Unconditional Kindness to Strangers

Human Sociality and the Foundation for an Ethical Psychology

Edward E. Sampson
Center for Critical Studies, Berkeley
Abstract. Relational science has become an increasingly important paradigm in psychology. Its emphasis on the centrality of interpersonal relationships to psychological processes and its insistence that such relationships are the key to human survival and well-being appear to be the needed antidote to the problems of the individualistic paradigm. Unfortunately, however, even while talking the language of relationships, relational science continues to walk individualistically. Using Levinas philosophy as the basis, I argue that this problem stems from adopting a conditional understanding of the interpersonal domain; this differs from Levinass insistence on persons unconditional obligations to be responsible for others, especially the stranger. I further argue that these unconditional obligations offer the only basis by which sociality can contribute to human survival and well-being. Four implications and a conclusion for an ethical psychology complete the article. Key Words: ethics, kindness, obligations, relationships, sociality, stranger

In the nal scene of Tennessee Williams play A Streetcar Named Desire (1951), Blanche Du Bois is being led away by the doctor who will escort her to the asylum. She turns to him and utters one of the most well-known lines in all of theater: Whoever you areI have always depended on the kindness of strangers (p. 142). In these few words, Blanche poignantly expresses a truth for all people: in one way or another, everyone relies on others, including the kindness of strangers, for her or his own survival and well-being. Without kindness received from strangers, no one could successfully manage their everyday lives, let alone hope to thrive. In addition to requiring kindness from others, however, people are also said to have obligations to others, both those near and familiar as well as those distant and unfamiliar. In passage after passage, story upon story, the
Theory & Psychology Copyright 2003 Sage Publications. Vol. 13(2): 147175 [0959-3543(200304)13:2;147175;032182]

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Bible, for example, does not simply remind people of their obligations to others but commands them to fulll those obligations. Simply consider the Golden Rules admonition to treat others as one would wish to be treated by them. The story of the Good Samaritan likewise illustrates the rule commanding every person to help strangers, whether they be foreigners or sojourners in need. The Bible is also lled with hospitality rules, including the dire consequences that follow should one fail to follow them: failure is likely to call forth the wrath of God. Interpretations of several biblical stories, including the well-known fate of Sodom and Gomorrah, for example, express these hospitality rules and the biblical injunction to treat strangers in a kindly and hospitable manner, or else. Although the interpretations of the Sodom story that have come down through history emphasize the issue of sexuality, many current interpretations argue that Sodom is less a condemnation of homosexuality than the expression of Gods wrath over the violation of well-known rules demanding the kind treatment of the stranger, not the harsh treatment that the strangers received in Sodom (e.g. Fone, 2000; Gomes, 1996; Helminiak, 1994; Jordon, 1997). The Bible also reminds everyone not to harm the stranger who may harm them. Vengeance is said to be Gods alone. Peoples task is to be kind to their opponents, not to hurt them. In these and many other passages the Bible recognizes the human obligation to the stranger and enjoins everyone to show kindness and be hospitable. It seems clear that this biblically ordained obligation towards the stranger is not based on any expectation of receiving a return kindness from them. This command is not a contractual matter in which a kindness is given as a return for a kindness received or anticipated. Rather, the Bible presents a commandment to be unconditionally kind and hospitable to others, both neighbor and stranger. The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1981, 1988, 1993, 1998, 1999; see also Hand, 1989; Hendley, 2000; Oppenheim, 1997), whose ideas will be examined later in more detail, bases his entire framework on the primary commandment that obligates people to be unconditionally responsible for the other. According to Levinas, every encounter with the other opens each person to her or his responsibility to that other. In agreement with the biblical commandments, Levinas likewise sees this obligation to be non-contractual and asymmetrical, not building on any principle of reciprocity: that is, no return is expected for a kindness given. For Levinas, these unconditional obligations towards others, especially the stranger, dene human sociality and serve as the very bedrock of human relations and morality. Indeed, human life itself is made possible by human sociality, understood by Levinas as peoples capacity to form, to sustain and to nourish interpersonal relationships, and, in particular, to meet their unconditional obligations to others. Although coming at this issue of the foundational quality of human

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sociality from a slightly different starting point, the anthropologist Michael Carrithers (1992) arrives at much the same conclusion as Levinas. Carrithers reminds us that people do not simply spend their lives in relationships, but form and sustain relationships in order to live their lives. Although he does not directly endorse the biblical or Levinasian claim that sociality must build upon unconditional obligations towards the other, I will later insist that only unconditional relationships can serve the vital purposes of sociality that he does endorse. All of these accountsbiblical, Levinas, Carrithers and others we have yet to considerconcur in insisting that the very foundation that makes human life possible is tied to the ability to form, to sustain and to nourish unconditional relationships with others. All agree that human sociality is the foundation for human life. These accounts thereby introduce the two themes that will become central to this article. First, interpersonal relationships (i.e. sociality), including with the stranger, make human life possible. Second, the key to socialitys foundational role lies in peoples unconditional obligations to others. It is interesting to speculate about why these themes were made the centerpiece of the Bible and of Levinas parallel account. Both the biblical account and Levinas selected the two most vulnerable and problematic aspects of human sociality on which to center their attention. The rst, being kind to those nearest and dearest, is thought to be less problematical and thereby requiring less commentary than relationships with strangers, those who are not members of ones home group of familiars. Although abuse and harmful behavior towards familiars and intimates is of near epidemic proportions, on the larger world stage, it is those relationships with the outsider that have resulted in even more substantial social instability and horror, as the literature on prejudice and intergroup relations testies (e.g. Brewer & Miller, 1996; Jones, 1997; Sampson, 1999). With respect to the second themeconditional vs unconditional relationshipsit appears that both the Bible and Levinas consider conditional relationships with others, based on reciprocity or some form of contractual agreement, to be less of a key to human survival and well-being than the far more difcult task of establishing unconditional relationships that obligate us to the other. In other words, when it comes to understanding human sociality as the foundation for human life, the preceding accounts draw a line separating conditional relationships, which play a useful but not dening role, and unconditional relationships, which are considered the sine qua non of human sociality.

