EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-26127. June 28, 1974.] (Civil Case No. 3621) VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffsappellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-26128. June 28, 1974.] (Civil Case No. 3622) JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffsappellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-26129. June 28, 1974.] (Civil Case No. 3623) DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendantappellant. Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees. Manuel O. Chan & Rodolfo M. Caluag for defendantappellant.

DECISION

ZALDIVAR, J :
p

Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623. 1 On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially the same allegations. 2 In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 278,928 square meters: that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiffs' grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894; that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs registered their claims of ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes

in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 148,118 square meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the children of Bonoso Alcantara; that these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same, planting therein palay and other agricultural products and exclusively enjoying said products; that on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs filed and registered their claims of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured permission from plaintiffs,

settled and constructed their houses on said lands and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from them. In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of land from time immemorial; that upon the death of Candido Pili his children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and possession and cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as owners and possessors of said land, had openly, adversely an continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other agricultural products and enjoying exclusively the products harvested therefrom; that during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and registered their claim of ownership over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said land and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from their lessees or

tenants. The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands in question, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged

that the registered owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are different and not identical with the

boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and technical description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries and technical description appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of their respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because said defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void. 3

The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them owners and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or parcels, of land described in their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the decision of the Court of Land Registration, dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681, and to declare Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning with respect to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which include the lands of the plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original Certificate of Title No. 735, particularly as it refers to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to declare null and void all transfer certificates of titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and of Quezon City subsequent to, and based on, Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (5) to order the defendants, in the event Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is declared valid, to reconvey and transfer title over the land described in their respective complaint in favor of the plaintiffs in each case, as the case may be; (6) to order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the market value of the lands in question in case of defendants' inability to reconvey the same; (7) to order the defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants, their lawyers, their agents and representatives from disturbing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency of these cases. The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as paupers. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually

served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default. On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court on July 20, 1955. On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints. The preliminary injunction, however, was lifted by order of the trial court on October 3, 1955, upon the posting by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of bonds in the total amount of P14,000.00 pursuant to the order of the court of September 26, 1955. On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a motion for reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955 denying the motion to dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of the court of September 26, 1955. On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in each of the three cases. In its answer, this defendant, among others, specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. The answer contains special and affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156 which was subsequently elevated to the

Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter case the Supreme Court affirmed in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the complaints failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants; (3) that the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their complaints state sufficient cause of action, had prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under statutes governing prescription of action; (4) that defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for valuable consideration of the parcels of land involved in the three cases; (5) that the registration proceedings had in LRC No. 7681 instituted by the defendant's predecessors in interest was in accordance with law, and the requirements for a valid registration of title were complied with. By way of counterclaim the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay damages as therein specified. The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases by including additional parties as plaintiffs, and the amended complaints were admitted by the trial court. The defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a manifestation that it was reproducing and realleging its answers to the original complaints as its answers to the amended complaints in view of the fact that the amendments to the complaints consist merely in the inclusion of additional indispensable as well as necessary parties-plaintiffs. 4 On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the cases upon grounds that (1) the actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that

the actions were barred by a prior judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence to prove their claim of ownership. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, as well as to the motion of defendant to withdraw its third ground to dismiss. The trial court, in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to dismiss. 5 After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants as follows: "A Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC No. 7681, are null and void, ab initio, and of no effect whatsoever; "B Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on page 136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void from the very beginning (and) of no effect whatsoever; "C Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or allegedly derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Province of Rizal are likewise null and void;

"D Declaring that the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land claimed and described in paragraph V of their respective complaints; "E Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 and indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B and Parcel C, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV"); "F Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint, in Civil Case No. 3622 and indicated as Parcel D and Parcel F in SWO40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV"); "G Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated as Parcel E, in SWO-491187 (Exh. "UU and Exh. "VV"); "H Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 the sum of P600.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;

"I Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 the sum of P600.00 a month, as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them; "J Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P150.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them; "K Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; "L The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for lack of merit." 6

A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal. 7 The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965. 8 Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court committed the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue decree No. 17431 for the alleged reason that:

(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published; (2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical with the description of Parcel 1 as applied for and as published in the Official Gazette; (3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as applied for; (4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of Parcel 1. II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of the decree No. 17431 was not in accordance with the law and that. therefore, said OCT 735 was a complete nullity and the land remains unregistered. III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite its lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the same. IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these eases on the grounds of prescription and laches, and in denying the motions to dismiss filed on said grounds. V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground. VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certificates of title emanating from

OCT 735. VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not a purchaser in good faith and for value.

VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands claimed by, and in awarding damages to, the appellees. IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's counterclaim and in sentencing appellant to pay the costs of these suits.

As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the decision and the decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and the ownership and possession of several parcels of land, claimed by the plaintiffs in their respective complaints . . . ." The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that: (1) the decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio, having been rendered by a court without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant to the decree in LRC No. 7681 is null and void, having been issued pursuant to a void decree; (3) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void because the Decree No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the decree to be valid, had not been inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all Transfer Certificates of Title allegedly emanating and derived from the void Original

Certificate of Title No. 735 are likewise null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil cases are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their respective complaints. We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the numerous documentary evidence, of these three cases, and We find that the conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable decisions of this Court. The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab initio by the trial court covers two big parcels of land, mentioned in said title as Parcel 1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less, known as the Santa Mesa Estate; and Parcel 2, having an area of 15,961,246 square meters more or less, known as the Diliman Estate. The three parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853 square meters, more or less; the two parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate area of 154,119.7 square meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in Civil Case No. 3623, having an area of 62,481 square meters, more or less, are all included in the area of Parcel 1. 9 The trial court, in its decision, states that the identity of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not disputed, and that both the plaintiffs and the defendant admit that the parcels of land litigated are found within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 10 It is shown in the survey plans, presented by both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that

the six parcels of lands involved in these three cases are located at the northwestern portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh. 29). The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration an application for the registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application was docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three other parcels of land, docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On November 20, 1911 the Court of Land Registration issued an order of general default against the whole world except the Insular Government, the Director of Lands and the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). On November 11, 1913 the applicants and the Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2)

on condition that the roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further agreed "that the issuance of the title to applicants shall be made subject to all the exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that during the registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new (amended) plans had included lands which were not covered by the original plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated that in the event that the new plans did not include new parcels of land and that the lands that were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had been excluded, an additional decision would be made decreeing the adjudication and registration of the lands that were the subject of the registration proceedings in favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion; to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion.

In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, on January 24, 1914, submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among others, stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been previously included in the original plan. On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental decision declaring that, on the basis of the decision of December 29, 1913 and of the report of the Surveyor of Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz and others were the owners of the land applied for, as described in the amended plan, in the proportion mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the land applied for be registered in the names of the applicants and that a decree of registration be issued in accordance with the decision and the amended plan. On March 27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a communication to the registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 be modified such that the decree of registration he based upon the original plan as published and not upon the amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The Court of Land Registration did not follow the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree of Registration No. 17431 was issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land Registration of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains the technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as amended.

It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which were published in the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911; and that Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a decrease of 292,791 square meters from the area of 16,254,037 square meters that was stated in the application and in the notice of hearing that were published in the Official Gazette (Exhs. 25 and YY). All in all, there is a decree of 292,763.90 square meters in the aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to be registered. Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in the names of the applicants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz (Exh. 30). 1. We, shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant. The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void ab initio because, according to said court, that title was based on Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree having been issued pursuant to a decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render said decision.

As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big parcels of land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate. The records show that these two parcels of land had been subdivided into numerous lots, and most of those lots had been sold to numerous parties Parcel 1 having been converted into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private individuals and entities, such that in that subdivision now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital, the station of Pangasinan Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church and others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel 1 was subdivided, transfer certificates of title were issued to the purchasers of the lots, and these transfer certificates of title were based upon transfer certificates of title that emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735.

The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire area included in Parcel 1 which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs and also the title over the entire area included in Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7

square meters, more or less. In other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a little over two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision of the trial court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 735, without any qualification. The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the registration proceedings, after the original application and notice of hearing had been duly published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no publication regarding the amended plan was made. The trial court pointed out that the area and the description of Parcel 1 in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are not identical with the area and description of Parcel 1 applied for and published in the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act). We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the

application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. 11 The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. 12 But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary. 13 In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication. 14 In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject of another registration case; and the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended plan included lands or areas not included in the

original plan. In compliance with the order of the registration court said Chief of the Survey Division informed the court that no new parcels were included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated December 29, 1913 (Exh. 24), We read the following:
"Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes en ambos expedientes, se enmerdaron los planos unidos los mismos para excluir ciertas porciones que habian sido objeto de oposicion." . . . "POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la declaracion de rebeldia general, se ordena: "1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de este Tribunal terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales . . ." 15

On January 24, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration made a report to the court (Exh. 22), from which report We read the following:
"Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte dispositiva de su Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre proximo pasado, el que suscribe, despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos los Expedientes arriba citados, tiene el honor de informar: "1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes corresponden a las parcelas

1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expediente No. 7680 y la 1.a parcela del No. 7681, que son las mismas que se refiere el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680. xxx xxx xxx "4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y 3.a del Expediente 7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no incluyen terreno alguno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales. 16

And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the Chief of the Survey Division was taken into consideration and the court ordered the registration of the lands applied for by the applicants as described in the amended plan ("como esta descrito en el plano enmendado"). It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC No. 7681 did not cover parcels, or areas, that were not previously included in the original plan which accompanied the application that had been published in the Official Gazette. There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in order to vest the Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 and to order the issuance of Decree of Registration No. 17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was based. Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial court had declared null and void in the three cases now before this Court. In the case of the

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was assailed by the appellants (Pascual Acua and others) precisely upon the ground that during the registration proceedings, which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the original plan of the applicants was ordered amended, and no new publication was made of the amended plan and so it was urged that the registration court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of the applicants. The action in this case was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and others certain lands included in the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, Province of Rizal. Upon hearing the Court of First Instance of Rizal declared that none of the defendants owned any part of the land in controversy. On appeal, this Court observed that the character in which the plaintiff sued was not open to question, and the material facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate, referred to as the Tuason Entail, held a Torrens title to a tract of land with an area of about 1,600 hectares located in the province of Rizal. This property was then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certificates dating from July 8, 1914. This Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 17 The appellants precisely sought to nullify the title of the heirs of the Tuason estate, which emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, upon the ground, as now urged by the appellees in the

three cases at bar, that during the registration proceedings the original plan of the lands known as the Sta. Mesa and Diliman estates was amended, and no publication was made of the amended plan. Regarding the question of the non-publication of the amended plan, this Court said:
"Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay group, it is alleged that the Torrens title relied upon by the plaintiff is void, and in support of this contention it is stated that, during the course of the registration proceedings, an order was made by the court for the amendment of the original plan of the applicants and that this order was not followed by new publication, wherefore, it is supposed the court was without jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In this connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in the Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil. 122). But the brief for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the rule stated in the case cited has reference to an amendment of the plan by which additional land, different from that included in the original survey, is intended to be brought within the process of registration. In the case before us, the order referred to was for the exclusion of certain portions of the land covered by the original survey, and the doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from this it does not appear that the portion intended to be excluded comprehended any part of the land which had been usurped." 18

The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua, supra, is not applicable to the three eases now before this Court because what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and not Parcel 1 which is the land involved in these cases. This assertion of the appellees is not correct. The decision in that case states that the action was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver of the Tuason Entail, for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and others "certain lands contained in the Sta. Mesa and Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte." 19 But what matters is the doctrine that was laid down by this Court in that case, that is: that when the original survey plan is amended, after the publication of the application in order to include land not previously included in the original survey, a new publication of the amended plan is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the registration court to order the registration of the land that is added to what was included in the original survey plan. The ruling of this Court in the Bank of the Philippine Islands case has a decisive application in the three cases now before this Court. The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of Parcel 1 should have been made because it appears in the Decree of Registration No. 17431, and as reproduced in Original Certificate of Title No. 736, that the area of said parcel is "bigger" than the area stated in the application as published in the Official

Gazette; and, also, that the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree are not identical with the boundaries stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette. We paid particular attention on this point of the lower court's decision, and our impression is that the trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies between the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration and its description in the original application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to render a decision on the amended plan, boundary descriptions, and additional lands comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a republication of such amended plan, boundary description, technical description and additional areas is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the Court." 20 Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. It was error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on this circumstance and made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended plan there is this increase in area as compared to the area appearing in the application as published, the Land Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to render the decision decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, in his report to the court of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 did not include any land that was not included in

the original plan. That report was made precisely in compliance with the order of the registration court, in the decision of December 29, 1913 in LRC No. 7681, to inform the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen o no terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales". That report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor "despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los expedientes". Under the foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10 square meters was already included in the original plan, and that the computation of the area in the original survey must have been inaccurate; and the error was corrected in the recomputation of the area when the amended plan was prepared. We made a careful study and comparison of the technical description of Parcel 1 appearing in the application as published, and the technical description appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6), and We accept the explanation of counsel for the appellant that this seeming increase of 27.10 square meters had been brought about "by the fact that when the amendment of the plan was made, the distances and bearings in a few points along the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the nearest millimeter and to the nearest second respectively; whereas, the computation of the survey in the original plan was to the nearest decimeter and to the nearest minute only". 21 We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan .. included additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86

hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared, can not be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1. Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square meters, nor to show its location, in relation to the entire area of Parcel 1. The appellees did not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10 square meters is included within the parcels that they are claiming. We cannot, therefore, consider this area of 27.10 square meters as an area that was separate and distinct from, and was added to, the land that was covered by the original survey plan, such that the publication of the amended plan would be necessary in order that the registration court could acquire jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this increase of 27.10 square meters was simply the result of the recomputation of the area when the original plan was amended. There is no showing that the recomputation is incorrect. Neither is there a showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters belongs to any person and that person had been deprived of his property, or had failed to claim that particular area because of the non-publication of the amended plan. On the other hand, there is the report of the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration (Exh. 22) stating that the amended plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land which was not included in the original plan. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases

where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not previously included in the original plan should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area that was added after the publication of the original plan. 22 The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void insofar but only insofar as the land not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication the publication being the basis of the jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction. 23 And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the registration court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of 27.10 square meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower court could

have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate of title insofar as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if that area can be identified. But certainly, the lower court could not declared, and should not have declared, null and void the whole proceedings in LRC No 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which covers not only the supposed excess area of 27.10 square meters but also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2. The trial court, in its decision, declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever' without any qualification. This declaration by the lower court, if sanctioned by this Court and given effect, would nullify the title that covers two big parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total area of 24,759,890.10 square meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And not only that. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that are derived, or that emanated, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, regardless of whether those transfer certificates of title are the results of transactions done in good faith and for value by the holder of those transfer certificates of title.

It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that have an area of some 495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5 hectares), whereas the combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about 2,476 hectares). It must also be noted that both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been

subdivided into numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been acquired by numerous persons and/or entities that are now holding certificates of title which can be traced back to Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The decision of the lower court, however, would render useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, therefrom. The decision of the lower court would certainly prejudice the rights of the persons, both natural and juridical, who had acquired portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine of the indefeasibility of Torrens title. The decision of the lower court would, indeed, prejudice the rights of persons who are not parties in the present cases. And this is so, because the trial court, in its decision, did not adhere to the applicable decisions of this Court in resolving the pertinent issues in these cases. Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of Registration No. 17431 is null and void is that the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is different from the description of the same parcel in the notice of hearing of the original application for registration as published in the Official Gazette. The different description that appears in the decree of registration, according to the lower court, is an amendment to the Original survey plan that accompanied the application and the amended survey plan should have been republished; and because there was no such republication the registration court was without jurisdiction to issue the decree of registration. The lower court also committed an error in making this ruling. We find that the lower court incorrectly laid stress on

differences in the names of the owners, and on differences in the designations, of the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 along its southwestern boundary. We find, however, that these differences are well explained in the record. In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries of Parcel 1 are stated as follows:
"Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others (Maysilo Estate); E. by the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by Parcel 2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church"

As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel 1 are as follows:
"PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan River; on the SW. by properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co.; and on the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and property of the Roman Catholic Church . . ."

It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing that was published and in Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern boundary where there appear some

differences in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the adjoining lands. Thus, in the published notice of hearing, it appears that the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and parcel 1; while in the decree of registration it appears that the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful examination of the records, We find that the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in the notice of hearing that was published in the Official Gazette, are the same lands that are indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary. There is simply a change in the names of the owners or in the designations, of the lands. We find that parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the boundary lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact parcels of land that are owned, and had been applied for registration, by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No. 7680. This LRC No. 7680 was heard and decided jointly with LRC No 7681 by the Land Registration Court (Exh. 24). These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No. 7680, being lands owned by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., it may as well be stated in the decree of registration that those lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., instead of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and

parcel 1 (of LRC 1680) And so, what appears in Decree of Registration No. 17431 as the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side of Parcel 1 are no other than those very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice of hearing as the lands that bound Parcel 1 on the southwest. In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries on the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the decree of registration the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are replaced by the words "C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered that during the registration proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and the surveyor who prepared the amended plan must have found that what used to be the property of the Santa Clara Monastery at the time of the original survey was already the property of C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply mean that there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to C.W. Rosenstock & Co. It must be considered that the original survey took place from December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 8 and 19), while the registration case was decided on March 7, 1914. Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court." Evidently, the Court of Land Registration acted in consonance with this provision of the law when, in its decision in LRC 7681, it took into consideration the actual description of Parcel 1 as shown in the amended survey plan, and when it disregarded the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division,

dated March 27, 1914, that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 "be based upon the original plans, as published, and not upon the amended plan." It may well be said that Decree of Registration No. 17431 simply contains the correct area of Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC No. 1681 as of the time when the decision of the land registration court was rendered. In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Domingo vs. Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent:
"We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of registration. This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all plans for land registration were defective especially in regard to errors of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land registered can be determined, the technical description in the certificate of title may he corrected without cancelling the I decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final decrees merely by reason of faulty technical descriptions would lead to chaos."

We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the plaintiffs in the three cases

now before this Court are on the northwestern portion of Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B). They are far from the southwestern boundary. The circumstance, therefore, regarding the dissimilarity in the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that adjoin the southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no moment insofar as the lots claimed by appellees are concerned. What matters is that the lots claimed by the appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the northwestern portion of said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the lower court to make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of Registration No. 17431 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and of no effect whatsoever the aforestated dissimilarities in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1, because those dissimilarities are well explained in the records of these cases. The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that the only boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and then declared that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were never the subject of the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower court declared the lands west of A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and awarded the ownership of those lands to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128). This finding of the lower court is contrary to the evidence presented by the parties in these cases. Both the appellees and the appellant submitted as their evidence the notice of hearing of the application as

published in the Official Gazette (Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26) and the decree of registration No. 17431 (Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West are: (1) a road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6, UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower court considered the A. Bonifacio road as the only boundary on the West, and ignored the two other boundaries on the West that are mentioned both in the notice of hearing as published and in the decree of registration. The sketches and the survey plans, forming part of the evidence on record, show that the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes alongside the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1 and the Cementerio del Norte), until it reaches a point where it traverses the northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such that from the point where it enters the area of Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries on the western side are the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, W, 17, 19 and 29). Ignoring the existence of the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church as the other boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the lower court declared that the lands west of the A. Bonifacio road, which form part of the lands that are claimed by the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on the west and that those particular areas had remained as unregistered lands and are not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This finding of the lower court is contrary to the very admission of the appellees in these three cases that all the lands (six parcels in all) that they claim are included in the area of Parcel 1 mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In paragraph XIV

of the original, as well as in the amended complaint, in each of these three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the lands that they claim "had either been fraudulently or erroneously included .. in Parcel 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) of the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the Province of Rizal." 24 In their appeal brief, the appellees categorically stated that "Both the appellees and the appellant admit that these parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these three (3) civil cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735". 25 In the pre-trial order of the lower court of December 18, 1957, it was stated that the parcels of land litigated in these cases are portions of the lands covered by OCT No. 735. 26 The lower court itself, at the earlier part of its decision, stated that "both the plaintiffs and the defendants admit that the parcels of land litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are found within the boundaries of the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735" 27 The appellees in these two cases had never asserted that part of the lands that they claim are outside the boundaries of Parcel 1, nor did they assert that part of the lands that they claim have remained unregistered and not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court had made a finding not only contrary to the evidence of the appellees but even more than what the appellees asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of Parcel 1 is only the A. Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the appellees west of this road had never been registered. This Court certainly can not give its approval to the findings and rulings of the lower court that are patently erroneous.

2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void upon the ground that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496. In its decision, the lower court said:
"During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought to the Court. The Court had occasion to see and examine the `ENTRY' made in the Registration Book. The Court found that the Face of the Title which, under ordinary circumstances, should be Page 1 is found as Page 2. The sheet containing the technical description which should be page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the Title, which should have been Page 1, contained the last portion of the description of the land described in the decree. The sheet containing the bulk of the description of the lands decreed should have been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of Section 41 of the Land Registration Law have not been complied with. Said Section requires that the entry in the Registration Book must be a transcription of the Decree and the paging should consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order . . ." 28

The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads,

as follows:
"SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the registration of any property, the clerk shall send a certified copy of such decision to the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the decree in accordance with section forty of Act numbered four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward a certified copy of said decree to the register of deeds of the province or city in which the property is situated. The register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the "Registration Book' in which a leaf, or leaves in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office. . . ."

The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

"SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife. If the owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of the disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court, . . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form

for transcription upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned."

Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been registered in the office of the register of deeds, as provided in Section forty-one, the property included in said decree shall become registered land under the Act. Section 42 of Act 496 provides that the certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree. This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the register of deeds in the registry.
29

The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, as found in the Registration Book in the office of the register of deeds of Rizal (Exhibit 50). 30 We have examined this document very carefully, and We find that it is a copy of the original that satisfies all the requirements of a valid Torrens title as provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496. On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the Chief of the Land Registration Office that the decree of registration was registered in Manila on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Rizal that the decree was received for transcription in his office an July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P .M. It is also stated on the face of this title that it was entered pursuant to Decree No. 17431 of the Court of Land Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court. The names of the declared owners, their civil status, their spouses if

married, and their respective interest or share in the lands covered by the title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that the technical descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title are copied on the sheets constituting the title. We have compared the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear on this photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the technical descriptions of these lands as they appear in the decree of registration (Exhibit Y for the plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We find that the technical descriptions appearing on the title are the complete and faithful reproduction, or transcription, of the technical descriptions appearing in the decree of registration. We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of this title, as a technical description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What appears on the face of this title is the last part of the technical description of Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the first page. This circumstance, that is, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of the title, is the basis of the lower court in ruling that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the registration book in accordance with Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void. We have noted, however, that in its decision the lower court made no mention that in the transcription of the decree in the registration book any of the data that is required in Section 40 of Act 496 to be included had been omitted.

We have also noted and this fact is undenied that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are fully and faithfully transcribed on the photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50). There is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that photostat, was done for a fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead. Considering that the decree of registration is fully transcribed in the Registration Book, and also as copied in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the beginning of the technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said certificate of title. We agree with the lower court that the transcription of the technical descriptions should begin, or should have been started, on the face, or on the first page, of the title. We hold, however, that the fact that this was not so done in the case of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 should not be taken as a factor in determining the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This defect in the manner of transcribing the technical descriptions should be considered as a formal, and not a substantial, defect. What matters is that the original certificate of title contains the full transcription of the decree of registration, and that the required data provided for in Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the original certificate of title. The lower court made a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly applied its construction in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 should be interpreted liberally, in keeping with Section

123 of said Act which provides that "This Act shall be construed liberally so far as may be necessary for the purpose of effecting its general intent." If We adopt a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496, as was done by the lower court, such that the defect in the manner or form of transcribing the decree in the registration book would render null and void the original certificate of title, then it can happen that the validity or the invalidity of a certificate of title would depend on the register of deeds, or on the personnel in the office of the register of deeds. The register of deeds, or an employee in his office, can wittingly or unwittingly render useless a decree of registration regularly issued pursuant to a decision of a registration court and thus nullify by the error that he commits in the transcription of the decree in the Registration Book an original certificate of title that has been existing for years. This strict interpretation or construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would certainly not promote the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which generally are: to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed property 31 ; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court. to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title 32 ; to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title 33 ; and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and indisputable. 34 We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not render null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of land (Parcel 1 which includes the lands claimed by the appellees, and Parcel 2) covered by

Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are properly registered under the Torrens System of registration.

