Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
A2010
-1-
prof. casis
- Re: Naguiat Enterprises liability Reasoning - The respondents were regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a boundary basis. They offered no evidence that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. They instead submitted documents which had to do with CFTI, not Naguiat Enterprises. - Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person supplying workers to the employer does no have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools or machinery and 2) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of the employer. - Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods without being subject to the control of their employer except as to the result of their work. - Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of Naguiat Enterprises but, in supervising the taxi drivers and determining their employment terms, he was carrying out his responsibility as president of CFTI. - Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in the taxi business. - The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association states that the members of the union are employees of CFTI and for collective and bargaining purposes, the employer is also CFTI. - Re: Antolin Naguiats liability Reasoning - Although he carried the title of general manager, it has not been shown that he had acted in such capacity. - No evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or operation of the business was proferred. - Re: Sergio Naguiats liability Ratio A director or officer may be held solidarly liable with a corporation by a specific provision of law because a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors and officers. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporation agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. In the absence of definite proof of who clearly are the officers of the corporation, the assumption falls on the President of the corporation. Reasoning - In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot be exonerated. - An employer is defined to be any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. - Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs. NLRC held that the identified employer A.C. Ransom Corporation, being an artificial person, must have an officer and in the absence of proof, the president is assumed to be the head of the corporation. - Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family corporations owned by the same family. To the extent that stockholders are actively engaged in the management or business affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance. > Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI obtained reasonable adequate liability insurance. > Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of corporate tort. Tort essentially consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Tort is a breach of legal duty.
INTRODUCTION
NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of Workingmen and Galang) 269 SCRA 565 PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
NATURE Special civil action in the Supreme Court, certiorari FACTS - Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaires contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat was its vice president. Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it was also a family-owned corporation. - Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab drivers. > They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of US$26.50 (for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN) > Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers (including gasoline expenses). > Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the availability of vehicles and earned no less than US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount, they had to make cash deposits to the company which they could withdraw every fifteen days. - AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the military bases in Clark and the services of the respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991. - AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers would be given P500 for ever year as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted this but some refused to do so. - Those who did not accept the initial severance pay disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through the National Organization of Workingmen, they filed a complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union. - The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the drivers P1,200 for every year of service for humanitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier agreement between the CFTI and the drivers union. It also rejected the idea that the CFTI was forced to close it business due to great financial losses and lose opportunity since at the time of its closure it was profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not award separation pay because to impose a monetary obligation to an employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeur would be unfair and unjust. - The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after respondents appealed by granting separation pay to the private respondents. It said that half of the monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid in Philippine pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat as jointly and severally liable.
Petitioners Claim: - Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business was due to the great financial losses and lost business opportunity when Clark Air Base was phased out due to the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. - They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers union to grant the taxi drivers separation pay equivalent to P500 for every year of service. - They allege that Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process beause the petitioners were not furnished copies of the appeal to the NLRC. - They also allege that NOWM cannot make legal representation in behalf of the respondents because the latter should be bound by the decision of the drivers union. Respondents Comments: - The drivers alleged that they were employees of Naguiat Enterprises although their individual applications were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTO and that Naguia Enterprises managed, controlled and supervised their employment. - They averred that they should be entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily earnings or US$15 for working 16 days a month. ISSUES 1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting separation pay 2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the private respondents 3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were liable 4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process HELD 1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion. Ratio Findings of fact of administrative bodies and quasi-judicial bodies are afforded great respect by the Court and are binding except when there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or the decision was arrived at arbitrarily. Reasoning - Respondents showed that their monthly take home pay amounted to no less than $240 and this was not disputed by petitioners. - There is no record or evidence which shows that the closure of the taxi business was brought about by great financial losses no thanks to the Pinatubo eruption. It was rather brought about by the closure of the military bases. - Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The NLRC ruling was correct in terms of US$120 as the computed separation pay. 2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of NOWM and are held in estoppel. Reasoning - NOWM was already representing the respondents before the labor arbiter and the petitioners did not assail their juridical personality then. - Petitioners also acknowledged before the Court that the taxi drivers are themselves parties in the case. 3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is not personally liable whereas Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable.
A2010
-2-
prof. casis
-The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. -Barredo v Garcia (dual charactercivil and criminal of fault or negligence as a source of obligation): "The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued." "It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. -Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. -ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides: "ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant." - According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery," - Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that me preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, its "more congruent with the
arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. The parents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence. Obiter Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict 1) crimes public interest; quasi-delict only private interest 2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage 3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt 4) crime guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil mere preponderance of evidence - Presumptions: 1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both 2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family - basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater familias - motor accidents need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles
A2010
-3-
prof. casis
NATURE Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the CA decision which affirmed in toto the RTCs decision FACTS - Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. **MGs allegations in the complaint: - That she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of good moral character and respected reputation in her community. - That Baksh is an Iranian citizen, residing in Dagupan, and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan. - That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. MG accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They later agreed to get married at the end of the school semester. Petitioner had visited MGs parents to secure their approval of the marriage. Baksh later forced MG to live with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. A day before the filing of the complaint, Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that he is already married to someone in Bacolod. She prayed for payment for damages amounting to Php 45,000 plus additional costs. - Baksh answered with a counterclaim, admitting only the personal circumstances of the parties in the complaint but denied the rest of the allegations. He claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married; neither sought the consent of her parents nor forced her to live in his apt.; did not maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his place after having discovered that she stole his money and passport. He also prayed for 25,000 as moral damages plus misc. expenses. - The RTC, applying Art. 21 CC decided in favor of private respondent. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php 20,000 as moral damages and 3,000 pesos attys. fees plus litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed this decision to respondent CA, contending that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and in ordering him to pay moral damages, attys fees, etc. - Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial courts ruling which prompted Baksh to file this petition for certiorari, raising the single issue of WON Art. 21 applies to this case. ISSUE WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art.21 of the Civil Code HELD 1. YES Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction, Art. 21 may be applied. Reasoning - Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
FACTS - Cinco filed on Feb 25, 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. - Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident. - At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit. - The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioners MFR having been denied, he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu., which in turn dismissed the petition. Plaintiffs claims: - it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision. - Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision - There was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents. Respondents Comments: - They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot. ISSUE WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action HELD YES - Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of the Civil Code. - The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases prvided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. - Petitioners cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code, is so broad that in includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between damage to persons on the one hand and damage to property on the other. The word damage is used in two concepts: the harm done and reparation for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since harm is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted.
A2010
-4-
prof. casis
- Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were issued. - All pleaded not guilty. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates. - In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions. Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands, Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had, in fact, just consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test., and that his hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound, the source of which is urine. Lastly, he said that he was not even present at the crime scene - Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, that he went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. He returned home and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 oclock. The next morning, he busied himself with some chores, which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate. He handled the fertilizers without gloves. He said that he uses his left hand in lighting cigarettes and he had no motive to kill the victims. - Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros - The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, and ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily: 1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00, and actual damages in the amount of P35,755.00, with interest; 2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00, and actual damages in the total amount of P61,785.00, with interest; 3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of P2,003.40, and moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00, with interest; 4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each, with interest. 5. The costs. ISSUES 1. WON the trial court was correct in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt 2. WON the Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treachery 3. WON the Court was correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims HELD 1. YES Ratio Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. The doubt to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence. Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Reasoning - In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well illumined by the moon. Considering the luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them, the victims could distinctly identify their assailants. Also, the constant interaction between them through the years (in the buying and selling of cattle and Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal) would
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above 18 yrs of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and although the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action. Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. - Art.2176 CC, which defines a quasi-delict, is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Art.2176 CC. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Art.21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Art.21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Art.21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
A2010
-5-
prof. casis
1. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court Reasoning - Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest. 2. YES Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one person (in this case, upon his own property) in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. Reasoning [1] To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. [2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. [3] In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. The injury must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong. [4] In this case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right (Art.21 CC) [5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property (See Art.430 CC). DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is REINSTATED.
the victims, although inestimable, may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
A2010
-6-
prof. casis
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. Reasoning - The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). - It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.
. HELD 1. YES Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case. Reasoning - In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. - It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. - As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. - As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasidelict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted . . . and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso." - But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal . 2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict. Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents;
A2010
-71
prof. casis
- Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. - Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. - The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 2 of the Civil Code. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette, Inc) 191 SCRA 195 FERNAN; November 6, 1990
NATURE Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus FACTS - Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. - Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. - In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. - On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent corporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. - On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case. And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.The decision was based on Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." - Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. - On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court . ISSUE WON a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case HELD
Ratio YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." Reasoning - A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. - The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. - In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party. - While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. - It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
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rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." - The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several courts. But the doctrine of the case is controlling in our jurisdiction. - This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. - But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. - In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. - True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
- Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles. ISSUE WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries HELD NO - We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. - We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. - These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration. - It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents. - But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him. - In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon. - As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same
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Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement . Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983. - Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. He was traveling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position. The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an ownertype jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao." The two men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat. - The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fermin Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them. Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation. - December 6, 1983 - Investigating Fiscal Cantos, filed an information against Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. - October 31, 1983 - an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the head." - June 28, 1984 - Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident . These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984. - prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. - The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down, having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard. - On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a customer.
(4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores DISPOSITION petition granted. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside, case REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings.
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bar, the judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence, the court express a finding that the defendants offenses are civil in nature. - The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The SC took the position that the said provision merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act. The acquittal extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground.
and distinct from each other, One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and homicide, but sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz.
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- The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee. DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence. - In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient.
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acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." - In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The cement platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. It is the Courts conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances.
or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third persons suffer damage. Article 1903 presumes negligence, but that presumption is refutable. - In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. - Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. - The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case, if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. - The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence: "The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have
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- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. However, the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. Petitioners negligence contributed only to his own injury and not to the principal occurrenceit was merely an element to the damage caused upon him. Had it been otherwise, parties being mutually in fault, there can be no appointment of damages. The law has no scales to determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief (Railroad v Norton). In this case, petitioner may recover from the defendant, less a sum deemed suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. - Damages are awarded to petitioner at Php5,000, deducting Php 2,500, the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence.
the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" - The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence, compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort. DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by way of moral damages
M.H. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY 7 Phil 359 TRACEY; January 23, 1907
NATURE Action for damages FACTS - the plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 African-American laborers in the employment of defendant, Atlantic, was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars, some behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. At one point, the track sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the cars side, breaking his leg, which was later amputated at the knee. - the plaintiffs witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. This was reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. Also, there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off. - However, the companys officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars. As Rakes was walking along the cars side when the accident occurred, he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted, although not as the primary cause. - Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. ISSUES 1. WON Atlantic is only subsidiarily liable 2. WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner and if so, WON it bars him from recovery HELD 1. NO - By virtue of culpa contractual, Atlantic may be held primarily liable as it failed in its duty to provide safe appliances for the use of its employees. Petitioner need not file charges with the foreman to claim damages from Atlantic; a criminal action is not a requisite for the enforcement of a civil action. 2. YES
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA 241 SCRA 671 VITUG; February 23, 1995
NATURE Petition for review FACTS - In October 1986, Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. Luna. - In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to be- to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. - On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Fil-Am, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident. - In a letter, dated 11 Oct. 1988, Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a VP of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders. However, it failed to inform him about its security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been him who
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have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. - In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. - It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees. - The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort. - Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasidelicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. In contracts and quasicontracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code). - Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below. - Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: - Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. - Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court. DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by
- Fores vs. Miranda explained with great clarity the predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote: Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as follows: - Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; xxx xxx xxx - Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. - By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the parties." - Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. xxx xxx xxx - The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. - Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties
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causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. - Air France did not present evidence that the white man made a prior reservation, nor proved that the white man had better right over the seat; also, if the managers actions could be justified, they should have presented the manager to testify in court but they did not do so - The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes 4. YES - The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not. be essayed. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. 5. YES - Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's. action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. (note: it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract) Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation.43 And is, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and I advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. Reasoning - Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 6. YES, if forms part of the res gestae Ratio. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. - alsoFrom a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". Reasoning - Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene". The petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as evidence, as it was only hearsay. However, the subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Also, the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by an employee of
AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al) 18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ; September 28, 1966
NATURE PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - Carrascoso, a civil engineer, left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48 other Filipino pilgrims. Air France, through PAL, issued plaintiff a first class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right' to the seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane." - both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it, and if such, WON the Court could review the questions of fact Substantive 2. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims, as proved by written documents (tickets) 3. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages, when his action is planted upon breach of contract and thus, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith which the CA allegedly failed to find 4. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France, granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act 5. WON damages are proper in a breach contract 6. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account made by the air-carriers purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay 7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages 8. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorneys fees 9. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive HELD 1. NO, NO Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals, contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it. is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense"."The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the
contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution"; "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. Obiter. - Constitution mandates that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based" and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before" .xxx The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. - FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon".16 They consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue" - QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties 2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. Ratio .A written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Reasoning - Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. However, CA held that Air France should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carriers employees attested that indeed, Carrasco was issued a first class ticket. - If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. -Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in Bangkok, he was granted the first class seat. If there had been no seat, and if the white man had a better right to the seat, then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat? 3. YES Ratio. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. Reasoning - There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby
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- CA affirmed judgment of dismissal; MFR was also denied. ISSUES 1. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with petitioners, or alternatively 2. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana HELD 1. NO Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law between them. A contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract. (RCBC v CA) Reasoning - They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care." Mla Memorial bound itself to provide the concrete box to be sent in the interment. - Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA MEMORIAL provides that: Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association . Pursuant to this, a concrete vault was installed and after the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid. - Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract because it was stated in the brochures that lot may hold single or double internment underground in sealed concrete vault." - "Sealed" meant "closed." Standard dictionaries define seal as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening. - "Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. 2. NO Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family. Reasoning - Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, circumstances of the case do not show negligence. The reason for the boring of the hole was explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said that: When the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water. - Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave. Finding no evidence of negligence, there is no reason to award damages. Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto.
Reasoning - The case should be tried on its merits. But respondent courts premise is incorrect. It is expressly mentioned in Art. 2180 that the liability arises from acts done by pupils or students of the institution. In this sense, PSBA is not liable. But when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, the school makes itself responsible in providing their students with an atmosphere that is conducive for learning. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or explore the realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent wit this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park) 217 SCRA 624 CAMPOS, JR.; January 27, 1993
NATURE Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia familys complaint for damages against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Mla Memorial) FACTS - Juan SYQUIA, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the remains of deceased. - After about a month, preparatory to transferring the remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the same cemetery , the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground . As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface, the Syquias discovered that the vault had a hole approx 3 in. in diameter near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the hole. - Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Paraaque, they caused the opening of the concrete vault and discovered that: (a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding; (b) coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased; (c) entire lining of coffin, clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled. - SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault; (2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault (Art. 2176) - Whatever kind of negligence it has committed, MLA MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the grave of the dead. Trial Courts Ruling - Contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof. - No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and Mla Memorial. - The father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. - The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent the vault from floating away.
NEGLIGENCE
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however, that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversed.
HELD YES - As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. - In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. - The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. - The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, the court thinks, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. - But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. - When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger, he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law. - The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. - The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. - The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. - The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. - Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. - Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case, negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. - The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. It will be noted
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unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter. ISSUE 1. WON the defendants negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries, making the company liable HELD 1. NO - Just because the kids trespassed doesnt mean that the company is not liable for anything bad that might happen to them. However, we also have to look at the proximate cause and the maturity of the plaintiff if it was his negligence that contributed to the principal occurrence of the tragedy. In the case at bar, the Court said that it is of the opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstance of the case." - As regards the maturity of the child, this has to be examined on a case-tocase basis. In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was well grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stands, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away. - We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion , the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was his own act of putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover." DISPOSITION The petition is DISMISSED.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout ( 17 Wall. (84 U.S.), 657), (wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for an injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposed of amusement, if such injury was, under the circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are that "while railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of the case." - The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in severally state courts, saying that (1) That the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation of license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises. However, after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases, both English and America, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout." Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs. Marlow, said that: Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken." - The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressively or impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child form entering premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does not enter under such conditions the owner's failure to make reasonable precaution to guard the child against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, a negligent omission, for which he may and should be held responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose to all the children in the community to unknown perils and
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child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. (Sangco) - Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal that it was not durable after all. Shaped like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured. No contributory negligence from Criselda - CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her. Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
- An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." - On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." - Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. - The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. - Gonzales testimony about what Zhieneth said to the doctor should be accepted because at the time she said it, she was in so much pain and she answered right away. This means she wasnt making it up. It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base. 2. JARCO MKTG, ET AL. - Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. No contributory negligence from Zhieneth - The conclusive presumption favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasidelict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a
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- His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an action will lie to recover damages for death caused by the wrongful act. (Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821.) - In criminal cases- indemnity to the heirs of the deceased is equivalent to P1,000 - Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in criminal cases, I am of the opinion that those reasons do not obtain in fixing the amount of the damages recoverable in the present case. - The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely incidental to the main object sought, which is the punishment of the guilty party. - In a civil action, the principal object is the recovery of damages for wrongful death; and where, as in this case, the defendant is a corporation, not subject to criminal prosecution for the act complained of, the question assumes a vastly different aspect. - There should be a distinction between the civil liability of an ordinary person who, by wrongful act, has caused the death of another; and the civil liability of a corporation, organized primarily for profit, which has caused the death of a person by failure to exercise due care in the prosecution of its business. - The liability of such a corporation for damages must be regarded as a part of the risks which it assumes when it undertakes to promote its own business; and just as it is entitled to earn adequate profits from its business, so it should be made adequately to compensate those who have suffered damage by its negligence.
DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO. 57 PHIL 478 STREET; November 5, 1932
FACTS ***This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for the death of his son, Alberto, resulting from a shock from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission of electricity. - Aug 4, 1930 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on Dimas- Alang St for the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs. - Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its connections smoking. One of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the way. - As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble, he stepped into a garage which was located nearby and asked Jose Soco to telephone the Malabon station of MERALCO that an electrical wire was burning at that place. - Soco transmitted the message at 2.25 p.m. and received answer from the station to the effect that they would send an inspector. - At the time that message was sent the wire had not yet parted, but from the testimony of Demetrio Bingao, one of the witnesses for the defense, it is clear that the end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p.m. - At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home. - Alberto del Rosario , 9 yrs old, who was a few paces ahead of his classmates, Jose Salvador and Saturnino Endrina, all members of the second grade in the public school. - As the three neared the place where the wire was down, Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it. - Jose, who happened to be the son of an electrician, knew never to touch a broken electrical wire (as his dad told him so!)- stopped Saturnino- telling him that the wire might be charged.
- Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped, but Alberto, who was somewhat ahead, said, I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires. - Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they carry a current, but Alberto, no doubt feeling that he was challenged in the matter, put out his index finger and touch the wire. - He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre". - The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. - A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body. Upon being taken to St. Luke's Hospital the child was pronounced dead. - The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid weather proof wire, such as is commonly used by the defendant company for the purpose of conducting electricity for lighting. - The wire was cased in the usual covering, but this had been burned off for some distance from the point where the wire parted. - The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special inspection of these wires at least once in six months, and that all of the company's inspectors were required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind. - There is nothing in the record indicating any particular cause for the parting of the wire.
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ISSUE WON Manila Electric is liable HELD YES Reasoning - When notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger; but more than an 1 hours passed before anyone from MERALCO appeared on the scene, and in the meantime Alberto had been claimed as a victim. - The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of Jose (8 yrs old), doesnt alter the case. - But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359.) - With respect to the amount of damages recoverable, Julian is entitled to recover P250 for expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial of the boy. - Citing Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company : Julian should recover the sum of P1,000 as general damages for loss of service. Disposition judgment reversed
SEPARATE OPINION ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part] - He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the death of Alberto,
but dissents in so far as the decision allows the recovery of the father of the sum of P1,250 only as damages. It should be P 2250.
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Quest. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possession and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem to be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. - This action was instituted about two years after the accident had occured, and after Quest had ceased to be manager and had gone back to the US. Upon these facts, the defendant bases the contention that the action should be considered stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not one where the defense of laches can be properly invoked. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.
CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION [citation] STREET; November 3, 1930
NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS - Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in Manila and plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline. - Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He had a conference with Quest, Phil. Motors manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work. - The work was begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. Quest had the assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to place themselves under Quest's directions. - Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed and thus installed a Zenith carburetor. The engine was tried with gasoline and the result was satisfactory. The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the engine compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the operator to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the engine had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel supply. - It was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear. - The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a few times during the first part of the course, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial, Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and occupied himself with making distillate, with a view
to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results in the engine. - As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occured, as the court found, was P10,000. - CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6 per centum per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with costs. ISSUE WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest HELD YES Ratio When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. Reasoning - The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material near-by. The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed. - Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame. - The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that, as a consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of
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account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the request for pretermination. - Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value because of its pretermination, the caller insisted on the pretermination just the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds, one for P1,800,000.00 and the second for the balance, and that the checks be delivered to her office at Philamlife. Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare the "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination as required by office procedure, and from his desk, the papers, following the processing route, passed through the position analyst, securities clerk, verifier clerk and documentation clerk, before the two cashier's checks, nos. 021759 and 021760 for P1,800,000.00 and P613,215.16, respectively, both payable to Eligia G. Fernando, covering the preterminated placement, were prepared. The two cashier's checks, together with the papers consisting of the money market placement was to be preterminated and the promissory note (No. 35623) to be preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E. de Castro and Celestino Sampiton, Jr., Manager and Administrative Assistant, respectively, in BPI's Treasury Operations Department, both authorized signatories for BPI, who signed the two checks that very morning. Thereafter, the checks went to the dispatcher for delivery. - Later in the same morning, however, the same caller changed the delivery instructions; instead of the checks being delivered to her office at Philamlife, she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, to pick them up. Eustaquio then told her that if it were her niece who was going to get the checks, her niece would have to being a written authorization from her to pick up the checks. This telephone conversation ended with the caller's statement that "definitely" it would be her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, who would pick up the checks. Thus, Eustaquio had to hurriedly go to the dispatcher, Bernardo Laderas, to tell him of the new delivery instructions for the checks; in fact, he changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order slip, writing thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick up. - It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the dispatcher, as shown by the delivery receipt. As it turned out, the same person impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando. Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G. Fernando's placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement. There is also no showing that Eligia G. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks, both of which letters were presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie Fernando, was compared or verified with Eligia G. Fernando's signature in BPI's file. Such purported signature has been established to be forged although it has a "close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G. Fernando. In the afternoon of October 13, 1981, a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G. Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening of a current account. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso, Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened, earlier that year, an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co, a long-standing "valued client" of CBC. What Cuaso indicated in the application form, however, was that the new client was introduced by Valentin Co, and with her initials on the form signifying her approval, she referred the application to the New Accounts Section for processing. As finally proceeds, the application form shows the signature of "Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex, civil status, nationality, occupation
transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser any thing. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. - Remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of druggists, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view is borne out by the Spanish translation, which we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsity, deception, and injury must be present - but not scienter. Dispositive Judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted.
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make to Eligia G. Fernando, a vice-president of Philamlife; b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G. Fernando's account did not do anything about the account's pre-termination; c) Again no verification appears to have been made on Eligia G. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pre-termination and the letter authorizing her niece to pick-up the checks, yet, her signature was in BPI's file; and d) Another step that could have foiled the fraud, but which BPI neglected to take, was requiring before the two checks in controversy were delivered, the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money market placement that was supposedly pre-terminated. The Arbitration Committee, however, belittled petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that of respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the impostor who impersonated Eligia G. Fernando. - The PCHC Board of Directors, however, stated that these withdrawals, without any further showing that the CBC employees had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts (Sec. 56, Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in accepting their checks for deposit and allowing the withdrawals against the same amounted to bad faith cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC liable. - Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. - In the present case, there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees. The Arbitration Committee, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court, however disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks. While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC graver, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. To the extent that the degree of negligence is equated to the proximate cause of the loss, we rule that the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter how many justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. 2. NO - The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor. Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied considering the circumstances of this case. Under this doctrine, where both parties were negligent and such negligence were not contemporaneous, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. - Applying these principles, petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement. Moreover, Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. Hence, a comparison of the signature of Eligia G. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G. Fernando, which respondent CBC did, could not have resulted in the discovery of the fraud. Hence, respondent CBC had no way to discover the fraud at all. In fact the records fail to show that respondent CBC had knowledge, actual or implied, of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and the employees of BPI.
2. In the event that the payee's signature is forged, WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may claim reimbursement from the collecting bank which earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were cleared HELD 1. NO - BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the back of the checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prior endorsements in the checks are genuine. Under this premise petitioner BPI asserts that the presenting or collecting bank, respondent CBC, had an unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on the checks were forged. With these circumstances, petitioner BPI maintains that considerations of relative negligence become totally irrelevant. - In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the collecting bank made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements." Thus, stamped at the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such warranty, the drawee bank would not have paid on the checks. No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation. - Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. If the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof, it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank. However, the point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery. - The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative", and payment made "through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument. The exception to this rule is when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. In this jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule. - In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forged. Following the general rule, the checks are "wholly inoperative" and of no effect. However, the underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable. The issue as to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks. - The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged checks. - The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved in the processing of the pre-termination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call, which nobody in BPI bothered to
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FACTS - About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were assembled in the defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom, when he, the non-Christian Baggay, without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately; and with the same bolo he like wise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan. - For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur, dated February 15, charging the non-Christian Baggay, jr., with murder, because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause was instituted separately from the other, No. 1109, for lesiones. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration, the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the defendant's counsel appealed to this court. ISSUE WON an insane person, exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable HELD YES Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. Reasoning - Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts. - Article 17 of the Penal Code states: Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable. - Article 18 of the same code says: The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject to the following: (1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part. Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.
- Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway - Plaintiffs residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendants tracks run. To enter his premises from the street, plaintiff must cross defendants tracks. - One night, plaintiff drove home in a calesa and, in crossing the tracks to enter his premises, the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries - At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks, the rails were above-gruond, and the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street. - It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but defendant claims the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated, and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident - Trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that plaintiffs negligence was not as great as defendants, awarded plaintiff P1,000. ISSUE WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the principal occurrence or only to his own injury. (If the former, he cannot recover; if the latter, the trial court was correct in apportioning damages) HELD NO Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. Reasoning - Intoxication in itself is not negligence, and no facts, other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated, are stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described. - A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork. DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. No facts to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff.