Psychologys Relational Paradigm and Sociality I will now expand the inquiry by introducing psychologys account of the foundational quality of human sociality. We will nd both similarities with

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and important differences from the preceding accounts. For present purposes, I will focus on psychologys account as it appears in the newly emerging paradigm commonly referred to as relational science (see, e.g. especially Berscheid, 1999; Reiss, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000). Even a cursory review of recent psychological literature makes it increasingly apparent that a relational paradigm is slowly but surely overtaking the self-contained individualistic view that has heretofore dominated most psychological inquiry and practice (see, e.g., Berscheid, 1999, and Reiss et al., 2000, for a general overview, and Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson, 2000; Hubbard, Dodge, Cillessen, Coie, & Schwartz, 2001; Kenny, Mohr, & Levesque, 2001, for more specic research examples). While the individualistic paradigm hopes to explain human behavior by seeking stable structures and processes that reside within the individual, the relational paradigm seeks its explanatory principles within the relationship jointly created by person and other. The relational paradigm argues that the interpersonal relationship is an emergent system that cannot be reduced to the operation of structures or processes found within any of its constituent parts, making the more individualistic forms of psychological inquiry at best an incomplete portrait, at worst, inaccurate and misleading. For my present purposes, however, what is most important about the relational paradigm is its elevation of human sociality to a foundational principle. Similarities: Sociality as the Foundation Either by ignoring interpersonal relationships or reducing them to properties of the individuals involved, the individualistic paradigm in psychology has failed to address that which is said to be most fundamental about, and, indeed, the very foundation for, all human survival and ourishing, namely human sociality. Berscheid (1999), for example, notes that our relationships with others are both the foundation and the theme of the human condition (p. 261): because our entire lives are spent in relationships, no facet of human psychology can ignore this feature without generating a misleading understanding. Reiss et al. (2000) amplify these remarks, suggesting that most of the psychological structures and processes of interest to psychology today have evolved to facilitate functioning with others and to maintain the ongoing social world necessary for survival and well-being. Sociality within the relational paradigm both emphasizes the evolutionary value of those cognitive and affective skills that are essential for effective group living and sees the interpersonal domain as the essential basis for all facets of human life. In agreement with Carrithers (1992), whose ideas were previously noted, the relational paradigm argues that human survival is rooted in human sociality, in maintaining the interpersonal relationships that are the ground for human life in this world and have been so since its beginnings.

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Among advocates of the relational paradigm, there is general agreement both about the fundamental importance of human sociality and about why sociality has this foundational status. Reiss et al. (2000), for example, call upon various works in evolutionary psychology in support of their contentions regarding the foundational role of the interpersonal domain. They suggest that those who effectively form and sustain interpersonal relationships gain a signicant survival value over those lacking such abilities. Baumeister and Leary (1995) develop their arguments around what they refer to as the human need to belong, to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive and signicant interpersonal relationships (p. 497). Again, the clear message is that interpersonal relationships allow people to survive and thrive. Bugentals (2000) arguments focus on those special human skills that develop in domain-specic ways, including what she refers to as skills requisite to function within the reciprocity domain: learning the skills necessary to keep track of past benets provided by others and reciprocating those benets at a later time (p. 199). Once again, long-term survival benets accrue to those who have developed the interpersonal skills of sociality when compared with those who have not. In emphasizing human sociality, the relational paradigm hopes to restore the missing social (i.e. interpersonal) dimension to the study of psychology and thereby to offer a more complete and accurate understanding of human life. Advocates argue that in ignoring the foundational centrality of interpersonal relationships, the individualistic paradigm offers not only an incomplete portrait of humankind, but, as Reiss et al. (2000), among others, have commented, an inaccurate portrait as well (also see, e.g., Douglas & Ney, 1998). To this point, therefore, the relational paradigms emphasis on socialitys foundational status shares a great deal with the biblical and Levinasian accounts with which I opened this article. Differences: Unconditional Kindness to the Stranger On the other hand, one of the key differences between the relational paradigm in psychology and both the biblical and Levinass account lies in the theme to which I previously alluded: the Bible and Levinas share a deep conviction that the key to understanding the role that sociality plays as the foundation for human life resides in the unconditional obligation all people have to others, especially the stranger. Where obligations to others appear within the relational paradigm in psychology, they tend to be less an unconditional commandment than a reafrmation of the primarily egocentric (i.e. conditional and self-interested) view that continues to dominate psychologys understanding of human relations (see, e.g. Batson, 1990, on this same point). I will argue that this commitment to a conditional view of relationships proves to be the downfall of relational science. A conditional

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account cannot serve the foundational purposes for sociality that the relational model advocates. As Levinas argues, sociality works as a foundational principle only when it operates unconditionally. This difference between relational psychologys conditional version and Levinas unconditional account is thus of major signicance. This is the matter to which I now direct my attention.

Two Different Accounts of Sociality Although psychologys relational paradigm clearly considers human sociality to be foundational, there is an important way in which its understanding of sociality undermines the very claims that it makes about socialitys foundational status. This failure is even noted by prominent advocates. Reiss et al. (2000), for example, comment that even those for whom the relational paradigm is central, somewhat ironically, have treated relationships individualistically, making the lions share of relationship theory and research . . . individualistic in nature (p. 846). I believe that this failure can be better understood if we compare the relational view with the view proffered by Levinas. In brief, while both relational science and Levinas concur in making sociality the foundation of human life, they part company when it comes to their understanding of the specic character of the relationships on which this foundation is based. The key distinction hinges on relational sciences conditional version of sociality and Levinas unconditional account. Conditional Sociality Conditional interpersonal relationships tend to dominate relational psychologys work, weakening the case for sociality. This failure occurs in part because any conditional view of human relationships is less about relationships than all about the individual person or central protagonist. When persons act towards others in anticipation of later receiving some return benet from them; when persons actions are a return for a prior benet received; when persons focus primarily on what can be gained or not lost by virtue of behaving in a kindly manner towards others all of which describe a conditional form of relationshipsociality gives way to an individualistic account centering on the individual person. Somewhat this same point was made over a decade ago by Batson (1990), who referred to what he termed the social egoism of most psychological versions of human relations: insofar as people calculate their own interests in every social encounter, they may appear to act socially towards others, but it inevitably seems to come back to looking out for Number One (p. 337).

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The altruismegoism debate. A helpful way to esh out the social egoism inherent in all conditional forms of relationship, and thus the way in which conditional accounts cannot successfully address sociality, is to consider the debate published in the 1997 issue of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology involving Batson and his associates on one side (e.g. Batson, 1997; Batson et al., 1997) and Cialdini and his, on the other (e.g. Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg,1997; Neuberg et al., 1997). The debate centers on the question of whether people can act altruistically, that is, solely to benet the other (i.e. the unconditional version), as Batson as his associates maintain, or if all kindly acts are invariably coated with selfinterest (i.e. the conditional version), as Cialdini and his team suggest. In a series of complex studies, Batson believes his group has successfully demonstrated unconditional acts of altruism, while in an equally complex series of challenges, the Cialdini group has argued that each and every apparent sign of pure altruism reveals the all too human underbelly of selfinterest and is thereby conditional. For example, if people help others who are in distress, is this purely out of concern with the other or because the help-giver suffers on seeing the others pain and so, in relieving the others pain, is actually relieving her or his own pain? Or, to take another example, do people help others in distress because they anticipate receiving some personal reward, such as 15 minutes of fame for having done so, or is their assistance provided purely with the other in mind? The most recent candidate supporting a conditional account, introduced by the Cialdini group and challenged in its turn by Batsons side, involves the idea that either empathy or perspective taking blurs the boundaries between person and other and thereby makes any kindly act one that simultaneously benets the individual person (see, e.g., Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Presumably, when the boundaries between person and other become blurred through empathy or perspective taking, the two once distinct selves overlap and become one. And so, when people help another, they are actually helping the self. Needless to say, Batson has resisted this view, continuing to envision an unconditional empathy in which, without any conditions attached and without any apparent merging involved, people are concerned about others welfare and so help for no other motive than the desire to alleviate the others suffering. Implications of the debate. I have not introduced this debate in order to seek a resolution: I do not think that one is likely. Rather, the debate illustrates the nature of a conditional as contrasted with an unconditional account of interpersonal relationships. In my view, the issue is not whether people can behave out of self interest (obviously they can and do), but rather, whether self-interested, conditional accounts can serve the purposes of granting

