Marx as Ally: Deleuze outside Marxism, Adjacent Marx

Aldo Pardi

Universit Lille III

Translated by Daniel Richter

Abstract Deleuze reworks Marxist concepts in order to identify those that represent discontinuity and produce a theory of revolution. Marx is important because, along with Spinoza and Nietzsche, he is a part of a project to leave behind concepts such as transcendence and univocity which underlie the totalitarianism of traditional philosophy. Deleuze is looking for concepts that might form a different theory, within which the structures of production are not organised vertically by the domination of universal concepts, such as being or essence, but ow horizontally through a multiplicity of relations of conceptual singularity. The production of a different series of concepts is a strategic and tactical operation that, in confronting prior notions of transcendental philosophy, turns philosophy itself into a battleeld. Marx provides the general methodology for this tactical approach through two fundamental categories: production and conict. Deleuze practises Marxs theoretical method and by using Marxs own central concepts challenges traditional Marxism, to arrive at a totally different and revolutionary philosophical structure based on concepts such as those of force, variation, difference, singularity, production and the war machine. Keywords: Conict, production, forces, linking, battleeld, substance, immanence, transformation Marx is at our side. That is to say, to reconstruct a thought worthy of a possible revolution means to cross the threshold of Marx. He has always been thought of as the eldest brother who, representing the beginning of a lineage, assigned and distributed roles and positions within a family tree. Half-father and half-mother, Marx was the reference necessary

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and sufcient to recognize oneself, to dene oneself in relation to an identity. Marx was at the same time a space of thought and a eld of activation, the precursor who had already accomplished in advance all the events brought about in his name. He was the rst projection of the origin, the necessary process of history, and the identity of the motor which pushed it onward. Each event related to Marxism was, and presented itself as, the accomplishment of a potential which history had until then kept hidden within its folds. Marx therefore himself contained that potential, as an iconographic image of the general form of thought. But what thought? What thought did Marx incarnate? The lineage that the Marxist tradition always wished to attain in making of Marx the rst son of a revolution already present and given in its ideational terms: consumption as necessary passage, but so determined, between production and appropriation, and the motor which powered the two moments which accomplished each other. The rst was called natural dialectic of need and consumption, or nature. The other was denominated subjectivity. Nature is a dialectic process that circulates inside of a network of organic functions organised inside of a superior system, the corporeal organism. Production appears as an exterior application of its biological articulations, in their turn the formation of one sole model. This model remains the accomplished gure of the natural character of the organism and does not ideally guide its manifestations. The continuity that links function to satisfaction is guaranteed by need. Need is the a priori form which gives to function its structure, the direction for its undertakings, the sense of each cogwheel which constitutes its mechanism. Need is the carving tool that gives to the thing the image of a function, in rendering consumption a continual labour of recuperation and incorporation. It is the motor which pushes function beyond itself. It discovers itself in the mirror where the body will coincide with the body of nature. The natural organism is nature itself in the expression of its accomplished totality, form actualised by the resolution already foreseen in its cracks. Nature is not a substrate, a hyle, to speak like Husserl, but is the sole content, the ontological horizon that presides over the existence of every phenomenon. Nature projects itself forward from itself. As positional signier and thetic signied, it is Subject. It devotes itself to the centring of the circuits which nd their necessity in the form they accomplish. Each of them is a variant of the logic of identity which reshufes nature upon its body. Its homogeneity afrms itself through the centrifugal movement of extrusion that activates it. Its contents are nothing other than itself,

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a manifestation which never strays from its origin, for it recalls nothing other than the character which it already was. Nature is the principle of reason that governs all processes by unifying them. Its projections are the gures it assumes in expressing itself. Nature is the invisible and the visible, a source which springs forth everywhere. This originary core remains forever in its properties, and cannot surpass them because it has already brought them back to the interior of its intentionalities. Nature expresses itself in making of existents the signs of a supreme signier which engraves the marks of one sole meaning. Objects reduce themselves to being the transcendental return of a general principle. There are processes of subjective totalisation everywhere. Once we suppose the existence of a function related to a body, we also admit the presence of its specular double, the thing, and their originary unity. At this point, it gives itself a subjective projection. Needs are always natural needs, even originary intentionalities, of the transcendental substance of the principle. What differentiates the manifestations of nature is not their content, but their gradient of formalisation. We will nd givens which are still embryonic, simple inferior moments of the dialectic which activates the passage towards a superior manifestation. We will be able to trace an entire hierarchy of passage which makes the inorganic fall away onto the organic, and from there to superior living forms, to spill eventually into the human, with its capacity for manipulation and management, and its linguistic potential which is a sign of its proximity to the principle. Having attained the human, we installed ourselves at the level of the totality. Human reason is only the enacted position of transcendental contents which qualify the thetic constitution of nature. Man is the adequate expression of its lines of totalisation. Man is nature as given to itself, life as it is exploding forth, the transcendence of reason which makes itself esh. The body of man, his esh, represents his intentional projection, which envelops beings, and his totalisation thanks to signifying links which intertwine. Man exercises his needs and works in order to consume: his productive activity is the identity of meaning and signication. For man, what happens in other natural entities is not valuable in itself. The different manifestations of the human are not reference points of a complete signifying expression. Man and signier are one. He is the model which serves as criterion for other living and non-living elements (for they are also the superior stage envisaged by the non-organic). Man is the universal which is in the midst of living. His existence is totalisation because man synthesises in himself the identity between functions and things, and distributes them all along signifying chains. Functions and things do not indicate the collocation of

