GreekOntologyandthe'Is'ofTruth MOHANMATTHEN

Thisisanessayabouttheontologicalpresuppositionsofacertainuseof'is'inGreek philosophyIshalldescribeitinthefirstpartandpresentahypothesisaboutits semanticsinthesecond. Ibelievethatmystudyhasmorethanesotericinterest.First,itprovidesan alternativesemanticaccountofwhatCharlesKahnhascalledthe'is'oftruth,thereby sheddinglightonanumberofissuesinGreekontology,includinganEleaticparadoxof changeandAristotle'sresponsetoit.Second,itfindsinthesemanticsofGreekabasis foradmittingwhathavebeencalled'nonsubstantialindividuals'or'immanent characters'intoaccountsofGreekontology.Third,ityieldsaninterpretationof Aristotle'stalkof'unities'whichiscrucialtohistreatmentofsubstanceinthecentral booksoftheMetaphysics. I.ACOMPREHENSIVEUSEOFABSOLUTE'IS' I.1SomeExamples Thereisauseof'is'inGreekphilosophythatcomprehendsboththeideaexpressedby our'is'ofexistence(whetherornotthatmarksaseparateuseof'is'inGreek)andthat expressedbythecopula.Forexample,AristotlesometimesstatesthePrincipleofNon Contradictioninthisway:"Itisimpossibleforthesamethingbothtobeandnottobe". Itisobviousfromthegeneralityofthisprinciplethateventhoughtheuseof'is'it containsisabsolute(andwouldthusnormallybeidentifiedasdenotingexistence),itis meanttocomprehendbothexistentialandpredicativestatesofaffairsthatis,it prohibitsathingexistingaswellasnotexisting,andequallyitprohibitsathingbeing bothFandnotFforanyvalueof'F'.1(SimilarlyforPlato'scategoryofthings"thatare andarenot"Republic478dethesearethingsthatbothexistandfailtoexist,thatare FaswellasnotF.) Therearemanyotherexamplesofthisuseof'is'.Thusconsiderthegeneralityof Plato'sandAristotle'sdefinitionoffalsity(andofAristotle'scorrespondingdefinitionof truth):Tosaythatwhatisisnotandwhatisnotisisfalse.(SeeSophist,240deandMet, 1011b2627).Again,thereisAristotle'sstatementatDeInterpretatione19a23:'What isnecessarilyiswhenitis;andwhatisnotnecessarilyisnotwhenitisnot'etc.Thisis supposedtocovernotonlyexistentialsituationslikethatalludedtoin'Therewillbea seabattletomorrow',butalsosituationsthatAristotlehimselfcharacterizes predicatively,asin'Thiscoatwillbecutup'.FromanearlierperiodthereisProtagoras' famousdictum:'Manisthemeasureofallthings,ofwhatisthatitis,ofwhatisnotthat itisnot'.Obviouslythisappliestowhatisabsolutely,butasPlatounderstooditinthe Theaetetus,italsoappliestowhetherthewindiscold,orwhetherthewineisbitter. I.2HowNotToTreatTheseExamples

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 Theoccurrencesof'is'abovecannoteasilybeassimilatedtoanyofthemorefamiliar usesof'is'.Forexample,theycannotbetreatedasinstancesofthesocalled 'incompletecopula'2becausetheprinciplesinwhichtheyoccurrangealsoover existentialsituationsbestdescribedintermsofabsolute'is'.3Conversely,theycannot (giventhenormallyacceptedexistentobjects,individualsubstancesandproperties)be treatedasinvolvingthe'is'ofexistencebecausethiswouldleaveoutpredicativestates ofaffairs. Itmightbethoughtthatagoodwaytodescribeouruseof'is'isasakindof schematicvariable,thatisasstandingfornoonenotion,butdoingdoubledutyfortwo ormoredifferentnotions,standingforwhicheverismostappropriateatagiven moment.Thusonemightbeinclinedtosaysomethinglikethis:"WhenPlatosaysthat sensiblethingsbothareandarenot,hemeansboththattheyexistanddonotexistas wellasthattheyareFandnotFforatleastsomevaluesof'F'." Usefulthoughsuchaperiphrasismightbeasareminderoftherangeofthe quantifiersthatmightgovernoccurrencesofour'is',forexampleintheprincipleofnon contradiction,itisclearlyinadequateasatheoryofhow'is'comestobeusedinthis way.Afterall,itsoundsgrammaticallyunacceptabletoabbreviate'isF'by'is'(exceptin thelimitedrangeofcasesmentionedinnote2),andsoweneedtoexplainhow philosopherssodiverseintimeandstyleasProtagoras,PlatoandAristotlecametouse soopaqueastylisticdevice. Theproblembecomesparticularlyacutewhenwenoticethattherearetimes whenthesephilosophersseemtotreatcomprehensiveusesof'is'asstandingfora unitarynotion.Threeimportantexamplesofthismaybementionedhere.Platoslides, asKahnhasnoticed,4betweentwoformulationsoftheeternalityofFormshesays, withnoindicationthatthesearedifferent,boththatsomethingiseternallyFandthat theFitselfiseternally.Inasimilarvein,Aristotleputshistheoryofcategoriesin differentways,sayingsometimesthat'is'issaidinmanyways(EN,1096a23), sometimesthatthecategoriesare"figuresofpredication"(Met,1017a23),andinyet otherplacesthatthecategoriesarekindsofthethingsthatare(Cat,Ib25:notethat ontaembodiesanabsoluteconstructionofeinai).ItisasifAristotledoesnotdistinguish herebetweentheclaimsthattherearemanysortsof'isF'constructions,thatthereare manysortsofexistence,andthattherearemanyusesoftheverb'tobe'.Finally,we shouldnoteanunusuallyexplicituseofthe'AnFis'/'SomethingisF'transformation.In describingProtagoreanrelativismintheTheaetetus(156ff.),Platodescribesatheoryof perceptioninwhichaperceiverandathingperceivedcometogether,therebybegetting "twins",oneofwhichisasensationandtheotherissomethingdescribed,forexample, asawhiteness(156d),asweetness(159d)orabitterness(159e).Theresultofthis birthisthatthepassiveparent,thethingperceived,comestobecharacterizedbythe correspondingadjectivethatis,itbecomeswhite,orsweet,orbitter."Theobjectthat joinedinbegettingthecolourisfilledwithwhitenessandbecomesinitsturn,not whitenessbutwhite,whetheritbestickorstone"(56e;cf.159de).Hereanequivalence isestablishedbetween'(An)Fnesscomestobe'and'SomethingcomestobeF.5

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Allthesephilosophers(IamassumingthatProtagoraswasaccurately representedbyPlato,butifthisisfalseread'Plato'sProtagoras'for'Protagoras')were making,intheexamplescited,claimsinthetheoryofBeing:Platoisinterestedin establishingthatForms(ascontrastedwithsensibles)arethingsthatare(notthings thatareandarenot),AristotleinshowingthatthereisnotjustonekindofBeing,and ProtagorasinshowingthatBeingismeasuredbymen.ButBeingherecomprehends,as wehaveseen,boththeexistentialandthepredicative,andtheformulationofthese claimsdisplaysastrangeambivalencebetweenthe'is'ofpredicationandthatof existence6justthatambivalencethatwefoundinour'is'.Thisseemstoshowthat Greekphilosopherstendtotreatour'is'asunitary,oratleastthattheytreatitas correspondingtosomeunitarynotionofBeing.Itisthusnotmerelybyplaceholding thatitacquiresitscomprehensiveness. I.3AFormalCharacterizationofComprehensive'Is' LetuslookonceagainatAristotle'sonticstatementoftheprincipleofnoncontradiction (e.g.atMet,1006a45). O:Itisimpossibleforthesamethingbothtobeandnottobe. Evidently(seenote1),thisprincipleismeanttobeequivalenttoapredicative statement: P:Itisimpossibleforthesamethingbothtobelongandnottobelongtothesamething atthesametime(+somequalificationsthatdonotconcernushere:Met,1005b18). TheconditionunderwhichPandOareequivalentis: C1:Forallxandythereisazsuchthatxbelongstoyifandonlyifzis.7 ThusAristotle'suseofOandPtostatethesamelawimpliesthatheatleastimplicitly subscribestoCl. AsimilarresultcanbeobtainedbyscrutinizingAristotle'sdefinitionsoftruthand falsityatMetaphysics1011b25:ajudgementistrueifitsaysthatwhatisisorwhatis notisnot,otherwiseitisfalse.Byinspectingthedefiniensanddefiniendumwederive: C2:Forallpropositions,p,thereisanxsuchthatpistrueifandonlyifxis. C2accountsalsoforthe(presumed)equivalenceoftheonticstatementofnon contradictionabovewiththealethicstatementoftheprincipleatMetaphysics1011b 14. CIandC2constitutewhatIhavebeencallingthecomprehensivenessofthe'is' thatwearediscussing.AndC2istheconditionthatjustifiescallingit'the'is'oftruth'. OurtaskistoexplainwhyGreekontologistsacceptedtheseprinciples.