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human sociality the foundational status that many increasingly have argued sociality should have. Can human survival and well-being be founded on any conditional account of the personother relationship, or must that foundation be sought in something akin to Levinas unconditional view? But, prior to developing the case in support of this latter position, I will rst examine the unconditional account as presented by Levinas. Levinas and Unconditional Sociality Levinas (1981, 1988, 1993,1998, 1999; see also Hand, 1989; Hendley, 2000; Oppenheim. 1997) introduces a framework that shares relational psychologys rejection of the individualistic paradigm while also emphasizing the foundational status of human sociality. Furthermore, in agreement with Meads (1934) earlier view and relational sciences current focus, Levinas is clear that the self exists only in and through interpersonal relationships and that meaning and intelligibility likewise emerge only within the interpersonal domain. At the same time, however, his understanding of the role that interpersonal relationships play in the story of human sociality dramatically departs from most of the ideas that psychology in general and relational science in particular describe. There are a few noteworthy exceptions: for example, Batsons (1990) idea that altruistic caring involves an unconditional concern for the others wellbeing; Clark and Mills (1979) distinction between exchange and communal relationships, in which only the latter but not the former is based on an exclusive concern with the other. Overall, however, it is rare to nd any extant psychological analysis that joins these three key elements: considering human survival and well-being as humanitys dominant terminal values; the idea that these values are the ground that makes sociality the central concern of all humankind; and the understanding, primarily from Levinas, that human sociality is based on the primary commandment that unconditionally obligates the person to be responsible for the stranger. Advocate for the other. While all three elements change the focus from the more familiar protagonist, the individual person, to the other person, Levinas forcefully gives privilege to the other, or, as he states it, to the face of the other. In this move, Levinas not only shifts the focus from the individual protagonist to the other, but also emphasizes the fundamental commandment centering on the protagonists irrecusable (the term is his) responsibility for the other. Although I do not intend to develop Levinas framework in great detail, I will focus on those ideas that ground sociality in an unconditional rather than a conditional relationship with the other. Every meeting with the other, says Levinas, is an occasion for accepting ones fundamental and ongoing obligations to the other: to nourish the other with ones own fasting; to meet the others needs without regard for ones

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own projects; to let ones obligations to the other trump both ones own interests and ones loyalties to those close and familiar; to exercise responsibilities beyond any legal or contractual requirements; to be responsible even to others who have done nothing for ones self; to have an ongoing and bottomless debt to the other that is not based on any loan received or anticipated from the other. In short, Levinas focuses all of his attention on the primary commandment, the unconditional obligation each person has to the other. In passage after passage, he afrms that the most fundamental interpersonal requirement, the root basis for all human sociality, is to be there for the other, unconditionally, without strings attached, without expectations of reciprocity or calculations based on contractual understandings. Plainly and simply, the primary commandment is to serve the other. Levinas (1998) describes these unconditional obligations as asymmetrical: the person is responsible to care for the other without any return sought or expected: At the outset, I hardly care what the other is with respect to me, that is his own business; for me, he is above all the one I am responsible for (p. 105). Levinas argues that these asymmetrical and unconditional responsibilities for the other are unlimited, inalienable and hence irrecusable. The responsibilities are unlimited: people are never done with their responsibilities to the other; the obligations are never completed; the commandment is open-ended. No one can just sit back comfortably feeling satised that they have nally completed their service to the other. As Levinas states it, I am never nished with emptying myself of myself (quoted in Hand, 1989, p. 182). The responsibilities are inalienable: people cannot simply hand off to someone else the responsibilities that are uniquely theirs to fulll. A responsibility that can be given to another to take care of, says Levinas, is no responsibility at all. In recognition of the all too human experience of being in a situation and not quite knowing what to do to exercise these responsibilities, Levinas offers a suggestion: simply be there for the other; or in more biblical terms, respond to the face of the other with the declaration, Here I am. Without deliberation. Levinas also argues that this unconditional commandment is not based on reasoned deliberation. Obligations do not issue from the persons rst perceiving the commandment to be responsible to the other, deliberating upon it, and then nally committing him- or herself to it. Levinas considers these unconditional obligations to the other to precede any conscious awareness even of self. The commandment, he argues, is the foundation not only for human relationships but for self-consciousness as well. To clarify this aspect of Levinas view, it will prove helpful to consider Bubers (1958) conception of the IThou in contrast to the IIt relationship. Buber reserves the terms IIt to describe relationships in which the

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individual (as the I) meets the other (as the It) on a more rational, selfconscious and reective basis: for example, the person contemplates the other and in this act notes her or his unique features as one object among many in the world. The individual can readily talk about the other person and describe her or his features. The IThou form of relationship, by contrast, does not issue from standing back from the other as an object that can be known and described and talked about. Rather, this relationship is the direct encounter with the other person as Thou. The encounter cannot be independently represented without exiting the Thou and entering the world of It. When asked, for example, if he believed in God, here is Bubers answer:
If to believe in God means to be able to talk about him in the third person, then I do not believe in God. But if to believe in him means to be able to talk to him, then I do believe in God. . . . God cannot be expressed but only addressed. (quoted in Friedman, 1996, p. 9)

It is clear that for Buber, to talk about God, or anything for that matter, is to establish a mediated rather than an unmediated relationship with the other; the latter is the meeting itself. Although Bubers and Levinas views differ in certain important ways, I believe that Levinas arguments about the unconditional obligations that join person with other are similar to the unmediated view that Buber employs to describe the IThou relationship: the obligations that link person with other are not representations of the idea of an obligation. People do not talk about following the commandment to be unconditionally obligated to the other; in addressing the other, they express this obligation. People do not step back so that they may reect upon the commandment and what it commits them to. Rather, in the face of the other, people are committed unconditionally to the other. In other words, both Levinas and Buber introduce the idea of a direct (i.e. unmediated) encounter with the other. They tell us that if people rst think about the other before relating to them, they step outside the direct meeting with the other and enter into a different realm of relationship. Neither considers this move to be improper, but only a different way of meeting the other. And, at least in the case of Levinas, meetings that are reected upon open the door to conditional forms of relationship that undermine the primary commandment and the human sociality that builds upon it. Concluding comments. I have not provided this brief overview of Levinas account so that psychologists can now debate its empirical validity. My point, rather, pertains to conceptual coherence and integrity. The selfinterested and conditional accounts are awed, not because they are without empirical supports, but because they cannot serve the foundational purposes required by human sociality. In other words, even if research discovered that many or even most people act in terms of self-interest, this would not negate

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the essential role that unconditional relationships serve for human survival and well-being. In brief, if human sociality is the key to human survival and well-being, then it cannot rest on a conditional relationship between person and other. Sociality must be based on an account of the relationship that rests, as Levinas suggests, on a persons fundamental obligation to the stranger without any strings attached. Those strings make any story egoistic; hardly the basis for sociality.

