Estrada v. Sandiganbayan GR. 148 560. November 19, 2001.

13/07/2010 0 Comments Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his coaccused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS. RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Ratio: In view of vagueness and ambiguity Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:" Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession. Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. In view of due process On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth. In view of mens rea As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says,

in his Concurring Opinion . . . Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effect and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it. In view of presumption of innocence At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical precision how the law should be interpreted under any and all given situations. The application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative enactments. A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the ends that are sought to be attained by its enactment. Viewed broadly, "plunder involves not just plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not just private parties or personal interests but the nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped permanently." In view of estoppel Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute. What is RICO Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States federal law that provides for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970). RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. 19611968. While its intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were actively engaged in organized crime, its application has been more widespread. In view of facial challenge A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. In view of burden of proof (accused) according to PANGANIBAN, J. In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to the Constitution before this Court may declare its unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute allows to be done. 40 To justify the nullification of the law, there must be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution; not a doubtful, argumentative implication. 41 Of some terms in the law which are easily clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at best, managed merely to point out alleged ambiguities. Far from establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring conflict with the Constitution, the constitutional challenge to the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption of constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of proof. Petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates proof of each and every component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern of over or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy." All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often perceived to be the reality with respect to the crime of plunder that "the actual extent of the crime may not, in its breadth and entirety, be discovered, by reason of the 'stealth and secrecy' in which it is committed and the involvement of 'so many persons here and abroad and [the fact that it] touches so many states and territorial units."' "The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. 'The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality . . . To doubt is to sustain.' In view of burden of proof (State) according to KAPUNAN, J. The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A criminal statute should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. There are three distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that individuals are properly warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This "fair notice" rationale was articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out with mathematical certainty the standards to which an individual must conform his conduct, it is necessary that statutes provide reasonable standards to guide prospective conduct. And where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, the standard of certainty is higher. The penalty imposable on the person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion

perpetua to death. Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably higher than that of other laws. It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot mount a "facial challenge" to the Plunder Law, and that "facial" or "on its face" challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute. Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several problematical portions of the law that were left unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" The meanings of "combination" and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear. To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder and sentence the accused to death than to convict him for each of the component crimes otherwise punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are bailable offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and immoral, are patently mala in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must clearly be established together with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paying the way for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the life and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power. In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and excitement, when the desire to do justice is tarnished by anger and vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections accorded an accused may be taken away. Substantive due process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in any law which deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other procedures leading to conviction may be fair and proper. But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation, due process is violated. Thus, an accused may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or life imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial construction takes over where Congress left off, and interpretation supplies its meaning. The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Substantive due process requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and uncertain. More explicitly That the terms of a penal statute. . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process. In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 9 A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A statute is vague or overbroad, in violation of the due process clause, where its language does not convey sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important element of the criminal acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed. Equally disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder Law which does away with the requirement that each and every component of the criminal act of plunder be proved and instead limits itself to proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or conspiracy. 18 In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy, and does away with the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes are concerned. In other words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because the law requires merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful scheme or conspiracy. I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the specifications of details in an information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An information cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even the construction by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision can supply the missing ingredients of the Plunder Law. The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care with which a complaint or information should be drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required of an information should also be present in the law upon which the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity in the information will come from the prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of Congress. In view of vagueness according to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime possesses inviolable rights founded on the Constitution which even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how socially-relevant the purpose of a law is, it must be nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused. When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the enumerated "criminal acts" under Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as essential elements of plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play. As a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. The State may not specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. 8 With more reason, it should not be allowed to go around the principle by characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a "means" of committing the crime. For the result is the reduction of the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be convinced of the existence of a "combination or series." As to which criminal acts constitute a combination or series, the Justices need not be in full agreement. Surely, this would cover-up a wide disagreement among them about just what the accused actually did or did not do. Stated differently, even if the Justices are not unified in their determination on what criminal acts were actually committed by the accused, which need not be proved under the law, still, they could convict him of plunder. The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three of the acts enumerated under Section 1(d) thereof." 33 But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least three times. And the Office of the Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the House of Representatives, contends differently. It defines the term series as a "repetition" or pertaining to "two or more." A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already punished with lesser penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be cured by judicial construction. In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr. Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The issue before this Court is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the constitutionality of the law. I vote to grant the petition, not because I favor Mr. Estrada, but because I look beyond today and I see that this law can pose a serious threat to the life, liberty and property of anyone who may come under its unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this Court, my duty is to see to it that the law conforms to the Constitution and no other. I simply cannot, in good conscience, fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.

DOMINGO VS BALLENA (GR 168111) DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision[2] and Resolution[3]of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 and 9 May 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 79101. The appellate courts Decision set aside the Resolutions[4] of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dated 19 March 2002 and 9 August 2002, and reinstated the Final Resolution[5] of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. Nos. 01-03-1007, 01-04-1129 and 01-04-1130, which ordered the filing of two (2) informations against petitioners Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo and Robert Lim. The appellate courts Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows: Petitioners Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo and Robert Lim were officers of Footjoy Industrial Corporation (Footjoy), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing shoes and other kinds of footwear, prior to the cessation of its operations sometime in February 2001. On 19 March 2001, respondent Amelito Ballena,[6] and one hundred thirty-nine (139) other employees of Footjoy, filed a Joint ComplaintAffidavit[7] before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan against the company and petitioners Tan and Domingo in their capacities as owner/president and administrative officer, respectively.[8] The Complaint-Affidavit alleged that the company did not regularly report the respondent employees for membership at the Social Security System (SSS) and that it likewise failed to remit their SSS contributions and payment for their SSS loans, which were already deducted from their wages. According to respondents, these acts violated Sections 9, 10, 22 and 24, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 8282;[9] as well as Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f), and (h) thereof, in relation to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portions of which read: SEC. 9. Coverage. - (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon all employees not over sixty (60) years of age and their employers: x x x Provided, finally, That nothing in this Act shall be construed as a limitation on the right of employers and employees to agree on and adopt benefits which are over and above those provided under this Act. SEC. 10. Effective Date of Coverage. - Compulsory coverage of the employer shall take effect on the first day of his operation and that of the employee on the day of his employment: x x x. SEC. 22. Remittance of Contributions. -- (a) The contribution imposed in the preceding section shall be remitted to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid. If deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the collection and remittance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semi-annually in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective employers: Provided, That upon separation of an employee, any contribution so paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to his employer. (b) The contributions payable under this Act in cases where an employer refuses or neglects to pay the same shall be collected by the SSS in the same manner as taxes are made collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. Failure or refusal of the employer to pay or remit the contributions herein prescribed shall not prejudice the right of the covered employee to the benefits of the coverage. The right to institute the necessary action against the employer may be commenced within twenty (20) years from the time the delinquency is known or the assessment is made by the SSS, or from the time the benefit accrues, as the case may be. (c) Should any person, natural or juridical, defaults in any payment of contributions, the Commission may also collect the same in either of the following ways: 1. By an action in court, which shall hear and dispose of the case in preference to any other civil action; x x x. SEC. 24. Employment Records and Reports. xxxx (b) Should the employer misrepresent the true date of employment of the employee member or remit to the SSS contributions which are less than those required in this Act or fail to remit any contribution due prior to the date of contingency, resulting in a reduction of benefits, the employer shall pay to the SSS damages equivalent to the difference between the amount of benefit to which the employee member or his beneficiary is entitled had the proper contributions been remitted to the SSS and the amount payable on the basis of the contributions actually remitted: x x x. SEC. 28. Penal Clause. xxxx (e) Whoever fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this Act or with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission, shall be punished by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), or imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more than twelve (12) years, or both, at the discretion of the court: Provided, That, where the violation consists in failure or refusal to register employees or himself, in case of the covered self-employed, or to deduct contributions from the employees compensation and remit the same to the SSS, the

penalty shall be a fine of not less Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more than twelve (12) years. (f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the offense. xxxx (h) Any employer who after deducting the monthly contributions or loan amortizations from his employees comp ensation, fails to remit the said deductions to the SSS within thirty (30) days from the date they became due shall be presumed to have misappropriated such contributions or loan amortizations and shall suffer the penalties provided in Article Three hundred fifteen of the Revised Penal Code. Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: xxxx 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. Respondents also alleged their entitlement to actual and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit,[10] petitioners Tan and Domingo blamed the economic distress that beset their company for their failure to timely pay and update the monthly SSS contributions of the employees. They alleged that the companys dire situation became even more aggravated when the buildings and equipment of Footjoy were destroyed by fire on 4 February 2001.[11] This incident eventually led to the cessation of the companys operations. Because of this, some of the companys employees tried to avail themselves of their SSS benefits but failed to do so. It was then that the employees filed their complaint. Petitioners Tan and Domingo thereafter underlined their good faith and lack of criminal culpability when they acknowledged their fault and demonstrated their willingness to pay their obligations by executing a memorandum of agreement with the SSS on 10 April 2001, the pertinent portions of which read: April 10, 2001 FOOTJOY INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION Antonio Tan President Mercado St., Guiguinto, Bulacan Dear Mr. Antonio Tan, Pursuant to Office Order No. 141-V dated February 2, 1995, your application to pay on installment the amount of P5,227,033.66 representing SS premium contribution and penalties for the period August 2000 up to January 2001 is hereby approved subject, however, to the following terms and conditions: 1. That the amount of P5,227,033.66 be paid in twenty-four (24) monthly installment (sic): xxxx 2. Upon payment, you are hereby directed to submit to us within three days the official receipt as proof of payment of the monthly installment; and, 3. That in the event of default in the payment of at least two (2) monthly installments or non-compliance with the payment plan, the employers total outstanding obligations shall become due and demandable without need of further notice otherwise, we will pursue legal action against you. Please be guided accordingly. Very truly yours, (Signed) Maylene M. Sanchez Branch Head CONFORME: (Signed) Antonio Tan[12] On 17 May 2001, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution, [13] which found probable cause to charge Footjoy, Antonio Tan, and Danilo Domingo with violations of Sections 9, 10 and 24, paragraph (b) in relation to Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the Social Security Law. On the other hand, the charge for the violation of Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code was dismissed, as the same was deemed absorbed by the violations under the SSS Law, but the penalty imposed by the former law would be applied whenever appropriate. The Provincial Prosecutor approved the above Resolution on 29 May 2001 and affirmed the filing of informations against petitioners Tan and Domingo. On 14 June 2001, respondents filed a Motion[14] to implead five additional party respondents purportedly for being owners and/or responsible officers of Footjoy, in accordance with the above-mentioned Section 28 paragraph (f) of the SSS Law. Meanwhile, on 29 June 2001, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] of the above Joint Resolution. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Final Resolution[16] on 20 August 2001, the dispositive portion of which provides: Accordingly, the original resolution is modified by impleading therein as additional respondent Robert Lim. [17] On the other hand, two informations (one count each) for violation of Sec. 9 in relation to Sec. 10 and, Sec. 24(b) should be prepared for filing in court. All the rest found in the original resolution are maintained.

