OPERATIVE FACT A fact that is directly relevant to deciding some question of law.

When a legal question is governed by fact-driven rules, operative facts may be thought of as variables that are plugged in to those rules so that the right answer can be obtained Adjudicative facts are fact that is either legally operative or important as to be controlling on some question of law. Adjudicative facts re-create the course of events that led to the dispute and help in determining the proper outcome in the case. They differ from ordinary facts in that they are considered facts only if the court recognizes and accepts them.

Union of Filipino Employees vs. Vivar CD Facts: This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales personnel from the holiday pay award and the change of the divisor in the computation of benefits from 251 to 261 days. On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay in the light of the Court's decision in Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople (138 SCRA 273 [1985]). Both Filipro and the Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) agreed to submit the case for voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator. Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2) the exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales personnel) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor. (Rollo, pp. 138-145) Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, that their sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and that the use of 251 as divisor is an established employee benefit which cannot be diminished.

Issue:

W/N the respondent's sales personnel are not field personnel under Article 82 of the Labor Code?

Held: The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding sales volume based on sales target; (2) good collection performance; (3) proper compliance with good market hygiene; (4) good merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns; and (6) proper truck maintenance. (Rollo, p. 190). The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, but from October 23, 1984, the date of promulgation of the IBAA case. WHEREFORE, the order of the voluntary arbitrator in hereby MODIFIED. The divisor to be used in computing holiday pay shall be 251 days. The holiday pay as above directed shall be computed from October 23, 1984. In all other respects, the order of the respondent arbitrator is hereby AFFIRMED.

Mention of Doctrine: The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. It is now almost the end of 1991. To require various companies to reach back to 1975 now and nullify acts done in good faith is unduly harsh. 1984 is a fairer reckoning period under the facts of this case. Applying the aforementioned doctrine to the case at bar, it is not far-fetched that Nestle, relying on the implicit validity of the implementing rule and policy instruction before this Court nullified them, and thinking that it was not obliged to give holiday pay benefits to its monthly paid employees, may have been moved to grant other concessions to its employees, especially in the collective bargaining agreement. This possibility is bolstered by the fact that respondent Nestle's employees are among the highest paid in the industry. With this consideration, it would be unfair to impose additional burdens on Nestle when the non-payment of the holiday benefits up to 1984 was not in any way attributed to Nestle's fault. The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, but from October 23, 1984, the date of promulgation of the IBAA case.

League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC CD

Facts: The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. Subsequently, the 12th Congress municipalities from the P100million income requirement of RA 9009. The cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and lapsed into law without enacted Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 20 June 2001, amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20million to P100million. Thereafter, 16 municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 the Presidents signature. Said Cityhood Laws directed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the conversion. Petitioners sought to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause, lament ing that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities would reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA).

On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no city shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. The Supreme Court held that since respondent municipalities did not meet the P10 0million income requirement under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, the Cityhood Laws converting said municipalities into cities were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court also declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of the equal protection clause since there was no valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100million income requirement: (1) there was no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted and municipalities that did not have such pending bills; (2) the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress was not germane to the purpose of the law, which was to prevent fiscally non- viable municipalities from converting into cities; (3) the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limited the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009 a condition that would never happen again, violating the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) limiting the exemption only to the 16 respondent municipalities violated the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated; municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities could not convert into cities.

On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote, denied the respondent municipalities first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondent municipalities second motion for reconsideration. The 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009. However, on 21 December 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws. The Court reasoned that:

(1) When Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the local government code, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. It would be noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, they would have referred to BP 337. Also, they would not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Section 3, Article X of the Constitution. Accordingly, the criteria for creation of cities need not be embodied in the LGC. Congress can impose such criteria in a consolidated set of laws or a single-subject enactment or through amendatory laws. T he passage of amendatory laws, such as RA 9009, was no different from the enactment of the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting laws, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.

(2) Deliberations on RA 9009, particularly the floor exchange between Senators Aquilino Pimentel and Franklin Drilon, indicated the following complementary legislative intentions: (a) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the proposed P100million minimum income requirement; and (b) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the pending cityhood bills were concerned. That said deliberations were undertaken in the 11th and/or 12th Congress (or before the cityhood laws were passed during the 13th Congress) and Congress was not a continuing legislative body, was immaterial. Debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.

(3) Petitioners could not plausibly invoke the equal protection clause because no deprivation of property resulted by the enactment of the Cityhood Laws. It was presumptuous on the part of petitioner LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA was yet to be allocated. Furthermore, the equal protection clause does not preclude reasonable classification which (a) rests on substantial distinctions; (b) is germane to the purpose of the law; (c) is not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) applies equally to all members of 4

the same class. All of these requisites had been met by the subject Cityhood Laws: (a) Respondent municipalities were substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. They had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009, and years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondent municipalities had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. However, due to extraneous circumstances (the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment), the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they had gone through would appear to be unfair; (b) the exemption of respondent municipalities from the P100million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality, occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009, between respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress; and (c) the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of P20 million.

