et le personnel des services de secours, car il produit des fumes toxiques. A cet gard, il faut galement prter attention lapplication de matriaux de revtement des parois pour larchitectonique, ltanchit ou lclairage. Les spcifications pour ces matriaux doivent comprendre des exigences quant leurs proprits en cas dincendie. Laspect extrieur, la facilit d'entretien et la rsistance la corrosion sont habituellement recherchs, mais pas aussi souvent les proprits vis--vis du feu. Il est indispensable de slectionner un matriau de revtement de parois qui ne soit pas combustible ou, au moins, qui ne propage pas lincendie, ni ne produise de grandes quantits de substances dangereuses lorsquil brle. Les matriaux non combustibles comprennent les cramiques, les panneaux en acier maill, etc. Bien entendu, il faut tenir compte de la quantit de matriaux utiliss. En effet, en raison d'un accroissement possible des cots, il n'y a pas d'interdiction systmatique des matriaux potentiellement dangereux.
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For instance polyurethane was used until very recently for the moisture barriers in rock tunnels in Norway. However, fire tests have shown that this resulted in unacceptable risks for the public and the emergency service personnel, due to the generated poisonous fumes. In this respect, attention must also be drawn on the application of wall-covering materials for architectural, waterproofing or lighting purposes. The specifications set for such materials should also include requirements concerning their properties in the event of a fire. External appearance, maintenance and resistance to corrosion are usually looked at, but not so frequently the properties with respect to fire. It is necessary to choose a wall-covering material which is not combustible or at least will not spread fire nor produce hazardous substances in appreciable quantities when burning. Non-combustible materials include tiles, enamelled steel panels, etc.
Of course, the quantity of material used must be considered. There is no point prohibiting potentially dangerous materials indiscriminately, as this increases the costs unnecessarily.
An example of a corrosive compound which can be produced during a fire is hydrochloric acid (HCl). It is for instance produced by the burning of PVC, a material very often used in power and control cable insulation. Hydrochloric acid is very corrosive and the inhalation of its vapours is dangerous to living creatures. Inhalation has an immediate effect, but the corrosive behaviour of HCl shows its effect on the structures in a longer period. Therefore countries require that cable insulation containing PVC should not be used in tunnel installations. Other countries consider that the only important condition is that the cables should not spread fire: if they meet this criteria, the quantity of HCl released by the cables local combustion is deemed to be negligible compared to the corrosive gases released by the vehicle which burns. It is also not advisable to use coatings which form corrosive vapours or smoke in the event of a fire. Of course, the amount of the materials to be applied must be considered. The indiscriminate banning of certain materials is not advisable and can result in an unnecessary increase in costs.
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Il faut tout de mme attirer lattention sur les matriaux transports par les usagers. Ces matriaux sont bien videmment hors du contrle du concepteur et de lexploitant du tunnel. Cela signifie que ces derniers ne peuvent prvoir leffet, sur la structure, de la fume et des vapeurs produites par la combustion dun de ces matriaux.
bton de ciment, enrob bitumineux dense classique, enrob drainant, qui est utilis pour stocker leau de pluie sous la surface afin de rduire les claboussures et/ou de rduire le bruit.
Le bton de ciment est le seul qui ne soit pas combustible et qui ne prsente aucune difficult dutilisation dans les tunnels. Lenrob bitumineux classique peut senflammer de trs fortes tempratures. Il produit galement des fumes et des gaz chauds dangereux car la quantit denrob en feu augmente la production de chaleur de lincendie. Cependant, comparativement au feu dorigine, ces productions supplmentaires sont la plupart du temps ignores ; lenrob bitumineux classique peut donc tre utilis. Lenrob drainant nest pas recommand dans les tunnels car une fuite de carburant, que ce soit en conditions normales de circulation ou lors daccidents ou dincendies, sera stocke sous la surface. Ce stockage entranera une plus large propagation de l'incendie, et il faudra plus de temps pour pomper le carburant. Un autre dsavantage de lenrob drainant est le suivant : en cas de fuite, une surface plus importante est atteinte par le liquide, dont les vapeurs, en raison de leur combustion incomplte, risquent de provoquer une explosion l'extrieur de la zone de lincendie. En outre, la structure granulaire de ce type denrob augmente la surface dvaporation.
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A general remark has to be made in relation to the materials passing through the tunnel in the users' vehicles. These materials are outside the control of the tunnel designers and operators. That means as well that no prediction can be made of the effect on the structure of the smoke and vapour produced during a burning of these materials.
cement concrete, common compact asphalt, very open asphalt which is used to store the rain below the road surface in order to reduce the splashing effect on the traffic, and/or to reduce noise.
Of these, cement concrete is the only one which is not combustible and does not raise any question as to its use in tunnels. The normal asphalt can be ignited by a high temperature fire. Some additional dangerous smoke and hot gases will be produced while the amount of burning asphalt will increase the fire burning rate. However, seen in comparison with the initial fire, these additional outputs are most generally ignored, so that normal asphalt can be used in any case. The open asphalt is not advisable in tunnels as a fuel spillage, occurring during normal traffic, accident or fire situations, will be stored below the road surface. The fire area will be spread more by this storage volume, which also takes more time to be removed. Another disadvantage of the open asphalt is the fact that the spillage creates a larger liquid area from which vapours can easily generate an explosion danger outside the direct fire spot due to the not-complete burnt vapours. Besides the larger area, also the granular structure of this type of asphalt enlarges the surface of evaporation.
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permettre lvacuation des usagers, permettre les oprations de secours et de lutte contre lincendie, limiter les dommages sur le gnie civil du tunnel, sur ses quipements et sur les btiments voisins.
Les deux premiers objectifs sont lis la scurit, le troisime la protection de louvrage. Un objectif supplmentaire, fortement li au troisime, est de :
limiter le temps de fermeture la circulation pour les travaux de rfection conscutifs un incendie.
En ce qui concerne le dlai tolr avant la dfaillance de la structure dun tunnel, la manire dont ces objectifs gnraux sont traduits en exigences prcises dpend des consquences dune dfaillance : plus elles sont importantes, plus les exigences seront leves. En consquence, ces exigences dpendent :
du type de tunnel (certains tunnels, comme par exemple, les tunnels immergs, les tunnels urbains peu profonds ou les tunnels dans des sols meubles ou boulants, seront bien plus affects par une rupture localise que dautres, comme les tunnels creuss dans la roche) ; du type de structure et de son rle pour la scurit et la protection des biens (par exemple, la dalle sparant le tunnel dun immeuble proche doit tre mieux protge quune sortie de secours lair libre qui, de toute faon, ne peut pas tre utilise sil y a des tempratures leves son entre) ; du type de circulation autoris dans le tunnel (selon quil ny a que des vhicules particuliers, ou galement des poids lourds, ou aussi des transports de marchandises dangereuses, la courbe temprature-temps utilise pour vrifier la rsistance au feu sera diffrente voir chapitre II-, mais aussi lincendie durera plus longtemps et peut ncessiter une dure plus longue avant rupture).
Lexigence de base est quune rupture localise ne doit pas entraner des effets gnraliss tout le tunnel. Des applications spcifiques de ce principe sont dcrites dans les paragraphes qui suivent, mais, dans tous les cas, il y a deux consquences :
un effondrement en chane doit tre vit, ce qui signifie que la dfaillance dune partie ne doit pas transfrer de sollicitations une partie proche et conduisant la rupture de celle-ci, et ainsi de suite jusqu provoquer une raction en chane ;
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to allow the evacuation of users, to make rescue and fire-fighting operations possible, to limit damage to tunnel structure and equipment, and to surrounding buildings.
The first two objectives relate to safety, the third one to the protection of property. A supplementary objective, strongly linked to the third one, is the following:
to limit the time during which traffic will be disrupted due to the repairs after a fire.
The way these general objectives are translated into precise requirements concerning the accepted time before failure of tunnel structures depends on the consequences of a failure: the larger the consequences, the higher the requirements will be. As a consequence, these requirements will depend on:
the type of tunnel (certain types of tunnels - as e.g. immersed tunnels, shallow urban tunnels or tunnels in soft or running ground - will be much more affected by a local collapse than other ones - as e.g. rock tunnels); the type of structure and its role for safety and protection of property (e.g. the slab separating the tunnel from a nearby building requires a stronger protection than an emergency exit to the open which cannot be used anyway when there are high temperatures at its entry in the tunnel); the type of traffic allowed in the tunnel (if only passenger cars, or also heavy goods vehicles, or also dangerous goods are allowed, the temperature-time curve to be used to check the fire resistance will be different - see section II - but also the duration of the fire will be longer and may require a longer time before failure).
The basic requirement is that a local collapse should not lead to generalised consequences in the tunnel. Specific applications of this principle are described in the following paragraphs, but two consequences apply in all cases:
progressive collapse must be prevented, which means that the failure of a part must not transfer the stress to a nearby part in such a way that this part will fail and transfer the stress farther away, and so on;
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une rupture localise ne doit pas couper un quipement longitudinal essentiel comme une alimentation lectrique ou un cble de communication, une gaine ncessaire lors dun incendie, etc. ; sil nest pas jug ncessaire de protger la totalit de la structure, alors ces quipements doivent tre situs un endroit o ils seront toujours labri, par exemple dans une tranche protge sous le revtement. Les deux paragraphes qui suivent donnent des informations sur la rsistance au feu des diverses structures et sur lcaillage. Des recommandations sont ensuite donnes sur la rsistance au feu de la structure principale et des autres lments de gnie civil.
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a local collapse must not cut off a vital longitudinal system such as an electrical supply or communication cable, a duct necessary during a fire, etc. If it is not deemed necessary to protect the structure, then this vital longitudinal equipment must be located in such a place that it is protected in any case, for instance in an insulated trench under the pavement. The next two paragraphs give information on fire resistance of various structures and spalling. Then recommendations are given on the fire resistance of the main and some other structures.
In a number of other cases, shotcrete support is left visible. It can be reinforced with steel mesh or various kinds of steel or polymer fibres. Further work is necessary to gain better knowledge in the fire behaviour of such materials.
Better known is reinforced concrete which is used in TBM driven tunnels, cut-and-covers, immersed structures, etc. Due to the high intensity of the heat generated during a major fire, the reinforced concrete used in tunnel structures can lose its supporting function. The strength of the reinforced concrete largely depends on the temperature. This material quickly loses its strength at a temperature of 400C. The high-grade steel in particular has a poor temperature characteristic. The increase in temperature of the reinforcement is delayed by the concrete cover. In the past, it was common practice to have a rather thick (up to 5 cm) of concrete cover in combination with low-grade types of steel. At present, most often high-grade steel with a thinner cover of concrete is applied. Both facts, namely the thinner cover of concrete and the high-grade of the steel are a disadvantage in the event of a fire.
Prestressed reinforcement can be used for large spans. The prestressing ducts are fitted as low as possible in the structure, which means close to the surface which can be heated by a fire. In all cases, an insulating fire-resistant protection can be applied to prevent early damage to the structure. It is then necessary to consider the fire resistance of the total construction (type and depth of reinforcement/prestressing, additional protection, etc.).
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VII.4.3 caillage
Des carts de temprature et de dilatation l'intrieur du bton et avec larmature ventuelle peuvent provoquer lcaillage du bton, ds que la temprature en surface atteint 200 C. Cela peut tre dangereux pour larmature qui se trouve ainsi plus facilement expose des tempratures leves. Comme indiqu dans le chapitre I ( I.5), lcaillage napparaissant pas avant une temprature et un dlai donns, il ny a gnralement pas de risques pour les usagers en fuite, mais cela peut savrer dangereux pour les pompiers. Bien quil ne puisse tre compltement vit en raison des tempratures leves lors dun incendie, le risque dapparition de lcaillage et ses effets peuvent tre rduits par une protection rsistant au feu. Si aucune protection nest prvue, il y aura invitablement un risque plus lev deffondrement du tunnel en cas dincendie. Le risque dcaillage est accru par les oprations dextinction. Il peut survenir lorsque leau utilise pour lextinction refroidit trop rapidement la structure. Pour plus de dtails, voir le paragraphe VII.5.4 Utilisation des quipements dextinction des incendies.
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VII.4.3 Spalling
Differences in temperature and expansion inside the concrete and with the possible reinforcement can cause a spalling of the concrete. This may start already at a surface temperature of 200 C. It causes a danger for the reinforcement which is more easily exposed to high temperatures. As stated in section I ( I.5), due to the temperature and time needed to start spalling, it will generally not be a danger for evacuating people, but it may be dangerous for firemen.
A fire-resistant protection can be used to reduce the risk and the effects of spalling, although it never can be completely prevented due to the occurring high temperatures. If no protection is installed, this will automatically result in a higher risk of tunnel collapsing in the event of a fire. The danger of spalling is increased by the fire-extinguishing activities. It may occur when the water used for fire-fighting cools down the structure too quickly. For more details on this subject please refer to paragraph VII.5.4 "Use of the fire extinguishing equipment".
VII.4.4 Fire resistance of the main structure according to the type of tunnel
Immersed tunnels versus land tunnels
A distinction must be made between immersed tunnels (under water) and land tunnels (under land). In an immersed tunnel, a local collapse can cause the whole tunnel to be flooded with catastrophic consequences on people and construction. As such a tunnel is generally built of reinforced concrete, it will not be possible to repair it after a collapse, or if it is possible, it will take a lot of time and money. The additional economic loss of the lack of availability of the tunnel connection for a long period of time is very large. As a consequence, a complete protection is advisable during the total time of the worst fire. It is recommendable to install a fireresistant insulation on those parts of the structure where the reinforcement is under strain of tension, the ceiling and a section at the top of the wall. The cost of such installation is around 50 euros/m2.
In a land tunnel, a local collapse will generally have much smaller consequences on safety and property. It will often be repaired more easily and in a shorter time so that a more limited fire resistance can be sufficient.
However, a number of land tunnels can lead to consequences similar to an immersed tunnel should a local collapse occur. For example, the collapse of a tunnel in soft or running ground conditions with a high water table can be disastrous in terms of evacuation of people. Similarly shallow tunnels in urban situations, where their collapse can also affect and endanger overlying services and structures to a significant degree, also deserve high precautions.
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In most excavated tunnels, a local collapse of the main structure will not have a major impact on safety, provided that vital longitudinal systems are located so that they are protected in any circumstances. However, a repair or replacement of parts of driven tunnels is often very difficult, due to the deep positions of these tunnels, but it is not impossible. It strongly depends on the soil conditions. Situations could arise in which, as a result of ground water penetration filling the tunnel, repair from the outside is essential. This leads to an extremely long repair time, and therefore high costs. The fire protection must be adapted to these stakes.
Rock tunnels
In rock tunnels, the risk of a total collapse is very low, but the fact that parts of the vault can fall down should be considered. This can constitute a danger to the people and equipment present in the tunnel, such as emergency service personnel and their equipment. However, nobody can normally survive near a place where the temperature is high enough to cause a collapse: the main risk is that important safety facilities such as supply or communication cables are cut off, which means that these should be protected. What has been stated above about immersed tunnels does not apply to underwater tunnels built in rock, such as the undersea tunnels in Norway and Japan. Such structures behave as rock tunnels as described in this paragraph.