On 20 September 2001, the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Supplementary Resolution,[18] which clarified the last statement in the Final Resolution, stating that: Let it, therefore, be understood and for which this supplementary resolution is being issued, that the last recommendation of Pros. F. F. Malapit was approved as [to] the filing of two informations as contained in his approved original resolution, that is, violations of Sec. 9, 10 & 24(b) in relation to Sec. 28, pars. (e) (f) and (h) of R.A. 1161, as amended.

Thus, on 28 September 2001, the Provincial Prosecutor filed two informations against petitioners Tan, Domingo and Lim in Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. Criminal Case No. 2592-M-2001[19] charged petitioners Tan, Domingo and Lim with violation of Section 9 in relation to Section 10 and Section 28, paragraph (e) of the Social Security Law. On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 2593-M-2001 charged petitioners with violation of Section 24 paragraph (b) in relation to Section 28, paragraph (h) of said law. On 13 November 2001, petitioners filed a Petition for Review[20] with the DOJ, alleging, inter alia, that the Assistant Prosecutor committed grave and manifest error when he found probable cause to charge them with the alleged offenses. Due to the pendency of the above petition, petitioners filed with the RTC of Bulacan a motion for the suspension of their scheduled arraignment[21] in the criminal cases, in accordance with Section 11, paragraph (c) of Rule 116[22] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[23] On 19 March 2002, the DOJ resolved to grant the petition for review, [24] stating: WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is REVERSED. The Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan is hereby directed to cause the withdrawal of the informations for violation of the Social Security Law earlier filed against respondents Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo, and Robert Lim and to report the action thereon within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] of the DOJ resolution, but the same was denied in a Resolution[26] dated9 August 2002. On 16 October 2002, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari[27] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79101. Respondents claimed that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that no probable cause existed to charge petitioners Tan, Domingo and Lim with violations of the SSS Law; that the allegation of petitioners failure to report respondents to the SSS for coverage is not supported by evidence; and that charges [for the vi olation] of a special law such as the Social Security Act can be overcome by a show of good faith and lack of intent to commit the same. In a Resolution[28] issued on 29 November 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed outright the above petition because only respondents Zenaida Borlongan and Francis Bulaong, who did not possess a special power of attorney empowering them to sign on behalf of the other respondents, signed the certification of non-forum shopping. The petition was also filed only on 16 October 2002 or one day beyond the reglementary period, which ended on 15 October 2002. Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration[29] of the appellate courts resolution, contending that the procedural lapses committed by their counsel were honest and excusable mistakes and that the same should give way to their meritorious case. They, likewise, prayed for the admission of a Special Power of Attorney[30] that authorized Mercy Santomin, Zenaida Borlongan and Ronaldo Nicol to sign court pleadings and documents on their behalf. Before resolving the respondents motion, the Court of Appeals directed the respondents to amend their petition by impleading as party p etitioners the two hundred thirty-eight (238) other employees of Footjoy, whose names were not included in the title of the original petition, but were merely contained in an annexed document.[31] On 13 March 2003, respondents filed their amended petition, which was signed by only one hundred eighty employees.[32] On 2 June 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered a Resolution[33] which granted the respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the 29 November 2002 resolution and admitted the amended petition. After requiring the parties to comment, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision dated 30 September 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the resolutions of the Department of Justice dated March 19, 2002 and August 9, 2002 areVACATED and SET ASIDE, while the final resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan dated August 20, 2001 is REINSTATED.[34]

In reversing the DOJ resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that the agency acted with grave abuse of discretion when it committed a palpable mistake in dismissing the charges against petitioners. The appellate court found that petitioners were indeed remiss in their duty to remit the respondents SSS contributions in violation of Section 28(h) of the Social Security Law. The petitioners claim of good faith and the absence of criminal intent should not have been considered, as these were evidentiary in nature and should thus be more properly proved in a trial. Furthermore, the appellate court declared that said defenses are unavailing in crimes punishable by a special law, which are characterized as mala prohibita. In these crimes, it is enough that they were done freely and consciously and that the intent to commit the same need not be proved. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration[35] of the above decision, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[36] dated 9 May 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

Petitioners now come before us, pleading that we reverse the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals as we rule on the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR AND ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED OUT [OF] TIME. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) SIGNATORIES THEREAT WERE NOT ABLE TO SHOW THAT THEY WERE DULY AUTHORIZED BY THE OTHER PETITIONERS TO FILE THE PETITION ON THEIR BEHALF. III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED THE RESOLUTION OF THE DOJ WHICH FOUND OUT THAT THE PETITIONERS COULD NOT BE INDICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE SSS LAW FOR WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE.[37] Petitioners case centers on the alleged error of the Court of Appeals in giving due course to a formally defective petition. Respondents, on the other hand, pray for a liberal interpretation of the rules in pleading for their cause. We find that the petition lacks merit. Procedurally, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the respondents Petition for Certiorari even if the original petition was filed one day beyond the reglementary period allowed by the rules, and the two signatories therein were not shown to have been properly authorized by their co-petitioners to file the petition. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides for the requirements for filing a Petition for Certiorari, namely: Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (Emphases ours.)

Specifically, the requirement of verification is contained in Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

On the other hand, the fourth paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides: The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.

Finally, the reglementary period within which a Petition for Certiorari must be filed is provided for under the first paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65,[38] to wit: The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. (Emphasis ours.) In the present case, only two employees signed the original Petitions verification and certification of non -forum shopping and the same was filed one day beyond the period allowed by the rules. The appellate court initially resolved to dismiss the original petition precisely for these reasons in a Resolution dated 29 November 2002. When asked to reconsider, the appellate court ordered the filing of an amended petition in order to include all the original complainants. An amended petition was then filed in compliance with the said order, but only one hundred eighty (180) of the two hundred forty (240) original complainants signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals then granted the motion for reconsideration and resolved to reinstate the petition. Thereafter, on 30 September 2004, the assailed decision that upheld the filing of the informations against the petitioners was issued. This Court finds no fault in the assailed actions of the Court of Appeals. It is a well-settled principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. [39] In deciding a case, the appellate court has the discretion whether or not to dismiss the same, which discretion must be exercised soundly and in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account the circumstances of the case. [40] It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[41] The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it gave due course to the amended petition despite the signing of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of only some, and not all, of the original complainants. Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation of the requirements of verification and certification so that the ends of justice may be better served.[42] Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith; while the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping.[43] In Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation,[44] we ruled that the verification requirement had been substantially complied with despite the fact that only two (2) out of the twenty-five (25) petitioners have signed the petition for review and the verification. In that case, we held that the two signatories were unquestionably real parties-in-interest, who undoubtedly had sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the Petition. In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo,[45] we also ruled that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of verification when only one of the petitioners, the President of the University, signed for and on behalf of the institution and its officers. Similarly, in Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Uy ,[46] we allowed the signature of only one of the principal parties in the case despite the absence of a Board Resolution which conferred upon him the authority to represent the petitioner BCDA.