3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or not the lower court had correctly declared that "Original Certificate of Title No. 735 . . . is null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever." 35 In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it declared null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We have found that the registration proceedings that brought about the decree of registration upon which was based the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, as amended. We have held that the Land Registration Court that ordered the issuance of the decree of registration had jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration filed by Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz. The records show that the notice of hearing of the application, which embodied the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land (Parcel 1, known as the Sta. Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate), was duly published as required by law. The records show that the hearing on the application was regularly held, and that the registration court had seen to it that no land which was not included in the original survey plan and not covered by the original application was made the subject of the registration proceedings. We have found that the decree of registration was

properly issued by the Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Land Registration Court, and that said decree of registration was fully transcribed in the Registration Book in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. We have found also that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in the three cases now before Us are all included in Parcel 1 that is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No. 135 was issued in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, and that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases are covered by said certificate of title, what is left for this Court to decide is whether or not the appellees still have any legal right over the six parcels of land that they claim. Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the appellees is principally to recover the ownership and possession of the six parcels of land mentioned and described in their complaints. The appellees would accomplish their objective through alternative ways: (1) secure the nullification of the decision of the Land Registration Court in LRC No. 6781, the nullification of the Decree of Registration No. 17431 and the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (2) if they fail in their efforts to secure the desired nullifications, with Original Certificate of Title No. 735 being considered valid and effective, they seek the reconveyance to them by the defendants named in their complaints, including herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that they claim; and (3) if they cannot secure a reconveyance, they seek to

secure payment to them by the defendants named in their complaints of the actual value of the six parcels of land that they claim. It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not adopted a definite stand, in asserting the rights that they claim. It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had been wrongly registered in the name of another person must recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the property registered may be demanded only from the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name. 36 The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration were null and void and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void ab initio and of no effect. The trial court even went to the extent of declaring that some of the parcels of land claimed by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128 before this Court) were not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court forthwith declared the appellees the owners of the parcels of land claimed by them, as

described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower court, upon declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make any statement, or observation, regarding the status or situation of the remaining lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 after adjudicating to the appellees the six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints. In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has endeavored to show, that the lower court was correct in annulling Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the ownership and possession of the six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints. But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 void and of no effect. We have held that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 which was regular and that said certificate of title is valid and effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general inscription "To whom it may concern", and such decree will not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgment or

decree. Such decree may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud would file in the competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had acquired an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree, or the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act 496). In the case now before Us, the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is undisputed that no person had filed any petition for review of the decree of registration in LRC 7681 within the period of one year from July 8, 1914. That decree of registration, and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915. Moreover, innocent purchase. 9 for value had acquired interest in the lands covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 37 The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names of the original applicants for registration, namely, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. Herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those who were registered as the original owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. When the original complaints were filed in these three cases in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the Parties named defendants in

each of the three cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the heirs of each one of these defendants (without naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the defendants named in the three complaints only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the complaints. All the other defendants did not appear, and so they were all declared in default. 38 It had to happen that way because as of the time when the three complaints were filed on May 19, 1955 the ownership of Parcel 1 that was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had already passed to defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to be subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots. The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail) which became involved in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 39 During the pendency of the case the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason were administered by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to execute, upon payment to it of the sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997, which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original Certificate of Title

No. 735 (Exh. 13-B). On June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands executed the deed of transfer and assignment (Exh. 13-A). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was forthwith issued in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and 36). The deed of transfer and assignment was approved by the court in an order dated June 17, 1938. This conveyance to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. took place at a time when the Supreme Court had already decided the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court upheld the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and also the validity of the transfer certificate of title emanating therefrom. 40 The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 which was formerly Parcel 1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 clearly indicate that said corporation acquired its title in a regular transaction as purchaser in good faith and for value. On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of the latter (Exhs. 12-c and 37). The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any evidence in the record that would sustain such a finding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is the fact that the

incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. were practically the same persons belonging to the same Tuason family. We do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are also incorporators of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when businesses are promoted, operated, and managed, through corporate entities, it is not surprising to see two or more corporations organized by the same persons or group of persons, with different purposes, for different lines of business and with distinct or separate assets and interests. Besides, as has been shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was authorized, and subsequently approved, by the court. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. paid the sum of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. had acquired the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable consideration, thereby acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in good faith and for value, the title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold same property to the latter was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in good faith and for value even if it appears that the incorporators of the two corporations belong to the same Tuason family. The records of these cases are bereft of any evidence which would indicate that the sale of Parcel 1 in question by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was fraudulent.

Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when said appellant bought Parcel 1 originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the appellees or their predecessors in interest were in possession of, and were cultivating, the six parcels of land that they now claim in these cases. The conclusion of the lower court is too strained. It should be remembered that the registered property bought by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had an area of some 879 hectares. It could happen that certain relatives or ancestors of appellees had been squatting on some portions of the land and claimed certain areas as their own, to the extent of having the areas claimed by them declared for taxation purposes in their names. Thus the appellees presented in evidence tax declarations that appear to have taken effect as of 1941. We have noted, however, that at the back of those tax declarations are written the words "This parcel is a duplicate of the land under Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs. EAlcantara, F-Alcantara, FF-1-Benin, GG-Benin, HH-Benin BBB-Pili, and BBB,1-Pili). 41 These annotations simply reveal that when the predecessors of the appellees had those tax declarations made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands were already included in the tax declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been exercising, and asserting, its proprietary rights over the land in question after it bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. 42 This is borne by the statement in the order, dated September 26, 1955, issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the time was presiding the branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal where these three

cases were pending, as follows:

"3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering the land in question which they are subdividing into small lots for sale and in view of the observation under paragraph 2 hereof the Court finds that there is no justifiable reason to maintain the writ of preliminary injunction that has been issued. This is particularly true in Civil Case No. 2622, defendants having secured a final judgment against plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment before the Municipal court of Quezon City; and such injunction would annul the order of the execution issued by the Quezon City courts. It should be noted that the herein plaintiffs at the beginning pleaded to the Court that the area on which their respective houses stand be not touched and their possession thereof be respected by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co. In other words, each plaintiff is merely asking for about 250 square meters each which represents the land on which the house stands and their immediate yard, and not the whole land covered by these three cases or 68 hectares. On the other hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond of P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer for whatever damages he may suffer by reason of the continuance during the action of the acts complained of." 43

Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by

themselves or through their predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be unavailing against the holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels of lands now in question. From July 8, 1914 when Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued, no possession by any person of any portion of the lands covered by said original certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of title derived from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the lands covered by the certificate of title. In this connection, let it be noted that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co, Inc. became the registered owner of Parcel 1, which was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only on June 15, 1938, or almost 24 years after Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued. It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.) when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 from the judicial receiver, duly authorized and approved by the court. We, therefore, can not agree with the lower court when it declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser on bad faith. The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, including the six parcels claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous

persons and entities had purchased the subdivision lots, and the purchasers in turn were issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, based on the transfer certificate of title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc. The buyers of the lots necessarily relied upon the certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., and because they paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The purchasers of these lots have built thereon residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital, even churches. But the lower court, disregarding these circumstances, declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that were derived, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error committed by the lower court. And the error is compounded when the lower court ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming under said appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the parcels of lands that are claimed by them in the present cases. The possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and who hold certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, are not parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of the lower court would annul their titles and compel them to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect to the decision of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without due process of law. 44 The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible. 45

In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees in the three cases now before this Court must fail. It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title over the land which includes the six parcels that are claimed by the appellees. The fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees or any person, for that matter had not filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration in LRC No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of registration was issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed any proceeding for the review of said decree. As We have adverted to, that decree of registration had become incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by the appellees in each of the present cases, which attack collaterally the said decree of registration cannot be entertained. 46 Neither may the action of the appellees for reconveyance of the lands in question be entertained because such action bad already prescribed, and barred by laches, considering that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been issued way back in 1914 and the complaint in the present cases were filed only on May 19, 1955, or after a lapse of some 41 years. Moreover, as of the time when these complaints were filed the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees are no longer covered by the certificate of title in the names of the persons who procured the original registration of those lands. The title to Parcel 1, which includes the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the hands of parties who were innocent purchasers for value. This Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered by Original

Certificate of Title No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has been shown, this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was conveyed by order of the court in Civil Case No. 24803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and the latter in turn conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision. Numerous persons and entities bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that an action for reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., much less against the registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. 47 Neither may the appellees have a cause of action for damages against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is not one of the original registered owners that procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had anything to do with the registration proceedings which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 even supposing that the registration was procured fraudulently. 4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court,

dealing on questions regarding the validity and effectiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The rulings of this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive hearing in, the resolution of the issues involved in the three cases now at bar. (a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil., 183), where the jurisdiction of the Court of Land Registration that issued the decree which was the basis of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was questioned, and this Court upheld the jurisdiction of the registration court and categorically pronounced the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. (b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, et al. (G.R. No. L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), where this Court declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive against all persons claiming, either by themselves or by their predecessors in interest, rights over the lands covered by said certificate of title. We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and the rulings of this Court in that former case are of decisive application to these three cases. On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual Pili, Alejandro de Dios, Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio

Araneta, Inc. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-156. It will be noted that three of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among the original plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court; Elias Benin, in Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case. No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, in Civil Case No. 3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in that Civil Case No. Q-156 claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of the ten) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their complaint - Jose Alcantara claiming two parcels, Elias Benin claiming three parcels, and Pascual Pili claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is alleged in the complaint 48 that each plaintiff, by himself and by his predecessors in interest, as lawful owner, had been in the actual, open and continuous possession of his own respective parcel, or parcels, of land from time immemorial until January 1950 when the defendants by force and by the use of armed men started to convert their lands into a subdivision; that on July 8, 1914 the defendants had obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a parcel of land which included the lands possessed by them (plaintiffs) and which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years before the issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of the defendants since the date of their original certificate of title showed that said certificate of title did not express the status of the their claim to the said parcels, that plaintiffs were not given formal notice by the defendants of the registration of the lands, such that defendants' certificate of title No. 735 was not in accordance with law, and that defendants did not have proper title for registration to the parcels of land owned

by the plaintiffs, as described in the complaint; and that because the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds was still in the names of the defendants, successors in interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz, and has not passed to innocent parties for valuable consideration, the conveyance of the same to the plaintiffs was in order. The plaintiffs prayed that therein defendants be ordered to execute deeds of conveyance of the parcels of land described in their complaint in favor of the plaintiffs that the defendants' certificate of title be cancelled and the corresponding certificate be ordered issued in the names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:
"The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are owners of the parcels of land set forth in their complaint, which parcels are situated along Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose, Quezon City, and that they have been in actual, open, and continuous possession and enjoyment thereof without molestation from defendants from time immemorial to the present; that on July 8, 1914, defendants obtained a certificate of title (No. 735) over a parcel of land, which included the lands possessed by plaintiffs, and which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners more than 30 years before the issuance of said title; that on June 23, 1950, defendants caused the removal of two houses of plaintiffs on the land; and that defendants did not file any action against plaintiffs before the inclusion of the lands in their title, in violation of the `due process of

law' clause of the Constitution. There are other allegations which really are arguments of legal discussion, thus: that defendants could not acquire title by the registration proceedings against the lawful holder, especially without formal notice, because registration is to confirm title, not to acquire it; that the silence of the defendants since the issuance of their title shows that this does not express the lawful status of their claim, etc. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that, if it does, the same is barred by the statute of limitations. The court sustained this motion on the second ground. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the same substantial allegations, but with new ones, i.e., that it was in January, 1950, that they learned that their lands were included in the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of defendants' title; that defendants never claimed ownership to the lands, but directly or indirectly allowed plaintiffs to continue exercising their rights of ownership over the same. This amended complaint was denied admission, and the motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal was also denied. Hence the appeal."

In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court held:
"Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended complaint is

erroneous or not, we are constrained to hold that the dismissal of the action, even with the amended complaint is a basis thereof, is correct. From the allegations of both the original and amended complaints, it appears that the defendants are holders of a certificate of title issued on July 8, 1914 as a consequence of registration proceedings. There is no allegation in both original and amended complaints that the plaintiffs were not notified, or were not aware, of the registration proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that as occupants proper notices thereof were served on them and that they were aware of said proceedings. If this is so, then the plaintiffs, who were, or whose predecessors in interest were, on the land during the registration proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The latter are in rem and bind the whole world, whether served with notice personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49). And the decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto, and is conclusive against the plaintiffs, (Section 38, Land Registration Act). The supposed right of plaintiffs by reason of their alleged continued possession for thirty years was, therefore, destroyed fully and completely by the registration proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of the inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from the effects of the registration proceedings, and the supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to

continue on the land after registration can not serve as basis of any title or right thereto, because acts of a possessory character by tolerance of an owner does not constitute possession (Article 1942, Spanish Civil Code), and because no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Section 46, Land Registration Act)".

Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acua case, supra, this Court upheld the validity of the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court declared that "the decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the plaintiffs." In other words, in virtue of that decision, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, and their successors-in-interest, could no longer question the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, nor claim any right of ownership over any portion of the land that is covered by said certificate of title. But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim ownership over portions of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and his sister Marta Benin, filed Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his brother Juan Alcantara, filed Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by his sister Luisa Pili, filed Civil Case No. 3623.

These are the three cases which originated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) which are now before this Court on appeal.

In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in these three cases had been amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs all the heirs of the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in each case. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 was amended to include all the heirs of Sixto Benin the alleged owner of the three parcels of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was amended to include all the heirs of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 was amended to include all the heirs of Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one parcel of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (defendant therein) filed a motion to dismiss upon the principal ground "that the cause of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior judgment, or by the statute of limitation". In its motion to dismiss J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

The lower court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. In its answer to the complaint in each of these three cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as affirmative defenses the very grounds of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs had closed their direct evidence, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another motion to dismiss upon the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and by a prior judgment, and that the plaintiffs had not presented evidence to prove their claim of ownership. This second motion to dismiss was also denied by the lower court. 49 In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that the decision in the Alcantara case was not a bar to the action in these three cases, ruling that there is no identity, of the parties, of the subject matter, and of the cause of action, between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other. It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal, that "the trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground." 50 Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the action of the appellees in the three cases at bar? In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and

(d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281283). We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for res judicata which we have to determine is whether between Civil Case Q-156 (G.R. No. 4998), on the one hand. and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 (G.R. Nos. L26127, 26128 and 26129), on the other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity of subject matter. In the lower court's pre-trial order, dated December 18, 1957, which was based on the agreement of the parties, it is stated
"That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are substantially identical to the same parcels of land litigated in these cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623." 51

We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading the original complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and the decision in the Alcantara case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156 was based on the alleged fact that the defendants had dispossessed and deprived the plaintiffs therein of the parcels of land described in the complaint, which were claimed by the plaintiffs as their own and of which they had been in actual, open and continuous

possession from time immemorial, and that said lands were wrongly included in Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In the three cases at bar, plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of having been dispossessed and deprived by the defendants of the parcels of land of which they were absolute owners and possessors, by themselves and through their predecessors in interest, since time immemorial and that their said lands wrongly included in Parcel 1 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and in the three cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and the reconveyance to them of the parcels of land that they claim as theirs. 52 It appears clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the three cases at bar, the object or purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership and possession of the same parcels of land. As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of parties between Civil Case No. Q156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 only Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and Pascual Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156, the defendants were Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M. Tuason, & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. while in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the defendants were Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz (the persons

appearing as registered owners in Original Certificate of Title No. 735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. We find that the natural persons surnamed Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons who belong to the Tuason family that secured the registration of Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case No. Q-156 is the administrator of the Tuason properties. So, the parties defendants in all these cases are practically the same. We find, however, that in Civil Case No. Q-156 as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. that actually controverted the claims of the plaintiffs. After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Elias Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. 3622 (G.R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of res adjudicata. We are likewise of the considered view that the decision in the Alcantara case would serve to rule out the action of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the doctrine of stare decisis. In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and Elias Benin two brothers and a sister. In the amended complaint it was alleged that these three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another sister, namely Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin. But because all the five Benin brothers and sisters died, they were all substituted by their heirs, such that as of

the time when Civil Case No. 3621 was decided the Plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the heirs of Marta Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban Benin, and (5) the heirs of Felipa Binin. In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara. Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan Alcantara, and (2) Jose Alcantara. In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had two brothers who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they were substituted by their heirs. Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted by her heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili. It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual Pili, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156. It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q156 (G.R. No. L-4998 the Alcantara case) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court that

had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, and that there is identity of subject matter and cause of action between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it appearing that Elias Benin is a partyplaintiff both in Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3621, that Jose Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3623; and that the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are practically the same persons and/or entities, We hold that the doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely applies to Elias Benin, or to his heirs and successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3622; and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3623. 53

We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623. It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their

complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931. When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-156 (which was filed in 1950) that they were the owners of the parcels of land specified in their complaint, having inherited the same from their ancestors and had been in possession of the same from time immemorial, each was claiming a right as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido Pili, respectively. Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, the source of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all the other plaintiffs were their respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin and Candido Pili, as the case may be. Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931, it is obvious that during all the time when the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court of Land Registration, which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 on July 8, 1914, Sixto Benin, Bonoso Alcantara, and Candido Pili were living. The records show that no one of these three persons, or their representative, had filed any opposition to the application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor did any one of them, or their representative, file any petition for review of the decree of registration No. 17431 that was issued in said LRC No. 7681. It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which affirmed the order of the Court of

First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) in Civil Case No. Q-156 should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case, No. Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all claim the same right, based on the alleged ownership of their respective common predecessor in interest - in Civil Case No. 3621 the common predecessor in interest being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622 the common predecessor in interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and in Civil Case No. 3623 the common predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In Civil Case No. Q-156 Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Sixto Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual Pili, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Candido Pili. It follows, therefore, that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L4998 (Civil Case No. Q-156i, which held untenable the cause of action of the successors in interest, of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili, to recover the ownership and possession of any land

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would also foreclose a similar cause of action of all other persons who claim to be successors in interest of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili over any land covered by said certificate of title. As We have adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931. These three predecessors in interest of the appellees died long after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, which took place on July 8, 1914. And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are not privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998 the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that case, still the ruling of this Court in that former case, to the effect that therein plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest were bound by the proceedings in the registration court which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to those plaintiffs in these three cases, because the claim of ownership of these plaintiffs is based on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-156. 54 It may well be said that the interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127 (Civil Case No. 3621) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin were represented by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara were represented by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26129 (Civil Case No. 3623) who

claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q156 (G.R. No. L-4998). (c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-14223, November 23, 1960) 55 , where Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was also in question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in the three cases now at bar. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q2918, against J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. alleging, substantially, that their ancestor, Inocencio Santiago, was the owner of a parcel of land, evidenced by a document (attached to their complaint as Annex A) issued by the Spanish government on May 12, 1848 56 ; that Inocencio Santiago had since then been in possession of the aforesaid land as owner, publicly, continuously and adversely until his death, when his two children, Isaias and Albina, succeeded and continued to own and possess said land pro indiviso in the same character as that of their predecessor; that upon the death of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land was inherited by his eleven children who, together with their aunt Albina, continued to own and possess the land in the same character as that of their predecessors; that Albina and her co-plaintiffs came to know that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil Case No. Q27 for "quieting of title and recovery of possession" against five of the children of Isaias Santiago involving the parcel of land of which they were co-owners; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had claimed that parcel to be part of the land

covered by its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27, in which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as parties, had already become final 57 ; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the judgment against them, excluding and ousting them from the enjoyment and possession of the land. Albina and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the former was derived, did not include the parcel claimed by them; that even granting that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 included the parcel claimed by them the inclusion of that parcel in the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was done through fraud because they, nor their predecessors, were not actually notified of the registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation of the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs further alleged that the technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to include areas never brought within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, since they were areas not included in the application and publication in the registration proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. applied for, and secured, registration of the land which included their parcel of land they had already acquired ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex A of their complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her coplaintiffs prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from enforcing Civil Case No. Q-27 against them; that a resurvey be ordered to determine whether or not Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) included

the land described in their complaint; that a reconveyance to them be ordered of whatever portion of the land claimed by them may be found included in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 be ordered cancelled and substituted with a new certificate of title embracing only those lands included in the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.

Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissed the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon the grounds that there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a prior judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27 which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-5079, and that the action of the plaintiffs, if they had any, had prescribed. This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Albina Santiago and her coplaintiffs. 58 Regarding the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous case (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed in G.R. No. L-5079) would not operate as res judicata against them because they were not parties in that suit, and that they did not derive their title from the defendants in the previous suit, this Court held:
"We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to quiet title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other

heirs of Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727), can not constitute res judicata against these appellants who were not parties to that suit and do not derive their title from the defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is authority for the proposition that a judgment may be made binding in a subsequent litigation upon one who, although not a formal party to a previous suit, has actually conducted or controlled the action or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately represented in such previous litigation but no clear proof of the existence of such exceptional circumstances is before us in the present case. On the other hand, the rule is that co-owners are not privies inter se in relation to the property owned in common. xxx xxx xxx "But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the defendants Santiago in the former litigation over this same property (S.C.G.R. No. L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to the effect that the Spanish document (Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado, and, therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to herein appellants, since the quality or the

legal effect of the document does not depend upon the person who invoke it. "If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed property by virtue of the document Annex A, then appellants herein, as heirs of Ynocencio, have not acquired such ownership either. It follows that the first and second causes of action of their complaint, predicated as they are on the assumption that such ownership and its consequential rights resulted from Annex A, must necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can complain of no invasion of dominical rights." It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned decision in the Santiago case, even if Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not considered privies to the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not parties in that previous case, this Court nevertheless applied to them the judgment (G. R. No. L-5079) in that previous case where it was pronounced that the document, Annex A of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado, and it did not establish the right of ownership of their predecessor in interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs had based their claim of ownership on that document (Annex A). 59

This Court held in that previous case that the document was unavailing against

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 of J, M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of Title No. 735. And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case, in the three cases at bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621, except the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622, except Jose Alcantara, are not privies to Jose Alcantara and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; and even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623, except Pascual Pili, are not privies to Pascual Pili and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q156, still the pronouncement of this Court in the judgment in that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that the plaintiffs in that case and their predecessors in interest were bound by the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to all the plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases. In that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not sustain, the rights claimed by the predecessors in interest of herein appellees over the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees, therefore, have not succeeded to any right that can derrogate the validity and conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and of the certificates of title that are derived from said original certificate of title. Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the registration proceedings which resulted in the

issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular and fraudulent, this Court held:
"(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessorsin-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more."

Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-

plaintiffs that they had acquired title by prescription over the parcel of land claimed by them, this Court held:
"It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action. If such prescription was completed before the registration of the land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and extinguished by the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was either begun or completed after the decree of registration, it conferred no title because, by express provision of law, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner (Act 496, section 46)."

Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared conclusive and indefeasible Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. There are many other cases where this Court has made a similar pronouncement regarding Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 60 In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it follows that, as contended by the appellant, the lower court also erred when it declared the appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding damages to them, in these three cases. 61 We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys fees against the appellees 63 We believe that the appellees had filed their complaints in the honest, but

mistaken, belief that they have a good cause of action against the appellant corporation and not because they meant to embarrass or humiliate the persons who are identified or connected with the appellant. WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed from, is reversed and set aside. The bond filed by appellant in the three cases in the court below for the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction is ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as to costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 163551. July 18, 2011.] DATU KIRAM SAMPACO, substituted by HADJI SORAYA S. MACABANDO, petitioner, vs. HADJI SERAD MINGCA LANTUD, respondent. DECISION

PERALTA, J :
p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' Decision dated August 15, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 63801 and its Resolution dated May 13, 2004, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: On September 14, 1984, respondent Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud, the plaintiff in the lower court, filed an action to quiet title with damages 1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Branch 8, Marawi City (trial court), against petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco (deceased), the defendant in the lower court, who has been substituted by his heirs, represented by Hadji Soraya Sampaco-Macabando. 2 Respondent alleged in his Complaint 3 that he is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential lot located at Marinaut, Marawi City, with an area of 897 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-658. On August 25, 1984, petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco, through his daughter Soraya SampacoMacabando with several armed men, forcibly and unlawfully entered his property and destroyed the nursery buildings, cabbage seedlings and other improvements therein worth P10,000.00. On August 30, 1984, Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen prepared and issued a decision 4 in writing stating that petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco is the owner of the subject parcel of land. Respondent stated that the acts of petitioner and the said decision of the Barangay Captain may cast a cloud over or otherwise prejudice his title. Respondent stated that he and his predecessors-ininterest have been in open, public and exclusive possession of the subject property. He prayed that the acts of petitioner and the decision of Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen be declared

invalid, and that petitioner be ordered to pay respondent damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and attorney's fees. In his Answer, 5 defendant Datu Kiram Sampaco, petitioner herein, denied the material allegations of the Complaint. Petitioner asserted that he and his predecessors-in-interest are the ones who had been in open, public, continuous, and exclusive possession of the property in dispute. Petitioner alleged that OCT No. P-658 was secured in violation of laws and through fraud, deception and misrepresentation, considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential lot and the title issued is a free patent. Moreover, respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had never taken actual possession or occupied the land under litigation. On the contrary, petitioner has all the evidence of actual possession and ownership of permanent improvements and other plants on the land in dispute.
TcSaHC

Petitioner filed a counterclaim for actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees for the unfounded complaint and prayed for its dismissal. He also sought the cancellation of respondent's OCT No. P-658 and the reconveyance of the subject parcel of land. During the trial, respondent Hadji Lantud testified that he acquired the subject lot from his grandmother, Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof from his grandmother's helper, Totop Malacop, pursuant to a court decision after litigating with him. 6 Respondent had been residing on the lot for more than 30 years, applied for a title thereto and was issued OCT No. P-658. 7 He paid the corresponding real estate taxes for the land. 8 He planted

assorted trees and plants on the lot like bananas, jackfruits, coconuts and others. 9 He testified that he was not aware of the alleged litigation over the lot before Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato, although he was furnished a copy of the decision. 10 On the other hand, petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco testified that the land under litigation is only a portion of the 1,800 square meters of land that he inherited in 1952 from his father, Datu Sampaco Gubat. 11 Since then, he had been in adverse possession and ownership of the subject lot, cultivating and planting trees and plants through his caretaker Hadji Mustapha Macawadib. 12 In 1962, he mortgaged the land (1,800 square meters) with the Development Bank of the Philippines, Ozamis branch. 13 He declared the land (1,800 square meters) for taxation purposes 14 and paid real estate taxes, and adduced in evidence the latest Tax Receipt No. 1756386 dated September 15, 19[9]3. 15 Petitioner presented four corroborating witnesses as regards his possession of the subject property. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on March 31, 1999 in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
DEICHc

WHEREFORE, premises considered the court is of the opinion and so holds that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Dismissing plaintiffs complaint for lack of merit;

2. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. P-658 (Exh. A) null and void and of no legal effect; 3. Declaring the defendant the absolute or true owner and possessor of the land in dispute; and

4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P10,000.00 for attorney's fees plus P500.00 per appearance.
16

The trial court held that the issuance of respondent's title, OCT No. P-658, was tainted with fraud and irregularities and the title is, therefore, spurious; hence, it is null and void, and without any probative value. The finding of fraud was based on: (1) the Certification issued by Datu Samra Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural Resources District No. XII-3, Marawi City, stating that the data contained in respondent's title were verified and had no record in the said office; (2) the said Certification was not refuted or rebutted by respondent; (3) while free patents are normally issued for agricultural lands, respondent's title is a free patent title issued over a residential land as the lot is described in the Complaint as a residential lot; and (4) Yusoph Lumampa, an employee of the local Bureau of Lands, to whom respondent allegedly entrusted the paperwork of the land titling, was not presented as a witness. Moreover, the trial court stated that respondent failed to establish with competent and credible evidence that he

was in prior possession of the subject property. No corroborative witness was presented to further prove his prior possession. On the other hand, the trial court stated that petitioner offered documentary evidence, consisting of a contract of real estate mortgage of the subject property, tax declarations, an official tax receipt, and testimonial evidence to prove that he had been in open, public, continuous, and lawful possession of the subject property in the concept of owner. Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. On August 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE: 1. The appeal is granted and the appealed judgment is hereby totally REVERSED. 2. To quiet his title, plaintiff-appellant Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud is confirmed the owner of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-658; 3. The defendant-appellee is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as attorney's fees to the plaintiff-appellant; and 4. Costs against the defendant-appellee.
SHECcT

17

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the

Court of Appeals in its Resolution 18 dated May 13, 2004. The Court of Appeals held that there is no controversy that respondent is a holder of a Torrens title; hence, he is the owner of the subject property. The appellate court stressed that Section 47 19 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) provides that the certificate of title covering registered land shall be received as evidence in all courts of the Philippines and shall be conclusive as to all matters stated therein. The Court of Appeals stated that the Torrens title has three attributes: (1) a Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership over registered land and, unless annulled in an appropriate proceeding, the title is conclusive on the issue of ownership; (2) a Torrens title is incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the entry of the decree of registration; 20 and (3) a Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack. 21 The Court of Appeals held that petitioner's counterclaim filed on October 15, 1984 for cancellation of respondent's original certificate of title issued on May 22, 1981 was filed beyond the statutory one-year period; hence, petitioner's title had become indefeasible, and cannot be affected by the decision made by Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen. Moreover, the appellate court held that petitioner's prayer for the cancellation of respondent's title, OCT No. P-658, through a counterclaim included in his Answer is a collateral attack, which the law does not allow, citing Cimafranca v. Court of Appeals 22 and Natalia Realty Corporation v. Valdez. 23

The allegation of fraud in securing OCT No. P-658 on the ground that the property in dispute is a residential lot and not subject of a free patent was not given weight by the appellate court as it was supported only by testimonial evidence that did not show how (by metes and bounds) and why the property in dispute could not have been the subject of a free patent. The appellate court stated that a mere preponderance of evidence is not adequate to prove fraud; 24 it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioner claimed that the subject property is only part of his larger property. Although petitioner introduced proof of payment of the real estate taxes of the said property, as well as a previous mortgage of the property, petitioner did not show that the disputed property is part of his larger property. Hence, the appellate court stated that under such circumstances, it cannot rule that petitioner owned the land under litigation, since petitioner failed to show that it is part of his larger property. The Court of Appeals did not award actual and moral damages, because respondent failed to prove the amount of any actual damages sustained, and the instances enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code warranting the award of moral damages were not present. However, the Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00, considering that respondent was forced to incur expenses to protect his right through the action to quiet title.

Petitioner filed this petition raising the following issues:

I THE COURT OF APPEALS MISERABLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE TORRENS TITLE INVOLVED HEREIN WAS ISSUED PURSUANT TO A FREE PATENT WHICH COULD NOT BE VALIDLY ISSUED OVER A PRIVATE LAND. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED 1N DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT AS CERTIFIED TO BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS ITSELF NO SUCH FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT LAND WAS ISSUED BY IT; HENCE, SAID FREE PATENT IS SPURIOUS.
cEATSI

III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE SUBJECT LOT HAD LONG BEEN OWNED, POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED BY THE DEFENDANT (PETITIONER HEREIN) OR HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER'S

COUNTERCLAIM FOR CANCELLATION OF RESPONDENT'S TITLE IS BARRED. V THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM IN THE INSTANT CASE IS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF'S TITLE. VI THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 25

The main issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the validity of OCT No. P-658 and confirming respondent as owner of the property in dispute. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the fact that the Torrens title was issued to respondent by virtue of a free patent covering a residential lot that is private land as it has been acquired by petitioner through open, public, continuous and lawful possession of the land in the concept of owner. Petitioner thus prayed for the cancellation of respondent's title and the reconveyance of the subject property. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the subject lot belongs to respondent. The contention is without merit. The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to

the ownership of the land described therein, and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings. 26 Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. 27 An original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial proceedings. 28 However, the Court has ruled that indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. 29 In this case, petitioner alleged in his Answer to respondent's Complaint in the trial court that respondent's title, OCT No. P-658, was secured in violation of the law and through fraud, deception and misrepresentation, because the subject parcel of land is a residential lot, which cannot be subject of a free patent, since only agricultural lands are subject of a free patent. The trial court found that "[t]he lot under litigation as clearly described in the complaint is a residential lot and a free patent title thereto cannot validly be issued." This finding was one of the bases for the trial court's declaration that the issuance of OCT was tainted with fraud and irregularities and is, therefore, spurious; thus, OCT No. P-658 is null and void. It should be pointed out that the allegation in the Complaint that the land is residential was made only by respondent, but the true classification of the disputed land as residential was not shown to have been made by the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, pursuant to Section

9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land Act. 30 Hence, the trial court erred in concluding that there was fraud in the issuance of respondent's free patent title on the ground that it covered residential land based only on the Complaint which stated that the property was residential land when it was not shown that it was the President who classified the disputed property as residential, and OCT No. P-658 itself stated that the free patent title covered agricultural land. It has been stated that at present, not only agricultural lands, but also residential lands, have been made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any natural born Filipino citizen. 31 Nevertheless, the fact is that in this case, the free patent title was granted over agricultural land as stated in OCT No. P-658.
HcDATC

Moreover, petitioner contends in his petition that the Certification 32 dated July 24, 1987 issued by Datu Samra I. Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural Resources District No. XII-3, Bureau of Lands, Marawi City, certifying that the data contained in OCT No. P-658 in respondent's name had no records in the said office, showed that respondent's Torrens title was spurious. The Court holds that the certification, by itself, is insufficient to prove the alleged fraud. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. 33 Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved. 34 The signatory of the certification, Datu Samra Andam, A/Adm.

Assistant II, Natural Resources District No. XII-3, Marawi City, was not presented in court to testify on the due issuance of the certification, and to testify on the details of his certification, particularly the reason why the said office had no records of the data contained in OCT No. P-658 or to testify on the fact of fraud, if any. Thus, the Court holds that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove that fraud was committed in the issuance of respondent's Torrens title. Hence, respondent's Torrens title is a valid evidence of his ownership of the land in dispute. On the other hand, petitioner claims ownership of the subject lot, which is merely a portion of a larger property (1,800 square meters) that he allegedly inherited from his father in 1952, by virtue of open, public and continuous possession of the land in the concept of owner making it petitioner's private property. Hence, petitioner prays for reconveyance of the said property. Article 434 of the Civil Code governs an action for reconveyance, thus:
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.

Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. 35

In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that lie has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. 36 In this case, petitioner claims that the property in dispute is part of his larger property. However, petitioner failed to identify his larger property by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description contained in the title of respondent, which would have shown whether the disputed property really formed part of petitioner's larger property. The appellate court correctly held in its Resolution dated May 13, 2004 that petitioner's claim is solely supported by testimonial evidence, which did not conclusively show the metes and bounds of petitioner's larger property in relation to the metes and bounds of the disputed property; thus, there is no sufficient evidence on record to support petitioner's claim that the disputed property is part of his larger property. In regard to the second requisite of title to property, both petitioner and respondent separately claim that they are entitled to ownership of the property by virtue of open, public, continuous and exclusive possession of the same in the concept of owner. Petitioner claims that he inherited the subject property from his father in 1952, while respondent claims that he acquired the property from his grandmother Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof from his grandmother's helper Totop Malacop pursuant to a court decision after litigating with him. 37 Respondent has OCT No. P-658 to prove his title to the subject

property, while petitioner merely claims that the property is already his private land by virtue of his open, public, continuous possession of the same in the concept of owner.
HTASIa

The Court holds that petitioner failed to prove the requisites of reconveyance as he failed to prove the identity of his larger property in relation to the disputed property, and his claim of title by virtue of open, public and continuous possession of the disputed property in the concept of owner is nebulous in the light of a similar claim by respondent who holds a free patent title over the subject property. As stated in Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Couurt, 38 it is relatively easy to declare and claim that one owns and possesses public agricultural land, but it is entirely a different matter to affirmatively declare and to prove before a court of law that one actually possessed and cultivated the entire area to the exclusion of other claimants who stand on equal footing under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) as any other pioneering claimants. Further, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner's counterclaim is timebarred, since the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot, citing Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago. 39 Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the counterclaim in this case is a collateral attack on respondent's title, citing Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court. 40 Petitioner cites the case of Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of

Mariano E. Santiago, 41 which held that a counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the title. The Court notes that the case of Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 42 cited by the Court of Appeals to support its ruling that the prayer for the cancellation of respondent's title through a counterclaim included in petitioner's Answer is a collateral attack on the said title, is inapplicable to this case. In Cimafranca, petitioners therein filed a complaint for Partition and Damages, and respondents therein indirectly attacked the validity of the title involved in their counterclaim. Hence, the Court ruled that a Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its validity can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Here, the case cited by petitioner, Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, declared that the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the party seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot, as well as distinguished a collateral attack under Section 48 of PD No. 1529 from a direct attack, and held that a counterclaim may be considered as a complaint or an independent action and can be considered a direct attack on the title, thus:
The one-year prescriptive period, however, does not apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title which is imprescriptible. In David v. Malay, we held that a person in actual

possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. xxx xxx xxx Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action is an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
cSEDTC

. . . A counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the title. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court Appeals, we ruled on the validity of a certificate of title despite the fact that the nullity thereof was raised only as a counterclaim. It was held

that a counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. . . . 43

The above ruling of the court on the definition of collateral attack under Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 was reiterated in Leyson v. Bontuyan, 44 Heirs of Enrigrre Diaz v. Virata, 45 Arangote v. Maglunob, 46 and Catores v. Afidchao. 47 Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioner's counterclaim for cancellation of respondent's title is not a collateral attack, but a direct attack on the Torrens title of petitioner. However, the counterclaim seeking for the cancellation of title and reconveyance of the subject property has prescribed as petitioner has riot proven actual possession and ownership of the property due to his failure to prove the identity of his larger property that would show that the disputed property is a part thereof, and his claim of title to the subject property by virtue of open, public and continuous possession in the concept of owner is nebulous in the light of a similar claim by respondent who holds a Torrens title to the subject property. Respondent's original certificate of title was issued on May 22, 1981, while the counterclaim was filed by petitioner on October 15, 1984, which is clearly beyond the one-year prescriptive period. In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in confirming that respondent is the owner of the parcel of land covered by

OCT No. P-658. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' decision dated August 15, 2003, and its Resolution dated May 13, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 63801, are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170375. July 7, 2010.] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents. [G.R. No. 170505. July 7, 2010.] LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION and NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION (TRANSCO), respondents. [G.R. No. 173355-56. July 7, 2010.]

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twenty-Third Division, Cagayan de Oro City), and LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, respondents. [G.R. No. 173401. July 7, 2010.] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DEMETRIA CACHO, represented by alleged Heirs DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL and/or TEOFILO CACHO, AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, respondents. [G.R. Nos. 173563-64. July 7, 2010.] NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special TwentyThird Division, Cagayan de Oro City), and LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION as represented by Atty. Max C. Tabimina, respondents. [G.R. No. 178779. July 7, 2010.] LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DEMETRIA CONFESOR

VIDAL and AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. [G.R. No. 178894. July 7, 2010.] TEOFILO CACHO and/or ATTY. GODOFREDO CABILDO, petitioner, vs. DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL and AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J :
p

Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land.
ITDHSE

In G.R. No. 170375, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), by way of consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, seeks to set aside the issuances of Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara (Judge Mangotara) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 (RTCBranch 1) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case

No. 106, particularly, the: (1) Resolution 1 dated July 12, 2005 which, in part, dismissed the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic for the latter's failure to implead indispensable parties and forum shopping; and (2) Resolution 2 dated October 24, 2005, which denied the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic. G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where Landtrade Realty Corporation (LANDTRADE), Teofilo Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo assail the Decision 3 dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution 4 dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00456. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 5 dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 (RTC-Branch 3) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452, granting the Petition for Quieting of Title, Injunction and Damages filed by Demetria Vidal and Azimuth International Development Corporation (AZIMUTH) against Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo. G.R. No. 170505 is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which LANDTRADE urges the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision 6 dated November 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85714 and 85841. The appellate court annulled several issuances of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 (RTC-Branch 5) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and its sheriff, in Civil Case No. 6613, specifically, the: (1) Order 7 dated August 9, 2004 granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of LANDTRADE; (2) Writ of Execution 8 dated August 10,

2004; (3) two Notices of Garnishment 9 both dated August 11, 2004, and (4) Notification 10 dated August 11, 2004. These issuances of the RTC-Branch 5 allowed and/or enabled execution pending appeal of the Decision 11 dated February 17, 2004 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, favoring LANDTRADE in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, the ejectment case said corporation instituted against the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO).
cHSIAC

G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 are two Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed separately by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. Both Petitions seek to annul the Resolution 12 dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, which (1) granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE for the issuance of a writ of execution and the designation of a special sheriff for the enforcement of the Decision 13 dated December 12, 2005 of the RTCBranch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613, and (2) denied the applications of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the execution of the same RTC Decision. The Decision dated December 12, 2005 of RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613 affirmed the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, favoring LANDTRADE. G.R. No. 173401 involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the

Republic, which raises pure questions of law and seeks the reversal of the following issuances of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 (RTC-Branch 4) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6686, an action for cancellation of titles and reversion: (1) Order 14 dated December 13, 2005 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686; and (2) Order 15 dated May 16, 2006, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic. I THE PRECEDING CASES The consolidated seven cases have for their common genesis the 1914 case of Cacho v. Government of the United States 16 (1914 Cacho case). The 1914 Cacho Case Sometime in the early 1900s, the late Doa Demetria Cacho (Doa Demetria) applied for the registration of two parcels of land: (1) Lot 1 of Plan II-3732, the smaller parcel with an area of 3,635 square meters or 0.36 hectares (Lot 1); and (2) Lot 2 of Plan II-3732, the larger parcel with an area of 378,707 square meters or 37.87 hectares (Lot 2). Both parcels are situated in what was then the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province, which later became Sitio Nunucan, then Brgy. Suarez, in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. Doa Demetria's applications for registration were docketed as GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.
HTASIa

The application in GLRO Record No. 6908 covered Lot 1, the smaller parcel of land. Doa Demetria allegedly acquired Lot 1 by purchase from Gabriel Salzos (Salzos). Salzos, in turn, bought Lot 1 from Datto Darondon and

his wife Alanga, evidenced by a deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by Alanga, on behalf of Datto Darondon. The application in GLRO Record No. 6909 involved Lot 2, the bigger parcel of land. Doa Demetria purportedly purchased Lot 2 from Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claimed to have inherited Lot 2 from his uncle, Datto Anandog, who died without issue. Only the Government opposed Doa Demetria's applications for registration on the ground that the two parcels of land were the property of the United States and formed part of a military reservation, generally known as Camp Overton. On December 10, 1912, the land registration court (LRC) rendered its Decision in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Based on the evidence, the LRC made the following findings in GLRO Record No. 6908:
6th.The court is convinced from the proofs that the small parcel of land sold by the Moro woman Alanga was the home of herself and her husband, Darondon, and was their conjugal property; and the court so finds. xxx xxx xxx As we have seen, the deed on which applicant's title to the small parcel rests, is executed only by the Moro woman Alanga, wife of Datto Darondon, which is not permitted either by the Moro laws or the Civil

Code of the Philippine Islands. It appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto Darondon, is alive yet, and before admitting this parcel to registration it is ordered that a deed from Datto Darondon, husband of Alanga, be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908, in favor of the applicant. 17 (Emphases supplied.)

In GLRO Record No. 6909, the LRC observed and concluded that:
SHacCD

A tract of land 37 hectares in area, which is the extent of the land under discussion, is larger than is cultivated ordinarily by the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of parcels now on trial before this court, the average size of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro with all his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one in question. . . . xxx xxx xxx The court is also convinced from the proofs that the small portion in the southern part of the larger parcel, where, according to the proofs, Datto Anandog had his house and where there still exist some cocos and fruit trees, was the home of the said Moro Datto Anandog; and the court so finds. As to the rest of the large parcel the court does not find the title of Datto Bunglay established. According to his own declaration his

residence on this land commenced only a few days before the sale. He admitted that the coco trees he is supposed to have planted had not yet begun to bear fruit at the time of the sale, and were very small. Datto Duroc positively denies that Bunglay lived on the land, and it clearly appears that he was not on the land when it was first occupied by the military. Nor does Datto Bunglay claim to have planted the three mango trees by the roadside near point 25 of the plan. The court believes that all the rest of this parcel, not occupied nor cultivated by Datto Anandog, was land claimed by Datto Duroc and also by Datto Anandog and possibly by other dattos as a part of their general jurisdiction, and that it is the class of land that Act No. 718 prohibits the sale of, by the dattos, without the express approval of the Government. It is also found that Datto Bunglay is the nephew of Dato Anandog, and that the Moro woman Alanga, grantor of the small parcel, is the sister of Datto Anandog, and that he died without issue. xxx xxx xxx It appears also that according to the provisions of the Civil Code as also the provisions of the 'Luwaran Code' of the Moros, the Moro woman Alanga has an interest in the portion of land left by her deceased brother, Datto Anandog. By article LXXXV, section 3, of the 'Luwaran Code,' it will be seen that the brothers and sisters of a

deceased Moro inherit his property to the exclusion of the more distant relatives. Therefore Datto Bunglay had no legal interest whatever in the land to sell to the applicant, Doa Demetria Cacho. But the Moro woman, Alanga, having appeared as a witness for the applicant without having made any claim to the land, the court finds from this fact that she has ratified the sale made by her nephew. The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied. And it is ordered that a new survey of the land be made and a corrected plan be presented, excluding all the land not occupied and cultivated by Datto Anandog; that said survey be made and the corrected plan presented on or before the 30th day of March, 1913, with previous notice to the commanding general of the Division of the Philippines.
IaEASH

On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection of the land for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog, so often mentioned herein, with previous notice to the applicant and her husband and representative, Seor Dionisio

Vidal. Having arrived late, Seor Vidal did not assist in the ocular inspection, which was fixed for 3 o'clock, p.m. of the day mentioned. But the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., and S.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated by the deceased Anandog. The N.E. limit of said land is a brook, and the N.W. corner is the point where the brook intersects the shore line of the sea, the other corners mentioned being marked with pine stakes. And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned, by tracing four straight lines connecting these four points. Between the portion cultivated by Datto Anandog and the mouth of the River Agus there is a high steep hill and the court does not believe it possible to cultivate said hill, it being covered with rocks and forest. 18 (Emphases supplied.)

The LRC additionally decreed at the end of its December 10, 1912 Decision:
It is further ordered that one-half of the costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by the Government of the United States, and that the applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto Darondon on or before the above-mentioned 30th day of March, 1913. Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and the new plan. 19

Apparently dissatisfied with the foregoing LRC judgment, Doa Demetria appealed to this Court. In its Decision

dated December 10, 1914, the Court affirmed in toto the LRC Decision of December 10, 1912, well satisfied that the findings of fact of the court below were fully sustained by the evidence adduced during trial. Eighty-three years later, in 1997, the Court was again called upon to settle a matter concerning the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the case of Cacho v. Court of Appeals 20 (1997 Cacho case). The 1997 Cacho Case On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doa Demetria's son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title (OCTs), docketed under the original GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.
TAScID

Teofilo's petition was opposed by the Republic, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan. Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic and NSC, the RTC initially dismissed Teofilo's petition for reconstitution of titles because there was inadequate evidence to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. According to the RTC, the proper remedy was a petition for the reconstitution of decrees since "it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909, Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, respectively, were issued." Teofilo sought leave of court for the filing and admission of his amended petition, but the RTC refused. When elevated to this Court in Cacho v. Mangotara, docketed as G.R. No. 85495, the Court resolved to remand the case to the RTC, with an order to the said trial court to accept

Teofilo's amended petition and to hear it as one for reissuance of decrees. In opposing Teofilo's petition, the Republic and NSC argued that the same suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that Teofilo was not the real party-in-interest; that Teofilo was guilty of laches; that Doa Demetria was not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees were ever issued in Doa Demetria's name; and that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and irregular. After trial, on June 9, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision granting Teofilo's petition and ordering the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The RTC held that the issuance of Decree No. 10364 in GLRO No. 6908 on May 9, 1913 and Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 on July 8, 1915 was sufficiently established by the certifications and testimonies of concerned officials. The original issuance of these decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had become final. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision dated June 9, 1993 and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 because: (1) re-issuance of Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 could not be made in the absence of the new survey ordered by this Court in the 1914 Cacho case; (2) the heir of a registered owner may lose his right to recover possession of the property and title thereto by laches; and (3) Teofilo failed to establish his identity and existence and that he was a real party-in-interest.
HSAcaE

Teofilo then sought recourse from this Court in the 1997 Cacho case. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found that such decrees had in fact been issued and had attained finality, as certified by the Acting Commissioner, Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the then Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). The Court further reasoned that:
[T]o sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which

Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915). Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that the judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree inconclusive. 21

As to the issue of laches, the Court referred to the settled doctrine that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. A final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. Anent the issue of the identity and existence of Teofilo and he being a real party-in-interest, the Court found that these were sufficiently established by the records. The Court relied on Teofilo's Affidavit of Adjudication as Doa Demetria's sole heir, which he executed before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago, United States of America (U.S.A.); as well as the publication in the Times Journal of the fact of adjudication of Doa Demetria's estate. Teofilo also appeared personally before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago to execute a Special Power of

Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo (Atty. Cabildo) who represented him in this case. The Court stressed that the execution of public documents is entitled to the presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert the same.
EcICSA

In the Resolution dated July 28, 1997, 22 the Court denied the Motions for Reconsideration of the Republic and NSC. As a result of the 1997 Cacho case, the decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for the two parcels of land in Doa Demetria's name. OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) was based on re-issued Decree No. N-219464 in GLRO Record No. 6908, while OCT No. 0-1201 (a.f.) was based on reissued Decree No. N-219465 in GLRO Record No. 6909. II THE ANTECENT FACTS OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR The dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another four cases involving the same parcels of land were instituted before the trial courts during and after the pendency of the 1997 Cacho case. These cases are: (1) the Expropriation Case, G.R. No. 170375; (2) the Quieting of Title Case, G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894; (3) the Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case, G.R. No. 170505 (execution pending appeal before the RTC) and G.R. Nos. 17335556 and 173563-64 (execution pending appeal before the Court of Appeals); and (4) the Cancellation of Titles and

Reversion Case, G.R. No. 173401. These cases proceeded independently of each other in the courts a quo until they reached this Court via the present Petitions. In the Resolution 23 dated October 3, 2007, the Court consolidated the seven Petitions considering that they either originated from the same case or involved similar issues. Expropriation Case (G.R. No. 170375) The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed on August 15, 1983 by the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter's mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank (PNB). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 106 and raffled to RTCBranch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara. ISA was created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 2729 24 dated August 9, 1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Its existence was extended until October 10, 1988. On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, 25 reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 302,532 square meters or 30.25 hectares, to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the Government. MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for Expropriation.
IASEca

When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the

pendency of Civil Case No. 106, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of capacity to sue of ISA. The RTC-Branch 1 granted the Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated November 9, 1988. ISA moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for the substitution of the Republic as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, but the motion was denied by RTC-Branch 1. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 106 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, thus, ISA appealed to this Court. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals 26 (ISA case), the Court remanded the case to RTC-Branch 1, which was ordered to allow the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff. Entry of Judgment was made in the ISA case on August 31, 1998. In an Order 27 dated November 16, 2001, the RTC-Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed with the RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint dated October 7, 2004 and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004 28 seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to admit the Supplemental Complaint on the ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same because ISA was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move for the execution of the decision in the ISA case within the

prescriptive period of five years, hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an independent action to revive the judgment. MCFC further pointed out that the unreasonable delay of more than six years of the Republic in seeking the substitution and continuation of the action for expropriation effectively barred any further proceedings therein on the ground of estoppel by laches. In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1 allowing the substitution of the Republic for ISA. In an Order dated April 4, 2005, the RTC-Branch 1 denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental Complaint. The RTC-Branch 1 agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for execution of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for execution had been filed, the RTC-Branch 1 ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 4, 2005 Order of the RTCBranch 1.
aSEHDA

MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 for: (1) failure of the Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the reversion of the same parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation.