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 I.4FurtherEvidenceandTwoBadTheories Aninterestingapplicationofour"comprehensivenessaxioms"comesinconnectionwith change.AtDeGenetCorr316b34317a10,319b2531andPhysics190a1012, Aristotlemaintainsthateveryalterationisaccompaniedbyaperishingandacreation. Suppose,forexample,thatamanceasestobeartistic.Thischangeinthemanis simultaneouslyaccompanied,hesays,byacreationofanunartisticandaperishingof anartisticorbythecreationofanunartisticmanandtheperishingofanartisticman. (Hedoessaythatthesearenotcreationsorperishingsinanunqualifiedsense.Thisisa pointthatwillconcernuslater.Forthemomentweshallbeconcernedonlywithwhy theyarecreationsorgenerationsinanysense.) ThispointispresupposedalsobyAristotle'scharacterizationofpoiesisas concernedwithgenesis(EN,1140a10).ItisevidentthatAristotleisherecontrasting poiesis,anactivitythatderivesitsvaluefromaconsequence,withpraxis,anactivity thathas"intrinsic"value(i.e.regardlessofwhatmightresultfromit),andthatthis distinctionhasnothingwhatevertodowithwhethersomepreviouslynonexistentthing isbroughtintobeing.Forexample,medicineinvolvespoiesis,thoughtypicallyweshould notwanttosaythatitbringsanythingintobeing;ratheritbringsamantohealth.The pointthatAristotleismakingisthatitisessentialtopoieseisthattheycreatechanged circumstances,forthesegivethemtheirvalue.Butaccordingtotheterminology establishedintheDeGenetCorrandPhysics,anychangeisaccompaniedbyagenesis; thereisnodifferencebetweensayingthatanactivityresultsinchangedcircumstances, andsayingthatitisconcernedwithgenesis. EvidentlyClandC2groundtheseotherwisepuzzlingassertions.Acreation occurswhensomethingthatwasnotcomestobe.Analteration,ontheotherhand, occurswhensomethingthatwasnotFcomestobeF,orwhenafalse(undated) statementcomestobetrue.(SeeCat,4a22ff.)ButaccordingtoC1somethingisifand onlyifxisF,andaccordingtoC2somethingisifandonlyifp.ThusifxcomestobeF,or pcomestobetrue,somethingcomestobe.AndthisistheassertionthatAristotle makes. Interestingly,theDeGenetCorrandPhysicspassagestellushowtocharacterize theentityinquestion:whenanXcomestobeFwearetosayeitherthatanFXcomesto be,orsimplythatanFdoes.Wehaveencounteredtwootherpassagesinwhichthe lattertransformationoccurs:Theaetetus156eand159de.Anditparallelstheduality notedbetween'SomethingisF'and'AnFis'.Letuscallthistheindefinite transformation.Itallowsustogofrom'Socratesis/becomesF'or'Amanis/becomesF' to'AnFis/comestobe'.Theothertransformation(observedatDeGenetCorr,319b 2531)allowsustogofrom'AnXis/becomesF'to'AnFXis/comestobe'.Letuscallthis theattributivetransformation.Itispartofourtasktoexplainthesephenomena. Theapplicationofcomprehensivenesstochangerepresentsaperhaps unexpecteddegreeofcontinuitybetweenAristotleandhispredecessors.Parmenides, forexample,hadargued(fragment8,lines68)thatcreationisimpossible,but apparentlyconcluded(forexampleatline26ofthesamefragment)thatallchangeis
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impossible.Thishasbeendiagnosedasfallaciousreasoning,asaconfusionbetweentwo quitedistinctusesof'is',namelytheexistentialandthepredicative.Andithasalsobeen claimed8thatParmenideswasnotconfused;ratherthathewasusinga"fused" conceptionofBeing,i.e.onethatcombinesexistenceandpredication.Theclaimisthat inParmenides'caseatleast,comprehensivenessistobeexplainedby(con)fusion. However,Aristotlecannotbeaccusedofanysuchconfusion,orfusion.IntheDe GenetCorrheclearlydistinguishesbetweencreationandalteration,whichcanbe definedasfollows: xiscreated=xwasnotandxis. xisaltered=ForsomeF,xwasnotFandxisF. Thesedefinitionsseemtopresupposeacleardistinctionbetweenabsoluteand predicativeusesof'is';andtheyexploitthisdistinctioninordertoformulatethe conceptofasortofchange,alteration,thatpermitsacontinuingsubject.Itisthus unlikely,tosaytheleast,thataconfusionoridentificationoftheseusescouldbewhat explainsthecorrelativityofalterationsandcreations,orAristotle'scommitmentto comprehensiveness. ThesecommentshaveaconsequencefortheinterpretationofParmenides. Whatinhiswritingsforcesustoassumethathistheoryof'is'istobeblamedforhis conclusionthatallchangeisimpossible?Supposethatthedifferencebetweenalteration andtheotherchangeswerepointedouttohim.Couldhenotstillargueasfollows?"I nowrecognizethatalterationsarenotthesameascreations.Buteveryalterationis accompaniedbyasimultaneouscreation(andbyadestruction).Ihaveshownthat creationisimpossiblethereisnosuchthing.Sothereisnosuchthingasalteration either."Soevenifhedoesconfuseorfusedistinctusesof'is',itwillnotdoforAristotle orforustocriticizehimmerelyonthegroundsofthiserror.Parmenidesissimply employinganinferencethatAristotleendorses.SinceAristotledoesnotthinkthat changeisimpossible,itmustbepossibletoadmitchangeintothelogicofeventhis'is'. Theproblemthenisthis:Whattheoryof'is'permitsthedistinctionbetween alterationandcreationgivenabove,andatthesametimeallowsAristotletoholdthat everyalterationisaccompaniedbyacreation?Thatis,whataccountsforCIandC2 above,sincetheseyieldthedesiredresult? Ofsecondaryimportancetousisthisquestion:sincemerelydistinguishingbetween alterationandcreationwillnothelpAristotleevadetheParmenideanconclusionthat thatchangeisimpossible,howdoesheevadeit? I.5Kahnonthe'Is'ofTruth LetuslooknowattheproposalofCharlesKahn.9 Ignoringforpresentpurposestheadmirableandusefulsyntacticsutbtletiesof Kahn'saccount(mostofwhichIcanleaveuntouched,sinceIamconcernedwith semantics),theproposalconcerningthesemanticsof'is'inphilosophicalcontexts comestothis.Thecopulahastwofunctions.Itjoinspredicatetosubject,anditstatesof