In the present case, the circumstances squarely involve a verification that was not signed by all the petitioners therein. Thus, we see no reason why we should not uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals in reinstating the petition despite the said formal defect. On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the certification of nonforum shopping. The reason for this is that the persons who have signed the certification cannot be presumed to have the personal knowledge of the other non-signing petitioners with respect to the filing or non-filing of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition. [47] The rule, however, admits of an exception and that is when the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must be able to convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.[48] In the case at bar, counsel for the respondents disclosed that most of the respondents who were the original complainants have since sought employment in the neighboring towns of Bulacan, Pampanga and Angeles City. Only the one hundred eighty (180) signatories were then available to sign the amended Petition for Certiorari and the accompanying verification and certification of non-forum shopping.[49] Considering the total number of respondents in this case and the elapsed period of almost two years since the filing of the Joint Complaint Affidavit on 19 March 2001 and the filing of the amended petition on 13 March 2003, we hold that the instant case sufficiently falls under the exception to the aforesaid rule. Thus, the Court of Appeals cannot be said to have erred in overlooking the above procedural error. We also cannot fault the act of the Court of Appeals in ordering submission of an amended petition and the reinstatement of the same despite the original petitions late filing, considering the obvious merits of the case. In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals,[50] the Court of Appeals initially dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, but on appeal, we reversed the appellate courts ruling, as petitioner had presented a good cause for th e proper determination of his case. Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed serious error when it reversed the DOJ resolution, which found that there was no probable cause to indict petitioners for any violation of the SSS Law. They argue that the DOJ is the highest agency and the ultimate authority to decide the existence or non-existence of probable cause, and that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to reverse such findings. This argument is utterly misguided. Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[51] It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.[52] The determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by the RTC are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor.[53] This broad prosecutorial power is, however, not unfettered, because just as public prosecutors are obliged to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it, they are also constrained to be circumspect in filing criminal charges against the innocent. Thus, for crimes cognizable by the regional trial courts, preliminary investigations are usually conducted. [54] As defined under the law, a preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.[55] The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.[56] This power of review, however, does not preclude this Court and the Court of Appeals from intervening and exercising our own powers of review with respect to the DOJs findings. In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[57] This is precisely the situation in the case at bar. In deciding the respondents Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals ruled that the DOJ committed palpable mistake in reversing the Final Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and, in so doing, acted with grave abuse of discretion. In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared that the DOJs dismissal of the charges against petitioners, on the g round that the evidence on record did not support the same, was incorrect. Furthermore, the appellate court held that the defenses of petitioners of good faith and lack of criminal intent should not have been considered, inasmuch as the offenses charged were for violations of a special law and are therefore characterized as mala prohibita, in which the intent to commit is immaterial. After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals findings that there was indeed probab le cause to indict petitioners for the offenses charged. In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a wellgrounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.[58] Certainly, it does not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the person. Only prima facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.[59] Therefore, matters of evidence are more appropriately presented and heard during the trial.[60] In the present case, petitioners were charged with violations of the SSS Law for their failure to either promptly report some of the respondents for compulsory coverage/membership with the SSS or remit their SSS contributions and loan amortizations. In support of their claims, respondents have attached unto their Joint Complaint-Affidavit a summary of their unreported and unremitted SSS contributions, [61] as gathered from the SSS Online Inquiry System, and a computation of their unreported and unremitted SSS contributions. [62] On the part of the petitioners, they have not denied their fault in not remitting the SSS contributions and loan payments of the respondents in violation of Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the SSS Law. Instead, petitioners interposed the defenses of lack of criminal intent and good faith, as their failure to remit was brought about by alleged economic difficulties, and they have already agreed to settle their obligations with the SSS through a memorandum of agreement to pay in installments. As held by the Court of Appeals, the claims of good faith and absence of criminal intent for the petitioners acknowledged no n-remittance of the respondents contributions deserve scant consideration. The violations charged in this case pertain to the SSS Law, which is a special law. As such, it belongs to a class of offenses known as mala prohibita. The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?[63] When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.[64] Thus, the petitioners admission in the instant case of their violations of the provisions of the SSS Law is more than enough to establish the existence of probable cause to prosecute them for the same.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30 September 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79101 and the Resolution dated 9 May 2005 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS STA MARIA (GR 169141) DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Romeo del Mundo y Sta. Maria (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 135, for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 in two (2) Informations that read:

CRIMINAL CASE No. 02-3038

That on or about the 18th of October 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and transport Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, weighing ZERO POINT ZERO THREE GRAM (0.03 gram) contained in one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

CRIMINAL CASE No. 02-3039

That on or about the 18th day of October 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control zero point zero three (0.03) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous drug in violation of the above cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. [3] Trial ensued. After trial, his co-accused Susan Pugal was acquitted from a separate charge for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. However, in a Decision[4] dated 8 September 2003, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it appearing that the guilt of the accused ROMEO DEL MUNDO y STA. MARIA was proven beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. [No.] 9165, as principal, with no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, accused is hereby sentenced:

1. In Criminal Case No. 02-3038, to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00;

2. In Criminal Case No. 02-3039, to suffer imprisonment for a period of twelve [12] years and one [1] day, as minimum, to twenty [20] years and a fine of P300,000.00; and

3. To pay the costs.

It appearing that the guilt of accused SUSAN PUGAL y PINGOL in Criminal Case No. 02-3040 was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, she is hereby acquitted of the crime of violation of Section 11 of RA [No.] 9165.

Let the zero point zero nine [0.09] gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride be turned over to the PDEA for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Culled from the records and decisions of the courts below, the antecedents follow.

The office of Cluster 2 of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) received a report from a confidential informant that a certain Romy, later identified as appellant, was engaged in the selling of prohibited drugs, particularly shabu. Proceeding from this information, the head of MADAC Cluster 2 formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation and designated MADAC agent Norman A. Bilason (Bilason) as the poseur-buyer, to be provided with two (2) marked P100 bills.[6][7]

On 18 October 2002, at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the informant accompanied Bilason to the place where appellant was reported to be plying his trade. Meantime, the rest of the MADAC and Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) operatives positioned themselves at a strategic place to monitor the transaction.[8]

Bilason and the informant approached appellant who was then standing at the corner of Pasong Tirad and Ponte Streets inTejeros, Makati and talking to his female companion, later identified as Pugal and allegedly a scorer according to the informant. The informant introduced Bilason to appellant as a buyer of shabu. Appellant asked Bilason how much he intended to buy. Bilasonreplied, Dos lang, panggamit lang. Then, appellant received the P200.00 marked money from Bilason while handing the latter one (1) plastic sachet[9] of shabu which came from the left pocket of his pants. Next, Bilason gave the pre-arranged signal. The rest of the team closed in. Bilason introduced himself as a member of MADAC and, with the team, placed appellant and Pugal under arrest. Two (2) plastic sachets[10] and the marked money were recovered from appellant while one (1)

plastic sachet[11] was confiscated from Pugal. Appellant and Pugal were duly apprised of the nature of their arrest and their constitutional rights.[12]

Afterwards, appellant and Pugal were brought to the DEU office for proper disposition. Tests conducted on the plastic sachet yielded positive results for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.[13]

The parties stipulated that the physical science report[14] was duly accomplished after the specimens of shabu had been subjected to laboratory tests. Hence, the prosecution dispensed with the presentation of the Forensic Chemist. The parties likewise stipulated that: (1) MADAC agent Diomedes Camporaso confiscated from Pugal one [1] plastic sachet suspected to contain shabu; and (2) SPO2 Wilmer Antonio was the team leader of the buy-bust operation wherein he assisted in the arrest of appellant.[15]

Appellant, a 63-year old jobless resident of Tejeros, Makati, interposed the defense of denial. He claimed that there was never a time in his life that he sold shabu. He alleged that in the afternoon of 18 October 2002, he was inside his house lying down with his grandchild. He was awakened from sleep when police officers kicked the door open and entered the house. The police officers forced him to reveal the whereabouts of the shabu and the money. Appellant replied that he does not sell shabu. Then, the police officers searched the house but were not able to find anything. Subsequently, appellant was asked to go out of the house and board the police officers service vehicle for allegedly selling shabu. Appellant entrusted his grandchild to his wifes sibling.[16]

At the DEU office, appellant was told to escape but he did not as he claimed not to have done anything wrong. Ten (10) minutes after, Pugal arrived. Appellant came to know of the charges against him on the day he was arrested. Allegedly, these are false charges but appellant failed to file any complaint against the arresting officer for lack of money. [17]

Appellant was found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for automatic review. In a Resolution [18] dated 6 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 159854-56,[19] the cases were transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Courts ruling in People v. Mateo.[20]

Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that the trial court erred in: (1) according greater weight to the evidence adduced by the prosecution and disregarding the defense of denial interposed by appellant; and (2) finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged.[21]

The Court of Appeals in a Decision[22] dated 27 June 2005, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00232, affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Romeo del Mundo y Sta. Maria is herebyACQUITTED in Crim. Case No. 02-3039. His conviction in Crim. Case No. 02-3038 for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165 and all other aspects of the Decision are maintained.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The Court of Appeals held that in Criminal Case No. 02-3038, the details of the sale of shabu between appellant and the MADAC operatives have been clearly and sufficiently shown.[24] However, the appellate court entertained doubts with respect to appellants culpability in Criminal Case No. 02 3039 resulting to his acquittal therein. The appellate court observed that the prosecution did not produce evidence to show that appellant was actually in possession of the second sachet supposedly containing shabu.[25]

Appellant is now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the Court of Appeals, though this time he questions only his conviction in Criminal Case No. 02-3038, for the illegal sale of shabu, as he was acquitted of the charge in Criminal Case No. 02-3039 by the appellate court. Through his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief) [26] dated 14 November 2005, appellant stated that will not file a Supplemental Brief and in lieu thereof, he will adopt the Appellants Brief he had filed before the appellate court. The Office of the Sol icitor General likewise manifested that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief.[27]

Appellant principally contends that the non-presentation before the trial court of the informant and witnesses other than MADAC agents Bilason and Camporaso militates against the trustworthiness of the prosecutions theory. [28]

The Court is not persuaded.