Why Conditional Accounts Fail as a Basis for Sociality I will now examine in more detail why I have argued that a conditional account of interpersonal relationships can neither be the foundation for human sociality nor contribute to its purported role in human survival and well-being. The arguments that appear in the following section form around two main themes and are based in part on some of Levinas ideas that I have just reviewed. First, while purporting to describe an interpersonal relationship, conditional accounts tend to so focus on the individual person or protagonist that any hope for a truly relational account is lost, replaced by the social egoism that Batson (1990) so aptly described and the individualized analyses to which Reiss et al. (2000) referred. Second, the specic arguments on which most conditional accounts are based tend to provide both a shaky and a short-term interpersonal bond, hardly a suitable foundation for something of such monumental importance to human survival and well-being as sociality. Conditional Is Not Relational One of the problems with any conditional form of relationship is that it turns out to be primarily an account centered on the individual protagonist: that is, the focus is upon the benets that accrue to that individual from being kind to others. When the story begins and ends with the protagonist, the others primary role is as an object to be used by the protagonist in the pursuit of her or his own ends. We have moved into the relational world of dialogue, where sociality truly lives, only when persons relate unconditionally to others, without any strings attached, such that both the others unique individuality and the person who is relating to them can follow the command to be responsible for this particular other. In these instances, protagonists neither merge with the other, including them within their own self, nor employ the other as an instrument to complete their own projects. The other remains a distinctive voice addressing this person, this protagonist. I will both develop this argument more fully in the next section dealing with the

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implications of the model of unconditional sociality, and suggest what changes psychology must make to redress this glaring failure. Briey for now, the current psychological discourse on interpersonal relationships tends to create the very conditions that undermine the possibility of dealing with relationships at all. This is not a helpful way to advocate the centrality of sociality to human survival and well-being. Thus to speak of sociality as central to human life while employing what sound like relational concepts but turn out to be primarily individualistically centered on the individual protagonist serves to undo socialitys claimed primacy. It is much as Reiss et al. (2000) suggested, noting the paradoxical quality of even most relational theorists, who remain more individualistic than the relational paradigm advocates. Conditional Arguments Form a Shaky Foundation My second argument about why conditional accounts fail to address sociality focuses on several of the central ideas that have been proposed to support the conditional approach. For the most part, reciprocity, fame and identity have been put forth as the essential conditions for smoothly working interpersonal relationships. I will suggest that each of these offers both a imsy and a short-term basis for serving sociality. Reciprocity. Of the various conditions said to be important to the interpersonal domain, reciprocity stands out as one of the most signicant. Indeed, it is not too extreme to suggest that reciprocity has rewritten the Golden Rule: Do unto others only what you can expect them to do in return for you. Reciprocity insists that the person be kind to the other, for example, either in return for a kindness previously shown by the other or in anticipation of banking a future favor from them. Recall Bugentals (2000) claims suggesting that one of the central cognitive abilities to be learned lies within the reciprocity domain and involves keeping track of past benets provided by others and reciprocating those benets at a later time (p. 199). Calculations involving reciprocity or the presumed social norm of reciprocity proposed by Gouldner (1960) can clearly help smooth out potentially bumpy places that crop up in many interpersonal relationships. On the other hand, reciprocity can cause more grief than it provides help. When the other fails to reciprocate, for example not returning a favor for a favor received, the relationship itself may suffer as tensions build up, anger erupts and distancing results. Similarly, becoming indebted to others may promote what has been referred to as reactance (e.g. Brehm, 1966), leading less to a happy situation than to one fraught with problems. When reciprocity works well, it seems useful in cementing a relationship, at least for a short time. When reciprocity fails, however, it undermines the likelihood that socialitys

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foundational role will be accomplished. The grounds for sociality must be made of sterner stuff than reciprocity. Even staunch relational theorists encounter similar problems in their analyses of the importance of social support for both mental and physical health (e.g. Reiss et al., 2000). How can support be effective, however, if the person in need of such support is aware of its conditional quality? Indeed, support given conditionally may contribute more to the stressful aspects of human relations than to their healthful possibilities. On the other hand, support that is given unconditionally, that clearly says, I will be there for you no matter what, may very well be the key to the frequently found positive correlation between social support and health. It also seems likely that the conditionality of relationships may actually thwart rather than facilitate the survival of human communities and in the long run undo rather than achieve individual well-being. Contractual relationships tend to be built around issues of power and fear (e.g. benets given by the powerful to the less powerful may be withdrawn at any time) more than trust, and so provide a imsy basis for building human communities and achieving individual well-being. Identity and Fame. Much the same form of argument can be made for the other two rationales presented in support of self-interested, conditional accounts. Both those 15 minutes of fame people are promised and the blurring of selfother boundaries that make care for others really care for self provide very shaky foundations for human sociality. Even if fame were to last for 20 minutes or two years, it would still be too eeting, hardly suitable as the basis for something as important to human life as sociality. And a boundary that is blurred today may tomorrow be sharpened sufciently to lead the individual to withdraw all caring, or perhaps even turn caring into resentment and hostility: again, hardly a basis for human sociality. Furthermore, if people are kind to others only insofar as they can construe a strong similarity to those others, achieving overlapping selves (e.g. Aron et al., 1991; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) or a oneness of selves (e.g. Cialdini et al., 1997), this may contribute less to happy interpersonal relationships than to troubling relationships. As some psychological literature reveals, for example, all too often individuals achieve oneness by remaking others into a copy of themselves, thereby denying others a distinctive voice (see, e.g., Sampson, 1993a, 1993b; Tavris, 1992). Studies of racism and other forms of prejudice have suggested how a blurring of selfother boundaries may support rather than reduce the hold of prejudice. Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer and Kraus (1995), for example, found that whites who were color-blind, seeing people of color as like themselves, denied any unique individuality to these people, transforming a diversity of voices into one white voice. These authors join others (e.g. Sampson, 1993a,