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thesentenceinwhichitoccursthatit(thesentence)istrue.Further,thereisan "essentialambiguity"inthissecondfunctionof'is':itcanbetakennotonlyassaying thatthesentenceinwhichitoccursistrue,butalsothatthefact"corresponding"to thatsentenceisso,orobtains. Itisveryimportanttorealizethatbeingso,orobtaining,asappliedtofactsis notexistence.ItisthereforeimportanttodistinguishKahn'sproposalfromonemade byWigginsaccordingtowhichPlatounderstoodtruthappliedtosentencesas equivalenttoexistenceappliedtothecorrespondingfacts.10IfindWiggin'sproposal implausible(evenasanaccountofordinaryintuitions)forthefollowingreason.Suppose that'Johnispale'istrue,andsupposethatitistruepreciselybecausethereisafact, John'sbeingpale.NowsupposethatJohnacquiresatanandisnolongerpale.'Johnwas pale'isnowtruenevertheless.Isitnotplausibletosaythatthefactthatoncemade 'Johnispale'trueistheverysameasthefactthatnowmakes'Johnwaspale'true?Ifso, ceasingtobetruedoesnotcorrespondtogoingoutofexistence.Itwouldbemore appropriatetosaythatthefactinquestioncontinuestobe,butceasestoobtain,orbe so.ThisispreciselywhatKahndoessay:heiscarefultodistinguishbetweenbeingso andexistence.11 WecanseehowwellmeasuredKahn'sproposalistoaccountingforthe comprehensivenessaxioms.Whyisthereathingthatisforeverytrueproposition? Because'is'canmean'istrue',andsotosayofapropositionthatitistrueistoposita thingthatis,namelythepropositionitself.Whyisthereathingthatisforevery propertythatbelongstoanindividual?Becausethereis,foreachsuchpair,atrue propositionthatassertsthattheconnectionholds. Still,theproposalisnotassimpleasitmaylook.Toillustratethis,letusexamine thequestionofhowcopulamodifiersaretobetreated.SinceKahn'sclaimisthata singleoccurrenceofaverbis"overworked"or"overdetermined"i.e.thatithas, simultaneously,twofunctionsonewouldimaginethatanymodifierswould simultaneouslyaffectbothfunctions.Butitiseasytoseethatthiscannotbeso. Considertense.Itseemsthat'Socrateswassitting'containsatensemodifieron thecopula.Butwecannotallowthismodifiertooperatemorethanonce.Oursentence sayseitherthatitistruethatSocrateswassitting,orthatitwastruethatSocratesis sitting.ItcertainlydoesnotsaythatitwastruethatSocrateswassitting.Buthoware wenonarbitrarilytoreadthesameverbintworolesatonce,buttheverbmodifieronly once?Thedifficultyextendstonegatedcopulaethesesayeitherthatthepositive joiningofpredicatetosubjectisfalse,orthatthenegativejoiningistrue,andobviously notthatthenegativejoiningisfalse. Kahncouldattempttogetoutofthisdifficultybyassertingthatthemodifiers operateonasentenceasawhole,ratherthanonthecopula.Butthisisnotatenable theoryoftensesinGreekoranyotherIndoEuropeanlanguage.Noristhereany evidencethatAristotlerecognizedsententialoperatorsasdistinctfromcopulamodifiers. YetKahnattributestoAristotleanexplicitawarenessofthe"veridicalnuance"ofthe copula.(HecitesMet1017a3135andBook,chapter10.)Thusitwillbedifficultfor himtodealsatisfactorilywithAristotle'stheoryofthemodifiers.

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Secondly,considerAristotle'sdefinitionoftruthandPlato'ssimilardefinitionof falsity:Tosaythatthatwhichisisandthatwhichisnotisnotistrue.Kahn'sclaimisthat theseusesof'is'represent"theveridicalconstructionproper"(PhronesisXXVI,p.106). Nowtheveridicalconstructionis,werecall,"*essentiallyambigbuous"between'istrue' and'isso'.Aristotlecouldnothavebeenusing'is'inthefirstofthesesenses,forthen hisdefinitionwouldbetrivialanduninformative.Sohemustconsciouslyhavebeen usingthesecondsense.Canitbeplausiblyheld,though,thatAristotlewasthisclear abouttheambiguityintheveridicalconstruction,andyetmadenomentionofit,even towarnhisreadershowhewasusing'is'?Ithinknot. Finally,KahnisrobbedoftheabilitytotreatoftheEleaticparadoxofchangeby assimilatingittothatofnegativeexistentials.Heisofcourseawareofthis,andhasan articledefendingtheviewthatParmenidesdependedinsteadonthe"factive"natureof 'knows'.12ItisnotmyintentiondirectlytotakeissuewithKahn'sinterpretationof Parmenides.ButitisrelevanttonotethatParmenideswasreportedbysomeofthe ancientsinawaythatdoesnotsupportKahn'sthesis.Forexample,PlatohastheEleatic StrangerintheSophistreporttheviewsof'myfatherParmenides'inawaycompletely independentofknowledge(heusesotherpsychologicalattitudes,believingand saying),andexplicitlytiedtotheproblemofnegatingbeing.Letuswaivethequestion ofwhoisrightaboutParmenides,KahnorPlato.Thequestionis:WhataccountisKahn togiveofthesubstantialdegreeofcredencethatPlatoobviouslygivestotheargu menthereports? Theseobjectionsshow,atmost,thattheapplicationofKahn'sproposalto certainancienttextsisnotunproblematic.Thereis,however,anothermoreconclusive objectiontohisproposal.Itisthat'istrue'andthecopulaaregrammatically incongruent.Theformerattaches,typically,tonominalizationsofsentencesorto phrases,suchas'Pythagoras'theorem',thatalludetosententiallycomplete utterances.13Thelatter,bycontrast,playsanessentialroleinsentenceformation,in theweldingtogetherofsubsententialparts.IwantnowtoarguethatAristotlewas explicitlyawareofthisfeatureofthecopula,andmakesitanessentialpartofhis accountofbeing.MyaccountofAristotle'sphilosophicalgrammarwillyieldan explanationofthecomprehensivenessphenomenadescribedabove,andshedslighton theotherissuesmentionedintheopeningsectionofthepresentessay. II.ARISTOTLEONTHESYNTAXANDSEMANTICSOF'IS' II.1'Is'asDyadic:DeInterpretatione,14 InDeInterpretatione13,Aristotledistinguishesbetweennounsandverbs.Bothare significant(semantikos),hesays,butnounssignify,whereasverbssignifyabout. Moreovernounsdonotcarrytense,whereasverbsdo.14 Now,'is'carriestense,andinthisrespectitislikeaverb.However,itismade clearthatinotherrespectsitisnotlikeaverb.First,itisnotsignificant,asverbsare,but onlyconsignificant:"Byitselfitisnothing,butitconsignifiessomecombinationwhich cannotbethoughtofwithoutthecomponents"(16b2426).Secondly,itisrequiredin anywholesentence."Falsityandtruthhavetodowithcombinationandseparation.
