Talking Points for Media Appearances - June 17, 2004

What have we learned in the past two days of hearings?

We learned that NORAD and FAA were unprepared for the type of attacks launched
against the United States on September 11, 2001. They struggled, under difficult
circumstances, to improvise a homeland defense, against a challenge they had never
encountered and had never trained to meet.

We learned that there was great chaos that morning. Communications were not good.
Situational awareness was poor at all levels of the government.

We learned that the military had very little warning of the hijackings. The nine minutes
notice of the American 11 hijacking was the most the military received that morning of
any of the four hijackings. There was no prior notice of United 175 or United 93, and
two minutes notice of an unidentified plane headed toward Washington, later identified
as American 77.

We learned that by the early 1990s, Bin Ladin had established a complex well-organized
terrorist organization, with international reach. We did not begin to understand the scope
and sophistication of al Qaeda until several years later.

We presented, for the first time since 9/11, a complete overview of how the attack on
America was conceived, prepared and executed, as best we can understand it.

We learned that the 9/11 plot was meticulously organized over many years. The plotters
had their problems - failure to train pilots, failure to get recruits into the United States,
dissent within the team, and dissent at the highest levels of al Qaeda. But the plotters
overcame their problems. Al Qaeda adjusted. It exhibited flexibility and succeeded.

We learned, among the many details of the enemy plan, the role of Zacarias Moussaoui.
He apparently received funding from al Qaeda for pilot training at a time when one of the
pilots in the 9/11 plot nearly bailed out.

We also learned just how little the 9/11 plot cost. For less than half a million dollars, the
plotters were able to inflict astounding devastation upon us.

Finally, we were reminded again of the continuing threat of al Qaeda. Its intent to inflict
harm is clear; its capability today to harm us is unclear - and our efforts to collect
intelligence on al Qaeda continue.
Questions and Answers

Q. Moussaoui's defense attorneys claim that we have harmed his ability to get a fair trial.
How do you respond?

A. We cleared our staff statement with the Administration. We would refer questions to
the Department of Justice. [If pressed, no further comment.]

Q. Did General Larry Arnold lie to you when he testified last year?

A. General Arnold made clear that the Commission's investigation helped him to
learn the facts, and he understands that those facts are different from his testimony last
year. He did not disagree with the analysis in the staff statements.

Q. Did General Arnold lie? Did he knowingly mislead the Commission?

A. We have no judgment on that question.

Q. This is your second go-round with NORAD and third with FAA. What have you
learned?

A. Well, we believe we now have the full, authoritative story. It is a complicated story.
It took us some time to put together. The main conclusion we draw about the day is
confusion and poor communication. The civilian and military leaders struggled to get
situational awareness, and did not achieve it before the four hijackings had concluded.

Q. Are you satisfied that NORAD can now intercept a hijacked aircraft and defend the
country?

A. NORAD has testified that it can carry out the mission today. Many steps have been
taken to improve NORAD and FAA communication. Protocols, procedures, training,
and exercises have changed significantly since 9/11.
Q. Are you satisfied that the President, and not the Vice President, gave the shoot down
order?

A. We have the testimony of the President and the Vice President that they spoke before
before the shoot-down order, and that the President authorized the shootdown. Dr. Rice
believes she heard the Vice President's side of that conversation.

Among the sources that reflect other important events that morning, there is no
documentary evidence for this call, although the relevant sources are incomplete.

Q.Do we know why the Secretary of Defense was not in the chain of command that
morning?

A. The Secretary of Defense was in the parking lot helping with rescue efforts after the
Pentagon was hit. He then joined the Air Threat Conference call by 10:39 AM, after the
Vice President had already passed the shoot-down authorization.

Q. Why did the President stay at the elementary school after he learned of the second
hit?

A. The President has addressed this question, and his answer is reflected in the staff
statement. He wanted to project strength and calm until he could better understand what
was happening. That is what he told us.

Q. We heard that the Secret Service wanted to get the President airborne as fast and has
high as possible. Why?

A. Air Force One can go higher than most aircraft. They thought it was the safest place
for him at that time. Then they decided to proceed to Barksdale AFB, the nearest
military base. Then they decided to provide to Offutt Air Force Base, where they
believed the President could best exercise command and control.

Q. Given all you have made public, what is most important to tell the American
people about 9/11 and the threat we face today?
A.The single point I would emphasize is that al Qaeda is a sophisticated, capable,
entrepreneurial organization.

The system as a whole - the Intelligence Community and the policymakers - took a long
time to assimilate and understand the gravity of the threat.

Government officials believe they disrupted some of al Qaeda's operations post 9/11.
We also know that al Qaeda adapted.

Al Qaeda's intent to hit us again is clear. Our goal is to make sure that we deny them the
capability, and deny them support in the Arab and Muslim world.

Q. What have you really found out about the Iraqi connection?

A. We know that Bin Ladin had ties to several governments - above all, with Sudan and
Afghanistan. He had contacts with Iran and to a lesser extent Iraq.

We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the
United States.

Q. Why didn't you tell us the real names of the CIA officials?

A. The Agency, or the witnesses, requested this step for security reasons. We
accommodated their request.

Q. How do you assess the role of Saudi Arabia and the role of the hijackers?

Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. Funding for Al Qaeda came from
charities and rich donors in the Gulf, many of them from Saudi Arabia.

We have investigated this issue exhaustively, and our investigation still continues. We
have no credible evidence of the support by Saudi government for the 9/11 plot.

Q. What happened in San Diego and Los Angeles with Hazmi and Mihdhar?
Hazmi and Mihdhar had assistance from the Muslim community. It appears that most of
this help was unwitting.

Some of their contacts within the United States were suspicious. We discuss what we
know of these individuals in the staff statements.