E.M. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO. 28 Phil 122 MORELAND; October 1, 1914
NATURE An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident FACTS
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ISSUE 1. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque 2. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated the employers prohibition to ride haulage trucks
- it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his employment, in that it happened at the "time" when, and at the "place" where-according to the amended complaint-he was working. However, the accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment. The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of, or arisen from, his employment. It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such work. But, his death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. It was a risk to which any person on board the M/S Pilar II, such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been exposed had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as Filomeno had. - was the accident caused by Filomenos notorious negligence? - "notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to "gross negligence", which, in turn, has been defined as follows: - By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others." (Wall vs. Cameron [1882] 6 Colo., 275; see, also, The Law Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines by Francisco, 2nd ed., p. 877.) - It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence," that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury. - case provides for other jurisprudence which describe instances of gross negligence attributable to employee (see case). - this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act done is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops a cigarette on the pavement and picks it up. So, also, if, while Filomeno Managuit was working, his 2-peso bill merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked up the bill from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely be entitled to compensation, his act being obviously innocent. - since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous, his accident could be attributed to his gross negligence.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 99 PHIL 48 BENGZON; June 30, 1956
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC FACTS - A truck driven by Procopio Macunat, belonging to Marinduque, turned over and hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other laborers. - Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. He has paid nothing, however, to the latter. - Deceaseds wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque as the employer.
HELD 1. YES - Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was a suit for damages against a third person, thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from liability. - The criminal case, however, was not a suit for damages against third persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the indemnity ordered by the court. - At any rate, even if the case was against a third person, the court already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti that criminal prosection of the "other person" does not affect the liability of the employer. - Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against the employer because she has already elected one of the remedies. - This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was the offender's criminal proscution and not all civil action for damages. 2. NO - Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn't be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. - Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks, its violation does not constitute negligence per se, but it may be an evidence of negligence. - Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be declared negligence because the proibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders. - Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies "conscious indifferenece to consequences", "pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury". Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed
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truck. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. 2. NO Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in this case. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. But as far as were concerned and relevant to our discussion in the outline, I formulated it in an issue-type. This is what the Court actually said in the case to prove its just obiter, and its relevant to the main issue on negligence: At this juncture, it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. Obiter [1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways to put it: (a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care, and (b) According to Blacks Law dictionary, Res ipsa loquitur . The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer. [2] In our jurisdiction, and the way we apply it in cases, particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. So, it is inapplicable where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury, or where theres direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. And once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence. In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver. Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against private respondents.
FACTS - In the case at bar, the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. - Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder she was as normal as any other woman. Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a series of examinations which included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery. She and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hozaka, one of the defendants in this case, on June 10, 1985. They agreed that their date at the operating table at the De Los Santos Medical Center, would be on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M.. Dr. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a cholecystectomy operation after examining the documents presented to him. Rogelio E. Ramos, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. She was admitted in the hospital and was with her sister-inlaw, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was also there for moral support. After praying, she was given injections. At the operating room, Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer anesthesia. Although not a member of the hospital staff, Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide moral support to the patient, to them. Herminda was allowed to stay inside the operating room. - Hours later at about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was inside the operating room with the patient, heard somebody say that Dr. Hosaka is already here. She then saw people inside the operating room moving, doing this and that, [and] preparing the patient for the operation. As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan (id., p. 17). Because of the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. The patients nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. Immediately thereafter, she went out of the operating room, and she told Rogelio E. Ramos that something wrong was x x x happening. Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient. - Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). - Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient. The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm. Erlinda Ramos stayed for about four months in the hospital, she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25. She has been in a
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circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care. - The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. - However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. - In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the control of the instrumentality which caused the damage. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. - In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res
proximate cause of Erlindas comatose condition. Corollary thereto, we shall also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents 4. What is the cost for the damages HELD 1. NO - A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of petitioners, the Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of the decision of the appellate court was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos. Based on the other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos, the appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. Thus, no copy of the decision of the appellate court was furnished to the counsel on record. Petitioner, not being a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for filing a motion for reconsideration, referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995. - It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices should be sent to the partys lawyer at his given address. With a few exceptions, notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no notice at all. In the present case, since a copy of the decision of the appellate court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner, there can be no sufficient notice to speak of. Hence, the delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. Moreover, since the Court of Appeals already issued a second Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, which superseded the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995, and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner, we believe that the receipt of the former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of the present petition. Based on this, the petition before us was submitted on time. 2. YES - We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As will hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur. - Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur . Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, if negligence attended the management and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. - Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage. - Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. The phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
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patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to these, the physicians performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely terminated. - In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patients condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioners condition. - The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the formers responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. - In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlindas condition. - Upon these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 4. Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. - Art. 2199. - Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. - Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where
respondents unacceptable. - First of all, Dr. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. Since Dr. Jamora is a pulmonologist, he could not have been capable of properly enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications. Dr. Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergic-mediated processes. Moreover, he is not a pharmacologist and, as such, could not have been capable, as an expert would, of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the supposed culprit, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). - An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. Jamoras testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. - Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. It is the dominant, moving or producing cause. - Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the captain of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlindas cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latters operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlindas condition. - We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting consultants, who are allegedly not hospital employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent than real. - In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for consultant slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. This is particularly true with respondent hospital. - After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand rounds and
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decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record, or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts Substantive - The focal point of the appeal is Dr. Khos testimony. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony, which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA. The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Khos testimony and did not consider it with other portions of Dr. Khos testimony. Also, the phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist. Furthermore, Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first hand knowledge for, as she asserted before the trial court. - It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to Dr. Batiquins testimony, that there was neither any tear on Dr. Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. But the trial court failed to recognized that these were mere denials or negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. - While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. Kho's testimony, a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. Furthermore, no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. The trial court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. Kho handled the piece of rubber, it was not prepared to doubt Dr. Kho's credibility, thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr. Kho's trustworthiness. - Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her positive testimony prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners. As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. - This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." - In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof DISPOSITION Decision affirmed
NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before September 21, 1988. In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses, performed a caesarian operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered the latters baby. - After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. However, the pains still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho suggested that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery. - When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitishyellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas - The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's Discharge Summary. The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated - There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Khos testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUES Procedural WON the court can review questions of fact Substantive WON Dr. Batiquin is liable HELD Procedural YES - While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, there are exceptions, among which are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when the appealed
BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas)
D.M. CONSUNJI V CA
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- Regulations of the City required that all wires be kept three feet from the building. - There was no insulation that could have rendered it safe, because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire (according to appellant, and this was not refuted). Petitioners Claim - Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the construction of the media agua (17% more). Respondents Comment Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the media agua. ISSUE WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence. HELD NO - It was the victim who was guilty of negligence Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. Reasoning - The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence, and in some measure by the too close proximity of the media agua to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the media agua. Had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his media agua, the distance from the wires to the edge of said media agua would have been 3ft and 11 3/8 inches. - The company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. - The violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. He had training and experience for the job. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. - To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident. Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is reversed, and complaint against the Company dismissed.
appellees deceased husband; thus, the last requisite is also present. A reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident. 2. NO Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. There is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC, whereupon payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - August 22, 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Pealoza, hid stepbrother, on Rodriguez Lanuza St, Manila, to repair a leaking media agua. The media agua was just below the window of the third story. - Standing on said media agua, Magno received from his son thru the window a 3x6 galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua and 2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. - his widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. - The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles pm the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was installed there some two years ago before Pealozas house was constructed. During the construction of said house a similar incident took place, with less tragic consequences. The owner of the house complained to defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.
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months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times. - Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. - The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. - Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be without merit. - Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the respondent Court, petitioner filed the petition in the SC. ISSUE WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force majeur HELD NO - Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. - Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y Compaia vs. La Compaia Maritima: 1. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law: Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person. 2. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudenci ,: The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque provideri neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating circumstances. 3. Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been expected. 4. Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English case, said that were a captain uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required of him; and if, under such circumstances, he is overpowered by storm or other natural agency, he is within the rule which gives immunity from the effects of such vis major. The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc. -The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he isincompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. - Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. - The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner
WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs
HELD NO - The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it - The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. - There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. - The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be reversed and in the court of origin another judgment was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against J.V. House for the amount of P1,000, and for the costs of both instances.
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR.; June 16, 1992
FACTS - Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. - Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. - Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. - The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. - Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3)
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Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the old woman that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was unconscious. She was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died 3 hours later. - Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. CA affirmed - Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death ISSUES WON contributory negligence can be used as defense by Genobiagon HELD NO - The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. - "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29, 1947)." (People vs. Quiones, 44 O.G. 1520) Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30,000. Costs against petitioner.
- TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversed the ruling. ISSUE WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from PLDT HELD NO Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Reasoning - The accident was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. > Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the accident mound > That plaintiffs jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDEN MOUND. > Plaintiffs jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. > If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff husband had not exercised the deligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. - The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. Disposition resolutions of respondent CA, dated March 11, 1990 and September 3, 1980, are hereby SET ASIDE, Its original decision, promulgated on September 25, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS) 178 SCRA 422 GRIO-AQUINO; October 22, 1957
NATURE Petition for review of the CAs decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence. FACTS - On Dec 31, 1959, at about 7:30 PM, a rig driven by Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing the street. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. The old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who fell at the middle of the road. The appellant continued to drive on, but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop.
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- It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners. - Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, 17 defines proximate cause as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. - LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. The rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure. - In the case of banks, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. - The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under A2179 CC, to wit: . . . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. In view of this, we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioner.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA (ROMMELS MARKETING CORP.) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA JR; March 14, 1997
NATURE Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming the RTC decision in a civil case FACTS - the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommels Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with the bank but which were not credited, and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank. ISSUE What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74, suffered by the private respondent RMC petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's? HELD - The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad, in validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate, presented by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad, notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished. Ratio Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
Reasoning - There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. - In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. - Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. - Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself. - The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information that of the name of the account holder should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space later on. 11 A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation. Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent. - Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. In the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures. - It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February, 1983, or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years counted from the period when the funds in question were deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May, 1975 to July, 1976) that bank manager Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the practice of his teller Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips. Undoubtedly, this is gross, wanton, and inexcusable negligence in the appellant bank's supervision of its employees.
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ISSUES 1. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event 2. WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event HELD 1. YES - The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Transportation Co., that a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. This conclusion is based on a misapprehension of overall facts. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v De Jesus, et al , We held that, not only are the rulings of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. Co. not binding on this Court but they were also based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and 14 in the rear. - While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. 2. NO Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following essential characteristics: 1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will 2. It must be impossible to foresee the even which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid 3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner 4. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor Reasoning - In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. - Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects, we held in Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al, that: The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer,
instead of that of RMC, the rightful owner of such deposited funds. Precisely, it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly caused damage to RMC, her employer, not the validation of the deposit slip by the teller as the deposit slip was made out by Yabut in her husband's name and to his account. - LAST CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last clear chance," it is my considered view that the doctrine assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. In short, there must be a last and a clear chance, not a last possible chance, to avoid the accident or injury. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself. - In the case at bar, the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so, but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks. - It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statements sent to it monthly or regularly. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut, private respondent should, at least, have taken ordinary care of its concerns, as what the law presumes. Its negligence, therefore, is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury.
JUNTILLA V FONTANAR 136 SCRA 624 GUITERREZ JR; May 31, 1985
NATURE Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu FACTS - Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro, registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar, but actually owned by Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire exploded causing it to turn turtle. Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost consciousness upon landing on the ground. When he came back to his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm, injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back and also found this Omega wrist watch was lost. He went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the City Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to go to site of the accident to look for his watch but the watch was nowhere to be found. - Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu against Fontanar, Banzon, and Camoro, who filed their answer, alleging that the accident was beyond their control taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and slightly used at the time it blew up. - City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu, which reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. Petitioners MFR was denied, hence this appeal.
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Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.
- however, the Commission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the petitioner's request, observing inter alia: In the instant case, the loss of the P10,175.00 under the accountability of Mr. Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office, which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds, the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been aborted. - In the petition at bar, Hernandez claims that the respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen money. He avers he has done only what any reasonable man would have done and should not be held accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no control. - On his decision to take the money home that afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate, he says that the first course was more prudent as he saw it, if only because his home in Marilao was much nearer than his office in Ternate; that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was stronger in Ternate than in Marilao; that what happened was a fortuitous event that could not have reasonably been foreseen, especially on that busy highway. - then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds. Later, however, his successor sided with the petitioner, agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any negligence or, assuming he was guilty of contributory negligence, had made up for it with his efforts to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers, who was eventually convicted. - COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved from his money accountability because it was his own negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had sought to take not to Ternate but to Marilao. Its contention is that the petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour was already late and he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. The memo concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office, the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed.
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR; June 16, 1992
NATURE Petition for Review FACTS - In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. - The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh, "C") issued by Dr. Ernesto G. Brion, plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following injuries: - Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. ISSUES 1. WON Jesus Lim Ongs investigation maybe given weight in the trial 2. WON the collapse was due to force majeure HELD 1. NO - there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling, Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer, He is a graduate of architecture from the St. Louie University in Baguio City. It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated, as an act, of God. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence. 2. NO - Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either
ISSUE WON petitioners acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money HELD NO - This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions, something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did. For most of us, all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might happen, based on common sense and our own experiences, or our intuition, if you will, and without any mystic ability to peer into the future. So it was with the petitioner. - It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person.
Section 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty Notice to Auditor. When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire, theft, or other casualty, the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor General, or the provincial auditor, according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or provincial auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall present his application for relief, with the available evidence in support thereof. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts.
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have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers.' - In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor." In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event. - There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier ,incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse. Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no control whatsoever over the same. Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set aside.
afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin, destroying appellees' cargoes. Before the fire, however, appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant. - On the bases of the foregoing facts, the lower court rendered a decision, ordering Philippine Steam to pay for damages. The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the appellant. Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following: Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ... ISSUE WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the shipowner in this case HELD YES Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so long as the stipulation is not contrary to law, morals, public policy. The stipulation which merely iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes valid. Reasoning - We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there is nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or public policy. - Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not sign the same. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated June 29, 1979, 3 where the Court held that while it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket , he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent." (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49). - Besides, the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code4 Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for nonperformance. The Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not
4
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL) DAVIDE JR; May 21, 1993
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
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one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those located on both ends of the building, which remained intact after the storm. 6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2 diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams. - It then recommended that to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a structural hazard. - In their Complaintii[6] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for damages based on culpa aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others houses. And so they sought to recover from petitioner P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, P300,000.00, as exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorneys fees; plus costs. - In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is in tip-top condition; and furthermore, typhoon Saling was an act of God and therefore beyond human control such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part. - The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular inspection made by the city engineer. Thus, this appeal. ISSUES WON the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school buildings roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon Saling, was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event HELD YES - Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the private respondents. This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. - The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. iii[9] Escriche elaborates it as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that [f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.iv - In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by
'early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient. 2. YES - given that NPC is guilty of negligence. Juan F. Nakipil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. - In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of God,' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor, (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability. - The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are, to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175). Disposition Petition dismissed.
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caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. - The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for any damages it may cause and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage. - In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. - On the other hand, if action is to be based on Art. 1902, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points. - In a decision of the Spanish SC, cited by Manresa, the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be a veritable accident of labor which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905, CC. The present action, however, is not brought under labor laws in effect, but under Art.1905. Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED.
typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school buildings roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than Saling. - In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents house.
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL) 179 SCRA 5 PARAS; November 6, 1989
FACTS - 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. Isabel Lao Juan, (Nana Belen) went to her store, Five Sisters Emporium, to look after the merchandise to see if they were damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood, Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. Her companions, two girls (sales girlls) attempted to help, but were afraid because they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Yabes, the son-in law, upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law, passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post. - 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power Plant Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. - 6-6:30AM June 29, 1967- he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. When he went to INELCO office, he could not see any INELCO lineman. - Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, there was a hollow wound. In the afternoon, the dangling wire was no longer there. - Dr. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn. About the base
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
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hiring and supervision of its drivers. This being the case, the Company is relieved of any responsibility from the accident. Reasoning - In its ruling, the court citing its ruling on Bahia as follows: From this article (2180) two things are apparent: (1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arise a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer or master either n the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after the selection, or both, and (2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much or so little of law) and not juris et de jure (of law and from law), and consequently may be rebutted . - It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. - It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely satisfy itself that Bonifacio possessed a drivers license. A background check was done and he was required to submit various clearances, previous experience, and medical records. He was also made to undergo both theoretical and practical driving tests prior to being hired as driver. In terms of the aspect of supervision, the petitioners raised no questions. Given this, the proof called for under Article 2180 to show diligence of a good father of a family has been met. Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed.
eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. - In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office. - INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" Disposition CA decision, except for the slight modification that actual damages be increased to P48,229.45, is AFFIRMED.
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA (CUSTODIA) 223 SCRA 521 REGALADO; June 21, 1993
FACTS - At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney, then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work, where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25 a day. - While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) bus driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. - As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. - She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined for twentyfour (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three and one half months (31/2). - A complaint for damages was filed by herein private respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by her parents, against all of therein named
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible, Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
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- In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. - Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court's award, without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in the determination thereof, especially since private respondent did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court, and not as a matter of right.
enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence, and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference. 2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family, which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate, to use an oft-quoted phrase, is more often honored in the breach than in the observance. - Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field, through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian Bautista, as its transport supervisor, both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC. - Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii, couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. - The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff. It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180. - Article 2180 applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship, although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry. Employer is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. But, it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the public. - With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC in this instance, the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence. - Due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer.
KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES) 178 SCRA 289 GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989
FACTS - The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. - The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia. The Kramers instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. Petitioners claim: - that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve - that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. ISSUE WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by presciption HELD YES
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there was any confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the third-party complaint, it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original complaint. While these allegations in the proposed third-party complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the main suit, it cannot be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any purpose. - The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim" are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based, or whether the third-party's claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction; or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has, or may have against plaintiffs claim. (Capayas v CFI Albay) The claim of third-party plaintiff, private respondent herein, can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b) abovementioned. 2. YES - The action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four 4 years from the day the cause of action accrued. - It is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. (Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Admistration) - While the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed, since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not be admitted. Disposition petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and declared null and void, and another judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the admission of the third party complaint
ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO) 178 SCRA 526 GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989
NATURE Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in "Joselito Z. Yujuico vs. Hon. Domingo D. Panis, RTC Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp.,"1 and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. FACTS - Mar 25, 1977 - Respondent Yujuico, a ranking officer in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and a member of the family owning control of the said bank, obtained a loan from the said institution in the amount of 500K. Private respondent issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK. - March 25, 1977 the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Phil. It was followed by another resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. - In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo Aurellano as liquidator of GENBANK, Allied acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK, including the receivable due from Yujuico. - Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting Allied to file a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the CFI Manila (now RTC).
- First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. This decision declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK. It was then that Yujuico filed the third party complaint to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party 7 defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations. - Second and current proceeding (1987) Yujuico filed a motion to admit Ammended/Supplemental Answer and a Third Party Complaint to impead the Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants. The complaint alleged that by reason of the tortuous interference by the CB with the affairs of GENBANK, he was prevented from performing his obligation such that he should not be held liable thereon. RTC Judge Mintu denied the third-party complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental answer. The case was re-raffled where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order made by Judge Mintu. Both parties filed for motions of partial reconsideration, which were both denied. - CA, in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied motions, rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order. The RTC judge was found to be in grave abuse of discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party complaint. - Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has already prescribed. Being founded on what was termed as "tortious interference," petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the action against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of action accrued. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1977, the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines, petitioner maintains that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25, 1981. On the other hand, private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12,1986 when the decision in CA (first case)became final and executory. It is contended that while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17,1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7, 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed. ISSUE 1. WON there was ground to admit the third-party complaint 2. WON the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed HELD 1. YES - The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a single transaction. - The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party complaint. There is merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory note, they are seeking, by means of the third-party complaint, to transfer unto the third-party defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK which was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note. If
7
A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiffs claim. The third party complaint is independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint.
CAUSATION
BATACLAN V MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957
FACTS - Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, driven by Saylon, shortly after midnight. While the bus was running very fast on a highway, one of the front tires burst. The bus fell into a canal and turned turtle. Four passengers could not get out, including Bataclan. It appeared that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. Ten men came to help. One of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the four passengers trapped inside. - The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered
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between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. - A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by opening the tanks cover. The accident is thus of the victims own doingan ordinarily prudent person should be aware of the attended risks of cleaning out the tank. This was especially true for the victim, Bertulano, since he was an old hand to septic services and is expected to know the hazards of the job. The victims failure to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. - When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill required in what he attempts to do. As the CA observed, the victims would not have died, had they not opened the tank which they were not authorized to open in the first place. They find it illogical that the septic tank which had been around since the 50s would be the proximate cause of an accident which occurred only 20 years later, especially since no other deaths or injuries related to the tank had ever occurred. Disposition amended decision of the CA is AFFIRMED
bidders, Bertulano, and four other companions including an Alberto Fernando were found dead inside the septic tank. The City Engineers office, upon investigation, found that the men entered without clearance or consent of the market master. They apparently did the re-emptying as the tank was nearly empty. The autopsy showed that the victims died of asphyxia caused by lack of oxygen supply in the body. Their lungs had burst due to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from the waste matter in said tank. *Di nakalagay sa case, pero mukhang kinasuhan ni Sofia Fernando yung Davao City for negligence in a previous case dahil namatay yung asawa nya - Upon dismissal of the case by the TC, petitioners appealed to then IAC (now CA) which set aside the judgment and rendered a new one, granting the families of the deceased men P30k each in compensatory damages, P20k each as moral damages and P10k for attorneys fees. - Both parties filed their separate MFRs; the CA rendered an amended decision granting Davao Citys MFR, dismissing the case. Hence this petition. ISSUES 1. WON Davao City is guilty of negligence 2. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims HELD 1. NO - Although public respondent had been remiss in its duty to re-empty the tank annually (for almost 20 years), such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the market master about the need to clean said tank, it immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Public respondent lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. Also, public respondents failure to empty the tank had not caused any sanitary accidents despite its proximity to several homes and the public market as it was covered in lead and was air-tight. In fact, the public toilet connected to it was used several times daily all those years, and all those people have remained unscathed which is ironically evidenced by the petitioners witnesses. The only indication that the tank was full was when water began to leak, and even then no reports of casualties from gas poising emerged. - Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in the tanks backfired as their witnesses were no experts. Neither did they present competent evidence to corroborate their testimonies and rebut the city government engineer Alindadas testimony that safety requirements for the tank had been complied with. - The Court also does not agree with petitioners contention that warning signs of noxious gas should be placed around the area of the toilets and septic tank. As defined in Art 694 of the NCC, they are not nuisances per se which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. - Petitioners contention that the market master should have been supervising the area of the tank is also untenable. Work on the tank was still forthcoming since the awarding to the winning bidder was yet to be made by the Committee on Awardshence, there was nothing to supervise. 2. NO - Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. To be entitled to damages, one must prove under Art 2179 of the NCC that the defendants negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. A test for such a relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. which states that a distinction must be made between the accident and the injury,
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PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. (CARBONEL) VS. IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO, MARCH 10, 1987
NATURE Petition for review FACTS -About 1:30 am, Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was driving home (he lived in Bangkal, Makati) from cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken a shot or two of liquor. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts. At Bangkal, Makati (not far from his home) and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street without headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. (PHOENIX), which was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIOs lane). The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel (CARBONEL), its regular driver, with the permission of his employer PHOENIX, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, DIONISIO claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, DIONISIO suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. DIONISIOs claim: the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix PHOENIX + CARBONELs claim: the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass; if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. TC: in favor of Dionisio, awarded damages in favor of Dionisio IAC: in favor of Dionisio, reduced the damages awarded ISSUES Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer substantial justice without remanding the case to the lower court since both TC and IAC did not consider defenses set by petitioners) 1. WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night 2. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; 3. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck 4. WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Substantial Issues: 5. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked
which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death. Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied) - Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. - In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died. If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused . And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. - Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. - A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause DISPOSITION :. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide.
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intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk. Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass . Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; x x x. The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. x x x [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it - - "
4. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE ANYTHING. EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken to Makati med + Dionisio admitted he had taken a shot or two - not enough evidence to show how much liquor Dionisio had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. "One shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently. SUBSTANTIAL 5. YES. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts a. NO. Besides, this argument had no validity under our jurisdiction and even in the United States, the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. - the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause; Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.
FROM PROF. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case the latter am the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause ." "Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances , the defendant may be negligent , among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it ; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. x x x In all of these cases there is an
b. NO. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. -The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. 6. NO. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its track driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. 7. YES. Taking into account the comparative negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners, the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. As to the other awards of damages, sustain.
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HELD 1. Yes. -Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. -What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. -The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. -That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower courts finding: Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorists especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman, none was found at the scene of the accident. -The provisions of Article 2189 9 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision is tantamount to negligence which renders the City government liable -Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on city streets with light traffic, as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code. -These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time in their Motion for Reconsideration. -It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. -Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondents car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.
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PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES) 234 SCRA 435 PUNO; July 25, 1994
NATURE - Petition for review of CA decision FACTS - FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks. These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. in amount of P21T due Oct.10, 1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount of P11.4T due Oct.12. - To cover the face value of the checks, he requested PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of P32T from his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK. - PILIPINAS BANKS Current Account Bookkeeper made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for a certain FLORENCIO AMADOR. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. - On Oct.11, the Oct.10 check in favor of WINNER INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. - It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The same thing happened to the Oct.12 check. The payee then demanded a cash payment of the checks face value which REYES did if only to save his name. - Furious, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. That was only when they noticed the error. RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory damages, P100T moral damages, P25T attorneys fees, as well as costs of suit. CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and P25T attorneys fees and costs of suit. ISSUE WON Art.21798 of NCC is applicable
HELD NO - For it to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence." Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. - The bank employee is deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. Dispositive Petition denied.
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory , the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
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the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away. Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with the modification that the award of moral damages is deleted.
URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES) 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ; January 7, 1988
Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court Facts:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier admitted that he was the one responsible for what happened. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand . Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. On November 14,1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital. Appellants claim: -there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death -the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980 - Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD: Yes. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. Reasoning: -The case involves the application of Article 410 of the Revised Penal Code.
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Art. 4. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended x x x." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom
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- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85: SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. - In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation: SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage. The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxx xxx f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order. - Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots: Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions. xxx xxx xxx Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels. ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent HELD YES. - The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent. PILOT
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. '(45 C.J. pp. 931-932)." (at p. 125)
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meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance. 2. YES. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus, and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory negligence, because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the road, it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board, the owners of the two vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other springs from a quasidelict. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. Dispositive Judgment affirmed.
SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET AL 17 SCRA 1088 CONCEPCION; August 31, 1966
NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS In Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven by Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as truck was full of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda. As a result, Custodio was injured and died. To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales. However, Makabuhay, widoy of Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio. The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed. Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks. Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. hereinafter referred to as the carrier and its driver Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable. ISSUES 1. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence 2. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver HELD 1. YES. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari, such as the one at bar. At any rate, the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven
VDA. DE BATACLAN VS. MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite FACTS - Shortly after midnight, a bus of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about 18 passengers, including the driver and conductor. - At about 2am, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. - the three passengers Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. - Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus. Calls or shouts for help were made to
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-The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of Rabbit - Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway, or after stopping for a couple of minutes, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries. - At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles following the jeepney, neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day was fair. - A criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. - Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned. The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. ***As regards the damages. - Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses (owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon, (jeepney driver)Manalo, Rabbit and (Rabbits driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants. - Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. - As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. - Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. (the insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as additional defendant in the civil case filed by the Pascuas. - Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were for medical expenses, burial expenses, loss of wages, for exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. - Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. - On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and for its non-use during the period of repairs. - TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENT and held that there was a breach of the contract of carriage with their passengers; ordered them to pay the damages. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it was the jeepneys insurer. Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney party for actual damages. - IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found delos Reyes to be negligent; ordered to pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs; Applied primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that delos Reyes was negligent. ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF THE JEEPNEY HELD: YES. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS ARE LIABLE. REASONING: TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS CONCERNING MANALOS NEGLIGENCE. (1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning (2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on the
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. - According to the evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers - The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. - In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Note: This case was under the heading but for. I dont know if the italicized phrases are pertinent, but these were the only ones that contained but for.
DISPOSITION In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased to P6,000 and P800, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v. IAC & CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., 189 SCRA 158 MEDIALDEA/August 30, 1990
NATURE: CERTIORARI FACTS: - This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who died as a result of the collision between the Phil. Rabbits bus driven by Tomas delos Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo. - Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical injuries. - It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio, the jeepneys right rear wheel detached which caused it to run in an unbalanced position. -Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going).
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Nature: Petition to review the decision of the IAC Facts: - at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975, Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. - Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters away from his car. - The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of the street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights or any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. - The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. - Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. - As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. - Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. IAC affirmed the lower courts ruling, with modification on award of damages. Petitionerscomments - the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. - if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a " passive and static condition " and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. (NOTE: this was the contention of petitioners which SC noted in is decision) Private respondents comments - the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix Issue: WON the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisios negligence (driving faster than he should have, and without headlights) or the negligence of the driver in parking the truck. Held: - it is the drivers negligence. (see previous digest) - ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c, page 5 of outline) - petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States. These arguments, however, do not have any validity in this jurisdiction.
- To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him. - Also, It was shown by the pictures that driver delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have been due to limitations of space and time. - That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane: Under such a situation, he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside as the jeepney then was abruptly making a U-turn. -SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice. - In culpa contractual , the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657). - To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day before the collision, which included the tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain, much less establish, it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. . . . -In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75). ***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners (excluding Manalo) -the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. CA, et al., April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). - if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal, contradictory to the explicit provision of A 2181 of the NCC. DISPOSITION: TC S DECISION WAS REINSTATED and AFFIRMED BUT MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE AND THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP. INC WERE LIABLE. AFFIRMED TOO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC v IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO; Mar 10, 1987
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strong materials. Plaintiffs say that the company failed to supervise their employees properly and was negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without smokestack protection for arresting sparks. They also say that the sparks were produced by an inferior fuel used by the company Bataan coal. Defense said Rodiguezas house stood partly within limits of land owned by company. Rodrigueza didnt mind the warnings from the company. His houses materials included nipa and cogon, this indicates contributory negligence on his part. Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad, which appealed. ISSUE WON damage was caused by Rodriguezas contributory negligence HELD Yes. - Manila Railroads defense is not a bar to recovery by the other plaintiffs. - There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon companys property. His house was there before the railroad companys property. He may be at risk for fire, but should not bear loss if the fire resulted from the companys negligence. - The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage was the negligent act of the company. That Rodriguezas house was near was an ANTECEDENT CONDITION but that cant be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE because that condition was not created by himself and because his house remained by the toleration and consent of company and because even if the house was improperly there, company had no right to negligently destroy it. The company could have removed the house through its power of eminent domain.
the said window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, he turned around and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua, electrocuting him and killing him. - His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company and the TC rendered judgment in their favor. The Company appealed to the CA, which affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision the Company now seeks to appeal. ISSUE WON the Companys negligence in the installation and maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of the death HELD No. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury to occur). Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter's length of 6 feet. - The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution. Disposition CA decision reversed. Complaint against company dismissed
MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG 211 SCRA 517 DAVIDE; July 16, 1992
NATURE Appeal from decision of the IAC FACTS - A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort. - When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. - Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977. - On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.
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good father of a family to prevent the damage. The answers of the private respondents in the civil cases did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it. On the separate civil and criminal actions - The civil cases, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of criminal case. They were eventually consolidated for joint trial. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to consolidate criminal case with the civil cases, or vice-versa. - Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least expense to the parties litigants, would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two judges appreciating, according to their respective orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this case. - The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. In the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. Dispositive Petition granted. Assailed decision set aside while its original is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee
been defined as: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred; the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
- Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the
initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. - The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. - Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. - Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident. - As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a
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accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation. Dispositive Decision appealed from is affirmed.
2. NO. Reasoning It was the use of the building for school purposes which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance; and it was the petitioner and not the owners who were responsible for such use. 3. YES. Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by settling other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result there from. [Citing Bataclan v Medina] - The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death. The violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. - A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. [Citing MERALCO v Remoquillo] - According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it was precisely such contingencies or events that the authors of the ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. - To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more
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1. WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and owner of the truck (answered by WON CA correctly applied the doctrine of last clear chance) HELD: 1. NO Ratio: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only between the negligent parties. It does not apply in a case wherein a victim (who is an outsider to the cause of the accident) demands liability from the negligent parties. Reasoning: The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident (Sangco). A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (Am. Jur). As against 3rd persons, a negligent actor cant defend by saying that another had negligently failed to take action which would have avoided injury. Disposition: Petition GRANTED. Defendants Del Pilar and Montesiano ordered to pay damages with other defendants
foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case, negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. It will be noted however, that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND MONTESIANO) 193 SCRA 603 MEDIALDEA; February 6, 1991
NATURE: petition for certiorari to review decision of CA FACTS: a truck and a passenger bus sideswept each other, causing the deaths of the passengers of the bus. This is the way the collision happened: The bus, driven by Susulin, was traversing an inclined road when the driver saw from 30 meters away an approaching truck (driven by Montesiano), going very fast and the front wheels wiggling. The bus driver also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the truck driver was merely joking, Susulin shifted from 4th to 3rd gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. The heirs of the victims filed for damages. The RTC awarded damages, saying that the negligent acts of both drivers were the cause of the accident, thus their liability must be solidary. The driver and owner of the truck appealed to the CA, which was denied at first, but was granted on MFR, absolving the defendants based on the doctrine of last clear chance, saying that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the same. ISSUES:
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO; March 10, 1987
NATURE PETITION for review of the decision of the IAC FACTS - 130AM 15 November 1975 - Leonardo Dionisio, driving his Volkswagen car, was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. was parked askew (partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
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respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number, she made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth and in fact, they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. - Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a collection suit before RTC Pasig, which found petitioner bank negligent and ordered the bank and Mabayad to pay RMC jointly and severally P304,979.72, plus damages, attornets fees and costs of suit. - CA affirmed, but modified the award of damages. Issue: Whether the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74, suffered by the private respondent RMC is petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's. Held: It was the negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. - There are three elements of a quasi-delict : (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. - Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. - Picart v. Smith. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case : Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. - the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate. - Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. - Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.
the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission, To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society. Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA (LIPANA) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA; March 14, 1997
Nature: Petition to review decision of CA Facts: - Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, filed a complaint to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC), now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank, P304, 979.74 representing various deposits RMC made in its current account with said bank. The amount was not credited to RMCs account but was instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. - RMC maintained two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. - From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank. - During this period, petitioner bank had been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately, it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank. -Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account number. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private
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3. Roranes' testimony, given in plaintiffs' behalf, was "not as clear and detailed as that of Zacarias," and was "uncertain and even contradicted by the physical facts and the police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia." 4. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene, and none by the jeep, demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had not; and that the jeep had on impact fallen on its right side is indication that it was running at high speed. 5. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision, in that he had caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of the road, Engr. Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he still had ample room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck, or he could simply have braked to a full stop. - IAC reversed TC. It found Zacarias to be negligent on the basis of the following circumstances, to wit: 1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision occurred,' and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters, he "did not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep . . .;" what is worse, "the truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still within the lane of the jeep;" had both vehicles stayed in their respective lanes, the collision would never have occurred, they would have passed "along side each other safely;" 2) Zacarias had no license at the time; what he handed to Pfc. Esparcia, on the latter's demand, was the 'driver's license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro;" 3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against Zacarias should not be taken against "plaintiffs" Roranes and Patos who had the right, under the law, to opt merely to bring a civil suit. ISSUES WON respondent court is correct in reversing the decision of trial court. HELD NO. Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability. (Picart v Smith) Reasoning Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck , by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path. -Picart v Smith: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of
therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so, but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks. It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statement sent to it monthly or regularly. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut, private respondent should, at least, have taken care of its concerns, as what the law presumes. Its negligence, therefore, is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury.
GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA. DE CALIBO and kids)
GR No.70493 NARVASA; May 18, 1989 NATURE Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court which, it is claimed, ignored or ran counter to the established facts. FACTS - Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that time, the cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep, including its fender and hood, was extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road. - On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck. - Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and defendants' counterclaim) "for insufficiency of evidence." The circumstances leading to the conclusion just mentioned: 1. Moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias, the jeep of the deceased Calibo was "zigzagging." 2. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police, Calibo's companions who suffered injuries on account of the collision, refused to be so investigated or give statements to the police officers. This, plus Roranes' waiver of the right to institute criminal proceedings against Zacarias, and the fact that indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in Court against Zacarias, were "telling indications that they did not attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias' negligence or fault."
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-When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over their acts. Although this presumption is only a disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a family, this Court believes that the evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family iti the case of Ramirez, as a company driver is far from sufficient
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC v CAR BASCOS BAESA 179 SCRA 384 CORTES J.: November 1989
FACTS: At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim, Marceline and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to MaIalam, River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it. - David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively damaged. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago, Isabela. From that time on up to the present, Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding. - Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and for her minor children, filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. Other victims settled with Bus Company. -PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez -TC ruled against PANTRANCO and ordered them to pay damages. -Pantranco appealed the decision. Appeal dismissed for lack of merit ISSUE: WON PANTRANCO is liable for damages.
HELD: YES -Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm. -petitioner claims that the original negligence of its driver was not the proximate cause of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident - The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. -The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff - The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case - Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it - In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. - Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. At the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. - This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered" - Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 4136** which provides that the driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either direction on such through highway. -Petitioner's misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in this case. The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a through highway or a stop intersection. At the time of the accident, the jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam River -On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner claims that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
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CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L.C.DIAZ AND CO.) GR No. 138569 CARPIO; September 11, 2003
NATURE Review of the decision of the CA FACTS - LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in accounting. On 14 August 1991, LC diaz, thru its cashier, instructed their messenger, Calapre, to deposit money in Solidbank. Calapre then deposited in Solidbank. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When he came back, the teller told him that somebody else got the passbook. The next day, it was learned that 300k was withdrawn from the account. - An information for estafa was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola. LC Diaz demanded SolidBank the return of their money. The latter refused and a case for recovery of a sum of money was filed against them - TC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook. The rules state that possession of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor personally. Also, they applied the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed the owner. It was also held that Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook and as such, their act was not the proximate cause of the loss. The proximate cause was LC Diaz negligence. - CA revered. It ruled that Solidbanks negligence was the proximate cause. It applied the provision on the CC on quasi delicts and found that the requisite elements were present. They found that the teller made no inquiry upon the withdrawal of 300k. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was significant. The appellate court ruled that while L.C. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller, Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of last clear chance. Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered by L.C. Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to verify the withdrawal. ISSUES WON Solidbank was liable HELD - For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor. - When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. Likewise, Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative - In culpa contractual , once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. Solidbank failed to discharge this burden. (they could have presented the teller to whom the passbook was left, but they didnt)
ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity. WON ASB must incur the resulting loss Yes. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. In the case under consideration, from the evidence on hand it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity; and yet, the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. Magno, covering the same parcels of land in question. Applying Art. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled property. The business of a bank is affected with public interest, holding in trust the money of the depositors, which bank deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith, by reason of which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law, accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith. Evidently, the efforts exerted by the bank to verify the identity of the couple posing as Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of the responsibility of the bank to observe more than the diligence of a good father of a family. The negligence of respondent bank was magnified by the fact that the previous deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking the genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas spouses) did not bear the tax account number of the spouses, as well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas. But such fact notwithstanding, the bank did not require the impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity. For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, whose business is impressed with public interest, respondent Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon. Disposition WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 25242 SET ASIDE. The Decision of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. M-028 is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
1wphi1.nt
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and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. - On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. Petitioners Claim The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own the dog that bit her. Respondents Comments The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. ISSUE WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog. HELD Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. Reasoning ART. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. - While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. - There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly. - Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. - It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. - Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. DISPOSITION The Court approves the time.
1. YES. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left. Petitioners acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. But what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. There was no clear chance to speak of. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioners pick-up, which was already on a head to head position going against Irans Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that Iran could have avoided a head-on collision. Dispositive The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
STRICT LIABILITY
VESTIL V IAC (UY) 179 SCRA 47 CRUZ; December 6, 1989
NATURE Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court. FACTS - July 29, 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead. She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. - Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies - Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. - Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants. IAC found that the Vestils were in possession of the house
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The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. - If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover. - In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance. - Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant company did not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles. - These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.
- One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. - It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. in Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. - According to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning. - The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. - Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses. - Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act No. 3428, as amended, is unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the equal protection of the law, and impairs the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan, and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code. ISSUE WON the employer is liable to pay the employees heirs. RULING NO. - As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not approved until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of which reads as follows: When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. - The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. - At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant. - The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. - The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". Discussing this phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial Board, said:
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA (GERONIMO) 227 SCRA 292 DAVIDE, JR.; October 18, 1993
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan. - August 12, 1989 - A group of parents complained that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from Geronimos store. Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the Department of Health office in their region and was informed that the soda samples she sent were adulterated. - Because of this, Geronimos sales plummeted with her regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3 cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day which later on forced her to close down her business on December 12, 1989.
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- In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be used by them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan. - Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC Chuan. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. The CA, on appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial court and the CA awarded legal fees only. ISSUE - WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract HELD- Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. In the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latters property right. Reasoning- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damges are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial; c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion;
- Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period. - Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. ISSUE WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties HELD YES - Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. - Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed
SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua) GR No. 120554 Quisumbing; September 21, 1999
NATURE Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision FACTS - In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok, entered into a lease agreement with D.C. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. The contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the same, they continued on a month to month basis. In 1976, Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation, Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. - So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, occupied the same stalls under the business name, Trendsetter Marketing. - In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1, 1990 was implemented. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing. While the letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed, the same were not rescinded.
d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules. - On the other hand, the elemts of tort interference are a) existence of a valid contract b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse - Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference. - The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages.
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meat, an owl that affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. - After hearing the evidence adduced during trial, the judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, holding all the defendants (except for Reyes, Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in a subordinate position and found to have merely acted under the direction of their superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of petitioners wounded feelings, mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of P35,000 as well as P25,000 as punitive damages. - This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC, claiming that the CFI committed several errors in rendering said judgment among which was that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants. ISSUE WON the defendants, regardless of their participation in the commission of the actual tort, may be held jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors HELD YES. Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. ***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might have sued jointly and severally, as they were. It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. **note: Ponente used examples of torts as held under common law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by various persons, under the common law, all are principals). So also is the person who counsels, aids, or assists in any way the commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided, assisted or counseled, in any way the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. - Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others. - The courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. However, in this case, the lower court, committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants. As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277 of the
GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN 171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989
Nature: Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA Facts: - on July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, accidentally fell into a manhole while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at Perez Blvd. Her right leg was fractured, due to which she was hospitalized, operated on, and confined. - She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and she is no longer her former jovial self. Moreover, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. - Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep. - City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. He said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates. - Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees. CA reversed the lower courts ruling on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd. - City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. Issue WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 CC. Held
YES - The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. - It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. - In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. - The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from defective streets, public buildings and other public works. On Damages awarded - Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053.65. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. The court can not rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the amount. - Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000. Guilatcos handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. - Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000. - Award of P7420 as lost income for one year, plus P450 bonus remain the same - P3000 as attorneys fees remain the same Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside, decision of trial court reinstated with modification.
PERSONS LIABLE
WORCESTER v OCAMPO 22 PHIL 42 Johnson; Feb. 27, 1912
NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS - Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government commenced an action against defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos, Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto and Cansipit (owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of a certain newspaper known as El Renacimiento or Muling Pagsilang) for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication. - The editorial Birds of Prey was alleged to have incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held. The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten
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- Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. He was driving the latters Cadillac along highway 54. On the other side of the road, Caedo was driving his Mercury car. He was with his family. - A carretela was in front of the Cadillac. Bernardo did not see the carretela from afar. When he approached the carritela, he decided to overtake it even though he had already seen the car of the Caedos approaching from the opposite lane. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. - The Caedos were injured. They filed a suit for recovery of damages against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. The CFI ruled in favor of the Caedos and held Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable.
before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following took the switch (there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other)that is, went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. Thereupon the defendant either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front of the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff. - The judgment of the trial court was for defendant. ISSUE WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver. HELD NO. Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present herein at5 the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefore. The act complained of must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own. Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. - The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. - in the case of Johnson vs. David, the driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art.1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. - it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
ISSUES
WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as Bernardos employer
HELD
No. - Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. No negligence of having employed him maybe imputed to his master. - Negligence on the employers part, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting,, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. - No negligence can be imputed. The car was running at a reasonable speed. The road was wide and open. There was no reason for Yu to be specially alert. He had reason to rely on the skill of his driver. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. - The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another
CAEDO V YU KHE THAI GR NO. L-20392 MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968 NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo
DISPOSITIVE
Decision modified. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability
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After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime. In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperia. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperia, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the control, supervision and custody of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence, it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From this decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law. It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperia, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher. Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability. ISSUE Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperia caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno. RULING YES.12
1. YES. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. 2. NO. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. - The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. - The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. - The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by -their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed. - Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.
SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO G.R. No. L-10068-70 June 29, 1957 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperia and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperia, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused.
12
The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, (schools liability versus parental liability) which provides: "ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. xxx xxx xxx Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody."
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the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in proportion to their means", while on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This, defendants failed to prove. In another case, Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce , the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce, below 18 years of age who was living with him. Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen, minor son of plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case, stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In reversing the decision, this tribunal held: It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases. Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties, independently of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility. I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
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Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis, thus is void. Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years, and an annual net income of P55,000 (P75,000 gross income less P20,000 personal expenses). In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC considered the age and health of the deceased. However, the CA modified this by factoring in the engagement of Luna in car racing, thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years. WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death, and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years, thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75,000. However, the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30,000, due to the escalating gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45,000. CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy. There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed. Also, it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income. It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing [a statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof 2. YES Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances, interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (The attys fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant.) Obiter: The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll, where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty. Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son, but since the son had attained majority, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily. To this contention, the court is unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts. Also, he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere. Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE, reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of attys fees.
to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge, the speed in operating the machine, and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. In its broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions, with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other, with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment appealed from will be modified, and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of both instances.
RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS; February 28, 1985
NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna, driving a gokart, and Luis dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father, which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas, awarding P1,650,000 as unearned net earnings of Luna, P12,000 compensatory damages, and P50,000 for loss of his companionship (come on!!), with legal interest from date of the decision, and attorneys fees of P50,000 (no interest mentioned). (Note: father and son solidarily liable for damages.) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which affirmed in toto the RTC. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas, the CA modified the decision, this time reducing the unearned income to P450,000. Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC. Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas, contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income, and that the award for attys fees should include legal interest. Pending the decision, the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas, in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970, and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas P450,000 for unearned net earnings, P12,000 compensatory damages, P50,000 for loss of companionship, all with legal interest, and attys fees of P50,000, within 30 days. The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts, saying that they had no cash money. The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis is already of age, married, with 2 kids, and living in Spain but only causally employed (His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as yet). ISSUES: 1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2. WON the award for attys fees should have legal interest HELD: 1. YES
2.
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discernment. The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc. - The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18, 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint. - The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal. The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice. ISSUE - WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. HELD- Yes. The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred. The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live. To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable. Reasoning- The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176. However, because of his minority, the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable. Article 2180 reads the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible The father and, incase of his death or incapacity, the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their company The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. - The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability under the Anglo-American tort law. Thus, under this doctrine, a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility. Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing, controlling, and disciplining of the child. The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities. As stated, sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption. Disposition Petition granted. Decision set aside.
- Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was. - A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.' - BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary > if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary, they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. But if the liability id direct and primary, the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense. HENCE, LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY > applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. A101 RPC SAYS SO > RULES: + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18) + liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC: responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
MERCADO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR; May 30, 1960
NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals
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a. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute, Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence. It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" - phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. - At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. b. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: . 1. Sentencing the Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3. dismissing defendants' counterclaims. . REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
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However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed.
Held: Yes. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools, academic or non-academic. Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable. There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present. x x x The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not ended, or has ended or has not yet begun. The term custody signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it. Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him. In any event, the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior, but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180. Basis of teachers vicarious liability is, as such, they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child. As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties, they were exonerated of liability. (Note the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries, in or out of the school premises J. Guttierez, Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected. It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose. The court cannot make law, it can only apply the law with its imperfections.
PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS; April 25, 1988
NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal. FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias Teng. Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery. - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions. They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime, which they did not commit. Since it was a civil case, respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school. MTD was granted by the CA. - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal. Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling. ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC13 applies to academic institutions HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue. What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable. The answer is no since the provision speaks of teachers or heads Dispositive WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
(COLLEGIO
DE
SAN
JOSE-
AQUINO
Facts: It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. Alfredo went to the school to submit his Report in Physic. While they were in the auditorium of their school, hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon. ISSUE: WON Art 2180 is applicable.
FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren,
13
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
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convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro, a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF. BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP. Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro; (2) absolving the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon. HELD NO. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts. Ratio: Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time." Reasoning: a. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA. According to the CA, while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident , which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening; but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra . In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." HELD Only Aquino, the teacher, is liable. Ratio: As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Reasoning: This is in line with the Courts ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. Reasoning: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence. DISPOSITION Granted.
SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA, J.: October 5, 1988
FACTS Jimmy Abon, a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was
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breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties -Using the test in Cangco, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBAs liability; hence, any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only. -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment, a contract is established between them, resulting in a bilateral obligation. The school is obliged to provide the student with an education, along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge. In turn, the student abides by the schools academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations. However, a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks; one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBAs negligence in providing proper security measures. At this stage, the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(Castillo/Cadiz) 194 SCRA 340 Paras, J.: Feb. 25, 1991
NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at St. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Quezon. His parents didnt allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home. However, he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher. -his parents filed a complaint against St. Francis HS, represented by its principal, Illumin, and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son, contending that it occurred due to petitioners failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family. The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim. Also, the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking. The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned, and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited. -Both parties appealed to the CA. On the issue of the liability of St. Francis HS and the Illumin, the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th, and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180. They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnt an extra-curricular activity of the HS. From the evidence, it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event. As such, under Article 2180, both are jointly and severally liable w/ the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St. Francis and the principal). Petitioners contend that the victims parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnt give their son consent to join the picnic. The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability. Also, 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers. Hence this petition. ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art. 2180, in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them. At the outset, it should be noted that the
victims parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination. -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it. If the CAs findings are to be upheld, employers will be forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties. -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family. In fact, 2 P.E. teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming. Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident. The records also show that the 2 P.E. teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim. (2) NO. The CA erred in applying Art. 2180, particularly par 4. For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task. In the case at bar, the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity. (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them, no moral or exemplary damages under Art. 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is SET ASIDE
SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO, J; May 18, 1992
NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS - On August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman, Jr., a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC), was in the campus premises thereof, the defendant, Jimmy Solomon, who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant R.L. Security Agency, Inc., without any provocation, shot the plaintiff on the abdomen. The plaintiff was confined in a hospital, and as per doctor's opinion, he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months. Petitioner, represented by his guardian, filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC, RL Security Agency and Solomon, - RCC filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. It further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school. - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCs motion to dismiss. Petitioners MFR was denied, Hence, this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code
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Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the case.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.
- Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. In the instant case, Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon. 2. YES - In the case of PSBA v CA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however, the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract results in obligations for both parties. It held: When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. - It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. - In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been based, only on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC.
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**Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, and denied MFR -Hence, this appeal ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes. -Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 217614 and 218015 of the Civil Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer, petitioner Philtranco, respectively. -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver. As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides: the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. -Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. (with regard to this issue)
Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. * This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses. Dispositive Lower courts order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.
PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO; March 25, 1975
NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, Inc., its manager BALINGIT and the driver, PINEDA. - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK, owned by PhilAm, along the natl highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan, owned by Phil Rabbit. Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days. This deprived the company of earnings of about P8,600. - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art.2180 CC. - In the appeal, the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. But this was not alleged in their complaint.* ISSUE WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in Art. 2180 NCC (Art.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments: Art.2180 uses the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer. - Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders,
PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE; June 17, 1997
NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence, recklessness, violation of traffic rules and regulations, abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondents Version -In the early morning of March 24, 1990, about 6:00 oclock, the victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd., defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. -The Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street. -As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and, thereafter, was run over by the said bus. Petitioners Version -Manilhig, in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City, warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog. -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street, the victim, who was biking towards the same direction as the bus, suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road. -The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn, the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus. -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired. -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles, without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear, which caused the death of the victim
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
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Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. xxxxxxxxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
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In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle. 14 cda The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m., way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employeremployee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager. On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks, ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. The SC does not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle: I. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work
FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR; August 17, 1992
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responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him. Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the "laboronly" contractor, including the latter's workers. - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry." - In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action. DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed.
- Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver. There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep. - The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO; August 14, 1998
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers. - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects, but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks). - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages. ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dump truck, which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC, we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting. In a "labor only" contract, the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG, J/February 6, 2003 397 SCRA 75
NATURE: APPEAL from CAs DECISION - 14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. - No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. - At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanors widow), along with their children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. - LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. - TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following: "a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; 2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral damages of P50,000.00; c) Attorneys fees of P20,000; d) Costs of suit.