(4) The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the Cityhood Laws in the plebiscites held in the affected municipalities is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Pursuant to the operative fact doctrine, the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in question should be upheld.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration (ad cautelam) and for the annulment of 21 December 2009 Decision. Some petitioners-in-intervention also moved for reconsideration (ad cautelam).

Issues: Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause.

Held: The 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional.

(1) Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local 5

Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units follows the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code.

From the moment RA 9009 took effect (on 30 June 2001), the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P 100million income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement, even for municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress when RA 9009 was passed. The uniform exemption clause in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one.

(2) Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admissi on that the law is unconstitutional.

Respondent municipalities theory that the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, which resulted in 16 municipalities functioning as new cities with new sets of officials and employees, operated to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws, was a misapplication of the operative fact doctrine and would set a gravely dangerous precedent. This view would open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court could declare them unconstitutional.

The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. Accordingly, the 16 Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the 6

Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective, as a matter of equity and fair play, to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts declaration of their unconstitutionality.

(3) There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Moreover, the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress, as a criterion, limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated; municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.

* Re: the split or tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration of the 18 November 2008 Decision. The dissenting opinion stated that a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a nonmajority does not constitute a rule with precedential value.

However, Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides that when, in appealed cases, the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution denying reconsideration, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied. Hence, the 18 November 2008 judgment and the 31 March 2009 resolution stand in full force. These prior majority actions of the 7

Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.

The 18 November 2008 Decision, declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional, was reinstated.

PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS In general laws should be prospective not retroactive. However, there are some exceptions: 1. If the laws themselves povide for their retoractivity (Art. 4 Civil Code). 2. If the laws are remedial in nature. 3. If the statute is penal in nature, provided: a. It is favorable to the accused or convict. b. The accused or convict is not a habitual delinquent as defined in Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code. 4. If the laws are of an emergency nature and are authorized by the police power of the government. (Santos vs. Alvarez 44 O.G. 4259) 5. If the law is curative (necessarily retroactive for the precise purpose to cure errors or irregularities). This kind of law to be valid must not impair vested rights nor affect final judgments. (Frivaldo vs. Comelec and Lee G.R. 120295, June 28, 1996)

Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC CD Facts: In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his contract without availing his vacation or home leave His contract was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment. 8

However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE. On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to $231. Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in teh said contract and the amount paid to him. On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and bonus. While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec 4(a) of E) 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by Burgos.

Held: No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.

Mention of the Doctrine: 1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, DETERMINED BY LAW IN FORCE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; LABOR ARBITER HAS JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS OF OVERSEAS WORKER FILED ON MARCH 31, 1982. - The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same. 2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 797 CREATING THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA); WITHOUT RETROACTIVE APPLICATION; LABOR ARBITER NOT DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION BY EFFECTIVITY OF E.O. 797. - E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect. The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It created the POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." The rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed prior to its effectivity. 3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CURATIVE STATUTE; DEFINED. - A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements.

CURATIVE LAWS Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. 6 [Erectors, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 629 (1996).] They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was 10

invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. 7 [Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs. Dela Serna, 312 SCRA 22 (1999).] Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive. 8 [Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 (1994).]

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC CD Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.

Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

Mention of the Doctrine: But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under 11

the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the core of this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasizedand Lee has not disputed that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8,1995.

It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an 12

incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes 13

the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these womenthe right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.

The Solicitor General argues:

"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative."

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof." It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that 14

citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty." This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.

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Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.

And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed. The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.

And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his Filipino citizenship restored as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he 16

abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

EMERGENCY LAWS Extraordinary or exceptional laws that become effective in a state of emergency and that give the government extraordinary powers, such as the right to establish legal norms the executive is ordinarily not entitled to establish and the right to suspend individual laws or certain of their norms, including constitutional guarantees.*** (Definition not from any Phil. Article, defn from Encyclopedia.)

PENAL STATUTES Prospectivity or Irretrospectivity- means that generally penal laws should have only prospective application (Arts. 21 & 22-RPC). Exception if this is favorable to the accused ( has retroactive effect).Exception to the exception if the accused is a habitual delinquent. Ex. Re-imposition of Death penalty under RA 7659, which took effect on December 31, l993. This cannot be given a retroactive effect on the accused who committed a crime on September 23, l987 ( Pp. vs. Bracamonte- 257 SCRA ).