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1993b, 1999; Tavris, 1992) in suggesting that oneness may be the new form in which prejudice is packaged. Concluding comments. Although I may have omitted some other rationales offered in support of the conditional accounts of interpersonal relationships, the preceding should be sufcient to clarify why I contend that conditional forms of relationship at best offer a rather shaky and short-term foundation for socialitys serving as the ground for human survival and well-being. It is important to repeat that I am in no way denying that these or other conditional or contractual bases of relationship exist or may even dominate at any given point in a societys history. Nor am I denying that they may facilitate a positive relationship, at least for a short time and under limited circumstances. I am simply suggesting that contracts between persons, explicit or implied, that are designed to cement their relationship provide a less secure basis for that relationship than the Levinasian commandment. If I am obligated to you, but only insofar as I can see something in it for me, then I can withdraw that obligation once I am made aware that perhaps I am not getting out of the deal what I had hoped to receive. While this makes sense in a world founded on so-called rational agreements, it does not work well when considering human sociality as the foundation for human survival and well-being. Most people have come to accept the conditional view as the normative basis for sociality, as the best deal anyone can ever hope to achieve, while forgetting that what is desired can only be found through unconditional obligations to the other. Conditionality has become so much a part of the taken-for-granted everyday background, at least in the current western world, that people hardly notice other possibilities or the risks involved in basing so much of their life together on a conditional form of relationship. Indeed, perhaps cultural cynicism has led people neither to recognize nor to grant much validity to the Levinasian unconditional account. And yet, I submit that only such an account can fulll the promises of human sociality. The Bible, at least in this case, did have an important and valid message: kindness to the stranger is the very basis for human society and individual ourishing.

Implications for Psychology What does it mean for psychological theory and practice to accept the idea that human sociality is the foundation for human life and that this foundation can rest securely only on unconditional relationships of responsibility to others? In this nal section, I will briey introduce four major implications that I believe follow from adopting this framework of unconditional sociality.

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Developing a Genuinely Relational Psychology Although I have already introduced aspects of this theme in discussing why a conditional account is not a relational account and thereby not suited to address human sociality, the implications of this critique warrant a separate discussion. The Levinasian framework of unconditional sociality, when applied to psychology, suggests that, in order to address issues of sociality, psychology must shift its focus from the character who still dominates the eld, the self-contained, autonomous protagonist, to the other person. This change in focus presents psychology with a challenge that is more difcult than it may initially appear. Let me illustrate the nature of this challenge by turning to two so-called relational approaches in psychology that are trapped within the world of the individual person even while speaking as though the other were also important. I will follow these examples with two that offer a clearer picture of what it means to focus on the other. Trapped within the world of the individual protagonist. In order to develop the case in support of my contention that even well-intended relational approaches tend to remain trapped in the world of the individual, I will focus on two studies: Clark and Mills (1979); and Kenny, Mohr and Levesque (2001). Clark and Mills (1979). I previously made reference to Clark and Mills (1979) distinction between two types of relationship: exchange and communal. It is clear from their descriptions that the exchange form remains rmly embedded in the world of the protagonists own needs and interests: not only does that individual seek to maximize benets and minimize costs to the self, but she or he also acts to ensure that reciprocity is accomplished in the exchange with the other. Communal relationships are said to differ in that they move the focus from the protagonists self concerns to her or his concern with the other persons welfare. In spite of the claims Clark and Mills make on behalf of communal relationships, however, even here their focus remains steadfastly on the individual protagonist. The questions that Clark and Mills ask, for example, reveal the extent to which the other is sloughed off while the protagonist remains the centerpiece of interest: (a) Can people have both communal and exchange relationships with the same other? (b) Do some people fail to distinguish between the two types of relationship and so inappropriately treat communal as exchange or vice versa? (c) Do some kinds of people prefer one form of relationship over the other? If so, what kinds of personalities dispose persons to one or the other preference? That these questions do not appear peculiar to most psychologists but rather very reasonable contains the key to the problem that keeps the eld keenly focused on the individual protagonist even while proclaiming otherwise.

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Let me reiterate my point. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with these questions. They are not unusual or idiosyncratic in the eld of psychology. They are very likely to motivate further research that will someday appear in issues of one or another psychology journal and demonstrate the conditions under which people act or fail to act communally. The problem with such questions, rather, is that relationships are reduced to some feature of the protagonist while ignoring both the other person and the dynamics of the relationship itself. In other words, in centering their inquiry on the individual protagonist, not only do Clark and Mills lose the other person, who enters primarily as a functionary in the protagonists world, but also, as previously noted, the personother relationship is reduced to something about the individual protagonist. Relationships, even those purported to be communal and thus concerned with the other person, turn out to be simply another chapter in the story of the individual protagonist. Batson (1990) made a similar point when he commented on how the Clark and Mills work on communal relationships presented merely another version of the social egoism he felt infected almost all of psychology. Although Reiss et al.s (2000) critique of the unfortunate individualizing tendencies of even most relational theorists did not specically refer to Clark and Mills, they could well have offered Clark and Mills work as one further illustration of their argument. I have used this rst example to illustrate the tendency for psychology to abjure anything but the primacy of the individual protagonist. The very questions asked exemplify this deep proclivity to individualize psychological concerns, even while purporting to be discussing relationships. It seems very difcult even for relational science to move from the individuals involved to the properties of the relationship itself (see, e.g., Batson, 1990; Berscheid, 1999; Reiss et al., 2000). Kenny, Mohr and Levesque (2001). The near intractability of the problem also appears in the otherwise excellent program of theory and research recently reported by Kenny et al. (2001). Their work offers a second illustration of the failure of ostensibly relational approaches to deal with the other person. Their approach is to examine the three sources of variance that comprise the personother dyad: (1) the actor or individual protagonist; (2) the situation: in this case, the protagonists partner or other person; and (3) the interaction between person and other treated as an interaction effect in an analysis of variance. In order to undertake their investigation, Kenny et al. developed what they referred to as a social relations model (SRM), which allowed them to examine the relative contribution of each source of variance to the behavior examined: that is, is it the protagonists dispositions, the responses elicited from the partner, or the interaction between these two? While I will not go into the details of Kenny et al.s own research methods or those they summarize from others investigations, one typical design involves what they refer to as a round robin encounter. In this design, for

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example, each person interacts with every other person; the behavior in question (e.g. nonverbal immediacy cues) is recorded on videotape and then coded by independent observers. Although this is not the only design employed, it is typical of the way in which dyadic interaction is studied so that the sources of behavioral variance can be examined. The initial impression of the SRM approach is that it both focuses on the personother relationship and provides data that include the other persons contribution to the behavioral outcomes studied. At long last a serious focus is given to the other. Or is it? On closer examination, it appears that the other, the partner, enters the SRM not as an individual in her or his own right, but primarily as a gure whose role is dened in terms of the protagonist. The following material led me to this conclusion. Kenny et al. begin with the promise that their work will join the growing body of literature that considers the impact of an interaction partner on an individuals perceptions and behavior (p. 129). On reading this, I became hopeful, expecting to nd the transition from person to other clearly in evidence. My hopes were quickly dashed, however, as I read on. The problem emerges when Kenny et al. use the SRM to argue that [i]t would seem reasonable that an individuals dispositional characteristics would affect the behavior of individuals with whom he or she interacts (p. 130). Yes, it is reasonable that the protagonists dispositions elicit responses from the partner: for example, that a friendly act is likely to elicit friendly responses. But what does this mean for the so-called interaction effect on which the entire relational view depends? The two factors that are said to interact are not in fact from two separate variance sources, person and other, but rather from only one, namely the person or protagonist. That is, the interaction is between the protagonists dispositions and the behavior those dispositions elicit from the other person. The other person enters not as a fellow human being with her or his own qualities and characteristics worthy of study, not as the true partner that Kenny et al. claim, but rather only as an adjunct through which the protagonists life plays itself out. In this, the other persons story remains underdeveloped and barely known as such. While talking about relationships, the relationship dissolves into more about the protagonist and very little about the other person, her or his partner. Once again, I am not arguing that there is anything intrinsically wrong with the SRM approach. Nor am I arguing that the protagonists perceptions of the situation or eliciting dispositions are unimportant. Nor am I even suggesting that it is unreasonable to examine how the protagonists dispositions affect her or his behavior and in turn elicit behavior from the other. So much of this is simply part of psychologys everyday background that, of course, it all seems reasonable and perhaps even beyond challenge. What I am arguing, however, is that a relational model cannot be built entirely around the individual protagonists point of view and remain relational.