Judge Mangotara of RTC-Branch 1 issued a Resolution 29 on July 12, 2005, denying for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granting the Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 filed by MCFC. Judge Mangotara justified the dismissal of the Expropriation Case thus:
What the Republic seeks [herein] is the expropriation of the subject parcels of land. Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner . . ., then a complaint for expropriation must, of necessity, be directed against the owner of the land subject thereof. In the case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the United States . . ., decreeing the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of the late Doa Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is conclusive as to the question of ownership thereof. Since MCFC, the only defendant left in this case, is not a proper party defendant in this complaint for expropriation, the present case should be dismissed. This Court notes that the Republic [has filed reversion proceedings] dated September 27, 2004, involving the same parcels of land, docketed as Case No. 6686 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Iligan City Branch 4. [The Republic], however, did not state such fact in its "Verification and Certification of Non-Forum

Shopping" attached to its Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004. [It is therefore] guilty of forum shopping. Moreover, considering that in the Reversion case, [the Republic] asserts ownership over the subject parcels of land, it cannot be allowed to take an inconsistent position in this expropriation case without making a mockery of justice. 30

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 12, 2005, insofar as it dismissed Civil Case No. 106, but said Motion was denied by Judge Mangatora in a Resolution 31 dated October 24, 2005. On January 16, 2006, the Republic filed with this Court the consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, docketed as G.R. No. 170375.
ECTIHa

The Quieting of Title Case (G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894) Demetria Vidal (Vidal) and AZIMUTH filed on November 18, 1998, a Petition 32 for Quieting of Title against Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo, and the Register of Deeds of Iligan City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4452 and raffled to RTC-Branch 3. In the Petition, Vidal claimed that she, and not Teofilo, was the late Doa Demetria's sole surviving heir, entitled to the parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). She averred that she is the daughter of Francisco Cacho Vidal (Francisco) and Fidela Arellano Confesor. Francisco was the only child of Don Dionisio Vidal and Doa Demetria.

AZIMUTH, for its part, filed the Petition as Vidal's successor-in-interest with respect to a 23-hectare portion of the subject parcels of land pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 2, 1998 and Deed of Conditional Conveyance dated August 13, 2004, which Vidal executed in favor of AZIMUTH. Teofilo opposed the Petition contending that it stated no cause of action because there was no title being disturbed or in danger of being lost due to the claim of a third party, and Vidal had neither legal nor beneficial ownership of the parcels of land in question; that the matter and issues raised in the Petition had already been tried, heard, and decided by the RTC of Iligan City and affirmed with finality by this Court in the 1997 Cacho case; and that the Petition was barred by the Statute of Limitations and laches. LANDTRADE, among other parties, was allowed by the RTC-Branch 3 to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452. LANDTRADE alleged that it is the owner of a portion of the subject parcels of land, measuring 270,255 square meters or about 27.03 hectares, which it purportedly acquired through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 1, 1996 from Teofilo, represented by Atty. Cabildo. LANDTRADE essentially argued that Vidal's right as heir should be adjudicated upon in a separate and independent proceeding and not in the instant Quieting of Title Case. During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested that there was no possibility of any amicable settlement among them.
TEAcCD

Vidal and AZIMUTH submitted testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial before the RTCBranch 3. Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo failed to present any evidence as they did not appear at all during the trial, while LANDTRADE was declared by the RTC-Branch 3 to have waived its right to present evidence on its defense and counterclaim. On July 17, 2004, the RTC-Branch 3 rendered its Decision 33 in Civil Case No. 4452 in favor of Vidal and AZIMUTH, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and against the respondents and intervenors: 1)DECLARING: a.)Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal the sole surviving heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho; b.)Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal alone has the hereditary right to and interest in the Subject Property; c.)Petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation is the successor-in-interest of petitioner Demetria C. Vidal to a portion of the Subject Property to the extent provided in their 2 April 1998 Memorandum of Agreement and 13 August 1998 Deed of Conditional Conveyance; d.)Respondent Teofilo Cacho is not a

son or heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho; and e.)Respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and any of their transferees/assignees have no valid right to or interest in the Subject Property. 2)ORDERING: a.)Respondent Register of Deeds of Iligan City, and any other person acting in his behalf, stop, cease and desist: i)From accepting or registering any affidavit of self-adjudication or any other document executed by respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any other person which in any way transfers the title to the Subject Property from Doa Demetria Cacho to respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors.
ESHAcI

ii)From cancelling the OCTs or any certificate of title over the Subject Property in the name of Demetria Cacho or any successor certificate of title, and

from issuing new certificates of title in the name of respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors. b)Respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo, their transferees/assignees, and any other person acting in their behalf, to stop, cease and desist: i)From executing, submitting to any Register of Deeds, or registering or causing to be registered therein, any affidavit of self-adjudication or any other document which in any way transfers title to the Subject Property from Demetria Cacho to respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors. ii)From canceling or causing the cancellation of OCTs or any certificate of title over the Subject Property in the name of Demetria Cacho or any successor certificate of title, and from issuing new certificates of title in the name of respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their

transferees/assignees, including the intervenors. iii)From claiming or representing in any manner that respondent Teofilo Cacho is the son or heir of Demetria Cacho or has rights to or interest in the Subject Property. 3)ORDERING respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, the following: a)For temperate damages-P80,000.00 b)For nominal damages-P60,000.00 c)For moral damages-P500,000.00 d)For exemplary damages-P500,000.00 e)For f)For attorney's fees P1,000,000.00 (ACCRA Law)-

Attorney's fees-P500,000.00 (Atty. Voltaire Rovira)

g)For litigation expenses-P300,000.00 For lack of factual and legal basis, the counterclaim of Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo is hereby dismissed. Likewise, the counterclaim of intervenor IDD/Investa is dismissed for lack of basis as the petitioners succeeded in proving their cause of action. On the cross-claim of intervenor IDD/Investa,

respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo are ORDERED to pay IDD/Investa, jointly and severally, the principal sum of P5,433,036 with 15% interest per annum. For lack of legal basis, the counterclaim of Intervenor Landtrade Realty Development Corporation is dismissed. Likewise, Intervenor Manguera's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of legal basis. 34

The joint appeal filed by LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo with the Court of Appeals was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 00456. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision 35 of January 19, 2007, affirmed in toto the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3. According to the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Branch 3 did not err in resolving the issue on Vidal's status, filiation, and hereditary rights as it is determinative of the issue on ownership of the subject properties. It was indubitable that the RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction over the person of Teofilo and juridical personality of LANDTRADE as they both filed their Answers to the Petition for Quieting of Title thereby voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of said trial court. Likewise, the Petition for Quieting of Title is in itself within the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3. Hence, where there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the resolution of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise by the court of its jurisdiction. Moreover, Teofilo and LANDTRADE were guilty of estoppel by laches for failing

to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 at the first opportunity and even actively participating in the trial of the case and seeking affirmative reliefs. In addition, the Court of Appeals held that the 1997 Cacho case only determined the validity and efficacy of the Affidavit of Adjudication that Teofilo executed before the Philippine Consulate General in the U.S.A. The decision of this Court in the 1997 Cacho case, which had become final and executory, did not vest upon Teofilo ownership of the parcels of land as it merely ordered the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition.
DaHSIT

The Court of Appeals agreed in the finding of the RTCBranch 3 that the evidence on record preponderantly supports Vidal's claim of being the granddaughter and sole heiress of the late Doa Demetria. The appellate court further adjudged that Vidal did not delay in asserting her rights over the subject parcels of land. The prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is 30 years. Vidal's rights as Doa Demetria's successor-ininterest accrued upon the latter's death in 1974, and only 24 years thereafter, in 1998, Vidal already filed the present Petition for Quieting of Title. Thus, Vidal's cause of action had not yet prescribed. And, where the action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law, the doctrine of laches was also inapplicable. LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the January 19, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals, which were denied in the July 4, 2007 Resolution 36 of the same court.

On August 24, 2007, LANDTRADE filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 178779. On September 6, 2007, Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo filed their own Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 178894. The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case (G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64) Three Petitions before this Court are rooted in the Unlawful Detainer Case instituted by LANDTRADE against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. On August 9, 1952, NAPOCOR took possession of two parcels of land in Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Iligan City, denominated as Lots 2029 and 2043, consisting of 3,588 square meters (or 0.36 hectares) and 3,177 square meters (or 0.32 hectares), respectively. On Lot 2029, NAPOCOR constructed its power sub-station, known as the Overton Sub-station, while on Lot 2043, it built a warehouse, known as the Agus 7 Warehouse, both for the use of its Agus 7 Hydro-Electric Power Plant. For more than 30 years, NAPOCOR occupied and possessed said parcels of land pursuant to its charter, Republic Act No. 6395. 37 With the enactment in 2001 of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), TRANSCO assumed the functions of NAPOCOR with regard to electrical transmissions and took over possession of the Overton Sub-station.
TaSEHC

Claiming ownership of the parcels of land where the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse are located,

LANDTRADE filed with the MTCC on April 9, 2003 a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11475-AF. In its Complaint, LANDTRADE alleged that it acquired from Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo, two parcels of land at Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Brgy. Maria Cristina, Iligan City, with a combined area of 270,255 square meters or around 27.03 hectares, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale 38 dated October 1, 1996. Certain portions of said parcels of land were being occupied by the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, through the tolerance of LANDTRADE. Upon failure of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to pay rentals or to vacate the subject properties after demands to do so, LANDTRADE filed the present Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, plus damages in the amount of P450,000.00 as yearly rental from date of the first extra-judicial demand until NAPOCOR and TRANSCO vacate the subject properties. In their separate Answers, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO denied the material allegations in the Complaint and countered, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the Complaint was barred by res judicata; that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; and that LANDTRADE lacked the legal capacity to sue. On February 17, 2004, the MTCC rendered its Decision 39 in favor of LANDTRADE. The MTCC disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff Land Trade Realty Corporation represented by Atty. Max C. Tabimina and against defendant National Power Corporation represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio M. Murga and co-defendant TRANSCO represented by its President Dr. Allan T. Ortiz and Engr. Lorrymir A. Adaza, Manager, NAPOCOR-Mindanao, Regional Center, Ma. Cristina, Iligan City, ordering: 1.Defendants National Power Corporation and TRANSCO, their agents or representatives or any person/s acting on its behalf or under its authority to vacate the premises;
STcAIa

2.Defendants NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarily: a.Php500,000.00 a month representing fair rental value or compensation since June 29, 1978 until defendant shall have vacated the premises; b.Php20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and c.Cost of suit. Execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by this Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff, to pay the rents, damages, and costs

accruing down to the time of judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, defendants deposit with the appellate court the amount of P500,000.00 per month, as reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises for the preceding month or period on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. 40

NAPOCOR and TRANSCO seasonably filed a Joint Notice of Appeal. Their appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 6613, was initially assigned to the RTC-Branch 5, presided over by Judge Maximino Magno Libre (Judge Libre). LANDTRADE filed on June 24, 2004 a Motion for Execution, asserting that NAPOCOR and TRANSCO had neither filed a supersedeas bond with the MTCC nor periodically deposited with the RTC the monthly rental for the properties in question, so as to stay the immediate execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment. However, the said Motion failed to comply with the required notice of hearing under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. LANDTRADE then filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or Replace Notice of Hearing. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed on July 13, 2004 a Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings citing Amagan v. Marayag, 41 in which the Court ruled that if circumstances should require, the proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. Since LANDTRADE anchors its right to possession of the subject parcels of land on the Deed of Sale executed in

its favor by Teofilo on October 1, 1996, the ejectment case should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of other cases in which title over the same properties are in issue, i.e., (1) Civil Case No. 6600, the action for the annulment of the Deed of Sale dated October 1, 1996 filed by Teofilo against LANDTRADE pending before the RTC-Branch 4; and (2) Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case filed by Vidal and AZIMUTH against Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo pending before the RTC-Branch 3.
CaSAcH

LANDTRADE filed on July 19, 2004 another Motion for Execution, which was heard together with the Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. After said hearing, the RTC-Branch 5 directed the parties to file their memoranda on the two pending Motions. LANDTRADE, in its Memorandum, maintained that the pendency of Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case, should not preclude the execution of the MTCC judgment in the Unlawful Detainer Case because the issue involved in the latter was only the material possession or possession de facto of the parcels of land in question. LANDTRADE also reported that Civil Case No. 6600, the action for annulment of the Deed of Sale dated October 1, 1996 instituted by Teofilo, was already dismissed given that the RTC-Branch 4 had approved the Compromise Agreement executed between LANDTRADE and Teofilo. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO likewise filed their respective Memoranda. Subsequently, NAPOCOR filed a Supplement to its Memorandum to bring to the attention of the RTC-Branch 5 the Decision rendered on July 17,

2004 by the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case, categorically declaring Teofilo, the predecessor-in-interest of LANDTRADE, as having no right at all to the subject parcels of land. Resultantly, the right of LANDTRADE to the two properties, which merely emanated from Teofilo, was effectively declared as nonexistent too. On August 4, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued an Order 42 denying the Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. The RTC held that the pendency of other actions involving the same parcels of land could not stay execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment because NAPOCOR and TRANSCO failed to post the required bond and pay the monthly rentals. Five days later, on August 9, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued another Order 43 granting the Motion of LANDTRADE for execution of the MTCC judgment pending appeal. The next day, on August 10, 2004, the Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Joel M. Macaraya, Jr., issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal 44 which directed Sheriff IV Alberto O. Borres (Sheriff Borres) to execute the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004. A day later, on August 11, 2004, Sheriff Borres issued two Notices of Garnishment 45 addressed to PNB and Land Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, garnishing all the goods, effects, stocks, interests in stocks and shares, and any other personal properties belonging to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO which were being held by

and under the possession and control of said banks. On even date, Sheriff Borres also issued a Notification 46 to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for them to vacate the subject parcels of land; and to pay LANDTRADE the sums of (a) P156,000,000.00, representing the total fair rental value for the said properties, computed at P500,000.00 per month, beginning June 29, 1978 until June 29, 2004, or for a period of 26 years, and (b) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
CcAIDa

Thereafter, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO each filed before the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. The Petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85174 and 85841, were eventually consolidated. The Court of Appeals issued on August 18, 2004 a TRO 47 enjoining the enforcement and implementation of the Order of Execution and Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the RTC-Branch 5 and Notices of Garnishment and Notification of Sheriff Borres. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision 48 dated November 23, 2005, determined that public respondents did commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing and/or effecting the execution of the MTCC judgment pending appeal, since NAPOCOR and TRANSCO were legally excused from complying with the requirements for a stay of execution specified in Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, particularly, the posting of a supersedeas bond and periodic deposits of rental payments. The decretal portion of said appellate court Decision states:

ACCORDINGLY, the two petitions at bench are GRANTED; the Order dated 9 August 2004, the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal dated 10 August 2004, the two Notices of Garnishment dated 11 August 2004, and the Notification dated 11 August 2004, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. 49

Displeased, LANDTRADE elevated the case to this Court on January 10, 2006 via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 170505. In the meantime, with the retirement of Judge Libre and the inhibition 50 of Judge Oscar Badelles, the new presiding judge of RTC-Branch 5, Civil Case No. 6613 was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 promulgated on December 12, 2005 a Decision 51 in Civil Case No. 6613 which affirmed in toto the February 17, 2004 Decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF favoring LANDTRADE. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the RTC-Branch 1 twin Motions, namely: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated December 12, 2005; and (2) Motion for Inhibition of Judge Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 denied both Motions in a Resolution dated January 30, 2006.
IDcHCS

NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the Court of Appeals separate Petitions for Review with prayer for TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, which were docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, respectively. In a Resolution dated March 24, 2006, the

Court of Appeals granted the prayer for TRO of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. With the impending lapse of the effectivity of the TRO on May 23, 2006, NAPOCOR filed on May 15, 2006 with the Court of Appeals a Manifestation and Motion praying for the resolution of its application for preliminary injunction. On May 23, 2006, the same day the TRO lapsed, the Court of Appeals granted the motions for extension of time to file a consolidated comment of LANDTRADE. Two days later, LANDTRADE filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the issuance of (1) a writ of execution pending appeal, and (2) the designation of a special sheriff in accordance with Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court. In a Resolution 52 dated June 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE and denied the applications for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. In effect, the appellate court authorized the execution pending appeal of the judgment of the MTCC, affirmed by the RTC-Branch 1, thus:
IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISQUISITIONS, this Court resolves to grant the [LANDRADE]'s omnibus motion for execution pending appeal of the decision rendered in its favor which is being assailed in these consolidated petitions for review. Accordingly, the [NAPOCOR and TRANSCO's] respective applications for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction are both denied for lack of factual and legal bases. The Municipal Trial Court in

Cities, Branch 2, Iligan City, which at present has the custody of the records of the case a quo, is hereby ordered to cause the immediate issuance of a writ of execution relative to its decision dated 17 February 2004 in Civil Case No. 11475-AF. 53

On July 20, 2006, NAPOCOR filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an urgent plea for a TRO, docketed as G.R. No. 173355-56. On August 2, 2006, TRANSCO filed with this Court its own Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 173563-64.
TaDAHE

On July 21, 2006, NAPOCOR filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO in G.R. No. 173355-56. In a Resolution 54 dated July 26, 2006, the Court granted the Motion of NAPOCOR and issued a TRO, 55 effective immediately, which enjoined public and private respondents from implementing the Resolution dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 and the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF. On July 31, 2006, Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment-inIntervention, contending therein that Vidal was the lawful owner of the parcels of land subject of the Unlawful Detainer Case as confirmed in the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4452. In a Resolution dated September 30, 2006, the Court required the parties to comment on the Motion of Vidal and AZIMUTH, and deferred action on the said Motion pending the submission of such comments.

The Cancellation of Titles Case (G.R. No. 173401)

and

Reversion

On October 13, 2004, the Republic filed a Complaint for the Cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) and Reversion against the late Doa Demetria, represented by her alleged heirs, Vidal and/or Teofilo, together with AZIMUTH and LANDTRADE. The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 6686, was raffled to the RTC-Branch 4. The Republic sought the cancellation of OCT Nos. 01200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) and the reversion of the parcels of land covered thereby to the Government based on the following allegations in its Complaint, under the heading "Cause of Action":
5.On October 15, 1998, Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) were issued in the name of "Demetria Cacho, widow, now deceased. . ." consisting of a total area of Three Hundred SeventyEight Thousand Seven Hundred and Seven (378,707) square meters and Three Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty-Five (3,635) square meters, respectively, situated in Iligan City, . . .
ESTcIA

xxx xxx xxx 6.The afore-stated titles were issued in implementation of a decision rendered in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated December 10, 1912, as affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the United States, 28 Phil.

616 (December 10, 1914), 7.The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, upon which the titles were issued, did not grant the entire area applied for therein. . . . xxx xxx xxx 9.As events turned out, the titles issued in connection with LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 i.e., OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) cover property MUCH LARGER in area than that granted by the land registration court in its corresponding decision, supra. 10.While the LRC Decision, as affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court, granted only the southern part of the 37.87 hectare land subject of LRC (GLRO) Record Case No. 6909, the ENTIRE 37.87 hectares is indicated as the property covered by OCT 01200 (a.f.). Worse, OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) made reference to Case No. 6908 as basis thereof, yet, the decision in said case is clear: (i)The parcel "object of Case No. 6908 is small" (Cacho vs. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616, p. 619) (ii)"The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the bigger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares. . ."

11.More significantly, the technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1200 (a.f.) specifies the date of survey as "August 31 to September 1, 1910," which is EARLIER than the date the Supreme Court, in Cacho supra, resolved LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 (involving 37.87 hectares). In resolving the application involving the 37.87 hectares, the Honorable Supreme Court declared that only the southern part of the 37.87 hectare property applied for is granted and that a new survey specifying the "southern part" thereof should be submitted. Accordingly, any survey involving the "granted southern part" should bear a date subsequent to the December 10, 1914 Supreme Court decision. . . .
CcAITa

xxx xxx xxx 12.The Honorable Supreme Court further declared that the Decision in LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 was reserved: "Final decision in these case is reserved until the presentation of the . . . new plan." (28 Phil. 616, p. 631; Underscoring supplied) In other words, as of December 10, 1914, when the Honorable Supreme Court rendered its Decision on appeal in LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909, "final decision" of the case was still reserved until the presentation of a new plan. The metes and bounds of OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) could not

have been the technical description of the property granted by the court described as "the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente 6909 only" (Cacho vs. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 617, 629). As earlier stated, the technical description appearing in said title was the result of a survey conducted in 1910 or before the Supreme Court decision was rendered in 1914. 13.In the same vein, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1201 (a.f.) specifies LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 as the basis thereof (see front page of OCT No. 0-1201 (a.f.)). Yet, the technical description makes, as its reference, Lot 1, Plan II-3732, LR Case No. 047, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6908 (see page 2 of said title). A title issued pursuant to a decision may only cover the property subject of the case. A title cannot properly be issued pursuant to a decision in Case 6909, but whose technical description is based on Case 6908. 14.The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 has become final and executory, and it cannot be modified, much less result in an increased area of the property decreed therein. xxx xxx xxx 16.In sum, Original Certificates of Title Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), as issued, are null and void since the technical descriptions

vis--vis the areas of the parcels of land covered therein went beyond the areas granted by the land registration court in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. 56

Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion to Dismiss dated December 23, 2004 on the grounds that (1) the Republic has no cause of action; (2) assuming arguendo that the Republic has a cause of action, its Complaint failed to state a cause of action; (3) assuming arguendo that the Republic has a cause of action, the same is barred by prior judgment; (4) assuming further that the Republic has a cause of action, the same was extinguished by prescription; and (4) the Republic is guilty of forum shopping.
ECHSDc

Upon motion of the Republic, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an Order 57 dated October 4, 2005, declaring LANDTRADE and Teofilo, as represented by Atty. Cabildo, in default since they failed to submit their respective answers to the Complaint despite the proper service of summons upon them. LANDTRADE subsequently filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated September 28, 2005. It also moved for the setting aside and reconsideration of the Order of Default issued against it by the RTC-Branch 4 on October 20, 2005. On December 13, 2005, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an Order 58 dismissing the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686, completely agreeing with Vidal and AZIMUTH. The RTC-Branch 4 reasoned that the Republic had no

cause of action because there was no showing that the late Doa Demetria committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the Republic. Doa Demetria had sufficiently proven her ownership over the parcels of land as borne in the ruling of the LRC in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. On the other hand, the Republic had no more right to the said parcels of land. The Regalian doctrine does not apply in this case because the titles were already issued to Doa Demetria and segregated from the mass of the public domain. The RTC-Branch 4 likewise held that the Republic failed to state a cause of action in its Complaint. The arguments of the Republic i.e., the absence of a new survey plan and deed, the titles covered properties with much larger area than that granted by the LRC had been answered squarely in the 1997 Cacho case. Also, the Complaint failed to allege that fraud had been committed in having the titles registered and that the Director of Lands requested the reversion of the subject parcels of land. The RTC-Branch 4 was convinced that the Complaint was barred by res judicata because the 1914 Cacho case already decreed the registration of the parcels of land in the late Doa Demetria's name and the 1997 Cacho case settled that there was no merit in the argument that the conditions imposed in the first case have not been complied with. The RTC-Branch 4 was likewise persuaded that the cause of action or remedy of the Republic was lost or extinguished by prescription pursuant to Article 1106 of the Civil Code and Section 32 of Presidential Decree No.