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passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage - The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. - In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which LRTA and Roman, according to the CA, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved. DISPOSITION: CAS DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs. ______________ 12 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. 13 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 14 Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. - Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply. - In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasidelictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. 2. YES. There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. REASONING: - Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. - The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides: "Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. "Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755." "Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. "This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees." "Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission." -The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. - Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO) 221 SCRA 517 Davide, Jr.; July 16, 1992
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- Li was, therefore, negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer 2. NO - Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. - While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. - Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 3. YES - Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. - In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated.
VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC.) 253 SCRA 303 KAPUNAN; February 7, 1996
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire. She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd., put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. - Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She filed a claim for damages against defendant. - Lis alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction. He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent. -RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. CA absolved Alexander. ISSUE 1. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued car 2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence 3. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Lis employer HELD 1. YES - The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert as every driver should be to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by one of the witneses; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes.
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commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. - The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim , and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. - The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 On the computation of damages The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to 2months and 21 days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of 6 months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only 2 months and 21 days while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075. Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. - Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. - The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. - The Civil Code in chap 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state. - Although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers , in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease. - The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (one who receives a definite and fixed order or
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MENDOZA V. DE LEON
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welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides: Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for emphasis). Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that: (b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration, such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy; to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof; Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . . The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): (f) . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law , insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. DISPOSITION We conclude that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED. DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees, is still another thing. The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent.
FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION 194 SCRA 486 PARAS; February 27, 1991
NATURE Resolution FACTS The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. o NIA believes this bases this on: PD 552 amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA) The case of Angat River Irrigation System v. Angat River Workers Union Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System, like the NIA, exercised a governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions. The Angat dissenting opinion: Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated, which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract. ISSUE WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent HELD YES Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public
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-Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the two Aranetas proving that they were involved in sending Taylor abroad -trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5,043.20 with interest at the legal rate from August 23, 1954 until full payment. 3rd party complaint dismissed -CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party complaint was reversed stating that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company -CA noted that based on the facts, both petitioners knew and through their acts showed that they approved of the trip. were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant; what had happened was in truth and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of approval; and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds, and it was these three without whose acts the same could not have happened, the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation, for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict HELD: Yes - The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated, he in particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner remained passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad, concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary, demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. -The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment. The existence of a contract between the parties, as has been repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages
ISSUES WON City of Manila should be held liable for the damages suffered by Teotica. HELD YES. Ratio RA 409,sec.4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189, CC governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. Voting Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
WITH CIVIL
FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto
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habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. ISSUES 1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. 2. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated. 3. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to (dome of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to dismiss HELD 1. NO. Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art. 32 CC is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. [b] The invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. It cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. [c] Art. 32 of CC which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the RPC or other penal statute. [d] Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. 2. NO Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case, as contended by respondents, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32 CC. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person
"The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated." "ART. 2219.Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: xxx "(6)Illegal search; xxx "(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 36." - Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in addition, P750.00 for attorney's fees.
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"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. WON MHP Garments is liable Yes. The omission will not exculpate petitioners. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman who did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 already directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body it orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions which the petitioners miserably failed to do. And thirdly, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not. WON an award for moral damages should be awarded Yes. It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities. Disposition IN VIEW WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%)
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2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is SET ASIDE
MARCIA V CA (PAJE) 205 PHIL 147 RELOVA; January 27, 1983 NATURE
Petition for certiorari
ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC CARPIO MORALES, J., March 25, 2004
NATURE Petition for review of CA Deci FACTS (Consti II Case) -Respondent Morales wrote an article for Peoples Journal Tonight based on the sworn statement in the police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month before then attempted to rape her the night she filed a complaint. Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but since the latters office was still closed at that time (past 12mn he works for NIAS-PAGASA), he was not able to do so. -About a year following the published article, Arafiles filed action for damages based on the alleged grossly malicious and overly sensationalized report by Morales which cast aspersions on his character, being the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist. -RTC: in favor of Arafiles -CA: in favor of Morales, et. al. based on doctrine of fair comment ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages HELD NO. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. Ratio. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. Reasoning. First discussed applicable provisions (A33, 19, 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.
FACTS
- Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus - His bus collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, causing the latters death and physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap - Paje was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. A civil case was also instituted against him by herein petitioners for reckless imprudence and negligence in driving the passenger bus. - He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC. However, he was acquitted in the CA. The CA ruled that criminal negligence is wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence, for the case was of pure accident. - The defendants presented the copy of said criminal case to the court handling the civil case against them. The civil case was dismissed. ISSUES WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a dismissal in the civil case HELD YES - The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. - Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC. However, the said article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed
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- 84 CARPIO [dissent]
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- I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous, but because it constitutes an intentional tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private respondent IDCP represents. - Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and humiliating to Muslims, causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam. This finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private respondents an intentional wrongful act - humiliating persons because of their religious beliefs.
ISSUE 1. WON elements of libel exist 2. WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress HELD 1. NO. Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. 2. NO. The cause of action is libel. Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this case, for such action is personal in nature, and since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article, such cause of action cannot be sustained. Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. - The purported damage caused by the published article falls under principle of relational harm - which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm - which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. The present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation. - To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a) conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff; (b) conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) causal connection between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe. - Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, embarrassment, or anger. (AmJur) Disposition Petition granted. Decision reversed.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent]
- Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by the article that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims that there is only one God, and, that the greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons other than Allah. - The article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. Liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact of defamation.
MVRS V ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL G.R. No. 135306 BELLOSILLO; January 28, 2003
NATURE Petition to review decision of CA FACTS - The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP), a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs, and some individual Muslims filed in the RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, et.al. - Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Phil but the entire Muslim world, esp. every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. - MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was published without malice. Also, it did not mention respondents as object of the article, hence, were not entitled to damages. RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of Islamic faith.
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2. Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust receipt; 3. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable with Philippine Rayon for the obligation sought to be enforced 3a. If not, WON he may be considered a guarantor 3b. If he is a guarantor, WON the case should have been dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action as there was no prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties. HELD: 1. NO. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). The parties herein agree, and the trial court explicitly ruled, that the subject, drafts are sight drafts which do not require presentment for acceptance. They are, pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL, payable on demand. And even if these were not sight drafts, thereby necessitating acceptance, it would be the petitioner and not Philippine Rayon which had to accept the same for the latter was not the drawee. 2. YES. -And although it is true that the petitioner commenced a criminal action for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law, no legal obstacle prevented it from enforcing the civil liability arising out of the trust, receipt in a separate civil action. Under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appear in the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Art.315, par. 1(b) of the RPC. -Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. Estafa falls under fraud. 3. NO. Private respondent Chi's signature in the dorsal portion of the trust receipt did not bind him solidarily with Philippine Rayon. 3a. YES. SCs own reading of the questioned solidary guaranty clause yields the conclusion that the obligation of Chi is only that of a guarantor. Reasoning Last sentence of the clause speaks of waiver of exhaustion, which, nevertheless, is ineffective in this case because the space therein for the party whose property may not be exhausted was not filled up. -The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake" refers to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it or to the liability existing between themselves. It does not refer to the undertaking between either one or both of them on the one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the liability described under the trust receipt. Elsewise stated, their liability is not divisible as between them, i.e., it can be enforced to its full extent against any one of them.
textile machinery imported by the Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc., represented by co-defendant Anacleto R. Chi. FACTS -August 8, 1962: Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into a contract with Nissho Co., Ltd. of Japan for the importation of textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. To effect payment for said machineries, Phil. Rayon applied for and was granted a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. Against this letter of credit, drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho, which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent in Japan, the Bank of Tokyo, Ltd. As indicated on their faces, two of these drafts were accepted by the Phil Rayon through its president, Anacleto R. Chi, while the others were not. -Upon arrival of the machineries, the Prudential Bank indorsed the shipping documents to the Phil Rayon which accepted delivery of the same. To enable the Phil Rayon to take delivery of the machineries, it executed, by prior arrangement with the Prudential Bank, a trust receipt which was signed by Anacleto R. Chi in his capacity as president of Phil Rayon. -At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be accomplished by two sureties who, by the very terms and conditions thereof, were to be jointly and severally liable to the Prudential Bank should the Phil Rayon fail to pay the total amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid for by Prudential Bank. The Phil Rayon was able to take delivery of the textile machineries and installed the same at its factory site at 69 Obudan Street, Quezon City. -Sometime in 1967, the Phil Rayon ceased business operation. On December 29, 1969, Phil Rayon's factory was leased by Yupangco Cotton Mills for an annual rental of P200,000.00. The lease was renewed on January 3, 1973. On January 5, 1974, all the textile machineries in the Phil Rayon's factory were sold to AIC Development Corporation for P300,000.00. -The obligation of the Phil Rayon arising from the letter of credit and the trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated. Repeated formal demands for the payment of the said trust receipt yielded no result Hence, the present action for the collection of the principal amount of P956,384.95 was filed on October 3, 1974 against the Phil Rayon and Anacleto R. Chi. Defendants Defenses lack of cause of action; prescription; laches Lower Courts Ruling Both the CFI and the IAC ruled that Philippine Rayon could be held liable for the two (2) drafts because only these appear to have been accepted by the latter after due presentment. The liability for the remaining ten (10) drafts did not arise because the same were not presented for acceptance. In short, both courts concluded that acceptance of the drafts by Philippine Rayon was indispensable to make the latter liable thereon. ISSUES: 1. Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon;
PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine Rayon Mills & Anacleto Chi) 216 SCRA 257 DAVIDE, JR.; G.R. No. 74886 December 8, 1992
NATURE Petition for review of the decision of IAC, which affirmed in toto the decision of CFI Quezon City in a civil action instituted by the petitioner for the recovery of a sum of money representing the amount paid by it to the Nissho Company Ltd. of Japan for
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ISSUE WON the action had already prescribed. RULING YES. - There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). - Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. - But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. - And when they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. - In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which read: ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. - The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. In other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years. - The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the fouryear period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; without having made it they could file as in fact they did a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case; and consequently, as held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict." - As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription, the said rule does not apply in the present case. DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed, without costs.
CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1965
FACTS - The case arose from a vehicular collision. - Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. - The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. - Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. - While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. - Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act. -In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan. - In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action. -The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. - The parties in the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." - The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case. - At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. - This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been taken. - The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed; and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.
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case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.) - Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,) Obiter - There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely: 1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." 2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. - The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. - In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. - In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death" **(end of obiter) - Corpus vs. Paje, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result. Disposition Petition is granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside.
- Although in the case of Dyogi vs. Yatco this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries. - In People vs. Buan, the Court ruled that the offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. - Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved. - With regard to the issue of prescription, the Court ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because the prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146, CC) and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was committed. Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs.
MADEJA V CARO 211 PHIL 469 ABAD SANTOS; December 21, 1983
NATURE Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI dismissing the civil case against Japzon FACTS - DR. EVA A. JAPZON was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. - In the information, the offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages - The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages, alleging that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. - The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the respondent judge granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court16 ISSUE WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of a criminal case HELD YES - Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. - Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
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Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses . In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. ...
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committee to be formed. Mr. Fitzgerald of Shell, Atty. Agcaoili of National Airports Corp., and Atty. Alexander Sycip were appointed to the working committee. - Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair prorata division of its assets. The management of CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors, it would file insolvency proceedings. - Aug 9, 1948, working committee discussed methods of achieving objectives, which were to preserve the assets of CALI and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. However, negotiation on the division of assets was left pending. - On the same day (Aug 9), Shell effected a telegraphic transfer of all its credit against CALI to the American Corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., assigning its credit amounting to $79,440. This was followed on Aug 10 by a deed of assignment of credit amounting to $85,081.29. - Aug 12, 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint against CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California, USA, for the collection of assigned credit of $79,440, and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued against a C-54 plane. Sept 17, 1948 an amended complaint was filed to recover assigned credit of $85,081.29 and a supplemental attachment for a higher sum against the C-54 plane, plus miscellaneous personal properties. - Unaware of Shells assignment of credit, CALI on Aug 12, 1948 approved the memorandum agreement of sale to PAL, and noted that the Board had been trying to reach an agreement with creditors to prevent insolvency proceedings, but so far no definite agreement had been reached. - First week of Sept 1948, National Airports Corp learned of Shells action in the US and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against CALI in the CFI of Manila. - Oct 7, 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. An order of insolvency was issued by the court on the same day. Mr. Alfredo Velayo was appointed Assignee in the proceedings. - Velayo instituted case against Shell for the purpose of securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from prosecuting against CALI, and as an alternative, that Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value of the plane if the case in the US will defeat the procurement of CALI of its plane. - Dec 22, 1948, Court denied petition because whether the conveyance of Shells credit was fraudulent or not, the Phil court would not be in a position to enforce its orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., which is outside the jurisdiction of the Phils. - Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of damages against Shell. Lower court dismissed the case. Defendants Comments > Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was for valuable consideration and made in accordance with established commercial practices > It has no interest in the case instituted by American Shell, as they are separate and distinct corporations. > Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheon-meeting, without knowing the purpose for which it was called. Fitzgerald could not have officially represented Shell because authority resides on Crawford. ISSUES 1. WON Shell Co., of the P.I. Ltd, taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALIs airplane C-54 at California, USA, acted in bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused." - It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. - The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co; Carandang v. Santiago). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro). - Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
INTENTIONAL TORTS
VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS 100 PHIL 186 FELIX; October 31, 1956
NATURE Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila FACTS - Since the start of Commercial Air Line, Incs (CALI) operations, its fuel needs were all supplied by Shell Company of the P.I., Ltd, (Shell). Desmond Fitzgerald, Shells Credit Manager was in charge of collecting payment. Any extensions of term of payment, however, had to be decided by Stephen Crawford and later by Wildred Wooding - As of August 1948, Shells books showed a balance of P170,162.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. Shell had reasons to believe that the financial condition of Shell was far from being satisfactory. Alfonso Sycip, CALIs President of Board of Directors, offered to Fitzgerald CALIs Douglas C-54 plane, which was then in California. The offer was declined by Crawford. - Aug 6, 1948, management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors in a luncheon, and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. Alexander Sycip, Secretary of the Board of Directors of CALI, explained the memorandum agreement executed by CALI with Phil Air Lines Inc on Aug 4, regarding the proposed sale to PAL of the aviation equipment of CALI. Alfredo Velayo, Auditor of CALI, discussed the balance sheets of CALI. The balance sheet made mention of the Douglas C-54 plane. - There was a general understanding among all creditors present on the desirability of consummating the sale in favor of PAL. Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to employees, the Government, and the National Airports Corp. The other creditors disputed such contention of preference. No understanding was reached on the matter of preference of payment and it was then generally agreed that the matter be further studied by a working
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence
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Rule 111.Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently - In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil-action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
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SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA) 297 SCRA 469 QUISUMBING; October 8, 1998
NATURE Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside CA resolution and decision FACTS - Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner Company. During a stop-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew members Thamer and Allah (both surnamed Al-Gazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. While there, Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She was saved by hotel security personnel who heard her cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She was eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men, through the intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They were put back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to Manila. - 2 years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudia, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah. - A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. She was told that it was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, she signed a document to appear before the court a week later. When the date of appearance came, she complied but only after being assured by Saudias Manila manager that the investigation was routinary and posed no danger to her. She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however, just as she was about to board a plane home, she was told that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again confiscated. A few days later, she was again brought before the same court where the Saudi judge, to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. - Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudia but she was denied assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by Saudia without being informed of the cause. - She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudia and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudia filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of
- If Article 23 of Civil Code goes as far as to provide that Even if an act or event causing damage to anothers property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited., with much more reason that Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. - Anent the argument that Civil Code provisions cannot be applicable as they came into effect only on Aug 30, 1950, Art 2252 of Civil Code provides by implication that when new provisions of the Code does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, they may be given retroactive effect. Shell did not have any vested or acquired right to betray confidence of CALI or of its creditors. Moreover, according to Art 2254 of Civil Code, no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others. Disposition Shell is liable to pay plaintiff, for the benefit of CALI and its creditors, compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time Shell assigned its credit to American Shell, and another equal sum as exemplary damages.
VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS RESOLUTION 100 PHIL 207 FELIX; July 30, 1957
Defendant-appellees contentions - It is not guilty of bad faith, it having done nothing but to protect legitimately its own interest or credit against the bad faith of its debtor, the insolvent CALI, under the control of the latters president Alfonso Sycip - The transfer of credit to its sister corporation in the US did not prejudice the Government, because its claims were fully paid, not caused any loss or injury to other creditors, except the entities and groups controlled by Alfonso Sycip. It is not liable for exemplary damages because the provisions of the new Civil Code on the matter are not applicable to this case - Plaintiff-appellant has no cause of action against it and is not the real party in interest - Plaintiffs right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and consequently he is stopped from pursuing another theory and is not entitled to damages under the provisions of the new Civil Code. HELD - The facts on which Court based its conclusion that Shell acted in bad faith are not and cannot be denied or contradicted by defendant. - There is no sensible reason for disturbing the finding that Shell is liable for exemplary damages. The amount of the award, however, may be modified. - According to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, and that the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court. - Majority of the Court is of the opinion that the value of the C-54 plane might result too high, and that exemplary damages should not be left to speculation but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount. The amount of exemplary damages is thus modified, and fixed at P25,000.
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handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. - the Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of participation in the anomalies. - Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted. - Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him. - the Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. - Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies petitioners filed a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. - Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa while the fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence). - All of the 6 criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. - In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been terminated. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. - Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the complaint. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. - Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company. However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. - Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. - Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. - The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. - CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. ISSUE WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent HELD YES Ratio Art.19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view, what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged according to the private respondent. All told, it is not without basis to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort. - In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, We find here an occasion to apply the State of the most significant relationship rule, which should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of the case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (A) the place where the injury occurred; (B) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (C) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and; (D) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. - As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that the over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Phils. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged in international air carriage business here. Thus, the relationship between the parties was centered here. Disposition petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Civil case entitled Milagros Morada v Saudi Arabia Airlines REMANDED to RTC
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NATURE Petition assailing the decision of respondent CA which modified the judgment of the RTC and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages and attorney's fees. FACTS - Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." - From the records of the SEC, Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao." After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored check. However, private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, with the very same business address as Guaranteed. - Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of BP 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right. Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation. Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He found that the signature on the check is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. - Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee. In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of plaintiff, that the defendants may have been dealing with . . ." ISSUE WON private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the CC HELD NO Ratio The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of
as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity - The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. - Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith. Considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias. - It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances. - Petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that private respondent could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants. According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners. - Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled that moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. - Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. The nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
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- Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible
- The Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order from the Supreme Court, which was granted by the same. Upon a judgment on merits later on, Amonoy was ordered to return said properties to the rightful owners. But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision, respondents house had already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court. - Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the RTC on December 15, 1989. In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower courts ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied. Hence, this recourse. ISSUE WON Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque injuria in this case since at the time of the demolition he had color of authority over said properties HELD NO Ratio Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person who claims to exercise a right but does so in an abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Indeed, in the availment of ones rights, one must Reasoning - Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents house. He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC. - We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents house on May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986. - Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents house well until the middle of 1987. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition. - A commentator on this topic explains: The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.
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- The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. While the respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria. Ratio Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.
faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS DODGE PHILS) 286 SCRA 96 KAPUNAN; February 9, 1998
NATURE Petition for review decision of CA FACTS - Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such dealer, Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases of Phelps products. - From Dec1986 to Aug1987, Barons purchased on credit wires and cables worth P4.1m, which it in turn supplied to MERALCO. In the sales invoice, it was stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed, plus 25% for attys fees and collection. On Sept1987, Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving an unpaid account of P3.8m). Phelps sent several demands, but Barons still did not pay. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it could pay the outstanding account in monthly installments of P500k plus 1% interest. - Phelps, instead of responding to the request of Barons, filed a complaint for recovery of the P3.8m plus interest, and prayed for attys fees of 25% of the amt, and exemplary damages amounting to P100k. - Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and cables, but disputed the amt claimed by Phelps. The RTC rendered decision in favor of Phelps, ordering Barons to pay the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as attys fees. CA affirmed (with modification, reducing attys fees to 5%) Barons now assail the CA decision, alleging that Phelps should have been held guilty of creditors abuse of rights, and Barons should not be liable for attys fees. *note: Barons contends that Phelps abused its rights when it rejected Barons offer to settle the debt in installments **right involved: right of a creditor to refuse partial fulfillment of a prestation due to him ISSUES 1. WON there was creditors abuse of rights in this case 2. WON Barons should be liable for interest and attys fees HELD 1. NO
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ISSUES 1. WON BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card 2. WON MARASIGAN can recover moral damages arising from the cancellation of his credit card by BPI HELD 1. NO Ratio The agreement was for the immediate payment of the outstanding account. A check is not considered as cash especially when it is postdated sent to BPI. Thus, the issuance of the postdated check was not effective payment. BPI was therefore justified in suspending his credit card. BPI did not capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the use of the card. Reasoning - Under the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed by MARASIGAN, any card with outstanding balances after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement shall automatically be suspended, Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement date shall automatically be suspended and those with accounts unpaid after sixty (60) days from said original billing/statement date shall automatically be cancelled without prejudice to BECC's right to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for whatever reason. - By his own admission MARASIGAN made no payment within 30 days for his billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. Neither did he make payment for his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. Consequently as early as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his billing dated 27 September 1989, BPI could automatically suspend his credit card. Ratio To find the existence of an abuse of right A19 the following elements must be present (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Reasoning - Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging it. As early as 28 October 1989, BPI could have suspended MARASIGANS card outright. Instead, BPI allowed him to use his card for several weeks. Ratio The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. Reasoning - Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria - It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Caf Adriatico. He can not now pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card. As quoted earlier, the application contained the stipulation that the petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose billing has not been paid for more than thirty days. Nowhere is it stated in the
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA (MARASIGAN) 296 SCRA 260 KAPUNAN; September 25, 1998
FACTS - December 8, 1989 - Atty. Ricardo J. Marasigans credit card was dishonored, the bill amounting to P735.32, by Caf Adriatico when the he entertained some guests. One of his guests, Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibankard - MARASIGAN was a complimentary member of BECC from February 1988 to February 1989 and was issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P3,000.00 and with a monthly billing every 27th of the month His membership was renewed for another year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to P5,000.00. - MARASIGAN oftentimes exceeded his credit limits but this was never taken against him by BPI and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in check was tolerated.
- October 1989 statement amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid in due time. MARASIGAN admitted having failed to pay his account because he was in Quezon attending to some professional and personal commitments. He was informed that bpi was demanding immediate payment of his outstanding account, was requiring him to issue a check for P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and was threatening to suspend his credit card. - MARASIGAN issued Far East Bank Check of P15,000.00, postdated December 15, 1989 which was received on November 23, 1989 by Tess Lorenzo, an employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng Angeles, a co-employee who handles the account of the plaintiff. The check remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles. Mr. Roberto Maniquiz, head of the collection department of defendant was formally informed of the postdated check about a week later. - November 28, 2989 - BPI served MARASIGAN a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List. He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently cancelled - There is no showing that the plaintiff received this letter before December 8, 1989. - December 12, 1989 MARASIGAN requested that he be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15, 1989, to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and that said check be returned to him because he had already instructed his bank to stop the payment because BPI violated their agreement that when MARASIGAN issued the check to cover his account amounting to only P8,987.84 on the condition that BPI will not suspend the effectivity of the card - December 16, 1989 MARASIGAN sent letter to the manager of FEBTC requesting the bank to stop the payment of the check - March 12, 1990 MARASIGAN sent another letter reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with BPI and requesting for his correct billing, less the improper charges and penalties, and for an explanation within five (5) days from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8, 1989 despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge, otherwise the necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him - March 21, 1990 - final demand by BPI requiring him to pay in full his overdue account, including stipulated fees and charges, within 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action and also to replace the postdated check with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for violation of Bouncing Check Law - April 5, 1990 MARASIGAN demanded BPI compliance with his request in his first letter dated March 12, 1990 within three (3) days from receipt, otherwise the plaintiff will file a case against them - May 7, 1990 - MARASIGAN filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the RTC Makati - TC: ruled for MARASIGAN finding that BPI abused its right in contravention of A19 CC ordering BPI to pay P 100,000.00 as moral damages; P 50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P 20,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. - CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION P50,000.00 as moral damages: P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
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case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages - Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. - An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria. - Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given - In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate - Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside
- And under the facts and circumstances obtaining, one cannot sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend recognition was an act contrary to morals, good custom, or public policy. Disposition Petition denied. Order appealed from is affirmed. he modified award of attorneys fees.
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BAKSH V CA 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE JR; February 19, 1993
NATURE Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore argued to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries, during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages, reimbursement for actual expenses, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. - In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award for miscellaneous expenses and moral damages. - After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees. - The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to
Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." They gave an example "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action. The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law it is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer. - And in American Jurisprudence: On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. - Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, Araceli Santos, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had Araceli been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. Disposition the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed..