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the signifying chains in the pyramidal organisations which thought, and even language, have at their summit. In man the organism and the thing complete each other in a perfect identity, assured by consumption. Consumption is the link which makes of any thing a human object: the other dimension, the other face, the second aspect, reversed, of the breaking forth of the life of man in a completely human world. Consumption demonstrates that beings are only pieces of the enlarged universe of humanised nature, that is to say, of complementary modules of a milieu which does not exist if not as a human signier. They are managed and distributed according to the order of signication which emerges from its projections, declinations of a universal principle which proffers itself in its acts. Once man has been mentioned, we are directly addressing society. The totalisation of nature in the human anticipates a denition of man as a general collectivity, a global horizon of human characteristics and their intentional contents, an extensive milieu which invests the entire space of existence. Society is the human in its totalisation. It holds in all its partitions the same adequation between thetic signier, signication and meaning. Once again, it is the circuit of consumption that takes on the value of logical sequence which strings together the active tension of social subjectivity with all the forms which constitute the lines of sense. The process of assuaging that fashions beings in the blast furnaces of human expression causes the piercing cry of totalitarian reason to resound. Each being is the song which glories its perfection; each thing is a sign which indicates it; all movements are signals which indicate it, the rays of one sun which recall its source, light. In nature, only the interior exists. The form and actualisation of this absolute interior is consumption. The subject is a total subject, constituting inasmuch as it is capable of appropriation. Man realises his materialisation at the level of transcendent principle because he is by denition the being who has needs and thus speaks and works. He satises his needs as it is given that his acts are the universal origin which totalises itself as society. He comes a priori from a general social milieu that represents rational value. We can thus say that a thought of the individual as such is impossible. Every time an attempt was made to reconstruct humanity from man in shared milieus by glances met from far away, it was discovered, at times with horror, that the human was a concept which has society as its form. However, what is more important is that this human society is regulated, which is to say managed, in one way or another. The universal rationality which displays the essence of the human spreads its manifestations about according to an order.

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Society, which does not represent acts, nds in itself the logic that allows production to attain its ends. Society is always rational, even in its dysfunctions. It moves in forced conduct which forcibly drags the signier to meaning. Human society is a transparent collectivity that governs its manifestations while containing within itself the identity between actions and signications. This is the heritage that Marxist thinkers, among others, wished to claim. Need/production and subject/society is the grid that realised the circulation of the ontological principle in its forms, and the schema which gave an accomplished denition of the transcendental coordinates of the existent. Marxism was the conception which could bring thought to its goal by ending the problem of history. It went beyond the limits of bourgeois thought which, stuck in its divisions and dichotomies, did not succeed in holding the four together, as the wooden legs of a theory of universal history, adequate to its object. But again, what thought? And why was history a problem for thought? Once again these questions remained open, but unasked. In fact, they were the same which invested the famous adversarial eld. If this thought was essential to the philosophy of Marx, its ends were not to be distinguished from those of other philosophies. Surely it was a step forward in relation to them. However, the categories, the theoretical structures and the conclusions inhabited the same terrain. The grid of history targeted by Marxism also marked non-Marxist thought. The circularity that linked need, production and thing, and the historical process of subjectication which one could pull from them, were the points of departure of all the theories which made of the position of a transcendental form the fundamental task of a possible ontology. We can construct the passages of this strategy of conquest, this imperial campaign of thought directed by exceptional strategic intelligences. We could start with the Platonic partition of the four genres of knowledge, which found the asymmetrical equilibrium of all that is by organising it into a hierarchy between matter and idea. We could continue with Aristotle, who made of the accomplishing of souls, through their productive activation, the articulation of a universal substance having the same quality of realness. We can follow that with Augustine, who understood that time was the movement of totalisation which allowed need to jump beyond the nite and establish itself directly in the universal principle that spreads out everywhere in order to take hold of every thing. We can see how Hobbes made scissions produced by needs, i.e. the drives, in order to fold history onto the linear dynamic which appeases them in a principle that was henceforth socialised, which

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nds in its social form the very foundation of its transcendence. We can cite Descartes and his operation of negation of the existence of need, which was necessary in order to subjugate it to the ideal equation that regulates the correspondence between the absolute nature of subjective projections and their transcendent dimension. But the man who accomplishes this long search through the centuries is Hegel. Hegel realised the project of rendering the spread of needs in contingence, the realisation of their transcendence, by unifying it in one sole and unique movement of totalisation. It is the principle itself that is afrmed in the scissions of the nite, for they are only the unifying and necessary journey which assures complete extension. Beyond its movement there is no existence. Everything begins from nothing: the nothing of reality which exists at the exterior of the universality of the constituting foundation. It is already its beyond, projected, in any of its parts, to the celebration of its completion. It imposes itself by making of the negativity of the contingent a linear process of which each moment is a sign of its manifestation. It is in its end, as intrinsic goal of its absolute existence. It is absolute spirit, a transcendent principle which arranges the real according to its effusion. There is no longer in Hegel a distance between contingence and foundation. Absolute spirit is at the same time contingence and subsistence. Hegels operation is unheard of: all beings are organised into a hierarchy and forced to submit to the interior of a system of domination which enlists them into its regiments. It is not limited to assigning them forcibly an order of position, that is, a determined value proportional to the portion of totality which it incarnates. It also imposes upon them their form, their possibilities, their behaviours, and thus, their goals. All objects are the intentions of one sole source of activation. Absolute spirit is subject, possessor of its spiritual body: the dialectic of opposites, the negation of negation, expresses its activation. History is its property, and is controlled by it. It is an extraordinary, dominating power, and it is no coincidence that its denitive afrmation happens with the State. To attack Hegel is to go in the opposite direction of the pestle of the totalitarian thought of transcendence. Deleuze understood this well: What is philosophically incarnated in Hegel is the enterprise to burden life, to overwhelm it with every burden, to reconcile life with the State and religion, to inscribe death in life the monstrous enterprise to submit life to negativity, the enterprise of resentment and unhappy consciousness (Deleuze 2004b: 144). The State, as separated but immanent mechanism, is the scaffolding which harnesses all of realitys movement. Need, labour and