1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, which prescribes a one-year period within which to file an action for the review of a decree of registration. Finally, the RTC-Branch 4 found the Republic guilty of forum shopping because there is between this case, on one hand, and the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases, on the other, identity of parties, as well as rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, as the contending parties are claiming rights of ownership over the same parcels of land.
HScCEa

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of its Complaint but the same was denied by the RTC-Branch 4 in its Order 59 dated May 16, 2006. Assailing the Orders dated December 13, 2005 and May 16, 2006 of the RTC-Branch 4, the Republic filed on August 11, 2006 a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 173401. III ISSUES AND DISCUSSIONS Expropriation Case (G.R. No. 170375) The Republic, in its consolidated Petitions challenging the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 106, made the following assignment of errors:
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE EXPROPRIATION COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 106 CONSIDERING THAT:

(a)THE NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION PURSUANT TO SECTION 11, RULE 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE; (b)AN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING IS AN ACTION QUASI IN REM WHEREIN THE FACT THAT THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY IS MADE A PARTY TO THE ACTION IS NOT ESSENTIALLY INDISPENSABLE; (c)PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT ANY FORUM SHOPPING WITH THE FILING OF THE REVERSION COMPLAINT DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. 6686 WHICH IS PENDING BEFORE BRANCH 4 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILIGAN CITY. 60

Filing of consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 At the outset, the Court notes that the Republic filed a pleading with the caption Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) and Certiorari (Under Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. The Republic explains that it filed the Consolidated Petitions pursuant to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals 61 (MWSS case).
HETDAC

The reliance of the Republic on the MWSS case to justify

its mode of appeal is misplaced, taking the pronouncements of this Court in said case out of context. The issue in the MWSS case was whether a possessor in good faith has the right to remove useful improvements, and not whether consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court can be filed. Therein petitioner MWSS simply filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, but named the Court of Appeals as a respondent. The Court clarified that the only parties in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent. The court which rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said appeal. It is in the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or respondent. The Court, however, also acknowledged that there may be an instance when in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner-appellant would also claim that the court that rendered the appealed judgment acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which case, such court should be joined as a party-defendant or respondent. While the Court may have stated that in such an instance, "the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time a petition for certiorari under Rule 65," the Court did not hold that consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 could or should be filed. The Court, in more recent cases, had been stricter and clearer on the distinction between these two modes of appeal. In Nunez v. GSIS Family Bank, 62 the Court

elucidated:
In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner described her petition as "an appeal under Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court," this Court, in frowning over what it described as a "chimera," reiterated that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive. To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45.

But in the same case, the Court also held that:

This Court, . . ., in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, more so if the same was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. 63
CcHDSA

It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are two separate remedies that are mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the Court shall treat the

Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment. As the records show, the Petition was filed on time under Rules 45. Before the lapse of the 15day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic filed with the Court a motion for extension of time to file its petition. The Court, in a Resolution 64 dated January 23, 2006, granted the Republic a 30-day extension, which was to expire on December 29, 2005. The Republic was able to file its Petition on the last day of the extension period. Hierarchy of courts The direct filing of the instant Petition with this Court did not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. According to Rule 41, Section 2 (c) 65 of the Rules of Court, a decision or order of the RTC may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such petition raises only questions of law. 66 A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. 67 A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. 68

Here, the Petition of the Republic raises pure questions of law, i.e., whether Civil Case No. 106 should have been dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties and for forum shopping. Thus, the direct resort by the Republic to this Court is proper. The Court shall now consider the propriety of the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic. The proper proceedings parties in the expropriation

The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed by no less than this Court in the ISA case. The dispositive portion of the ISA case reads:
acADIT

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 October 1991 to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for petitioner Iron Steel Authority for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs. 69

The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment was made in said case on August 31, 1998. The RTC-Branch 1, in an Order dated November 16, 2001, effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA.

The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. 70 The November 16, 2001 Order of the RTC-Branch 1 should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution superfluous. Besides, no substantive right was violated by the voluntary compliance by the RTC-Branch 1 with the directive in the ISA case even without a motion for execution having been filed. To the contrary, the RTCBranch 1 merely enforced the judicially determined right of the Republic to the substitution. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of the substantive rights of the parties. 71 The Court also observes that MCFC did not seek any remedy from the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1. Consequently, the said Order already became final, which even the RTC-Branch 1 itself cannot reverse and set aside on the ground of "honest mistake." The RTC-Branch 1 dismissed the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106 on another ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the expropriation proceedings, not being the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated.

The RTC-Branch 1 ratiocinated that since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private land intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner, then a complaint for expropriation must be directed against the owner of the land sought to be expropriated.
CIaHDc

The Republic insists, however, that MCFC is a real partyin-interest, impleaded as a defendant in the Complaint for Expropriation because of its possessory or occupancy rights over the subject parcels of land, and not by reason of its ownership of the said properties. In addition, the Republic maintains that non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court 72 described how expropriation proceedings should be instituted:
Section 1.The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty

specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the complaint. 73 (Emphases supplied.)

For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals: 74
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by eminent domain, the owner . . . is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the term 'owner' when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)
DCSTAH

At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of Instructions No. 1277 75 dated November 16, 1982 expressly recognized that portions of the lands reserved by Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, also dated November 16, 1982, for the use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in the same Letter of Instruction that:
(1)NSC shall negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject lands at an amount of Thirty (P30.00) Pesos per square meter or equivalent to the assessed value thereof (as determined by the City Assessor of Iligan), whichever is higher. NSC shall give MCFC the option to either remove its aforesaid plant, structures, equipment, machinery and other facilities from the lands or to sell or cede ownership thereof to NSC at a price equivalent to the fair market value thereof as appraised by the Asian Appraisal, Inc. as may be mutually agreed upon by NSC and MCFC. (2)In the event that NSC and MCFC fail to agree on the foregoing within sixty (60) days from the date hereof, the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) shall exercise its authority under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 272, as amended, to initiate the expropriation of the

aforementioned occupancy rights of MCFC on the subject lands as well as the plant, structures, equipment, machinery and related facilities, for and on behalf of NSC, and thereafter cede the same to NSC. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, NSC shall take possession of the properties, subject to bonding and other requirements of P.D. 1533. (Emphasis supplied.)

Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1 evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper party. Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the original Complaint for Expropriation for having been filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property. Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. According to Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court:
SCaIcA

SEC. 11.Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (Emphasis supplied.)

MCFC contends that the aforequoted rule does not apply in this case where the party not joined, i.e., the owner of the property to be expropriated, is an indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. 76 Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when "title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals." The same rule provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants "all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest" in the property sought to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party. To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the

original Complaint for Expropriation in Civil Case No. 106. Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the property is an indispensable party in the expropriation proceedings, the non-joinder of said party would still not warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint for expropriation. In Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos, 77 the Court applied Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court even in case of non-joinder of an indispensable party, viz.:
[F]ailure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner's/plaintiff's failure to comply. (Emphasis supplied.)
IDSEAH

In this case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic to implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the Republic upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in the 1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped with the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106 sought leave of court to file a

Supplemental Complaint to implead these four parties. The RTC-Branch 1 did not take the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic into consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the original Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC. Forum shopping The RTC-Branch 1 further erred in finding that the Republic committed forum shopping by (1) simultaneously instituting the actions for expropriation (Civil Case No. 106) and reversion (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land; and (2) taking inconsistent positions when it conceded lack of ownership over the parcels of land in the expropriation case but asserted ownership of the same properties in the reversion case. There is no dispute that the Republic instituted reversion proceedings (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land subject of the instant Expropriation Case (Civil Case No. 106). The Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion 78 dated September 27, 2004 was filed by the Republic with the RTC on October 13, 2004. The records, however, do not show when the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation 79 dated September 28, 2004 was filed with the RTC. Apparently, the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation was filed after the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion since the Republic mentioned in the former the fact of filing of the latter. 80 Even then, the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping 81 attached to the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation did not disclose the filing of the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion. Notwithstanding such non-disclosure, the Court finds that

the Republic did not commit forum shopping for filing both Complaints. In NBI-Microsoft Corporation v. Hwang, 82 the Court laid down the circumstances when forum shopping exists:
Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Thus, it exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Forum-shopping is an act of malpractice because it abuses court processes. . . . .
STEacI

Here, the elements of litis pendencia are wanting. There is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 106 and Civil Case No. 6686. Civil Case No. 106 was instituted against MCFC to acquire, for a public purpose, its possessory/occupancy rights over 322,532 square meters or 32.25 hectares of land which, at the time of the filing of the original Complaint in 1983, was not yet covered by any certificate of title. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 6686 sought

the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), which was entered into registration on December 4, 1998 in Doa Demetria's name, on the argument that the parcels of land covered by said certificates exceeded the areas granted by the LRC to Doa Demetria in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, as affirmed by this Court in the 1914 Cacho case. Expropriation vis--vis reversion The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other. The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof. Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for expropriation even when "the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners." Rule 67, Section 9 of the Rules of Court further provides:
SEC. 9.Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as

compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. (Emphasis supplied.)
aASEcH

Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there are private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain. In sum, the RTC-Branch 1 erred in dismissing the original Complaint and disallowing the Supplemental Complaint in Civil Case No. 106. The Court reverses and sets aside the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case 106, and reinstates the Complaint for Reversion of the Republic. The Quieting of Title Case (G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894) Essentially, in their Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, LANDTRADE and Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo are calling upon this Court to

determine whether the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00456, erred in (1) upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 to resolve the issues on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452, the action for quieting of title; (2) not holding that Vidal and AZIMUTH have neither cause of action nor legal or equitable title or interest in the parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 01201 (a.f.); (3) finding the evidence sufficient to establish Vidal's status as Doa Demetria's granddaughter and sole surviving heir; and (4) not holding that Civil Case No. 4452 was already barred by prescription. In their Comment, Vidal and AZIMUTH insisted on the correctness of the Court of Appeals Decision dated January 19, 2007, and questioned the propriety of the Petition for Review filed by LANDTRADE as it supposedly raised only factual issues. The Court rules in favor of Vidal and AZIMUTH. Petitions for review under Rule 45 A scrutiny of the issues raised, not just in the Petition for Review of LANDTRADE, but also those in the Petition for Review of Teofilo and/or Atty. Cabildo, reveals that they are both factual and legal. The Court has held in a long line of cases that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is settled that as a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals especially those affirming the trial court are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the

Supreme Court. The exceptions to this rule are: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. 83 None of these exceptions exists in the Petitions at bar.
TAESDH

Be that as it may, the Court shall address in full-length all the issues tendered in the instant Petitions for Review, even when factual, if only to bolster the conclusions reached by the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals, with which the Court fully concurs. Jurisdiction vis--vis exercise of jurisdiction LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo argue that the RTC-Branch 3 had no jurisdiction to resolve the issues of status, filiation, and heirship in an action for quieting of title as said issues should be ventilated and adjudicated

only in special proceedings under Rule 90, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to the ruling of this Court inAgapay v. Palang 84 (Agapay case) and Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario 85 (Yaptinchay case). Even on the assumption that the RTC-Branch 3 acquired jurisdiction over their persons, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo maintain that the RTC-Branch 3 erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction by adjudicating and passing upon the issues on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship in the Quieting of Title Case. Moreover, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo aver that the resolution of issues regarding status, filiation, and heirship is not merely a matter of procedure, but of jurisdiction which cannot be waived by the parties or by the court. The aforementioned arguments fail to persuade. In the first place, jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. The Court distinguished between the two, thus:
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. 86 (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, the RTC-Branch 3 unmistakably had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in Civil Case No. 4452. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Once vested by law on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law. The power to change the jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative enactment, which none but the legislature may do. Congress has the sole power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the courts. 87
aAcDSC

The RTC has jurisdiction over an action for quieting of title under the circumstances described in Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended:
SEC. 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxx xxx xxx (2)In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred

upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Records show that the parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 4452 have a combined assessed value of P35,398,920.00, 88 undisputedly falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3. The RTC-Branch 3 also acquired jurisdiction over the person of Teofilo when he filed his Answer to the Complaint of Vidal and AZIMUTH; and over the juridical personality of LANDTRADE when the said corporation was allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452. Considering that the RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in Civil Case No. 4452, then it can rule on all issues in the case, including those on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship, in exercise of its jurisdiction. Any alleged erroneous finding by the RTCBranch 3 concerning Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452, is merely an error of judgment subject to the affirmation, modification, or reversal by the appellate court when appealed. The Agapay and Yaptinchay cases LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo cannot rely on the cases of Agapay and Yaptinchay to support their position that declarations on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirsip, should be made in special proceedings and not in Civil Case No. 4452.
EIcSTD

In the Agapay case, the deceased Miguel Agapay (Miguel) contracted two marriages. Miguel married

Carlina (sometimes referred to as Cornelia) in 1949, and they had a daughter named Herminia, who was born in 1950. Miguel left for Hawaii a few months after his wedding to Carlina. When Miguel returned to the Philippines in 1972, he did not live with Carlina and Herminia. He married Erlinda in 1973, with whom he had a son named Kristopher, who was born in 1977. Miguel died in 1981. A few months after Miguel's death, Carlina and Herminia filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda over a riceland and house and lot in Pangasinan, which were allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The RTC dismissed the complaint, finding little evidence that the properties pertained to the conjugal property of Miguel and Carlina. The RTC went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher, Miguel's illegitimate son. On appeal, the Court of Appeals: (1) reversed the RTC judgment; (2) ordered Erlinda to vacate and deliver the properties to Carlina and Herminia; and (3) ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over the subject property in the name of Erlinda and to issue new ones in the names of Carlina and Herminia. Erlinda filed a Petition for Review with this Court. In resolving Erlinda's Petition, the Court held in the Agapay case that Article 148 of the Family Code applied to Miguel and Erlinda. Article 148 specifically governs the property relations of a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. Under said provision,

only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In this case, the Court found that the money used to buy the subject properties all came from Miguel. The Court then proceeded to address another issue in the Agapay case, more relevant to the one at bar:
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession." 89
aDHScI

The Yaptinchay case involved two parcels of land in Cavite which were supposedly owned by Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (spouses Yaptinchay). Upon the death of the spouses Yaptinchay, their heirs (Yaptinchay heirs) executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the deceased spouses' estate. However, the Yaptinchay heirs discovered that the properties were already covered by TCTs in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation

(Golden Bay), prompting the Yaptinchay heirs to file with the RTC a complaint against Golden Bay for the annulment and/or declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. 493363 to 493367 and all their derivatives, or in the alternative, the reconveyance of realty with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order with damages. The Yaptinchay heirs later filed an amended complaint to include additional defendants to whom Golden Bay sold portions of the subject properties. The RTC initially dismissed the amended complaint, but acting on the motion for reconsideration of the Yaptinchay heirs, eventually allowed the same. Golden Bay and its other co-defendants presented a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which was granted by the RTC. The Yaptinchay heirs came before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari. The Court first observed in the Yaptinchay case that the Yaptinchay heirs availed themselves of the wrong remedy. An order of dismissal is the proper subject of an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Next, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the amended complaint, thus:
Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners, . . . . xxx xxx xxx In Litam, etc., et al. v. Rivera, this court opined that the declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of

Appeals where the court held: "In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffsappellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffsappellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that 'such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.' (p. 378)."
CcAITa

The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a

special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. 90

LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo missed one vital factual distinction between the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases, on one hand, and the present Petitions, on the other, by reason of which, the Court shall not apply the prior two to the last. The Agapay and Yaptinchay cases, as well as the cases of Litam v. Rivera 91 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals, 92 cited in the Yaptinchay case, all arose from actions for reconveyance; while the instant Petitions stemmed from an action for quieting of title. The Court may have declared in previous cases that an action for reconveyance is in the nature of an action for quieting of title, 93 but the two are distinct remedies. Ordinary civil action for reconveyance vis-a-vis special proceeding for quieting of title The action for reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, as amended, which states "[t]hat in all cases of

registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." The Court, in Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, described an action for reconveyance as follows:
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. . . . (Emphases supplied.)
ECAaTS

94

On the other hand, Article 476 of the Civil Code lays down the circumstances when a person may institute an action for quieting of title:
ART. 476.Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

In Calacala v. Republic, 95 the Court elucidated on the nature of an action to quiet title:
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure '. . . an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.' In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, '. . . not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best . . . . (Emphases supplied.)

The Court expounded further in Spouses Portic v. Cristobal 96 that:

Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties. Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person other than the registered owner because, in the Article reproduced above, "title" does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title. . . . (Emphases supplied.)

The Court pronounced in the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases that a declaration of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary civil action such as an action for reconveyance, but must only be made in a special proceeding, for it involves the establishment of a status or right.
THEDCA

The appropriate special proceeding would have been the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Nonetheless, an action for quieting of title is also a special proceeding, specifically governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court on declaratory relief and similar remedies. 97 Actions for declaratory relief and other similar remedies are distinguished from ordinary civil actions because:

2.In declaratory relief, the subject-matter is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of these documents. The relief sought is the declaration of the petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. The concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to declaratory relief as this special civil action presupposes that there has been no breach or violation of the instruments involved. Consequently, unlike other judgments, the judgment in an action for declaratory relief does not essentially entail any executional process as the only relief to be properly granted therein is a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties under the instrument, although some exceptions have been recognized under certain situations. 98

Civil Case No. 4452 could not be considered an action for reconveyance as it is not based on the allegation that the two parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, have been wrongfully registered in another person's name. OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), covering the subject properties, are still in Doa Demetria's name. Vidal and Teofilo each claims to have inherited the two parcels of land from the late Doa Demetria as said decedent's sole heir, but neither Vidal nor Teofilo has been able to transfer registration of the said properties to her/his name as of yet. Instead, Civil Case No. 4452 is indisputably an action for

quieting of title, a special proceeding wherein the court is precisely tasked to determine the rights of the parties as to a particular parcel of land, so that the complainant and those claiming under him/her may be forever free from any danger of hostile claim. Vidal asserted title to the two parcels of land as Doa Demetria's sole heir. The cloud on Vidal's title, which she sought to have removed, was Teofilo's adverse claim of title to the same properties, also as Doa Demetria's only heir. For it to determine the rights of the parties in Civil Case No. 4452, it was therefore crucial for the RTC-Branch 3 to squarely make a finding as to the status, filiation, and heirship of Vidal in relation to those of Teofilo. A finding that one is Doa Demetria's sole and rightful heir would consequently exclude and extinguish the claim of the other. Even assuming arguendo that the proscription in the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases against making declarations of heirship in ordinary civil actions also extends to actions for quieting of title, the same is not absolute. In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran 99 (Portugal case), the Court recognized that there are instances when a declaration of heirship need not be made in a separate special proceeding:
ACIEaH

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the

circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its reopening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased. 100

In the Portugal case itself, the Court directed the trial court to already determine petitioners' status as heirs of the decedent even in an ordinary civil action, i.e., action for annulment of title, because:
It appearing . . . that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which

assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pretrial, . . . . 101

Another case, Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. Court of Appeals 102 (Gabatan case), involved an action for recovery of ownership and possession of property with the opposing parties insisting that they are the legal heirs of the deceased. Recalling the Portugal case, the Court ruled:
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed

jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.

cAECST

In Fidel v. Court of Appeals 103 (Fidel case), therein respondents, the heirs of the late Vicente Espineli (Vicente) from his first marriage, instituted an action to annul the sale of Vicente's property to therein petitioners, the spouses Fidel. The subject property was sold to petitioners by Vicente's heirs from his second marriage. Even though one's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, the Court held that it was necessary to pass upon respondents' relationship to Vicente in the action for annulment of sale so as to determine respondents' legal rights to the subject property. In fact, the issue of whether respondents are Vicente's heirs was squarely raised by petitioners in their Pre-Trial Brief. Hence, petitioners were estopped from assailing the ruling of the trial court on respondents' status. In Civil Case No. 4452, Teofilo and/or Atty. Cabildo themselves asked the RTC-Branch 3 to resolve the issue of Vidal's legal or beneficial ownership of the two parcels of land. 104 During trial, Vidal already presented before the RTC-Branch 3 evidence to establish her status, filiation, and heirship. There is no showing that Doa Demetria left any other property that would have required special administration proceedings. In the spirit of thePortugal, Gabatan, and Fidel cases, the Court deems it more practical and expeditious to settle the issue on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452. "Title" in quieting of title

LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo further contend that Vidal and AZIMUTH have no cause of action for quieting of title since Vidal has no title to the two parcels of land. In comparison, Teofilo's title to the same properties, as Doa Demetria's only heir, was already established and recognized by this Court in the 1997 Cacho case. Again, the Court cannot sustain the foregoing contention of LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo. It must be borne in mind that the concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to quieting of title. In declaratory relief, the subject-matter is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of these documents. The relief sought is the declaration of the petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. Being in the nature of declaratory relief, this special civil action presupposes that there has yet been no breach or violation of the instruments involved. 105 In an action for quieting of title, the subject matter is the title sought to have quieted. "Title" is not limited to the certificate of registration under the Torrens System (i.e., OCT or TCT). Pursuant to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property subject of the action for quieting of title. The plaintiff need not even be in possession of the property. If she is indeed Doa Demetria's sole heir, Vidal already has equitable title to or interest in the two parcels of land by right of succession, even though she has not yet secured

certificates of title to the said properties in her name.

CSIDEc

LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo mistakenly believe that the 1997 Cacho case had conclusively settled Teofilo's identity and existence as Doa Demetria's sole heir. They failed to appreciate that the 1997 Cacho case involved Teofilo's petition for reconstitution of title, treated as a petition for the reissuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The grant by the RTC of Teofilo's petition, affirmed by this Court, only conclusively established the prior issuance and existence and the subsequent loss of the two decrees, thus, entitling Teofilo to the re-issuance of the said decrees in their original form and condition. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in its assailed Decision dated January 19, 2007, the issue of Teofilo's heirship was not the lis mota of the 1997 Cacho case. It was addressed by the Court in the 1997 Cacho case for the simple purpose of determining Teofilo's legal interest in filing a petition for the re-issuance of the lost decrees. The Court merely found therein that Teofilo's Affidavit of Adjudication, executed in the U.S.A. before the Philippine Consulate General, enjoyed the presumption of regularity and, thus, sufficiently established Teofilo's legal interest. The 1997 Cacho case, however, did not conclusively settle that Teofilo is indeed Doa Demetria's only heir and the present owner, by right of succession, of the subject properties. Factual findings of the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo additionally posit that the evidence presented by Vidal and AZIMUTH

were insufficient to prove the fact of Vidal's filiation and heirship to Doa Demetria. LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo particularly challenged the reliance of the RTC-Branch 3 on Vidal's baptismal certificate, arguing that it has no probative value and is not conclusive proof of filiation. Alternative means of proving an individual's filiation have been recognized by this Court in Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals. 106 The property in litigation in said case was co-owned by Lourdes Sampayo (Sampayo) and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario (collectively referred to as the spouses Conti). Sampayo died without issue. Therein respondents, claiming to be Sampayo's collateral relatives, filed a petition for partition of the subject property, plus damages. To prove that they were collaterally related to Sampayo through the latter's brothers and sisters, respondents submitted photocopies of the birth certificates, certifications on the nonavailability of records of births, and certified true copies of the baptismal certificates of Sampayo's siblings. The spouses Conti questioned the documentary evidence of respondents' filiation on the ground that these were incompetent and inadmissible, but the Court held that:
TCAHES

Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent's admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a

family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case. xxx xxx xxx The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]), thus . . . the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during the course of its business. It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated therein.

Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation. 107

Thus, Vidal's baptismal certificate is not totally bereft of any probative value. It may be appreciated, together with all the other documentary and testimonial evidence submitted on Vidal's filiation, to wit:
The first issue proposed by petitioners for resolution is whether or not petitioner Demetria C. Vidal is the sole surviving heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho. To prove that, indeed, she is the sole surviving heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho, she testified in open court and identified the following documentary evidence, to wit:
AcHEaS

Exhibit "A" Birth Certificate of Demetria C. Vidal Exhibit "B" Partida de Bautismo of Demetria C. Vidal Exhibit "C" Certificate of Baptism Demetria C. Vidal Exhibit "D" Cacho Family Tree Exhibit "D-1" Branch of Demetria Cacho Exhibit "F" Death Certificate of

Demetria Cacho. Exhibit "P" Driver's license of Demetria C. Vidal. Exhibit "Q" to "Q5" The book entitled "CACHO", the introductory page on March 1988 when the data were compiled, page 58 on the Vidal branch of the Cacho family, page 62 on Demetria Cacho and her descendants, page 69 on the family member with the then latest birth day 26 March 1988, and page 77 with the picture of Demetria Cacho Vidal, Dionisio Vidal and Francisco Vidal. 108

In contrast, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo failed to present any evidence at all in support of their claims. According to the RTC-Branch 3:
Landtrade was also declared to have waived its right to present evidence on its defense and counterclaim in the above-entitled case in view of its failure to present evidence on their scheduled trial date. xxx xxx xxx Since respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo opted not to adduce evidence in this case as they failed to appear during the scheduled trial dates, the court shall decide on the basis of the evidence for

the respondents-intervenor and petitioners.