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Il est donc ncessaire dexaminer les consquences dune rupture localise de gaine en cas dincendie. Lorsque les consquences peuvent tre srieuses, telles que la perte de contrle du courant d'air longitudinal ou l'interruption de l'alimentation dair frais dans une partie du tunnel o cela est indispensable, la gaine doit tre protge durant la priode ncessaire aux oprations de secours et de lutte contre lincendie. Dans dautres cas, par exemple lorsque le seul risque d'une rupture localise est de faciliter l'entranement de la fume dans une gaine, aucune mesure spciale nest ncessaire en termes de scurit (sil ny a aucun risque d'effondrement en chane). La dure d'interruption de la circulation ncessaire aux rparations aprs un incendie important peut cependant justifier une protection. Quand les gaines de ventilation sont situes sous la chausse, la situation est plus favorable quant la rsistance lincendie, puisque la dalle est moins expose lincendie. Cependant, cette conception prsente aussi des inconvnients comme le poids des vhicules et les dangers prsents par les substances inflammables et/ou explosives sinfiltrant dans les gaines de ventilation. Si lincendie se propage aux gaines de ventilation, ou si une explosion a lieu dans une gaine, les effets seront catastrophiques. Les aspects de scurit doivent tre intgrs dans le processus de dimensionnement le plus en amont possible, de telle manire que les risques soient dj pris en compte dans les tudes prliminaires. En tenant compte des aspects de scurit lis aux incendies ds le choix du type de tunnel et des quipements, beaucoup de temps et dargent ne seront pas investis a posteriori pour amliorer la scurit.
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Therefore it is necessary to examine the consequences of a local collapsing of a duct in case of fire. Whenever the consequences may be serious, such as the loss of control of the longitudinal airflow or the disruption of fresh air supply in a tunnel part where it is necessary, the duct should be protected for the time necessary for rescue and fire-fighting operations. In other cases, for instance when the only risk is to enlarge the smoke extraction opening to an exhaust duct by a local collapse, no special measure is necessary for safety (provided that there is no risk of progressive collapse). The duration of traffic disruption necessary for the repairs after a major fire may, however, justify a protection.
When the ventilation ducts are located under the road surface, the situation is better concerning the fire resistance, as the separation is not so much exposed to fire. However, there are also disadvantages attached to this design, such as traffic load, and the danger caused by flammable and/or explosive substances seeping into the ventilation ducts. If the fire spreads into the ventilation ducts, or an explosion occurs in this duct, the effects may be disastrous.
Safety considerations should be integrated in the design process at an early project phase, so that such risks are already taken into account in the preliminary design. By considering these fire and safety aspects while determining the tunnel type and systems in an early stage, a lot of time and money will not be spent in a later phase to change these principles in order to improve the tunnel safety.
Protection of escape routes means that the air in the route has to be free of smoke and other toxic products generated by the fire or accident. In addition, the temperature inside this area must not be too high. The structure must not be affected by the situation (major accident, fire, high temperatures) which may exist inside the tunnel itself.
VII.4.7 Suspending structures and other systems attached to the ceiling or walls
Use of plugs and anchors
All the fittings used for the fixing of equipment to the structures should be considered in relation to the fire situation. This means that use of the usual plastic plugs and similar devices should be prohibited. This material will either soften or melt at high temperatures, resulting in falling down of the equipment. This can even occur at places which are not directly exposed to the flames. Further research will have to demonstrate to what extent special plastic is suitable for fixing equipment inside the tunnel.
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Le comportement des chevilles en acier et des ancrages doit aussi tre contrl en situation dincendie. La rsistance la traction diminue haute temprature. Le calcul des ancrages doit tre fond sur les tempratures maximales auxquelles lancrage doit continuer se comporter correctement. Une distinction doit tre tablie entre les quipements majeurs, qui doivent continuer fonctionner en cas durgence, et les quipements dont le fonctionnement nest pas indispensable pendant ou aprs une catastrophe importante. Dans tous les cas, comme indiqu au chapitre I ( I.5), lexigence minimale est que les gros quipements ne doivent pas tomber lors de lvacuation des usagers ou lorsque le personnel de secours est encore dans le tunnel. Cela signifie quaucun quipement lourd ne doit tomber en dessous de tempratures de 400 - 450 C durant le temps requis pour la lutte contre l'incendie (dans un tunnel, de telles tempratures produisent un niveau de rayonnement de 5 kW/m, ce qui est le maximum tolrable pour les pompiers).
Usage de laluminium
Comme laluminium perd sa rsistance une temprature d'environ 550 C, il est recommand denvisager son utilisation avec prudence. Les matriaux de remplacement sont lacier ou lacier inoxydable.
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Also steel plugs and anchors should be checked for their behaviour during a fire situation. The tensile stress reduces at high temperatures. The calculation of these anchors should be based on the maximum temperatures at which the anchoring should be still properly working. A distinction must be made between major equipment, which should remain in function during an emergency situation, and equipment whose functions may not be needed during or after a major disaster. In all cases, as stated in section I ( I.5), the minimum requirement is that heavy equipment should not fall down when evacuating users or rescue personnel are in the tunnel. This means that no heavy item must fall under exposure to temperatures of 400 - 450 C during the time necessary to fight fire (in a tunnel, such temperatures can produce a radiation level of about 5 kW/m, which is the maximum tolerable value for firemen).
Use of aluminium
As aluminium loses its strength at a temperature of approximately 550C, it is recommended to carefully consider the use of aluminium materials in a tunnel critically. Alternative materials are steel or stainless steel.
Two types of doors can be used, the slide-type and the swing-type.
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Lun des inconvnients dune porte battante est sa sensibilit la surpression lintrieur de litinraire dvacuation. Si la pression est trop forte, la porte est dure ouvrir, ou bien peut prsenter un risque pour la personne qui cherche louvrir. Ce type de porte gnera toujours partiellement le passage. La porte coulissante prsente moins dinconvnients : elle est plus facile ouvrir en cas de surpression et ne provoque pas de blocage de litinraire dvacuation. Ce type de portes a t test aux Pays-Bas en conditions combines de rsistance au feu et de surpression ; il en rsulte que ces portes sont appropries et sont moins sensibles la surpression. Elles sont, entre autres, utilises au Japon et aux Pays-Bas dans certains tunnels et sont recommandes dans les nouveaux tunnels. Aprs ouverture, les portes doivent se refermer automatiquement afin dempcher lair pollu de pntrer lintrieur de litinraire dvacuation.
Dans dautres pays, lorsque les niches de scurit ne sont pas utilises comme passage vers un itinraire dvacuation, aucune exigence en matire de rsistance au feu nest impose puisque la niche ne sera pas utilise si elle est proche de lincendie.
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A disadvantage of the swing door is its sensitivity to the level of the overpressure inside the escape corridor. If this pressure is too high the door is difficult to open, or can be dangerous towards the person who tries to open the door. This type of door will always block a part of the passage. The slide door has less disadvantages, is easier to open in relation to the overpressure and causes no blockage of the escape route. These slide doors have been tested in the Netherlands for the combined conditions of fire resistance and overpressure, and were found to be suitable and less sensitive to the overpressure. Among others slide doors have been used in Japan and the Netherlands in some tunnels and are recommended in the new ones. After opening, the doors must close automatically, in order to prevent polluted air from entering into the escape corridor.
In the Netherlands an emergency cabinet, housing a fire hydrant, fire extinguisher and alarm push button is positioned in the concrete wall between the traffic tube and an escape corridor. The front of this cabinet is fitted with a glass door to make it easier for the public to recognise and use the fire extinguishers. The type of glass should be considered in relation to the fire resistance and safety. It can be assumed that in case a cabinet is close to the fire it will not be used, hence there is no need to use fire-resistant glass. As its wall separates the cabinet from the escape corridor, the fireproof requirement of the wall between the tunnel tube and the escape corridor has to be fulfilled with an additional fireproof lining behind the emergency cabinet. A fire cross-over must be prevented. In other countries, when the emergency recesses are not used as a passage to an escape route, there is no fire resistance requirement for the same reason as above: the cabinet will not be used if it is close to the fire.
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une planification en amont est ncessaire pour tablir des consignes claires en cas dincendie, que ce soit pour les responsables de lexploitation du tunnel ou pour les services de secours ; il est indispensable que la coordination entre les diffrentes interventions de secours se mette en place le plus rapidement possible ; les directives doivent tre prtes avant la mise en service dun tunnel et mises jour la suite des enseignements tirs d'exercices et dincidents rels.
Les actions prioritaires, indiques en [18], qui forment la base des plans de gestion de lintervention en cas dincendie, sont :
la sauvegarde des vies humaines, lintervention la plus rapide possible des services de secours sur les lieux, la mise en place dune coordination efficace entre les diffrents services de secours (pompiers, police, personnel dexploitation du tunnel, etc.), le maintien des communications entre la salle de contrle et le lieu de laccident.
Les consignes doivent tenir compte du systme de ventilation, mais aussi des caractristiques du tunnel : longueur, circulation uni- ou bidirectionnelle, systme de ventilation, nature des installations dalarme et de secours, situation en zone urbaine ou rurale, existence dun poste de commande, difficults daccs et dintervention des secours.
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More specifically, the report of the Committee on Road Tunnels [18] presented guidelines for the preparation of instructions on how to deal with fire. The major points made were as follows:
advance planning is required to create clear instructions on how to deal with a fire for those responsible for the operation of the tunnel, including emergency services; these plans must ensure that co-ordination of the various emergency responses takes place in the shortest time; instructions should be prepared before commissioning the tunnel and amended in the light of lessons learned during trial exercises and actual incidents.
Priority actions, noted in reference [18], and which must form the basis of emergency response plans, must be:
to save human lives, to ensure the rapid intervention of emergency services at the scene of the fire, to create the smoothest possible co-ordination between the various emergency services (firemen, police, tunnel operation staff...), to maintain communications between the control room and scene of the accident.
Instructions must take into account the method of ventilation and the characteristics of the tunnel e.g. length, one-way or two-way traffic, ventilation system, nature of the alarm and emergency equipment, urban or rural location, existence of a control room, problems of access and difficulties for the intervention of emergency services.
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Des essais et des exercices doivent tre conduits pour tester le plan de gestion de lintervention. Le rapport [18] fournit quelques suggestions quant aux procdures adopter.
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To test the plan, fire tests and trial exercises should be carried out. Reference [18] provides some suggestions for the procedures to be adopted.
Lighting is set to maximum levels, staff must inform the police, the fire emergency service, the safety team responsible for assisting with means of heavy rescue and if necessary, personnel working inside the tunnel (technical rooms, ducts, tunnel). The ventilation system must be automatically started up according to pre-planned procedures. Later manual control can be used if this can provide better evacuation or fire-fighting conditions in the tunnel. Specific instructions for various fire scenarios must be available in the tunnel technical rooms.
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Actions supplmentaires
En plus des actions de base cites auparavant, d'autres actions sont ncessaires. Leur ordre de priorit dpendra du type dincident et des caractristiques du tunnel, de son exploitation et de son environnement.
Pendant lincident
Le personnel doit pouvoir oprer dans une zone libre de toute fume. Personne ne doit voluer dans le tunnel sans que le responsable du contrle nait vrifi les conditions de circulation et denfumage. Le poste de contrle doit rester libre, except pour le personnel impliqu dans les oprations. Aux points de contrle des entres, une voie libre doit tre conserve, ainsi que des voies daccs pour permettre aux vhicules de secours de rouler ventuellement contresens. Le responsable du contrle de la circulation doit suivre l'volution de lincident sur les crans de tlvision, estimer la nature et la gravit de lincident, et prendre les mesures appropries. Du personnel supplmentaire de police et d'entretien doit se tenir prt intervenir si ncessaire. Le gestionnaire du tunnel doit tre tenu inform. Un service de restauration doit tre prvu pendant toute la dure des interventions. Le responsable du contrle de la circulation doit donner au personnel les instructions ncessaires pour aider lvacuation des usagers. Le personnel doit s'assurer que les cls de contact sont restes dans les vhicules et que les portes sont closes, mais non verrouilles. Si besoin, un message dvacuation doit tre radiodiffus.
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Unmanned Tunnel
The above remarks imply that the tunnel is manned and suitable surveillance systems are available. In the event of an unmanned tunnel then reliance will have to be placed on members of the public to report the occurrence of incidents. As a minimum, the tunnel should have emergency stations without remote control but with telephone and rudimentary fire-fighting equipment. Clear instructions as to the emergency procedures should be provided, including telephone numbers and order of priorities.
Additional Actions
In addition to the basic actions set out above, the additional actions listed below may be necessary. Their order of priority will depend on the type of incident and the characteristics of the tunnel, its operation and environment.
Ensure investigating personnel proceed into the tunnel in smoke free area and not into dense smoke. Ensure that nobody proceeds into the tunnel without first receiving assurances from the traffic controller regarding traffic and smoke. Maintain control point clear except for personnel involved in the operation of the incident. Instruct the portal control points to maintain a "clearway" including crossover lanes for possible contra-flow for emergency vehicles. The traffic controller will monitor the incident on the TV monitors and assess the nature and seriousness of the incident, and take further action as appropriate. Arrange for additional uniformed and maintenance staff as considered necessary to report for duty. Advise management. Arrange additional canteen facilities to be available for the duration of the emergency. The Traffic Controller should instruct staff to assist in the evacuation of persons in the tunnel. Advise staff to ensure that ignition keys are left in the cars, doors unlocked but closed. If appropriate broadcast "Evacuate" message.
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Selon la nature et l'ampleur de lincident, les services de secours peuvent demander que soient prvus : a) un endroit pour accueillir les blesss, b) un point de rassemblement pour lvacuation, c) un point de rassemblement des victimes dcdes. La liaison avec les services de secours doit tre maintenue pour les aider dans les soins aux blesss graves.
Un code prcis de fin d'alarme incendie doit tre diffus, par radio, aux responsables de la circulation. Les conducteurs et les passagers doivent tre raccompagns leurs voitures abandonnes sur le lieu de lincident. Il faut mettre en place, selon le cas, une circulation alterne sur une voie restant utilisable ou une circulation contresens dans le tunnel non touch par l'incendie. Ds que les circonstances le permettent, il faut revenir progressivement des conditions normales de circulation. Les informations doivent tre inscrites dans le journal de bord du poste de contrle. Un rapport complet doit ensuite tre prpar et diffus.
dsignation du responsable de lintervention et dfinition des responsabilits des diffrentes quipes ; moyen de transmission le plus rapide de lalarme au poste de commande et information permanente des quipes dintervention sur limportance et la localisation de lincendie, ainsi que sur les possibilits daccs au lieu du sinistre ; dclenchement dun programme automatique ou manuel de gestion de la circulation et dvacuation des vhicules ;
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Depending on the nature and the scale of the incident, the following facilities may be required by the emergency services: a) casualty collection point, b) evacuation assembly point, c) mortuary collection point. Maintain liaison with emergency services to assist in dealing with the injured persons.
Broadcast in internal fire alarm clear code by radio to traffic officers. Guide the drivers and passengers to abandoned cars at the scene of the incident. Establish tidal-flow in unaffected lane or contra-flow in the unaffected tunnel, as appropriate. As and when circumstances permit progressively return to normal traffic flow. Enter details in control point log. Prepare and submit full report.
appointment of the person in charge of the intervention, and description of the respective responsibilities of the various teams; quickest means of transmitting alarms to the control room and reliable information to the intervention teams regarding the severity and location of the fire and the possibilities for gaining access to its location; start-up of the automatic or manual programme to manage the traffic and evacuate the vehicles;
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mise en marche automatique du rgime appropri de dsenfumage dans la phase initiale en tant que partie intgrante des consignes ; d'autres scnarios de fonctionnement de la ventilation peuvent tre mis en place par la personne de permanence, en fonction de la spcificit de lurgence et de ce qui apparat comme la meilleure faon de matriser la fume aussi rapidement que possible ; confirmation du droulement convenu des oprations de secours suivant un plan labor aprs des exercices dincendie dans le tunnel avec la participation de toutes les quipes dintervention ; les consignes doivent tre simples, faciles lire et mmoriser ; elles sont destines au personnel de lexploitation et des services de secours, et peuvent tre compltes par des tableaux affichs ; des instructions destines aux usagers sur la conduite tenir en cas dincendie devraient tre prpares, soit sous forme de messages rdigs lavance et destins aux rponses par tlphone, soit sous forme de messages prenregistrs diffuser par le systme radio du tunnel.