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Thusnamesandverbsbythemselvesforinstance'man'or'white'15whennothing furtherisaddedarelikethoughtsthatarewithoutcombinationorseparation"(16a 1214). Theargumentseemstobethis:'Is'consignifies"somecombination"(and'isnot' signifiesseparation?).Truthbearersrequirecombinationorseparation.Therefore truthbearersrequire'is"or'isnot'(orsomeequivalent). Letuscallauseof'is'monadicifitmustbecompletedbyexactlyonetermto formasentence,dyadicifitrequiresexactlytwo.Aristotle'sremarkssuggest(a)thatthe copulaisdyadic,and(b)thatasubjectpredicatesentencewillincorporateanoun(the subject),averb(sincethepredicatewillsignifyaboutthedenotatumofthesubject)and acopula(orequivalent)to"combine"or"separate"these. Atfirstsightthisseemsabadtheory.Forcopulaearerequired,itwouldseem, exactlywhereotherverbsareabsent.Forifwehaveafiniteverblike'runs'wecanform asentencewithoutthecourtesyofacopula,e.g.'Themanruns'.However,awider examinationofthetextsprovidesuswithanAristotelianresponsetothis.'Theman runs'isequivalent,hethinks,to'Themanisrunning'where'running'istheparticiple functioningasanadjective,and'is'isthecopula.(SeeDeInt,21b9;Met,1017a28and 1028a15;Phys,185b27.) HerethenisoneplausibleaccountofAristotle'stheoryofthesubjectpredicate sentence: (a)Itconsistsinthefirstinstanceoftwopartsanounandaverbphrase.Thenoun carriesnotenseandsignifiesthesubject;theverbphrasecarriestenseandsignifies abouttheontologicalsubject. (b)Theverbphrasecanbesplitupintotwofunctional(asopposedtosyntactic)parts.It instantiatestheparadigm: Copulaequivalent+predicabledenoter. Thisisnotagrammaticalbutasemanticobservation,forsometimesthefunctionalparts willnotcorrespondtosyntacticparts.Forexample,'runs'(averbphrase)cannotbe syntacticallybrokenupinconformitywiththeparadigm,butissemanticallycongruent with'isrunning'.Ontheotherhand,'isrunning'and'iswhite'arebothsyntacticallyand semanticallyinstancesoftheparadigm. ThistheoryimprovesonPlato'sSophist(26le263d)grammarinatleasttwo ways.Platohadheldthattherearetwopartsofspeech,nounsandverbs,bothofwhich revealbeing(261e262a),andthatacombinationofoneofeachsortconstitutesa statement.Bymakingtheroleofthecopulaequivalentseparatefromthatofnouns andverbs,Aristotleisabletoaccountforadjectivalpredicationssuchas'Themanis white'.Secondly,heisabletoaccountforthedifferencebetween'therunningman'and 'Themanruns',bothofwhicharecombinationsofnounandverb,butonlyoneofwhich expressesastatement.Thedifference,accordingtoAristotle,isthatonlythecomplete sentencecontainsthecopulaequivalenttheotherphrasehasthesamenounand predicabledenoter,butlacksanythingthatconsignifiesBeing.16

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(c)Unfortunatelyfortheclarityofbothhisexpositionandhisownthought,Aristotle usestheterm'verb'(rhema)todenoteboththeverbphrasetakenasawhole,andthe predicabledenoterbyitself.Hepresumablyintendsittomean'verbphrase'hesays 'averbiswhatconsignifiestime'(16b6),thatverbsareinflected(16b16)andthat verbssignifyabout.Ontheotherhand,heprobablyhaspredicabledenotersinmind whenhesays(16b19)"Whenutteredbyitselfaverbisanounandsignifies something","7thepointbeingthatpredicabledenotersstandtopredicablesinjustthe waythatnounsstandtowhattheydenote.18Thusapredicabledenoterrequires'is' beforeitcanbeadjoinedtoanountoyieldasentence.(Thisexplains17a1011,which hasbeentakenasevidencethat'is'isaverb.) ThetheorythatIhavepresentedmakesAristotleabsolutelyclearandexpliciton theroleandtypeof'is':thecopulalinkssubsententialdenotingexpressions,converting theseintosentences.Therewouldseemtobenorolehereforthesententialoperator rolethatKahnenvisages.19KahnmaywishtorespondbysayingthatitisAristotle's intentionheretodealwithonlyoneofthetwofunctionsofthecopula,reservingfor Metaphysicsr,1017a3135,E4,ande10adiscussionoftheveridicalnuance.Ishall returntothesepassageslater,afterIhavediscussedwhynosuchambiguityisrequired toaccountforthefacts. II.2'Is'asMonadic:AnotherLookatDeInterpretatione14 RevealingthoughtheaboveaccountisaboutAristotle'sphilosophicalgrammar,Idonot thinkittellsthewholestory.OneindicationofthisisthatnowhereintheDe InterpretationedoesAristotleexplicitlymentiondyadic'is',althoughhedoesmention monadic'is'.(IamindebtedtoDavidHitchcockforthisobservation,whichseemsto havebeenneglectedbyeverycommentatoronthatwork.)Thushesaysthrice(16a9 19,16b1926,and16b2829)thatbothnounsandverbsneedtobesupplementedby 'is',butcanweconcludethat'Manrunning'issimilarlylackingan'is'?Aristotle'sclaim seemstobethateachnounandeachverbislackingconsignificationofbeingandthis permitsustoconcludethatthereisaneedforamonadicuseof'is'thus'Manis'and 'Runningis'aresentences20butwheredoeshesaythatthereisadyadicuseof'is'to complete'Manrunning'?ItisdifficulttoadaptAristotle'sremarksabout'is'inthefirst fourchaptersoftheworktodyadic'is'. ButhowcanAristotlemanagewithoutadyadic'is'?Howcouldhethenaccount for'Themanisrunning',andothersuchexamplesencounteredinthelastsection?The followingisasomewhatconjecturalsuggestion;therestofthepaperdealswiththe advantagesofadoptingit. TworemarksintheDeInterpretationesuggestthatthemonadic'is'which attachestosimplessuchasnounsandverbscanbeappliedalsotocomplextermsthat involveacombinationofsimples.Thus:"Even'goatstag'signifiessomethingbutnotas yetsomethingtrueorfalseunless'is'or'isnot'areadded"(16b1618).And:"Even thelogosofmanisnotyetastatementmakingsentence,unless'is'or'willbe'or'was' orsomethingelseofthatsortisadded"(17a1012).

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Appendedtothesecondoftheseremarksisasignificantcomment."Toexplain whytwofootedlandanimalisaonenotamanybelongstoadifferentinquiry;certainly itisnotbybeingsaidalltogether."Whenwelooktooneoftheplaceswherethis "differentinquiry"isconducted,MetaphysicsZ12,wefindthefollowing:"Inthecaseof manandpalethereisapluralitywhenonedoesnotbelongtotheother,butaunity whenitdoesbelongandthesubject,man,hasacertainattribute;forthenaunityis producedandwehavethepaleman."