109

Based on the evidence presented before it, the RTCBranch 3 made the following factual findings:
From the evidence adduced, both testimonial and documentary, the court is convinced that petitioner Vidal is the granddaughter of Demetria Cacho Vidal, the registered owner of the subject property covered by decree Nos. 10364 & 18969, reissued as Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869. Such being the case, she is an heir of Demetria Cacho Vidal.
SHDAEC

Petitioner Vidal's Certificate of Birth (Exh. "A") shows that she was born on June 3, 1941, with the name Demetria Vidal. [Her] father was Francisco Vidal and her mother was Fidela Confesor, Francisco Vidal is the son of Dionisio Vidal and Demetria Cacho as shown by [his] Partida de Bautismo (Baptismal Certificate). Moreover, it was shown in the same document that her godmother was Demetria Cacho. By inference, this Demetria Cacho is actually Demetria Cacho Vidal because she was married to Dionisio Vidal, the father of Francisco Vidal. Now then, is Demetria Cacho Vidal the same person referred to in Cacho v. Government of the United States (28 Phil. 616 [1914])? Page 618, Vol. 28 of the Philippine Reports would indicate that the applicant for registration was Doa Demetria Cacho y Soriano (Exh. "R-1"). The Death Certificate of Demetria Cacho

Vidal shows that her mother was Candelaria Soriano (Exh. "F"). Necessarily, they are one and the same person. This is further confirmed by the fact that the husband of Demetria Cacho Vidal, Seor Dionisio Vidal, was quoted in pp. 629-630 of the aforecited decision as the husband of Demetria Cacho (Exh. "R-3"). The book "CACHO" (Exhs. "Q" to "Q-5") and the Cacho Family Tree (Exhs. "D" to "D-1") further strengthen the aforecited findings of this Court. It was established by petitioner Vidal's own testimony that at the time of Doa Demetria Cacho's death, she left no heir other than petitioner Vidal. Her husband, Don Dionisio, died even before the war, while her only child, Francisco Cacho Vidal . . . Vidal's father died during the war. Petitioner's only sibling Francisco Dionisio died at childbirth. xxx xxx xxx The next factual issue proposed by petitioners is whether or not respondent Teofilo Cacho is the son or heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho. The following facts and circumstances negate the impression that he is the son, as he claims to be, of Doa Demetria Cacho. Thus: a)Doa Demetria Cacho was married to Don Dionisio Vidal, and thus

her full name was Doa Demetria Cacho Vidal. Her only child, expectedly, carried the surname Vidal (Francisco Cacho Vidal). Had Teofilo Cacho actually been a son of Demetria Cacho, he would and should have carried the name "Teofilo Cacho Vidal", but he did not.
DCcTHa

b)Teofilo Cacho admits to being married to one Elisa Valderrama in the Special Power of Attorney he issued to Atty. Godofredo [Cabildo] (Exh. "O"). Teofilo Cacho married Elisa Valderrama on 27 May 1953, in the Parish of the Immaculate Conception, Bani, Pangasinan. The Certificate of Marriage shows that Teofilo Cacho is the son of Agustin Cacho and Estefania Cordial, not Demetria Cacho. In his Certificate of Baptism (Exh. "G"), he was born to Agustin Cacho and Estefania Cordial on May 1930 (when Doa Demetria Cacho was already 50 years old). c)The Cacho Family Tree (Exh. "D") (that is, the Cacho Family to which Doa Demetria Cacho

belonged) as well as the book on the Cacho Family (Exh. "Q") are bereft of any mention of Teofilo Cacho or his wife Elisa Valderrama, or even his real father Agustin Cacho, or mother Estefania Cordial. They are not known to be related to the Cacho family of Doa Demetria Cacho. d)Paragraph 1.11 of the Petition charges respondent Teofilo Cacho of having falsely and fraudulently claiming to be the son and sole heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho. In his answer to this particular paragraph, he denied the same for lack of knowledge or information to form a belief. He should know whether this allegation is true or not because it concerns him. If true, he should admit and if false, he opted to deny the charges for lack of knowledge or information to form a belief. The Court considers his denial as an admission of the allegation that he is falsely and fraudulently claiming to be the son and sole heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho. 110

Considering the aforequoted factual findings, the RTCBranch 3 arrived at the following legal conclusions, quieting the titles of Vidal and AZIMUTH, viz.:
The first proposed legal issue to be resolved had been amply discussed under the first factual issue. Certainly, petitioner Vidal has hereditary rights, interest, or title not only to a portion of the Subject Property but to the entire property left by the late Doa Demetria Cacho Vidal, subject, however, to the Deed of Conditional Conveyance executed by petitioner Vidal of a portion of the Subject Property in favor of petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation (Exh. "J") executed pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "I"). Consequently, it goes without saying that petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation has a right, interest in, or title to a portion of the subject property. As discussed earlier in this decision, Teofilo Cacho, not being the son, as he claims to be, of the late Doa Demetria Cacho Vidal, has no hereditary rights to the Subject Property left by Doa Demetria Cacho Vidal. He failed to show any evidence that he is the son of the late Doa Demetria Cacho Vidal as he and his co respondent, Atty. Godofredo Cabildo, even failed to appear on the scheduled trial date.
ADSIaT

It is, therefore, safe to conclude that respondents Teofilo Cacho and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo and their

transferees/assignees have no right, interest in, or title to the subject property. Prescinding from the finding of this Court that respondent Teofilo Cacho is not the son of the registered owner of the Subject Property, the late Doa Demetria Cacho Vidal, respondent Cacho committed false pretenses and fraudulent acts in representing himself as son and sole heir of Doa Demetria Cacho (Vidal) in his petition in court, which eventually led to the reconstitution of the titles of Doa Demetria Cacho (Vidal). Certainly, his misrepresentation in the reconstitution case, which apparently is the basis of his claim to the subject property, casts clouds on [respondents'] title to the subject property. It is only right that petitioner Vidal should seek protection of her ownership from acts tending to cast doubt on her title. Among the legal remedies she could pursue, is this petition for Quieting of Title under Chapter 3, Title I, Book II of the Civil Code, Articles 476 to 481 inclusive. . . . . 111

The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC-Branch 3. The appellate court even soundly trounced Teofilo's attack on the factual findings of the trial court:
[T]he material facts sought to be established by the afore-mentioned documentary evidence corroborated by the testimony of VIDAL, whose testimony or credibility neither TEOFILO and LANDTRADE even attempted

to impeach, only proves one thing, that she is the granddaughter of DOA DEMETRIA and the sole heiress thereof. xxx xxx xxx Hence, it is now too late for appellant TEOFILO to assail before Us the facts proven during the trial, which he failed to refute in open court. Verily, TEOFILO's lackadaisical attitude in the conduct of his defense only shows that he has no proof to offer in refutation of the evidence advanced by appellee VIDAL. Otherwise stated, appellant TEOFILO is an impostor, a pretender and bogus heir of DOA DEMETRIA. xxx xxx xxx Besides, it is quite unnatural and against human nature for a rightful heir, if TEOFILO is really one, to merely stand still with folded arms, while the accusing finger of VIDAL is right on his very nose. In all likelihood, and with all his might and resources, a rightful heir may even be expected to cross continents and reach distant shores to protect his interest over the subject properties, which in this case is arguably worth more than a King's ransom.
aScIAC

It stands on record that TEOFILO CACHO has all along even prior to executing his Affidavit of Adjudication in 1985 in Chicago, United States of America, and in

simultaneously executing a Special Power of Attorney in favor of ATTY. CABILDO, had remained in the United States, and not for a single moment appeared in court except through his agents or representatives. To Our mind, this fact alone adversely affects his pretension in claiming to be an heir of DOA DEMETRIA. 112

As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. The Court has consistently held that the findings of the Court of Appeals and other lower courts are, as a rule, accorded great weight, if not binding upon it, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons. 113 There is no justification for the Court to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals which are clearly supported by the evidence on record. Prescription LANDTRADE finally asserts that the action for quieting of title of Vidal and AZIMUTH already prescribed since LANDTRADE has been in possession of the two parcels of land in question. The prescriptive period for filing said action lapsed in 1995, ten years from the time Teofilo executed his Affidavit of Adjudication in 1985. Yet, Vidal and AZIMUTH instituted Civil Case No. 4452 only in 1998.

It is too late in the day for LANDTRADE to raise the issue of prescription of Civil Case No. 4452 for the first time before this Court. In this jurisdiction, the defense of prescription cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Such defense may be waived, and if it was not raised as a defense in the trial court, it cannot be considered on appeal, the general rule being that the Appellate Court is not authorized to consider and resolve any question not properly raised in the lower court. 114 But even if the Court takes cognizance of the issue of prescription, it will rule against LANDTRADE.
CHDaAE

A real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in what is now Rule 4, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property. 115 An action for quieting of title to real property, such as Civil Case No. 4452, is indubitably a real action. Article 1141 of the Civil Code plainly provides that real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years. Doa Demetria died in 1974, transferring by succession, her title to the two parcels of land to her only heir, Vidal. Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo, filed a petition for reconstitution of the certificates of title covering said properties in 1978. This is the first palpable display of Teofilo's adverse claim to the same properties, supposedly, also as Doa Demetria's only heir. When Vidal and AZIMUTH instituted Civil Case No. 4452 in 1998, only 20 years had passed, and the prescriptive period for filing an action for quieting of title had not yet prescribed.

Nevertheless, the Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code also clearly states that the 30-year prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. Thus, the Court must also look into the acquisitive prescription periods of ownership and other real rights. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. 116 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. 117 In the case of ownership and other real rights over immovable property, they are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of 10 years. 118 LANDTRADE cannot insist on the application of the 10year ordinary acquisitive prescription period since it cannot be considered a possessor in good faith. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.
119

LANDTRADE came to possession of the two parcels of land after purchasing the same from Teofilo. The Court stresses, however, that Teofilo is not the registered owner of the subject properties. The said properties are still registered in Doa Demetria's name under OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). The Affidavit of Adjudication, by which Teofilo declared himself to be the sole heir of Doa Demetria's estate, is not even

annotated on the OCTs. Worse, LANDTRADE is not dealing directly with Teofilo, but only with the latter's attorney-in-fact, Atty. Cabildo. It is axiomatic that one who buys from a person who is not a registered owner is not a purchaser in good faith. 120
THIAaD

Furthermore, in its Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11475-AF before the MTCC, LANDTRADE itself alleged that when it bought the two parcels of land from Teofilo, portions thereof were already occupied by the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. This is another circumstance which should have prompted LANDTRADE to investigate or inspect the property being sold to it. It is, of course, expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess the land en concepto de dueo, in concept of owner. As is the common practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who, as in this case, is not in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant's possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a "purchaser in good faith." 121 Since the ordinary acquisitive prescription period of 10

years does not apply to LANDTRADE, then the Court turns its attention to the extraordinary acquisitive prescription period of 30 years set by Article 1137 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 1137.Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

LANDTRADE adversely possessed the subject properties no earlier than 1996, when it bought the same from Teofilo, and Civil Case No. 4452 was already instituted two years later in 1998. LANDTRADE cannot tack its adverse possession of the two parcels of land to that of Teofilo considering that there is no proof that the latter, who is already residing in the U.S.A., adversely possessed the properties at all. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC-Branch 3 which declared, among other things, that (a) Vidal is the sole surviving heir of Doa Demetria, who alone has rights to and interest in the subject parcels of land; (b) AZIMUTH is Vidal's successor-in-interest to portions of the said properties in accordance with the 1998 Memorandum of Agreement and 2004 Deed of Conditional Conveyance; (c) Teofilo is not the son or heir of Doa Demetria; and (d) Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo, and their transferees/assignees, including LANDTRADE, have no valid right to or interest in the same properties.
cISAHT

The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case (G.R.

Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64) The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64 all concern the execution pending appeal of the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, which ordered NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to vacate the two parcels of land in question, as well as to pay rent for the time they occupied said properties. LANDTRADE filed its Petition for Review in G.R. No. 170505 when it failed to have the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004 executed while Civil Case No. 6613, the appeal of the same judgment by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, was still pending before the RTC-Branch 5. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO sought recourse from this Court through their Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 after the RTCBranch 1 (to which Civil Case No. 6613 was re-raffled) already rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 in Civil Case No. 6613, affirming the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004. Expectedly, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO appealed the judgment of the RTC-Branch 1 to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the motion for execution pending appeal of LANDTRADE, and denied the application for preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. The requirements of posting a supersedeas bond and depositing rent to stay execution The pivotal issue in G.R. No. 170505 is whether LANDTRADE is entitled to the execution of the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004 even while said

judgment was then pending appeal before the RTCBranch 5. The RTC-Branch 5 granted the motion for immediate execution pending appeal of LANDTRADE because of the failure of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to comply with the requirements for staying the execution of the MTCC judgment, as provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals subsequently found grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTCBranch 5 in issuing the Order dated August 9, 2004 which granted execution pending appeal and the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal dated August 10, 2004; and on the part of Sheriff Borres, in issuing the Notices of Garnishment and Notification to vacate, all dated August 11, 2004. According to the appellate court, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO are exempt from the requirements of filing a supersedeas bond and depositing rent in order to stay the execution of the MTCC judgment.
HIESTA

Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for staying the immediate execution of the MTCC judgment against the defendant in an ejectment suit:
SEC. 19.Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during

the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to timeunder the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.

After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal. (Emphases supplied.)
TADaCH

The Court had previously recognized the exemption of NAPOCOR from filing a supersedeas bond. The Court stated in Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 122 that a chronological review of the NAPOCOR Charter will show that it has been the lawmakers' intention that said corporation be completely exempt not only from all forms of taxes, but also from filing fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas bonds in any court or administrative proceedings. The Court traced the history of the NAPOCOR Charter, thus:
Republic Act No. 6395 (10 September 1971) enumerated the details covered by the exemptions by stating under Sec. 13 that "The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns from its capital investment, as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion . . . the

Corporation is hereby declared exempt from the payment of all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, charges, costs and service fees in any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be a party, restrictions and duties to the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities . . ." Subsequently, Presidential Decree No. 380 (22 January 1974), Sec. 10 made even more specific the details of the exemption of NPC to cover, among others, both direct and indirect taxes on all petroleum products used in its operation. Presidential Decree No. 938 (27 May 1976), Sec. 13 amended the tax exemption by simplifying the same law in general terms. It succinctly exempts service fees, including filing fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings. The use of the phrase "all forms" of taxes demonstrate the intention of the law to give NPC all the exemption it has been enjoying before. The rationale for this exemption is that being nonprofit, the NPC "shall devote all its return from its capital investment as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion. 123 (Emphases supplied.)

As presently worded, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6395, the NAPOCOR Charter, as amended, reads:
SEC. 13.Non-profit Character of the Corporation; Exemption from All Taxes, Duties, Fees, Imposts and Other Charges by

the Government and Government Instrumentalities. The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns from its capital investment as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion. To enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance and effective implementation of the policy enunciated in Section One of this Act, the Corporation, including its subsidiaries, is hereby declared exempt from the payment of all forms of taxes, duties, fees, imposts as well as costs and service fees including filing fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)

In A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, captioned In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, the Court addressed the query of a Clerk of Court from the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan on whether NAPOCOR is exempt from the payment of filing fees and Sheriff's Trust Fund. In its Resolution dated December 6, 2005, the Court, upon the recommendation of the Court Administrator, declared that NAPOCOR is still exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas bonds.
ACHEaI

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dated November 23, 2005 in CAG.R. SP Nos. 85714 and 85841 declaring that NAPOCOR was exempt from filing a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the MTCC judgment while the

same was pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 5. The appellate court also held that the exemption of NAPOCOR extended even to the requirement for periodical deposit of rent, ratiocinating that:
On the whole, the posting of supersedeas bond and the making of the periodical deposit are designed primarily to insure that the plaintiff would be paid the back rentals and the compensation for the use and occupation of the premises should the municipal trial court's decision be eventually affirmed on appeal. Elsewise stated, both the posting of the supersedeas bond and the payment of monthly deposit are required to accomplish one and the same purpose, namely, to secure the performance of, or to satisfy the judgment appealed from in case it is affirmed on appeal by the appellate court. xxx xxx xxx Thus viewed, the inescapable conclusion is, and so We hold, that although the term "making of monthly deposit in ejectment cases" is not expressly or specifically mentioned in Section 13 of R.A. 6395, however, inasmuch as it has the same or similar function, purpose, and essence as a supersedeas bond, it should be deemed included in the enumeration laid down under the said provision. This accords well with the principle of ejusdem generis which says that where a statute uses a general word followed by an enumeration of specific words embraced within the general word merely as

examples, the enumeration does not restrict the meaning of the general word which should be construed to include others of the same class although not enumerated therein; or where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. In a nutshell, We hold that petitioner NAPOCOR enjoys exemption not only from posting supersedeas bond in courts in appealed ejectment cases, but also from periodically depositing the amount of the monthly rental or the reasonable compensation of the use and occupancy of the property, as determined in the municipal trial court's decision. 124

The Court of Appeals further adjudged that the exemptions of NAPOCOR similarly applied to TRANSCO since "[i]t is all too obvious that the interests of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO over the premises in litigation are so interwoven and dependent upon each other, such that whatever is adjudged in regard to the former, whether favorable or adverse, would ineluctably and similarly affect the latter[;]" and "[c]onsequently, . . . the stay of the execution of the appealed decision insofar as NAPOCOR is concerned necessarily extends and inures to its co-defendant TRANSCO, not by virtue of the former's statutory exemption privilege from filing supersedeas bond and making periodic deposits, but by

the indisputably operative fact that the rights and liabilities in litis of BOTH defendants are so intimately interwoven, interdependent, and indivisible." 125
SACTIH

Only recently, however, the Court reversed its stance on the exemption of NAPOCOR from filing fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas bonds. Revisiting A.M. No. 0510-20-SC, the Court issued Resolutions dated October 27, 2009 and March 10, 2010, wherein it denied the request of NAPOCOR for exemption from payment of filing fees and court fees for such request appears to run counter to Article VIII, Section 5 (5) 126 of the Constitution, on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, which includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in courts. The Court categorically pronounced that NAPOCOR can no longer invoke its amended Charter as basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees. Nevertheless, in this case, the RTC-Branch 1 already promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. 6613 on December 12, 2005, denying the appeal of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO and affirming the MTCC judgment against said corporations. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO presently have pending appeals of the RTC-Branch 1 judgment before the Court of Appeals. Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court applies only when the judgment of a Municipal Trial Court (and any same level court such as the MTCC) in an ejectment case is pending appeal before the RTC. When the RTC had already resolved the appeal and its judgment, in turn, is pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, then

Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court governs. The Court already pointed out in Northcastle Properties and Estate Corporation v. Paas 127 that Section 19 applies only to ejectment cases pending appeal with the RTC, and Section 21 to those already decided by the RTC. The Court again held in Uy v. Santiago 128 that:
[I]t is only execution of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts' judgment pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. On the other hand, once the Regional Trial Court has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, be immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a Petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied.)

According to Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, "[t]he judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom." It no longer provides for the stay of execution at such stage. Thus, subsequent events have rendered the Petition of LANDTRADE in G.R. No. 170505 moot and academic. It will serve no more purpose for the Court to require NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to still comply with the requirements of filing a supersedeas bond and depositing

rent to stay execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment, as required by Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, when the appeal had since been resolved by the RTC.
CDScaT

Preliminary injunction to stay execution of RTC judgment against defendant in an ejectment case The issues raised by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO in their Petitions in G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 boil down to the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to enjoin the execution of the Decision dated December 12, 2005 of the RTCBranch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613 while the same is pending appeal before the appellate court. The Court of Appeals granted the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of LANDTRADE and denied the application for writ of preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO because Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the RTC judgment in an ejectment case, which is adverse to the defendant and pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, shall be immediately executory and can be enforced despite further appeal. Therefore, the execution of the RTC judgment pending appeal is the ministerial duty of the Court of Appeals, specifically enjoined by law to be done. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO argue that neither the rules nor jurisprudence explicitly declare that Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court bars the application of Rule 58 on preliminary injunction. Regardless of the immediately executory character of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case, the Court of Appeals, before which said judgment

is appealed, is not deprived of power and jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction when circumstances so warrant. There is merit in the present Petitions of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. The Court expounded on the nature of a writ of preliminary injunction in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Clinton Apparelle, Inc.: 129
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. An extraordinary remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard. It may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The resolution of an application for a writ of preliminary injunction

rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special recourse before the main case can be heard in due course of proceedings. Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
HAIaEc

SEC. 3.Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established: (a)That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b)That the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c)That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Under the cited provision, a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.

Benedicto v. Court of Appeals 130 sets forth the following elucidation on the applicability of Rule 58 vis--vis Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court:
This section [Rule 70, Section 21] presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. It is our opinion that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require. In the case of Amagan v. Marayag, we reiterated our pronouncement in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao that the proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. We further drew a fine line between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, thus:

Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.
aAcHCT

Patently, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately

executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. There need only be clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate said right. (Emphasis supplied.)