Lexigence la plus importante pour une gestion russie des urgences est l'entranement rgulier du personnel concern, ce qui permet de perfectionner le plan de gestion. Lorganisation dessais dincendie reprsente une part importante de cette formation.
Mthode dessai
Les essais doivent tre mens selon le mode opratoire d'urgence spcifique au tunnel ; cela inclut la dsignation d'un responsable gnral de la coordination des interventions. Les pompiers doivent tre prts matriser l'incendie avec les quipements disponibles aux points de secours. Une motopompe doit tre galement disponible en cas de dfaillance des quipements du tunnel ou de la procdure durant les essais. L'instrumentation doit comprendre la mesure de la vitesse de l'air, la mesure de la temprature 5 m, 10 m, 20 m, 50 m et 100 m de l'incendie dans les deux directions au niveau de la chausse, 1,5 m au-dessus de la chausse, et au niveau des cbles d'clairage et des autres quipements vulnrables dans les 3 m suprieurs de la section transversale. La temprature ambiante et la vitesse de l'air doivent tre mesures avant et aprs l'essai. Les donnes de temprature et les mesures fournies par les capteurs habituels du tunnel de CO doivent tre enregistres pendant toute la dure de l'essai. Il faut galement prendre des photographies, raliser un reportage vido ou tout autre enregistrement du dveloppement de la fume.
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start-up of the appropriate automatic smoke control ventilation regime at the initial stage, to be made part of the standing instructions. Alternative operational modes of the system can be implemented by the operator in the light of the specific emergency and what is deemed to be a more appropriate manual response to achieve smoke control as quickly as possible; confirmation of the agreed emergency operation sequences according to schedules set up after fire trials in the tunnel with the participation of all intervention teams; the text of the instructions must be simple, easy to read and remember. They must be aimed at the operation and emergency response staff, and may be supplemented by display panels. Instructions to the users about appropriate behaviour in case of fire should be prepared either as messages written in advance and used in telephone responses or as pre-recorded messages to be broadcast by the tunnel radio system in case of fire.
The most important requirement for successful emergency response is regular training of relevant staff and the subsequent refinement of the response plan. An important part of this training is the organisation of fire tests.
This section discusses in detail the tests to verify the smoke control procedures. Complementary recommendations appear in section IV ( IV.3.2).
Test method
Tests should be conducted using the draft emergency operating procedure for the tunnel which will include appointing somebody with the overall responsibility for co-ordinating the intervention. Firemen should be ready to control the fire using the equipment available at the tunnel emergency points. A fire appliance should also be in attendance in case of any failure of the tunnel equipment or procedures during the tests. Instrumentation should include air velocity measurement, temperature measurement at 5 m, 10 m, 20 m, 50 m and 100 m from the fire in both directions at the road level, at 1.5 m above the road and at the level of lighting cables or other vulnerable equipment in the top 3 m of the tunnel cross-section. Ambient temperature and air velocity should be measured before and after the test. Temperature data and the output from the tunnel normal CO, smoke and air velocity measuring equipment should be continuously recorded during the test. Photographic and video or other recording of the smoke development should be made.
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en faisant brler un mlange de 25 l d'essence, 5 l de gazole et des morceaux de pneumatiques dans un bac mtallique de 4 m3 plac sur la chausse, en faisant brler une pave de voiture, en faisant brler du gazole ou de l'heptane ; cette solution permet une meilleure rptabilit ; la surface du bac est adapte pour obtenir une puissance thermique acceptable (quelques MW).
D'aprs l'exprience, il est peu probable que les incendies de cette taille provoquent des dgts au tunnel s'ils sont correctement placs par rapport aux quipements vulnrables. Si on utilise une pave de voiture, le rservoir doit tre compltement vid de son carburant et rempli d'eau pour viter une explosion.
Prcautions prendre
Pour protger la chausse, le foyer doit tre plac sur des tles ondules, ou bien sur un lit de sable de 20 cm d'paisseur, ou encore sur des cales et en arrosant la chausse durant l'essai. L'essai doit tre conduit avant que le plafond ou la vote soient peints ou traits du point de vue de l'acoustique. L'exprience a montr que des essais d'incendie de quelques MW n'endommageront pas le plafond si la ventilation fonctionne. Cependant, un grand feu, quivalent un poids lourd, peut provoquer des dgts au plafond. Les pidroits et autres quipements ne seront vraisemblablement pas endommags, mais, titre prventif, on peut recouvrir de plaques les pidroits sur une longueur de 8 m, l'clairage sur 10 m et les cbles sur 20 m.
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by burning a mixture of 25 litres of petrol, 5 litres of gas oil and pieces of car tyre in a 4 m3 steel tank placed on the road surface, by burning an old car, by burning diesel oil or heptane. This solution permits a better repeatability. The tank surface is adapted to obtain an acceptable heat release rate (a few megawatts).
Experience shows that fires of this size are unlikely to damage the tunnel if carefully sited in relation to vulnerable equipment. If an old car is used the petrol tank must be emptied of petrol and must then be filled with water to prevent explosion.
Useful precautions
To protect the carriageway, the fire should be placed on corrugated iron sheets or a 20 cm thick bed of sand or blocks with the carriageway watered during the test. The test should be carried out before the ceiling or vault is painted or any acoustic treatment applied. Fire experience suggests that test fires of a few megawatts will not damage the ceiling provided the ventilation is operated. However, a large fire, equivalent to an HGV, can be expected to damage the ceiling. Sidewall equipment is not likely to be affected, but plastered plates covering the sidewalls for a length of 8 m, the lighting for 10 m and cables for 20 m can be employed as a precaution.
Test report
The test report should record the attending personnel, the object, conditions and method of the tests, the initial condition, instrumentation, description of the development of the fire including the smoke movement, measured data and analysis, evalua-tion of the fire intensity and les-sons to be drawn.
Figure 8.1 - Test of alertness at a tunnel in Norway Figure 8.1 - Exercice dalerte dans un tunnel en Norvge
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IX. REFERENCES
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] BARRAUSKAS ET AL, A new approach to fire toxicity data for hazard evaluation. Fire Journal, March/April 1987. BSI, DD 180 : 1989, Guide for the assessment of toxic hazards in fire in buildings and transport. Draft for development. DANIELSON, Mnniskans fysiska tlighet vid brand, vrmeupplagring. FOA-report C54055, May 1984, Stockholm. ERIKSSEN, Forprosjekt Brannkatastrofer - bedre brannmmingsmodeller. Huvedrapport SINTEF, Trondheim 1991. FARDELL ET AL, A study of life threat in bus fires. Interflam 1993. FUJIMURA ET AL, Practical test of emergency ventilation combined with bus firing at the KanEstu tunnel. 6th international symposium on the aerodynamics and ventilation of vehicle tunnels, September 1988. HYMES, The Physiological And Pathological Effects of Thermal Radiation. Health and Safety Executive, UK, September 1983. ISO/TC 92/SC 3N, 38, Toxic hazards in fire, CD 13344, Determination of the lethal toxic potency of fire effluents.. KLOTE, MILKE, Design of smoke management systems. ASHRAE, 1993. MELAND ET AL, Smoke hazard in offshore platform fires. STF 25 A 91007, SINTEF, Trondheim. ONDRUS, Brandfrlopp. Lund Technical University, 1990. PURSER [1], Interactions between behaviour patterns and physiological impairment in escape from fire. Interflam 1993. PURSER [2], Modelling Toxic and Physical Hazard in Fire. Interflam 1993. PURSER [3], The effects of Fire Products on Escape Capability in Primates and Human Fire Victims. Fire Safety Science, First international symposium 1985. PURSER [4], Modelling Time to Incapacitation and Death from Toxic and Physical Hazard in Aircraft Fires. Aircraft fire safety, Conference, Proceedings No.467, AGARD. STENSAAS, Toxicity, visibility and heat stress of the fire effluents-human tenability limits. SINTEF, Trondheim 1991. th PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XX World Road Congress, Montreal (Canada-Qubec), September 1995 (ref. 20.05.B) / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XXe Congrs mondial de la Route, Montral (Canada-Qubec), septembre 1995 (rf. 20.05.B) PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XIXth World Road Congress, Marrakesh (Morocco), September 1991 (ref. 19.05.B) / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XIXe Congrs mondial de la Route, Marrakech (Maroc), septembre 1991 (rf. 19.05.B) PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XVIIIth World Road Congress, Brussels (Belgium), September 1987 (ref. 18.05.E) / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVIIIe Congrs mondial de la Route, Bruxelles (Belgique), septembre 1987 (rf. 18.05.F). STUDIENGESELLSCHAFT STAHLANWENDUNG E.V. : "EUREKA-Project EU 499 Firetun: Fires in transport tunnels; Report on full-scale tests", Verlag und Vertriebsgesellschaft, Dsseldorf, November 1995 CETU, "Abstracts on breakdowns, accidents and fires in the tunnels: Fourvire (Lyon), Croix Rousse (Lyon), Frjus (Alpes)", Bron (France), 1993 MASSACHUSSETTS HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT AND FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION: "Memorial Tunnel Fire ventilation test program; Test report", (United States), November 1995
[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] [22]
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IX. REFERENCES
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] BARRAUSKAS ET AL, A new approach to fire toxicity data for hazard evaluation. Fire Journal, March/April 1987. BSI, DD 180 : 1989, Guide for the assessment of toxic hazards in fire in buildings and transport. Draft for development. DANIELSON, Mnniskans fysiska tlighet vid brand, vrmeupplagring. FOA-report C54055, May 1984, Stockholm. ERIKSSEN, Forprosjekt Brannkatastrofer - bedre brannmmingsmodeller. Huvedrapport SINTEF, Trondheim 1991. FARDELL ET AL, A study of life threat in bus fires. Interflam 1993. FUJIMURA ET AL, Practical test of emergency ventilation combined with bus firing at the KanEstu tunnel. 6th international symposium on the aerodynamics and ventilation of vehicle tunnels, September 1988. HYMES, The Physiological And Pathological Effects of Thermal Radiation. Health and Safety Executive, UK, September 1983. ISO/TC 92/SC 3N, 38, Toxic hazards in fire, CD 13344, Determination of the lethal toxic potency of fire effluents.. KLOTE, MILKE, Design of smoke management systems. ASHRAE, 1993. MELAND ET AL, Smoke hazard in offshore platform fires. STF 25 A 91007, SINTEF, Trondheim. ONDRUS, Brandfrlopp. Lund Technical University, 1990. PURSER [1], Interactions between behaviour patterns and physiological impairment in escape from fire. Interflam 1993. PURSER [2], Modelling Toxic and Physical Hazard in Fire. Interflam 1993. PURSER [3], The effects of Fire Products on Escape Capability in Primates and Human Fire Victims. Fire Safety Science, First international symposium 1985. PURSER [4], Modelling Time to Incapacitation and Death from Toxic and Physical Hazard in Aircraft Fires. Aircraft fire safety, Conference, Proceedings No.467, AGARD. STENSAAS, Toxicity, visibility and heat stress of the fire effluents-human tenability limits. SINTEF, Trondheim 1991. th PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XX World Road Congress, Montreal (Canada-Qubec), September 1995 (ref. 20.05.B) / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XXe Congrs mondial de la Route, Montral (Canada-Qubec), septembre 1995 (rf. 20.05.B) PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XIXth World Road Congress, Marrakesh (Morocco), September 1991 (ref. 19.05.B) / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XIXe Congrs mondial de la Route, Marrakech (Maroc), septembre 1991 (rf. 19.05.B) PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XVIIIth World Road Congress, Brussels (Belgium), September 1987 (ref. 18.05.E) / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVIIIe Congrs mondial de la Route, Bruxelles (Belgique), septembre 1987 (rf. 18.05.F). STUDIENGESELLSCHAFT STAHLANWENDUNG E.V. : "EUREKA-Project EU 499 Firetun: Fires in transport tunnels; Report on full-scale tests", Verlag und Vertriebsgesellschaft, Dsseldorf, November 1995 CETU, "Abstracts on breakdowns, accidents and fires in the tunnels: Fourvire (Lyon), Croix Rousse (Lyon), Frjus (Alpes)", Bron (France), 1993 MASSACHUSSETTS HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT AND FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION: "Memorial Tunnel Fire ventilation test program; Test report", (United States), November 1995
[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] [22]
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[23]
[27]
[28]
[34] [35]
[36] [37]
PERARD M., BROUSSE B.: "Full size tests before opening two French tunnels", 8th International Conference on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, BHR Group Conference Series, Publication No. 12, Mechanical Engineering Publications Ltd., London, July 1994 HACAR F., ABELLA A., GARCIA-ARANGO I.: "Incendios en tuneles", Ediciones Paraiso S.L., Muoz Degrain, Oviedo (Spain), 1993 SWISS COMMITTEE FOR SAFETY IN ROAD TUNNELS : "Final Report on the Fire Tests in the Ofenegg Tunnel", (Switzerland), 1965. PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XVIth World Road Congress, Vienna (Austria), September 1979 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVIe Congrs mondial de la Route, Vienne (Autriche), septembre 1979 PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XVIIth World Road Congress, Sydney (Australia), October 1983 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVIIe Congrs mondial de la Route, Sydney (Australie), octobre 1983 LACROIX D.: "PIARC Activities on Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels", 8th International Conference on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, BHR Group Conference Series, Publication No. 12, Mechanical Engineering Publications Ltd, London, 1994 PERARD M.: "Statistics on breakdowns, accidents and fires in French road tunnels", First International Conference on Tunnel Incident Management, Korsor (Denmark), May 1996 "Statistics on the traffic in the Elbtunnel from the year 1975 to the year 1992", Baubehrde Hamburg (Germany), Tiefbauamt LACROIX D.: "Smoke control in road tunnels in case of fire - issues and current methods", Revue Gnrale des Routes et des Arodromes, n. 723, November 1994 RUCKSTUHL F.: "Accident statistics and accident risks in tunnels", reports on the OECD-seminar on road tunnel management, p. 346-349, Lugano (Switzerland), November 1990 PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Road Safety in Tunnels", ref. 05.04.B, 1995 / COMIT AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS "Scurit routire dans les tunnels", rf. 05.04.B, 1995 HAACK A.: "Fire protection in traffic tunnels - Initial findings from large-scale tests", Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology, vol. 7, no. 4, p. 363-375, 1992 LINGELSER S.: "Donnes sur les incendies importants de poids lourds dans les tunnels routiers", internal paper of the French Centre d'Etudes des Tunnels and the Direction de la Scurit Civile, Lyon (France), september 1995, not published CETU: "remarks on fire risks", January 1996 MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION, PUBLIC WORK RESEARCH INSTITUTE: "State of the Road Tunnel Equipment Technology in Japan -ventilation, Lighting, Safety Equipment", Technical note, Vol. 61, September 1993 Werkhof Gschenen: Reports on the Gotthard-truck fire from July 5th, 1994 ROTH R.: "Brand eines Lastzuges im Gotthard-Straentunnel", PVT 1995, no. 2, p. 49-53 AMT DER VORARLBERGER LANDESREGIERUNG, DEPT. OF ROAD CONSTRUCTION: "Brandkatastrophe im Pfndertunnel bei Bregenz am 10. April 1995", Bregenz (Austria), May 1995 SOCIETA INIZIATIVE NAZIONALI AUTOSTRADALI (SINA): "Press reports about the fire in the tunnel :Isola delle Femmine", Milano (Italy), April 1996 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI): "Ventilation of Road Tunnels", Netherlands, November 1993 SWEDISH NATIONAL TESTING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE: "Proceedings of the International Conference on Fires in Tunnels", Bras, October 1994