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- A complaint fro breach of promise to marry was filed against Bunag Sr and Bunag Jr. The RTC upon finding that she was forcibly abducted and raped Bunag Jr was ordered to pay for P80K for moral damages, P20K for exemplary damage, P20K by way of temperate damage, and P10K for attys fees. Bunag Sr was absolved from liability. - Cirilo appealed on the disculpation of Bunag Srs liability. While the Bunags assigned several errors in the TC decision. CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed judgment of RTC in toto. - Bunag filed for the petition for review claiming that CA failed to consider vital exhibits and testimonies and error in the proper application of the law. ISSUE WON lower courts erred in granting damages for the breach of promise to marry HELD Ratio A breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se, except where the plaintiff incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents therrof. However, the award for moral damages is allowed in cases specified and analogous to those provided in Art 2219 CC. Under Art 21 CC, in relation to Art 2219, par10, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. Reasoning - The court is constrained with the factual findings of the lower courts. - A breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover for money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. - Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the petitioners promising to marry Cirilo to evade criminal liability constitutes acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which warrant and justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Art 21 in relation to par 3 and 10, Art 2219, and Art 2229 and 2234 CC. - Although TC granted damages on the basis of the forcible abduction and rape even after the criminal complaints dismissal, the extinction of the criminal liability does not extinguish civil liability unless there is a declaration of a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case may arise did not exist. In the case, only the fiscal made such dismissal of the criminal complaint. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailedjudgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
- In light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." Disposition Petition denied
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conducted clandestine love affairs. Defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that the defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he had caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUES 1. WON Quimiguing had a right to the support of the child 2. WON Quimiguing is entitled to damages HELD 1. YES - A conceived, unborn child is given a provisional personality by law and therefore has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly Icao (Art. 40) and may receive donations (Art. 742). Its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Art. 854) 2. YES - For a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damages caused. As stated in Art. 21, Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage. This is furthered by Art. 2219 which provides compensation in cases of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts. - Hence, independent of the right to support of the child, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages; thus the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error. Disposition the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside
QUE V IAC (NICOLAS) 169 SCRA 137 CRUZ; January 13, 1989
NATURE Petition for review FACTS - Magtanggol Que is a dealer of canvass strollers while Antonio Nicolas orders from him. The two had an amicable business relation until 1975, when Nicolas ordered strollers from Que, which were delivered, and then issued 5 postdated checks in favor of Que. The checks were dishonored, in accordance with Nicolas order to stop payment. After making demands for payment, which Nicolas allegedly ignored. Que filed an estafa case against Nicolas. The case was dismissed for lack of merit. - Nicolas then filed a case against Que for malicious prosecution. He allegedly ordered that payment be stopped because the goods delivered to him by Que were defective and that Que allegedly refused to replace them. Que on his part alleged that the said defective products were only returned after he filed an estafa case. TC ruled in favor of Que, IAC reversed. ISSUE WON Que had instituted a malicious prosecution of the private respondent (WON the reversal made by IAC was correct) HELD NO - It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his his rights when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscal's office. Ratio. One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. Reasoning -. 'Under the Spanish Law, the element of probable cause was not treated separately from that of malice, as under the American Law. When a complaint was laid and there was probable cause to believe that the person charged had committed the acts complained of, although, as a matter of fact, he had not, the complainant was fully protected, but not so much on the theory of probable cause as on the ground that, under such circumstances, there was no intent to accuse falsely. If the charge, although false, was made with an honest belief in its truth and justice, and there were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could be founded, the accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal sense. - To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person
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GLOBE MACKAY V CA CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE Certiorari FACTS - Globe Mackay found out an anomaly that has been causing them to lose money, to which Tobias was the number one suspect though he claimed he was the one who reported it. - The results of the investigations said that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of -Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. - Despite being cleared, complaints for estafa were filed against Tobias. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal and MRs of Globe were denied too. - Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon receiving the notice of his termination. - LA: dismissed the complaint; NLRC- reversed; the Secretary of Labor: reinstated the LA's decision which Tobias appealed to the Office of the President. - During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal. - Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). - However, Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. - This led Tobias to file a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. - RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. - Both parties appealed. CA: affirmed the RTC decision in toto, denied Globes MR. ISSUE WON there was malicious prosecution HELD YES - Petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. There was malicious intent manifested through the filing of the criminal cases as the case for illegal dismissal was pending; Hendrys threat of more suits against Tobias; The filing of the cases despite the police reports exculpating Tobias; and the eventual dismissal of the cases. SC anchored its findings on TCs finding (re bad faith of Globe Mackay in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias). Reasoning - Although Globe claims that they must not be penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against
DRILON V CA (ADAZA) 270 SCRA 211 HERMOSISIMA JR; March 20, 1997
NATURE Petition to reverse CAs Resolutions FACTS - Gen Renato DE VILLA, Chief of Staff of the AFP, requested the DOJ (headed by Sec Franklin DRILON) to order the investigation of several individuals, including private respondent ADAZA for their alleged participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup detat. - This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors who issued a subpoena to the said individuals after finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. The panel assigned to conduct prelim investigation found that there was probable cause to hold them for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. Information was filed before RTC QC, with no recommendation as to bail. - Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him, ADAZA filed a complaint for damages and charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books. - Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of action for this complaint for damages. - RTC denied MD. MFR for Order of Denial was also denied. - CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered RTC judge to proceed with the trial of civil case filed by ADAZA. (In Adazas latest Comment, he maintained that his claim before the trial court was merely a suit for damages based on tort and NOT a suit for malicious prosecution.) ISSUES 1. WON complaint was a suit for damages for malicious prosecution 2. WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution
HELD 1. YES Definition of Malicious Prosecution : - In American jurisdiction, it has been defined asOne begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained. Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause, and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies, called the action of malicious prosecution. - In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined asAn action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury. Reasoning - Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did respondent Adaza allege that his action is one based on tort. (Sec 3e of RA 3019) An examination of the records would show that this latest posture as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time on appeal. Such a change of theory cannot be allowed. 2. NO Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove these elements: (a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (b) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. - The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the NCC [Art 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8)]. Reasoning - Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza, NONE of these requisites have been alleged, thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. (a) Insofar as Adazas Criminal Case is concerned, what appears clear from the records only is that respondent has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail. This is not considered the termination of the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the information against him. (b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. The petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold Adaza for trial. (c) Suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to take no further action on civil case except to DISMISS it.
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(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. - ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. - Thus, under any of these three provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. - There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three articles together, and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages. - Albenson did not abuse its rights. The second and third elements are not present. All they wanted was to collect what is owed them. They believed Baltao was really the one who issued the check because it was his company who ordered and received the delivery. They wrote to him. He replied by denying and telling them to check the veracity of their claim. He didnt tell them that his son was his namesake and that the latter operated a business in the same building. Albenson acted in good faith and had probable cause in filing their complaint against Baltao. - There was no malicious prosecution. To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. The presence of probable cause means the absence of malice. Disposition Petition granted. CA reversed and set aside.
which Eugeneio Baltao was president; a check in the amount of P2,575 was given as payment. Said check was signed by a Eugenio Baltao, drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks. - The check bounced. Albenson extrajudicially demanded payment from Baltao. Baltao denied that it was his signature on the check. Albenson filed case for violation of BP22. Investigating fiscal found probable cause and filed info with the RTC. Baltao appealed to the Provincial Prosecutor. The provincial prosecutor found out that something was amiss during the investigation and upon reinvestigation, found no probable cause. He told the trial fiscal to move for dismissal. - After the criminal case was dismissed, Baltao filed a complaint for damages against Albenson because the latter had unjustly filed a criminal case against him. - IT TURNS OUT that E.L. Woodworks business address was the same as Guaranteed Industries. ELW was owned by Baltaos son, who is his namesake. - RTC granted actual (P133k), moral (P1M) and exemplary damages (P200k), and attys fees (P100k). CA modified by awarding only half of original moral damages and attys fees. ISSUE WON Baltao is entitled to damages HELD NO - An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria. - ABUSE OF RIGHTS Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is different, these three articles are all related to each other. "With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). - There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]). - The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty;
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mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. - The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that "willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith" - Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for damages. At most, this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which respondent Ongsip is entitled. In consequence thereof, We reduce the amount of moral damages to P15,000.00 The award of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, on the other hand, is sustained, being similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil Code as complemented by Article 2220. Disposition Decision of CA modified as regards the amount of damages.
"moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: .. . (8) malicious prosecution; .. . - To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. - Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. - In the instant case, however, there is reason to believe that there was malicious intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft. - As correctly observed by the trial court in its decisionA significant fact brought about by the testimony of Coronel himself is the total absence of immediate accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment when the bypass valve was allegedly discovered. Right then and there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-pass valve and in effect stealing gas from Defendant. The circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in flagrante delicto. But the truth is that when Coronel and his men entered Plaintiff's compound and made changes therein, Plaintiff was sleeping. When Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the afternoon, Coronel and his men had already made the changes and had already gone. They returned however at five o'clock, this time with a photographer. This was the time when Plaintiff met Coronel. Here was then the opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly, even brutally, tell him that there was thievery of gas. This, Coronel did not do. .. .. ." - It bears noting that when he was informed as to the existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection, respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronelthis is the attitude of someone who knows how to take a firm stand where his principles and rights are concerned. To prove his innocence, he was even willing to have his place excavated but petitioner would not dare take the consequences. Besides, Delfin Custodio, petitioner's own mechanical engineer, testified that the second gas meter was replaced as being defective because "some of its parts were worn out and that it was not properly registering." - Evidently, petitioner Manila Gas Corporation, in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect recording, sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman but also as a person. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral depravity in an individual. To be accused of such crime without basis is shocking and libelous. It stigmatized private respondent causing him emotional depression and social degradation. The fact that the complaint for qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. The damage had been done. Necessarily, indemnification had to be made. - The Court gives due consideration to respondent Ongsip's social and financial status as a businessman and the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the false imputation. However, petitioner's financial capability must also be considered. Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary concern is service to the people, the profit motive being merely secondary. Under the circumstances, the award of moral and exemplary damages should be reduced to P25,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively. - Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional
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onlookers, hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament. The Court does not believe that private respondent was intentionally paraded in order to humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's business depended for its success and patronage the good will of the buying public which can only be preserved and promoted by good public relations. Disposition Petition denied. CA modified: moral damages = P5k; attys fees = P2k. no exemplary damages.
for the file. He apologized and said he had forgotten. He started towards the cashier to pay; but the guard stopped him and said they were to go to the back of the supermarket. There, a report was made, where Espino said that he just forgot that he placed it in his pocket while talking to the maid and his wife. He was then brought to the front of the grocery, near the cashiers to a Mrs. Fandino. It was around 9am and the many people were at the store. - Fandino read the report and remarked: Ano,nakaw na naman ito. Espino said he was going to pay for it. Fandino replied: That is all they say, the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say . . . They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them. Espino objected, saying he was a regular customer of the supermarket. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay for the P3.85 file. Fandino reached over and took the P5 bill and said it was a fine. Espino and wife objected and said that he was not a common criminal. Fandino said it was a reward for guards who apprehend pilferers. People started milling around and stared at Espino. He was directed to get in line at the cashier to pay for the file. All the time the people were staring at him. He was totally embarrassed. - After paying he and his wife walked out quickly. He thought about going back that night to throw stones at the supermarket; but decided to file a case. The CFI dismissed. CA awarded him damages. ISSUE WON Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced at the supermarket HELD YES - The false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code). - While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated, the assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code). The whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for the file. It was his forgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for it that started the chain of events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of
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- CFI granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint basically involves an employee-employer relationship.
purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence and abuse. - Respondent is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated, courts are mandated to take into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to their discretion. Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant, or to enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendant's culpable action. In any case, award of moral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. Considering respondent's social standing, and the fact that her profession is based primarily on trust reposed in her by her clients, the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has greatly tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the other, affect her future dealings with her clients, the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages appears to be a fair and reasonable assessment of respondent's damages. Disposition Petition denied
ISSUE WON a complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney's fees, arising from an employer's constructive dismissal of an employee, is exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice or by the NLRC HELD NO - The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute. It has to do with an alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society, and does not involve an existing EE-ER relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of LC. The complaint is thus properly and exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice, not by the National Labor Relations Commission. Reasoning -The jurisdiction of the NLRC is defined by section 2 of PD No. 21(AKA LC) which reads: SEC. 2. The Commission shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following. (1) All matters involving employee employer relations including all disputes and grievances which may otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under Republic Act No. 875; (2) All strikes overtaken by Proclamation No. 1081; and (3) All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor Relations. - Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal. - Civil law consists of that "mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations ... that exist between members of a society for the protection of private interests. 3 - The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. - If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10. Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cages: (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, .... Disposition CASE REMANDED to the CFI for further proceedings in accordance with law.
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Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. - That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law. The requirement under the aforesaid provision that such refusal must be "without just cause" is implicit in the context of the allegation. The statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated in a subsequent paragraph of the complaint, where it is alleged that "he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of exculpation in favor of the policemen. - All that the Rules require is that there be a showing by a statement of ultimate facts, that the plaintiff has a right and that such right has been violated by the defendant. - Moran: The real test of good pleading under the new rules is whether the information given is sufficient to enable the party to plead and prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well as anything else if it gives the proper information. If the party wants more he may ask for more details in regard to the particular matter that is stated too generally Disposition THE ORDER APPEALED from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against appellee.
- In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for damages is correct because the claims of Medina and Ong were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. - Medina and Ong should not split their cause of action against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola.
OTHER TORTS
AMARO V SUMANGUIT G.R. No. L-14986 MAKALINTAL; July 31, 1962
NATURE Appeal from decision of CFI FACTS - October 5, 1958: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay - The following day he, together with his father and his witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized" -In view thereof, they "gave up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime " - Upon advice of the City Mayor an investigation was conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to file or had already filed an information for illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant - Having finished the investigation of the crime complained of, the defendant chief of police is now harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when he is absent, and he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared affidavits exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the crime." - Appellants filed suit for damages in the CFI of Negros Occidental against the chief of police of the City of Silay. Although not specifically alleged in the complaint, it is admitted by both parties, as shown in their respective briefs, that the action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code.The complaint was dismissed upon appellee's motion in the court below on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. ISSUE WON the case should have been dismissed HELD NO Ratio An action should not be dismissed upon mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty, for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss, under Rule 8, but rather for a bill of particulars according to Rule 16. Reasoning - The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code, which states that
SEPARATE OPINION
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damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission. Reasoning - In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the court. Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper. - However, the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount of P50,000 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity, and not as compensatory damages. - As regards moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter. Disposition Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. No pronouncement as to cost.
who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. Disposition Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
CONCEPCION V CA
DAMAGES
PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS 285 SCRA 438 ROMERO; January 29, 1998
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged under Article 248 of the RPC. FACTS - The information alleged that the accused with the use of firearms caused the death of Eduardo Tolentino Sr. and Jerry Agliam and inflicted gunshot wounds to Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino. - The Supreme Court upheld the RTCs decision as to the guilt of the three accused, FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN BULUSAN. This digest will focus on the RTCs award of damages which is relevant to our recitation. - As to damages, the RTC further sentenced them to pay jointly and solidarily: 1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000, moral damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages in the amount of P35,755, with interest; 2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000, moral damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages in the total amount of P61,785, with interest; 3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of P2,003.40, and moral damages in the amount of P10,000, with interest; 4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the amount of P5,000 each, with interest. 5. The costs. ISSUE WON the trial court erred in the award of damages to the victims heirs HELD 1. NO Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory
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value to him after the accident. At the trial, he testified that his wife had earned about fifteen pesos during the two months that he was disabled. That this almost total destruction of his business was directly chargeable to defendant's wrongful act, there can be no manner of doubt; and the mere fact that the loss can not be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is no reason for denying plaintiff's claim altogether. As stated in one case, it would be a reproach to the law if he could not recover damages at all. (Baldwin vs. Marquez, 91 Ga., 404) - We are of the opinion that the lower court had before it sufficient evidence of the damage to plaintiff's business in the way of prospective loss of profits to justify it in calculating his damages as to his item. That evidence has been properly elevated to this court of review. Under section 496 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are authorized to enter final judgment or direct a new trial, as may best subserve the ends of justice. We are of the opinion that the evidence presented as to the damage done to plaintiff's business is credible and that it is sufficient and clear enough upon which to base a judgment for damages. Plaintiff having had four years' experience in selling goods on commission, it must be presumed that he will be able to rebuild his business to its former proportions; so that at some time in the future his commissions will equal those he was receiving when the accident occurred. Aided by his experience, he should be able to rebuild this business to its former proportions in much less time than it took to establish it as it stood just prior to the accident. One year should be sufficient time in which to do this. The profits which plaintiff will receive from the business in the course of its reconstruction will gradually increase. The injury to plaintiff's business begins where these profits leave off, and, as a corollary, there is where defendant's liability begins. Upon this basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff's business at P250. Disposition The judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the plaintiff is awarded the following damages; ten pesos for medical expenses; one hundred pesos for the two months of his enforced absence from his business; and two hundred and fifty pesos for the damage done to his business in the way of loss of profits, or a total of three hundred and sixty pesos. No costs will be allowed in this instance.
this court, citing numerous decisions of the supreme court of Spain, held that evidence of damages "must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in reality of the damages alleged to have been suffered." But, while certainty is an essential element of an award of damages, it need not be a mathematical certainty. That this is true is adduced not only from the personal injury cases from the supreme court of Spain which we have discussed above, but by many cases decided by this court, reference to which has already been made. As stated in Joyce on Damages, section 75, "But to deny the injured party the right to recover any actual damages in cases f torts because they are of such a nature a cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to enable parties to profit by and speculate upon their own wrongs; such is not the law." - As to the elements to be considered in estimating the damage done to plaintiff's business by reason of his accident, this same author, citing numerous authorities, has the following to say: It is proper to consider the business the plaintiff is engaged in, the nature and extent of such business, the importance of his personal oversight and superintendence in conducting it, and the consequent loss arising from his inability to prosecure it. - The business of the present plaintiff required his immediate supervision. All the profits derived therefrom were wholly due to his own exertions. Nor are his damages confined to the actual time during which he was physically incapacitated for work, as is the case of a person working for a stipulated daily or monthly or yearly salary. As to persons whose labor is thus compensated and who completely recover from their injuries, the rule may be said to be that their damages are confined to the duration of their enforced absence from their occupation. But the present plaintiff could not resume his work at the same profit he was making when the accident occurred. He had built up an establishing business which included some twenty regular customers. These customers represented to him a regular income. In addition to this he made sales to other people who were not so regular in their purchases. - But he could figure on making at least some sales each month to others besides his regular customers. Taken as a whole his average monthly income from his business was about P50. As a result of the accident, he lost all but four of his regular customers and his receipts dwindled down to practically nothing. Other agents had invaded his territory, and upon becoming physically able to attend to his business, he found that would be necessary to start with practically no regular trade, and either win back his old customers from his competitors or else secure others. During this process of reestablishing his patronage his income would necessarily be less than he was making at the time of the accident and would continue to be so for some time. Of course, if it could be mathematically determined how much less he will earn during this rebuilding process than he would have earned if the accident had not occurred, that would be the amount he would be entitled to in this action. But manifestly this ideal compensation cannot be ascertained. The question therefore resolves itself into whether this damage to his business can be so nearly ascertained as to justify a court in awarding any amount whatever. - When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going concern with a fairly steady average profit on the investment, it may be assumed that had the interruption to the business through defendant's wrongful act not occurred, it would have continued producing this average income "so long as is usual with things of that nature." When in addition to the previous average income of the business it is further shown what the reduced receipts of the business are immediately after the cause of the interruption has been removed, there can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant. In the present case, we not only have the value of plaintiff's business to him just prior to the accident, but we also have its
PNOC V CA (MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION) 297 SCRA 402 ROMERO; October 8, 1998
NATURE Petition for certiorari on a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC) but then subsequently transferred to PNOC, causing the former to sink. - Private respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there should be a
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considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for which it claimed compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in the original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims. Disposition the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) in favor of private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.
emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). - Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements, - If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it was unable to fulfill - What the court has to ascertain in each case is the "capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract but in view of the actual circumstances," without, of course, taking into account considerations which were too remote at the time of the loss. - Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of private respondent corporation whatever testimony he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest therein. Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence. - Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally deprives private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. - Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasidelicts, or in every case where property right has been invaded. Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns." - Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such damages. The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may also depend on certain special reasons extant in the case. - Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that petitioner's vessel Petroparcel was at fault as well as private respondent's complaint claiming the amount of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that the vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint
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- Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual damages on the basis of the mere testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano, without any tangible document to support such claim. - This is a valid point. In crimes and quasi-delict's, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. - The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the testimony of the victim's elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina - However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted
- Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good. 20 There being an award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees are also recoverable
TALISAY SILAY V ASSOCIACION 247 SCRA 361 FELICIANO; August 15, 1995
NATURE Petition to review of the decision of the Court of Appeals reducing the award of damages granted by the court a quo from approximately P15.4 million to only P1 million FACTS - On 15 February 1966, Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. ("TSMC") and TalisaySilay Industrial Cooperative Association, Inc. ("TSICA") instituted an action for damages against defendants Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. ("AATSI"), et. al. - On 4 March 1972, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered its decision condemning the defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative Association the amount of P6,609,714.32 and to plaintiff Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. the sum of P8,802,612.89 with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid. - The Court of Appeal rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of the court a quo by reducing the amount of damages due plaintiffsappellees TSMC and TSICA from approximately P15.4 million to only P1 million. ISSUE WON the reduction of damages was proper HELD - In reducing the amount of damages awarded by the court a quo to petitioners TSMC and TSICA from roughly P15.4 million to only P1 million, the Court of Appeals, citing Malayan Insurance Co.. Inc. v. Manila Port Service reasoned that the reduction was dictated by the failure or TSMC and TSICA to comply with Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rule of Court, i.e., TSMC and
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actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be proven. - The lower court its decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint at the rate of 6% per annum.
- The plaintiff TSMC failed to realize P3,015,077.77 and plaintiff TASICA failed to realize P6,609,714.32 or a total of P9,624,792.09. In 1967-68 after the lease to TASICA has expired, TSMC failed to realize a net income of P4,805,514.12." - We believe, in other words, that the figures and computations utilized by the trial court in its award on damages need further examination and refinement. For instance, the award of damages rendered by the trial court took into account the loss of income suffered by TSMC and TSICA when AATSI, et al. transferred two (2) of sugar quota: the "domestic quota" and the "export quota." The consent of the sugar central was not required for the validity of a transfer of the domestic sugar quota. Accordingly, the transfer by AATSI, et al. of their domestic sugar quota must be regarded as valid and the loss of income attributable to the transfer of such domestic sugar quota from TSMC and TSICA to FFMCI must be deducted from the aggregate amount of damages due to TSMC and TSICA. A second example: Exhibits "P-1" and "W-1" embody figures relating to "molasses." Molasses are a by-product of milled sugar, whether that sugar be covered by a "domestic quota" or by an "export quota." The amount of income lost traceable to molasses that would have been extracted from domestic sugar must be deducted from the aggregate damages due to TSMC and TSICA. Disposition Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals MODIFIED insofar as the award of actual damages due Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. and Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative Association, Inc. are concerned. Subject to the rulings referred to herein, this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the determination, with all deliberate dispatch, of the amount of damages due Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. and Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative Association, Inc.
HELD RE DAMAGE TO PROPERTY - Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). Thus: "Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements.x x x. x x x. If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it was unable to fulfill. What the court has to ascertain in each case is the `capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract but in view of the actual circumstances,' without, of course, taking into account considerations which were too remote at the time of the loss." - Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasidelicts, or in every case where property right has been invaded. [Arts. 2222 & 1157, Civil Code.] Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."
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NATURE Appeal from a decision of CA FACTS - In July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus and on the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Bauang, La Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken the hospital for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead. - While injured. passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12 with which to pay her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. She also had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit which stated, among other things: That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries. - Despite this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with CFI La Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. Respondents defense was that vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid and moreover had waived any right to institute any action against him and his driver, when Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit. - TC ruled in favor of respondents because of the waiver. CA reversed but affirmed TC in denying petitioners claim for damages. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON there was a valid waiver to effect relinquishment of any right of action on the oart of the petitioner 2. WON private respondent Delim was able to prove that he had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the mishap 3. WON damages may be awarded petitioner Gatchalian HELD 1. NO Ratio A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person. Reasoning [1] Under the circumstances petitioner was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only 3 days, when the waiver/Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading it, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read it in its entirety. There is substantial doubt whether petitioner fully understood it
ISSUE WON the damages awarded by lower court was inadequate HELD YES - The amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. However, the provisions of the Civil Code on actual or compensatory damages present us with some difficulties. Actual damages which may be claimed by the plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly proved. (A1299 CC19) - Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. But these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict. Other damages discussed: - In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. - Moral damages: the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner which would be virtually impossible to quantify. The husband and the children will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. - Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages are awarded considering the length and nature of the instant suit. Disposition Decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the ff: 1) P1.352M as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8K up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2M as moral damages, 3) P1.5Mas temperate damages; 4) P100K each as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
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group of Panoso had been looking for him. Because of this threat on his life, he left the place and went to his in-laws at Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Nestor dela Rosa collaborated the accuseds account of the incident. - SP03 Mario Fernandez who testified on the procedures undertaken by his police detachment in investigating the shooting of Rufino Gestala. - The Court a sided with plaintiff. Defendant filed an MFR which was denied. ISSUES 1. WON trial court erred in concluding that herein accused-appellant failed to prove any basic element of self-defense 2. WON treachery can be appreciated to qualify the crime into murder 3. What is the correct amount for the indemnity HELD 1. NO - The Court has almost invariably ruled that the matter of assigning value to the declaration of witnesses is best done by trial courts which, unlike appellate courts, can assess such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial stage and thus, unless cogent reasons are shown, the findings of the trial court are accorded great respect and credit. - Accuseds defense is devoid of merit. At first, accused put up the defense of alibi when the instant case was being investigated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. Then, he sets up self-defense at the trial on the merits of the case. These two defenses are incompatible with each other. They do not at all provide shield to the accused to ward off the commission of the crime charged against him. Setting up such contradictory defenses will lead to the conclusion that the accused is confused of what defense is for real. This being so, accuseds testimony is wanting of credence at the outset. When accused finally he adopts self-defense saying that the victim pulled out a gun from his right side then poked it to the accused, squeezed its trigger once but misfired. Reacting to the situation, accused picked up the gun from the pasimano of the store, fired it once to the victim and then ran away from the scene of the incident. Analyzing the testimony of the accused, the inevitable conclusion would be that such testimony is unreasonable and improbable. If the victim really intended to kill the accused, it is natural for him, under the situation, to squeeze the trigger of his gun not only once if the first squeeze missed, but for several times until his gun fired or to pick up the gun on the pasimano of the store and use it instead in shooting the accused. It is inconceivable also that the victim would have to kill the accused just because the latter refused to buy or accept as pledge the gun Renato Panoso was offering to the accused. Incidentally, the alleged gun of the victim was not presented in Court. Likewise unbelievable is the claim of the accused that he picked up the gun from the pasimano of the store then shot the victim. At the moment of the incident, accused was facing the store and 1 meter, more or less, away from the victim who was sitting on the said pasimano indicating that that the victim was nearer to the gun on the pasimano than him. This being so, the victim should have picked up the gun from the pasimano ahead of the accused or should have grappled for the gun taken by the accused after his gun misfired at first squeeze of the trigger. This should have been the natural reaction of the victim when his life was placed in imminent danger after his gun misfired. Moreover, it is strange why Renato Panoso a best friend of the victim and who was much nearer to the gun on the pasimano than the accused and the victim did not react to the situation when the life of his best friend was in imminent danger. It is likewise strange why Renato Panoso should place and leave the gun on the
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- A suit was brought for damages against the bus company. Judgment was rendered in favor of the heirs of Malecdan. The court awarded them: a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity; b. P88,339.00 for actual damages; c. P200,000.00 for moral damages; d. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; e. Thirty percent (30%) as attorneys fees of whatever amount that can be collected by the plaintiff; and f. The costs of the suit. ISSUE WON the court erred in the amount of damages awarded HELD YES - To justify an award of actual damages, there should be proof of the actual amount of loss incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim. We cannot take into account receipts showing expenses incurred some time after the burial of the victim, such as expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st year death anniversaries. - The award of P200,000.00 for moral damages should likewise be reduced. The trial court found that the wife and children of the deceased underwent intense moral suffering as a result of the latters death. Under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Under the circumstances of this case an award of P100,000.00 would be in keeping with the purpose of the law in allowing moral damages. (they only prayed for 100k in the RTC, but RTC gave them 200k) - On the other hand, the award of P50,000.00 for indemnity is in accordance with current rulings of the Court. - Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in cases involving quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with gross negligence. In this case, petitioners driver Joson, Jr. was grossly negligent in driving at such a high speed and overtaking another vehicle. He did not even help the victim. The amount of exemplary damages is proper Disposition Decision affirmed with modification
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. The only proof that the attack was treacherous is their bare testimonies that the accused-appellant suddenly shot the victim. However, there is no treachery where there is no evidence proving that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure execution without risk to himself - mere suddenness of attack would not, by itself, constitute treachery. In fact, the circumstances surrounding the case belie the trial courts finding that treachery was present. The shooting occurred in broad daylight. The victim was openly conversing with accused-appellant for several minutes before the incident. The victim himself was with his best friend who could have come to his aid at anytime. Verily, if accused-appellant wanted to insure that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to shoot the victim. The evidence then for the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused for the crime of homicide only, not murder. The penalty imposed for homicide in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. 3. In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of the deceased. With respect to the actual damages incurred by the relatives of the deceased, we have previously held: Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipt and which appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake, or burial of the victim. Thus, the Court cannot take account of receipts showing expenses incurred before the date of slaying of the victim; those incurred after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the victim and which do not have any relation to the death, wake, or burial of the victim; those incurred for purely aesthetic or social purposes, such as the lining of the tomb of the victim - Thus, from the evidence presented before the lower court, we affirm the award of P14,590.00 for funeral and burial expenses as these were properly supported by receipts and proven during the trial of the case. However, we reduce the amount awarded as actual damages for food served during the burial of the victim to P7,285.00 which cover only those expenses incurred during the wake and vigil of the victim. The other expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st year death anniversaries are deleted as these were incurred after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the victim. Disposition the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED, and the accused-appellant is found GUILTY OF HOMICIDE and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the death indemnity of P50,000.00; and actual damages of P21,875.00.