As in Benedicto, substantial considerations exist herein that compels the Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the February 17, 2004 Decision of the MTCC, as affirmed by the December 12, 2005 Decision of the RTC-Branch 1, until the appeal of latter judgment, sought by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, is finally resolved by the Court of Appeals. First, the two parcels of land claimed by LANDTRADE are the subject of several other cases. In fact, Vidal and AZIMUTH, who instituted the Quieting of Title Case against Teofilo and LANDTRADE (also presently before the Court in G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894) have filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in the instant case, thus, showing that there are other parties who, while strangers to the ejectment case, might be greatly affected by its result and who want to protect their interest in the subject properties. And although cases involving title to real property, i.e., quieting of title, accion publiciana, etc., are not prejudicial to and do not suspend an ejectment case, 131 the existence of such cases should have already put the Court of Appeals on guard that the title of LANDTRADE to the subject properties on which it fundamentally based its claim of possessory right is being fiercely contested. Second, it is undisputed that TRANSCO and its

predecessor, NAPOCOR, have been in possession of the disputed parcels of land for more than 40 years. Upon said properties stand the TRANSCO Overton Substation and Agus 7 Warehouse. The Overton Sub-station, in particular, is a crucial facility responsible for providing the power requirements of a large portion of Iligan City, the two Lanao Provinces, and other nearby provinces. Without doubt, having TRANSCO vacate its Overton Sub-station, by prematurely executing the MTCC judgment of February 17, 2004, carries serious and irreversible implications, primordial of which is the widespread disruption of the electrical power supply in the aforementioned areas, contributing further to the electric power crisis already plaguing much of Mindanao. Lastly, allowing execution pending appeal would result in the payment of an astronomical amount in rentals which, per Sheriff Borres's computation, already amounted to P156,000,000.00 by August 11, 2004, when he issued the Notices of Garnishment and Notification against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO; plus, P500,000.00 each month thereafter. Payment of such an amount may seriously put the operation of a public utility in peril, to the detriment of its consumers.
ADTCaI

These circumstances altogether present a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, not just to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, but to a substantial fraction of the consuming public as well, which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction is justified by the circumstances. The Court must emphasize though that in so far as the

Ejectment Case is concerned, it has only settled herein issues on the propriety of enjoining the execution of the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004 while it was on appeal before the RTC, and subsequently, before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has yet to render a judgment on the appeal itself. But it may not be amiss for the Court to also point out that in G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 (Quieting of Title Case), it has already found that Vidal, not Teofilo, is the late Doa Demetria's sole heir, who alone inherits Doa Demetria's rights to and interests in the disputed parcels of land. This conclusion of the Court in the Quieting of Title Case will inevitably affect the Ejectment Case still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals since LANDTRADE is basing its right to possession in the Ejectment Case on its supposed title to the subject properties, which it derived from Teofilo. The Cancellation of Titles Case (G.R. No. 173401) and Reversion

The Republic is assailing in its Petition in G.R. No. 173401 the (1) Order dated December 13, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 4 dismissing Civil Case No. 6686, the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion filed by the Republic against the deceased Doa Demetria, Vidal and/or Teofilo, and AZIMUTH and/or LANDTRADE; and (2) Order dated May 16, 2006 of the same trial court denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic, averring that:
With due respect, the trial court decided a question of substance contrary to law and jurisprudence in ruling: (i)THAT PETITIONER HAD NO

CAUSE OF ACTION IN INSTITUTING THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT FOR CANCELLATION OF OCT NOS. 0-1200 (A.F.) AND 01201 (A.F.), INCLUDING ALL DERIVATIVE TITLES, AND REVERSION. (ii)THAT PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT FOR CANCELLATION OF OCT NOS. 0-1200 (A.F.) AND 01201 (A.F.) INCLUDING ALL DERIVATIVE TITLES, AND REVERSION IS BARRED BY THE DECISIONS IN CACHO VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (28 PHIL. 616 [1914] AND CACHO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (269 SCRA 159 [1997]. (iii)THAT PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED; AND (iv)THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING. 132
CacTIE

The Court finds merit in the present Petition. Cause of action for reversion The Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 seeks the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), with all their derivative titles, and reversion. The Complaint was dismissed by the RTC-Branch 4 in its

Order dated December 13, 2005, upon Motion of Vidal and AZIMUTH, on the ground that the State does not have a cause of action for reversion. According to the RTC-Branch 4, there was no showing that the late Doa Demetria committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the Republic. Additionally, the Regalian doctrine does not apply to Civil Case No. 6686 because said doctrine does not extend to lands beyond the public domain. By the own judicial admission of the Republic, the two parcels of land in question are privately owned, even before the same were registered in Doa Demetria's name. The Court disagrees. Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant's act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter. 133 Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. 134 In Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic 135 (Yujuico case), reversion was defined as an action which seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or

corporations to the mass of public domain. It bears to point out, though, that the Court also allowed the resort by the Government to actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a patent of the conditions imposed by law; 136 and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable forest land 137 or portion of a river, even when such grant was made through mere oversight. 138 In Republic v. Guerrero, 139 the Court gave a more general statement that the remedy of reversion can be availed of "only in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title." The right of the Republic to institute an action for reversion is rooted in the Regalian doctrine. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 140 It is incorporated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution under Article XII, Section 2 which declares "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. . . ." No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of the title from the State. 141
DcTSHa

The reversion case of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 rests on the main argument that OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), issued in Doa Demetria's name, included parcels of lands which were not adjudicated to her by the Court in the 1914 Cacho case. Contrary to the statement made by the RTC-Branch 4 in its December 13, 2005 Order, the Republic does not make any admission in its Complaint that the two parcels of land registered in Doa Demetria's name were privately owned even prior to their registration. While the Republic does not dispute that that two parcels of land were awarded to Doa Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case, it alleges that these were not the same as those covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) issued in Doa Demetria's name 84 years later. If, indeed, the parcels of land covered by said OCTs were not those granted to Doa Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case, then it can be presumed, under the Regalian doctrine, that said properties still form part of the public domain belonging to the State. Just because OCTs were already issued in Doa Demetria's name does not bar the Republic from instituting an action for reversion. Indeed, the Court made it clear in Francisco v. Rodriguez 142 that Section 101 of the Public Land Act "may be invoked only when title has already vested in the individual, e.g., when a patent or a certificate of title has already been issued[,]" for the basic premise in an action for reversion is that the certificate of title fraudulently or unlawfully included land of the public domain, hence, calling for the cancellation of said certificate. It is actually the issuance of such a certificate of title which constitutes the third element of a

cause of action for reversion. The Court further finds that the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 sufficiently states a cause of action for reversion, even though it does not allege that fraud was committed in the registration or that the Director of Lands requested the reversion. It is a well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in cases like these is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically admits the truth of the factual allegations made in a complaint. 143 The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the defendants. 144 In Vergara v. Court of Appeals, explained that:
145

the Court additionally

In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or

allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
ITHADC

The Republic meticulously presented in its Complaint the discrepancies between the 1914 Cacho case, on one hand, which granted Doa Demetria title to two parcels of land; and OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), on the other, which were supposedly issued pursuant to the said case. In paragraphs 9 and 16 of its Complaint, the Republic clearly alleged that OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) cover properties much larger than or areas beyond those granted by the land registration court in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Thus, the Republic was able to satisfactorily allege the unlawful inclusion, for lack of an explicit grant from the Government, of parcels of public land into Doa Demetria's OCTs, which, if true, will justify the cancellation of said certificates and the return of the properties to the Republic. That the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 does not allege that it had been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), at the behest of the Director of Lands, does not call for its dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended, simply requires that:
SEC. 101.All actions for the reversion to the

Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clear from the aforequoted provision that the authority to institute an action for reversion, on behalf of the Republic, is primarily conferred upon the OSG. While the OSG, for most of the time, will file an action for reversion upon the request or recommendation of the Director of Lands, there is no basis for saying that the former is absolutely bound or dependent on the latter. RTC-Branch 4 cited Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio Nio Residents Association, Inc. 146 (Sherwill case), to support its ruling that it is "absolutely necessary" that an investigation and a determination of fraud should have been made by the Director of Lands prior to the filing of a case for reversion. The Sherwill case is not in point and does not constitute a precedent for the case at bar. It does not even involve a reversion case. The main issue therein was whether the trial court properly dismissed the complaint of Sherwill Development Corporation for quieting of title to two parcels of land, considering that a case for the declaration of nullity of its TCTs, instituted by the Sto. Nio Residents Association, Inc., was already pending before the Land Management Bureau (LMB). The Court recognized therein the primary jurisdiction of the LMB over the dispute, and affirmed the dismissal of the quieting of title case on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping.

Res judicata Public policy and sound practice enshrine the fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issues more than once. It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. 147
CHIaTc

The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts (1) bar by former judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the

concept of conclusiveness of judgment. Although it does not have the same effect as res judicata in the form of bar by former judgment which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. 148 The 1914 Cacho case does not bar the Complaint for reversion in Civil Case No. 6686 by res judicata in either of its two concepts. There is no bar by prior judgment because the 1914 Cacho case and Civil Case No. 6686 do not have the same causes of action and, even possibly, they do not involve identical subject matters. Land registration cases, such as GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, from which the 1914 Cacho case arose, are special proceedings where the concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply. In special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. 149 Civil Case No. 6686 is an action for reversion where the cause of action is the alleged unlawful inclusion in OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) of parcels of public land that were not among those granted to Doa Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case. Thus, Civil Case No. 6686 even rests on supposition that the parcels of land covered by the certificates of title in Doa Demetria's name, which the Republic is seeking to have cancelled, are different from the parcels of land that were

the subject matter of the 1914 Cacho case and adjudged to Doa Demetria. Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, likewise, does not apply as between the 1914 Cacho case and Civil Case No. 6686. A careful study of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 reveals that the Republic does not seek to re-litigate any of the issues resolved in the 1914 Cacho case. The Republic no longer questions in Civil Case No. 6686 that Doa Demetria was adjudged the owner of two parcels of land in the 1914 Cacho case. The Republic is only insisting on the strict adherence to the judgment of the Court in the 1914 Cacho case, particularly: (1) the adjudication of a smaller parcel of land, consisting only of the southern portion of the 37.87-hectare Lot 2 subject of Doa Demetria's application in GLRO Record No. 6909; and (2) the submission of a new technical plan for the adjudicated southern portion of Lot 2 in GLRO Record No. 6909, and the deed executed by Datto Darondon, husband of Alanga, renouncing all his rights to Lot 1, in GLRO Record No. 6908, in Doa Demetria's favor. 150 Similarly, the 1997 Cacho case is not an obstacle to the institution by the Republic of Civil Case No. 6686 on the ground of res judicata.
DETcAH

Bar by prior judgment does not apply for lack of identity of causes of action between the 1997 Cacho case and Civil Case No. 6686. The 1997 Cacho case involves a petition for re-issuance of decrees of registration. In the absence of principles and rules specific for such a petition, the Court refers to those on reconstitution of certificates of title, being almost of the same nature and

granting closely similar reliefs. Reconstitution denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form or condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. 151 Reconstitution is another special proceeding where the concept of cause of action in an ordinary civil action finds no application. The Court, in the 1997 Cacho case, granted the reconstitution and re-issuance of the decrees of registration considering that the NALTDRA, through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan, 152 its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, certified that "according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908[;]"153 thus, leaving no doubt that said decrees had in fact been issued. The 1997 Cacho case only settled the issuance, existence, and subsequent loss of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. Consequently, said decrees could be reissued in their original form or condition. The Court, however, could not have passed upon in the 1997 Cacho case the issues on whether Doa Demetria truly owned the parcels of land covered by the decrees and whether the decrees and the OCTs subsequently issued pursuant thereto are void for unlawfully including land of the public domain which were not awarded to Doa Demetria.

The following pronouncement of the Court in Heirs of Susana de Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals 154 is instructive:
Precisely, in both species of reconstitution under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature of the action denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the action is merely to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred, and does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit, which is exactly what the private respondents did when they filed Civil Case No. 95-3577 before Branch 74. The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. . . . . (Emphases supplied.)
TacSAE

Whatever findings the Court made on the issue of ownership in the 1997 Cacho case are mere obiter dictum. As the Court held in Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr.:155
Petitioner claims in his petition that the 3 October 1957 Decision resolved the issue of ownership of the lots and declared in the body of the decision that he had "sufficiently proven uncontroverted facts that he had been in possession of the land in question since 1946 . . . [and] has been in possession of the property with sufficient title." However, such findings made by the CFI in the said decision are mere obiter, since the ownership of the properties, titles to which were sought to be reconstituted, was never the issue in the reconstitution case. Ownership is not the issue in a petition for reconstitution of title. A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. It may perhaps be argued that ownership of the properties was put in issue when petitioner opposed the petition for reconstitution by claiming to be the owner of the properties. However, any ruling that the trial court may make on the matter is irrelevant considering the court's limited authority in petitions for reconstitution. In a petition for reconstitution of title, the only relief sought is the issuance of a reconstituted title because the reconstituting officer's power is limited to granting or

denying a reconstituted title. As stated earlier, the reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title, and any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. (Emphases supplied.)

The Court concedes that the 1997 Cacho case, by reason of conclusiveness of judgment, prevents the Republic from again raising as issues in Civil Case No. 6686 the issuance and existence of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969, but not the validity of said decrees, as well as the certificates of title issued pursuant thereto. Forum shopping Forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. A party violates the rule against forum shopping if the elements of litis pendentia are present; or if a final judgment in one case would amount to res judicata in the other. 156 There is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.
157
EacHSA

Given the preceding disquisition of the Court that the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases do not constitute res judicata in Civil Case No. 6686, then the Court also cannot sustain the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 4 of the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 for forum shopping. Prescription According to the RTC-Branch 4, the cause of action for reversion of the Republic was already lost or extinguished by prescription, citing Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
SEC. 32.Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase

"innocent purchaser of value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.

Decree No. 10364 in GLRO Record No. 6908 was issued on May 9, 1913, while Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 was issued on July 8, 1915. In the course of eight decades, the decrees were lost and subsequently reconstituted per order of this Court in the 1997 Cacho case. The reconstituted decrees were issued on October 15, 1998 and transcribed on OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). The reconstituted decrees were finally entered into the Registration Book for Iligan City on December 4, 1998 at 10:00 a.m. Almost six years had elapsed from entry of the decrees by the time the Republic filed its Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 on October 13, 2004. Nonetheless, elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions. When the government is the real party in interest, and it is proceeding mainly to assert its own right to recover its own property, there can as a rule be no defense grounded on laches or prescription. Public land

fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription. 158
STIcaE

The Court discussed lengthily in Republic v. Court of Appeals 159 the indefeasibility of a decree of registration/certificate of title vis--vis the remedy of reversion available to the State:
The petitioner invokes Republic v. Animas, where this Court declared that a title founded on fraud may be cancelled notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof. Thus: . . . The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law which provides as follows: "The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions or parts of any concession, title or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement thereon or omission of facts, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statement, and any subsequent modification,

alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. . . ." A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. This doctrine was reiterated in Republic v. Mina, where Justice Relova declared for the Court: A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. And, a title will be considered void if it is procured

through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land on the claim that he has been occupying and cultivating it. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. . . . The lapse of one (1) year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
aTSEcA

Justifying the above-quoted provision, the Court declared in Piero, Jr. v. Director of Lands: It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a Torrens title issued on the basis of a free patent or a homestead patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. And in repeated previous decisions of this Court that indefeasibility has been emphasized by Our holding that not even the Government can file an action for annulment, but at the same time, it has been made clear that an action for reversion may be instituted

by the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government. Private respondent PNB points out that Animas involved timberland, which is not alienable or disposable public land, and that in Piero the issue raised was whether the Director of Lands would be enjoined by a writ

of prohibition from investigating allegations of fraud that led to the issuance of certain free patents. Nevertheless, we find that the doctrine above quoted is no less controlling even if there be some factual disparities (which are not material here), especially as it has been buttressed by subsequent jurisprudence. In Director of Lands v. Jugado, upon which the appellate court based its ruling, the Court declared meaningfully that: There is, however, a section in the Public Land Law (Sec. 101 of Commonwealth Act 141), which affords a remedy whereby lands of the public domain fraudulently awarded may be recovered or reverted back to its original owner, the Government. But the provision requires that all such actions for reversion shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (See Director of Lands v. De Luna, supra). As the party in interest in this case is the Director of Lands and not the Republic of the Philippines, the action cannot prosper in favor of the appellant.
2005cdasia

The reference was to the Public Land Law which authorizes the reversion suit under its Sec. 101, thus:

Sec. 101.All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. This remedy was recently affirmed by the Court in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose and Victoria Aliwalas, thus: . . . Title to the property having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy.

It is evident from the foregoing jurisprudence that despite the lapse of one year from the entry of a decree of registration/certificate of title, the State, through the Solicitor General, may still institute an action for reversion when said decree/certificate was acquired by fraud or misrepresentation. Indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens system does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrant's already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring ownership. 160

But then again, the Court had several times in the past recognized the right of the State to avail itself of the remedy of reversion in other instances when the title to the land is void for reasons other than having been secured by fraud or misrepresentation. One such case is Spouses Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, 161 where the Bureau of Lands (BOL), by mistake and oversight, granted a patent to the spouses Morandarte which included a portion of the Miputak River. The Republic instituted an action for reversion 10 years after the issuance of an OCT in the name of the spouses Morandarte. The Court ruled:
Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the BOL in this regard cannot be invoked against the government with regard to property of the public domain. It has been said that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land or property illegally included. Otherwise stated, property of the public domain is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.
cSaADC

Another example is the case of Republic of the Phils. v.

CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. IV, 162 in which the homestead patent issued by the State became null and void because of the grantee's violation of the conditions for the grant. The Court ordered the reversion even though the land subject of the patent was already covered by an OCT and the Republic availed itself of the said remedy more than 11 years after the cause of action accrued, because:
There is merit in this appeal considering that the statute of limitation does not lie against the State. Civil Case No. 1382 of the lower court for reversion is a suit brought by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines as a sovereign state and, by the express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, any transfer or alienation of a homestead grant within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent is null and void and constitute a cause for reversion of the homestead to the State. In Republic vs. Ruiz, 23 SCRA 348, We held that "the Court below committed no error in ordering the reversion to plaintiff of the land grant involved herein, notwithstanding the fact that the original certificate of title based on the patent had been cancelled and another certificate issued in the names of the grantee heirs. Thus, where a grantee is found not entitled to hold and possess in fee simple the land, by reason of his having violated Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the Court may properly order its reconveyance to the grantor, although the property has already been brought under the operation of the Torrens

System. And, this right of the government to bring an appropriate action for reconveyance is not barred by the lapse of time: the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State." (Italics supplied). The above ruling was reiterated in Republic vs. Mina, 114 SCRA 945.

If the Republic is able to establish after trial and hearing of Civil Case No. 6686 that the decrees and OCTs in Doa Demetria's name are void for some reason, then the trial court can still order the reversion of the parcels of land covered by the same because indefeasibility cannot attach to a void decree or certificate of title. The RTC-Branch 4 jumped the gun when it declared that the cause of action of the Republic for reversion in Civil Case No. 6686 was already lost or extinguished by prescription based on the Complaint alone. All told, the Court finds that the RTC-Branch 4 committed reversible error in dismissing the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686. Resultantly, the Court orders the reinstatement of said Complaint. Yet, the Court also deems it opportune to recall the following statements in Saad-Agro Industries, Inc. v. Republic: 163
It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy, involving a question of fraud and misrepresentation committed against the government and it is aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the public domain. It seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate

of title, including the transfer certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation. Thus, the State, as the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the application of the free patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate. It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for reversion, to show the details attending the issuance of title over the alleged inalienable land and explain why such issuance has deprived the State of the claimed property. (Emphasis supplied.)
HSaCcE

It may do well for the Republic to remember that there is a prima facie presumption of regularity in the issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969, as well as OCT Nos. 01200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), in Doa Demetria's name, and the burden of proof falls upon the Republic to establish by clear and convincing evidence that said decrees and certificates of title are null and void. IV DISPOSITIVE PART WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders the following judgment in the Petitions at bar:

1)In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106, the admission of the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic, and the return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs. 2)In G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 (Quieting of Title Case), the Court DENIES the consolidated Petitions for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation, Teofilo Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo for lack of merit. It AFFIRMSthe Decision dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 00456, affirming in toto the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452. Costs against Landtrade Realty Corporation, Teofilo Cacho, and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo. 3)In G.R. No. 170505 (The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case execution pending appeal before the Regional Trial Court), the Court DENIES the Petition for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation for being moot and academic given that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte had already rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 in Civil Case No. 6613. No costs. 4)In G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case execution

pending appeal before the Court of Appeals), the Court GRANTS the consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition of the National Power Corporation and National Transmission Corporation. It SETS ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It further ORDERS the Court of Appeals to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the Decision dated December 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6613, while the same is pending appeal before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889. It finally DIRECTS the Court of Appeals to resolve without further delay the pending appeals before it, in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, in a manner not inconsistent with this Decision. No costs.
cEAHSC

5)In G.R. No. 173401 (Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Orders dated December 13, 2005 and May 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 of Iligan City in Civil Case No. 6686. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 and the return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175375. June 23, 2009.] CONRADO O. LASQUITE and TEODORA I. ANDRADE, petitioners, vs. VICTORY HILLS, INC., respondent. DECISION

QUISUMBING, J :
p

This appeal seeks to annul the Decision 1 dated November 8, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 77599. The Court of Appeals had set aside the Decision 2 dated July 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 in Civil Case No. 548 which upheld Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. NP-197 3 and NP-198, 4 in the names of petitioners Andrade and Lasquite, respectively. The antecedent facts are as follows: On May 4, 1971, Jose Manahan 5 executed a Deed of Quitclaim/Assignment of Rights 6 over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3050 at Barrio Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal in favor of Conrado O. Lasquite. Lasquite applied for a free patent over the lot, and pending approval of the application, sold half of the land to Juanito L. Andrade on January 11, 1981. 7 Upon the grant of the patent application, OCT Nos. NP-197 and NP-198 were issued in the names of Andrade and Lasquite, respectively, on June 18, 1981. Thereafter, on August 22, 1983
8

and October 22, 1983,

Simeona, Armentina, Herminia, Zenaida, Gloria, Yolanda and Rodolfo, all surnamed Prescilla, filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands to question the grant of free patent in favor of petitioners. They claimed to have been in possession in concepto de dueno of Lot No. 3050, planting and cultivating crops thereon since 1940. On March 8, 1989, the Prescillas also instituted a case for reconveyance and damages against petitioners before the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 which was docketed as Civil Case No. 548-SM. They alleged that Lasquite forged the signature of Jose M. Manahan in the Deed of Quitclaim/Assignment of Rights since the latter has died on April 11, 1968. 10
9

It also appears that a second complaint, 11 for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages, was filed by Roberto and Raquel Manahan, Maria Gracia M. Natividad, the heirs of Leocadio Manahan, and the heirs of Joaquin Manahan against petitioners on June 1, 1990. The Manahans asserted title over Lot No. 3050 as successors of Jose S. Manahan whom they claimed to have died on October 12, 1947. 12 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 680-90-SM and raffled to Branch 76 of the San Mateo, Rizal RTC. Upon learning of Civil Case No. 548-SM initiated by the Prescillas against petitioners, the Manahans filed a Complaint in Intervention 13 on June 23, 1993, and Civil Case No. 68090-SM was consolidated with Civil Case No. 548-SM.
DTcASE

It also appears that on January 11, 1994, respondent Victory Hills, Inc. (Victory Hills) also intervened in Civil Case No. 548-SM. Victory Hills likewise claimed to be the owner of the subject lot. Victory Hills traced its title to Lot

No. 3050 to OCT No. 380 14 which was allegedly registered on January 4, 1937 to Jose H. Manahan by virtue of Homestead Patent No. H-19562 15 dated December 14, 1936. According to Victory Hills, Jose H. Manahan sold Lot No. 3050 to Rufino Hieras on May 17, 1944 to whom Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 46219 16 was issued. Hieras then conveyed the lot to spouses Serafin and Veronica Angeles, and Catalina Cayetano who obtained TCT No. 85082 17 in their names. Later, the lot was transferred to Victory Hills on September 6, 1961 under TCT No. 90816. 18 On November 27, 1991, Victory Hills filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Relocation Survey 19 with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Upon grant of the motion, the DENR released a Narration Report of the Relocation Survey 20 on December 9, 1993. The report noted that: xxx xxx xxx
1. H-19562 and H-19887 had been accepted by Cad. 375-D, San Mateo Cadastre and identical to Lot [No.] 3050 and Lot [No.] 258 respectively[;] 2. H-19562 had been issued a free patent and Original Certificate of Title No. 380 in favor [of] Jose Manahan on June 4, 1937. That said title was transferred to Rufin[o] Hieras on May 17, 1944 with TCT [No.] 46219, cancelling O[CT] [No.] 3[8]0. Again TCT [No.] 46219-T237 was cancelled and TCT [No.] [8]5082 was issued to [Spouses]

Serafin Angeles and [Veronica] D. Angeles and Catalina Cayetano [on] March 17, 1961; 3. A consolidate[d] subdivision survey of H19562 and H-19887 had been approved by the LRC designated as plan (LRC) Pcs [-] [1586] surveyed June 1-15, 1961; which was not projected in Cad. 375-D, San Mateo Cadastre; 4. Lot [No.] 3050 which is identical to H19562 was subdivided and designated as plan Cad-04-002023-D, into two lots. (Emphasis supplied.) 21 xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the said report, Branch 77 of the Rizal RTC, on July 2, 2002, promulgated a Decision which upheld the title of petitioners to Lot No. 3050. It decreed: Accordingly, the title of defendants, Conrado Lasquite and Jose Andrade, involving the subject parcel of land under OCT No. NP-198 and OCT No. NP-197 registered on June 18, 1981, are sustained. Likewise, the title issued to plaintiffs Prescilla, under OCT No. ON-333 involving Lot 3052 is sustained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing these cases. No Costs. SO ORDERED. 22

The trial court disregarded OCT No. 380 and ruled that it was spurious as it lacked the signature of then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce Eulogio Rodriguez. The RTC also ruled that the complaints for reconveyance of the Precillas, the Manahans and Victory Hills, which were all founded on extrinsic fraud, had prescribed since more than four (4) years have elapsed since the land was registered before they filed cases in court.
ScaEIT

The Prescillas, the Manahans and Victory Hills interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On November 8, 2006, the appellate court set aside the ruling of the RTC and declared Victory Hills the absolute owner of Lot No. 3050. The appellate court ruled:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 2, 2002 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DECLARING VICTORY HILLS, INC. the absolute owner of the parcel of land designated as Lot 3050 subject of the instant case and ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel OCT No. NP-198 and OCT No. NP-197 in the names of defendantsappellees Conrado Lasquite and Juanito Andrade. SO ORDERED. 23

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to us. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
I. . . . HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT'S OCT

NO. 380 AND HOMESTEAD PATENT NO. H-19562 ARE VALIDLY ISSUED; II. . . . HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT VICTORY HILLS, INC. HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF TITLE AND OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY VIS-A-VIS PETITIONERS CONRADO O. LASQUITE AND TEODORA I. ANDRADE; III. . . . GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO RESPONDENT'S HOMESTEAD PATENT NO. H-19562 DESPITE THE FACT THAT A COPY OF SAID HOMESTEAD PATENT WAS NEVER PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL NOR IN THE APPEAL; IV. . . . HOLDING THAT OCT NO. 380 IS AN EN TOTO TRANSCRIPTION OF HOMESTEAD PATENT NO. H-19562 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT NO EVIDENCE RELATIVE THERETO WAS ADDUCED IN THE LOWER COURT; V. . . . NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE THAT RESPONDENT'S CLAIM HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED. 24

Condensed, the twin issues for our determination are: (1) whether respondent Victory Hills, Inc. is entitled to

reconveyance of Lot No. 3050; and (2) whether respondent's claim had prescribed. Petitioners assail the validity of OCT No. 380 as the source of respondent's derivative title. They fault the appellate court for according weight to the certificate of title even if it does not bear the signature of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. They stress that the Bureau of Lands has no record of Patent No. H-19562 which respondent cited as the basis for the issuance of its title to Lot No. 3050 and yet the appellate court still concluded that the transcription of Patent No. H-19562 in OCT No. 380 was conclusive proof of its due execution. Petitioners likewise call for a review of the facts in this case owing to the conflicting findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
AacCHD

On the other hand, respondent relies on OCT No. 380 as evidence of the earlier registration of Lot No. 3050 in the name of its predecessor, Jose H. Manahan. Such recording, respondent asserts, has rendered OCT No. 380 indefeasible one year following its issuance on January 4, 1937 and has effectively segregated Lot No. 3050 from the domain of public lands. Respondent further justifies that the notation "sgd" in OCT No. 380 was sufficient indication that the original copy of Homestead Patent No. H-19562 had been signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce Eulogio Rodriguez. In any case, respondent invokes the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by the Register of Deeds in issuing OCT No. 380. It finally argues against the issue of prescription since petitioners raised the same only for the first time on appeal.