AIPCR 286
05.05.B - 1999
[23]
PERARD M., BROUSSE B.: "Full size tests before opening two French tunnels", 8th International Conference on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, BHR Group Conference Series, Publication No. 12, Mechanical Engineering Publications Ltd., London, July 1994
HACAR F., ABELLA A., GARCIA-ARANGO I.: "Incendios en tuneles", Ediciones Paraiso S.L., Muoz Degrain, Oviedo (Spain), 1993 SWISS COMMITTEE FOR SAFETY IN ROAD TUNNELS : "Final Report on the Fire Tests in the Ofenegg Tunnel", (Switzerland), 1965. PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XVIth World Road Congress, Vienna (Austria), September 1979 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVIe Congrs mondial de la Route, Vienne (Autriche), septembre 1979 PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XVIIth World Road Congress, Sydney (Australia), October 1983 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVIIe Congrs mondial de la Route, Sydney (Australie), octobre 1983 LACROIX D.: "PIARC Activities on Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels", 8th International Conference on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, BHR Group Conference Series, Publication No. 12, Mechanical Engineering Publications Ltd, London, 1994 PERARD M.: "Statistics on breakdowns, accidents and fires in French road tunnels", First International Conference on Tunnel Incident Management, Korsor (Denmark), May 1996 "Statistics on the traffic in the Elbtunnel from the year 1975 to the year 1992", Baubehrde Hamburg (Germany), Tiefbauamt LACROIX D.: "Smoke control in road tunnels in case of fire - issues and current methods", Revue Gnrale des Routes et des Arodromes, n. 723, November 1994 RUCKSTUHL F.: "Accident statistics and accident risks in tunnels", reports on the OECD-seminar on road tunnel management, p. 346-349, Lugano (Switzerland), November 1990 PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Road Safety in Tunnels", ref. 05.04.B, 1995 / COMIT AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS "Scurit routire dans les tunnels", rf. 05.04.B, 1995 HAACK A.: "Fire protection in traffic tunnels - Initial findings from large-scale tests", Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology, vol. 7, no. 4, p. 363-375, 1992 LINGELSER S.: "Donnes sur les incendies importants de poids lourds dans les tunnels routiers", internal paper of the French Centre d'Etudes des Tunnels and the Direction de la Scurit Civile, Lyon (France), september 1995, not published CETU: "remarks on fire risks", January 1996 MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION, PUBLIC WORK RESEARCH INSTITUTE: "State of the Road Tunnel Equipment Technology in Japan -ventilation, Lighting, Safety Equipment", Technical note, Vol. 61, September 1993 Werkhof Gschenen: Reports on the Gotthard-truck fire from July 5th, 1994 ROTH R.: "Brand eines Lastzuges im Gotthard-Straentunnel", PVT 1995, no. 2, p. 49-53 AMT DER VORARLBERGER LANDESREGIERUNG, DEPT. OF ROAD CONSTRUCTION: "Brandkatastrophe im Pfndertunnel bei Bregenz am 10. April 1995", Bregenz (Austria), May 1995 SOCIETA INIZIATIVE NAZIONALI AUTOSTRADALI (SINA): "Press reports about the fire in the tunnel :Isola delle Femmine", Milano (Italy), April 1996 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI): "Ventilation of Road Tunnels", Netherlands, November 1993 SWEDISH NATIONAL TESTING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE: "Proceedings of the International Conference on Fires in Tunnels", Bras, October 1994
[27]
[28]
[34] [35]
[36] [37]
PIARC 287
05.05.B - 1999
[44]
[45]
[49] [50]
[51]
[52]
[63] [64]
BUNDESMINISTERIUM FR BILDUNG, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie, Studiengesellschaft Stahl e.V., iBMB der TU Braunschweig, STUVA e.V.: "Proceedings of the International Conference on Fire Protection in Traffic Tunnels", Dresden, September 1995 BUNDESMINISTER FR VERKEHR: "ZTV-Tunnel - Zustzliche technische Vertragsbedingungen und Richtlinien fr den Bau von Straentunneln, Teil 1: Geschlossene Bauweise (Spritzbetonbauweise)", Bund/Lnder-Fachausschu, Bonn, 1995 EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDISATION : "Eurocode 1: Basis of design and actions on structures, Part 2-2: Actions on structures exposed to fire", ENV 1991-2-2, 1994 LACROIX D.: "Research Advancement in France on Road Tunnel Safety", Conference on Protection from fire of rail and road tunnels, Rome (Italy), June 1996 CHASSE P.: "EUREKA 499 - Caractrisation des feux de vhicules routiers", internal paper of the French Centre d'Etudes des Tunnels and the Direction de la Scurit Civile, Lyon (France), 1995, not published BLUME G.: "Smoke and hot gas movements during tunnel fire tests with realistic fire loads", Tunnel 1995, no. 2, p. 90-99 RICHTLINIEN FR DIE AUSSTATTUNG UND DEN BETRIEB VON STRAENTUNNELN (RABT), "Forschungsgesellschaft fr Straen- und Verkehrswesen", Cologne (Germany), Issue 1994. PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Working Group on Operation-MaintenanceManagement, 'Fire in road tunnels: Protection for civil ingineering structures, electrical circuits and equipment' / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, Groupe de travail Exploitation, Entretien, Gestion , Incendies dans les tunnels Protection du gnie civil, des circuits lectriques et des quipements , Routes/Roads, No. 275, -1991, pages 55-68 LACROIX D.: "PIARC Activities on fire and smoke control in road tunnel", 8th International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, pp. 345-355, Liverpool (UK), July 1994 KOMMISSION FR SICHERHEITS MASSNAHMEN IN STRASSENTUNNELN: "Schlussbericht der Versuche in Ofenegg Tunnel vom 17. bis 31, Mai 1965", (Switzerland), 1965 FEDERAL MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND TECHNOLOGY: "Fire tests in a tunnel, Part 1 and 2", Road Research, Volume 50; (Austria), 1976. BURGESS D.; HERTZBERG M.: "Heat Transfer in Flames", Chapter 27. John Wiley & Sons Publishers, New York , (United States), 1974. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND TECHNOLOGY: "Thermodynamic Investigation of Tunnel Fires", Road Research, Volume 78, (Austria), 1977. PUCHER K.: Fire in the 7 km long Pfnder Tunnel, Lecture given at the International Conference for Tunnel incident management, Korsor (Denmark), May 1996 BRANDAUER R.: Ausbreitung der Schadstoffe bei einem Waggonbrand in einem Tunnel, Diplomarbeit, Institut f. Verbrennungskraftmaschinen u. Thermodynamik, Graz Technical University, 1995 HAERTER A.: "Fire tests in the Ofenegg tunnel in 1965", International Conference on Fires in Tunnels, Bors (Sweden), October 1994 FEIZLMAYR A.H.: "Research in Austria on tunnel fires", 2nd International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, paper J2, 1976 PUBLIC WORKS RESEARCH INSTITUTE: "State of the Road Tunnel Equipment Technology in Japan -ventilation, Lighting, Safety Equipment", Technical note, Vol. 61, September 1993 HAACK A.: "Fire protection in traffic tunnels - Initial recognitions from large-scale tests", First International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Basel (Switzerland), November 1992 LUCHIAN S.F., BENDELIUS A.G.: "West Virginia Memorial Tunnel fire test program", International Conference on Fires in Tunnels, Bors (Sweden), October 1994 CASALE E.: "Heptane fire test in EUREKA 499", 2nd International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels - Seminar on Physical and Numerical Modelling of Fires in Tunnels, Granada (Spain), April, 1995
AIPCR 288
05.05.B - 1999
[44]
[45]
[49] [50]
[51]
[52]
[63] [64]
BUNDESMINISTERIUM FR BILDUNG, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie, Studiengesellschaft Stahl e.V., iBMB der TU Braunschweig, STUVA e.V.: "Proceedings of the International Conference on Fire Protection in Traffic Tunnels", Dresden, September 1995 BUNDESMINISTER FR VERKEHR: "ZTV-Tunnel - Zustzliche technische Vertragsbedingungen und Richtlinien fr den Bau von Straentunneln, Teil 1: Geschlossene Bauweise (Spritzbetonbauweise)", Bund/Lnder-Fachausschu, Bonn, 1995 EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDISATION : "Eurocode 1: Basis of design and actions on structures, Part 2-2: Actions on structures exposed to fire", ENV 1991-2-2, 1994 LACROIX D.: "Research Advancement in France on Road Tunnel Safety", Conference on Protection from fire of rail and road tunnels, Rome (Italy), June 1996 CHASSE P.: "EUREKA 499 - Caractrisation des feux de vhicules routiers", internal paper of the French Centre d'Etudes des Tunnels and the Direction de la Scurit Civile, Lyon (France), 1995, not published BLUME G.: "Smoke and hot gas movements during tunnel fire tests with realistic fire loads", Tunnel 1995, no. 2, p. 90-99 RICHTLINIEN FR DIE AUSSTATTUNG UND DEN BETRIEB VON STRAENTUNNELN (RABT), "Forschungsgesellschaft fr Straen- und Verkehrswesen", Cologne (Germany), Issue 1994. PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Working Group on Operation-MaintenanceManagement, 'Fire in road tunnels: Protection for civil ingineering structures, electrical circuits and equipment' / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, Groupe de travail Exploitation, Entretien, Gestion , Incendies dans les tunnels Protection du gnie civil, des circuits lectriques et des quipements , Routes/Roads, No. 275, -1991, pages 55-68 LACROIX D.: "PIARC Activities on fire and smoke control in road tunnel", 8th International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, pp. 345-355, Liverpool (UK), July 1994 KOMMISSION FR SICHERHEITS MASSNAHMEN IN STRASSENTUNNELN: "Schlussbericht der Versuche in Ofenegg Tunnel vom 17. bis 31, Mai 1965", (Switzerland), 1965 FEDERAL MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND TECHNOLOGY: "Fire tests in a tunnel, Part 1 and 2", Road Research, Volume 50; (Austria), 1976. BURGESS D.; HERTZBERG M.: "Heat Transfer in Flames", Chapter 27. John Wiley & Sons Publishers, New York , (United States), 1974. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND TECHNOLOGY: "Thermodynamic Investigation of Tunnel Fires", Road Research, Volume 78, (Austria), 1977. PUCHER K.: Fire in the 7 km long Pfnder Tunnel, Lecture given at the International Conference for Tunnel incident management, Korsor (Denmark), May 1996 BRANDAUER R.: Ausbreitung der Schadstoffe bei einem Waggonbrand in einem Tunnel, Diplomarbeit, Institut f. Verbrennungskraftmaschinen u. Thermodynamik, Graz Technical University, 1995 HAERTER A.: "Fire tests in the Ofenegg tunnel in 1965", International Conference on Fires in Tunnels, Bors (Sweden), October 1994 FEIZLMAYR A.H.: "Research in Austria on tunnel fires", 2nd International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, paper J2, 1976 PUBLIC WORKS RESEARCH INSTITUTE: "State of the Road Tunnel Equipment Technology in Japan -ventilation, Lighting, Safety Equipment", Technical note, Vol. 61, September 1993 HAACK A.: "Fire protection in traffic tunnels - Initial recognitions from large-scale tests", First International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Basel (Switzerland), November 1992 LUCHIAN S.F., BENDELIUS A.G.: "West Virginia Memorial Tunnel fire test program", International Conference on Fires in Tunnels, Bors (Sweden), October 1994 CASALE E.: "Heptane fire test in EUREKA 499", 2nd International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels - Seminar on Physical and Numerical Modelling of Fires in Tunnels, Granada (Spain), April, 1995
PIARC 289
05.05.B - 1999
[71]
[75]
[76]
[80] [81]
[85] [86]
EUREKA 499 Report: "Fires in transport tunnels, Report on full scale tests", Edited by Studiengesellschaft Stahlanwendung e.V., Dsseldorf, April 1996 PERARD M.: "Organisation of fire tests in an operated road tunnel", First International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Basel (Switzerland), November 1992 CASALE E., MOULET J.M.: "Essais incendie au tunnel du Puymorens", Tunnels et Ouvrages Souterrains, N 127, pp 45-56, January / February 1995 KOSEKI H., HAYASAKA H.: "Estimation of thermal balance in heptane pool fire", J. of Fire Sciences, Vol. 7, pp 237-250, July/August 1989 SCETAUROUTE DTTS: "Essais d'incendie au tunnel de Chamoise - Rapport scientifique", February 1996 (Unpublished) SALAN-PENQUER G., GUILLAUME R., COLLINI P.: "Comportement du Halon 1301 dans les wagons-navettes (feux de siges et feux de chassis)", Rapport d'tudes Env XXXIII pour TRANSMANCHE-LINK, June 1989 LACROIX D., CHASSE P., MULLER T.: "Small scale study of smoke trap door systems", 8th International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Liverpool (UK), pp. 409-438, July 1994 VAUQUELIN O.: "Caractrisation exprimentale de l'apparition d'une nappe de retour", Compte Rendu l'Acadmie des Sciences de Paris, t. 321, Srie II b, pp 15-18, 1995 LACROIX D.: Smoke control in road tunnels in case of fire: issues and current methods research ways, CETU publication, November 1994, March 1995 GUELZIM A., SOUIL J.M., VANTELON J.P., DOAN KIM SON, GABAY D., DALLEST D.: "Modelling of a reverse layer of fire induced smoke in a tunnel", 4th International Symposium on Fire Safety Science, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada), June 1994 SAITO N., YAMADA T., SEKIZAWA A., YANAI E., WATANABE Y., MIYAZAKI S.: "Experimental study on fire behaviour in a wind tunnel with a reduced scale model", 2nd International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Granada (Spain), April 1995 CORDIER H., VAUQUELIN O., BERTRAND E., CASALE E., OUAZZANI J.: "Experimental and numerical study of reduced scale model tunnel fires", First European Symposium on Fire Safety Science, Zrich (Switzerland), August 1995 KUMAR S. & COX G.: "Mathematical modelling of fires in road tunnels", 5th International Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Lille (France), May 1985 BIOLLAY H.: "Projet EUREKA 499: Simulations numriques de lessai dheptane H32", Journe de prsentation de rsultats de recherche, Arche de la Dfense, Paris, January 1996 BIOLLAY H. & CHASSE P.: "Validating and optimizing 2D and 3D computer simulations for the Ofenegg tunnel fire tests", 8th International Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Liverpool (UK), July 1994 BIOLLAY H.: "Contribution la simulation numrique dun incendie en tunnel par un modle de champ", PhD thesis, Lyon1 University (France), March 1997 KAWABATA N., OHASHI H., KATO Y.: "Numerical simulation of fire fume propagation along the ceiling of a down-grade tunnel", 7th International Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Brighton (UK), November 1993 SIMCOX S., WILKES N.S., IONES L.P.: "Computer simulation of the flows of hot gases from the fire at Kings Cross underground station", Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 18, pp 49-73, 1992 WOODBURN B.: "CFD simulations of fires in tunnels: a sensitivity study", First European Symposium on Fire Safety Science, Zrich, August 1995 PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Road Tunnels: Emissions, Ventilation, Environment", ref. 05.02.B,1995 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS : "Tunnels routiers : missions, ventilation, environnement", rf. 05.02.B, 1995 JAPAN ROAD ASSOCIATION: "Tunnel ventilation design guidelines", Japan, 1985 PUBLIC WORKS RESEARCH INSTITUTE (PWRI): "Road Tunnel Technology in Japan", Technical Memorandum of PWRI n 3023, Japan, October 1991
