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DIASPORIC SENSE OF PLACE:

POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND LOCALITY AMONG BANGLADESHI MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN

David Garbin CRONEM, University of Roehampton, London. d.garbin@roehampton.ac.uk

Introduction Through a study of the politics of identity and locality among British Bangladeshis, this paper examines the complex and fluid relationship between space, belongings and diaspora. It aims to shed light on the heterogeneity of socio-spatial dynamics and the ways in which national, religious or cultural references have been politically grounded in different local British Bangladeshi urban configurations. Moreover, I will show how the production of locality and the diasporic construction of collective identities involve the symbolic appropriation of memory and imagined communities in a British multicultural context. The links and tensions between this diasporic public sphere and a transnational political space of circulation, networks and flows will also be explored. Finally, beyond the political and discursive construction of community I will look at the dynamics of hybridity and subcultural practices among young British 1

Bangladeshis with a focus on the reinvention of traditions through a specific social experience of urban space.

History and impact of migration Bangladeshis in Britain are a largely young population, heavily concentrated in Londons inner boroughs and experience a range of socio-economic problems. According to the most reliable national enumeration the decennial Census in 2001 283,063 Bangladeshis lived in the UK, i.e. 0.5% of the total population. 54% of the Bangladeshi population lived in the Greater London area and a high proportion of these London inhabitants were located within the inner boroughs. Indeed, the heartland of the London Bangladeshi community is to be found in Tower Hamlets, which contained 65,553 Bangladeshi residents or 22.8% of the UK Bangladeshi population. Outside London, the largest Bangladeshi population is located in Oldham 9,817 in 2001 or 4.5% of the citys population - while 20,836 are scattered across Birmingham (2% of the citys population), 7,642 in Luton (4%) and 4,967 in Bradford (1%). It is a very English urban population - very few live in Scotland or Wales. The formation of sizeable settled communities in Great Britain did not begin until the 1960s even though Bangladeshis, working usually in the bowels of British-owned ships (as lascars), travelled to various parts of the globe during the 19th and first half of the 20 th century (Adams, 1987). The majority of the Bangladeshis in the UK originates from several thanas (administrative subdistricts) in the north-eastern district of Sylhet. These strong links with particular localities is the result of the well-documented process of chain migration but it also due to geographical factors, such as the proximity of

the Surma and Kushiara rivers which linked Sylhet to Southern Bengal and to Kolkata (Calcutta) where the lascars were recruited (see Adams, 1987). In addition, Sylhets distinctive land tenure system may have played an important role in creating a caste-like group ( zat) of small landowner lineages (such as Talukdar). Those lineages had enough resources at their disposal to finance the initial departure of one of several young male members to Kolkata, thus establishing the first chain migration network to Bidesh (abroad) (see Gardner, 1995, 2002). Migration has dramatically altered the economic and community local landscape in the Bangladeshi homeland through the transfer of remittances. In the context of an intense competition for status, bidesh has become a strategic resource, a crucial source of power, allowing families in Bangladesh which contain probashis (expatriates) to improve rapidly their socioeconomic position and strengthen their role in the shomaj - the village communitys moral and social order. Thus, connections ( lainta) with bidesh constitute a precious source of social capital and increasingly a social divide has emerged between lineages with these connections or whose status can help establishing an alliance with probashi groups - and those without such resources (see Garbin, 2002, 2004). The local ideological hegemony of migration as a strategic source of economic wealth and symbolic success is produced and reproduced by the visibility of the migration miracle, in particular the improvement of collective facilities (mosque, school, madrassah, etc.) conducted by migrant lineages in Sylhet. Since the mid-1980s this process has involved the establishment of numerous development groups ( Jonokollan Shomittee) based in bidesh. These groups are organised according to different allegiances, mainly at village (gram) or thana (sub-district) level, and their aim is to collect money among probashi lineage members in order to undertake development (jonokollan) projects and thus to maintain or 3

increase the lineages izzat (prestige/honour) in Bangladesh. These groups engage in endless rivalry with each other and their role cannot be fully understood without referring to a broader diasporic territory where business interests, regional belongings and participation in Bangladeshi political parties are embroiled. Indeed, leaders of Bangladeshi political parties are often key members of such committees, which can be used as political platforms. Money is collected among families belonging to these groups in order to support political campaigns in Bangladesh, for example.