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consumption are the movement accomplished by the State to assimilate reality. They are, under the name of civil society, the properties incorporated by this total conscience which presents itself in the form of order and organised human society into a hierarchy as totalising expression of an apparatus which is in itself totalised (and thus collective), thetic, and constituting. In other words, its primacy is explained by its nature as absolute reason, originary and universal conscience which imposes its norm. Its power afrms its supreme law and its innite power of control. Is it possible to embark upon another project, in another direction? Was it possible to search for a different route? Was it a hopeless enterprise to push through the history of domination in order to arrive at a path of liberation? Was it possible to wrench theory away from its ostensibly natural task of afrming in the sign the power which makes of every layer of reality the object of a tremendous domination? The problem was that of manoeuvring oneself as an alternative force through thought. One had to make war against the power which forced signs into submission, in order to join with experiences of emancipation which struggled against the actual form of domination, i.e. capitalism. Besides, Hegel, the steel point of occidental philosophy, had been responsible for making of history the living presence of the transcendent principle, in order to transform the government of the bourgeoisie into the completed reality of absolute reason under the State form. It was necessary to free oneself from the problems which led to the imposition of a government founded upon transcendence. To embark upon the path to liberation meant to draw theory out of the dialectic game which rendered nature the concretisation of the subject, and the subject the proper name of nature. One had to put on the map an other project, to make of thought an escape, instead of a place of integration. The tactic and the strategy of this at the limit experience should have been twofold: 1) the desegregation of transcendence and the idea of the negative, which sustained it; 2) the afrmation of a scission, which would enable extrication from the process of totalisation. It is in this direction that Deleuze engages philosophy. From the beginning of his theoretical work, he embarks upon a lateral movement, traversing philosophy diagonally in search of faults capable of opening out upon the possibility of liberation. It is a veritable combat strategy against the normalising conceptions of transcendence and domination.1 Of course, it was not an explicitly declared struggle, the sort that provides a small pleasure which comforts narcissistically with selfrecognition in what are only self-aggrandising good deeds. It was not a

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question of small transgressive reassurances which give the impression of omnipotence. In Deleuze, there is none of this sort of hidden complicity with the ideas he fought against. He did not seek self-afrmation through attention-seeking gimmicks, similar to many philosophers who remain attached, in a sort of eternal adolescence, to the idealisation of daddy-theories from which they believe themselves emancipated while remaining all the more dependent. Deleuze constructed piece by piece his theoretical strike forces with the concentrated silence of the artisan who is one with the labour he is accomplishing. And like a true artisan completely immersed in the process of creation which is not himself, because it is only a movement of fashioning that comes from the outside and renders him an anonymous eld of transformation, Deleuze cultivated the silent calm which gives speech, one could say humbly, to the piecing together of a work which springs up like a collective construction, and never becomes the auto-referential din of a paranoiac individual haunted by himself. What he practised was a revolutionary action of a theoretic gesture towards escape. In positioning himself in order to perceive experiences of rupture that produced new regimes of signs in the arts and in literature, he allowed himself to be contaminated in order to render thought a part of a constellation of forces, and no longer the solitary birth of a sage, of a philosopher, but the collective construction of all the dissociations which constitute the pluralist elds of alternatives to domination. Thought must reconstitute itself as a network of an apparatus of productive extrication. It should not return to a social base superimposed upon its second manifestations, it must in itself socialise itself. It must become an institution:
We are forced back on the idea that intelligence is something more social than individual, and that intelligence nds in the social its intermediate milieu, the third term that makes intelligence possible. What does the social mean with respect to tendencies? It means integrating circumstances into a system of anticipation, and internal factors into a system that regulates their appearance, thus replacing the species. This is indeed the case with the institution. It is night because we sleep; we eat because it is lunchtime. There are no social tendencies, but only those social means to satisfy tendencies, means which are original because they are social. (Deleuze 2004b: 21)

We must practise theory as a curve that tears the law away from power, assemble an entirely new toolbox that can bend thought and provoke in it radical scissions. In this sense Deleuze disperses the traditional concepts, in particular those of nature and subject, while

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traversing practices of thought which made of movement and change precarious equilibria, always problematised by the social components which engendered them, or their eld of production. Deleuze works on Hume (Deleuze 2001a), Bergson (Deleuze 2001b) and Kant (Deleuze 1984). In Hume, he takes up again the idea of nature composed of sensible processes, a transferential collation which forms a socialised imaginary. This phantasm is on the one hand a partial mechanism of management of sensible stimulations, and on the other a schema of regulation of practices which activate it. Humes problem is to emphasise the juridical rather than ontological nature of natural associations, partial applications of processes of the management of complex systems of partial practices of regulation. Bergson is the philosopher who rst proposed the theme of change at the heart of a possible ontology. After Bergson, reality is only visible if one considers it from the point of view of time which passes by while changing its connotations. This passing does not accomplish a given present, i.e. the return of a stasis which reafrms itself each time. It is the past which presents itself as an already passed instant. Reality is the leap forward which is always overtaken by a leap which overtakes itself. It carries along with it all beings by projecting them far from their constituted form, a transformation which has already happened, and in spite of this, is in the process of realising itself again. Life is loss and forgetting, for it is evolution which creates through detachment and difference:
The Bergsonian question is therefore not: why something rather than nothing, but: why this rather than something else? Why this tension of duration? Why this speed rather than another? Why this proportion? And why will a perception evoke a given memory, or pick up certain frequencies rather than others? In other words, being is difference and not the immovable or the undifferentiated, nor is it contradiction, which is merely false movement. Being is the difference itself of the thing, what Bergson often calls the nuance. (Deleuze 2004b: 25)

Kant revolutionises the theory of knowledge by producing a double movement of scission. On the one hand, he blocks the relation between thought and the immediately given sensible; on the other, he breaks apart the universality without individuation of ideas founding traditional metaphysics (God, soul and world), empty representations of a being without positive manifestation. The faculties, and in particular the faculty of knowing, support intuitive dynamics which intertwine with ideas strung together by functional relations, qualied by their proper