AIPCR 290
05.05.B - 1999
[71]
[75]
[76]
[80] [81]
[85] [86]
EUREKA 499 Report: "Fires in transport tunnels, Report on full scale tests", Edited by Studiengesellschaft Stahlanwendung e.V., Dsseldorf, April 1996 PERARD M.: "Organisation of fire tests in an operated road tunnel", First International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Basel (Switzerland), November 1992 CASALE E., MOULET J.M.: "Essais incendie au tunnel du Puymorens", Tunnels et Ouvrages Souterrains, N 127, pp 45-56, January / February 1995 KOSEKI H., HAYASAKA H.: "Estimation of thermal balance in heptane pool fire", J. of Fire Sciences, Vol. 7, pp 237-250, July/August 1989 SCETAUROUTE DTTS: "Essais d'incendie au tunnel de Chamoise - Rapport scientifique", February 1996 (Unpublished) SALAN-PENQUER G., GUILLAUME R., COLLINI P.: "Comportement du Halon 1301 dans les wagons-navettes (feux de siges et feux de chassis)", Rapport d'tudes Env XXXIII pour TRANSMANCHE-LINK, June 1989 LACROIX D., CHASSE P., MULLER T.: "Small scale study of smoke trap door systems", 8th International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Liverpool (UK), pp. 409-438, July 1994 VAUQUELIN O.: "Caractrisation exprimentale de l'apparition d'une nappe de retour", Compte Rendu l'Acadmie des Sciences de Paris, t. 321, Srie II b, pp 15-18, 1995 LACROIX D.: Smoke control in road tunnels in case of fire: issues and current methods research ways, CETU publication, November 1994, March 1995 GUELZIM A., SOUIL J.M., VANTELON J.P., DOAN KIM SON, GABAY D., DALLEST D.: "Modelling of a reverse layer of fire induced smoke in a tunnel", 4th International Symposium on Fire Safety Science, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada), June 1994 SAITO N., YAMADA T., SEKIZAWA A., YANAI E., WATANABE Y., MIYAZAKI S.: "Experimental study on fire behaviour in a wind tunnel with a reduced scale model", 2nd International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Granada (Spain), April 1995 CORDIER H., VAUQUELIN O., BERTRAND E., CASALE E., OUAZZANI J.: "Experimental and numerical study of reduced scale model tunnel fires", First European Symposium on Fire Safety Science, Zrich (Switzerland), August 1995 KUMAR S. & COX G.: "Mathematical modelling of fires in road tunnels", 5th International Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Lille (France), May 1985 BIOLLAY H.: "Projet EUREKA 499: Simulations numriques de lessai dheptane H32", Journe de prsentation de rsultats de recherche, Arche de la Dfense, Paris, January 1996 BIOLLAY H. & CHASSE P.: "Validating and optimizing 2D and 3D computer simulations for the Ofenegg tunnel fire tests", 8th International Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Liverpool (UK), July 1994 BIOLLAY H.: "Contribution la simulation numrique dun incendie en tunnel par un modle de champ", PhD thesis, Lyon1 University (France), March 1997 KAWABATA N., OHASHI H., KATO Y.: "Numerical simulation of fire fume propagation along the ceiling of a down-grade tunnel", 7th International Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Brighton (UK), November 1993 SIMCOX S., WILKES N.S., IONES L.P.: "Computer simulation of the flows of hot gases from the fire at Kings Cross underground station", Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 18, pp 49-73, 1992 WOODBURN B.: "CFD simulations of fires in tunnels: a sensitivity study", First European Symposium on Fire Safety Science, Zrich, August 1995 PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Road Tunnels: Emissions, Ventilation, Environment", ref. 05.02.B,1995 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS : "Tunnels routiers : missions, ventilation, environnement", rf. 05.02.B, 1995 JAPAN ROAD ASSOCIATION: "Tunnel ventilation design guidelines", Japan, 1985 PUBLIC WORKS RESEARCH INSTITUTE (PWRI): "Road Tunnel Technology in Japan", Technical Memorandum of PWRI n 3023, Japan, October 1991
PIARC 291
05.05.B - 1999
[95] [96]
[97]
[98]
[99]
[100]
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI): "Ventilation of Road Tunnels", Netherland, July 1991 CENTRE DETUDES DES TUNNELS (CETU): "Dossier pilote des tunnels - Document quipements - Section ventilation", France, to be published th LACROIX D. : "New French recommendations for fire ventilation in road tunnels", 9 International Conference on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Aosta (Italy), October 1997 FORSCHUNGSGESELLSCHAFT FUR DAS VERKEHR UND STRASSENWESEN (FVS) - RVS 9261; 9262, " Design guidelines tunnel ventilation", Austria, 1997 NORDISK VEJTEKNISK FORBUND (NVF) - Sub Committee 61- : "Ventilation of road tunnels", Report n6: 1993, English translation 1995 PUBLIC ROADS ADMINISTRATION: "Norwegian design guide - Road Tunnels", Norway, December 1990 SWEDISH NATIONAL ROAD ADMINISTRATION: "Tunnel 95 - General Technical Specification", Publ. 1995:32E, Sweden, 1996 RHODES N.: "Smoke Modelling", Proceedings of the One Day Seminar on Smoke and Critical Velocity in Tunnels, Organised and sponsored by Independent Technical Conferences Ltd., London (UK), April 1996. OKA Y., ATKINSON G. : "Control of Smoke Flow in tunnel fires", Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 25, pp. 305-322, 1995 PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Classification of tunnels, Existing guidelines and experiences, Recommendations", 1995, ref. 05.03.B / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS: "Classification des tunnels, directives et expriences existantes, recommandations", 1995, rf. 05.03.B SHIELDS T.J., BOYCE K.E., Emergency egress capabilities of people with mixed abilities, Fire SERT, Univ. of Ulster, 2nd International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Granada (Spain), April 1995. th PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, report to the XV World Road Congress, Mexico City, 1975 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVe Congrs mondial de la Route, Mexico City, 1975 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI) : "Ventilation of Road Tunnels, Recommendations 1991", Department of Tunnel Technology and Underground Engineering Works, (Netherlands), printed February 1994 PIARC: Safety - General Report to the XIXth World Road Congress, Marrakesh, September 1991, ref. 19.34.B / AIPCR : Scurit Rapport gnral au XIXe Congrs mondial de la Route, Marrakech, septembre 1991, rf. 19.34.B
AIPCR 292
05.05.B - 1999
[95] [96]
[97]
[98]
[99]
[100]
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI): "Ventilation of Road Tunnels", Netherland, July 1991 CENTRE DETUDES DES TUNNELS (CETU): "Dossier pilote des tunnels - Document quipements - Section ventilation", France, to be published th LACROIX D. : "New French recommendations for fire ventilation in road tunnels", 9 International Conference on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Aosta (Italy), October 1997 FORSCHUNGSGESELLSCHAFT FUR DAS VERKEHR UND STRASSENWESEN (FVS) - RVS 9261; 9262, " Design guidelines tunnel ventilation", Austria, 1997 NORDISK VEJTEKNISK FORBUND (NVF) - Sub Committee 61- : "Ventilation of road tunnels", Report n6: 1993, English translation 1995 PUBLIC ROADS ADMINISTRATION: "Norwegian design guide - Road Tunnels", Norway, December 1990 SWEDISH NATIONAL ROAD ADMINISTRATION: "Tunnel 95 - General Technical Specification", Publ. 1995:32E, Sweden, 1996 RHODES N.: "Smoke Modelling", Proceedings of the One Day Seminar on Smoke and Critical Velocity in Tunnels, Organised and sponsored by Independent Technical Conferences Ltd., London (UK), April 1996. OKA Y., ATKINSON G. : "Control of Smoke Flow in tunnel fires", Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 25, pp. 305-322, 1995 PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Classification of tunnels, Existing guidelines and experiences, Recommendations", 1995, ref. 05.03.B / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS: "Classification des tunnels, directives et expriences existantes, recommandations", 1995, rf. 05.03.B SHIELDS T.J., BOYCE K.E., Emergency egress capabilities of people with mixed abilities, Fire SERT, Univ. of Ulster, 2nd International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Granada (Spain), April 1995. th PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, report to the XV World Road Congress, Mexico City, 1975 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVe Congrs mondial de la Route, Mexico City, 1975 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI) : "Ventilation of Road Tunnels, Recommendations 1991", Department of Tunnel Technology and Underground Engineering Works, (Netherlands), printed February 1994 PIARC: Safety - General Report to the XIXth World Road Congress, Marrakesh, September 1991, ref. 19.34.B / AIPCR : Scurit Rapport gnral au XIXe Congrs mondial de la Route, Marrakech, septembre 1991, rf. 19.34.B
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Pour faciliter la consultation de ce document, les pages qui suivent sont des rptitions de pages antrieures en raison des figures bilingues quelles comportent.
To make this document easier to consult, the following pages are the repetition of previous pages containing bilingual figures.
I.4.2 Rayonnement
Le rayonnement est cr par la temprature et peut tre exprim comme suit pour une couche infinie de fume dans laquelle la temprature est constante :
E f = 5,67 10 8 r T 4 W / m2
q. [1.4.2.1]
o r est lmissivit rsultante et T la temprature de la fume (en degrs kelvins). Le niveau du rayonnement dpend de la temprature et de lmissivit de la fume. Lorsque la temprature lintrieur de la couche de fume nest pas constante, une intgration est ncessaire pour calculer le niveau de rayonnement. Le rayonnement est produit par lincendie lui-mme et par la couche de fume chaude (figure 1.4.2.1). La ligne continue sur la figure 1.4.2.2 montre le rayonnement touchant une personne en fuite, calcul partir dune couche infinie de fume temprature constante dans toute la couche. La ligne pointille correspond un tunnel de 8 m de large et 6 m de haut dans lequel la fume est descendue 3 m au-dessus du niveau de la chausse. Dans les deux cas, une valeur de 0,8 est prise pour r. Prs du foyer de lincendie, il faut en outre prendre en compte la contribution des flammes.
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I.4.2 Radiation
Radiation is created by temperature and may be expressed as follows for an infinite layer of smoke in which the temperature is constant:
E f = 5.67 10 8 r T 4 W / m2
eq. [1.4.2.1]
where r is the resulting emissivity and T the temperature of the smoke (in kelvins). The level of radiation depends on the temperature and the emissivity of the smoke. When the temperature within the smoke layer is not constant an integration is necessary to calculate the radiation level. The radiation is produced by the fire itself and by the hot smoke layer (figure 1.4.2.1). The continuous line in figure 1.4.2.2 shows the calculated radiation affecting escaping people from an infinite smoke layer with a constant temperature in the whole layer. The dashed line corresponds to a tunnel 8 m wide and 6 m high in which the smoke layer has descended to 3 m above road level. A value of 0.8 is assumed for r in both cases. Near the fire site a contribution from the flames should be added.
corresponds to an infinite layer correspond une couche infinie corresponds to a tunnel 8 m wide, correspond un tunnel de 8 m de large, 6 m high and smoke ---------6 m de haut et de la fume at 3 m above floor 3 m au-dessus du sol Figure 1.4.2.2 - Heat radiation at floor level Figure 1.4.2.2 - Rayonnement de chaleur au niveau du sol
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La figure 1.4.2.3, daprs Hymes [7], montre la dure de rsistance avant blessure par brlure pour diffrents flux de chaleur, jusqu une dure dexposition de 100 s. Par exemple, pour une dure dexposition de 100 s, 11 kW/m provoquent 50 % de dcs.
Purser [13] montre, dans la figure 1.4.2.4, quil existe une limite dintensit relativement vidente de 2,5 kW/m2 pour la rsistance une chaleur rayonne constante. Dans cette figure, les lettres "a" "e" correspondent diffrentes valeurs observes dans la bibliographie et les recherches. A la figure 1.4.2.5, Danielsson [3] montre le moment o la douleur apparat diffrents niveaux de rayonnement constant. P est un facteur scurit pour diffrents vtements : P = 1 correspond la peau nue et P = 26 correspond des vtements de pompier.
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In figure 1.4.2.3, Hymes [7] shows tolerance times to burn injury levels for various incident heat fluxes up to an exposure time of 100 s. For example at a 100 seconds exposure time, 11 kW/m creates 50% lethality.
Figure 1.4.2.4 - Time to severe skin pain for exposure to radiant heat
Purser [13] shows in figure 1.4.2.4 that there is a fairly obvious intensity limit for tolerance of constant radiant heat at 2.5 kW/m2. In this figure letters "a" to "e" correspond to different observed values in literature and investigations.
In figure 1.4.2.5 Danielsson [3] shows time until pain occurs at different constant radiation levels. P is a safety factor for different clothes: P = 1 corresponds to naked skin and P = 26 corresponds to a fire-fighter clothes.
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Figure 1.4.2.5 - Rsistance la douleur pour diffrents niveaux de radiation et diffrents facteurs de scurit
Figure 1.4.2.5 - Time to pain for different radiation levels and safety factors
q [1.4.3.1]
Si la temprature nest pas constante, comme dans une situation normale, le concept de dose est introduit. Puisque la dure de rsistance prend la forme dune courbe exponentielle, il est possible de considrer la victime comme ayant absorb une dose de chaleur convecte. Par consquent, il est possible dutiliser le concept dune dose fractionnaire de chaleur absorbe chaque minute du point de vue de la mise en incapacit :
1
5.1849 0.0273 T
Flh = e
q. [1.4.3.2]
o T est la temprature en C durant cette minute. Lorsque la dose cumule est suprieure 1, la survie est menace.
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eq [1.4.3.1]
If the temperature is not constant, as in a normal situation, the "dose" concept is introduced. Since the tolerance time takes the form of an exponential curve, it is feasible to consider the victim as taking up a "dose" of convected heat. Thereafter it is possible to use the concept of a fractional incapacitating dose of heat acquired during each minute as follows:
Flh = e
5.1849 0.0273 T
eq. [1.4.3.2]
where T is the temperature in C during that minute. When the cumulative fractional dose exceeds unity, life threatening conditions have occurred.
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I.5
Recommendations
In order of importance, the aims of fire and smoke control in tunnels are: to save lives by making users evacuation possible, to make rescue and fire fighting operations possible, to avoid explosions, to limit damage to tunnel structure and equipment and to surrounding buildings.
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Most fires, however, are generated by the traffic passing through a tunnel and not by tunnel equipment or maintenance work. So-me of the most serious fires known yet started due to accidents (e.g. frontback-collisions).