Often cited but rarely heeded is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the Court does not normally undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, there are several recognized exceptions 25 in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court. Two of these exceptions find application in the present case, to wit: (1) when the findings of fact of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court; 26 and (2) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals upheld OCT No. 380 as the origin of TCT No. 90816 in the name of respondent Victory Hills. The appellate court ruled that the homestead patent which was awarded to respondent's predecessor, Jose H. Manahan, in 1936 cannot simply be defeated by the subsequent grant of free patent to petitioners 45 years later. It accepted the transcript of Homestead Patent No. H-19562 in OCT No. 380 as a faithful reproduction of the original. Also, the Court of Appeals recognized the notation "sgd" in OCT No. 380 as customary to signify that the original copy of the patent had been signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. After carefully poring over all the evidence submitted in this case, we find the petition to be impressed with merit.

The relocation survey conducted by the DENR on October 25, 1993 positively confirmed that the mother title of respondent's TCT and the OCTs of petitioners cover the same land. We are confronted, therefore, with a case of successive registration, in the event of which we have been constantly guided that:
In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. 27

However, we find that the circumstances attendant in this case militate against a forthright application of this rule. Section 105 of Act No. 2874, 28 the governing law when Homestead Patent No. H-19562 was purportedly issued, speaks of who must sign the patents and certificates granted pursuant to the Act:
Sec. 105. All patents or certificates for lands granted under this Act shall be prepared in the Bureau of Lands and shall issue in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands under the signature of the Governor-General, countersigned by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, but such patents or certificates shall be effective only for the purposes

defined in section one hundred and twentytwo of the Land Registration Act; and the actual conveyance of the land shall be effected only as provided in said section. (Emphasis supplied.)
SAHEIc

Noteworthy, Section 47 29 of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act 30 provides that a certified true copy of an original certificate of title shall be admissible as evidence in our courts and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein except as otherwise provided by the Act. This is complementary to the rule on the admissibility of public documents as evidence under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
SaIHDA

Thus, the evidentiary value of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. 31 In the case at bar, the appellate court gave credence to the certified true copy of OCT No. 380 as proof of ownership of respondent's predecessor. Yet, it is readily apparent from a cursory reading of said copy that OCT No. 380 was supposedly signed, 32 not by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by law, but by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

Hence, it is plain to see that to give OCT No. 380 probative value in court would be to allow variance or an evasion or circumvention of the requirement laid down in Section 105 of Act No. 2874. We are thus warned that any title sourced from the flawed OCT No. 380 could be void. On this basis, we are justified to consider with great care any claims derived therefrom. What taints OCT No. 380 even more is the fact that the records of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) are devoid of evidence to prove that Homestead Patent No. H-19562, 33 much less a patent application 34 for Lot No. 3050 with the Bureau of Lands ever existed. The certification 35 from the Bureau of Lands that Lot No. 3050 was surveyed in the name of Jose Manahan suggests, at best, that he was a survey claimant. Neither do we find the derivative titles of OCT No. 380 free from any taint of irregularity. While TCT No. 46219 in the name of Hieras indicated January 4, 1937 as the original registration date of Lot No. 3050, the TCTs of subsequent transferees designated a different date May 17, 1944. True, a duly-registered certificate of title is considered a public document and the entries found in it are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce evidence establishing otherwise. 36 Even then, records of public officers which are admissible in evidence are limited to those matters which the public officer has authority to record. 37 Indisputably, it was beyond the power of the Register of Deeds to register a public land based on an invalid, much worse, a nonexistent patent. To sanction an otherwise invalid

document in the guise of upholding the stability of our land registration system would run counter to the judicial devotion towards purging the system of illicit titles, in accordance with our base task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy. 38 The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. 39 It is rather obvious from the foregoing disquisition that respondent failed to dispense such burden. Indeed, the records are replete with proof that respondent declared the lots comprising Lot No. 3050 for taxation purposes only after it had instituted the present case in court. This is not to say of course that tax receipts are evidence of ownership, since they are not, albeit they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one would ordinarily be paying taxes for a property not in his actual or at least constructive possession. 40 Other than paying taxes from 1994-1997, however, respondent has not shown that it exercised dominion over Lot No. 3050. In contrast, petitioner Lasquite has been continuously paying taxes on the land since 1972, 41 and has utilized the land as a farm, planted fruit trees and raised goats thereon. Petitioners have likewise built structures and managed to entrust the property to the care of certain individuals without any objection from respondent. Respondent avers that petitioner Lasquite forged the Deed of Quitclaim/Assignment of Rights to make it

appear that Jose Manahan conveyed Lot No. 3050 to him. It must be stressed, however, that whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same. Forgery cannot be presumed but should be substantiated with clear and convincing evidence. 42
IDATCE

Regrettably, Victory Hills was unable to establish that the Jose H. Manahan from whom it derived its title is the same Jose Manahan from whom petitioner Lasquite bought Lot No. 3050. During the trial of this case, several death certificates had been proferred by the parties, albeit, inconclusive to establish the identity of Jose Manahan as the common origin of all their titles. Respondent Victory Hills obtained its title from Jose H. Manahan. Meanwhile, the records disclose that the Jose S. Manahan from whom the Manahans derived title was 54 years old and married when he died of infectious hepatitis on October 12, 1947. 43 For their part, the Prescillas traced their title from Jose M. Manahan, who was supposedly 68 years old and single when he succumbed to acute myocardial infarction on April 11, 1968. 44 This was however belied by the List of Register of Deaths in the Municipality of San Mateo Rizal for the year 1968. 45 Relevant to the issue of prescription, we have ruled that to determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, the plaintiff's possession of the disputed property is material. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only

if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. 46 The records reveal that it was only on January 11, 1994 or nearly 13 years after OCT Nos. NP-197 and NP-198 were issued that respondent filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Complaint in Intervention 47 and Complaint in Intervention 48 before the RTC of Rizal. Nevertheless, respondent claimed to be in actual possession in concepto de dueno of a sizeable portion of Lot No. 3050. Thus, the action assumed the nature of a suit to quiet title; hence, imprescriptible. However, in our view, respondent Victory Hills has failed to show its entitlement to a reconveyance of the land subject of the action. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 8, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 77599 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated July 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

EIAaDC

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 179540. March 13, 2009.] PERFECTA CAVILE, JOSE DE LA CRUZ and RURAL BANK OF BAYAWAN, INC., petitioners, vs. JUSTINA LITANIA-HONG, accompanied and joined by her husband, LEOPOLDO HONG and GENOVEVA LITANIA, respondents. DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J :
p

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated 8 March 2007 and the Resolution 3 dated 3 September 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66873. The assailed Decision of the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated 29 February 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 6111, dismissing the complaint of respondents Justina Litania-Hong, her husband Leopoldo Hong, and her sister Genoveva Litania; and declaring petitioner spouses Perfecta Cavile and Jose de la Cruz to be the absolute owners of the parcels of land subjects of this case. The assailed Resolution of the appellate court denied petitioner spouses' Motion for Reconsideration of its decision.
TAcSaC

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case proceed as follows: On 5 April 1937, a Deed of Partition 5 was entered into by the heirs of the spouses Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon. Said heirs included the legitimate children of Bernardo and Tranquilina, namely, (1) Susana Cavile, (2) Castor Cavile, and (3) Benedicta Cavile; as well as the children of Bernardo by his previous marriages, specifically: (4) Simplicia Cavile, (5) Fortunato Cavile, and (6) Vevencia Cavile. 6 Subject of the Deed of Partition were several parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Tolong, Negros Oriental, which were then covered by Tax Declarations No. 5615, No. 5729, No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, all under the name of Bernardo. Of particular interest in this case are the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956. The lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 7421 was described in the Deed of Partition as "bounded on the North by Simplicio Cavile antes Roman Echaves, on the East by Rio Bayawan, on the South by Riachuelo Napasu-an, and on the West by Riachuelo Napasu-an y Julian Calibug antes Francisco Tacang." The lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 7956 was identified to be the one "bounded on the North by Hilario Navaro, on the East by Silverio Yunting, on the South by Fortunato Cavile, and on the West by Maximiano Balasabas." In accordance with the Deed of Partition, the conjugal properties of Bernardo and Tranquilina were divided into two parts. The first part, corresponding to Bernardo's share, was further divided into six equal shares and

distributed among his six heirs. The second part, corresponding to Tranquilina's share, was subdivided only into three shares and distributed among her children with Bernardo, i.e., Susana, Castor, and Benedicta. Also stated in the Deed of Partition was the sale by the other aforementioned legal heirs to their co-heir Castor of their aliquot shares in the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7143, No. 7421, and No. 7956; thus, making Castor the sole owner of the said properties. Similarly, the Deed of Partition acknowledged the sale by all the legal heirs to Ulpiano Cavile of their respective shares in the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 5729, thus, transferring to the latter absolute ownership of said parcel of land. Thereafter, on 5 August 1960, Castor and Susana executed a Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, 7 whereby Castor recognized and confirmed that the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 were the just and lawful shares of Susana in the properties left by their deceased parents Bernardo and Tranquilina, and that Susana was in actual possession of the said properties. According to the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 2039 was "bounded on the North by Simplicio Cavile, on the East by Rio Bayawan, on the South by Napasuan, and on the West by Napasu-an Creek and Julian Calibog;" while the one covered by Tax Declaration No. 2040 was "bounded on the North by Hilario Navvaro (sic), on the South by Fortunato Cavile, on the East by Silverio Yunting, and on the West by Maximino (sic) Balasabas."
EADSIa

The descriptions of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition were strikingly close to those of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, respectively, in the Deed of Partition. Fourteen years after the execution of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition in 1960, respondents filed on 23 December 1974 a Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery of Property with Damages before the RTC against Perfecta Cavile, the daughter of Castor, Jose de la Cruz, the husband of Perfecta (hereinafter petitioner spouses), and the Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6111. 8 Respondents averred in the Complaint that respondents Justina and Genoveva inherited two parcels of land, covered by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 (subject lots), 9 from their mother Susana, who, in turn, inherited the same from her parents Bernardo and Tranquilina. Respondents invoked the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated 5 August 1960 wherein Castor purportedly recognized Susana's ownership of the subject lots. Susana had enjoyed undisputed ownership and possession of the subject lots, paying the realty taxes due and introducing improvements thereon. Susana was even able to obtain a loan from the Rural Bank of Dumaguete City sometime in 1960, mortgaging the subject lots as security for the same. After Susana's death in 1965, the subject lots were inherited by her daughters, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who then assumed the mortgage thereon. However, respondents alleged that Castor and petitioner

spouses eventually intruded upon and excluded respondents from the subject lots. When Castor died in 1968, petitioner spouses continued their unlawful occupancy of the subject lots, planting on the same and harvesting the products. Respondents claimed that they exerted efforts to settle the matter, but petitioner spouses stubbornly refused to accede. In 1974, prior to the filing of the Complaint, respondents again sought an audience with petitioner spouses, yet the latter only presented to them the Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) No. FV4976, 10 No. FV-4977, 11 and No. FV-4978 12 covering the subject lots, issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Negros Oriental, on 9 October 1962, in the name of petitioner Perfecta. Respondents were, thus, constrained to institute Civil Case No. 6111 against petitioner spouses and the Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc., seeking the cancellation of the OCTs in the name of petitioner Perfecta or, alternatively, the reconveyance by petitioner spouses of the subject lots to respondents, plus award for damages. The Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc. was impleaded as a defendant in the Complaint since petitioner spouses mortgaged the subject lots in its favor as security for a loan in the amount of P42,227.50. However, the bank was later dropped as a party after the aforesaid loan was settled.
HEacAS

Petitioner spouses countered in their Answer to the Complaint that, by virtue of the Deed of Partition dated 5 April 1937, the heirs of both Bernardo and Tranquilina took exclusive possession of their respective shares in the inheritance. Castor fully possessed the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, after his co-heirs sold to him their shares therein. In

1962, Castor sold to petitioner Perfecta the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, which corresponded to the subject lots in the Complaint. Following the sale, petitioner Perfecta took possession of the subject lots and filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for the issuance of title over the same. The Bureau issued free patent titles over the subject lots in favor of petitioner Perfecta and, by virtue thereof, she was able to secure on 9 October 1962, OCTs No. FV4976, No. FV-4977, and No. FV-4978 in her name. Petitioner spouses asserted that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated 5 August 1960 involving the subject lots was a nullity since said properties were never owned nor adjudicated in favor of Susana, respondents' predecessor-in-interest. Castor and Susana executed the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition merely to accommodate the latter who then needed security for the loan she was trying to obtain from the Rural Bank of Dumaguete City. Respondents would not be able to deny the said accommodation arrangement, given that neither Susana nor respondents actually possessed the subject lots or applied for titles thereto. Respondents did not even know that the subject lots were divided into three lots after a Government survey. If Susana and respondents paid realty taxes for the subject lots, it was only to convince the Rural Bank of Dumaguete to renew their loan from year to year, secured as it was by the mortgage on the subject lots. Thus, petitioner spouses posited that no ownership could then be transferred to respondents after Susana's death. Trial in Civil Case No. 6111 thereafter ensued before the

RTC. 13 On 29 February 2000, the RTC promulgated its Decision, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [herein petitioner spouses] as the absolute owners over the parcels of land in litigation. Consequently, [herein respondents'] complaint is ordered dismissed. [Respondents'] counterclaim is likewise entered dismissed for lack of merit. 14

The RTC ruled that the petitioner spouses' evidence was more worthy of credence in establishing their ownership of the subject lots. As petitioner Perfecta testified before the RTC, Castor immediately took possession of the subject lots after the Deed of Partition was executed in 1937. This fact was supported by the unrebutted testimony of Luciana Navarra, petitioner Perfecta's cousin, who declared that her husband was petitioner Perfecta's tenant on the subject lots since 1947 and that respondents never actually occupied the said properties. The RTC observed that it was highly questionable and contrary to human experience that respondents waited nine long years after their ejection from the subject lots in 1965 before taking any legal step to assert their rights over the same.
cAEaSC

The RTC further subscribed to the testimony of Perfecta that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was executed by Castor solely to accommodate Susana, enabling her to obtain a bank loan using the subject lots

as collateral. It noted that Susana did not bother to apply for the issuance of title to the subject lots in her name. Contrarily, it was Perfecta who applied for and obtained title to the subject lots, which, surprisingly, respondents were not even aware of. The RTC found that the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties after the execution of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition evidently demonstrated their intention to merely accommodate Susana in her loan application. Hence, the RTC concluded that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was a simulated contract which was void and without any legal effect. Without seeking a reconsideration of the above RTC Decision, respondents challenged the same by way of appeal before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 66873. On 8 March 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision in favor of respondents, the decretal portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one entered ORDERING [herein petitioner spouses] and/or their heirs, assigns and representatives as follows: 1. To reconvey to [herein respondents] the possession and title to the litigated parcels of land. 2. Upon reconveyance of the litigated properties, the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City is ordered to cancel

Certificate of Title No. 4877 (sic), 4976 and 4978 and to issue a new certificate to [respondents] or their successors in interest. 3. With costs spouses]. 15 against [petitioner

The Court of Appeals agreed in the respondents' contention that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was not a simulated document. The said document should be entitled to utmost respect, credence, and weight as it was executed by and between parties who had firsthand knowledge of the Deed of Partition of 1937. Moreover, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition constituted evidence that was of the highest probative value against the declarant, Castor, because it was a declaration against his proprietary interest. Other than petitioner Perfecta's testimony, the appellate court found no other proof extant in the records to establish that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was a simulated document or that it did not express the true intent of the parties. The Court of Appeals likewise highlighted the fact that Castor did not attempt to have the subject lots declared in his name during his lifetime and that petitioner Perfecta herself admitted that she only started paying real estate taxes for the subject lots in 1993. It was Susana and, later, her children, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who had been paying for the realty taxes on the subject lots since 1937.
ISDCaT

Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the foregoing Decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution 17 dated 3 September 2007.

Petitioner spouses filed the instant Petition, raising the following issues for the Court's consideration:
I. WHETHER [OR NOT] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW IN RULING THAT EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF AN AFFIDAVIT, THE "CONFIRMATION OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION", MAY BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE TO VARY THE TERMS OF A JUDICIALLY DECLARED VALID AGREEMENT ENTITLED "DEED OF PARTITION"? II. WHETHER [OR NOT] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL ERROR IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA? III. WHETHER [OR NOT] THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING? IV. WHETHER [OR NOT] THE FREE PATENT TITLES ISSUED TO THE PETITIONERS MAY BE RECONVEYED TO THE

RESPONDENTS? 18

Essentially, the Court finds that the fundamental issue that must be settled in this case is who, among the parties herein, have the better right to the subject lots. The Court notes prefatorily that in resolving the present case, an examination of the respective evidence of the parties must necessarily be undertaken. Although the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, we find that an exception 19 to this rule is present in the instant case in that the Court of Appeals made findings of fact which were contrary to those of the RTC.
STECAc

Before proceeding, the Court further establishes as a foregone fact, there being no issue raised on the matter, that the subject lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 described in the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6111 are the very same lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7956 and No. 7421 included in the Deed of Partition, and by Tax Declarations No. 2040 and No. 2039 subject of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition. Respondents, as plaintiffs before the RTC in Civil Case No. 6111, sought the reconveyance and recovery of the subject lots purportedly illegally usurped by petitioner spouses who succeeded in having the same titled in the name of petitioner Perfecta. Respondent Justina testified in open court that the subject lots were inherited by her and co-respondent Genoveva's mother, Susana, from their grandparents, Bernardo and Tranquilina. 20 As proof

of Susana's ownership of the subject lots, respondents presented the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition executed on 5 August 1960 by Castor and Susana. In said document, Castor ostensibly recognized and confirmed Susana's ownership and possession of the subject lots. 21 Tax declarations 22 covering the subject lots in the names of Susana and respondents were also offered to the court a quo to lend support to respondents' claims of ownership. On the other hand, to prove their entitlement to the subject lots, petitioner spouses presented before the RTC the Deed of Partition 23 entered into by the heirs of spouses Bernardo and Tranquilina on 5 April 1937. By virtue thereof, Castor acquired through sale the shares of his co-heirs in the subject lots. Petitioner Perfecta testified before the trial court that right after the execution of said Deed, she and her father, Castor, assumed possession of the subject lots, planting coconuts, rice, and corn thereon. 24 She additionally testified that realty taxes on the subject lots had since been paid by Castor and, subsequently, by her. 25 Possession of the subject lots by Castor and petitioner spouses was corroborated by the testimony of Luciana Navarra, who insisted that respondents never occupied the said lots. 26 Finally, petitioner spouses presented OCTs No. FV-4976, No. FV-4977, and No. FV-4978, covering the subject lots, issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Negros Oriental on 9 October 1962 in the name of petitioner Perfecta. After a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties in the instant case, the Court rules in favor of

petitioner spouses. At this point, let it be stated that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition executed in 1937 is not directly assailed in this case, thus, the Court need not pass upon the same. Under the said Deed of Partition, the other heirs of Bernardo and Tranquilina clearly and unequivocally sold their shares in the subject lots to Castor, petitioner Perfecta's father. What appeared to be the clear right of ownership of Castor over the subject lots was put in doubt by the execution of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition by Castor and his sister Susana in 1960. Respondents, children and heirs of Susana, base their claim of ownership of the subject lots on the said document, while petitioner spouses denounce the same to be simulated, executed for purposes other than to transfer ownership of the subject lots, and cannot legally alter the terms of the previously duly executed Deed of Partition.
SDIaHE

As held by the Court of Appeals, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition partakes of the nature of an admission against a person's proprietary interest. 27 As such, the same may be admitted as evidence against Castor and petitioner spouses, his successors-in-interest. The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence, notwithstanding that they are hearsay, is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further, that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest. 28 Nevertheless, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition is just one piece of evidence against petitioner spouses.

It must still be considered and weighed together with respondents' other evidence vis--vis petitioner spouses' evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence". "Preponderance of evidence" is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 29 Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

Herein, despite the admission made by Castor in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition against his own interest, the Court is still convinced that the evidence adduced by the petitioner spouses preponderated over that of the respondents.
DaACIH

In analyzing the two vital documents in this case, the Court discerns that while the Deed of Partition clearly explained how Castor came to fully own the subject lots, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, even though confirming Susana's ownership of the subject lots, failed to shed light on why or how the said properties wholly pertained to her when her parents Bernardo and Tranquilina clearly had other heirs who also had shares in the inheritance. Other than the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, respondents were only able to present as evidence of their title to the subject lots tax declarations covering the same, previously, in the name of Susana and, subsequently, in their own names. We find such tax declarations insufficient to establish respondents' ownership of the subject lots. That the disputed property has been declared for taxation purposes in the name of any party does not necessarily prove ownership. Jurisprudence is consistent that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership of the properties stated therein. A disclaimer is even printed on the face of such tax declarations that they are "issued only in connection with real property taxation [and] should not be considered as title to the property." At best, tax declarations are indicia of possession in the concept of an owner. 30

Conversely, non-declaration of a property for tax purposes does not necessarily negate ownership. 31 On the other hand, the Court is at a loss as to how the Court of Appeals failed to give due consideration to the Torrens titles issued in the name of petitioner Perfecta when it rendered its assailed Decision. Sometime in 1962, petitioner Perfecta applied for and was granted by the Bureau of Lands free patents over the subject lots. Pursuant thereto, Original Certificates of Title No. FV-4976, No. FV-4977, and No. FV-4978, covering the subject lots, were issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Negros Oriental, on 9 October 1962, in the name of petitioner Perfecta. Given this crucial fact, the Court pronounces that respondents' Complaint for reconveyance of the subject lots and damages filed only on 23 December 1974 is already barred. A Torrens title issued on the basis of the free patents become as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of the patent. 32 However, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether or not fraud has been committed in securing the title. Indeed, one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to public land should not be allowed to benefit from it. 33
DaTICc

On this matter, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 34 provides that all actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain or

improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines. Such is the rule because whether the grant of a free patent is in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is so raised by the government and set aside, another claiming party may not question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. 35 Thus, private parties, like respondents in the instant case, cannot challenge the validity of the patent and the corresponding title, as they had no personality to file the suit. Although jurisprudence recognizes an exception to this case, the respondents may not avail themselves of the same. Verily, an aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, which prescribes in 10 years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate of Title over the property, provided that the property has not been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully or fraudulently registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. 36 If the registered owner, be he the patentee or his successor-in-interest to whom the free patent was transferred, knew that the parcel of land described in the patent and in the Torrens title belonged to another, who together with his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession thereof, and if the patentee and his successor-in-interest were never in possession thereof,

the true owner may bring an action to have the ownership of or title to the land judicially settled. The court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titled issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof. 37 In the instant case, respondents brought the action for reconveyance of the subject lots before the RTC only on 23 December 2004, or more than 12 years after the Torrens titles were issued in favor of petitioner Perfecta on 9 October 1962. The remedy is, therefore, already time-barred. And even if respondents' Complaint was filed on time, the Court would still rule that respondents failed to satisfactorily prove that they were in possession of the subject lots prior to the grant of free patents and issuance of Torrens titles over the same in favor petitioner Perfecta. The bare testimony of respondent Justina that Susana had been in the peaceful and undisturbed possession of the subject lots since 1937 up to the time of her death in 1965 was entirely bereft of substantiation and details. No information was provided as to how said possession of the subject lots was actually exercised or demonstrated by Susana. In contrast, the possession of the subject lots by Castor, and later on by petitioner spouses, was established not just by the testimony of petitioner Perfecta, but was corroborated by the testimony of Luciana Navarra, whose husband was a tenant working on the subject lots. Petitioner spouses possessed the subject lots by planting

thereon coconuts, rice, and corn a claim which respondents were unable to refute.
cHCIEA

Furthermore, respondents' allegation that petitioner Perfecta committed fraud and breach of trust in her free patent application is specious. The fact that the document evidencing the sale of the subject lots by Castor to petitioner Perfecta was not presented does not automatically mean that said contract was never in existence. Also undeserving of much consideration without sufficient proof is respondents' averment that the subject lots were private lands which could no longer be granted to any person via free patent. Respondents ought to remember that mere allegation of fraud is not enough. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive another party of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved. 38 Also, the issuance by Bureau of Lands of free patents over the subject property to petitioner Perfecta enjoys the presumption of regularity. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 8 March 2007 and Resolution dated 3 September 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66873 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 29 February 2000 of the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 6111 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.