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content. Their general character does not escape the indetermination of their form, but is their result, rather than the necessary effects of gures taken by the two coordinates which are closer to any experience whatsoever: space and time. They preside over the movements of coupling that reunite the sensible elements into series, arranging them in ordered relations where each spatial point connects to the next according to the parabola traced by the instants of time. Since space and time are the principles of constitution of the objective syntheses, they come before and after each real manifestation. They contain within them all sensible elements, since these latter are only their phenomena, partial moments, a posteriori, of a network of normal relations a priori which reconnect the extension of all existence. Space and time are the universal forms which govern the consistence of reality in terms of conceivable subsistence. It is the reason of proximity that discharges an innite complex of points in a dynamic which assigns them form and function, returning them to the norm that brings them together. They remain above things, principles of an ideal constitution that selects the phenomenal modalities of the presentation of beings. A concept, an existing given, nds its objective dimension in the regulated constellations which unite it with elements composed by a law which transcends them all. Space and time are thus the transcendental principles of a normalising activity which informs experience. They manage to ll the totality of what exists by afrming the norm posed by their twistings and turnings in such a way as to represent presence enacting the universal. They must remain detached from empirical reality.2 They compartmentalise inside of a specic and general physical equation an innite number of sensible impressions, whose concrete character is assured by their collocation in the spatiotemporal relations. They cannot be confused with an individual given, an empty content-less box incapable of nding its qualication. They surround the complex evolutions which dig through existence from one end to the other while forcing them to become the points of application of a disciplinary power which surpasses them as proper variations. The Kantian universe is an innite outpouring of equation where space is arranged in relation to unities of time. The collocation of objects in space is a function of temporal diagrams which do not regulate their relations. It is thus time which commands, and it is time which divides the idea, or the active expression of the law, from the sensible reality it incorporates into norms. However, the scission which separates forever the concept from the individual matter subsists while imposing obstructions. They prevent each position of existence that works to found the universal in the immediate apprehension of a universal given

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without passing through the categorical grid which gives its normal quality to the object. Reason falls into its amphibologies when it wishes to attain the innite in one stroke. This is the defeat of any metaphysic that would like to assign itself the value of a rst ontology. The general norm that governs the existent establishes itself by seizing the dynamic of constitution which, in surpassing the particular, attaches it back innitely to its global application. The law is a categorical content sprung from a general stratication of synthetic mechanisms of regulation. This is why space and time are always ideal factors, and the activity of transcendental constitution of real series is a production of concepts in the form of singular indices, despite being plural, of formal discontinuities. From this it follows that judgements are a priori active intuitions of an activity of knowledge which is the mirror of an ideal plane that ceaselessly develops.3 Deleuze does not approach these authors in order to assign them a perfunctory interpretation. He does not unearth their veritable spirit in order to offer it forward to the reader in the form of a lifeless review. His reading is already engaged in a theoretical project which is the afrmation of a political position inside of theory. He crosses paths with philosophers according to the requirements of his own travels, pushed by strange meetings which emerge from a foreign collocation inside of philosophy. His experience of thought does not take off vertically, from a base to a summit, but moves horizontally while it encircles, through scission, a plane of conceptual construction where each thesis is at the same time a rupture, an overlapping and an aggregate.4 In describing these hyperboles, theory is separated from its spiritual ghost to offer itself up to shapings provoked by cracks which trouble the identity of its concepts. Philosophy is no longer the lightning ash that reveals the essence, but the practice of difference which resides in the theatre of relations between elements which intertwine. We must leave behind us the grid of totalisation, hollowed out by the dialectic binary naturesubjectivity, of which Plato dened the assumptions and which Hegel brought to its conclusion with his idea of the negative. Deleuze begins to produce thought in difference, exploiting the power of liberation it contains:
It is as though Difference were evil and already negative, so that it could produce afrmation only by expiation that is, by assuming at once both the weight of that which is denied and negation itself. Always the same old malediction which resounds from the heights of the principle of identity: alone will be saved not that which is simply represented, but the innite representation (the concept) which conserves all the negative nally to deliver

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difference up to the identical. Of all the senses of Aufheben, none is more important than that of raise up. There is indeed a dialectical circle, but this innite circle has everywhere only a single centre; it retains within itself all the other circles, all the other momentary centres. The reprises or repetitions of the dialectic express only the conservation of the whole, all the forms and all the moments, in a gigantic Memory. (Deleuze 2008: 65)

According to this method, one touches on philosophies in order to locate the necessary gears of an engine which does not realise itself from total notions. It must act as a sort of drill which pierces a hole in the domination of transcendence and its hierarchies. Deleuze addresses himself to theories which made of difference the centre of their questioning, to theses which took speculative knowledge as the point of departure of a practice of putting into question, and not as its solution. This is how Deleuze meets Hume, Kant and Bergson, from the angle of the crises which they provoked in thought. It was said that these were arbitrary operations of interpretation, at the very limit of thought, and this is true: they deliberately abandon the fact that Hume nds his equilibria in the dependence of institutions upon sympathy, that Bergson submits change even more to transcendence in making of time a life force (un lan) towards a personal absolute being which accomplishes unheard-of creations, and that Kant twists the ontological superiority of the general idea into the immanence of space and time in order to inject it directly into the particularity of the sensible. But Deleuze was well aware of this, to the point that these conceptions are used by him to strike the foundations of ontology, and to invade its eld itself through the place where it seemed the most secure: the grid which orders reality in the specular game between nature and subject. They were only bridgeheads which served to break the defences of theories of transcendence and begin to ravage them: Precisely, by virtue of those criteria of staging or collage we just discussed, it seems admissible to extract from a philosophy considered conservative as a whole those singularities which are not really singularities: that is what I did for Bergsonism and its image of life, its image of liberty or mental illness (Deleuze 2004b: 144). In order to reach a position, we rst must decompose the lines of the adversary. This action had to be accomplished by detaching the domain of signs from the problem of the position of reference. One intervened in signication by breaking, with the hammer of paradox, the closed triangulation which connected designation, manifestation and even signication itself, henceforth dispersed in the proliferations of