(Myhyphenation;1037b1417.)Aristotlethen goesontocontrastthisunity,thepaleman,withdefinitionalunitiessuchastwofooted landanimal. Theseremarkspointtoacertaincorrelativitybetweenadjectives,including participles,inattributiveandpredicativepositions.Wearedealingnowwithaproblem thatariseswhenweseetheminpredicativeposition,namelythatAristotledoesnot seemtonoticethatthe'is'insuchsentencesisdyadic.Butperhapsthereasonthat Aristotledoesnotmakeanexplicitpointofthisisthat Themanisrunning canbetransformedintotheequivalent Therunningmanis. CouldAristotlenotbeassuming,inotherwords,thatallusesof'is'correspondtoa monadicuse,andinparticularthatthecopulacanbermiademonadicbymovingits complementtoattributiveposition?21Suchamonadicuseof'is'wouldbeattachednot toanounoraverbbuttoacomplexterm.Thatmonadic'is'canbethusappliedto complextermsisexplicitlypermittedbytheDeInterpretationebuttheexistenceof dyadic'is'isnot. HerethenisasecondaccountofAristotle'stheoryofthesubjectpredicate sentenceintheDeInterpretatione. (a)Allsubjectpredicatesentencescanberegardedasconsistingof'is'appliedtoa singleterm. (b)Thetermtowhich'is'isappliedmaybesimpleorcomplex.Examplesofsimpleterms are'man'or'running'.Acomplextermconsistsofanoun22modifiedbyapredicable denoterinattributiveposition. (a)and(b)neednotbetakenasgrammaticallyanalysingsubjectpredicate sentences,forobviouslythelatterincludesentenceswithpredicabledenotersin predicativeposition,anditwouldbeagrossmistaketoassimilatethissyntacticpattern totheonethatwearenowdiscussing.Rathertheclaimissemantic:boththedyadic'is' andthemonadic'is'providesemanticparadigmstowhichallsubjectpredicate sentencescanbeassimilated,howeverthesesentencesmaybephrased.23Aristotle sometimesusesoneofthese,sometimestheother,tomakevariouspointsabout ontology. III.PREDICATIVECOMPLEXES III.IIntroducingPredicativeComplexes Letusnowintroducethenotionofapredicativecomplexanentityformed,asAristotle suggestsinMetaphysicsZ12,fromauniversalandaparticularwhenthatparticular
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instantiatesthatuniversal.(ThepredicativecomplexconsistingofxandFdoesnotexist whenxdoesnotinstantiateF.)Theproposalinthefirstinstanceisthattermsconsisting ofasubstantivewithanadjectiveinattributivepositionrefertosuchcomplexeswhen theyrefertoanythingatall.Forexample,'artisticCoriscus'willrefertoapredicative complexwhenCoriscusisartistic,andtonothingotherwise. Itwillbeobviousthatpredicativecomplexescorrespondrathercloselytocertain modernconceptionsoffacts,andtoRussell'sconceptionofatrueproposition.Thereis howeveradifference:themodernconceptionsIalludetoareconstructsoutof individualsandproperties,wherepropertiesare,likeFrege'sconcepts,ofatypedistinct fromthetypeofindividuals.TheAristotelianconceptionthatIamtryingtoreconstruct consistsofindividualsandpredicables,where,becauseoftheseparationof'is',the predicablesareobjectsinFrege'ssenseofthatterm(universalobjects,ofcourse).A predicativecomplexisthereforethedenotatumofapartofasentence,anddoesnot correspondtoasentenceasawhole.Anaptwaytoepitomizethisdifferenceistonote thattheRussellianentitycorrespondingto'Coriscusisartistic'couldbereferredtoas 'Coriscusbeingartistic':theAristotelianentity,ontheotherhand,ismoreproperly called'Coriscusartistic'or'artisticCoriscus'.ThepointofAristotle'sremarkson'is'asI understandthemisthatacompletethoughtisformedbyattributing(monadic)beingor nonbeingtooneofthesecomplexes,andthatthecomplexesdonotcontaineitherof theseasconstituents. Thenotionofapredicativecomplexenablesustoexplainthefirst comprehensivenessaxiom: C1:Forallxandythereisazsuchthatxbelongstoyifandonlyifziswithouthavingto assumethatthelast'is'thatoccursinthisprinciple(whichismonadicandabsolute) meansanythingotherthan'exists'.Thisisbecauseapredicativecomplexisa"unity" thatexistsonlywhenoneofitscomponentsinstantiatestheuniversalthatistheother. Thus'Simmiasislarge'isequivalentto'LargeSimmiasis',andthelatterisequivalentto 'LargeSimmiasexists'. Theseequivalencesmarksignificantadvantages.Thefirstofthemmakessense oftheattributivetransformationnotedearlier,andthusofthepredicativeattributive dualitieswenotedearlierthePlatonicdualitybetweensayingthatsomethingis foreverbeautifulandsayingthatsomebeautyforeveris,andtheAristotelianduality betweenthecategoriesbeing"figuresofpredication"andkindsofthingsthatare. Theequivalenceof'Simmiasislarge'and'LargeSimmiasexists'enablesustosee whyParmenidesandPlato(Sophist237241)thoughtthatfalseandnegativesentences areparadoxical.Itisbecausenegativesentencessaythatpredicativecomplexesfailto exist,andfalsepositivesentencespresupposereferencetoanonexistentpredicative complex.Thustheproblemoffalseandnegativestatementsreducestotheproblemof falseandnegativeexistentials.Andweareabletoachievethisreductionwithout resortingtothedubioustechniqueofmakingtruthfactexistence. Ourhypothesishelpsmakesensealsooftheoccurrenceofphraseslike'artistic Coriscus'and'musicalman'intheparagraphsonaccidentaloneness,beingand samenessinMetaphysics6,7and9respectively.Foritisplausibletointerpret AristotleassayingthatwhereCoriscusisaccidentallyartistic,theartisticisaccidentally
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thesameas,andisaccidentallyonewith,Coriscus,andthatartisticCoriscusaccidentally is.Thesetheses(whichIshallnotworkoutindetailhere)helpmakesenseofthe followingsortofutterance: ExamplesofaccidentalonenessareCoriscusandtheartistic,andartisticCoriscus (foritisthesamethingtosaythatCoriscusisonewiththeartisticandthat artisticCoriscusisone).(Met,1015b1719) Ofparticularinteresttousisthecorrelationofthedyadic'isonewith'andthemonadic 'isone'intheparentheticalremark,usingpreciselythedevicethatIhavecalledthe attributivetransformation.24 III.2DoesAristotleAnalyseTruthinTermsofExistence? Itseemsreasonabletosupposethatifthenotionofapredicativecomplexcanaccount forthefirst,predicative,comprehensivenessaxiom,thenitcouldaccountforthe second: C2:Forallpropositions,p,thereisanxsuchthatpistrueifandonlyifxis. ThismaywellbethepointofamuchdiscussedpassageinMetaphysics: 'Tobe'and'is'indicatealsothatsomethingistrueand'nottobe'thatsomething isnottruebutfalseasisthecasewithaffirmationsanddenials.Forexample, thatSocratesisartistic(estiSokratesmousikos),thatthisistrue.(1017a3135) Thetraditional,andpossiblymoststraightforward,readingofthesewordsisassaying that'is'canmean'istrue'. Thecruxisinthewords'ThatSocratesisartistic,thatthisistrue'towhatdoes the'this'refer?Presumablytothenearesttruthbearer:thatSocratesismusical.Butthe 'is'inthenearesttruthbearerisnotnaturallytakenaspredicatinganythingofthe wholesentenceinwhichitoccurs.Sothereissomedifficultyinunderstandingtheclaim inthemoststraightforwardway.25 IshouldthereforeliketotakeAristotle'swordsinasomewhatmoreobliqueway, namelyasclaimingtheequivalenceof'ArtisticSocratesis'and'ThatSocratesisartisticis true'.Thepointwouldthenbethat'is'saidofpredicativecomplexesindicatesthesame thingas'istrue'saidofthecorrespondingjudgement. ThisistosomeextentconfirmedbyMetaphysicsE4ande10whereinitis claimedthatbeingasappliedtocompositeobjectsis"combinationandseparation", whichinturnparallelstheclaimmadeinZ12thatacertain"unity",thepaleman,is broughtintobeingwhenthemanbecomespale,andthetalkintheDeInterpretatione about'is'consignifying"combinationandseparation".Aristotleexplicitlyclaims(1027b 18ff.,1051b3335)thattruthshouldbeunderstoodintermsofthisbeing.Andwe havealreadynotedthatAristotledefinestruthandfalsityintermsofanabsolute'is'.