The pertinent provision of Article II of R.A. 9165[29] reads as follows:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.- The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.000) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[30] What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has been actually committed. It has two elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event; and (2) some persons criminal responsibility for the act.[31]

MADAC agent Bilason, the poseur-buyer, clearly established that an illegal sale of shabu actually took place and that appellant was the author thereof. He testified as follows:

Fiscal Moreno to witness:

Q: A:

How did you come to know the accused in this case? On October 18, 2002, we arrested both accused Romeo del Mundo and Susan Pugal.

Q: A:

For what particular offense? For violation of Sections 5 and 11.

Q: A:

Did you conduct a buy-bust operation against said accused? Yes, sir.

Q: A:

Was the buy bust operation successful? Yes, sir.

Q:

In connection with the buy-bust operation that you conducted against the accused, do you recall having executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest? Yes, sir.

A:

Q: A:

If that affidavit will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same? Yes, sir.

Q:

I am showing to you a Pinagsanib Na Sinumpaang Salaysay. Please go over this and tell the Court if this is the same affidavit that you executed? Yes, sir.

A:

Fiscal Moreno:

This was previously marked as Exhibits A and A-1.

xxxx

Fiscal Moreno:

For purposes of expediency and to save the material time of the Honorable Court, we propose for stipulation with the defense that thisPinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaylay (sic) will form part as the direct testimony of the witness.

Atty. Quiambao:

We agree, your Honor.

x x x x[32]

In the Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay,[33] Bilason together with SPO2 Wilmer Antonio and MADAC AgentCamporaso narrated in detail the sale of shabu made by appellant to Bilason. Based on a tip from a confidential informant, a team composed of MADAC and DEU agents was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team proceeded to the place wherein, according to the confidential informant, appellant allegedly conducted his transactions. After introductions were made, Bilasonhanded the marked money to appellant while the latter in turn handed him one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu. Appellant was thereafter immediately arrested.[34]

The result of the laboratory examination conducted on the white crystalline substance confiscated from appellant and forwarded to the crime laboratory of the Philippine National Police confirms the testimony that indeed, what was sold by appellant was shabu. The results of the examination states:

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE result to the tests for the presence of Methylamphetaminehydrochloride, a dangerous drugs. x x x x

CONCLUSION:

Specimens A to C contains Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drugs. x x x x[35]

Moreover, Bilason was able to present and identify in court the confiscated drugs and the marked money, which are corroborating pieces of evidence of the corpus delicti, thus:

Fiscal Moreno:

Q:

You likewise stated in your Affidavit that you were able to buy shabu from the accused and confiscated another plastic sachets (sic) containing shabu. If those items will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same? Yes, sir.

A:

Q: A:

I am showing to you a white envelope, do you know the contents of this envelope? Yes, sir. Three plastic sachets.

Q:

Will you go over these plastic sachets and tell us which of these plastic sachets you were able to buy from accused Del Mundo?

A:

This one with marking RDMS.

Fiscal Moreno:

We request that this white envelope be marked as Exhibit E and this plastic sachet with marking RDMS be marked as E[x]hibit E-1.[36]

xxxx

Fiscal Moreno:

Q:

You said in your Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay that in conducting the buy bust operation against the accused, you used buy bust money consisting of two pieces of One Hundred Peso bills. If that two pieces of One Hundred Peso bills will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same? Yes, sir.

A:

Q:

I am showing to you two pieces of One Hundred Peso bills, will you please tell us if these are the same buy bust money which you used in conducting the buy bust operation against the accused? This is the photocopy of the buy bust money we used in the operation.

A:

x x x x[37]

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.[38] The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummates the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. [39] Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserves full faith and credit.[40]

It is very clear from the testimony of Bilason and the other members of the team bear that their narration of events was positive, probable and in accord with human experience. It bears the badges of truth, such that it is difficult for a rational mind not to find it credible. Thus, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.

In addition, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties has not been controverted; hence, the Court is bound to uphold it. Appellant failed to prove that in testifying against him, Bilason and the other members of the team were motivated by reasons other than the duty to curb the sale of dangerous drugs. There is no proof of any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police authorities to impute falsely such a serious crime to appellant.[41]

On the non-presentation of the informant, the rule is that his presentation in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would merely be corroborative and cumulative. Informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. Here, the agents directly testified regarding the entrapment, and the testimony of the informant would merely have been corroborative.

Appellants defenses of denial and alibi are unavailing. It bears emphasis that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate entrapment operation conducted by the MADAC and DEU agents. Hence, his identity as the person who sold the dangerous drug to Bilason cannot be doubted anymore. Such positive identification prevails over his weak defenses of denial and alibi.

In People v. Isnani,[42] we ruled that:

The defenses of denial and alibi have been invariably viewed by us with disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[43]

Appellants contention that the police authorities intruded his house and that he only failed to file ch arges against them due to lack of money could neither be believed. Appellant did not bother to present any evidence to support this contention. It likewise bears stressing that the police authorities are presumed to have performed their duty in a regular manner.[44]

In fine, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that appellant is guilty of the crime of illegal sale of shabu. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 27 June 2005 of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 00232 finding appellant Romeo del Mundo y Sta. Maria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 02-3038 for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA (GR 172116) DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00975, dated December 20, 2005, affirming in toto the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 72, in Crim. Case No. 27159-MN finding appellant Roger Villanueva y Huelva guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (2002), otherwise known as theComprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and costs.

The Information dated July 11, 2002 against the appellant alleges:

That on or about the 9th day of July, 2002 in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a private person and without authority of law, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver in consideration of the amount of P100.00 to poseur buyer One (1) heatsealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with net weight 0.21 gram, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known shabu, a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

Appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.[4]

PO1 Ariosto Rana of the Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Group (DDEG), Northern Police District, testified that at 8:00 p.m.of July 9, 2002, a confidential informant informed them that appellant was selling shabu at Block 8, lot 2, Phase 2, Area 1, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas.[5] He immediately composed a team of police operatives to entrap the appellant,[6] with him posing as the poseur-buyer. After marking the P100.00 bill and recording in the blotter its serial number, the team proceeded to the place and arrived thereat around 9:30 p.m. He and the informant approached the appellant while the rest strategically positioned themselves. The informant introduced him to the appellant, who asked them if they wanted to buy shabu. Appellant got one plastic sachet from his pocket containing a white crystalline substance. After appellant received the marked money, Rana executed the prearranged signal and the team arrested the appellant. The confiscated substance was submitted to the Northern Police District-Crime Laboratory for examination,[7] which yielded the following results: SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: A one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings RVH BB containing 0.21 gram of white crystalline substance. x xx. xxxx FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x[8] Denying the accusations against him, appellant testified that on the night of the alleged commission of the crime, he was at home watching television. Thereafter, two policemen knocked at the door looking for a certain person named Roger. When he identified himself as Roger, he was immediately handcuffed and brought to the headquarters without explanation. It was only later that he found out that he was being charged for selling shabu.[9]

After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Roger Villanueva y Huelva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for drug pushing, penalized under Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165 and he is hereby sentenced, in view of the small quantity of shabu involved, toLife Imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, and to pay the costs. The decks of shabu subjects of this case are forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed of under the rules governing the same. OIC-Branch Clerk of Court Enriqueta A. Marquez is hereby enjoined to immediately turn over the deck of shabu to the proper authority for final disposition. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.[10] Considering the penalty imposed, the case was directly appealed to this Court for automatic review. However, pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo[11] modifying the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was referred to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, thus: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.[12] Hence, this petition. The core issue for resolution is whether error attended the trial courts findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165. Appellant maintains that there was no entrapment and that he was arrested in his house on the night of the alleged commission of the crime. While he admits that the resolution of the case would boil down to the determination of who between the parties is more credible, he insists that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty alone could not sustain a conviction; and that the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Rana could not prevail over his constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. [13] In essence, what appellant puts at issue is the trial courts appreciation of factual details of the buy-bust operation or the entrapment. Suffice it to say that settled is the policy of this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the factual findings of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest determination of the witnesses deportment during the trial.[14] In the instant case, we find no basis to disregard the trial courts factual findings. Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case.[15] To sustain a conviction under a single prosecution witness, such testimony needs only to establish sufficiently: 1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. Indeed, what is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence. [16] In this case, PO1 Rana, being the poseur-buyer, was the most competent person to testify on the fact of sale and he did so to the satisfaction of both the trial court and the appellate court. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: Contrary to appellants assertions, the prosecution has established with moral certainty the presence of all the elements necessary for the prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that appellant was caught in the very act of selling shabu, a prohibited drug. PO1 Ariosto Rana, the prosecution witness who acted as poseur-buyer, narrated in a clear and straightforward manner the facts of sale. x x x xxxx What is more, the identities of the seller and the buyer together with the corpus delict[i] of selling shabu have also been duly established. Poseur-buyer PO1 Ariosto Rana positively identified accused-appellant Roger Villanueva as the person who sold to him one plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance. x x x xxxx Then too, the regulated drug of shabu contained in a plastic sachet which the appellant handed over to the buyer, was also duly proven before the trial court. x x x xxxx Against these strong positive and substantial evidence, appellant could only say that no buy-bust operation was conducted and, instead, insists that he was just a victim of frame-up; that the policemen carried out an illegal search on the premises of his house, planted evidence, and then charged him as a supplier of drugs. The contentions are without merit. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing felons in the execution of their criminal plan. The operation is sanctioned by law and has consistently proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies with respect to the operation deserve full faith and credit. Verily, here, from the evidence adduced, We find no reason to depart from the general rule. We are one with the court a quos conclusion that the prosecution was able to establish that a buy-bust operation actually took place starting from the time the team composed of nine (9) members proceeded to the target area at 9:00 p.m. for the initial negotiation until the perfection of the sale at 9:30 p.m. the same night.[17] Moreover, when the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly; [18] and as held in People v. Pacis,[19] bare denials by the accused cannot overcome this presumption. All told, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that the appellant committed the crime charged. What remains to be determined is the correctness of the penalty imposed on the felony committed.

Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 reads: Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppyregardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. In finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00). While it correctly imposed the said penalties, we find the reason given therefor, that is, in view of the small quantity of shabu involved, inaccurate. Unlike under the repealed R.A. No. 6425 (1972) or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 where the imposable penalty depends on the quantity of the regulated drug involved, the foregoing provision now imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) for the sale, trade, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of shabu, a dangerous drug, regardless of the quantity involved.[20] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00975, dated December 20, 2005, affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 72, in Crim. Case No. 27159-MN finding appellant Roger Villanueva y Huelva guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and costs, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS PANGANIBAN (GR 175928) DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

On appeal before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00303 dated 31 August 2006 which affirmed in toto the decision[2] dated 16 August 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154, convicting accused-appellant Alvin Panganiban Pringas of Violation of Sections 5,[3] 11[4] and 12[5] of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

On 25 April 2003, appellant was charged before the RTC of Pasig City with Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 under the following informations:

Criminal Case No. 12360-D

On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to sell, possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to Police Officer Joselito Esmallaner, a police poseur buyer, one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance weighing three (3) centigrams (0.03 grams), which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. [6]

Criminal Case No. 12361-D

On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control three (3) small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance weighing, the following to wit:

(a)

twenty-five (25) decigrams (0.25 grams);

(b)

two (2) centigrams (0.02 grams); and

(c)

two (2) centigrams (0.02 grams).

for a total of twenty-nine (29) decigrams (0.29 grams), which were found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.[7]

Criminal Case No. 12362-D

On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess drug paraphernalia, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in is possession, custody and control, the following to wit:

(a)

one (1) small tape-sealed transparent plastic bag containing four (4) smaller unsealed transparent plastic bags each with traces of white crystalline substance;

(b)

one (1) improvised water pipes containing traces of white crystalline substance;

(c)

two (2) empty strips of aluminum foil;

(d)

one (1) pin;

(e)

one (1) pair of scissors;

(f)

one (1) improvised bamboo tongs;

(g)

one (1) pack of empty small transparent plastic bag;

(h)

one (1) improvised burner; and

(i)

two (2) disposable lighters.

all are fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting any dangerous drug into the body. [8]

On 30 April 2003, appellant, having been charged without the benefit of a preliminary investigation, filed a motion for reinvestigation.[9] On 14 May 2003, the trial court granted the motion and ordered the Pasig City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. [10] With the finding of the City Prosecutor that no cogent reason existed to modify or reverse its previous finding of probable cause against accused-appellant, the trial court set the cases for arraignment and trial.[11]

When arraigned on 4 September 2003, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.[12]

During the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted the existence and the contents of the Request for Laboratory Examination [13] and the Forensic Chemist Report,[14] with the qualification that the subject of the forensic report was not taken from him, and if ever same was taken from him, it was obtained illegally.[15]

With the termination of the pre-trial conference, the cases were heard jointly.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: PO1 Joselito Esmallaner [16] and SPO3 Leneal Matias,[17] both members of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Station.

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

On 22 April 2003, SPO4 Danilo Tuao, Officer-in-Charge of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Station, designated PO1 Joselito Esmallaner to act as a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation to be conducted against appellant alongBeverly Street, Barangay Buting, Pasig City. At around 10:30 p.m., the buy-bust team headed by SPO3 Leneal Matias arrived at the target area. PO1 Esmallaner and the informant proceeded to the unnumbered house of appellant, while SPO3 Matias and the other members of the team positioned themselves around ten (10) meters away to serve as back-up.

After the informant knocked on appellants front door, the latter came out. Upon recognizing the informant, appellant asked, Pare, ikaw pala. Bibili ka ba? The informant who was standing next to PO1 Esmallaner replied Oo, itong kasama ko kukuha. Appellant then asked PO1 Esmallaner how much drugs he intended to buy to which PO1 Esmallaner replied, P100 lang. PO1 Esmallaner thereafter gave a one hundred peso (P100.00) bill to the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant went inside the house. Appellant returned and handed to PO1 Esmallaner a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance later found to beshabu.[18]

Upon receiving the plastic sachet, PO1 Esmallaner grabbed appellants hand and got the P100.00 bill from the right front pocket of appellants pants. He introduced himself as a police officer and informed the appellant of his violation and his constitutional rights. PO1 Esmallaner then marked the plastic sachet[19] and placed his initials JE on the upper right portion of theP100.00[20] bill with serial number FX230133.[21]

After seeing that PO1 Esmallaner tried to grab the hand of appellant, who was able to run inside the house and tried to lock the door, SPO3 Matias and the other members of the team followed PO1 Esmallaner inside appellants house. Matias saw three pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets[22] containing a white crystalline substance which turned out to be shabu, two disposable lighters,[23] six strips of aluminum foil with traces of shabu,[24] improvised water pipe used as tooter,[25] improvised burner,[26]wooden sealer, small scissors,[27] 14 pieces of transparent plastic sachets,[28] and one small needle[29] on top of a small chair (bangkito). The items confiscated were marked and turned over to the Investigator who requested laboratory examination on said items.

On 23 April 2003, Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E[30] was issued with the conclusion that the four sachets, together with four other unsealed transparent plastic bags and a water pipe used as tooter, taken from appellant, were positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). On the same date, poseur-buyer PO1 Esmallaner and team leader SPO3 Matias executed their Joint Affidavit of Arrest. [31]

For the defense, appellant[32] took the witness stand together with his common-law wife, Gina Dean.[33]

Appellant and his common-law wife deny that a buy-bust occurred. Appellant claims that at about 10:00 p.m. of 22 April 2003, he and his common-law wife were with their three children in their house in Beverly Street, Buting, Pasig City, when somebody kicked the door of their house. Appellant was in the comfort room, while his common-law wife was in the bedroom taking care of their children. Thereafter, four persons, later identified as police officers Esmallaner, Mapula, Espares and Familiara, entered without any warrant of arrest or search warrant. He asked them what they wanted and he was told that they were going to arrest him. When he asked for the reason why he was being arrested, he was told that he would just be informed in their office. With his hands on his back, appellant was handcuffed. The policemen subsequently conducted a search in the house, but they neither recovered nor took anything. After that, appellant was brought to the police station, investigated and placed in jail. He added that the violent entry made by the policemen was witnessed by some of his neighbors, namely, Buboy, Macmac and Zaldy, who were then having a drinking session.

On 19 August 2004, the trial court promulgated its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It disposed of the cases as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ALVIN PRINGAS is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00.

Accused ALVIN PRINGAS is also found GUILTY OF Violation of Section 11 of the same law and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of imprisonment and to pay a fine ofP400,000.00 and also of violation of Section 12 of R.A. 9165, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment from SIX (6) MONTHS (and)ONE (1) DAY as minimum to THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as maximum, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00.

Considering the penalty imposed, the immediate commitment of the accused to the National Bilibid Prisons is ordered.

The Court fully realizes that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense committed by the accused is quite severe. However, the Court will not question the wisdom of the law and of the legislators who passed it. Dura lex, sed lex. The only thing that the Court can do is to recommend that the accused be pardoned after he shall have served the minimum period of the penalty imposed on him.[34]

On 3 September 2004, appellant, through counsel, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.[35] With the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the trial court transmitted[36] the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review pursuant to People v. Mateo.[37]

In its Decision dated 31 August 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.[38]

Unsatisfied, appellant appealed his conviction before this Court by way of a Notice of Appeal.[39]

With the elevation of the records to the Court and the acceptance of the appeal, the parties were required to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. [40] The parties manifested that they were not filing supplemental briefs, arguing that the issues of the case had been discussed in their respective briefs.[41]

Appellant makes a lone assignment of error, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 21 AND 86, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

Appellant argues that the apprehending police officers failure to comply with the provisions (Sections 21 and 86) of Republi c Act No. 9165 casts doubt on the validity of appellants arrest and the admissibility of the evidence allegedly seized from him. He maintains that since the procurement of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, during the buy-bust operation was violative of said law and of his constitutional right against illegal arrest, the same should not have been received in evidence to prove his guilt they being inadmissible under the law.

Appellant claims that the police officers violated Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the alleged buy-bust operation that led to the apprehension of appellant was conducted without the involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). It is his contention that nowhere in the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by the members of the arresting team was it shown that the buy-bust operation was conducted with the assistance, coordination, knowledge or consent of the PDEA.

We find this claim untenable.

In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, it is stated that That, on or about 10:30 PM April 22, 2003, as instructed by SPO4 DANILO TUAO, OIC/SDEU, this Office effected a coordination to (sic) Metro Manila Regional Office of PDEA and formed a team of SDEU operatives with a confidential informant to conduct anti-narcotics/Buy-bust operation against the said person x x x.[42] This portion of the affidavit clearly negates appellants claim that the buy bust operation subject of the case was not with the involvement of the PDEA. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the aforementioned statement was not contained in the affidavit, appellants claim of lack of involvement of the PDEA will render neither his arre st illegal nor the evidence seized from him inadmissible. QuotingPeople v. Sta. Maria,[43] we resolved the very same issue in this wise:

Appellant would next argue that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Prescinding therefrom, he concludes that the prosecutions evidence, both testimonial and documentary, was inadmissible having been procured in violation of his constitutional right against illegal arrest.