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propositions which produce uninterrupted series of predications, points of crossing of plural lines of sense. The rst was the task of Proust and Signs (Deleuze 2000), the second the undertaking of The Logic of Sense (Deleuze 2004a). But this is still not enough. The decomposition of transcendence could succeed in a real upheaval of the philosophical eld only in attaching to the decomposition of the centred structure conceptual totalisations of apparatuses capable, in the same moment, of afrming a new arsenal of concepts: no longer valuable transcendent ideas such as origins and ends in a closed circuit of biunivocal and polar designation, but zones of contact, connectors, pressure points, of detachment and connection; practical exercises of uncoupling and grouping in which pluralities of elements divide in a conicting eld, the horizontal plane of serial organisation realised by scission. Deleuze accomplished this task before and beside his search for an escape from thought dominated by ressentiment. He begins by positioning himself to listen to the afrmative practice of Nietzsches thought. He gives Nietzsche the density of the sensible in placing him in the positivity of conicting contacts which related singular elements to each other: this is the theme of Nietzsche and Philosophy (Deleuze 2002), Deleuzes second book.5 The quality of these components is not dened negatively, in relation to an essential nature given in advance. They are dissolved and recomposed in the reversals of asymmetrical engagements, effects of their meetings. This quality is discovered via evaluation, that is to say by a line of division which regroups forces among themselves by splitting them away from the others, themselves grouped in plural and singular constellations. This cut which welds complex and articulated bodies is what Nietzsche will call will. Thus, the content of partial segments is dened by orientation and position in a striated space of conict. These divisions criss-cross the formations, abandoning them to conictual games which harm every attempt at identitary formation. The shocks blows repeat tirelessly, similar to a throw of the dice which falls back into the same modality without ever producing the denitive combination. The detaching of constellations prevents there from being an interruption of the division which the objects of a group remove in order to unite them to another. Things enter into a combat which distributes them into innite series of scissions, a laboured earth in which they are afrmed by movements of conictual disintegration and differential formation. They are forces, sensible bodies that traverse the terrain opened up by their tactics of combat. This terrain, a veritable desert, does not know time, because it is the eternal return of an innite

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plurality of effects, a sliced up surface that transforms itself and becomes in relation to gures created by the scissions. To think is no longer anything to do with an essential glance, with reection which looks down upon existence while judging it according to its principles; it is action, strategic practice, a politics of construction of conceptual bodies. This relational activation is afrmative inasmuch as it does not refer to anything. The dynamic of forces poses their content and their signication. It expresses the political tasks which produce their movements. Their becoming is necessary inasmuch as it has no other reference than the changes effectuated by their counterblows. The necessity which Nietzsche is talking about is the recognition, always situated, of a strategic chessboard which draws out a political cartography. Thought is a topological art, a geographic designation of places where bodies hit against each other and divide up the earth into distinct domains.6 A force can never become universal. It is the fruit of a plural complexion, engendered by determined encounters of singular elements.7 A body is always situated by relations to a eld of manoeuvres where other forces already assumed places. If a body is composed, it is by seizing hold of elements which are parts of complexes present on the terrain. If an aggregate is taken apart, it is because it was swallowed up by an apparatus capable of incorporating it in its own process of aggregation. It is this strategic chessboard which splits up bodies between dominating and dominated. The dominating forces are those which succeed in becoming by attaching composites to their body. They are thus active aggregations. The dominated forces are subjected to a process of fragmentation, second form of activation, and submit to the dominating forces. This difference separates the forces qualitatively. It traces the equation which distinguishes them as different natures: the differential relation which denes their activation potential. It does not follow that the quality of forces is a question of quantity: the more bodies realise anchorages, the more their power of formation grows, the more the forces become afrmative. The concept of the will to power expresses the practical action which posits a domination that criss-crosses the genealogy of asymmetrical relations that realise the singular constellations of bodies. Forcedomination: these are the rst categories of a new image of thought. They dislocate it inopportunely, a never-nished world made of impersonal individuations or of pre-individual singularities.8 And nevertheless, it would not be possible to guide it back into this

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practical dimension where the vitality of conicts erupts without another theoretical operation. This intervention must block the framing of the existent in the unconditioned supremacy of a transcendent essence. The gures of the negative subdivide beings in proportion to their proximity to the last principle, all the while furthering them from the being which, always beyond them, remains frozen in a single point of concentration. The effacement of the negative must pass through a denitive prohibition of all possible ontology. We must construct concepts which do not possess any ontological value, and begin to act theoretically in another sense, on this earth, irreducible to any unity, worked upon by the political effects of encounters between sensible bodies. To do that means to relinquish the thread of mutual recallings that allowed the universal and the singular (which is, besides, its negative image) to take hold of the entire space of theory, forcing it to mechanically repeat the same act: the analogical judgement which forced all beings onto the One and the Same. We interrupt the vertically moving vicious circuit that makes of objects simple variants of a general biunivocal relation, equalising them on a plane without exteriority, the transcendental condition of immanence which only admits singular variations. Spinozas concept of substance and his theory of power give to difference the force to assail all constituting ontology (Deleuze 1992). There is only one plane, the egalitarian dimension where the eminence and ideal consistence of transcendent contents are reduced to formal variations. Apparently, each being lays claim to an essence. We must admit a plurality of eminent entities which found all the levels of existence. But how can we discover the difference of ontological constitution among these beings? How will the absolute nature of being not be touched by the presence of these other minor essences? There will be a multiplication of these substances which will lay claim to all their rights. They will have to settle for sharing the transcendent constitution of the rst essence. How is it, however, that elements of the same nature are differentiated? The relation between beings and existence, and the successive distinction by genux proximo et differentia specica are abolished in their own logical possibility. There is only innite immanence where the substance will equalise all elements. The movement of elevation that poses a transcendent instance is deprived of its own presuppositions. If there is no transcendence, it is impossible to acquire the ethereal nature that gives to essences their metaphysical esh. Substance is only a single material block (Deleuze 1992). On the other hand, as it is impossible that something is totalised while proposing itself as rst essence, neither is substance ever totalised

68 Aldo Pardi
retrospectively, in afrming itself behind things in terms of creative personality or rst cause. This is the fundamental argument Spinoza makes against Descartes. Substance exists in its singular manifestations because it is nothing other than singularities which cannot be totalised. And since there are no universal entities, substance varies in its innite series of controlled modulations. The attributes although we know theoretically only of two, namely thought and extension are innite, and function by putting substance back in circulation at the material and egalitarian level of existing singularities. Attributes contain substances innite modalities of pluralisation. Attributes continue to pulverise substance into singular formations which do not designate their intrinsic multiplicity. Nothing interrupts this collective distribution of contacts and disjunctions. It poses the insurmountable limit for beings. This is the theoretical motivation which makes of substance a constellation of modes, singular and plural, and assigns them an essence, that is to say, a reason for formation, different from that of substance. It is through the fault opened up by this difference that substance bursts out as a horizon of becoming. We must take a step back: modes, never capable of beholding themselves like faces of an identical essence, plug into each other at their contours, at their sensible shell. They encounter each other and form relational congurations, linking their members like pieces of a giant machine of production. Substance is the disarticulated factory which lives in its power of production, and production is the concept which expresses the specic form of the becoming of substance. Forcedomination and immanenceproduction: this is the new grid discovered by Deleuze at the end of his long deconstructive detour of transcendence and the thought of the One. Now, it is possible to begin again to think positively. It is possible to leave the circle of recognition to construct a critical theory which works to provoke crisis in the simple identication between need and subjective projection, and to work out a revolutionary theory of transformation. At this moment Deleuze takes up conceptual tools which leave nothing for the adversary. He returns to Marx. But another Marx, the Marx of forces of conict, of social relations of power, of strategies and war tactics which impose systems of domination, and groups which oppose them. It is the Marx of bloody struggles which tear apart the conformity of the social body and indefatigably transform it. A revolutionary Marx who makes of revolution the practice and content of his theory, and who is close to all experiences of the same signs, at all levels and places.9 Marx is a plural name, the seal of an alliance: he is the comrade who