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IproposethereforethatAristotlebetakennotassayingthatthereisauseof'is' thatmeans'istrue';justthattruth,whichisappliedtopropositions,canbeanalysedin termsofexistenceappliedtoanothersortofthing.26 III.3Change Ourconceptionofapredicativecomplexhelpsusunderstandhowtotakethenotionof creationinanaturalwayasthecomingintoexistenceofathingandstillunderstand why,accordingtoAristotleexplicitly,andaccordingtoParmenidesimplicitly,every alterationisaccompaniedbyanalteration.Thetrickistoregardeveryalterationas accompaniedbythecreationofonepredicativecomplex,andbythedestructionof another. ObviouslythiswillworkonlyifapredicativecomplexlikepaleConscusisnot identicalwithCoriscus;foritrequiresthatpaleCoriscusceasetoexistwhenCoriscus continuestoexist.Soourproposalsdemandthatonatleastoneuseoftheterm,'pale Coriscus'benoncoreferentialwith'Coriscus'.27 ThereisconfirmationofthisatTheaetetus159b160d.HerewefindSocrates explaining,onProtagoras'behalf,thatadraughtofwinecanseemsweetandpleasant tohimselfinhealthbutbittertohimselfinsickness.Whatisstrikingaboutthispassage fromourpointofviewistheuseoftheterms'healthySocrates'and'sickSocrates'to refertomomentaryobjects.Sincetheterm'Socrates'wouldrefertoanenduringobject (whetherornotProtagoraswouldacknowledgetheexistenceofsuchobjects)itseems thattheterminologyherepresupposesthattheterm'healthySocrates'can,asour theorydemands,beunderstoodasnoncoreferentialwith'Socrates'.(ThusProtagoras mightwanttosaysomethinglike'Socratesdoesnotexist,heisnothing,buthealthy Socratesexistsmomentarily',or'Socratesisnothingbutaconstructoutofcomponents likethemomentaryhealthySocrates'.) AninspectionofthepassagesjustcitedfromtheTheaetetusandearlierfrom Metaphysicsshows,bytheway,thattermslike'acolour','abitterness'and'an artistic'(or,withappropriateostensions,'theartistic')areusedasindefinitedescriptions forthingslikethewhitestick,thebitterwineetc.,thatisforpredicativecomplexes. (WenotedearlierthatProtagoraswaswillingtosaythingslike'Abitternesscomesto be',andthiscouldhardlybetakenasannouncingthecreationeitherofe.g.wine,a substance,orofauniversal.)WehaveshownthatartisticCoriscusisnotCoriscus.We cannowsupplementthiswiththeindefiniteidentity:artisticCoriscusisanartistic(nota man).28Thishelpsustoaccountfortheindefinitetransformationdescribedwhich enablesustogofrom'Coriscus/Amanis/becomesartistic'to'Anartisticis/comesto be'.And,becausepredicativecomplexesareindividualsthatarenotsubstances,italso suggeststhattheymightbetheindividualsoutofwhichAristotleconstructscategories otherthansubstance.29 III.4TheExpandedOntology
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Predicativecomplexesconstituteathirdontologicalrealmdistinctbothfromindividual substancesandfrompredicables.30 MuchofwhatAristotlesaysaboutunitiescanbeunderstoodasmaking distinctionsintherealmoftheseentities.Thusaccidentalunitiesarepredicative complexesinwhichthepredicablebelongsonlyaccidentallytotheindividualsubstance, andessentialunitiesarethosewherethisrelationisessentialthustwofootedCoriscus wouldbeanexampleofanessentialunity. Aninterestingpossibilityconcernsathirdkindofunity,whichIshallcalla definitionalunity.Anexampleofthiswouldbematterwithform,forinstancean ensouledbody.Thisisnotanessentialunitybecauseitispossibleforthebodytolack thesoulandafterdeathitwill.ButAristotleseemstowanttoholdthatitisnotsimply anaccidentalunityeither,becausewhenanunityofthissortcomestobe,anew substancecomestobe.(Thecomingtobeofadefinitionalunityisthusgeneration simpliciter.)Itispossible,then,thatAristotleconceivesofindividualsubstancesas themselvesbeingpredicativecomplexes,albeitofaspecialsort,inasmuchasthey possessdefinitionalunity.SoifAristotleistodistinguishbetweenindividualsubstances andotherpredicativecomplexes,whicharenotinthecategoryofsubstance,itbecomes importantforhimtodistinguishdefinitionalunityfrommerelyaccidentalunity,andthis iswhatheattemptstodoinMetaphysicsZ. SomesuchnotionofdefinitionalunityisrequiredtohelpusmakesenseofDeA nimaII,12,inwhichAristotlecanbeunderstoodasimplyingthetruthofanumberof identitiesoftheform'Amanisidenticalwithabodywithcertainactualities'.The objectionhasbeenmadetothisthatitimpliesthatmenareidenticalwithbodies,which isfalsebecausebodiesoutlastmen.Thedifficultyissolvedbymakingmenpredicative complexes,andbodiescomponentsofthesecomplexes.Obviously,thisisplausibleonly ifsomepredicativecomplexesareindividualsubstances. AsimilarmovesuggestsaninterpretationofAristotle'srepresentationofchange. WesawearlierthatAristotle'srefutationoftheParmenideanproofthatthereisno changecannotdependsolelyontheobservationthatalterationdoesnotinvolvenon being.ItisconceivablethatAristotledependsinsteadonthedifferencebetweenthe generationofcomplexesandthegenerationofsimples;thisissupportedbyhis terminology,whichdistinguishesbetweengenesisqualifiedandunqualified.Ifthisis right,AristotlewouldrejectthegeneralityoftheParmenideanprinciplethatthereisno creationordestruction,andacceptitonlyinarestrictedrealm,namelysimples.To justifythisrestrictionwouldbeamajortask,butitwouldnotbefarfetchedtogroundit onacorrespondentrestrictionoftheprinciplethatnegativeexistentialsarelogically faulty.PerhapsAristotlewantstosaythatonlythosestatementsthatdenythe existenceofsimplesarefaulty.Perhapsthisisinturnjustifiedbyobservingthatthereis nodifficultyinunderstandingwhatisassertedwhenwesaythatsomecombinationof simplesfailstoexistprovidedthatweknowwhatthesimplesare,sincethisis equivalenttosayingthatthesimplesarenotcombined.Ifthisistherightmove,andif ourproposalaboutindividualsubstancesbeingdefinitionalunitiescomposedofmatter andformisaccepted,thenthewayisopenforAristotletorepresentthecomingtobe ofindividualsubstancesasqualified,relativetotheunderlyingmatter.
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Itisreasonabletoidentifyaccidentalpredicativecomplexeswithimmanent charactersinthephilosophyofPlato,andwithnonsubstantialindividualsinAristotle. Platoinsists(Phaedo102d5ff.)thatinadditiontothebearersofproperties,like Simmias,andthepropertiestheybear,suchaslargeness,thereisathirdclassofentity exemplifiedbythelargenessinSimmias.HealsosaysthatwhereSimmiasadmitsthe small,thelargenessinSimmias"retreats".Thismeansthatthereisanequivalence between'Simmiasislarge'and'ThelargenessinSimmiasexists'andthissupportsthe identification.Aristotletooseemstocountenancesuchaclassofentities:inCategories 2hementionsitemsliketheindividualknowledgeofgrammarthatareinbutnotsaid ofanysubject.31 Gatheringthesesuggestionstogetherweshouldconcludethatpredicative complexesarereferredtonotonlybyphraseslike'theFX',butalsobyphrasessuchas 'theFinX','theFofthisX','X'sF'and'ThisF'.Ofcoursesomeofthesephrasesmightbe ambiguous;andforinstance'theFX'mightalsobetakenasreferringtotheunderlying substance,and'theFofthisX'mightbetakenasreferringtoaproperty. Ihavearguedinthisessayfortherecognitionofasortofentitythatisnotfamiliarin modernontologies.Ihavearguedonthebasisofasyntacticandsemanticanalysisof certainusesof'is',andfoundtextualsupportfortheanalysisincertaintextsofAristotle. Inaddition,therecognitionofpredicativecomplexesenablesustogiveaunified treatmentofanumberofpuzzlingfeaturesofGreekontology. ItispossiblethattheGreeksmayhaveregardedpredicativecomplexesnotin thewayIhavepresentedthem,namelyasconstructedentitiesderivativefrommore basictypes,butastheentitiesgiveninperception,andsoepistemicallyandeven ontologicallyprior.Ifso,wemayfindthatinpositingtheForms,Platowasmakinga breakwithanontologyofpredicativecomplexes,not,asisusuallythought,withan ontologyofindividualsubstances.Similarly,itispossiblethatAristotlepositedindividual substancesagainstthebackgroundofanontologycomposedofpredicativecomplexes andPlatonicForms.Thesepossibilitiesoffertheprospectofaricherappreciationofthe developmentofGreekontologythanisnowcustomary.32 McGillUniversity