The argument is specious.

Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:

Sec. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished; however they shall continue with the performance of their task as detail service with the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their original mother agencies.

The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide to joint the PDEA.

Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being conductetd by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.

Cursory read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on the part of the law enforcers to transfer drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 is also silent on the matter. But by no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.

It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.

As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the lead agency in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Additionally, the same provision states that PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board, :shall be responsible for the efficient and effective la w enforcement of all the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as provided in the Act. We find much logic in the Solicitor Generals interpretation that it is only appropriate that drugs cases being handled by ot her law enforcement authorities be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the lead agency in the campaign against the menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having a centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86(a) of the IRR emphasizes this point by providing:

(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies. The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA x x x. Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

As regards the non-participation of PDEA in a buy-bust operation, we said:

[T]he challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation of PDEA, did not violate appellants constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests.[44]

As regards Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, appellant insists there was a violation of said section when pictures, showing him together with the confiscated shabu, were not immediately taken after his arrest. He added that the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of the apprehending team did not indicate if the members thereof physically made an inventory of the illegal drugs in the presence of the appellant or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and given a copy thereof. In short, appellant insists that non-compliance with Section 21 regarding the custody and disposition of the confiscated/seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia, i.e., the taking of pictures and the making of an inventory, will make these items inadmissible in evidence.

We do not agree. Section 21 reads:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. [45] Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmis sible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case under consideration, we find that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the items involved were safeguarded. The seized/confiscated items were immediately marked for proper identification. Thereafter, they were forwarded to the Crime Laboratory for examination.

Though the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21 was not expressly stated by the arresting/buy-bust team, this does not necessarily mean that appellants arrest was illegal or the items seized/confiscated inadmissible. In the case at bar, as in Sta. Maria, the justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question during the trial the custody and disposition of the items taken from him. Assuming that Sections 21 and 86 were indeed breached, appellant should have raised these issues before the trial court. This, he did not do. Never did he question the custody and disposition of the items that were supposedly taken from him. It was only on appeal before the Court of Appeals that he raised them. This, he cannot do. We held:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were raised instead for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.[46]

Appellant was charged with violations of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165. Appellant was charged with violation of Section 5 for selling 0.03 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. [47] What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[48]

The evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements. The poseur-buyer and the team leader of the apprehending team narrated how the buy-bust happened, and that the shabu sold was presented and identified in court. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Joselito Esmallaner, identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Esmallaners testimony was corroborated by the team leader, SPO3 Leneal Matias. The white crystalline substance weighing 0.03 grams which was bought from appellant for P100.00 was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) per Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E.

In this jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-bust operation is a common and accepted mode of apprehending those involved in the illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven to be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug dealers and of luring them out of obscurity.[49] Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.[50]

In the case at bar, we find the testimonies of PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias credible. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respects when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[51] The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. [52] Finding no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we stand by their findings.

We, likewise, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Said presumption was not overcome, as there was no evidence showing that PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias were impelled by improper motive. Appellant and his common-law wife testified that the members of the buy-bust team were complete strangers.[53]

Appellants defense that there was no buy-bust operation deserves scant consideration. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.[54] Being his common-law wife, we find Gina Dean not to be a credible witness. Appellant said three of his neighbors witnessed the violent entry made by the policemen in his house, but he failed to present them or any of them to prove his point.

Appellant was, likewise, charged with possession of three sachets of shabu with a total weight of 0.29 gram. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. [55] All these elements have been established.

SPO3 Leneal Matias narrated how he discovered the three pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance and other drug paraphernalia on top of a small chair (bangkito) in the house of appellant.

Q.

After the accused handed something to PO1 Esmallaner, what else happened?

A.

I saw PO1 Esmallaner try to grab the hand of the accused, but the accused was able to run inside their house, and tried to close the door, sir.

Q.

As a member of the back-up team upon seeing this incident, what did you do, if any?

A.

We gave support to PO1 Esmallaner, sir.

Q.

Will you please tell us what kind of support did you give to PO1 Esmallaner?

A.

To arrest the accused, sir.

Q.

What did you do in particular?

A.

PO1 Esmallaner followed the accused inside me and my group followed Esmallaner also inside the house, sir.

Q.

So, in other words you, and your co-members also went inside the house?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

When [you] went inside the house, what did you find out if any?

A.

PO1 Esmallaner accosted the accused, while I discovered three (3) pieces of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing undetermined amount of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu, and other paraphernalia on top of the small bangkito, sir.

Q.

Were these three (3) sachet and paraphernalia were scattered on the small bangkito?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And what did you do, if any when you discovered the presence of these items?

A.

I confiscated it and then I marked it, sir.

Q.

When you said it what would this?

A.

The drug paraphernalia, and the heat plastic sachet, sir.

Q.

Could you remember one by one what are those paraphernalia that you confiscated and marked it?

A.

The paraphernalia are two (2) disposable lighter colored red and yellow, six (6) pieces of small stripe of aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu improvised water pipe used as tooter, improvised burner, wooden sealer, and the three (3) pieces heat plastic sachet, fourteen (14) pieces of transparent plastic sachet. That is all I can remember, sir.

Q.

Did you place markings on that items that you confiscated?

A.

Yes, sir.[56]

Appellant was indeed the owner of these items for they were found in his house on top of the bangkito following the buy-bust operation and after his arrest. The substance in the plastic sachets was shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E. Finally, the drug paraphernalia seized are sufficient to prove that appellant also violated Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Reviewing the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we find them to be in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00303 dated 31 August 2006 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154, convicting accused-appellant Alvin Panganiban Pringas of Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS EVORA (GR 182418) DECISION

TINGA, J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 5 October 2007 affirming the conviction by the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal of Edwin Partoza y Evora (appellant) for the crime of possession and sale of dangerous drug.

Appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations before the Regional RTC with possession and sale of shabu, viz:

Criminal Case No. 6524

That on or about the 2nd day of November 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram, which substance, after confirmatory test, was found positive to the test of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous, popularly known as shabu a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Criminal Case No. 6525

That on or about the 2nd day of November 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another person one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet weighing 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance which gave positive result to the screening and confirmatory test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous, popularly known as shabu a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both Informations. Trial ensued.

PO3 Juanito Tougan (PO3 Tougan) testified for the prosecution and narrated that on 2 November 2002 at around 7:30 p.m., the police received an information from an informant that a certain Parto was selling shabu at Sta. Barbara Subdivision, Brgy. Ampid I, San Mateo, Rizal. Parto had apparently been under surveillance by the police for selling prohibited drugs. They immediately planned a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Tougan acting as the poseur-buyer. Tougan received a P100.00 bill from the police chief and placed the serial numbers of the bill on the police blotter. [5]

PO3 Tougan, together with PO2 Pontilla and the civilian informant then proceeded to Sta. Maria Subdivision. However, before the actual buybust operation, the group responded to a commotion in the area where they arrested a certain Noel Samaniego. [6]Thereafter, they went to Neptune corner Jupiter Street and spotted Parto in the tricycle terminal. The informant initially approached appellant. The latter then went near the tricycle where PO3 Tougan was in and asked him, How much[?] PO3 Tougan replied, Piso lang, which means P100.00. Upon exchange of the money and the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance, PO3 Tougan immediately alighted from the tricycle, g rabbed Partos hand and introduced himself as a policeman. PO3 Tougan was able to recover another plastic sachet from the hand of Parto. [7]

At the police station, the two (2) plastic sachets confiscated from Parto were marked. After marking, the police immediately prepared the request for laboratory examination.[8]

Chemistry Report No. D-2157-02E confirmed that the two (2) plastic sachets seized from appellant were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.[9]

Appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was driving a female passenger in his tricycle at around 7:00 p.m.on 2 November 2002 going to Sta. Maria. Upon reaching Jupiter Street, appellant turned left and noticed the police officers trying to arrest a person who was then causing trouble. PO2 then Pontilla approached appellant and asked why he was driving drunk. Appellant explained that he had been offered a drink by his friends. He was asked to alight from his tricycle, took his drivers license and invited him to go to the police station.[10]

On 28 April 2005, the trial court convicted appellant beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in these two cases, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 6524 finding accused EDWIN PARTOZA Y EVORA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Possession of Dangerous Drug (Violation of Section 11, 2nd par.[,] No. 3 of Art. II of R.A. [No.] 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to Twenty (20) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00);

2. In Criminal Case No. 6525 finding accused EDWIN PARTOZA Y EVORA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Sale of Dangerous Drug (Violation of Sec. 5, 1st par.[,] Art. II of R.A. No. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500.000.00.