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Reason behind this provision Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward not backward). The rationale against retroactivity is that a law usually derides rights which may have already becom e vested or impa irs the obligation of contrac t and hence is unconstitutional. Example of a law which can be given a retroactive effect Pres. Decree No. l866 ( which took effect on April 4, l973) penalizesIllegal Possession of Firearms for Reclusion Temporal Maximum to Reclusion Perpetua ( 17 years, 8 months and 1 day to ReclusionPerpetua). This was amended by RA 8294( which took effect on June 6,l997) - wherein the penalty for illegal poss. of firearms is now based on the caliber of the FA if low caliber Prision Correccional in its Max. Period ( 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years); if high powered penalty is Prision Mayor in its Minimum Period- 6 years and 1 day to 8 years.

U.S. vs. Soliman CD Facts: Soliman, testifying in his behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he, with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial judge who presided in the former case acquitted him on the ground that there was room for reasonable doubt. Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in Section 3 of Act No. 1697. However, since judgement was entered on November 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code which was effective on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the judgement convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that statute should not be sustained and the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal liability of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative code had the effect of providing new and distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of perjury.

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(2) Whether or not the new penalties are more favorable to the convict in the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge.

Held: (1) Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury, not expressly, but by implication, and we are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of the code. The old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697. (2) The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that imposed in Section 3 of Act # 1697. Hence, the penalty imposed by the court below must be revoked and the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be imposed.

Mention: We conclude therefore that in any case in which a statute prescribing a penalty for the commission of a specific offense is repealed, and in which the new statute provides new and distinct penalties for the commission of such offense, the penalty which must be imposed on one who committed the offense prior to the enactment of the repealing statute is that one which is more favorable to the convict. (U. S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil. Rep., 241.) It seems important, then, to determine whether the repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code had the effect of providing new and distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of perjury, and whether the new penalties are or are not more favorable to the convict in the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge. Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury, not expressly, but by implication, and we are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of the code. (U. S. vs. Concepcion, 13 Phil. Rep., 424; U. S. vs. Estraa, 16 Phil. Rep., 520.) In the absence of the most express language to the contrary it will not be presumed that it was the intention of the legislator to let false swearing as to a material matter in a court of justice go unpunished, and such would be the effect of the repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697, unless we held that the repeal had the effect of reviving the old statute.

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At the common law the repeal of a repealing act revived the former act (6 Co., 199; 1 Gray, 163; 7 W. & S., 263; 2 Blackstone, 32; 54 N. J. L. J., 175); and the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the repeal of a repealing law has this effect, unless the language of the repealing statute or some general statute provides otherwise. (U. S. vs. Otis, 120 U. S., 52 [115].) Manifestly, with this rule in mind, section 12 of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) which is found in Article III, [Chapter I] dealing with the form and effect of laws in general, provides that "when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided." From which it may fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. Applying this rule, we conclude that the express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697. A comparison of the penalties prescribed in the Penal Code for the commission of the acts of which the accused in the case at bar was convicted, giving him as we should the benefit of the provisions of Act No. 2142, discloses that the penalty prescribed therein is less than that imposed upon the appellant under the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697, and we conclude from what has been said already that the penalty imposed by the court below should be revoked and that in lieu thereof the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be imposed upon the convict. A question has been raised as to whether, admitting that the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury have been revived, the accused can be convicted and penalized thereunder, it appearing that at the time when he testified falsely he was testifying in his own behalf in a criminal case in which he himself was the accused, on trial for the commission of a grave offense.

REMEDIAL LAWS Remedial laws are implemented in our system of government through the pillars of the judicial system, including the prosecutory service, our courts of justice and quasi judicial agencies. We cannot separate remedial law from substantive law. Remedial law does not establish a right. Substantive law establishes that right, but remedial law protects and enforces such right.

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SUBSTANTIVE LAWS VS. PROCEDURAL LAWS Procedural law comprises the set of rules that govern the proceedings of the court in criminal lawsuits as well as civil and administrative proceedings. The court needs to conform to the standards setup by procedural law, while during the proceedings. These rules ensure fair practice and consistency in the "due process". Substantive law is a statutory law that deals with the legal relationship between people or the people and the state. Therefore, substantive law defines the rights and duties of the people, but procedural law lays down the rules with the help of which they are enforced. The differences between the two need to be studied in greater detail, for better understanding.

Bustos vs. Lucero NOT CD Bustos v. Lucero[13]distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words: x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.[14](Citations omitted)

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA CD Facts: Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).

BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction. 21

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 191 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

Mention: In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 provides that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision. Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the Supreme Court entertains ordinary appeals only from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. Judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that "(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Thus, the right of appeal provided in E.O. 226 within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision is clearly not in consonance with the present procedure before this Court. Only decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional Commission (Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections or Commission on Audit), may be brought to the Supreme Court on original petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days form receipt of a copy thereof. 7 22

Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure. Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. 8 In Inciong v. de Guia, 9 a circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases instead of raffling is a common practice and holding that respondent could not go against the circular of this Court until it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary."
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The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.

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