Photo 2.1 - Fire following an accident in the Velsen Tunnel (Netherlands) in 1978
Photo 2.1 - Incendie la suite dun accident dans le Tunnel de Velsen (Pays-Bas) en 1978
In theory the frequency of tunnel fires is related to items like tunnel length, traffic density, speed control and slope of the road. This has to be accounted for when comparing different tunnels. Therefore the frequency of fire is rated not only by number per tunnel but also by number per vehicles x kilometres to include the gross effects of tunnel length and traffic density. Although many fires in tunnels are known there are only limited statistics covering a time interval (e.g. a calendar year) completely. Number of occurrences and fire rates from 45 tunnels are given in tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 as far as available. Rates are calculated according to the example given beneath for the Elb Tunnel [30]: observation period 2 years tunnel length (with ramps) 3.3 km number of vehicles passing the tunnel 37 106 veh./year portion of heavy good vehicles 15% number of events with passenger vehicles in the observation period 13 number of events with heavy good vehicles in the observation period 9 From these data the rates of fire expressed as cases of fire per vehicle x kilometre were calculated for the Elb Tunnel in Hamburg, Germany: passenger vehicles
PV = 13 cases . 2 37 10 (1 0.15) 3.3 veh. km
6
heavy vehicles
HGV = 9 cases 2 37 10 0.15 3.3 veh. km
6
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Il faut souligner que tous les rsultats EUREKA dpendent bien videmment des conditions dessais. Celles-ci incluent de basses vitesses de lair durant la plupart des essais et une section transversale sensiblement plus petite que dans les tunnels routiers habituels, ce qui survalue le rayonnement thermique renvoy par les parois. Lessai avec un poids lourd, par ailleurs, a t fait spcialement avec une vitesse longitudinale de lair de 6 m/s en avant de lincendie pendant les 15 premires minutes, ce qui donnait en moyenne environ 13 m/s autour du vhicule : une telle vitesse est significativement suprieure ce qui est gnralors des essais dincendie EUREKA lement rencontr dans les tunnels routiers et elle produit galement une combustion plus intense. En consquence, les essais EUREKA donnent des indications prcieuses sur les conditions durant un incendie, mais ils peuvent difficilement fournir par eux-mmes de nouvelles valeurs ralistes de dimensionnement. Aucune donne nouvelle nest disponible en ce qui concerne les incendies de marchandises dangereuses.
Photo 2.2 - Incendie de poids lourd Photo 2.2 - Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) fire in the EUREKA fire tests
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It must be emphasised that all the EUREKA results are of course dependent upon the test conditions. These include low air velocities during most of the tests and a cross-section significantly smaller than usual for road tunnels, which overestimates the heat radiation coming back from the walls. The test with a Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) on the other hand was specifically conducted with a longitudinal air velocity of about 6 m/s ahead of the fire during the first 15 minutes, which gave about 13 m/s on average around the vehicle: such a velocity is significantly higher than what is normally encountered in road tunnels and also produces a more intense combustion. As a consequence the EUREKA tests give valuable hints about the conditions during a fire event, but they can hardly provide new realistic design values on their own. No new experimental data is available concerning dangerous goods fires.
Poids lourd (HF1) Autobus (B11) Voiture en matire plastique (C21) Vhicule particulier (C11)
Figure 2.4.1 - Maximum temperatures in the cross-section of the tunnel during tests with road vehicles [20]
Figure 2.4.1 - Tempratures maximales dans la section transversale du tunnel lors dessais avec des vhicules routiers [20]
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Comme le montre la figure 2.4.2 dans les essais EUREKA, des tempratures potentiellement dangereuses pour les armatures du bton ont t enregistres jusqu environ 100 m en aval de lincendie et, en raison de la remonte de fumes, jusqu environ 30 m en amont. Ltendue de cette zone peut tre sensiblement diffrente selon les tunnels, en raison notamment de la ventilation, de la dclivit du tunnel, de la rugosit de la surface et des revtements rsistant au feu. Une nouvelle valuation des rsultats dEUREKA est ncessaire pour parvenir des spcifications plus globales des zones menaces.
plastique
Dans lensemble, les tempratures maximales suivantes au niveau des parois ou du plafond doivent tre considres en ce qui concerne la structure du tunnel et les rglementations du trafic poids lourds pour des tunnels spciaux :
voiture particulire 400 C autobus/petit camion 700 C poids lourd (HGV) avec matires combustibles (sauf essence ou autres marchandises dangereuses) 1 000 C camion citerne dessence (cas gnral) 1 200 C camion citerne dessence (cas extrmes : par exemple, aucun bnfice tir du drainage du tunnel et d'un dbit de fuite limit ; grande citerne ; viter linondation dun tunnel immerg) 1 400 C
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As can be seen by figure 2.4.2 in the EUREKA tests, temperatures which can be dangerous to the steel reinforcement of concrete were found till about 100 m downstream of the fire and because of back-layering till about 30 m upstream of the fire. The extension of this region in various road tunnels can be quite different from these values due to e.g. the ventilation, tunnel inclination, surface roughness and fire-resistant coatings. For a more general specification of endangered regions a further evaluation of the EUREKA results is necessary. On the whole the following maximum temperatures at the tunnels wall or ceiling should be considered with regard to the tunnel structure and the cargo-traffic-regulations for specific tunnels: passenger car 400 C * bus/small lorry 700 C * heavy lorry (HGV) with burning goods (not petrol or other dangerous goods) 1 000 C petrol tanker (general case) 1 200 C petrol tanker (extreme cases: e.g. no benefits due to tunnel drainage and limited leakage rate; large tanker; avoidance of the flooding of an immersed tunnel) 1 400 C
*: Higher if flames touch the walls.
Figure 2.4.3 - Time dependency of temperatures in Eureka tunnel fires and standard curves used in regulations upon fire protection [43; 44; 45]
Figure 2.4.3 - Tempratures en fonction du temps dans les incendies de tunnel Eureka et courbes standard utilises dans les rglementations pour la protection contre les incendies [43 ; 44 ; 45]
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Depuis, des progrs ont t raliss. En regroupant les essais dincendie EUREKA en Norvge et en Finlande, les donnes AIPCR de Bruxelles et les rcentes propositions du CETU (France), on peut faire apparatre les donnes approximatives suivantes de puissance thermique pour une dure significative dun incendie dans un tunnel [19 ; 20 ; 36] (exemple : figure 2.4.4, camion citerne dessence : voir tableau 2.4.2) : 1 petite voiture particulire : 1 grande voiture particulire : 2-3 voitures particulires : 1 camionnette : 1 autobus : 1 camion avec matires combustibles (cas gnral) : 2,5 MW 5 MW 8 MW 15 MW 20 MW 20-30 MW
Les poids lourds plus importants transportant des matires combustibles, et plus spcialement des marchandises dangereuses, peuvent produire de fortes puissances thermiques. Les essais dincendie EUREKA sur poids lourd ont rvl une puissance maximale denviron 100 120 MW, mais seulement sur une trs courte priode. Les puissances maximales relles peuvent scarter de ces valeurs car elles dpendent du type de vhicule, du type de cargaison, de la ventilation, des vitesses de combustion, etc. Pour les camions citernes dessence, les fuites provoques par un accident et la capacit du systme de drainage du tunnel ont galement une grande influence.
Dbit d'nergie
En ce qui concerne la construction du tunnel, les scnarios KIVI [42] tiennent compte dun incendie de 300 MW pour les tunnels immergs. Une proposition franaise prconise un incendie de 200 MW si un camion citerne dessence est impliqu [47]. Une analyse de risque pour le tunnel dOresund [43] considre la possibilit dune fuite de carburant partir de brches de diamtre quivalent 15, 35 et 50 mm. Cela reprsente une dfaillance potentielle dun tuyau de carburant de petit diamtre ou un lger dgt sur une collerette de tuyau, mais ne reprsente pas la rupture complte dun tuyau de livraison, ce qui quivaudrait un orifice de 100 mm de diamtre. Le dbit de la fuite dpend du diamtre de lorifice et de la pression du liquide. Pour les orifices considrs, les dbits massiques sont respectivement de 0,5, 2,7 et 5,6 kg/s.
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Since then further advances have been achieved. In summarising the EUREKA fire tests in Norway and Finland, the PIARC data from Brussels and recent CETU proposals in France the following approximate maximum calorific power outputs may occur for a significant duration during fire events in tunnels [19; 20; 36] (example: figure 2.4.4; petrol tanker: see table 2.4.2): 1 small passenger car: 1 large passenger car: 2 - 3 passenger cars: 1 van: 1 bus: 1 lorry with burning goods (general case): 2.5 MW 5 MW 8 MW 15 MW 20 MW 20-30 MW
Larger vehicles (HGV) with burning goods and especially with dangerous goods may cause higher calorific power outputs. The EUREKA HGV fire test indicated a peak power output of approx. 100 to 120 MW, but during a very short period only.
Real peak powers will differ from the values given above because they depend on the type of vehicle, type of cargo, ventilation, burning rates, etc. For petrol tankers there is also a great influence due to the leakage opening produced by an accident and the capacity of the tunnel drainage system.
Table 2.4.2 - Effect of leakage diameter and drainage rate on the fire size of petrol tankers [43] Tableau 2.4.2 - Effet du diamtre de la fuite et du taux de drainage sur la taille dun incendie d un camion citerne dessence [43]
Calorific power [MW] Equivalent diameter of leakage [mm] 15 35 50 Leakage mass flow of petrol [kg/s] 0.5 2.7 5.6 Drainage mass flow of petrol 0 kg/s 22 120 245 1 kg/s 76 201 2 kg/s 33 158 5 kg/s 27
0 kg/s
1 kg/s
2 kg/s
5 kg/s
With regard to the tunnel construction, KIVI scenarios [42] take a 300 MW fire for immersed tunnels into account. A French proposal claims a 200 MW fire if a petrol tanker is involved [47]. A risk analysis for the Oresund tunnel [43] considers the possibility of fuel leakage from ruptures of 15, 35, and 50 mm equivalent diameter. These represent the potential failure of small diameter fuel lines or a small damage of a delivery hose flange. They do not represent the complete rupture of a delivery hose which would give a hole diameter of 100 mm. The leakage flow depends on the diameter of the hole and the fluid pressure at the hole. For the holes considered the mass flows are 0.5, 2.7 and 5.6 kg/s respectively.
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Schweiger [56] a ralis une valuation thermodynamique des essais du tunnel du Zwenberg pour une quantit de combustible de 200 l dessence ordinaire. Pour une flaque de 7 m2, lnergie totale disponible tait de 6 410 MJ. Une combustion stchiomtrique suppose cela aboutit une masse totale de produit de combustion (fume) de 2 322 kg (besoins en air et en essence pour la combustion). Une combustion stchiomtrique est le rsultat de la combustion de lessence avec le minimum dair ncessaire. Pendant lincendie du tunnel, il ny avait pas une combustion stchiomtrique.
Photo 3.1 - Exemple de dveloppement de fume pendant un essai dincendie dans un tunnel prs de Monaco
Photo 3.1 - Example of smoke development during a fire test in a tunnel near Monaco
En plus des composants CO2 et H2O rsultant dune combustion stchiomtrique, se sont galement forms du CO et du NOx. Cependant, la quantit de ces derniers tait faible (en concentration), ce qui signifie quil nest pas ncessaire de les prendre en compte lors de lquilibre thermodynamique. Lvaluation tait ensuite fonde sur lhypothse quil ne pouvait y avoir de condensation de vapeur deau dans la fume. La figure 3.4.1 montre la production par combustion stchiomtrique (CO2, H2O et N2 non brl) dans le tunnel en fonction de la dure de l'incendie pour 200 l dessence ordinaire. On peut observer que la totalit de lessence brle en 10 mn environ. Au dbut, les produits de combustion montrent un accroissement linaire rapide. Aprs 400 secondes, 2 100 kg de fume ont t produits. Ensuite, la production de fume dcrot fortement, et aprs 620 secondes, lessence est totalement brle. Durant les 400 premires secondes, la puissance thermique tait d'environ 15 MW. Lvolution de cet incendie tait pour l'essentiel indpendante du type de ventilation (transversale, transversale sans apport dair frais, semi-transversale, longitudinale avec une 3 vitesse de lair de 2 m/s). Le systme de ventilation tait conu pour fournir 30 m /s dair frais et aspirer 30 m3/s dair vici sur une longueur de 400 m. Ainsi, dans le cas de la ventilation transversale, il tait possible dextraire de lespace de circulation la totalit de la fume sur une distance denviron 200 m.
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Schweiger [56] made a thermodynamic evaluation of the fire tests in the Zwenberg tunnel for a fuel mass of 200 l of regular petrol. In a 7 m2 pool area the total available fuel energy was 6410 MJ. Based on an assumed stoichiometric combustion, this results in a total combustion product (smoke) amount of 2322 kg (fuel and air requirements for combustion). A stoichiometric combustion product amount is the result of the complete combustion of fuel with the necessary minimum amount of air. During the tunnel fire there was no stoichiometric combustion.
Figure 3.4.1 shows the stoichiometric combustion product mass (CO2, H2O and unburned N2) in the tunnel depending on the duration of the fire for 200 l of regular petrol. It can be seen that the complete fuel mass is burned within approx. 10 minutes. At the beginning, there is a rapid linear increase in the combustion product mass. After 400 seconds, 2100 kg of smoke have been produced. Then the production of smoke decreases greatly, and after 620 seconds the fuel is completely burned. During the first 400 seconds the thermal output amounted to approx. 15 MW. The progress of this fire was essentially independent of the type of ventilation (transverse ventilation, transverse ventilation without fresh air supply, semi-transverse ventilation, and longitudinal ventilation with an air velocity of 2 m/s). The ventilation system was designed to supply 30 m3/s of fresh air and to withdraw 30 m3/s of exhaust air over a length of 400 m. Thus it was possible in the case of the transverse ventilation to withdraw the complete amount of smoke produced from the traffic space within a distance of approx. 200 m.
In addition to the compo-nents CO2 and H2O resulting from a stoichiometric combustion, CO and NOx were formed as well. However, the amount of these components was small (within the ppm range), which means that they can be neglected in the thermodynamic balance. The evaluation was further based on the assumption that no condensation of the water vapour contained in the smoke took place.
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Pour convertir les masses de fume en volumes, il est ncessaire de connatre la temprature de la fume. Les tempratures thoriques de combustion stchiomtrique de lessence ordinaire sont denviron 2 000 C. Les tempratures relles en cas dincendie sont gnralement plus faibles, principalement parce que la combustion nest pas stchiomtrique, ou parce que la fume se mlange lair. Les essais raliss dans les tunnels de lOfenegg et du Zwenberg ont montr que les tempratures maximales le long du plafond au-dessus du foyer de lincendie variaient entre 800 et 1 200 C. La figure 3.4.2 montre la distribution gnrale de la temprature dans le tunnel en fonction du temps dans le cas dune ventilation longitudinale avec une vitesse longitudinale de 2 m/s. La temprature est la moyenne de toutes les mesures de temprature effectues sur une section test.
Temprature (C)
Figure 3.4.2 Distribution de la temprature mesure le long du tunnel une vitesse longitudinale de 2 m/s Figure 3.4.2 - Temperature progression measured along the tunnel length at a longitudinal velocity of 2 m/s
Site de l'incendie
Sortie nord
La figure 3.4.3 montre la situation avec une vitesse longitudinale un peu plus leve (4 m/s). Il est difficile de comparer directement les deux rsultats, puisque lvolution de la temprature est seulement disponible des laps de temps diffrents (ramener les chiffres aux mmes temps nest pas possible). De plus, le facteur suivant doit tre pris en compte : dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus basses, les flammes ne sont que modrment rediriges dans le sens du courant d'air. On peut noter une lgre remonte des fumes le long du plafond, contre-courant du flux principal. Cependant, dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus grandes, les gaz de fume sont totalement rediriges dans la direction du courant d'air. En gnral, on peut dire que les tempratures des fumes jusqu une distance denviron 200 m sont plus leves dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales de 4 m/s que dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus basses. A partir dune distance de 200 m, cependant, les tempratures sont plus faibles en raison de la vitesse longitudinale leve et de leffet de lchange thermique avec la paroi.