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When psychology wishes to call itself relational, it must give independent weight to the situation itself: in this case, the other person or partner is the situation that exists independently of the protagonists perceptions of her or him or behavior towards her or him. The problem lies in talking relationally while walking individualistically, a problem that is not unique to the Kenny et al. research, but which their approach highlights. The challenge is not to tell the others story in terms dened by the protagonist, but rather to give the other a voice of her or his own. Changing the Focus from Person to Other. What specically does it mean to move our focus from person to other? In reviewing the literature in psychology proper, I have found two instructive examples illustrating this change in focus. The rst comes from a study recently reported by Bavelas, Coates and Johnson (2000); the other from an earlier and generally forgotten program of research in psychological ecology developed by Roger Barker and his associates (e.g. Barker, 1965; Barker & Gump, 1964; Barker & Wright, 1955). Bavelas, Coates and Johnson (2000). Bavelas et al. (2000) contrasted two models of the dyadic conversation: rst, what they referred to as the autonomous model, which is monologic and individually centered and derives for the most part from the individualistic paradigm; second, what they term a collaborative model, which is dialogic and follows the relational paradigm (also see Fay, Garrod, & Carletta, 2000, who further develop this distinction). According to the autonomous model, conversations are like one-way streets: the conversation originates in one person, who is considered the transmitter, and then moves to the other person, who is the receiver. In this view, the receiver is a kind of passive listener, a speaker in waiting (Bavelas et al., 2000, p. 941), simply awaiting her or his turn in a series of alternating monologues. Rather than involving the duet the collaborative model envisions, the autonomous view represents conversations as a series of alternating solos. According to the collaborative model proposed by Bavelas and her colleagues, receivers are co-creators of the conversation: they add to the transmitters story, modify it, illustrate it, and so forth. Their research demonstrated that even though person as transmitter and other as receiver were strangers, the receiver nevertheless was able to track the transmitters story sufciently to contribute specic and appropriate details (Bavelas et al., 2000, p. 944) on an ever-shifting moment-by-moment basis. Their examination of the microprocesses that occur during a typical conversation revealed the extent to which conversations are joint productions of person and other, transmitter and receiver, collaborative events in which both cocreate the story that is told. In short, conversations are joint activities that belong to neither person nor other, but rather, as Bakhtin (1981, 1986)

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argued some years earlier, are co-productions of both together (also see Sampson, 1993a, especially ch. 9). Bavelas et al.s (2000) research nicely illustrates both the distinction between the individualistic paradigm and its relational challenger and how the other can emerge as a unique person warranting separate attention: the other is not merely an extension of the individual protagonist nor dened in her or his terms. The contrast between the Bavelas et al. approach and that of Kenny et al. (2001) reveals how the former is genuinely and necessarily interested in the others contribution to the joint product, while the latter retains its focus rather clearly on the individual protagonist. For Bavelas et al., the other person is not merely a passive partner but rather is someone who, to employ Levinas terminology, is a true interlocutor: one who does not merely respond, but who has a unique co-creative role in the ongoing encounter between person and other. Bavelas et al. provide a view of the other that points towards the change in focus of which I have spoken. Barkers (1965) psychological ecology. The second example that I believe illustrates the needed shift in focus from person to other involves the rather extensive research program undertaken by Barker (1965) and his colleagues (e.g. Barker & Gump, 1964; Barker & Wright, 1955). What sets Barkers work apart from much of the cognitively centered or biologically rooted work that dominates psychology today is its examination of how a situations ecological requirements set the conditions for the behavior of the persons acting within that situation. In Barkers hands, the situation becomes a living and breathing entity and not merely the passive backdrop against which the individual protagonist acts. One brief example will illustrate both Barkers approach and what I intend in citing it. One of the ways that Barker and his colleagues dene the properties of a situation (or what he refers to as a behavior setting) is in terms of its population requirements: that is, the number of persons that are required to staff all the various components of a given setting. A small high school, for example, that has about as many behavior settings to staff as does a larger high schoole.g. band, drama club, sports teams, classrooms in a wide variety of subjects, etc.will create different pressures on its members to be involved than will a larger high school. For example, suppose that school A has 500 students and roughly 50 behavior settings, while B has 3000 students and approximately the same number of settings. There is much greater pressure on each individual to get involved and participate in A when compared with B. Given the greater number of students relative to settings, each individual in B is somewhat superuous (see Barker & Gump, 1964). What this illustrates is the way in which the situation-as-other has a presence of its own that cannot be reduced to something about the individual protagonists perceptions or eliciting acts. The situation-as-other is a distinct entity with its own properties and causal status; it cannot meaningfully be

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grasped as a mere extension of the protagonist, as known only through them. Although it is true that Barker did not examine otherness dened in terms of the dyadic interaction between people, as in the previously cited research, I believe that the point of his work nevertheless offers us clues about what is otherwise missing in much of psychology. The situation as another person is not merely a foil for the protagonists life to unfold, but rather is an independent world with its own story to tell and its own consequential effects to examine. Concluding comments. My point in all of this has been to suggest that until psychology takes the rst step of granting the other a separate and equal standing with the individual protagonist, we will have neither a truly relational science nor a basis for advocating sociality as the foundation for human survival and well-being. Without that separate focus on the other, psychology not only retains its exclusive focus on the individual protagonists world, but, in so doing, also disrupts the truly relational framework on which socialitys benecial consequences rest. I have not presented these studies by Bavelas et al. and by Barker and his colleagues because they are perfect illustrations of the shift that I have argued is needed; rather, they represent helpful directions that can serve as antidotes to psychologys unfortunate rapture with the individual protagonist. Each attempts to portray an independent other rather than one entirely dened in terms of something about the protagonist. Each treats the other not as a mere adjunct to the protagonist but rather as a distinct interlocutor whose own voice must be heard and whose own effects must be taken into consideration. This turn to the other is precisely what Levinas has advocated, albeit using different terms than those familiar to most psychologists, including these last two more exemplary cases. Levinas commandment obligating person to other is a fundamentally relational view. The other to whom Levinas refers clearly is someone other than the individual protagonist; the other is an independent voice calling out to the protagonist to which she or he must respond. For Levinas, the only way out of the egoism of always dwelling in the protagonists world and considering others as mere adjuncts for the protagonists use is to accept the unconditional obligations of responsibility for the other. Only thus can sociality become the essential ground for human survival and well-being. Guiding Metaphors: From the Marketplace to Caretaking Metaphors are often useful tools that facilitate understanding and the communication of complex ideas and that may also provide a basis for thinking itself (see, e.g., Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). One of the metaphors that has been found especially useful in the social psychological