Marx as Ally: Deleuze outside Marxism, Adjacent Marx 69

ghts by ones side, who attacks with goals and blueprints, who shares trenches. Traditional Marxism took Marx out of his natural place: politics, the struggle against power and its actual form. This was a strange reversal: they took him out of the place where he alone could explain the meaning of his theoretical project, that being political revolutionary practice in theory and in society, hoping that such a sterilisation would clear the way towards an alternative. No, Marx is not the theoretician who realises the dialectic, bringing it to a possible accomplishment which Hegel could not achieve.10 He did not introduce the most efcient categories with which to force nature onto a subject that would supposedly explain that subjects dialectic development. Determined Marxist analysis is an assault, a political investment of a social eld towards an alternative, under the conditions posed by a determined apparatus (mode of production) of the victorious forces, i.e. capitalism. To struggle next to Marx, one must practise another conceptual strategy, one which makes pivots out of production, domination and the immanence of the social eld in the conict of forces, in order clear a path of escape towards another regime, conceptually and also in social practice. It is no longer a question of criticising capitalism, nor of emphasising its backwardness, its contradictions or its irrationality. These are sterile positions, as they reproduce the capitalist ideology of egalitarian exchange through which an identitary subject extends itself all throughout history, or in this case, capital. It can be recognised in the satisfaction of its needs: it is the summit and blossoming of nature, in sum the essence of existent totality (the homo oeconomicus of Smith and other classical economists). The only possible critique has already been carried out by Marx. Capital is a combination of forces which compose a mode of production. It is not a neutral movement, set off by the nature of components which will be brought to their accomplishment. Upon forced labour, in its multiple congurations and strata, is engraved the mark of the power of capital: it becomes labour force.11 It is constrained to act, to speak and think under the weight of capitalist domination. Capitalism is an immense force of disjunction and reconnection of a system of relations which has the production of surplus-value as its goal. Capitalism does not work, as in feudalism, to allow the feudal lord to make wealth the sign of his supremacy. The ideas of the feudal epoch are not associated with a version of nature which proceeds by degrees of minor perfection. This is the nature of capitalism, the decoding which sweeps away the feudal code and projects it into a world of individual subjects which effectuate by themselves the

70 Aldo Pardi
comprehensive movement of a unique need for exploitation. Labours submission to capitalism is expressed in a closed social body, full to the brim with the power of its apparatuses of management, selection and control. These apparatuses discipline their subjects in reducing their functions to the circuit of accumulation composed by conjunction: That is why capitalism and its break are dened not solely by decoded ows, but by the generalized decoding of ows, the new massive deterritorialization, the conjunction of deterritorialized ows. It is the singular nature of this conjunction that ensured the universality of capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 224). Capitalism does not develop out of an interior necessity at the heart of feudalism. It has a genealogy of alliances, combats and tactical positions taken to organise itself as force and afrm itself as mode of production. It is here that Deleuze returns to Marx, in occupying the same theoretical front and reuniting himself with the latters revolutionary struggles that would construct an other social mechanism of production, a mechanism that works not for surplus-value but in common. The Marxian revolution is to have rst announced that each historical formation is a disposition which results from a struggle. Each historical formation is the investment of an organised complex, stratied into multiple components, and to master adversarial forces is to reduce them to the matter and cogwheels of a mechanism of production. It causes changes there, that is to say, transformations.12 The concept that opens the way for history in terms of revolutionary transformations is production. These transformations have different modalities and directions, and Deleuze endeavours to map them out. Capital revolutionises the feudal regime by installing another system of production. Feudalism knocks down the domination of the Urstaat, just as it subdued the savage connections of production, by intertwining their pieces into an utterly different apparatus of subjugation. There is conict everywhere because there is production everywhere. Production the connections, overlappings and disconnections which emerge is the category which presents the possibility of accomplishing this recognition of history. History is the battleeld of antagonistic productions, because everything is production:
production is immediately consumption and a recording process (enregistrement), without any sort of mediation, and the recording process and consumption directly determine production, though they do so within the production process itself. Hence everything is production: production of

Marx as Ally: Deleuze outside Marxism, Adjacent Marx 71

productions . . . Everything is production, since the recording processes are immediately consumed, immediately consummated, and these consumptions directly produced. This is the rst meaning of process as we use the term: incorporating recording and consumption within production itself, thus making them the productions of one and the same process. (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 4)

The body of history is a laminating constellation of strata of production.13 It is this articulated production, its syntheses and its effects of transformation, which are traced by genealogies divided between domination and ight. The modes of production function by connecting vanquished forces to engines which realise them. These vanquished forces are the materials with which the mode of production nourishes itself and reproduces its apparatuses. The word being no longer has any meaning.14 It recalls the analogical reference which reduces the noisy motors of engines dispersed everywhere to dreary images, phantasms of signication. Force immanence domination production, it is thanks to these concepts that conceptual machines are composed which break the cages constructed by the dialectic. The only logic familiar to this strategic plan linked to conjunctures of war is that of change by subordination, or even the political enterprise which afrms the government of partial collective entities through other partial constellations. It is the same for the Urstaat. Never was a Deleuzian concept less understood. The Urstaat is not the model of an ideal type of State which is regularly represented throughout history. The Urstaat is an apparatus of coupling of a particular group of forces. These forces compose a determined social formation which, if it conforms politically to the formation of an Urstaat, in the process of work requires an ensemble of systems of material production and exchange including the market to work for its pre-eminence. The Urstaat is the notion with which it is possible to seize the State from myths of the social nature of man (i.e. from ideology), and from the natural disposition of social practices to organise themselves in a juridical apparatus. The State is also an effect, produced from the construction of a social body by packs which conquer a territory and assume for themselves the right to inscribe upon it their mark. Once the State is made an object of production like the others, we can retrace the changes of the juridical processes jurisprudence, which so fascinated Deleuze of the various regimes. At this moment, the state formation established under capitalism loses its sacred allure. The differential specicity, related to conjuncture, of forms of the