The drugs shabu confiscated from accuseds possession are forfeited in favor of the government and is directed to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.[11]

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that appellant had taken the money in exchange for the shabu. It gave full faith and credence to the testimony of PO3 Tougan.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

The appellate court held that the prosecution had successfully adduced evidence which proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had sold one (1) sachet of shabu to PO3 Tougan, who had acted as the poseur buyer during a legitimate buy-bust operation. The Court of Appeals held further that appellant, after having been validly arrested and in the course of the subsequent incidental search, had been found with another sachet of shabu in his body.[12]

Appellant elevated the case to this Court via Notice of Appeal. [13] In its Resolution[14] dated 30 June 2008, this Court resolved to notify the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty (30) days from notice. Both parties adopted their respective appellant's and appellee's briefs, instead of filing supplemental briefs.[15]

Appellant maintains that the presumption of regularity, upon which his conviction rests, should not take precedence over the presumption of innocence. He challenges PO3 Tougans account of the events that transpired on 2 November 2002 considering that the police were present in the vicinity to respond to a report that Samaniego had been causing trouble and not to conduct a buy-bust operation. Appellant also questions the integrity of the evidence used against him on the grounds of failure to mark the items seized from him immediately and failure to observe the chain of custody as required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.[16]

The Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), on the other hand, insists that the direct testimony of PO3 Tougan sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu. With respect to the marking, the OSG argues that PO3 Tougan held on to the sachets from the time he confiscated them from appellant until such time that he was able to place his initials on them and submitted the duly accomplished request for examination of said sachets to the crime laboratory. Finally, the OSG avers that Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 which pertains to the chain of custody and disposition of confiscated or seized drugs was not yet applicable at the time appellant committed his crimes.

In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[17] What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale or had actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[18]

Otherwise stated, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[19] Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond doubt.

Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In People v. Obmiranis,[20] appellant was acquitted due to the flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from appellant, taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of

the exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court. [21] In Bondad v. People,[22] this Court held that the failure to comply with the requirements of the law compromised the identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against appellant, hence his acquittal is in order.[23] And in People v. De la Cruz,[24] the apprehending team's omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. No. 9165 in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs significantly impairs the prosecution's case. [25] In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with. PO3 Tougan stated that he marked the two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance in the police station, thus:

Q A

And after handing to him the P100.00 bill[,] what reaction was there, if any, from this alias Parto? He immediately handed to me one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu, sir.

xxx

Q A

After placing him under arrest what, if any, did you do next? After holding his hand, I immediately introduced myself as a policeman, sir.

Q A

What else did you do after that? I was able to recover another plastic sachet from his hand and also the P100.00 bill that I used in buying the shabu with serial number EN-668932, sir.

xxx

Q A

And having informed him of his constitutional rights[,] where did you take him, if any? It did not take long PO2 Pontilla arrived [sic] and we brought him to the police station together with his tricycle, sir.

xxx

At the station[,] what happened to the two (2) plastic sachets, one that was the subject of the sale and one which was the subject of your confiscation? I placed my initial, sir.[26]

PO3 Tougan did not mark the seized drugs immediately after he arrested appellant in the latter's presence. Neither did he make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of appellant. There was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were observed.

While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team,[27] yet these conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was offered by PO3 Tougan for his failure to observe the rule.

Furthermore, while PO3 Tougan admitted to have in his possession the shabu from the time appellant was apprehended at the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of proof on how the seized items were handled from the time they left the hands of PO3 Tougan. PO3 Tougan mentioned a certain Inspector Manahan as the one who signed the request for laboratory examination. He did not however relate to whom the custody of the drugs was turned over. Furthermore, the evidence of the prosecution did not reveal the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. The failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody is fatal to its cause.

All told, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The courts below heavily relied on the testimony of PO3 Tougan and in the same breadth, banked on the presumption of regularity. In People v. Garcia,[28] we said that the presumption only arises in the absence of contrary details in the case that raise doubt on the regularity in the performance of official duties. Where, as in the present case, the police officers failed to comply with the standard procedures prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption.[29]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 5 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Edwin Partoza y Evora is ACQUITTED based reasonable doubt and is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS SITCO & BAGTAS (GR 178202) DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the October 19, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00038 entitledPeople of the Philippines v. Norman Sitco y De Jesus and Raymundo Bagtas y Caparas , which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 in Malabon, in Criminal Case Nos. 19456-MN to 19459-MN for violation of Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The affirmed RTC decision adjudged accused-appellants Raymundo Bagtas and Norman Sitco guilty in Crim. Case No. 19456-MN for drug pushing and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. For illegal possession of drugs, Bagtas was sentenced to two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, in Crim. Case No. 19458-MN, and reclusion perpetua in Crim. Case No. 19459-MN. While the RTC convicted Sitco in Crim. Case No. 19457-MN, the CA would later overturn his conviction in this case. The Facts In Crim. Case No. 19456-MN, Sitco and Bagtas were charged with drug pushing in an information reading: That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being private persons and without authority of law, conspiring[,] confederating and mutually helping with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver, in consideration of the sum of P2,000.00+, most of which were boodle or fake money to a poseur buyer[,] two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with net weight of 108.40 grams and 105.84 grams respectively, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as Shabu, a regulated [drug]. [1] The other informations for illegal possession of drugs that were separately filed against either Sitco or Bagtas read as follows: Crim. Case No. 19457-MN against Sitco (illegal possession) That on or about the 11 day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being [a] private person and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in [his] possession, custody and control One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag, containing white crystalline substance with net weight of 20.29 grams, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as Shabu, a regulated drug. [2] Crim. Case No. 19458-MN against Bagtas (illegal possession) That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being [a] private person and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag, containing white crystalline substance with net weight of 1.31 grams, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as Shabu, a regulated drug. Crim. Case No. 19459-MN against Bagtas (illegal possession) That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being [a] private person and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control One (1) brick of suspected marijuana with net weight of 887.01 grams, which is a regulated drug.[3] During the arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a not guilty plea to all the charges. A joint trial then ensued. Version of the Prosecution From the testimony of the prosecution witness, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Buan, the following version is gathered: Acting on a tip from an informant, Senior Inspector Gatlet of the Navotas Police Station ordered the conduct of a buy-bust operation against accused-appellants, who were allegedly selling illegal drugs on Espina St. in Navotas, Metro Manila. The team consisted of Buan, as poseur-buyer, a confidential informant, and several police operatives as back-up. Marked money, consisting of four (4) PhP 500 bills for a total of PhP 2,000 and boodles or fake money amounting to PhP 196,000, was prepared. On May 11, 1998 at 11:15 in the evening, the team proceeded to a house in the target place where Bagtas answered the knocking of the door. Thereupon, the confidential informant introduced him to Buan who, then and there, expressed his desire to buyshabu. Bagtas replied that he did not have enough supply of shabu, but manifested that marijuana was available. Buan, however, insisted on buying only shabu.[4] Bagtas informed Buan that someone would be delivering more shabu. After waiting for a few minutes, a man, who turned out to be Sitco, arrived. After the usual introductions, Sitco told Buan to follow him to his motorcycle. He asked for the payment and took out a bag with two plastic bags of shabu inside. Buan examined the contents, then identified himself as a police officer, and arrested Sitco. The back-up officers joined the scene and frisked Sitco and Bagtas. Sitco was found to have in his possession a loaded caliber .38 paltik revolver, the buy-bust money, and more shabu. Bagtas had in his possession marijuana and shabu.[5] The seized items were sent to Forensic Chemist Grace N. Eustaquio for laboratory examination and were found positive forshabu and marijuana per Physical Science No. D-411-98. During trial, Buan identified accused-appellants, the four (4) PhP 500-bill marked money used, the shabu confiscated from both accusedappellants, and the marijuana seized from Bagtas. Buan explained during his testimony that the boodle money placed in-between the genuine marked money the buy-bust team used was unavailable as it had been confiscated by a policeman named Barlin when he himself (Buan) was arrested f or violating Sec. 27 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[6]
th