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In order to convert the smoke masses produced to smoke volumes it is necessary to know the smoke temperatures. The theoretical stoichiometric combustion temperatures of regular gasoline are about 2000 C. The real fire temperatures are usually much lower, mainly because the combustion is not stoichiometric, or because the smoke mingles with air. The fire tests performed in the Ofenegg tunnel and in the Zwenberg tunnel showed that the maximum local temperatures along the ceiling above the fire site were between 800 C and 1200 C. Figure 3.4.2 shows the main temperature distribution in the tunnel relative to time in the case of a longitudinal ventilation with a longitudinal velocity of 2 m/s. The temperature is the mean value of all temperature measurements performed in one measuring cross-section.
Figure 3.4.3 - Temperature progression measured along the tunnel length at a longitudinal velocity of 4 m/s
Figure 3.4.3 - Distribution de la temprature mesure le long du tunnel une vitesse longitudinale de 4 m/s
Figure 3.4.3 shows the conditions with a slightly higher longitudinal velocity of 4 m/s. It is not possible to directly compare the two measurement results with each other, since the temperature distribution is only available for different times (converting the figures to the same times is not possible). In addition, the following fact must be considered as well: in the case of lower longitudinal velocities, the flames are being redirected into the flow direction only to a small extent. There is still a minor backlayering of the flue gases along the ceiling, which is directed against the main flow. In the case of higher longitudinal velocities, however, the flue gases are completely redirected toward the flow direction. In general it can therefore be said that the flue gas temperatures up to a distance of approximately 200 m are higher in the case of higher longitudinal velocities of 4 m/s that in the case of lower longitudinal velocities. As of a distance of 200 m, however, temperatures decrease due to the higher longitudinal velocity and the resulting improvement in the heat transition into the rock.
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expriences PWRI (Japon, 1980) [61] : les essais japonais en vraie grandeur utilisrent une galerie de 700 m de long construite par lInstitut de Recherche des Travaux publics (PWRI) et un tunnel de 3 300 m de long. Seize exprimentations furent ralises dans la galerie et huit dans le tunnel. On utilisa comme foyers des bacs dessence (dix essais avec 4 m, deux essais avec 6 m), des vhicules particuliers (six essais) et des autobus (six essais). Les conditions physiques mesures dans le tunnel furent corrles aux capacits de secours. Linfluence de la vitesse longitudinale de lair fut dmontre.
tunnel de Repparfjord (Norvge, 1990-1992) [62] : ces essais furent conduits dans une ancienne galerie minire dune longueur de 2,3 km (parois non revtues et section transversale allant de 30 40 m). Ils rassemblrent neuf pays europens et constiturent la base du projet EUREKA 499 "Firetun". Un total de 21 essais fut men sur des wagons de train et de mtro, des vhicules particuliers, des poids lourds et des feux calibrs (bacs dheptane et palettes en bois). Prs de 400 capteurs furent installs le long du tunnel et lintrieur des foyers. Les mesures por-taient sur la temprature de lair et des parois, la vitesse, lopacit, la concentration des gaz, le mouvement des fumes (par vido), etc.
Photo 4.3.1 - Fire test in Repparfjord tunnel
Memorial tunnel (tats-Unis, 1993-1995) [63] : ce programme fut financ par la Federal Highway Administration et ltat du Massachusetts pour le projet de tunnel/artre centrale de Boston. Les expriences furent ralises dans un tunnel routier dsaffect de 850 m de long en Virginie occidentale. Prs de 91 essais furent mens avec des bacs de gasole. Les puissances thermiques obtenues variaient de 10 MW (4,5 m) 100 MW (44,4 m). Les systmes de ventilation transversale et longitudinale furent tests. 1 450 capteurs furent installs dans le tunnel, fournissant ainsi prs de 4 millions de donnes par essai.
Les rcents programmes de recherche sont fonds sur des systmes complets de mesures. Les capteurs sont nombreux et sont organiss en rseaux tout fait semblables ceux utiliss dans les simulations numriques par modle de champ.
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PWRI experiments (Japan, 1980) [61]: the Japanese full scale test programmes used a 700 m long gallery built by the Public Works Research Institute (PWRI) and a 3300 m long road tunnel. 16 experiments were performed in the gallery and 8 in the tunnel. The fire sources were fuel pools (10 tests with 4 m, 2 tests with 6 m), passenger cars (6 tests) and buses (6 tests). The physical conditions measured in the tunnel during the fires were connected with the emergency capacities. The influence of the longitudinal airflow velocity was shown. Repparfjord tunnel (Norway, 1990-1992) [62]: these experiments were performed in an abandoned 2.3 km long mining gallery (rough wall surfaces and cross-section varying from 30 to 40 m). They gathered 9 European countries (these experiments were the base of the EUREKA 499 "Firetun" project). A total of 21 tests were performed using rail and metro vehicles, passenger cars, heavy goods vehicles and calibrated fires (heptane pools and wood cribs). About 400 captors were installed along the tunnel and inside the fire loads. The measurements dealt with air and wall temperature, velocity, opacity, gases concentration, smoke motion (video network), etc. Memorial tunnel (USA, 1993-1995) [63]: this programme was financed by the Federal Highway Administration and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the Boston Central Artery Tunnel project. The experiments were performed in an abandoned 850 m long road tunnel located in West Virginia. About 91 tests were performed with diesel oil pool fires. The obtained heat release rates vary from 10 MW (4.5 m) to 100 MW (44.4 m). The transverse and longitudinal ventilation configurations were tested. 1450 captors were installed in the tunnel, providing about 4 millions data per experiment.
The recent research programmes are based on complete measurement systems. The captors are numerous and they are organised in networks quite similar to the mesh used in CFD models.
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IV.3.1.3 Rsultats
Lune des caractristiques de ces expriences est quil ny a pas daccs au site de lincendie. Aucune observation visuelle nest possible (sauf si une camra vido est installe sur le site). Dans certains cas, les oprateurs pouvaient tre prsents dans les sections situes en amont de lincendie (figure 4.3.1). Cet emplacement ne peut permettre une vue densemble de lexprience.
Figure 4.3.1 Front de la remonte de fume lors d'un essai avec un wagon de mtro (EUREKA 499) Figure 4.3.1 - Front of backlayering during a rail vehicle experiment in EUREKA 499
Dans ces conditions, le grand nombre de donnes recueillies est utile pour construire des interpr-tations concernant les phnomnes se dveloppant lors dun incendie (figure 4.3.2). La localisation des capteurs sur un maillage 3D apparat fondamentale pour lanalyse. Si certains phnomnes peuvent tre correctement identifis, il est plus difficile de dduire des lois gnrales partir des expriences en vraie grandeur. Cela est d au peu dexpriences conduites dans chaque programme. Il faut noter que leur objectif nest pas daboutir des lois gnrales. Par exemple, les essais japonais ont t en partie raliss pour recueillir des informations qualitatives sur les sorties de secours sous diffrentes conditions de vitesse de lair. Ce but ne semble pas tre compatible avec lutilisation des rsultats dans des modles scientifiques. Lune des caractristiques des essais EUREKA 499 est lutilisation de vrais vhicules routiers et ferroviaires comme charge combustible. Comme la puissance thermique de tels incendies est lun des paramtres du risque encore inconnus, les oprateurs ont saisi cette occasion pour raliser les mesures correspondantes. Le confinement de la chaleur semblait accrotre les taux de combustion. En ralit, les interprtations des rsultats obtenus avec des mthodes diffrentes conduisent des rsultats diffrents [65].
En raison des incertitudes des rsultats de mesure, les interprtations concluent gnralement que la puissance thermique calcule est lie la mthode utilise pour son valuation. Nanmoins, certaines des conclusions tires des essais sur les incendies de poids lourds (essai EUROTUNNEL) semblent en relative contradiction avec les informations disponibles dans les prcdentes recommandations de lAIPCR. Dans le rapport de Bruxelles [19], on mentionnait 20 MW pour la puissance thermique dun poids lourd en flammes. Les rsultats EUREKA montrent des valeurs plus leves : certaines dpassent 100 MW pendant quelques minutes.
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IV.3.1.3 Results
One of the characteristics of these experiments is the fact that no access is possible in the fire area. No visual observation is then possible (except when a video camera is installed in that zone). In some cases, operators could be present in the sections located upstream from the fire (Figure 4.3.1). This situation cannot provide an overview of the experiment. In these conditions, the great number of recorded data is helpful to build interpretations concerning the phenomena developed during the fire (Figure 4.3.2). The location of the captors on 3D mesh appears fundamental for this analysis work. If some phenomena can be correctly identified, it is more difficult to deduce general laws from the full scale experiments. This is due to the relatively low number of experiments performed in each programme. It is to be noticed that their aim is not the research of such relations. For example, the Japanese tests were partly planned to give qualitative information about the escape routes in different air velocity control conditions. This target does not appear to be compatible with the use of the results in scientific models. A characteristic of the EUREKA 499 experiments is the use of real road and rail vehicles as fire loads. As the heat release rate of such fires is one of the unanswered questions concerning the risks, the operators took this opportunity to perform the corresponding measurements. The heat confining seemed to increase the burning rates. Actually, the interpretations of results performed with different methods show different results [65].
Figure 4.3.2 - Deux tourbillons (dus la conjugaison de la force hydrostatique et de la trane de lincendie) peuvent tre dduits des courbes isothermes calcules partir des mesures (section transversale situe 20 m en aval de lincendie lors de lessai lheptane H32, EUREKA 499 [64])
0 16
14 0
0 12
14
0
0 10
100
80
60
120
16
Because of the uncertainties on the measurement results, the interpretations generally conclude that the calculated heat release rate is linked to the method used for its evaluation. Nevertheless, some of the conclusions drawn from the heavy goods vehicle fire (EUROTUNNEL test) appear in a relative opposition with the information available in previous PIARC recommendations. In the Brussels report [19], the heat release rate of a burning HGV was mentioned as 20 MW. The EUREKA results show higher peak values: some were found above 100 MW during a few minutes.
60
12 0
Figure 4.3.2 - Two vortices (induced by the combination of buoyancy and fire drag effects) can be deduced from the isothermal curves calculated from the measurements (cross-section located 20 m downstream the fire in EUREKA 499 heptane test H32, [64])
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IV.4.1.2 Research
Research works can also use small scale models for scien-tific reasons. If some specific behaviours have to be charac-terised, the best solution can be to show them using totally controllable methods. Complementary tests may be perfor-med with full scale facilities. The Photo 4.4.1 - Small scale model Photo 4.4.1 Maquette chelle rduite used to study ceiling trap doors utilise pour tudier les trappes knowledge of the laws daspiration en plafond obtained with the models is useful to plan the full scale experiments. Small scale models have been used to characterise the efficiency of ceiling trap doors for smoke extraction [71] or to determine of the non-dimensional laws governing the existence of backlayering [72].
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Ce chapitre traite principalement des simulations numriques par modle de champ, bien quil existe dautres simulations pouvant tre utilises pour tudier les incendies, comme les modles de zone ou les modles unidimensionnels.
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Figure 4.5.2 - Temperature field calculated with a CFD model for a tunnel with smoke exhaust shafts
Figure 4.5.2 Champ de temprature calcul l'aide d'un modle de champ pour un tunnel dot de puits d'extraction
This chapter will be mainly focused on CFD codes, even though there are also other models which can be used to study fire situations in tunnel, as zone models or one-dimensional models.
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dilution des polluants ( l'intrieur du tunnel), respect de l'environnement ( l'extrieur du tunnel), matrise des fumes en cas d'incendie.
Ce chapitre donne des dfinitions et des critres pour lvaluation des niveaux de scurit et le dimensionnement des systmes de ventilation selon les critres de matrise des incendies et des fumes. Un systme de ventilation conu uniquement partir des critres environnementaux et de dilution donnera souvent des rsultats insatisfaisants du point de vue de la matrise des fumes. De plus, les normes environnementales forcent les constructeurs de vhicules, aujourdhui plus quhier et probablement de plus en plus lavenir, amliorer la technologie de rduction des missions des vhicules ; ainsi, le dbit dair requis pour le critre de dilution est de plus de plus rduit, de mme que la puissance lectrique ncessaire. Puisque la matrise des fumes est indpendante des amliorations technologiques, ses critres seront lavenir dcisifs pour un nombre toujours croissant de projets (voir figure 5.2).
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dilution of air pollutants (inside tunnels), environmental issues (outside tunnel), smoke control in case of fire.
Figure 5.1 shows a possible logical flow of ventilation design. This section aims at giving the definitions and criteria for the assessment of the safety levels, and for the dimensioning of the ventilation system according to fire and smoke control criterion. A ventilation system designed only according to dilution and environmental criteria will often be unsatisfactory from the smoke control point of view. Furthermore the environmental standards force new vehicle producers (now more than in the past and more and more, probably, in the future) to upgrade their technology to reduce the emissions of the new vehicles; consequently the air flow required to meet the dilution criterion is more and more reducing, and therefore also the required mechanical power. As smoke control is independent of the aforementioned technological upgrading, the smoke control criterion will be, in the future, the decisive one for an increasing number of projects (see figure 5.2).
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Du point de vue du critre de dilution, la ventilation est considre satisfaisante lorsque le systme est capable de maintenir la concentration de polluants dans le tunnel en dessous de certains seuils, qui sont videmment infrieurs aux niveaux nocifs pour les usagers qui traversent le tunnel ou qui sont contraints d'y rester arrts pendant un certain temps. Un systme de ventilation conu uniquement en fonction du critre de dilution pourrait suffire du point de vue de la matrise des fumes, mais cela savre insuffisant la plupart du temps. Le projet doit alors tre complt afin de prendre en compte les critres de matrise des fumes numrs au V.7.2.
Dans les tunnels ventilation longitudinale, la concentration en substances nocives saccrot dans la direction du flux dair et diminue avec le dbit dair pur. La concentration maximale augmente selon la longueur du tunnel. Dans tous les cas, la production de polluants varie avec le volume de circulation, sa vitesse, la dclivit de la chausse et laltitude du tunnel. Ainsi, en calculant le dbit ncessaire pour la ventilation de deux tunnels ayant le mme trafic, on trouvera le dbit le plus lev pour le plus long tunnel et pour celui avec la plus grande pente ascendante. La vitesse longitudinale de lair possde une limite suprieure pratique ; par consquent, pour une circulation et une dclivit donnes, la longueur du tunnel pour laquelle une ventilation longitudinale est possible est galement limite. En premire estimation, la limite suprieure peut tre value par la connaissance de la section transversale du tunnel et de la vitesse maximale de lair (aujourdhui denviron 8 10 m/s 1), qui est rentable et ne perturbe pas les vhicules et le personnel travaillant lintrieur du tunnel. De plus, la puissance mcanique du systme de ventilation augmente en ralit avec la puissance trois de la longueur du tunnel dans les tunnels circulation bidirectionnelle. Pour les tunnels qui ncessitent un courant dair suprieur aux seuils dj cits, la ventilation longitudinale est toujours possible, mais elle doit tre complte par des puits assurant des changes massifs entre air vici et air pur.
1 Par exemple, les autorits franaises recommandent une vitesse maximale de lair de 8 m/s pour des tunnels bidirectionnels et 10 m/s pour des tunnels unidirectionnels.