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approach to interpersonal relationships turns to the economic marketplace: for example, Clark and Mills (1979) concept of an exchange relationship; Bugentals (2000) focus on the reciprocity domain; both Thibaut and Kelleys (1959) and Homans (1961) analysis of groups. Thibaut and Kelley, for example, theorize that peoples decision whether to remain in a relationship or exit and seek an alternative is based on their costbenet comparison between the current relationship and what is available elsewhere. Another use of the marketplace metaphor appears in Walster, Walster and Berscheids (1978) equity theory of justice. Equity theory denes justice in terms of the persons calculations comparing own inputs relative to outcomes with the other persons inputoutcome ratio. Inequity is said to exist when the result of such calculations reveals an imbalance: for example, if the protagonist expends more time and effort in studying for an exam than the other person (the inputs) and yet gets the same grade as the other (e.g. the outcome), both will experience a sense of injustice and in theory at least will seek to restore equity. The preceding examples encourage both psychologists and the general public to whom psychology is given away (e.g. Miller, 1969) to experience interpersonal relationships through the language of the economic marketplace. People dene relationships in terms of exchange and reciprocity; they evaluate relationships by calculating the bottom line. Thinking of interpersonal relationships in marketplace terms readily encourages the social egoism (e.g. Whats in it for me?) to which Batson (1990) referred and the acceptance of conditional relationships (e.g. How are my projects beneted by using you?) discussed by Levinas (1998). How tempting it must be for family and couples therapists to adopt marketplace concepts: to think of the troubled couple as being in an exchange relationship whose accounting books are out of balance; to help each party conduct a costbenet analysis of their relationship; to suggest what needs to be changed in order to balance their interpersonal bookkeeping. Any hint of other standards is lost midst the seductive press of the marketplace metaphor. People are encouraged to negotiate with their partner in order to get a better deal, where the deal is dened in terms of the marketplace terms rather than ethics and morals. Once again, I am not arguing that the marketplace metaphor paints an inaccurate picture of interpersonal relationships. My point, rather, is that this metaphor provides an understanding that undermines the claim that human sociality is the basis for human survival and well-being. As I have previously argued, the conditional sociality that the marketplace formulation describes is incompatible with the vital purposes claimed for sociality. In other words, although it is denitely possible to conceptualize human relationships in marketplace terms, doing so encourages the spread of marketplace ideologies and helps create a kind of self-fullling prophecy: people who believe that the marketplace applies to their lives with others act

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in ways to facilitate the creation of lives formed in these terms. A currently accurate snapshot, unfortunately, does not ensure well-being. Psychologys analysis of relationships, directed by the marketplace metaphor, limits peoples vision and ability to think of alternatives. Most people nd it difcult to envision the world portrayed by Levinas, a world in which people eschew the conditional calculations of the marketplace and accept their unconditional obligations to others. Indeed, many will nd his view na ve and simplistic in a world harshly ruled by the marketplace. Giving to others without expectations of return must sound like a formula for going broke, not for achieving a greater good. Is there a different metaphor, however, that reects Levinas position and that could help people envision what is currently so foreign to them? Although several possibilities come to mind, I nd the caretaking metaphor most apt: for example, parentchild, teacherstudent, gardenergarden, and so forth. The basic thrust of the caretaking metaphor involves a relationship in which the caretaker has obligations to be there for the other. Parents, for example, have these obligations towards their children, typically neverending, life-long and, as Levinas notes, asymmetrical. Even teachers have obligations to their students: to be there and to care for them, albeit in a manner that differs in certain ways from parental obligations, but obligations and responsibilities nevertheless. As the author Jerzy Kosinski (1970) recognized, gardens do not survive, let alone thrive, without careful tending by the gardener: another example of the caretaking metaphor. In a world and era suffused with market calculations, there is no doubt that those who wanted to could readily transform any of these examples of caretaking into an exchange relationship. I am suggesting, however, that though this transformation can be done, it need not be, especially if people hope to nd an alternative to the market view of human relationships. I am also suggesting, and here I necessarily repeat, that if psychology sees its central role as to contribute to human survival and well-being and views human sociality as the key to this achievement, then it surely must seek guiding metaphors that allow sociality to bloom. Although the marketplace may describe the interpersonal world, it tends to encourage both individualization and egocentrism, hardly sources for long-term sociality. The caretaking metaphor suggests another way to consider how we not only can but indeed must relate unconditionally to others in order to give truth to the claims for sociality. A Changed Perspective on Personal Control: From Mastery to Appreciation Levinas discussion of the primacy of the commandment to be unconditionally obliged to the other introduces two essential corollary commandments: rst, for people to follow the primary commandment, they must be willing to

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adopt an attitude of submission towards others rather than seeking mastery over them; and, second, this attitude is both developed and sustained only with particular kinds of institutional context. These two corollaries further increase the distance already apparent between Levinas and the major themes that dominate both modern western culture and the kind of psychology that culture has nourished. They ask people not only to defy the calculations of the marketplace and accept unconditional over conditional forms of relationship with others, but also to defy the cultural emphasis on mastery and control and submit themselves to others in order to appreciate rather than control them. One of the main settings within which either submission or mastery is nurtured, says Levinas, involves places of learning. Given his own background and experience, he suggests that talmudic study illustrates his point. He uses such terms as deference, submission and veneration to describe the students approach to the texts they are to read and from which they are to learn. Only through such an approach, suggests Levinas, will students encounter the texts own message rather than the message that meets their current interests and projects. Paradoxically for todays educational climate, Levinas seems to be arguing that when students and teachers collude by seeking to make lessons relevant to the students current needs, the messages contained within the material tend to get lost. Only by submitting to rather than trying to master and control the material will students encounter the texts own message. Although this example refers to a text, another person can be treated as a text: insofar as people try to master and control others, transforming them into objects relevant to students own interests, the message of the other necessarily yields to the message of the self. I am reminded here of the attitudes said to characterize great writers and artists who claim that they do their best work when they let the material lead them rather than trying to control it. Finding the message carried within the material by submitting to that material, in whatever medium it may appear e.g. writing, painting, music, sculpture, etc.rather than trying forcefully to take charge and thereby overwhelm the material with ones own interests, seems to parallel the attitude that Levinas hopes to imbue in students. I am also reminded of some fascinating work reported on peaceful societies, the small handful of cultures that seem, if not entirely devoid of aggression, at least to minimize hostility both within the group and towards outsiders (see, e.g., Bonta, 1997; Howell & Willis, 1989). One of the prime attitudes that these peaceful societies encourage is an attitude of submission of the sort described by Levinas. Where mastery is encouraged, violence tends to be manifested. Where submission is facilitated, peaceful interpersonal relations are likely to be found. Of course, to western ears, encouraging submission seems to be an alien call, hardly a message one would wish to encourage when socializing children, for example. Or is it?