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3. WON there is liability for damages, and to what extent (mitigation of liability) HELD 1. YES, there was an agreement for the subsequent rental. Reasoning - It was understood between the parties that Cerrano was to have it again at the increased rental as soon as the contemplated repairs had been completed. That such was the understanding is shown by the fact that plaintiff paid for the towage of the casco to the dry dock at Malabon; that he left his equipment in it; and that his patron stayed with the casco in Malabon during the time it was on the dock. - The sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was a breach of contract between the Cerrano and Tan. 2. The period was for a monthly rental. Ratio The reasonable presumption that one who agrees to pay a monthly rent intends that his tenancy is to endure for a like period, subject to indefinite tacit renewals at the end of each month as long as the arrangement is agreeable to both parties. Reasoning - When no definite agreement has been made regarding its duration, the lease of a house is deemed to have been made from day to day, from month to month, or from year to year, according to whether a daily, monthly, or yearly rent is to be paid. 3. YES, there is liability for damages, and there is no mitigation of the liability. Ratio Plaintiff is entitled to recover, as damages for the breach of the contract by the defendant, the profit which he would have been able to make had the contract been performed. HOWEVER, It is a well-recognized principle of law that damages resulting from avoidable consequences of the breach of a contract or other legal duty are not recoverable. It is the duty of one injured by the unlawful act of another to take such measures as prudent men usually take under such circumstances to reduce the damages as much as possible. Reasoning - By selling the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Tan broke his contract with Cerrano and is responsible for the damages caused by his failure to give plaintiff possession of the casco for the term of one month. - Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective profits may be recovered as damages, while article 1107 of the same Code provides that the damages recoverable for the breach of obligations not originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or might have been foreseen at the time the contract was entered into. - The injured party must produce the best evidence of which his case is susceptible and if that evidence warrants the inference that he has been damaged by the loss of profits which he might with reasonable certainty have anticipated but for the defendant's wrongful act, he is entitled to recover. - It is equally well-settled, however, that the burden of proof rests upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff might have reduced the damages. In this case the defendant has made no effort whatever to show that any other similar cascos were in fact available to plaintiff, or the price at which he would have been able to obtain the use of one. In the absence of evidence it will not be presumed that plaintiff could have secured another casco at the same price had he looked for one. Disposition It is decreed that Cerrano recover from Tan P50 as damages, and his costs in the Court of First Instance.
An action by plaintiff for damages alleged to have been caused by the breach of a contract for the hiring of a casco. FACTS - During the month of January, 1916, Tan (defendant), who was then the owner of casco No. 1033, rented it to Cerrano (plaintiff) at a monthly rental of P70. Delivery was made in Manila. - Some time during the month of May, 1916, the Tan notified Cerrano that in the following month it would be necessary to send the casco to Malabon for repairs. Cerrano then informed Tan that he would like to rent the casco again after the repairs had been completed. Defendant indicated that he was willing to rent it, but would expect P80 a month for it. - There was no agreement between the parties concerning the length of time for which the hire of the casco was to continue. - One week before the end of the repair period Tan sold the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. J. Santos, the man who had been employed by Cerrnao as patron of the casco while it was in his possession, upon hearing that it had been sold to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. went to the office of the latter in Manila, and asked for employment in the same capacity. - Cerrano, claiming that he was entitled to the possession of the casco under his contract with Tan regardless of its sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. induced Santos to refuse to take orders from the new owners. Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was obliged to bring an action of replevin against Santos for the recovery of the possession of their casco. - After the casco had been in possession of Santos for three months, the replevin suit was submitted to the court for decision upon a written stipulation in which it was admitted that the casco was the property of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. at the time of the suit was commenced, and that the "illegal detention" of the casco by Santos had caused damages to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. in the sum of P457.98. - Cerrano testified his average profit from other cascos rented by him was P60 a month for each casco (P600 for 10 months supposedly). Petitioners Claim > It was agreed that he was to take the casco at the increased rental. > A contract for the rental of a casco, when made by the owner, is deemed in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, to run from the date of the contract until the casco has to be docked for its annual overhauling and repair (ten months). Defendants Comments > His offer to lease it at the higher rate was never accepted. > In the absence of an express stipulation regarding the duration of the hire, duration is deemed to be from month to month when a monthly rental is agreed upon. > Cerranos claim of P60 profit does not furnish the proper measure of damages, and that plaintiff's right is limited to the recovery of the difference between the contract price at which the casco was hired by him and such higher rate as he might have been compelled to pay for the hire of a similar casco in the open market to take its place. > It Cerranos responsibility to rent another casco seeing that the one owned by Tan was already sold to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. (thus mitigating his liability to pay damages). ISSUES 1. WON it was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant that the casco was to be leased to the former again after it had been repaired 2. What is the duration of the term
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extraordinary degree of diligence for the safety of the travelling public and their passengers." - Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal: "it is high time to impress effectively upon public utility operators the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers and their duty to exercise greater care in the selection of drivers and conductors." - Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right. It is based entirely on the discretion of the court. 5. For Lucila, NO. - CA already considered this when it stated that the award of P25k included compensation for "mental anguish and emotional strain of not earning anything with a family to support." - Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity has not been duly proven with ITRs. The alleged loss must be established by factual evidence for it partakes of actual damages. A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be shown with a reasonable degree of certainty. - For Legaspi, YES. Pantranco failed to rebut the claim of Legaspi that he had been incapacitated for 10 months and that during said period he did not have any income. 6. YES - SC takes judicial notice of the propensity of motor repair shops to exaggerate their estimates. An estimate is not an actual expense incurred or to be incurred in the repair. The reduction made by respondent court is reasonable considering that in this instance such estimate was secured by the complainants themselves. Epilogue - In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. - Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. -Francisco vs. GSIS: there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. - Cocoland Devt Corp vs. NLRC: additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom. - Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. - Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. - There is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount. The yardstick: amount awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or
1. WON the bus driver was negligent and such negligence (and not a fortuitous event) was the proximate cause of the accident 2. WON Victors claim for deprivation of the right to marital consortium as a factor for the award of moral damages is proper 3. WON social and financial standing of Lucila can be considered in awarding moral damages 4. WON exemplary damages should be awarded 5. WON loss of earnings may be a component of damages in this case 6. WON the 10% reduction of the estimated actual damages on the pickup was proper HELD 1. Negligence and proximate cause are factual issues which SC can not pass upon in the absence of conflict between the findings of the trial court and the CA. 2. NO - For lack of factual basis, such claim of deprivation of the right to consortium cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this time. - Petitioners cited a California case, Rodriguez vs. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, as authority for the claim of damages by reason of loss of marital consortium, i.e. loss of conjugal fellowship and sexual relations. In the Rodriguez case20, it was ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person. - Whether Rodriguez may be cited as authority to support the award of moral damages to Victor &/or Lucila Kierulf for "loss of consortium" cannot be properly considered in this case. Victor's claim, although argued before CA, is not supported by the evidence on record. 3. NO - The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing. - But, it is still proper to award moral damages to Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and treatments. She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident. And it has taken 10yrs to prosecute the complaint and this appeal! 4. YES - in view of CAs finding of gross negligence on the part of Pantranco: "Public utility operators like the defendant, have made a mockery of our laws, rules and regulations governing operations of motor vehicles and have ignored either deliberately or through negligent disregard of their duties to exercise
20
Rodriguez involved a couple in their early 20s, who were married for only 16 months and full of dreams of building a family of their own, when the husband was struck and almost paralyzed by a falling 600-pound pipe. The wife testified how her life had deteriorated because her husband became a lifelong invalid, confined to the home, bedridden and in constant need of assistance for his bodily functions; and how her social, recreational and sexual life had been severely restricted. It also deprived her of the chance to bear their children. As a constant witness to her husband's pain, mental anguish and frustration, she was always nervous, tense, depressed and had trouble sleeping, eating and concentrating. Thus, the California court awarded her damages for loss of consortium.
ISSUES How much moral, exemplary and actual damages are victims of vehicular accidents entitled to?
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ISSUE WON the appellants assignment of error meritorious HELD YES - The appellants assignment of error is meritorious, the Court found after analyzing the nature of the damages, awarded, how the same were computed, and the trustworthiness of the company's evidence - On the basis of the reports of the two accountants, the damages, claimed by the complaint as a matter of simple addition, does not reach the sum of P 450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages, shown in the accountants' reports and in the statement made by the consignees. chief clerk (who did not testify) amount to P349,245.37, or much less than P450,000. - The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from them is oth the general result of the whole", the original writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court). - That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established. - It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the company, of the summary may be tested on cross-examination - What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like". - That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court. Disposition The trial court's judgment declaring the arrastre and stevedoring contract terminated, permanently enjoining the union and its officials from performing arrastre and stevedoring work for the vessels of the Compaia Maritima, and dismissing defendants' counterclaim was affirmed. The lower court's award of damages, was reversed and set aside. No costs.
date of a letter of credit in favor of petitioner Ang Tay c/o Visayan Sawmill Co. Inc., drawn without recourse on ARMACO-MARSTEEL ALLOY CORPORATION and set to expire on 24 July 1983, which is indisputably not in accordance with the stipulation in the contract signed by the parties on at least three (3) counts: (1) it was not opened, made or indorsed by the private respondent, but by a corporation which is not a party to the contract; (2) it was not opened with the bank agreed upon; and (3) it is not irrevocable and unconditional, for it is without recourse, it is set to expire on a specific date and it stipulates certain conditions with respect to shipment. In all probability, private respondent may have sold the subject scrap iron to ARMACOMARSTEEL ALLOY CORPORATION, or otherwise assigned to it the contract with the petitioners. Private respondent's complaint fails to disclose the sudden entry into the picture of this corporation. - In relation to the outline, not really an issue in this case: This Court notes the palpably excessive and unconscionable moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court to the private respondent despite a clear absence of any legal and factual basis therefor. In contracts, such as in the instant case, moral damages may be recovered if defendants acted fraudulently and in bad faith, 16 while exemplary damages may only be awarded if defendants acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. 17 In the instant case, the refusal of the petitioners to deliver the scrap iron was founded on the non-fulfillment by the private respondent of a suspensive condition. It cannot, therefore, be said that the herein petitioners had acted fraudulently and in bad faith or in a wanton, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. What this Court stated in Inhelder Corp. vs. Court of Appeals 18 needs to be stressed anew: At this juncture, it may not be amiss to remind Trial Courts to guard against the award of exhorbitant (sic) damages that are way out of proportion to the environmental circumstances of a case and which, time and again, this Court has reduced or eliminated. Judicial discretion granted to the Courts in the assessment of damages must always be exercised with balanced restraint and measured objectivity. - For, indeed, moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and it must be proportional to the suffering inflicted. Disposition Petition granted
COMPAIA MARITIMA V ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION 77 SCRA 24 AQUINO; May 24, 1977
FACTS - Since the onset in 1954 of litigation between the parties herein, this is the fifth case between them that has been elevated to the Court - The trial court awarded to the company of P450,000 as damages. - The appellants contend that the trial court erred in awarding to the company actual damages, amounting to P450,000, moral damages, of P50,000 and attorney's Considering of P20,000, and in holding that the four officers of the union are solidarily liable for the said damages. - Appellants' counsel assailed the award of actual damages, on the ground that the auditors' reports, on which they were based, were hearsay.
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HELD YES - That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted. Over a period of about a month. they experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness, fear, embarrassment and anger." - As declared by this Court in Makabili v. Court of Appeals, among other precedents: It is essential. . . . in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974.] and are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint. (San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968]) - As reflected in the records of the case, the Court of Appeals was in agreement with the findings of the trial court that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment and mental sufferings due to the failure of private respondent to perform its obligation to petitioners. - Its grant of moral and exemplary damages was justified by the Trial Court as follows: Form the evidence presented, plaintiffs' sufferings have been duly and substantially proven by the defendant's fraudulent actuation and breach of warranty, and thereby entitled for the claim of damages and litigation costs as enunciated by the testimony of the plaintiff... that the damages to his house caused sufferings and feelings of shock. helplessness, fears, embarrassment and anger, thereby entitling him to Moral Damages which should be assessed at P500,000.00. "The moral damages. . . . (are awarded) for indemnity or reparation not punishment or correction, that is, an award to entitle the injured party to obtain means (of) diversions and amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings he has undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action. (RNB Surety and Ins. Co. v. IAC, G.R No. 64515, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 745)." - This Court also agrees with the Trial Court - However, the same statutory and jurisprudential standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the amounts of moral and exemplary damages fixed by the Trial Court. the moral damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss or injury suffered.
Ratio In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish fright and the like. There must be clear testimony on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and similar injuries. Plaintiff must testify to his said injury and this should not merely be inferred from certain proven facts. Reasoning - In her testimony, Miranda-Ribaya established that due to respondents' deceitful and malevolent acts of defraudation, she had suffered "extreme anguish (without using the word anguish) and "could not sleep for three months," since she was forced to close her pawnshop, sell some of her personal jewelry and borrow money in order to pay off the owners of the jewelry wrongfully acquired by respondents from her. - Even if Miranda-Ribaya failed to use the precise legal terms, it is sufficient that these exact terms have been pleaded in the complaint and evidence has been adduced, as cited above, amply supporting the averments of the complaint. - Having established the moral damages, petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages. The wantonness and malevolence through which respondents defrauded petitioners, deceitfully incurring and then evading settlement of their just liability certainly justifies the award of exemplary damages by way of example and correction for the public good and also to serve as a deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds by others, even if the transaction were viewed as a breach of civil contract. Disposition the decision of respondent court insofar as it denies petitioners' claim for damages is hereby set aside. In addition to the amounts awarded in the affirmed judgment of the lower court, petitioners are further awarded moral and exemplary damages equivalent to twenty-five per cent (25%) of the principal sum of P125,460.79 adjudged in their favor by the lower court.
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Ratio Art.2219 enumerates the cases when moral damages may be recovered. A clearly unfounded suit is not included in the enumeration and cannot be basis for an award of moral damages. Reasoning - It will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual damages which are generally recoverable in tort cases as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art. 2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which moral damages may be recovered (Art. 2219). - A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But the two enumerations differ in the case of a clearly unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees, but is not included in the enumeration of Art.2219 in respect to moral damages. - Art. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be awarded in analogous cases to those enumerated, but we do not think the Code intended a clearly unfounded civil action or proceedings to be one of these analogous cases wherein moral damages may be recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it in Art.2219, as it did in Art.2208; or else incorporated Art.2208 by reference in Art.2219. - Art.2219 specifically mentions quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded, excepting, the special torts referred to in Art.309, par. 9, Art.2219 and in Arts.21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219). - While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage (Art.2217) and its causal relation to the defendants acts because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. - The trial court and the CA both seem to be of the opinion that the mere fact that respondents were sued without any legal foundation entitled them to an award of moral damages, hence they made no definite finding as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consist of. Such a conclusion would make of moral damages a penalty, which they are not, rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered, which they are intended to be. Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or exemplary damages. Disposition the dismissal order is affirmed with modification that only attys fees are awarded to respondents.
the allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter being that the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his parents." Such averment has the effect of tendering a valid issue. In a long line of cases, SC has consistently held that even if the allegations regarding the amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted. in no uncertain terms that actual damages must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation, conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on actual proof that damages had been suffered and on evidence of the actual amount. although an allegation is not necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to defendant's acts." Disposition Case is remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits.
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J. Francisco (plaintiff) appealed separately (L-18155), because the trial court did not award the P535,000.00 damages and attorney's fees she claimed. - October 10,1956: Trinidad J. Francisco mortgaged in favor of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a parcel of land containing an area of 18,232 square meters, with twenty-one (21) bungalows, known as Vic-Mari Compound. This was in consideration of a loan in the amount of P400K, out of which the sum of P336,100.00 was released to her. - January 6, 1959: GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on the ground that up to that date Francisco was in arrears on her monthly installments in the amount of P52,000.00. Payments made by the plaintiff at the time of foreclosure amounted to P130,000.00. GSIS itself was the buyer of the property in the foreclosure sale. - February 20, 1959: the plaintiff's father, Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of the defendant corporation, Mr. Rodolfo P. Andal, proposing to pay said amount of P30,000 to the GSIS if it would agree that after such payment the foreclosure of my daughter's mortgage would be set aside. As for the balance, Atty. Francisco proposed for GSIS to take over the administration of the mortgaged property and to collect the monthly installments, amounting to about P5,000, until the balance is paid. - February 20 1959: Atty. Francisco received a telegram containing an approval of his request. It was signed by Andal. - February 28 1959: Atty. Francisco remitted to GSIS, through Andal, a check for P30K. GSIS received the amount of P30K, and issued an official receipt No. 1209874, dated 4 March 1959. It did not, however, take over the administration of the compound (as was proposed by Atty. Francisco). - Remittances, all accompanied by letters, corresponding to the months of March, April, May, and June, 1960 and totalling P24,604.81 were also sent by Francisco to GSIS from time to time, all of which were received and duly receipted for. - Then the System sent three (3) letters, one dated 29 January 1960, which was signed by its assistant general manager, and the other two letters, dated 19 and 26 February 1960, respectively, which were signed by Andal, asking the plaintiff for a proposal for the payment of her indebtedness, since according to the System the one-year period for redemption had expired. Respondents Comment > The remittances previously made by Atty. Francisco were allegedly not sufficient to pay off her daughter's arrears, including attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in foreclosing the mortgage. ISSUES 1. WON the telegram generated a contract that is valid and binding upon the parties 2. WON Francisco is entitled to damages (moral damages in the outline)
integral part of the Information. The victim categorically alleged that she had been raped by appellant in 1993 when she was in grade three - Furthermore, appellant could not have been oblivious to the victims Sworn Statement, for he requested and was given an opportunity to rebut the same in his Motion for Reinvestigation. - It will be noted that appellant was charged with rape committed before and until October 15, 1994 xxx several times. Said acts are alleged in only one Information which, as a general rule, is defective for charging more than one offense. However, appellant failed, within the prescribed period, to file such motion on the ground of duplicity. He is thus deemed to have waived the defect in the Information. - appellant cannot be said to have been deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. Despite the duplicitous nature of the Information, he did not object to such defect. Moreover, he was given the chance to defend himself in court and to cross-examine the complainant. - the Court rigorously examined the records and arrived upon the conclusion that his guilt had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The victims clear, categorical and straightforward testimony indubitably demonstrated the culpability of appellant for the dastardly acts committed before and until October 15, 1994 - The foregoing shows that appellant sexually assaulted complainant in 1993 when she was 10 years old. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of statutory rape under Article 335 (3) of the RPC. Moreover, appellant is also guilty of acts of lasciviousness committed on October 15, 1995. - The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, an amount which is automatically granted to the offended party without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of rape. - Consistent with recent jurisprudence, appellant should also be ordered to pay the victim the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages. In People v. Prades, the Court resolved that moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Disposition The appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Appellant Rodelio Bugayong is ordered to pay Complainant Arlene Cauan P50,000 as indemnity and the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages.
HELD 1. YES, the contract is binding. Ratio If a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or any other agent, to do acts within the scope of an apparent authority, and thus holds him out to the public as possessing power to do those acts, the corporation will, as against any one who has in good faith dealt with the corporation through such agent, be estopped from denying his authority Reasoning - GSIS does not disown the telegram, and even asserts that it came from its offices, as may be gleaned from the letter, dated 31 May 1960, to Atty. Francisco, and signed "R. P. Andal, general manager by Leovigildo Monasterial, legal counsel.
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(a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, [In this latter case, moral damages may be recovered even in loss of or damage to property.] moral damages may aptly be recovered. - This rule also applies, as aforestated, to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to in Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law. - Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney's fees, [Article 2208(4), Civil Code; such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral damages. If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff. - The Court confirms, once again, the foregoing rules. Disposition petition is GRANTED and the award of moral damages to respondent Ricardo Lo under the assailed decision is DELETED. In its other aspects, the appealed decision shall remain undisturbed. No costs.
Expertravel, both courts said, the fact that the amount "delivered to the latter remain(ed) in its possession up to the present, mean(t) that the amount redounded to the benefit of petitioner Expertravel, in view of the second paragraph of Article 1241 of the Civil Code to the effect that payment made to a third person shall also be valid in so far as it has redounded to the benefit of the creditor." ISSUE WON moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that did not result to physical injury to the offended party HELD NO Ratio Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party. - An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. OTHER GROUNDS FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: "1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; "2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; "3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; "4) Adultery or concubinage; "5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; "6) Illegal search; "7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; "8) Malicious prosecution; "9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; "10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35. "The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this Article, may also recover moral damages. "The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this Article, in the order named." - Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict,
EXPERT TRAVEL & TOURS INC V CA (LO) VITUG; June 25, 1999
NATURE Petitioner, Expertravel and Tours, Inc., seeks in the instant petition for review on certiorari a modification of the decision, dated 20 March 1997, of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the 07th November 1994 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 5) of Manila declaring the instant suit DISMISSED, and ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant Ricardo Lo moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00, and to pay the costs of the suit. FACTS - On 07 October 1987, Expertravel & Tours, Inc., ("Expertravel"), a domestic corporation engaged in the travel agency business, issued to private respondent Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong, together with hotel accommodations and transfers, for a total cost of P39,677.20. Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a court complaint for recovery of the amount claimed plus damages. - Respondent Lo explained, in his answer, that his account with Expertravel had already been fully paid. The outstanding account was remitted to Expertravel through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega, who was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients of Expertravel. The payment was evidenced by a Monte de Piedad Check No. 291559, dated 06 October 1987, for P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega, in turn, issued City Trust Check No. 417920 in favor of Expertravel for the amount of P50,000.00, with the notation "placement advance for Ricardo Lo, etc." Per its own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on 10 October 1987. - The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held that the payment made by Lo was valid and binding on petitioner Expertravel. Even on the assumption that Ms. de Vega had not been specifically authorized by
MIJARES V CA (METRO DRUG INC) 271 SCRA 558 KAPUNAN; April 18, 1997
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Dioscoro Lamenta, salesman/collector of Metro Manila Drug Inc. - Mijares as owners of Aklan Drug had been buying pharmaceutical products from Metro Drug since 1976. They had good record with Metro Drug. - Editha Mijares, aside from being the operator of Aklan Drug, was also an officer of the Ospital Ng Maynila Consumers Cooperative, Inc., which became a concessionaire of a small area right inside the hospital compound and it operated a drugstore. Said drugstore had some transactions with the plaintiff as supplier of pharmaceutical products. Subsequently the Cooperative was dissolved and it stopped operating. Solomon Silverio, Jr. leased from the City of Manila the site previously occupied by the Cooperative and put up a drugstore on the same. - Lamenta delivered pharmaceutical products to the said store (8 times). - The first to the seventh deliveries were received by Luz Espares,the 8th delivery was received by Hilda Rodrigona. Both were never the employees of the defendants. - In partial payment of these receivables Solomon Silverio, Jr. issued a check under the account name Farmacia delos Remedios in the amount of P14,180.46, which was subsequently dishonored on the ground of insufficient fund.
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- On 18 July 1977, during the pendency of the forcible entry case, petitioner instituted the present action for reconveyance with damages against private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao City. -Petitioner alleged that private respondent fraudulently registered the 3/4hectare portion actually cultivated by him when the former stated in his free patent application that "the land applied for is not claimed or occupied by any other person." In addition, petitioner denied that a survey was conducted in 1970; if at all, it was merely a "table survey." Incidentally, it was discovered in the survey that the area of petitioner's actual occupation exceeded that which he bought from Ciriaco Reducto in 1946. - After trial, the court rejected petitioner's denial of the 1970 Survey. Since the disputed 3/4-hectare portion was not part of the area bought and paid for in 1946 by petitioner, the latter was not entitled to reconveyance. Petitioner was declared a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith who was "enjoying freely the use of government property" without even applying for the same nor paying taxes thereon. His prayer for P5,000.00 as actual damages for the sugarcane and bananas destroyed on the disputed portion was denied. Instead, private respondent's counterclaim was granted and petitioner was ordered to pay P6,000.00 in attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, P15,000.00 for moral damages, and the costs of the proceedings. - The Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision in toto. ISSUES 1. WON petitioner has legal standing in the suit 2. WON the award for attorney's fees, moral damages and expenses of litigation against the petitioner are proper HELD 1. NO - Petitioner Pantaleon de la Pea has absolutely no standing to institute the present suit for reconveyance. 2. NO Ratio It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual occupation since January 1947. However, petitioner's possession is not one that could ripen into ownership. Title to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years. It must be noted that the dispute regarding the 3/4-hectare portion started even before a free patent and OCT could be issued to private respondent in 1975. As early as 1956, the controversy already began between petitioner and private respondent's father. Hence, petitioner's possession falls short of the required period. Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present suit. - An award for attorney's fees and moral damages on the sole basis of an action later declared to be unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the other party is improper. The right to litigate is so precious that a Penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. Disposition Affirmed, with the sole modification that the award for attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, and moral damages is DELETED.