72 Aldo Pardi
State permit us to discover the content belonging to the capitalist state apparatus. It is no longer the needle which by itself guides all the members of society, similar to what happens under feudalism. Capitalism works through decoding. It must continually rework its objects in order to continue to obtain surplus-value from particular degrees of exploitation. Capitalism does not have the State at its centre because it is its own centre. It schizophrenizes in a ceaseless movement, incorporating everything it encounters, in changing its nature, modelling it and modelling itself even in relation to its fundamental disposition. Capitalism must stratify itself in occupying the entire body of society. Marx understood this well (judging from embryonic bits of theory which he left behind), so much so that he posed the capitalist State in terms of a concrete category realised concretely from more abstract categories which maintain it as a subordinated element (Marx 1970).15 The State becomes in a differential and stratied manner under the impulsion of the creative evolutions of capital. The capitalist norm directly manages its world and projects it in productive ows, sliced-up strata which spring forth from its intentional tensions similar to anonymous and memory-less noematic nuclei. We can thus appreciate the real value of minor ows, the schizophrenic lines traced by the subordinated which do not succeed in breaking free. They refuse the capitalist decoding and its law, and nd therein not transgressions, regardless of secondary troubles, but the slices of an alternative social body, a completely other socius. As Deleuze species, in the body of capital, which integrates everything through subjugation, there are never two classes, but one sole factory of reproduction of the capitalist axiomatic. The new full body which results from the inverted capital is neither a development nor the contrary of capitalism (which was called socialisation, especially by the State, of productive forces) but the last result of the intrinsic logic of accumulation. Socialisation resulted from the ctive opposition of two opposing poles, or classes, of a unique molar structure. As it happened, it only reproduced the totalitarian machine, inverted into the collective form of State. A different socius is made instead of forces which free themselves from this axiomatic just as they free themselves from the despotic signier, that break through this wall, and this wall of a wall, and begin owing on the full body without organs (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 255). They are machines which do not work towards despotism, but produce liberation in persistently conserving a minor dimension, that is to say, in never totalising themselves in an attempt at ending conicts.

Marx as Ally: Deleuze outside Marxism, Adjacent Marx 73

Capitalist decoding ows are produced everywhere. They stock up on resources in order to direct themselves again and again at their subjects, swallowing them into one body, that of surplus-value. This action which unites force, organisation and efciency also produces reactions. A logic of combat then imposes itself which gradually becomes explicit, on fronts in which are formed ows of singular machines of liberation that approach, as allies, all the other experiences which struggle against capitals domination of governed conjuncture. It is not said whether they will triumph in constructing other bodies, but under the pressure of domination, processes of work are set off which form machines of a completely different direction, architecture and function. The molar body that encloses ows in a despotic axiomatic is confronted by molecular actions which strike at the capitalist gears with weapons of a social disposition that already differ from their formation. This is the sole theoretical (and certainly political) criterion that may distinguish machines of liberation from machines of axiomatisation. This demolishing action occurs on all levels. There is a combat in work, just as there is a combat in signs. They are not similar, they do not even share modalities or movements. But they are all determining. Just as capital is extended over the totality of the social body, imposing its violence, various conicts traverse it from one end to the other. Signs are also a battleeld, a matter of forces which confront each other in a struggle to afrm their own regime. The confrontations which produce the body of signs are also traced out on the cartography of conicts. It is a true body, material as effectuated by relations between signifying elements which touch, connect with and detach from each other, and struggle. They are sensitive, and in this also nd the reason for their proximity to the sensitive functions of the physical body. The struggle waged by the schizophrenic is just as central to the struggle in the factory, for the schizo is a constellation torn apart by a struggle which plays itself out at the level of signs. It involves reattaching, under the sign of production, the analysis of capitalism to that of schizophrenia in order to bring signs into the immanent domain of production and conict. The forces of decoding allied to capital are found on this stratum as well. They have the name of Mommy and Daddy, and the factory in which they are formed is the family. These gures, as material as the materiality of capitals axiomatic, are active in the psychoanalysts ofce. It is there that the ruptures provoked by the freeing of signifying elements irreducible to despotic signication are approached, discovered and again subjugated. However, the struggle does not end. The schizo continues to fabricate a new regime of signs, he turns to the factory

74 Aldo Pardi
where sense is produced to carry it away from capitals totalising axiomatic. The schizo is in himself, in his very body, an advanced front, a eld of signifying forces that command an irreducible chain of production. The relations between the conicts that tear apart the layers of the socius are subjugated to the evolution of the respective battleelds. They may construct reasons for alliances, conuences. Sometimes, they even work in parallel. They will however remain different. It is this very distinction which prevents their totalisation. This distinction becomes, if guided with strategic intelligence, either a guarantee, or an excellent weapon: it can obstruct the orders of the adversary, which is always a present risk. It strikes at his defences by continuing to break his totalising (molar) structures. The act of disjunction traverses these structures, through processes of singularisation. The despotic machine was knocked down by the fabrication of a social body which puts into practice the absolute democracy of a factory of scission, made of gears of liberation which work to open up new spaces to conict and to ceaselessly deconstruct totalitarian superimposition.16 Thought is also brought back to unstable equilibria which create trembling in language, images and sounds, or the gural constellations of the unconscious. It is swept away by the scissions and overturned as much as these latter. It has no pre-eminence. Thought and foolishness are one, because ideas are partial elements produced by partial layers, parts of a divided social body, criss-crossed by the conicts which work upon all the strata. Theory is a singular moment in a singular proliferation of struggles.17 It must discover itself as one combat front and renounce its privileges. It is no longer the light which shines upon the learned, the rulers, on collective or organic intellectuals, inscribing upon them the marks of reason. It is a war machine, a combat apparatus which intervenes in the concept. A theory which works scissions and is produced to liberate itself from the paranoiac discipline of capital is found in the wake of Marx. It shares trenches. It ceases thus to be the prophet who sancties the name of the father assigning the dignity of the son to his brothers, a privileged voice of the sovereign principle, the dialectic of productive forces and manager of its royal science. Marx is a celibate body. He is a toolbox and a revolutionary movement. Marx digs escape routes in theory, and delivers blows in the streets with the other comrades. How many people racked their brains (one thinks of certain all too human Italian theorists, such as Della Volpe18 or Luporini,19 for example) over the question of fetishism, even of ideology, forgetting that it is only