Version of the Defense The evidence for the defense consists of the testimonies of Sitco and Bagtas. Bagtas branded as fabricated the accusations against him and Sitco. According to him, on the day of the alleged buy-bust operation, he was busy cleaning his motorcycle when, all of a sudden, policemen, led by Buan, entered his house. Buan came armed with an armalite rifle and a .45 caliber pistol, but did not show any document to justifying the police officers entry into his (Bagtas) home. The intruders pointed guns at Bagtas, his common law wife, his nephew, a certain Boy Macapagal, a certain Malou, a helper in his store, a girl applying for work as a househelper, and Sitco, who was visiting Buan at the time. They were ordered to lie face down as Bagtas house was being searched. He was told that he was a suspect in the killing of a Navotas policeman named Ira. After the search was done, no illegal drugs were found. Yet the police officers took his camera, tape recorder, and the cash from his stores sales. The pieces of jewelry they were wearing, including his ring and necklace, were also confiscated. Afterwards, all of them were handcuffed and asked to board the police officers vehicles. Two motorcycles belonging to Sitco and Bagtas were also seized. [7] At the police headquarters, Buan and the other police officers demanded payment for the release of Bagtas group. After some haggling, the group relented and paid some amount for their freedom. Sitco and Bagtas, however, were detained. Instead, they were handcuffed to a steel post after being blindfolded by the police.[8] Bagtas overheard the police officers dividing the jewelry among them. He was then beaten along with Sitco to extort money for their release. The police officers eventually told them to pay a reduced amount, which they still could not afford to give. Complaints were thus filed against them, with the police officers manufacturing the evidence used by the prosecution. Bagtas ended his testimony with a declaration that he was filing complaints against the police officers once he was released from detention. [9] Sitco corroborated Bagtas testimony, adding that Buan had already been dismissed from the service. [10] He testified that the police officers frisked him and confiscated his wallet, watch, ring, and motorbike. He was told that they were suspects in the killing of a Navotas policeman. At the headquarters, he claimed being tortured. Eventually, he fell asleep. When he woke up, he saw Buan with two others sniffing shabu. He declined Buans invitation to join the session. The police officer likewise instructed him to produce PhP 100,000 for his release. Sitco informed Buan that he could not afford the amount. The next day, May 12, Buan took some shabu from the cabinet and told Sitco that the charge against him would push through if he did not pay. Sitco was also warned about the difficulty of posting bail once charged. Since he could not raise the money, the police officers brought him to the prosecutors office for inquest where manufactured evidence alleg edly taken from him and Bagtas were shown to the fiscal. [11] On crossexamination, he admitted to having been previously arrested for possession of shabu and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866.[12] Ruling of the Trial Court The RTC gave full credence to the testimony of Buan and, mainly on that basis, convicted Bagtas and Sitco of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision[13] reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two accused, namely Norman Sitco y de Jesus and Raymundo Bagtas y Caparas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged against them in these cases. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (where applicable), the two accused are hereby sentenced as follows: 1) In Crim. Case No. 19456-MN: for drug pushing under Section 15, Article III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, involving more than 200 grams of shabu, for each of them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and for each of them to pay a fine in the amount of Php500,000.00; 2) In Crim. Case No. 19457-MN against Sitco only for illegal possession of 20.29 grams of shabu under Section 16, Article III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, to a prison term ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum, to SIX (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum; 3) In Crim. Case No. 19458-MN against Bagtas only for illegal possession of 1.31 grams of shabu under Section 16, Article III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, to a prison term ranging from TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor, as minimum, to ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as maximum; 4) In Crim. Case No. 19459-MN against Bagtas only for illegal possession of 887.01 grams of marijuana under Section 8, Article II, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, said accused is sentenced to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Since the death penalty was imposed, the case came to this Court on automatic review. In accordance with People v. Mateo,[14] however, we ordered the transfer of the case to the CA for intermediate review. Pending CA review of the case, or on May 5, 2006, Bagtas died at the National Bilibid Prison Hospital. Ruling of the Appellate Court Before the CA, Sitco argued against the credibility of Buan as witness, the latter having been involved in drug-related activities and was in fact dismissed from the service in March 1999. He also claimed that the alleged drug sale involving him was improbable as no one would sell drugs to a stranger. On October 19, 2006, the CA acquitted Sitco of illegal possession of drugs but affirmed his conviction of the other offenses charged. It reasoned that Buans testimony was focused only on the two (2) plastic bags of shabu which were the object of the buy-bust; no attempt was made to make a distinction between the said bags and the additional bag of shabu supposedly recovered from Sitco when he was frisked. The quantum of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for illegal possession of shabu was, thus, not met. However, as to the other charges, the CA ruled that the factual findings of the trial court on Buans credibility must be respected and upheld. The fallo of the CAs Decision[15] reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Joint Decision dated August 26, 1999 of the RTC of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72 in Criminal Case Nos. 19456-MN to 19459 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification ACQUITTING accusedappellant Norman Sitco y De Jesus in Criminal Case No. 19457-MN for violation of Sec. 16, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, on the basis of reasonable doubt. The rest of the Joint Decision stand[s]. SO ORDERED. On November 14, 2006, Sitco filed his Notice of Appeal of the appellate courts Decision. On September 24, 2007, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, manifested that it was submitting the case for decision based on the records previously submitted. In his Supplemental Brief, Sitco submits that PO3 Buan is not a credible witness given his arrest on drug charges and dismissal from the service. The Issue WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS CONVICTION ON THE BASIS OF AN UNRELIABLE WITNESS.

The Ruling of the Court We find sufficient compelling reasons to acquit the surviving accused-appellant Sitco. Credibility of Buan as Witness We start with the credibility of the lone prosecution witness, Buan, whose testimony Sitco has assailed at every turn. Sitco insists and with reason that Buan cannot competently make a plausible account of something of which he himself was equally culpable. Sitcos assault on the credibility of Buan is well -taken. As it were, Buans involvement as a police officer in illegal dr ug activities makes him a polluted source and renders his testimony against Sitco and Bagtas suspect, at best. It is like a pot calling a kettle black. To be believed, testimonial evidence should come only from the mouth of a credible witness. [16] Given his service record, Buan can hardly qualify as a witness worthy, under the limited confines of this case, of full faith and credit. And lest it be overlooked, Buan is a rogue cop, having, per his own admission, been arrested for indulging in a pot session, eventually charged and dismissed from the police service. [17] It would appear, thus, that Buans had been a user. His arrest for joining a pot session only confirms this undesirable habit. The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of the well-settled rule that prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of police buy-bust operators, and that the trial courts finding on the police-witness credibility deserves respect. Juxtaposed with this rule, however, is the postulate that when confronted with circumstances that would support a reasonable doubt in favor of the accused, then acquittal or the least liability is in order. Buans involvement in drugs and his alleged attempt to extort money from appellant Sitco in exchange for his freedom h as put his credibility under a heavy cloud. The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that his conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name.[18] As articulated inRabanal v. People: Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take a more than casual consideration of every circumstances or doubt proving the innocence of petitioner.[19] (Emphasis added.) Chain of Custody But over and above the credibility of the prosecutions lone witness as ground for acquittal looms the matter of the custodial chain, a term which has gained traction in the prosecution of drug-related cases. In prosecutions involving narcotics and other illegal substances, the substance itself constitutes part of the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[20] Of chief concern in drug cases then is the requirement that the prosecution prove that what was seized by police officers is the same item presented in court. This identification, as we have held in the past, must be established with moral certainty[21] and is a function of the rule on chain of custody. The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[22] The procedure to be followed in adhering to the chain of custody requirements is found in Sec. 21 of RA 9165: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment . The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination. The trial court summarized the chain of custody over the evidence as follows: x x x [Sitco] asked for the money and then took from a covered part of the motorcycle a plastic bag inside [of] which were two plastic bags with shabu which Sitco gave to Buan. Buan examined the same and upon being satisfied that it was really shabu, identified himself as a policeman and arrested Sitco. Buans companions then approached and Sitco and Bagtas were frisked. Found from Sitco was a caliber .38 paltik revolver with six bullet s, the buy-bust money and additional shabu. The marijuana earlier shown to Buan by Bagtas was also recovered along with the additional shabu found in the motorcycle of Bagtas which was parked nearby. The buy-bust shabu, the marijuana and the confiscated additional shabu from Sitco and Bagtas were sent to a Forensic Chemist for laboratory examination (Exhibit A) and were found to be positive for being shabu and marijuana, respectively, by examining PNP Forensic Chemist Grace N. Eustaquio under an initial laboratory report (Exhibit B) and a final report (Physical Science No. D-411-98) marked as Exhibit C.[23] From this narration and an examination of the records, a number of disturbing questions arise as to the identification and handling of the prohibited drugs seized. It is unclear at the outset whether Buan himself made the inventory of the seized items. There is no detail as to who brought the specimens to the forensic laboratory and who received it prior to the examination by the forensic chemist. It is also uncertain who took custody of the specimens before they were presented as evidence in court. There are, thus, glaring gaps or missing links in the chain of custody of evidence, raising doubt as to the identity of the seized items and necessarily their evidentiary value. This broken chain of custody is especially significant given that what are involved are fungible items that may be easily altered or tampered with.[24] It cannot be over-emphasized that pertinent provisions of RA 9165 require that the seized illegal items shall, after their inventory, be photographed in the presence of the drug dealer, representatives of media, the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation. The records do not yield an indication that this particular requirement has been complied with. The Court reiterates that, on account of the built-in danger of abuse that it carries, a buy-bust operation is governed by specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, separately from the general law procedures geared to ensure that the rights of persons under criminal investigation and of the accused facing a criminal charge are safeguarded.[25] To reiterate, the chain of custody requirement is necessary in order to remove doubts as to the identity of the evidence, by monitoring and tracking custody of the seized drugs from the accused, until they reach the court. We find that the procedure and statutory safeguards prescribed for compliance by drug enforcement agencies have not been followed in this case. A failure to comply with the

aforequoted Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165 implies a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the seized illegal items as part of the corpus delicti.[26] Although the non-presentation of some of the witnesses who can attest to an unbroken chain of custody of evidence may, in some instances, be excused, there should be a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with their testimonies. [27] In People v. Denoman,[28] the Court discussed the saving mechanism provided by Sec. 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165. [29] Denoman explains that the aforementioned provision contains a saving mechanism to ensure that not every case of non-compliance will permanently prejudice the prosecutions case. The saving mechanism applies when the prosecution recognizes and explains the lapse or lapses in the prescribed procedures. [30] In this case, the prosecution did not even acknowledge and discuss the reasons for the missing links in the chain. To reiterate, in prosecutions involving dangerous drugs, the substance itself constitutes the key part of the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [31] Taken with the uncorroborated testimony of Buan, the broken chain of custody over the marijuana and shabu in the instant case creates reasonable doubt on accused-appellants guilt. In a string of cases,[32] we declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before it was finally offered in court, fatally conflicts with every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused. As in People v. Partoza,[33] this case suffers from the failure of the prosecution witness to provide the details establishing an unbroken chain of custody. In Partoza, the police officer testifying did not relate to whom the custody of the drugs was turned over. The evidence of the prosecution likewise did not disclose the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. Given the prosecutions failure to abide by the rules on the chain of custody, the evidentiary presum ption that official duties have been regularly performed cannot apply to this case. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive. Not only is it rebutted by contrary proof, as here, but it is also inferior to the constitutional presumption of innocence.[34] On this score, we have held that while an accuseds defense engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime charged, it is not sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or probability of guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to overcome the presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. [35] This quantum of evidence has not been met in the instant case. WHEREFORE, the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00038 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Norman Sitco y De Jesus is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt. SO ORDERED.