Appeal from the decision of CA dismissing petitioners action for reconveyance with damages against private respondent. FACTS - Pantaleon De La Pena imputes fraud and misrepresentation to private respondent Herotido Tan in securing Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 and OCT No. P-7923 over the same. - Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of land in Sulongvale, Sulop, Davao del Norte (previously Padada, Tanwalang, Davao), designated as Lot No. 5714, for which he filed Homestead Application No. 192495 (E100806) with the Bureau of Lands. - However, another party also filed a Homestead Application for the same. - Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over six (6) hectares (later increased to eight [8]) of Lot 5714 to petitioner Pantaleon de la Pea who thereafter entered his appearance in the administrative case when the portion transferred to him remained included in the homestead applications of Ciriaco Reducto and Potenciano Nazaret. After it was ascertained in a field verification that petitioner had a better right to acquire the portion claimed by him being its actual occupant and cultivator, the Director of Lands directed petitioner to apply for the portion himself within sixty (60) days after its survey or else "lose his preferential right thereto." However, no such application was filed. - Meanwhile, on 7 March 1950, Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1 1/2-hectare portion of Lot 5714 to Michael Doble who in turn sold his rights in 1956 to Ricardo Tan, herein private respondent's father. The portion sold to Michael Doble, and later on acquired by Ricardo Tan, became the western boundary of de la Pea's land. - On 24 and 25 August 1970, a survey was conducted and it was discovered that the land occupied by petitioner was bigger by 3/4 of a hectare than what he actually bought and paid for from Ciriaco. On the other hand, the land ceded to Doble (later acquired by Tan) was "very much smaller" than what he actually bought. - Although the 3/4-hectare portion was part of the area acquired by Doble in 1950, it was petitioner de la Pea who cultivated the same without objection from Doble. However, when Ricardo Tan acquired the lot on 2 March 1956, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but petitioner kept destroying it; hence, the start of a boundary dispute. - On 5 May 1975, Ricardo Tan transferred his rights over Lot 5714-C to his son, private respondent Herotido Tan, by means of "Affidavit of Relinquishment." But the conflict over the 3/4-hectare portion continued. In an effort to resolve the conflict, a relocation survey was agreed upon except that the parties failed to agree on a common surveyor. Consequently, each party had to hire his own. Petitioner's surveyor conducted a relocation survey on 18 April 1977, while respondent's surveyor conducted his own five (5) days later. After it was determined that the 3/4-hectare portion was within Lot 5714C of private respondent, the latter built a fence around the property to prevent petitioner from entering. The sugarcane and bananas planted by petitioner were destroyed in the process. - On 29 April 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ricardo Tan in the Municipal Trial Court of Sulop. When it was discovered that private respondent Herotido Tan was the registered owner of Lot 5714-C under OCT No. P-7923 which was issued pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 dated 15 September 1975, the complaint was accordingly amended to implead him. - The MTC and CFI ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered that possession be restored to the petitioner..
J MARKETING V SIA
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- a complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action if it alleges the following: (1) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at least the prosecution was instituted at his instance; (2) that the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal of the plaintiff; (3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e. by improper and sinister motives - first TWO requisites are sufficiently alleged in the complaint. - the FOURTH requisite malice in which a a general averment is sufficient in view of Rule 8, 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners filed the criminal case for the purpose of harassing and pressuring Guevarra, in his capacity as chairman of Guevent Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC), to give in to their illicit and malicious desire to appropriate the remaining unsold properties of the corporation, may be considered sufficient. - To be sure, lack of probable cause is an element separate and distinct from that of malice. It follows, therefore, that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. - Obviously, a determination that there was no probable cause cannot be made to rest solely on the fact that the trial court, acting on private respondent Guevarra's demurrer to evidence, dismissed the criminal prosecution, just as it cannot be made to turn on the fact that the Department of Justice reversed the fiscal's findings and ordered the criminal case against private respondent Guevarra to be filed in court. The first would transform all acquittals into veritable countersuits for malicious prosecution. On the other hand, the second would result in the dismissal of all complaints for malicious prosecutions. - Accordingly, the inquiry should be whether sufficient facts are alleged showing that in bringing the criminal action, the defendant in the civil action for malicious prosecution acted without probable cause. This Court has ruled that for purposes of malicious prosecution, "probable cause" means "such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." Buchanan v. Vda. de Esteban. In this case, even if we consider the allegations in the complaint as true, as well as the order of the trial court annexed thereto, we do not find the same sufficient to establish the absence of probable cause. - To prove that the subject UNDERTAKING (Exhibit "N") is falsified, the prosecution presented the testimony of complaining witness REYNALDO COMETA to prove that as President of the STATE INVESTMENT he did not execute the document of undertaking and thus, the subject document (Exhibit "N") is falsified and his signature thereat is not his signature. To corroborate the testimony of COMETA, the NBI handwriting expert LUZVIMINDA C. SABADO, submitted the questioned Documents Report No. 278-688 dated 21 June 1988 to show that the signature above the name of COMETA in the subject undertaking (Exhibit "N") and the specimen signatures of COMETA WERE not written by one and the same person (Exhibit "Y"). - To prove that accused falsified and/or caused the falsification of the subject undertaking (Exhibit "N"), the prosecution presented the records of the HOUSING BOARD which include the "Official Form" letter-application (Exhibit "J") submitted by accused together with the required documents enumerated therein which supposedly included the undertaking to release mortgage. The testimony of a HOUSING BOARD official, Ms. Floredeliza Manuel was presented to testify as an official of the HOUSING BOARD the standard procedure is that the BOARD requires from applicants for authority such as
- With respect to the attorney's fees, an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award thereof to the winning party. Everything points to the fact that petitioner honestly thought that they had a good cause of action, so that notwithstanding the dismissal of their case, no attorney's fees can be granted to private respondent. - Considering that Sia claims to be the owner of the motorcycle, J mktg was compelled to sue him. When Sia "necessarily" became a party defendant no attorney's fees and litigation expenses can automatically be recovered even if he should win, as it is not the fact of winning alone that entitles recovery of such items but rather the attendance of special circumstances - the enumerated exceptions in Article 2208 NCC. - There being no bad faith reflected in petitioner's persistence in pursuing its case, other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of its cause, attorney's fees cannot not be recovered as cost. Disposition Decision of CA AFFIRMED
COMETA V CA (MACLI-ING ET AL) 301 SCRA 459 MENDOZA; December 29, 1999
FACTS - 1989 > SITI and Cometa filed a criminal case against Guevara for falsification of Public Documents (State Investment House, Inc. vs. Reynaldo S. Guevara) The basis of the aforesaid case is a forged Affidavit of Undertaking with its application of a License to Sell its townhouse units in the RSG Condominium-Gueventville II. The signature therein purporting to be that of Cometa is not Cometas signature. - Consequently, a criminal information was filed against Guevara in RTC Makati (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Reynaldo s. Guevara, Accused) - Upon the filing of the information, a Warrant of Arrest was issued against Guevara. Guevara posted the necessary bail bond and the warrant for his arrest was lifted. - After the prosecution had rested its case, Guevara filed a Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the Evidence, contending that all the evidence submitted by the prosecution do not suffice to show that he had committed the crime for which he has been accused - March 26, 1992 - RTC Makati issued an order, granting Guevara's Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case for falsification of public documents against him - it is clear that the defendants had maliciously prosecuted Guevara, to his and HBI's embarassment, damage and prejudice. The criminal case filed by the defendants against Guevara had absolutely no basis in fact and in law. Quite clearly, defendants had filed the aforesaid case with the sole intent of harassing and pressuring Guevara, in his capacity as Chairman of GIDC, to give in to their illicit and malicious desire to appropriate the remaining unsold properties of GIDC and/or to influence the appellate courts to decide in their favor, their appeal of the lower court's decision in the GIDC case. ISSUE WON requisites for malicious prosecution are present HELD YES
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- Osdana left for Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and commenced working for GCC. She was assigned to the College of Public Administration of the Oleysha University and, contrary to the terms and conditions of the employment contract, was made to wash dishes, cooking pots, and utensils, perform janitorial work and other tasks which were unrelated to her job designation as waitress. She was made to work a gruelling twelve-hour shift, without overtime pay. - Osdana suffered from numbness and pain in her arms. The pain was such that she had to be confined at a housing facility of GCC from June 18 to August 22, 1993, during which period, she was not paid her salaries. - Osdana was allowed to resume work, this time as Food Server and Cook at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, where she worked seven days a week from August 22 to October 5, 1993. Again, she was not compensated. - Then, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, Osdana was again confined for no apparent reason. During this period, she was still not paid her salary. - On October 24, 1993, she was re-assigned to the Oleysha University to wash dishes and do other menial tasks. Osdana worked long hours and under harsh conditions. She was diagnosed as having Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a condition precipitated by activities requiring repeated flexion, pronation, and supination of the wrist and characterized by excruciating pain and numbness in the arms. - Osdana underwent two surgical operations. Between these operations, she was not given any work assignments even if she was willing and able to do light work in accordance with her doctors advice. Again, Osdana was not paid any compensation for the period between February to April 22, 1994. - Osdana was discharged from the hospital on April 25, 1994. The medical report stated that she had very good improvement of the symptoms and she was discharged on the second day of the operation. - Four days later, however, she was dismissed from work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not given any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not allowed to work. - Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the help of petitioner, but to no avail. She was thus constrained to file a complaint before the POEA. ISSUES WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion for the following reasons: (a) ruling in favor of Osdana even if there was no factual or legal basis for the award and, (b) holding petitioner solely liable for her claims despite the fact that its liability is joint and several with its principal, GCC. HELD - The decisions of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC were based mainly on the facts and allegations in Osdanas position paper and supporting documents. We find these sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to support the questioned decisions. Generally, findings of facts of quasijudicial agencies like the NLRC are accorded great respect and, at times, even finality if supported by substantial evidence. This Court, therefore, upholds the finding of herein public respondents that the facts and the evidence on record adduced by Osdana and taken in relation to the answer of petitioner show that indeed there was breach of the employment contract and illegal dismissal committed by petitioners principal. - Article 284 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter of termination by reason of disease or illness, viz: Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law
verify the facts before impleading the defendants. Thus, the action brought against them resulted not only in inconvenience but also in unnecessary expenses, including expenses for atorneys fees. The CA reduced the damages that were awarded. - The petitioners filed this motion for review by the the SC. ISSUE WON the award of moral and exemplary damages are proper HELD YES - In impleading the defendants, the petitioner clearly acted in wanton disregard of the facts that were very obvious. This carelessness and lack of diligence destroyed their claim of good faith. While the court uphelds the right of any person to litigate without fear of penalty, this right should be exercised in good faith. Reasoning - As the defendants were compelled to hire the services of a lawyer to defend themselves against the unjustified suit, it is only proper that this cost be shouldered by the petitioner. - The award of moral damages was affirmed as it was shown that the defendants suffered injury which sprung from the unjustified act of the petitioner in bring the suit. The SC clarified however that mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feeling, social humiliation are not enough to grant moral damages. It said that it must be shown that the acts, as in this case, must have been tainted with bad faith or ill motives. - The Award for exemplary damages, which are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, was likewise affirmed due to the petitioners conduct that needlessly dragged innocent bystanders into an unfounded litigation. Disposition Petition denied. Order appealed from is affirmed.
TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC V NLRC 299 SCRA 608 ROMERO; December 3, 1998
NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - In August 1992, private respondent Osdana was recruited by petitioner for employment with the latters principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the original employment contract, Osdana was engaged to work as Food Server for a period of thirtysix (36) months with a salary of five hundred fifty Saudi rials. - Osdana claims she was required by petitioner to pay a total of P11,950.00 in placement fees and other charges, for which no receipt was issued. She was likewise asked to undergo a medical examination conducted by the Philippine Medical Tests System, a duly accredited clinic for overseas workers, which found her to be Fit of Employment. - Petitioner asked Osdana to sign another Contractor-Employee Agreement which provided that she would be employed as a waitress for twelve (12) months with a salary of two hundred eighty US dollars ($280). It was this employment agreement which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
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- Napoleon died on the way to the hospital. The doctor certified that the cause of death was the stab wound sustained at the stomach area just above the waistline. - Carlos voluntarily surrendered go the police. - In his defense, Carlos alleged that he was walking alone when he met Napoleon and Edgardo . Without any provocation, Napoleon suddenly drew his bolo and shouted, "Caloy, I will kill you!" Napoleon swung the bolo at him twice but missed him. Petitioner then drew out his knife and stabbed Napoleon. When he saw Edgardo rushing towards him, he grabbed a piece of bamboo from the newly constructed culvert and hit the former on the left arm. Edgardo ran away. Carlos also left the premises and went home. On the way, he met his brother, Benito, and together they proceeded to their house. - TC convicted the Carlos Arcona of homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and acquitted him of attempted homicide. He was ordered to pay indemnity of 30k for Napoleons death, 10K for actual damages, and 10K as moral damages. On the other hand, Benito Arcona was acquitted of homicide and convicted of attempted homicide. He was made to indemnify Edgardo the sum of 10K as actual damages. - Only Carlos appealed. CA affirmed the TC findings but increased civil liability to 50K. Hence, this petition. He maintains that it was self-defense. ISSUES 1. WON all elements of self-defense were present 2. What are the proper damages to be rendered? HELD 1. NO - Unlawful aggression was not proven. - When self-defense is invoked, the defendant has the burden of proving that the killing was justified. Even if the prosecution is weak, the case cannot be dismissed because of the open admission of the killing. - To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence that: (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. - Self-defense is a question of fact. He failed to prove that there was unlawful aggression of the part of the victim. Although the bolo of Napoleon was unsheathed, it does not conclude that there was unlawful aggression. When Jerry Boston testified to hearing someone say, Caloy, I will kill you, he did not categorically say it was Napoleon; and iIt was still possible that he said it while being assaulted by Carlos. It was not possible that Carlos escaped his alleged ambush with out a scratch. 2. CA was correct in increasing civil indemnity to 50K in line with existing jurisprudence. In cases of murder, homicide, parricide and rape, civil indemnity in the amount of 50K is automatically granted to the offended party or his heirs in case of his death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime. - On the other hand, the award of moral damages (10K) must be increased to 50K. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and
work, no pay rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first place, the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29, 1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all. - With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. - Finally, petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents for holding it solely liable for the claims of Osdana despite the fact that its liability with the principal is joint and several. Petitioner misunderstands the decision in question. It should be noted that contrary to petitioners interpretation, the decision of the labor arbiter which was affirmed by the NLRC did not really absolve the foreign principal. Petitioner was the only one held liable for Osdanas monetary claims because it was the only respondent named in the complaint and it does not appear that petitioner took steps to have its principal included as co-respondent. Thus, the POEA, and later the labor arbiter, did not acquire jurisdiction over the foreign principal.
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WON the TC erred in awarding damages HELD NO - In the instant case, the TC awarded damages analogous to malicious prosecution under Article 2219(8) of the NCC for the following reasons: - The malice with which petitioner filed the case is apparent. As an experienced jeweler who thoroughly examined the earrings himself and went so far as to sketch them earlier, it is illogical that he would fail to exert extra effort to check its genuineness at the precise moment of the exchange. His acts thus failed to accord with what an ordinary prudent man would have done in the same situation. - As an experienced businessman and banker, he was shrewd enough to bloat the propertys price from 25k to 75k only a few days after he had purchased it for a far lower cost, the value of which still fell short of the diamond earrings price. - Also, it took him 2 hours of unexplained delay before complaining the earrings were counterfeita period in which anything could have happened while petitioner was in possession of the jewelry. - Given this, it would appear that the cause of action in the instant case was contrived by the petitioner himself in hopes of obtaining a favorable outcome in his complaint to take the real jewelry, return a fake, and get back the property. This is plain and simple, unjust enrichment. All that considered, the damages prayed for were reasonably proportionate to the sufferings they underwent. - Petitioner filed a malicious and unfounded case all the while dragging down private respondents, whose reputations had been soiled by petitioners coming to court with unclean hands. Because of the falsity, malice and baseless nature of the complaint, defendants were compelled to litigate and are thus also entitled to the awarding of attorneys fees under Article 2208. Disposition decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. Dr. Cruz, however, is ordered to pay petitioner the balance of the purchase price of Php40k
FULE V CA (CRUZ, BELARMINO) 286 SCRA 698 ROMERO; March 23, 1998
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Fule, a corporate secretary of the Rural Bank of Alaminos (the Bank) by profession and jeweler on the side, acquired a 10-hectare property in Rizal. The former owner, Jacobe, had mortgaged it to the Bank for a loan of 10k but it was later foreclosed and offered for public auction upon his default. - Petitioner asked Dichoso and Mendoza (the Agents) to look for an interested buyer, and found one in private respondent Dr. Cruz. At the time, petitioner had shown interest in buying a pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings from Dr. Cruz but never came to an agreed price. Subsequently, negotiations for the barter of the jewelry and the property ensued; upon the request of Dr. Cruz, it was found by Atty. Belarmino that no barter was feasible because the 1-year period of redemption had not expired. To get over this legal impediment, petitioner executed a deed of redemption on behalf of Jacobe. - Petitioner arrived at Belarminos residence with the agents to execute a deed of absolute sale while Cruz held on to the earrings. Petitioner issued a certification stating the actual consideration of the sale was Php200k and not Php80k as indicated in the deed. Since the earrings were appraised at only Php160k, the remaining 40k was to be paid later in cash. This was done apparently to minimize the capital gains tax that petitioner would have to shoulder. Petitioner headed for the bank to meet up with Cruz and pick up the earrings. When asked if the jewelry was ok, petitioner nodded to express his satisfaction. Petitioner paid the agents $300 and some pieces of jewelry, but not half of the pair of earrings in question as previously promised. - Later that evening, petitioner arrived at Belarminos residence complaining the earrings were fake as confirmed by a tester. Petitioner accused the agents of deceiving him, which they denied. He nonetheless took back the $300 and jewelry given them. After another failed testing, the petitioner reported the matter to the police where the agents also executed their sworn statements. - Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC to declare the contract of sale over the property null and void on the ground of fraud and deceit. The lower court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction over the deed as they found that the genuine pair of earrings had been delivered by Cruz. The 2 hours before petitioners complaint was considered unreasonable delay, placing petitioner in estoppel. The Court furthered that all elements of a valid contract were present, namely a meeting of the minds, determinate subject matter, and price certain. As the earrings had been delivered and the contract of absolute sale executed, the contract of barter or sale had been consummated. - The Court also finds that the plaintiff acted in bad, awarding Cruz P300k as moral damages and P100k as exemplary damages; Atty. Belarmino P250k as moral damages and P150k as exemplary damages; and granting both P25k each as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. A petition with the CA yielded the same result, hence this petition. ISSUE
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC V CA (PANTEJO) 275 SCRA 621 REGALADO; July 17, 1997
NATURE Appeal by certiorari FACTS - On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled. - To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out cash assistance of P100.00 and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of two days in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL's expense because he did not have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. Thus, respondent Pantejo was forced to seek and accept the generosity of a co-passenger, an Engr. Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao.
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- CA: affirm conviction, removed award for loss of crops and hospitalization expenses, increased moral damages to P10,000.00, and awarding nominal damages in the same amount. ISSUE WON the increase in moral damages is warranted HELD YES - Anent the increase in the amount of moral damages awarded, suffice it to state that the nature of the injuries and the degree of physical suffering endured by the complainant warrants the same. The tragic incident caused a mutilation of complainant's left ear and a permanent scar on his right forearm. These injuries have left indelible marks on the complainant's body and will serve as a constant reminder of this traumatic experience. (more discussion on the modification of amount of nominal damages and moral damages when it was not the issue appealed, rationalization for deletion of actual and compensatory damages) Disposition the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
who verbally told him that she was reimbursed by the airline for hotel and meal expenses. It may even be said that the amounts, the time and the circumstances under which those amounts were offered could not salve the moral wounds inflicted by PAL on private respondent but even approximated insult added to injury. - The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes the former liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code. Such inattention to and lack of care by petitioner airline for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages. - Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. However, substantial damages do not translate into excessive damages. Except for attorney's fees and costs of suit, it will be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed point by point the factual findings of the lower court upon which the award of damages had been based. We, therefore, see no reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial court. - Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are convinced that the awards for actual, moral and exemplary damages granted in the judgment of respondent court, for the reasons meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in its decision, are just and equitable. It is high time that the travelling public is afforded protection and that the duties of common carriers, long detailed in our previous laws and jurisprudence and thereafter collated and specifically catalogued in our Civil Code in 1950, be enforced through appropriate sanctions.
LOPEZ V PAN AM WORLD AIRWAYS 16 SCRA 431 BENGZON; March 30, 1966
FACTS - Sen Fernando Lopez, his wife, his son-in-law, and his daughter made reservations, through their agency, for first class accommodations in the Tokyo San Francisco flight of PAN-AM. PAN-AM's SF head office confirmed the reservations. First class tickets were subsequently issued, with the total fare having been fully paid before this. - As scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they arrived in Tokyo, they contacted PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their accommodations. For the given reason that the first class seats were all booked up, PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed them that they could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class. Due to pressing engagements in the US, they were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight as tourist passengers. - Sen Lopez filed suit for damages alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by defendant out of racial prejudice against Orientals. He asked for P500T actual and moral damages, P100T exemplary damages, P25T attorney's fees plus costs. - PAN-AM asserted that its failure to provide first class accommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error of its employees. It interposed a counterclaim for atty's fees of P25T. - CFI Rizal decision: in favor of plaintiff and granted (a) P100T, moral damages; (b) P20T, exemplary damages; (c) P25T, atty's fees, and costs of the action. - Plaintiffs filed MFR asking that moral damages be increased to P400T and for 6% interest per annum on amount to be granted. - CFI modified decision: (a) P150T, moral damages; (b) P25T, exemplary damages; with legal interest on both from date of filing of complaint until paid; (c) P25T, atty's fees; and costs of the action. - Both appealed: PAN-AM contended that there was NO bad faith; Lopez et al wanted a total of P650T as award for damages.
VALENZUELA V CA SUMALPONG V CA (PEOPLE) 268 SCRA 764 FRANCISCO, February 26, 1997
NATURE Petition for review FACTS - Sumalpong shot the victim Ramos after the former slapped the latters wife. Before this, Sumalpong called upon the spouses then inquired regarding the identity of those who stoned his house, then accused Ramos of stoning his house. Ramos wife, Leonarda, remarked that he should first confirm the information he received before accusing anyone, then after this Sumalpong shot Leonarda at the back of her head (though apparently, Leonarda was not harmed) then Ramos rushed towards Sumalpong who then shot Ramos twice but missed. They wrestled and in the act, Sumalpong bit on Ramos ear, causing its mutilation. - TC: Sumalpong convicted of attempted homicide. Ramos awarded with P 16,800.00 for the loss of his crops due to his failure to attend to his farmwork because of the injuries inflicted upon him by the petitioner, P2,000.00 for hospitalization expenses, and P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
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- Private respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages, alleging that the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was without basis and was instituted maliciously in order to harass private respondents. - On April 26, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision on the latter case, in favor of the spouses Chua, awarding the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, and the sum of P250,000.00 as exemplary damages, among others. - On October 31, 1991, upon appeal by petitioner bank, the Court of Appeals modified the decisionone of the changes was the award of the sum of P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. - Petitioner moved for a consideration but the same was denied, hence, this petition ISSUE WON the petitioner bank is liable for moral damages HELD YES - Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding such damages, the court shall take into account the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its discretion. - As borne out by the record of this case, private respondents are engaged in several businesses , such as rice and corn trading, cement dealership, and gasoline proprietorship. The dishonor of private respondents' checks and the foreclosure initiated by petitioner adversely affected the credit standing as well as the business dealings of private respondents as their suppliers discontinued credit lines resulting in the collapse of their businesses. - In the case of Leopoldo Araneta vs. Bank of America , it was held that: "The financial credit of a businessman is a prized and valuable asset, it being a significant part of the foundation of his business. Any adverse reflection thereon constitutes some financial loss to him." - The damage to private respondents' reputation and social standing entitles them to moral damages. Article 2217, in relation to Article 2220, of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury." - Obviously, petitioner bank's wrongful act caused serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation to private respondents for which they are entitled to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 which we deem to be reasonable. Disposition The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification only as to the award of damages
first class seats. Hence, they also suffered social humiliation. (MD = P25T each) (b) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES - In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. (ED = P75T) (c) ATTORNEYS FEES - Record shows a written contract of services wherein plaintiffs engaged the services of their counsel Atty. Francisco and agreed to pay the sum of P25T upon the termination of the case in the CFI, and another P25T if case is appealed to the SC. This is reasonable considering the subject matter of the present controversy, the professional standing of the attorney for plaintiffsappellants, and the extent of the service rendered by him. Disposition Judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED so as to award in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, the following: (1) P200T as moral damages, divided among plaintiffs; (2) P75T as exemplary or corrective damages; (3) Interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on the moral and exemplary damages, from date of amended CFI decision, until said damages are fully paid; (4) P50T as attorney's fees; and (5) Costs of action. Counterclaim dismissed.
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA (SPS CHUA) MELO; September 17, 2001
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision and resolution of the CA FACTS - Sometime in April, 1982, respondent Salvador Chua was offered by Mr. Jimmy Rojas, manager of Producers Bank of the Philippines, to transfer his account from Pacific Banking Corporation to herein petitioner bank. - Respondent spouses opened and maintained substantial savings and current deposits with, and likewise obtained various loans from petitioner bank, one of which was a loan for P2,000,000.00 which was secured by a real estate mortgage and payable within a period of three (3) years or from 1982 to 1985. - On January 20, 1984, private respondents deposited with petitioner bank the total sum of P960,000.00, which was duly entered in private respondents' savings account passbook. - Petitioner bank failed to credit this deposit due to the fact that its Branch Manager absconded with the money of the bank's depositors. - Consequently, petitioner bank dishonored the checks drawn out by private respondents in favor of their various creditors on the ground of insufficient funds, despite the fact that at that time, the balance of private respondents' deposit was in the amount of P1,051,051.19. - Private respondents requested for copies of their ledgers covering their savings and current accounts, but petitioner bank refused. - Private respondents instituted on January 30, 1984 an action for damages against petitioner bank - On the other hand, petitioner bank filed with the City Sheriff of Bacolod a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
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moral damages may not be recovered in cases of crime or tort, unless either results or causes "physical injuries," which are lacking in the case at bar. Although the same article permits recovery of said damages in cases of malicious prosecution, this feature of said provision may not be availed of by the plaintiff herein, inasmuch as the acts set forth in the complaint took place in 1949, or before said Code became effective (laws shouldnt have retroactive effect).