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NOTES
1Thestatementofnoncontradictionwithabsolute'tobe'isimpliedatMetaphysics1005b24 and1006a1,andoccursexplicitlyat1006a4.Thejuxtapositionofthesestatementswiththe longer,predicativelyphrasedstatementat1005b18showsthatnodistinctionisintended betweenthetwowaysofstatingtheprinciple. 2Theincompletecopulaisanapparentlyabsoluteuseof'is'thatisactuallyellipticalforsome copulativeuse.Anuncontroversialexamplewouldbe:'IsTomwelldressed?Yes,heis.'Ivery muchdoubtthatonecouldjustifyaruleofgrammarthatpermitspredicatedeletionexceptin suchcasesofrepetition,andsoIsuspectthatthetheoryoftheincompletecopulais grammaticallyadhoc.Fortunately,thetheorythatIwillpresenthererendersthisitem unnecessary. 3AsimilarpointismadeinM.F.Burnyeat(ed.)NotesonMetaphysicsZ(Oxford:TheSub FacultyofPhilosophy,1980).Theuseof'is'at1028a18issaidnottobetheincompletecopula onthegroundsthatitpredicatesexistenceofcertainuniversals.(Actually,theinterpretationto beadvancedherewillimplyagreementwiththeassessmentthatthisisan'is'ofexistence,but notthatitssubjectisauniversal.) 4CharlesKahn,"SomePhilosophicalUsesof'tobe'inPlato",PhronesisXXVI(1981),see especiallypp.107109. 5ItseemstomethatProtagoraswouldhavebeenpreparedtosayalsothatsomethingisF wheneveranFis,wereitnotforthefactthatthedurativeimplicationsof'is'areinconsistent withhisendorsementofHeracliteanflux(asPlatoportrayshiminthedialogue,160ae).But whetherthisistrueornot,itisgenerallytruethatfactsaboutthedurativecopula,'is',are paralleledbyfactsaboutthemutativecopula,'becomes'. 6Itis,Ithink,significantthattheCategories4listofthingsthatareincludesitemsthatare predicated. 7ThussupposethatClistrue.LetCbeanentitythatisifandonlyifAbelongstoB.(Thereis suchanentity;Clensuresthis.)Thenif,perimpossibile,AbothbelongedanddidnotbelongtoB, Cwouldbothbeandnotbe(andconversely).ThusClimpliesthat0andPareequivalent.Again supposethatCldoesnothold.Thentherewouldbeanindividualthatbothwasandwasnot withoutsomexbelongingtosomey,andconversely. ThusthefalsityofCIimpliesthat0andParenotequivalent.ThusCIifandonlyifOandPare equivalent. 8SeeMontgomeryFurth,"ElementsofEleaticOntology",JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy6 (1968). 9Kahn'stheoryisstatedinseveralarticlesandabook.Ofthesethemostusefulfromasynoptic pointofviewarethefirstandthemostrecent:"TheGreekVerb'ToBe'andtheConceptof Being",FoundationsofLanguage2(1966),andthearticlecitedinnote4,above. 10DavidWiggins,"SentenceMeaning,NegationandPlato'sProblemofNonBeing",inG. Vlastos(ed.),Plato1,(GardenCityN.Y.:AnchorBooks,1971). 11Seehis"WhyExistencedoesnotEmergeasaDistinctConceptinGreekPhilosophy", ArchivfurGeschichtederPhilosophie58(1976),esp.pp.3267.TheargumentIgiveismine; Kahnreliesonatypedistinctionbetweenexistenceandbeingso.ThetroublewithKahn's argument,asIseeit,isthatitdoesnotpreventbeingsobeingwhatcorrespondstoexistencein thisothertype,withallthelogicalpropertiesthatWigginswants.Anotherargumentwitha conclusionsimilartoKahn'sbutbasedonthequestionableassumptionthatoneandthesame eventcanrecur,isfoundinRoderickChisholm,"EventsandPropositions",Nous4(1970).

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Forasophisticatedrepresentationofeventsandthenotionofoccurrenceeasily extendibletofactsandbeingso,seeRichardMontague,"OnTheNatureofCertain PhilosophicalEntities",inR.H.Thomason(ed.),FormalPhilosophy:SelectedPapersofRichard Montague(NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,1974),especiallypp.148150. 12CharlesKahn,"TheThesisofParmenides",TheReviewofMetaphysicsXXII(1969). "ParmenidesisconcernedwithknowledgeinthesenseinwhichitimpliesTruth...The'is'which Parmenidesproclaimsisnotprimarilyexistentialbutveridical"(p.712).Thustheobjectsof knowledgemustbe,i.e.mustbetrue. 13Itis,Ithink,asignificantfeatureoftheconstructionthatKahncalls"theveridical constructionproper"thatitneverallows'is'toattachdirectlytoasentenceorsentence nominalization.Ratheraverbofthinkingorsayingisrequired:'Thingsareasyousay'etc.(There areidiomaticexceptionstothisrule:'Thesethingsare'isaformulaofassentinGreek,and'So beit'isallowedinEnglishaswellasGreek.)Someexplanationisrequiredofthisdifferencewith 'istrue'. 14Itisunclearwherethisleavesadjectivessuchas'white'andcommonnounssuchas'man' thesedonotcarrytensebuttheydosignifyabout,thatistheyareusedinpredicateposition. Perhapssignifyingaboutissupposedtobecompatiblewithsignifying(cf.Met,1006b1415).I shallmakeasuggestionaboutadjectivesinduecourse. 15Isthesuggestionthat'white'isaverb?Butitlackstense. 16ThetheorythatIamattributingtoAristotleissimilartotheoneheldbyPeterAbelard. Abelardraisestheproblemof'therunningman'andsolvesitinthewayoutlinedhere,andhe introducesexplicitlythenotionofthecopulaequivalent;hecallsthistheviscopulativa.See MartinM.Tweedale,"Abelardandtheculminationoftheoldlogic",chapter6ofNorman Kretzmann,AnthonyKenny,JanPinborg(ed.),TheCambridgeHistoryofLaterMedieval Philosophy,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982),especiallypp143148.Mypointis thatmostoftheingredientsofAbelard'saccountarelatentinAristotle's,andthattheyare requiredtomakesenseofwhatAristotlesays. Forafurtherinterestingaccountofsomeoftheproblemsdiscussedhere,seeJ.M.E. Moravcsik,"Aristotle'sTheoryofCatogories",inhisAristotle(GardenCity,N.Y.:132 AnchorBooks,1967),pp129132.ItwouldseemthatMoravcsik'sinnocentlookingremarkonp. 129,thatAristotle"treats'being'asaverb"createsdifficultiesinMoravcsik'sdiscussion.We haveseenthatthisclaimoughttobequalified. 17ThisrecallsAbelard'spointthatthereislittledifferencebetweenadjoining'is'toanounand adjoiningittoadjectivesorparticiples.Bothproceduresyieldaverbphrase.WhydoPlatoand Aristotledistinguishinsosharpawaybetweencommonnounsandpredicabledenoters?For oneanswertothisquestion,seeJ.M.E.Moravcsik,"TheDiscernibilityofIdenticals",Journalof Philosophy,LXXIII(1976). 18SomeauthorshavethoughtthatAristotlethinksofthesubstructureofthedeclarative sentenceinmuchthesamewayasPlatodoesintheSophist.Theythusdistinguishthistheory fromthatoftheearlyPlatowho,accordingtothem,thoughtofpredicatesasnamesof universals,atendencythatleadstothetheoryoftranscendentforms.Ihaveinmindparticularly G.B.MatthewsandS.MarcCohen,"TheOneandtheMany"ReviewofMetaphysics21(1967 68),andJoanKung,"AristotleonThises,SuchesandtheThirdManArgument",PhronesisXXVI (1981).TheseauthorsattributetoAristotletheinsightthatpredicatesarenotnames,andtryto foundthepriorityofsubstancesovernonsubstancesonthedifferenceinlogicaltypeor functionbetweenthesetwocategoriesofexpression.IbelievethattheDeInterpretatione passagesdiscussedhereinthrowsomedoubtontheusefulnessofthisapproachbecausethey showthattheinsightattributedtoAristotleiscompatiblewiththerebeingnamesforitemsin