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What do people hope that their lives with others will create? When mastery over whatever is other leads either to transmuting otherness into selfhood or casting the other aside; when mastery interferes with encountering the other in its terms rather than those needed by the self; when mastery contributes more to hostility than peaceful relations with other peoplewe may wish to take a second look at the unfortunate side of mastery and the benecial side of submission. In order to conduct a genuine dialogue with others, whether text, situation or person, people must abandon their hopes to be in full control of the process. To be in charge, which is what most people are taught to consider desirable, is not to give the other its due but rather to make the other serviceable to a persons own projects. Only when people submit to the dialogue itself, yielding to the other, can they appreciate what another has to say to them. Obviously, not only psychology but much of current western and westernized society is geared to mastery rather than appreciation. Again I repeat. If our goals are to give sociality its foundational status, we must transform our attitudes, ceding mastery to appreciation. And, insofar as this transformation is developed and nurtured within particular institutional settings, we must reevaluate the ways in which both educational and therapeutic settings, for example, participate in afrming mastery or encouraging appreciation. Can people who teach create learning tasks that, rather than directing students to master the material to be learned, facilitate an appreciative approach to such material? What would assignments look like with appreciation as the central goal? How can teachers help students listen to the material speak to them rather than trying to speak to it? Can therapists learn to listen to what their clients say to them, really listen to them? How can therapists overcome their tendencies to make clients into a mirror image of their own life and world, especially tempting when clients come from very diverse backgrounds? Can therapists appreciate clients whose realities dramatically differ from their own and so at long last hear them speak? The Face of the Enemy: From Exclusion to Inclusion One of the most challenging implications of the Levinasian view of unconditional sociality, and the most difcult to accomplish, involves an issue with which both Levinas and Buber have had to wrestle. Briey considering their efforts will lead to a better appreciation of this challenge. In an interview reported in one of his publications, Levinas (1998) was asked if there were some persons, Nazi brutes, for example, who did not have the kind of face to which unconditional kindness must be shown. In other words, are there some forms of evil and persons who do evil who fall

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outside the commandment? Let me paraphrase Levinas response. While recognizing the legitimacy of this question and the extreme challenge it poses to anyone, but especially a Jew with memories of the Holocaust indelibly engraved in his consciousness, Levinas nevertheless offers an unequivocal answer: even the brute has a face; as painful as it may be, we are always obligated to the absolute commandment not to exclude anyone. In short, Levinas accepts peoples fundamental obligations even towards the human beasts of the world. Buber was frequently challenged both by political friends and adversaries with similar questions. Many of these challenges are reported in Friedmans (1996) edited collection on Buber. Does the IThou relationship extend not only to ones opponents but also to those who are evil? As did Levinas, Buber responded afrmatively. For example, in the mid-1950s, when the Nazi atrocities were becoming well known, Buber was not only willing to make conciliatory statements towards Germany but also to accept prizes and honors bestowed on him by Germany, even traveling there to accept these awards. This deeply upset many of his supporters, who wondered how he could afrm such doers of evil. Although it might have been difcult for Buber to follow the message of IThou, he clearly felt he had no real choice without abandoning his lifes project. He was similarly involved later with IsraeliPalestinian rapprochement, something he favored when many of his colleagues sought the annihilation or containment of the Palestinians. Once again, Bubers view of IThou, while often troubling and difcult to follow, allows no other choice without jettisoning the entire framework that has guided his lifes work. Recognizing that people are not perfect in their willingness to follow any commandment let alone what he considers as the primary commandment linking person with other, Levinas suggests that, as painful as it might sometimes be, the primary commandment is without meaning if it cannot be applied to all others equally. Once we begin to make exceptions, formulating what seem to be clear and convincing rationales as to why this or that person or this or that group does not fall under the commandments requirements (e.g. their race is different, their sexual orientation is different, etc.), we start over again with the never-ending history of exclusionary and destructive human relationships. The face of the enemy is still a face to which people are unconditionally obligated. One cannot refuse to fulll these obligations by letting the enemys past record of horrors interfere or by casting them from the human core. Much as was noted in a discussion among psychologists interested in the issue of moral inclusionexclusion (see Opotow, 1990), the real troubles begin once people start to exclude certain others from the realm of the human, removing their face as it were, and not extending moral concern to them.

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Conclusion: Towards a Moral and Ethical Psychology The implications of this article can best be summarized in terms of the main theme it addresses: ethics and morality must return to a position of primacy in the world today. This is especially relevant for psychology, a eld whose teachings have become of increasing societal importance. Following Levinas and the ideas I have presented, a moral and ethical psychology must be rooted in the commandment that unconditionally obligates person to other. If psychology cannot lead people from themselves to the stranger, then what ethical purpose can psychology serve for humankind? Unfortunately, psychologys collusion with societys general narcissism, seen in its commitments to the individual protagonist, has led it in a direction away from the needed ethical stance. Psychology has helped teach people to look inward, to remodel and to refurnish their personal houses, to see the world outside primarily in their own terms. The alchemy of this kind of psychology has transmuted otherness into selfsameness. We can never encounter an ethical stance by living entirely within our own private houses. The wise Rabbi Hillel once observed that if we are not for ourselves, then who will be; but if we are only for ourselves, then what does it really matter? For too long we have accepted the rst part of his counsel while failing to heed the ethical demands proposed by the second. As Blanche Du Bois contemplates her fate, she reects on how much her life has been built upon the kindness of strangers. In a very different context, war in Europe, Brecht (1947) contemplates the virtual impossibility for those, such as himself, who are seeking to create a kindly world, to act with kindness. Finally, Levinas, founding an ethics on unconditional kindness to the stranger, asks us to be taken hostage by the face of the other, whoever he or she may be. No conditions. No self. Whom do we follow? Blanche, reecting on her personal situation, trapped within the world experienced only in her own terms? Brecht, who poignantly expresses his inability to act kindly towards those who have harmed him? Levinas, who sees the face of the other, even the sworn enemy, and yet reaches out to them? Psychology, like much of the world it feeds and feeds off, has embraced Blanches narcissism and encouraged Brechts rationalizations that excuse people from acting morally and ethically towards the stranger. When will we reach out to Levinas?
References Aron, A., Aron, E.N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of other in the self scale and the structure of interpersonal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 596612. Aron, A., Aron, E.N., Tudor, M., & Nelson, G. (1991). Close relationships as

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