Marx as Ally: Deleuze outside Marxism, Adjacent Marx 75

comprehensible in relation to the function of thought in Marx, and thus to the war machine in the theory he assembles. The fetish is the military conquest of signs drafted by a despotic axiom, which struggles for and with capital. Furthermore, the analysis of the fetish has nothing to do with its substitution by another totalitarian truth. It is the ight which revives theory in ows of alternative production, the assault carried out upon a general domination which frees theory in order to bring about conicts everywhere in the strata of signifying production. The Marxian theory of fetishism is analysis in so far as it is decomposition of a totalitarian abstraction which afrms one sole law upon all signs. Or rather, it is a force which strikes the despotic sign par excellence: money.20 Marx, in attacking the fetish, had already moved elsewhere. Marxist theory became a plural body of alliances, a riot of singular war tactics against power and its machines of subjugation. Marx loses his identity and begins to open out in thousands of growths, in a proliferation of plural machines of liberation. We no longer encounter Marx in the stuffy atmosphere of identitary lineages, which are houses much too tight to give liberty its space. We meet him, with the intense joy of a liberty always to come, in traversing as nomads the capitalist city on our way to the desert where all encounters are possible, producing democracy without transcendence.

Notes
1. On this see also Delc (1988). 2. The phenomenon appears in space and time: space and time are for us the forms of all possible appearing, the pure forms of our intuition or our sensibility. As such, they are in turn presentations; this time, a priori presentations (Deleuze 1984: 8). 3. The important thing in representation is the prex: re-presentation implies an active taking up of that which is presented; hence an activity and a unity distinct from the passivity and diversity which characterize sensibility as such (Deleuze 1984: 8). 4. On this see also Fadini (1998) and Montebello (2008). 5. I refer here to Zourabichvili (1994). 6. See Agostini (2003). 7. See Hayden (1998). 8. I refer here particularly to Sibertin-Blanc (2006: 71793). 9. In this regard Deleuze makes the same theoretical move as Althusser. See Althusser (1969) and Althusser and Balibar (1970: 18294). 10. Gianfranco La Grassa made a great contribution in a non-dialectical critical reading of Marx (in Kautskys and Bernsteins deterministic and idealistic vein, but also similar to the hyper-subjective and even more idealistic dialectic of Luxemburg, Korsch and Lukcs). See La Grassa, Turchetto and Soldani (1979); La Grassa (1989, 2002); La Grassa and Preve (1996). 11. In my opinion, the most important contribution on this subject in Marxist theory has been made by Raniero Panzieri (1973, 1977).

76 Aldo Pardi
12. Etienne Balibar wrote a very important essay on this, which Deleuze knew very well (see Balibar 1970: 199308). 13. See Balibar (1970: 199308). 14. This is why I dont believe that a Deleuzian ontology exists (and so ontological interpretations of Deleuzes theory are misguided, whether for or against Deleuzes approach). One study that makes this typical mistake about Deleuze is Bergen (2001). 15. On this see Bidet (1985). 16. Vaccaro (1990) has worked on this. 17. I develop this idea in my introduction to the Italian translation of Deleuzes lessons on Spinoza (Pardi 2007). 18. See Della Volpe (1964, 1968). 19. See Luporini (1974), a fundamental essay for several generations of Italian theorists. 20. On the role of money in Marxs theory, see Dumnil (1978).

References
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Della Volpe, Galvano (1968) Critica del gusto. Crisi dellestetica romantica, Roma: Samon e Savelli. Dumnil, Grard (1978) Le concept de loi conomique dans Le Capital, Paris: Maspero. Fadini, Ubaldo (1998) Per un pensiero nomade, Bologna: Pendragon. Hayden, Patrick (1998) Multiplicity and Becoming: The Pluralist Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, New York: P. Lang. La Grassa, Gianfranco (1989) Linattualit di Marx, Milano: Franco Angeli. La Grassa, Gianfranco (2002) Fuori dalla corrente. Decostruzione ricostruzione di una teoria critica del capitalismo, Milano: Unicopli. La Grassa, Gianfranco and Costanzo Preve (1996) La Fine di una teoria: il collasso del marxismo storico novecentesco, Milano: Unicopli. La Grassa, Gianfranco, Maria Turchetto and Franco Soldani (1979) Quale Marxismo in crisi, Bari: Dedalo. Luporini, Cesare (1974) Dialettica e Materialismo, Roma: Editori Riuniti. Marx, Karl (1970) A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, ed. Maurice Dobb, trans. S.W. Ryazanskaya, London: Lawrence and Wishart. Montebello, Pierre (2008) Deleuze: la passion de la pense, Paris: Vrin. Panzieri, Raniero (1973) Scritti: 19561960, Milano: Lampugnani Nigri. Panzieri, Raniero (1977) La ripresa del marxismo leninismo in Italia, Roma: Nuove Edizioni operaie. Pardi, Aldo (2007) Prefazione, in Gilles Deleuze, Che cosa pu un corpo? Lezioni su Spinoza, Verona: Ombre Corte. Sibertin-Blanc, Guillaume (2006) Politique et clinique. Recherche sur la philosophie pratique de Gilles Deleuze, Lille: Ph.D dissertation. Vaccaro, Gian Battista (1990) Deleuze e il pensiero del molteplice, Milano: Franco Angeli. Zourabichvili, Franois (1994) Deleuze, une philosophie de lvnement, Paris: PUF.

DOI: 10.3366/E1750224109000713