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thenonsubstantialcategories.Forfurtherdiscussionoftheimplicationsofthispointseemy "Aristotle'sSemanticsandaPuzzleConcerningChange",forthcomingin1984ina supplementaryvolumeoftheCanadianJournalofPhilosophydevotedtoarticlesonAristotle. 19Kahniscertainlyawarethattherearetypedifficultiesinhisconceptionofthe'is'oftruth: seehisreviewofJonathanBarnes,ThePresocraticPhilosophers,intheJournalofPhilosophy LXVIII(1981).Seealsonote11above.MypointhereisthatAristotle'sciarityontypequestions intheDeInterpretationemakesitunlikelythatanytypeconfusioncanbeattributedtohim. 20Itmightbedoubtedthat'Runningis'isalegitimateGreeksentence,butseetheresultsof whatIhavecalledthe"'indefinitetransformation"insection1.4above.Notealsothat predicabledenotersoccurinthelistofontainCategories4.Thisparticipleembodiesan absoluteuseof'is'. 21Theremarksmadeinthelastsectionaboutseparatingthepredicabledenotingfromthe sentencecompletingfunctionscontinue,ofcourse,tohaveforceinthisnewrepresentation. WecanthusunderstandAristotle'scommentatDeInt16b19,"Whenutteredbyitselfaverbis anounandsignifiessomething...butitdoesnotsignifywhetheritisornot".andtheremarksat 16a1219,asapointedrejectionofPlato'sview(Sophist26le)thatnounsandverbsare"two sortsofrevealersofbeing".Theseparationofthecopulawouldnotpermitthisbyitselfsince thecounterpoisedopinionsareclearlystatedintermsofmonadic'is'. Theseparationofthesentencecompletingfunctionandtheidentificationofthiswith monadic'is'alsothrowssomelightonAristotle'scharacteristicdoctrinethatBeingisnota genus.Generaaredenotedbypredicabledenoters;'is'doesnotdenoteapredicable.Thefailure tounderstandthispointcanleadtothemisplacedexpenditureofphilosophicalefforton explainingthelackof"cognitivecontent"ofBeingorexistencetoexplainAristotle'sviews:see JosephOwens,"TheContentofExistence",inMiltonMunitz(ed.),LogicandOntology(New York:NewYorkUniversityPress,1973).Owenscorrectlytreats'exists'asgrammaticallya predicate,butseemstoassumethatthereforeit mustbesemanticallysimilartootherpredicates.Putintheseterms,theproblembecomesto accountfortheAristoteliandoctrineaboutBeingnotbeingagenuswithoutthehelpofthe Aristotelianaccountof'is'notbeingapredicabledenoter. 22InGreekitispermissibletoconstructanounphrasewithouttheuseofanounforexample 'hoienagora'means'themenintheagora'.Iamnotsurewhetherthisrequiresabroadeningof thedefinitionof'complexterm',becauseAristotlemaywellwanttoassertthatnounsare implicitlypresentinsuchphrases"optionallydeleted"asweshouldsayadoctrinethatis madehighlyplausiblebytherequirementthatthearticleinsuchphrasesagreeingenderwith theappropratenoun.(Itisthisrequirementthatenablesustotellthatthephrase'hoienagora' referstomen.) 23Iambeingcautioushere:Iwanttodistingushbothsyntacticallyandsemanticallybetween'x isF'andFxis'.Ithinkthatgiventheexistenceofwhateverisdenotedby'Fx','F'and'a',thetwo sentencesareequivalentbuthavedifferent"senseandreference".Aparallelexamplewouldbe thepair'Thesnowiswhite'and'Thatthesnowiswhiteistrue'.Giventheexistenceofboththe snowandthepropositionthatsnowiswhite,thetwostatementsareequivalent;butwhereas thesecondmakesaclaimaboutthefirstproposition,thefirstmakesaclaimaboutthesnow. Myclaim,elaboratedin111.2,isthatAristotlesometimesexplainsthetruthconditionsof dyadic'is'sentencesintermsofmonadic'is'sentences,notthatheignoresoreliminatesthe former.InthisrespecthiseffortsarecomparabletoTarski's,whoexplainedthetruthconditions ofsentencescontaining'true'intermsofsentencesnotcontaining'true'. 24Commentatorshavebeenbaffledbythisandthustheyhavenotalwaysunderstoodthis passageinaccordancewiththesmoothestreadingoftheGreekseeChristopherKirwan'slucid

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discussionofthecontroversiessurroundingtheselinesinhiscommentary,Aristotle's MetaphysicsBooks,,E(Oxford:TheClarendonPress,1971). Note,however,Kirwan'sremarkthat"theartisticCoriscusisaunifiedcomplexinwhich Coriscussomehowdetachedfromhisartistryisasimplepart"(134).ItseemsthatKirwan's awarenessoftheimplicationsofhisownsuggestionthatartisticCoriscusisacomplexisnot sufficientlyexplicit.CoriscusisdistinctfromtheartisticCoriscussimplybecauseheisaproper partofthelatterthereisnoneedtodetachhimfromhisartistrytosecuretheresult. 25Kirwanmakesthispointwellinhiscommentary,op.cit. 26Pointssimilartothosemadeinthissectionaretobefoundalsoinanunpublishedpaperby JohnThorpe,"AristotleonBeingandTruth",readatthemeetingsoftheCanadianPhilosophical AssociationheldinOttawa,June1982. 27Notrealizingthatthereisthisuseofphraseslike'paleCoriscus',C.J.F.Williams,inAristotle's DeGenerationeetCorruptione(Oxford:TheClarendonPress,1982),saysthat319b20ff. (discussedabove)"requiresanincoherentunderstandingof'Anunmusicalmancameinto existence'sinceithastoforbidtheinferenceto'Amancameintoexistence'."Thesamecause accountsforthetextualtranspositionmadebyPhiloponusandJoachimat319b2820.SeeH.H. JoachimAristotleonComingtoBeandPassingAway(Oxford:TheClarendonPress,1922),p. 109.Leftwhereitisinthemanuscripts,theoffendingsentencesaysthatthemusicalmanand theunmusicalmanareaffections(pathe)ofwhatunderlies. 28TheseindefinitedescriptionsareusedinthePhysicstoidentifyaitiai,anditispossiblethat properlyspeaking,aitiaiarepredicativecomplexes.Thiswouldaccountfortheapparent intensionalityofaitiativecontextsnotedbyJ.M.E.Moravcsikin"AristotleonAdequate Explanation"inSynthiese28(1974).Ontheotherhandtherelationof'accidentalsameness" i.e.therelationthatholdsofapairofpredicativecomplexesorapredicativecomplexandan individualsubstancewhentheindividualsubstancesinquestionareidenticalmakesitpossible toaccountfortheapparentextensionalityofaitiativecontextsnotedbyJamesBogeninhis commentonMoravcsik'spaper,provocativelytitled"MoravcsikonExplanation",Ioc.cit. 29Letusdistinguishbetweentwoformsofwords,'XisY'and'XisaY'.Thesehavebeenthought tobeformsofpredication,thefirstaccountingforcrosscategorialpredicationandthesecond forintracategorialpredication.Iammoreinclinedtothinkthat'XisaY'isinfactnotpredicative atall,butexpressesanidentitystatement,inwhichoneofthetermsisexpressedindefinitely. Theseidentitiescanbeusedtomaketheschemeofcategorieshierarchicallyconsistentinthe followingway.SupposethatxisanFandyisaG,andsupposethatwehavegroundsfor supposingeitherthattheindividualsorthepredicablesbelongtodifferentcategories.Thenwe puttheothertermintodifferentcategoriesaswell.Thisprocedurewouldofcoursenotbe availableinthecaseofpredicationasnormallyunderstood.Thedifferenceisthatwhereas somethingcanhavepropertiesindifferentcategories,itcannotbeidenticalwiththingsin differentcategories. 30Whenthisfactisnottakenintoaccount,Aristotle'soddsoundingpronouncementsonthe subjectofaccidentalsameness(see111.1)canbeinterpretedasincorporatingnonstandardor confusedviewsonidentity:seeNicholasP.White,"AristotleonSamenessandOneness",The PhilosophicalReviewLXXX(1971),and"OriginsofAristotelianEssentialism",TheReviewof MetaphysicsXXVI(197273),AlanCode,"Aristotle'sResponsestoQuine'sObjectionstoModal Logic",JournalofPhilosophicalLogic5(1976),andS.MarcCohen,"EssentialisminAristotle", TheReviewofMetaphysicsXXXI(197778). 31AlongercatalogueofAristoteliantextscommittedtotheexistenceofsuchentitieswillbe foundinRobertHeinaman,"NonSubstantialIndividualsintheCategories".PhronesisXXVI (1981),especiallypp.2957.

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32AnancestorofafragmentofthispaperwaspresentedtotheCanadianPhilosophical AssociationinHalifax,June1980andwasacutelycommentedonbyDavidHitchcock.A completedraftwascriticizedindetailbyCharlesKahn.Boththesephilosophersnotonlysaved mefromerrorbutmadealargenumberofusefulpositivesuggestions.AlastairMcKinnonmade itpossibletoprocessthefinalversiononMcGillUniversity'scomputer.

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