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From the point of view of the dilution criterion, the ventilation is considered satisfactory when the system is able to keep the concentration of pollutants in the tunnel air below certain thresholds, which are obviously under the noxious levels for people who travel throughout the tunnel or who are forced to be stationary within for a while. A ventilation system designed only according to the above-exposed dilution criterion, could be satisfactory also from the smoke control point of view, but is often not; thus the project has to be verified to take into account the smoke control criteria exposed in V.7.2. In tunnels with longitudinal ventilation, the concentration of noxious substances increases in the direction of the airflow and decreases with the fresh air rate. The maximum concentration increases according to the tunnel length. In any cases, the production of pollutants varies with the traffic volume, its velocity, the roadway gradient and the tunnel altitude. Therefore, if we compute the required airflow for the ventilation of two tunnels with the same (flowing) traffic, we would find the greater flow rate for the longer one and for the tunnel with the greater upward slope. The longitudinal airflow velocity has a practical upper limit; consequently, for a given traffic and slope of the roadway, the tunnel length for which longitudinal ventilation is possible has a maximum limit too. As a first estimate, this upper limit could be evaluated knowing the cross2 sectional area of the tunnel and the maximum air velocity (today considered to be about 8 to 10 m/s) which is cost effective and does not disturb vehicles and the staff operating within the tunnel. Moreover, the mechanical power of the ventilation system increases, in fact, with the third power of the tunnel length in tunnels used bi-directionally. For tunnels that require an overall airflow over the aforementioned threshold, the longitudinal ven-tilation is still possible, but it has to be supplemented with shafts for massive exchange of exhaust with fresh air.
2 For instance, the French authorities recommend a maximum air velocity of 8 m/s for two-way tunnels and 10 m/s for oneway tunnels.
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Such flow is perturbed by other factors (differences in wind pressure on tunnel openings, atmospheric pressure differences, traffic, fire in the tunnel, etc.) which create a longitudinal airflow. This means that, in practice, a flow which is purely transverse to the longitudinal axis of the tunnel will hardly ever occur. A second aspect which attracts the attention is that the longitudinal airflow is difficult to control even if the transverse ventilation system has a large capacity because there are no compensating forces present in the longitudinal direction. The most usual way to get some control on this longitudinal airflow is to create successive independent ventilation sections in which fresh air injection and/or exhaust air extraction can be operated separately. The concentration of pollution in the air is constant all over the tunnel (if there is no longitudinal airflow). This system is therefore suitable for application in long tunnels. In principle there is no limit to the tunnel length as far as the pollution removal is concerned; but of course technical and economic restrictions apply.
The ventilating air is generally supplied and extracted through purpose built air ducts. The total volume of ventilating air required is considerable, especially in long tunnels. As a result the ducts are large and therefore expensive. The air velocity in the ducts determines the required capacity of the fans to a significant extent. In long tunnels the ducts system is therefore longitudinally divided into sections and the air is supplied at various places in order to restrict the air speed in the various sections. Speeds of 15 to 25 m/s in the air ducts under full load conditions are usual. As already mentioned, creating several independent ventilation sections also provides a means to have some control on the longitudinal airflow. The fans are usually installed near the tunnel portals in order to be easy to reach, or in underground plants.
In case of a fire, the exhaust air duct in the fire area is turned on to full exhaust and the neighbouring ventilation sections are controlled in such a way that a longitudinal air velocity in the fire zone can move the smoke in a suitable way. However, experience shows that, in short tunnels and under the influence of the wind and chimney effect of the hot smoke, it is not easy to control the air direction and speed in the fire zone.
Normal operation
Exploitation normale
Fire
Incendie
Figure 5.1.2 - Example of a transverse ventilation system (without secondary supply ducts to pavement level)
Figure 5.1.2 - Exemple dun systme de ventilation transversale (sans carneaux descendant au niveau du sol)
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Recently very interesting results have also been obtained from fire tests performed in scale models [95] or in full size in the Memorial Tunnel [22]. These show that above a given level of heat release (probably depending on tunnel cross-section and slope) the critical velocity depends less on heat release rate than in the above equation. All these results tend to show that for a heat release rate not exceeding 100 MW and a slope lower than 4%, an airflow velocity of 3 m/s is sufficient to prevent backlayering. The design of the ventilation system and its operation must take into consideration that, due to the presence of the longitudinal airflow, the zone downstream of the fire is exposed to smoke and hot combustion gases with the danger of suffocation or burning if tunnel users are in this zone. Any possible design measure aiming at a safe fleeing of users from the dangerous section (fire area or downstream) must be taken. For this reason the present recom-mendations take into consideration the following cases:
A) Tunnel with one-way traffic not designed for queues (non-urban area) The ventilation design, in this case, can assume that drivers downstream of the fire are free to escape by their own cars whilst drivers upstream will not. Tunnels located in non-urban areas are generally not liable to frequent congestion situations. Therefore the relevant ventila-tion systems are generally not desi-gned for queues. Nonurban tunnels which are frequently congested have instead to be designed for queues (see follo-wing paragraph). The event of a fire ignited by vehicles involved in a secondary acci-dent in the pre-sence of others vehicles trapped downstream is possible, but the relevant probability is low (see section II); this case is nearly never taken into account in the design Figure 5.7.2 - Design Figure 5.7.2 Hypothses phase. If necessary the assumption de circulation tudier risk of such an for the traffic occurrence can be reduced by an automatic incident detection and a traffic control system (see section VI). B) Tunnel with one-way traffic designed for queues (urban area) The ventilation design must take into consideration that people prevented from escaping with their own vehicles can likely stand on both sides of the fire. In urban areas it is quite usual to find stop and go traffic situation, therefore this case applies generally to urban tunnels of sufficient length. C) Tunnel with two-way traffic In case of tunnels used by vehicles running in both directions, it must be taken into consideration that, in the event of fire, people prevented from escaping with their own vehicles will generally be located on both sides of the fire.
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Extraction capacity
Once a design fire and its amount of smoke production have been chosen, a permissible length over which the smoke may spread has to be fixed. Depending on the type of exhaust openings (fixed or remote-controlled), the extraction capacity per metre of tunnel length in the fire zone is derived. In general an extraction system needs less total exhaust volume when remotecontrolled flaps are installed than with fixed openings. However, it has also to be considered that in the first phase between start of the smoke spreading and full operation of the exhaust system with large flaps, the smoke may have spread over 1 km and more from the fire site. Thus it is not sufficient to only open a few exhaust openings near the fire, but a minimum exhaust rate along the whole ventilation section is recommended also. A suction strategy has to be developed depending on the type of tunnel and its ventilation system.
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Test
Puissance thermique atteinte nominale en pointe (MW) (MW) 20 15,5 50 52,1 Nominal Actual Peak (MW) (MW) Heat Release Rate
La fume remplit La couche de fume commence l'espace de descendre (mn) circulation (mn) 5+ 3 Smoke Layer begins Descent (mn) 6+ 4
Smoke Fills Carriageway (mn)
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In underwater tunnels these accesses are located at the portals and may be equipped with escalators or lifts.
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Lvacuation des tunnels se fait gnralement pied. Dans certains tunnels, un service spcial de secours est mis en place pour les conducteurs bloqus.
3m 12 - 24 m
Certains pays prvoient des galeries de retournement pour les vhicules dans les tunnels longs (plus de deux km) faible circulation (moins de 2 000 3 000 vh/jour). Les vhicules particuliers peuvent faire demi-tour dans un garage traditionnel (3 m x 12 m) et les petits camions dans un garage un peu plus grand (3 m x 24 m). Pour les poids lourds et les bus, des galeries de retournement sont ncessaires. Elles font gnralement 4 m x 17 m, parfois plus, et doivent tre situes tous les un deux kilomtres. Dans les tunnels fort trafic, le retournement des vhicules pour lvacuation nest pas recommand, car cela peut crer des difficults de circulation pouvant provoquer une panique. Un pays prvoit ce genre dinstallations uniquement pour les vhicules de secours. Lorsquil ny a pas de fume, les usagers pied prfrent quitter le tunnel par le tube lui-mme. Dans les tunnels superficiels, spcialement dans les villes, lorsque la circulation est intense, des galeries dvacuation vers lextrieur doivent tre construites. De telles galeries doivent pouvoir permettre de quitter le tunnel intervalles rguliers, par exemple tous les 100 200 m en ville. Ces galeries peuvent dboucher sur dautres installations souterraines, comme des parcs de stationnement ou des caves. Dans les tunnels profonds, des galeries dvacuation spares ne sont habituellement pas prvues en raison de leur cot lev. Cependant, si elles ont t construites pour des raisons techniques, elles doivent tre quipes de manire fournir un itinraire sr en cas d'urgence. Les abris sont des enceintes spcialement quipes dune alimentation spciale et indpendante en air frais et dun tlphone de secours. Les abris doivent rsister aux tempratures qui rgnent proximit immdiate dun incendie. Cependant, leffet psychologique sur les personnes sy rfugiant nest pas bien connu. Si les abris sont utiliss, ils doivent tre placs au niveau des garages et conus de manire accueillir les personnes jusqu larrive des quipes de secours (plusieurs heures). Ils doivent tre suffisamment vastes pour accueillir le nombre maximum de personnes pouvant se trouver entre deux abris.
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Tunnels are usually evacuated on foot. In some tunnels a special rescue service is provided for blocked drivers.
17 m
4m
Some countries provide turning bays for vehicles in long tunnels (more than 2 km) with low traffic (less than 2000-3000 vehicles per day). Private cars can turn in a regular lay-by (3 m by 12 m) and smaller trucks in a larger lay-by (3 m by 24 m). For heavy goods vehicles and buses, turning galleries are needed. These are usually 4 m by 17 m or larger. When they are used, they should be placed every 1-2 kilometres. In tunnels with heavy traffic, the turning of vehicles for evacuation is not recommended, because of the possibility of creating traffic problems which may result in panic. A country provides turning facilities which can be used by safety vehicles only.
When there is no smoke, tunnel users on foot prefer to leave the tunnel through the tube itself . In shallow tunnels, especially in cities, where the traffic is generally high, escape corridors to the open should be built. Such corridors should give an exit possibility from the tunnel at regular intervals, for example 100 - 200 metres in cities. Such escape corridors may run into other underground premises, such as car parks or cellars.
In deep tunnels, separate escape tunnels are usually not built, because they are very costly. However, if they are built for technical reasons during the construction of the tunnel, they should be equipped to provide a safe evacuation route during an emergency. Shelters are specially equipped enclosures with a separate special fresh air supply and an emergency telephone service. Shelters should withstand the temperatures that exist very near a fire. However, the psychological effect of making people use them is not well known. If shelters are used, they should be placed at lay-bys and designed to hold people as long as needed by the rescue team (several hours). They should be large enough to take in the number of persons expected to be between two shelters.
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tunnel tube on foot; passage (cross-connection) between tunnel tubes; direct communication to the open; escape corridor or separate escape gallery.
Direct communications to the open are also possible in shallow two-tube tunnels and tunnel ramps. Long ramps should have connections to other tubes or to the open. In cut-and-cover and immersed structures, a special escape corridor can be placed between the two tubes. This emergency corridor should be lighted and have a special ventilation system.
The most common escape route in twotube tunnels is a connection (cross passage) between the two tubes. The distance between connections should depend on traffic density and emergency rescue scenarios, for instance 100 - 200 m in cities. This distance should be designed so that people can walk to the nearest exit before smoke reduces visibility. When such cross-connections are used, the tunnel operator must consider that people will walk into the second tube. As a consequence the traffic in this other tube must be stopped immediately. Photo 6.2 - Galerie de retournement
dans un tunnel faible circulation en Norvge
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Netherlands Two powder extinguishers (9 kg) are provided every 50 m on each side of the roadway. Norway Fire extinguishers are required in all tunnels, located every 150 m in booths. Removal of extinguishers should give alarm.
Photo 6.5 A fire extinguisher box with a push button fire alarm in a tunnel in Japan Photo 6.5 Coffret dextincteurs avec un bouton-poussoir dans un tunnel au Japon
United Kingdom For all tunnels, emergency panels at about 50 m regular intervals contain 2 x 3 kg dry powder extinguishers or 9 litre AFFF foam, and 45 m hose of 19 mm internal diameter.
United States Portable fire extinguishers are required in tunnels of 240 m long or more. Each location must have at least one 9 kg multipurpose fire extinguisher placed on both sides of the tunnel in wellmarked cabinets at spacing of not more than 90 m.
VI.3.2.3 Recommendations
Since most vehicle fires start as a small fire which can be readily extinguished with a portable fire extinguisher, extinguishers should be provided in road tunnels. The portable fire extinguishers should be located in conspicuously marked boxes or recesses at uniformly spaced intervals.
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Sweden Emergency telephones are provided in all tunnels and push button alarms in some tunnels. Switzerland SOS telephones are installed in booths spaced every 150 m. United Kingdom All tunnels have emergency telephones at 50 m intervals in lay-bys and at tunnel portals on the approach road. United States All road tunnels longer than 240 m are recommended to have emergency communications and alarm systems.
VI.3.5.3 Recommendations
It is recommended that all road tunnels with a sufficient length or traffic be equipped with a system of emergency telephones located through the length of the tunnel. Push button alarms are optional.
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France In tunnels longer than 800 m, a system is compulsory to ensure the communication of all emergency services inside the tunnel and with their headquarters. When radio channels are rebroadcast for the general public, it must be possible to interrupt them to give emergency messages, provided that there is a manned control centre. Germany: in Germany all tunnels longer than about 1000m have a radio communi-cation system. Japan: radio rebroadcast apparatus is installed in tunnels longer than 10000 m in special circumstances.
Figure 6.7 - Equipment in a tunnel in France,including safety recess with telephone and extinguishers (on the left) and radio leaky feeder (on the top of the right sidewall)
Figure 6.7 - quipements d'un tunnel franais, comprenant une niche de secours avec tlphone et extincteurs ( gauche) et un cble de retransmission (en haut droite du pidroit)
Norway: in Norway, tunnels with Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) over 5000 or tunnels longer than 2500 m have radio communication systems. United Kingdom: radio rebroadcast facilities for all emergency services are provided in all tunnels. There is no provision for commercial radio or mobile phones except in special cases, e.g. Mersey Tunnels have mobile phones transmitters. United States: radio rebroadcast systems are installed in many road tunnels in the United States.
VI.3.8.3 Recommendations
A radio communication system is recommended in important tunnels (long or with much traffic). The first priority is to allow the communication of the emergency and operation services. Rebroadcasting commercial radios gives the opportunity to pass on safety messages to the motorists in case of an emergency. However, the following difficulties must be taken into account:
the use of a single language makes it difficult for foreigners; only drivers who have a radio have switched it on and set to the proper channels can listen to the safety messages; in some countries the use of radio in this form may present a legal problem.
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by burning a mixture of 25 litres of petrol, 5 litres of gas oil and pieces of car tyre in a 4 m3 steel tank placed on the road surface, by burning an old car, by burning diesel oil or heptane. This solution permits a better repeatability. The tank surface is adapted to obtain an acceptable heat release rate (a few megawatts).
Experience shows that fires of this size are unlikely to damage the tunnel if carefully sited in relation to vulnerable equipment. If an old car is used the petrol tank must be emptied of petrol and must then be filled with water to prevent explosion.
Useful precautions
To protect the carriageway, the fire should be placed on corrugated iron sheets or a 20 cm thick bed of sand or blocks with the carriageway watered during the test. The test should be carried out before the ceiling or vault is painted or any acoustic treatment applied. Fire experience suggests that test fires of a few megawatts will not damage the ceiling provided the ventilation is operated. However, a large fire, equivalent to an HGV, can be expected to damage the ceiling. Sidewall equipment is not likely to be affected, but plastered plates covering the sidewalls for a length of 8 m, the lighting for 10 m and cables for 20 m can be employed as a precaution.
Test report
The test report should record the attending personnel, the object, conditions and method of the tests, the initial condition, instrumentation, description of the development of the fire including the smoke movement, measured data and analysis, evalua-tion of the fire intensity and les-sons to be drawn.
Figure 8.1 - Test of alertness at a tunnel in Norway Figure 8.1 - Exercice dalerte dans un tunnel en Norvge
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