1.The authority of the Secretary of Justice to make the assignment in question and the validity thereof, under said legal provision, are submitted. Hence, it is not claimed that said officer may be held civilly liable for the aforementioned assignment. This being the case, how can such responsibility be exacted from Figueras who, it is urged, merely instigated said assignment? 2.Even if we assumed the act complained of to be wrong or to have caused injury, the right of action hypotethically resulting therefrom, if any on which we need not, and do not, express any opinion would have accrued in favor of Dr. Hernandez who is not a party in the present action not plaintiff herein. - "As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental suffering resulting from bodily injuries is restricted to the person who has suffered the bodily hurt, and there can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for another's suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against a third person. So the anguish of mind arising as to the safety of others who may be in personal peril from the same cause cannot be taken into consideration. - '. . . damages are not recoverable for fright or shock even when sustained as result of wilful act, unless such act was directed toward person or property or person seeking recovery; hence plaintiff is not entitled to recover against administratrix of sister's murderer for fright or shock caused by viewing mutilated body of murdered sister. The rule on this point, as stated in the American Jurisprudence, is: "Injury or Wrong to Another. In law mental anguish is restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering or which arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the other's suffering." It should be noted that plaintiff is not even related to Dr. Hernandez. The latter's wife is a daughter of Mrs. Strebel by a previous marriage. Hence Dr. Hernandez is merely related by affinity, not to Strebel, but to a relative by affinity of said plaintiff. - Another allegation made by plaintiffs in arguing their cause of action to recover damages, they said that "with a view to further injuring" him "and besmirching his good name in the community and waging a cleavage in the harmonious relation between Eustaquio & Co. and its laborers," defendants Felipe E. Jose and Cornelio S. Ruperto issued a press statement to the effect that plaintiff Strebel and his partner, Eustaquio had flagrantly violated the provisions of the Eight-Hour Law and that said Criminal Case had been dismissed by the court on a flimsy ground; and that this statement had "caused moral and mental suffering to the herein plaintiff and damage to his business in the amount of P5,000.00," The Supreme Court said that this news item mentions, neither the number of the case referred to, nor the names of the persons accused therein. Moreover, it merely contains a criticism of the action taken by the court. The reference, therein imputed to the Director of Labor, to the flagrant violation of the eight-hour labor law by the accused, was a mere reiteration of the theory of the Bureau of Labor, which the prosecution had adopted by filing the information in said case. Being a matter of court record, which had been taken up at the hearing held publicly, and settled in a decision already promulgated, said theory was open for public consumption, and, hence, an allusion thereto or statement thereof, in order to justify said criticism, is not actionable. - As regards the malicious prosecution point raised by Strebel, by specific mandate of Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, however,
ABS-CBN V CA (REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA FILMS) DAVIDE; January 21, 1999
FACTS - ABS-CBN, by virtue of contract with VIVA, had an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. ABS-CBN had a right of first refusal. VIVA gave ABS-CBN 3 packages (36 titles) to choose from. VP for ABS Charo Santos-Concio wrote VIVA that they are not accepting the list because there were only 10 titles there that they could potentially purchase. ABS asked for another list, saying they had quite an attractive offer to make. - VIVA gave ABS a new list: 52 original movie titles (never before aired on TV) and 104 reruns. VIVAs proposal was P60M (P30M cash, P30M TV spots) for 52 originals and 52 reruns. - Del Rosario (VIVAs rep) and Eugenio Lopez III had a mtg re this in Tamarind Grill Restaurant. Accdg to ABSCBN, the mtg culminated in Del Rosario accepting ABSCBNs offer of P35M for 52 of the films VIVA was selling for P60M plus Maging Sino Ka Man. - VIVA said this wasnt their agreement and that they refuse to sell anything less the 104-movie package for P60M. In the meantime, RBS bought the 104-film package (which included Maging Sino Ka Man) for P60M. There were ads in the newspapers for the airing of the movie on Channel 7. - ABSCBN filed a case in RTC to enjoin RBS from airing 14 VIVA films, including Maging Sino Ka Man. RTC granted a preliminary injunction; but lifted the same after RBS put up a counterbond. - ABSCBN filed a petition in the CA to challenge the RTC decision. CA granted TRO, but eventually dismissed ABSCBNs petition and made them pay for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attys fees to RBS, and attys fees to VIVA. ISSUE WON RBS may recover damages from ABSCBN HELD NO ACTUAL DAMAGES Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The indemnification shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee failed to obtain. In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which may be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted with good faith or otherwise. In case of good faith, the damages recoverable are those which are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the constitution of the obligation. If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for all damages
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admitted that as of July 28, 1987 those strikes had already ceased. And, even assuming that the strikes were still ongoing, PHIBRO should have shouldered the burden of a "strike-free" clause because their contract was "C and F Calaca, Batangas, Philippines," meaning, the cost and freight from the point of origin until the point of destination would be for the account of PHIBRO. Furthermore, NAPOCOR claimed that due to PHIBRO's failure to deliver the coal on time, it was compelled to purchase coal from ASEA at a higher price. NAPOCOR claimed for actual damages in the amount of P12,436,185.73, representing the increase in the price of coal, and a claim of P500,000.00 as litigation expenses. - Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court decided in favor of PHIBRO. Unsatisfied, NAPOCOR elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. ISSUE WON PHIBRO is entitled to damages HELD NO - NAPOCOR was not bound under any contract to approve PHIBRO's prequalification requirements. In fact, NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right to reject bids. And where the government as advertiser, availing itself of that right, makes its choice in rejecting any or all bids, the losing bidder has no cause to complain nor right to dispute that choice unless an unfairness or injustice is shown. - Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved in this case, the propriety of NAPOCOR's act should therefore be judged on the basis of the general principles regulating human relations, the forefront provision of which is Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Accordingly, a person will be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. 3 - NAPOCOR's act of disapproving PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification to bid was without any intent to injure or a purposive motive to perpetrate damage. Apparently, NAPOCOR acted on the strong conviction that PHIBRO had a "seriously-impaired" track record. NAPOCOR cannot be faulted from believing so. We cannot fault NAPOCOR if it mistook PHIBRO's unexpected offer a mere attempt on the latter's part to undercut ASEA or an indication of PHIBRO's inconsistency. The circumstances warrant such contemplation. - One who acted pursuant to the sincere belief that another willfully committed an act prejudicial to the interest of the government cannot be considered to have acted in bad faith. Bad faith has always been a question of intention. It is that corrupt motive that operates in the mind. As understood in law, it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill-will or for ulterior purpose. While confined in the realm of thought, its presence may be ascertained through the party's actuation or through circumstantial evidence. The circumstances under which NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's prequalification to bid do not show an intention to cause damage to the latter. The measure it adopted was one of self-protection. Consequently, we cannot penalize NAPOCOR for the course of action it took. NAPOCOR cannot be made liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
- Arts 19-21 have at their very core the common element of malice or bad faith. Such intentional design to do a wrongful act must be proved by evidence. Here, ABSCBN was honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria. Disposition Petition Granted. CA decision reversed, except to unappealed award of Attys damages of Viva Films.
NPC v PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC 369 SCRA 629 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; November 20, 2001
NATURE Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for the supply and delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was conveyed in a letter. PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that industrial disputes might soon plague Australia, the shipment's point of origin, which could seriously hamper PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal. PHIBRO again apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia, particularly informing the latter that the ship owners therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strike-free" clause is incorporated in the charter party or the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that they equally share the burden of a "strike-free" clause. NAPOCOR refused. - Subsequently, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable letter of credit. Instead of delivering the coal on or before the thirtieth day after receipt of the Letter of Credit, as agreed upon by the parties in the July contract, PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on November 17, 1987. - Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent bidding. On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification to bid for not meeting the minimum requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found that the real reason for the disapproval was its purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the delay in the delivery of the first coal shipment. - This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages with application for injunction against NAPOCOR with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City. In its complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's act of disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with malice and bad faith. PHIBRO prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. - In its answer, NAPOCOR averred that the strikes in Australia could not be invoked as reason for the delay in the delivery of coal because PHIBRO itself
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- Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded; and that even if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it was not an assurance that the appellant would succeed in recovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint, the amount of P2,000 the appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is excessive. - A2221 of NCC provides: Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. - A2216; Del Castillo vs. Guerrero[1960]: The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of the case. AS REGARDS ATTORNEY'S FEES: - since the V's claim does not fall under any of those enumerated in A2208 NCC, the V may not be compelled to satisfy it. Disposition TCs judgment affirmed
NO Reasoning AS REGARDS ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES: - V is not entitled to such damages as his basis is highly speculative. - A2199 NCC provides: Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. - Malonzo vs. Galang: He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss. - Ventanillas allegation that by Centenos negligence in not paying the appeal bond of P60, V lost his chance to recover from the defendants therein the sum of P4,000 and moral and actual damages, which V could have recovered if the appeal had duly been perfected, indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory damages is highly speculative. AS REGARDS MORAL DAMAGES: - Since the VENTANILLAS cause of action for recovery of moral damages is not predicated upon any of those specifically enumerated (under A2219, Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219) TC did not err in declining to award moral damages to him -V claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning that his appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary period due to the Centeno's negligence; serious anxiety upon learning that his adversary had won by a mere technicality; besmirched reputation for losing the opportunity to substantiate his claim made while testifying in open court that he was entitled to collect the sum of P4,000 and damages from the defendants in civil No. 18833; and wounded feelings for the Centenos failure to remain faithful to his client and worthy of his trust and confidence. (SEE A2217, 2219 AND 2220 NCC) -Malonzo vs. Galang: . . .Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical injuries," as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras, G.R. L-4722, Dec. 29, 1954), excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219). CONCERNING TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES: - Considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has been awarded nominal damages by the TC, such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages, and so TC did not err in refusing to award temperate or moderate damages to the Ventanilla AS REGARDS EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES: - It cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. TC didnt err in not giving any. NOMINAL DAMAGES - Considering the circumstances and the degree of negligence committed by ATTY CENTENO in not depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal within the extension period granted by the court, which brought about the refusal by the TCto allow the record on appeal, the amount of P200 awarded by the TC to VENTANILLA as nominal damages may seem exiguous.
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FACTS - In October 1981, Dr. Herman Armovit and his family decided to spend their Christmas holidays with relatives and friends in the Philippines so they purchased from Northwest Airlines 3 round trip airline tickets from the US to Manila and back, plus 3 tickets for the rest of the children, though not involved in the suit. Each ticket of the petitioners which was in the handwriting of Northwests tickets sales agent contains the following entry on the Manila to Tokyo portion of the return flight: "from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002, date 17 January, time 10:30 AM Status, OK" - On their return trip from Manila to the US scheduled on January 17, 1982, they arrived at the check-in counter of the airline at the Manila International Airport at 9:15 in the morning, which is a good one hour and fifteen minutes ahead of the 10:30 AM scheduled flight time recited in their tickets. They were rudely informed that they cannot be accommodated inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 am was already taking off and the 10:30 AM flight time entered in their plane tickets was erroneous. - Previous to the date of departure Armovit re-confirmed their reservations through their representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally presented the 3 tickets at the airlines Roxas Boulevard office. The departure time in the 3 tickets was not changed when re-confimed. Their names appeared in the passenger manifest and confirmed as Passenger Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight 002. - Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the bump-off he will not be able to keep his appointments with his patients in the US. They suffered anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and night of January 17th until the morning of January 18th when they were finally informed that seats will be available for them on the flight that day. - The RTC ruled in favor of the Armovits and ordered Northwest to pay actual (P1,300), exemplary (P1,100,000) and moral (P1,100,000) damages as well as attorneys fees. The CA affirmed but eliminated the moral damages on the ground that petitioners did not take the witness stand to testify on their social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, and that the breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent. It also reduced the exemplary damages to P170,000. Armovits motion for reconsideration was denied. ISSUE WON the CA erred in deleting the award of moral damages HELD 1. NO. Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this is because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty, Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. [Citing Air France v Carrascoso] Reasoning
that accused-appellant would hurt her and her family and that her friends would spread the news about her plight. Had it not been for that medical examination, the victim would not have told them about the rape committed by accused-appellant. This explains the delay in reporting the crime in this case. - On failure of the information to indicate the approximate time of the commission of the offense: The phrase in the information, that sometime in 1995. . . has sufficiently apprised accused-appellant of the crime which he allegedly committed in 1995. It bears stressing that, in the case of rape, the date of commission is not an essential element of the offense, what is material being the occurrence thereof and not the time of its commission. In any event, it is now too late in the day to question the form or substance of the information because when he entered his plea at his arraignment, accused-appellant did not object to the sufficiency of the information against him. - On irregularity of arrest: He failed to raise objections to his arrest at the earliest possible opportunity. The record shows that he voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty when he was arraigned, thereby waiving his right to question any irregularity in his arrest. 2. NO - The award of actual damages must be deleted in the absence of proof required by Art. 2199 of the Civil Code. To be entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent proof constituting evidence of the actual amount thereof, such as receipts showing the expenses incurred on account of the rape incident. In this case, only the laboratory fee issued by the hospital amounting to P350 was duly receipted. The rest of the documents were merely a doctors prescription and a handwritten list of food expenses. - Nevertheless, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in order that the right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized , and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. As has been held, whenever there has been a violation of an ascertained legal right, although no actual damages resulted or none are shown, the award of nominal damages is proper . In this case, the victims family clearly incurred medical expenses due to the rape committed by accused-appellant. The victim suffered from pains in her navel which required her physical examination. An award of P2k as nominal damages is thus appropriate under the circumstances. - Based on current rulings, the award of moral damages should be increased to P50k irrespective of proof thereof. - In addition, the victim is entitled to the award of P50k as civil indemnity which must be given even if there is neither allegation nor evidence presented as basis therefore. Disposition RTC decision modified. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amounts of P2k by way of nominal damages, P50k as moral damages, and the additional amount of P50k as civil indemnity, plus the costs of the suit.
ARMOVIT V CA (NORTHWEST AIRLINES) 184 SCRA 476 GANGAYCO; April 20, 1990
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- The court's discretion is, of course, subject to the condition that the award for damages is not excessive under the attendant facts and circumstance of the case. - Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages. - In the case of moral damages, the yardstick shaould be that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. The actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and the gravity of the injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable levels - The lower court's awards of damages are more consonant with the factual circumstances of the instant case. 21 The trial court's findings of facts are clear and well-developed. Each item of damages is adequately supported by evidence on record. On the other hand, there are no substantial reasons and no references to any misimpressions of facts in the appellate decision. The Court of Appeals has shown no sufficient reasons for altering factual findings which appear correct. We, therefore, affirm the lower court's awards of damages and hold that the appellate court's reduction of the amounts of temperate and moral damages is not justified. However, we modify the award of attorney's fees to P20,000.00 which we deem to be just and equitable under the circumstances. Disposition instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Court of First Instance of
21
The trial court based the amounts of damages awarded to the petitioner on the following circumstances: Coming now to the damages suffered by plaintiff Maximo Pleno, it is not controverted that Pleno was hospitalized for about five months beginning December 21, 1971, the day of the incident, up to May 9, 1972. While in the hospital, he underwent several major operations on his legs and in spite of Id operations, a deformity still resulted and that his left leg is shorter than the right. The medical expenses, hospital bills and doctor's fees were properly exhibited and not rebutted by defendants. This being the case, actual expenses of P48,244.08 may be awarded. As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that Pleno is an enterpreneur and the founder of his own corporation, the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. It appears also that he is an industrious and resourceful person with several projects in line and were it not for the incident, might have pushed them through. On the day of the incident, Pleno was driving homeward with geologist Langley after an ocular inspection of the site of the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. His actual income however has not been sufficiently established so that this Court cannot award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or moderate damages may still be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity. That Pleno sustained a permanent deformity due to a shortened left leg and that he also suffers from double vision in his left eye is also established. Because of this, he suffers from some inferiority complex and is no longer active in business as well as in social life. In similar cases as in Borromeo v. Manila Electric Railroad Co., 44 Phil 165; Cordage, et al. v. LTB Co., et al., L-11037, Dec. 29,1960, and in Araneta, et al. v. Arreglado, et al., L-11394, Sept. 9, 1958, the proper award of damages were given. There is also no doubt that due to the incident, Pleno underwent physical suffering, mental anguish, fight, severe arudety and that he also underwent several major operations. As previously stated, Pleno is the founder of Mayon Ceramics Corporation, manufacturer of the now famous Crown Lynn ceramic wares. He is a mechanical engineer and the topnotcher of the professional examination for mechanical engineering in 1938. From the record, most if not all of his children excelled in academic studies here and abroad. The suffering, both mental and physical, which he experienced, the anxiety and fright that he underwent are sufficiently proved, if not patent. He is therefore entitled to moral damages. Pleno is also entitled to exemplary damages since it appears that gross negligence was committed in the hiring of driver de Luna. In spite of his past record, he was still hired by the corporation. As regards de Luna, the very fact that he left the scene of the incident without assisting the victims and without reporting to the authorities entitles an award of exemplary damages, so as to serve as an example that in cases of accidents of this kind, the drivers involved should not leave their victims behind but should stop to assist the victims or if this is not possible, to report the matter immediately to the authorities. That the corporation did not also report the matter to the authorities and that their lawyer would attempt to bribe the police officers in order that the incident would be kept a secret shows that the corporation ratified the act of their employees and such act also shows bad faith. Hence, Id corporation is able to pay exemplary damages. The award of attorney's fees is also proper in this case considering the circumstances and that it took more than five years of trial to finish this case. Also, plaintiffs counsel prepared lengthy and exhausive memorandum. (pp- 48-50, Amended Joint Record on Appeal)
FRANCISCO V FERRER PLENO V CA (PHILIPPINE PAPER PRODUCTS INC ET AL) 307 SCRA 675 GUTTIERREZ JR; May 9, 1988
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision which modified the CFI decision in a vehicular accident case and reduced by one half the award for temperate damages, moral damages, and attorneys fees from P430,000 to P215,000. the awards for actual damages in the amount of P48,244 and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000 were affirmed FACTS - Philippine Paper Products is the owner of a delivery truck, and one of their drivers, Florante de Luna, in a reckless and imprudent manner, by driving the vehicle at a great speed, without taking any precautions to avoid accidents, hit, bumped, and sideswiped plaintiffs Volkswagen Delivery Van, driven by plaintiff, causing the Van to swerve and ram into the rear part of another truck - As a result of the accident, plaintiff was hospitalized, suffered injuries affecting his brain, acted beyond normalcy at times - Petitioner questioned the set off since there was no call or notice for the payment of the unpaid subscription, and that the alleged obligation is not enforceable. - The NLRC held that a stockholder who fails to pay his unpaid subscription on call becomes a debtor of the corporation and that the set-off of said obligation against the wages and other due to petitioner is not contrary to law, morals, public policy ISSUES 1. WON the employer's liability in quasi-delict is subsidiary 2. WON the appellant court was correct in reducing the amount of damages awarded to the petitioner HELD 1. NO Reasoning - We sustain the view of the petitioner that the ability of an employer in quasidelict is primary and solidary and not subsidiary. This, we have ruled in a long line of cases. 2. NO Reasoning - The Court of Appeals affirmed the awards of damages. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the appellate court reduced the amount of temperate and moral damages as well as the amount of attorney's fees on the ground that the awards were "too high" .The award of temperate damages was reduced by the appellate court on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00 is rather "too high" especially considering the fact that the driver De Luna is a mere driver and defendant-appellant Corporation is only subsidiarily liable thereof. The award was reduced to P100,000.00. - The award of temperate, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees lies upon the discretion of the court based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
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- In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, the following amount of actual damages were duly proven P16,500.00 funeral expenses and air ticket/freight of the cadaver $600.27. The amount of P400.00 for hospitalization expenses should be deleted for not being supported by evidence. The trial courts award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 moral damages are affirmed. The award of P500,000.00 as attorneys fees and P5,760,000 as compensation for loss of earning capacity, are likewise deleted for lack of basis. Awards for loss of earning capacity partake of damages which must be proven not only by credible and satisfactory evidence, but also by unbiased proof. The testimony of Balwinder Singh Gill, first cousin of the deceased, on the alleged income of the deceased while in the Philippines, is not enough. The best evidence to substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the Philippines is the payment of taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Absent such proof, bare allegation is insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, and the fact of loss has been established, appellants shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh temperate damages in the amount of P200,000.00. Obiter - In lieu of actual damages which was not proven or documented, temperate damages may be awarded in a murder case. (People vs. dela Tongga) Disposition in accordance with the foregoing disquisition, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed subject to the following modifications1. In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder, appellants shall only be liable to pay a. P370.50 for hospitalization expenses; b. P50,000.00, as moral damages, plus costs; and, 2. In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, in addition to the civil indemnity, moral damages and attorneys fees awarded by the trial court, appellants shall paya. P16,500.00, as funeral expenses; b. $600.27, as air ticket/freight of the cadaver, to be computed at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of the promulgation of this decision; and, c. P200,000.00, as temperate damages, plus costs.
PEOPLE V SINGH
360 SCRA 404
Singh was stabbed on his back with the same knife. As Dalvir Singh grappled for the possession of the knife from Surinder Singh, both of them fell down, with him landing on top of Surinder Singh and that was the time when Surinder Singh was stabbed on the right portion of his stomach. Then, Surinder Singh lost his grip and appellant Dalvir Singh was able to get hold of the knife. Appellant Dalvir Singh was so nervous that he left the place on his motorcycle while holding the knife. He threw the knife along the highway of Bian, Laguna. - After trial, appellants were convicted of the crime charged, thus "WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused Balwinder Singh, Malkit Singh Dhillon, Mohinder Singh, Dalvir Singh and Dial Singh having been established beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 8282 and murder in Criminal Case 8683 defined and penalized in Articles 248 and 250 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court hereby sentences them (except Dial Singh who died during the presentation of defense evidence on the main case) as follows: "Criminal Case No. 8682 "1. each to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum; "2. jointly and severally, to pay private complainant Dilbag Singh the amounts of P16,000 representing his hospitalization and medical expenses, and P30,000 for and as attorneys fees; and "3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit. "Criminal Case No. 8683 "1. each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; "2. jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of Surinder Singh the following sums: a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; b) P41,500.00 representing funeral, wake and transportation expenses; c) P5,760,000.00 for lost earnings/income; d) P400.00 for hospitalization expenses; e) P50,000.00 for moral damages; and f) P500,000.00 for and as attorneys fees; and "3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit. "Since accused Jarnail Singh, Gurmok Singh, Amarjit Singh, Johinder Singh and Kuldip Singh have remained at-large to date, in order not to clog the docket of this court, let the records of these two cases be sent to the files and warrant be issued for their immediate arrest. ISSUE WON the court a quo erred in awarding excessive damages against accusedappellants HELD YES Reasoning - In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder, the trial court awarded private complainant Dilbag Singh the amount of P16,000.00 representing his hospitalization and medical expenses, and P 30,000.00 as attorneys fees. For his hospitalization and medical expenses, the receipts submitted to support said claim amounted only to P370.50. Hence, private complainant Dilbag Singh is entitled only to the said amount. The award of attorneys fees is hereby deleted. Nonetheless, private complaint is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for the suffering he endured from appellants felonious acts.
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Re: Actual damages - Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have (been) suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. - The report of Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc. contains no statement whatever of the amount of the damage. Indeed, the testimony of Engineer Abril, the representative of the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., is that his firm had been retained only to determine the cause of the damage, not to estimate and assess it. Moral damages - Moral damages are awarded for indemnity or reparation not punishment or correction, that is, an award to entitle the injured party to obtain means (of) diversions and amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action. - That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. - Award of trial court of moral damages is reduced from P500K to P100K. Exemplary damages - Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. - Award of trial court of exemplary damages is reduced from P300K to P50K. Disposition Decision of the Regional Trial Court of November 18, 1991 is REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of actual damages and attorney's fees is deleted, and the moral and exemplary damages awarded are reduced from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively.
2) the representations -- particularly those characterizing the shingles as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong hook action on its overlaps"-- "prompted the Del Rosarios to buy the 'Banawe' shingles and have them installed at their residence;" 3) "(b)arely two (2) months after completion of the installation, portions of the roof of the Del Rosarios were blown away by strong wind brought about by typhoon "Ruping." - The Office of the President found that: one cannot efface the fundamental fact that MFC acted in bad faith and/or with gross negligence in falling to deliver the necessary accessories for the proper installation of the structure and actually installed inferior roofing materials at Del Rosarios residence, in violation of the proper installation procedure expressly specified in the former's brochures and advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to the roof panels should be two (2) self-drilling screws for one (1) metal cleat. However, instead of conforming with this procedure, MFC attached some of the metal cleats with this one (1)inch ordinary nail each and others were fastened with only one (10) wood screw each. - MFC however declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home. This prompted the latter to commence a civil action against MFC. The spouses sought to recover from MFC damages resulting from the events just narrated, contending that aside from the destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to its electrical wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and furniture. The Del Rosarios reckoned their actual damages at P1,008,003. They also prayed for an award to them of moral damages in the sum of P3,000,000; exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000; attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000,000. - Trial Court awarded P500K as moral damages and P300K as exemplary damages. - CA reversed decision of the trial court, holding that there was no privity of contract. ISSUES 1. WON there is a privity of contract between the parties 2. WON upon the facts established by the evidence, MFC is answerable to the Del Rosarios for the damage caused to the latter's residence when its roof, made of shingles purchased from and installed by the former, was blown away by a typhoon (this case is under EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the outline) HELD 1. YES, there is privity of contract between the Del Rosarios and MFC. Reasoning - At all times and with regard to the acquisition and installation of the metal tiles or shingles, Puno was in truth acting as contractor of the Del Rosarios and on their instructions. Ascertainment of the definite identity of the person who actually ordered the shingles from MFC is utterly inconsequential -- it might just as well have been a construction foreman, a trusted domestic, or any friend or acquaintance of the Del Rosarios. - The tiles were delivered to the Del Rosarios and used in fabricating the roof of their home; it was the employees and workers of MFC who (a) delivered the shingles or metal tiles to the construction site of the Del Rosarios' home, and (b) undertook and completed the installation thereof. 2. YES , the Del Rosarios are entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
PNB V CA DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING CORP.) 267 SCRA 158 NARVASA; January 29, 1997
NATURE An appeal of a Decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - The Del Rosarios' complaint, filed on November 21, 1990, charged Metal Forming Corp. (MFC) with violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc. The complaint alleged that: 1) "in selling to the public roofing materials known 'Banawe' shingles,** (MFC) made representations on the durability of the product and sturdiness of its installation through massive advertisements in print media and television (and) brochures ;"
i ii iii iv v vi vii