Political field and Islamic/secularist tensions As far this Bangladeshi political support within Britain is concerned, the avowedly secularist Awami League has always enjoyed a dominant position. This could be explained by the prestigious aura of its founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, for the first generation of migrants and by the role which the Awami League played in the independence of Bangladesh and its definition as a secular nation-state. (Sheikh Mujib later sought to emphasise Bangladeshs Muslim heritage and Islam has played an increasingly important role in debates about Bangladeshi national identity since his death). During the 1970s the antipathy towards Pakistan was very strong in London and large sums of money were sent to support the freedom fighters ( Mukti Bahini) through fundraising campaigns organised by the UK Awami League (created during the mid-1960s in Tower Hamlets). In the 1980s the UK Awami League also led the opposition against General Ershad, who took control in Bangladesh after a military coup in which Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was killed. Moreover, it should be noted that among all the Bangladeshi political parties in the UK, the Awami League is the only one to have a youth branch, the UK Jubo League.

Bangladeshi political groups outside Bangladesh, especially the Awami League and its main rival the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), serve several social and political functions. These include campaigning before elections in Bangladesh, representing the grievances of Non-Resident Bangladeshis returning to Sylhet, helping first generation migrants, in particular, to get elected in Bangladesh and developing economic activities or protecting business interests in Bangladesh. Many members of UK-based political parties are first generation migrants who settled in Britain during the 1960s. Yet these parties also include people who migrated to Britain during the 1980s or 1990s, usually after getting married to someone already living in Britain. Most of them were already involved in these parties (or in their youth/student branches) in Bangladesh. This process suggests that far from slowly disappearing, the Bangladeshi political sphere will continue to be reproduced within the diaspora through the arrival of those who had been involved in politics back in Bangladesh. In turn, the dynamics of this political sphere will still reflect those of the mainstream political landscape in Bangladesh. Furthermore, in Britain the intimate relationship between politics and religion has led to intense rivalry between secular and Islamist activists, who have taken a keen interest in the ways in which religious issues have entered the political arena in Bangladesh. This tension related to the 1971 Liberation War has been projected in British soil and re-interpreted through the struggle for community space and community representation. For instance, in Tower Hamlets, Bengali secular community leaders refer to a set of values (secularism, nationalism, socialism and democracy) linked to the 1971 Liberation War (Muktojudho) against Pakistan in order to define a cultural/political project in Britain. A wide range of initiatives reflecting their commitment to transmit a secular Bengali heritage is regularly undertaken organisations of festivals (such as the Bengali New Year) youth cultural 5

awareness programmes, celebrations of independence movements, etc. (see Eade and Garbin, 2002; Eade, Fremeaux, Garbin, 2002). In Tower Hamlets, as well as Oldham, these leaders are also keen to shape the local urban community space through symbols of Bengali nationalism. One of these symbolic markers is the Shaheed Minar, a monument which commemorates the martyrs (shaheed) of the Language Movement in 1952. In Tower Hamlets, the Shaheed Minar was erected in Altab Ali Park, Whitechapel, after funds were collected among a large number of secular Bangladeshi community groups. In Oldham, it was built in the Bangladeshi area of Westwood and funded through a local council regeneration scheme. For many, this urban visibility of a Bengali national heritage is a crucial marker of collective identity, as this Bangladeshi regeneration officer from Oldham Council explains: When it was created, the Shaheed Minar, the Shapla, it was a sense of identity, a sense of national belonging for the Bengali community. At that time, people were flocking, from everywhere. It was an event, and everybody wanted to get associated with it. Now it brings people into the area, people come to Oldham from all over the region. Its attached to the Language Movement. OK, the youngsters may not know what the symbolic gesture is, but they might see it as a cultural art piece. So its serving two purposes.

Islamist activists, in Tower Hamlets and Oldham, stress their moral commitment to an authentic religious identity and oppose the nationalist initiatives of the secular leaders. In both places these critiques are legitimised by the increasing role they tend to play in the local arena and, above all, by their claim to represent the local Muslim community. In Oldham, for instance, Islamist activists describe the Shaheed Minar as a waste of money and an encouragement to stop the youth to think Islamically. In Tower Hamlets, they describe the Bengali New Year as a

syncretic (shirk) event, which is influenced by Hindu traditions and promotes unrespectable behaviour and practices. In Tower Hamlets and Oldham, this tension between secularists and Islamists has been particularly prominent due the visits of Maulauna Delwar Hussain Saydee, a (non-Sylheti) Jamaat i Islami MP in Bangladesh, who travels regularly to the Bangladeshi enclaves in Britain and elsewhere in the Bangladeshi diaspora. A member of Awami League in Oldham (also a journalist for the newspaper Surma and local correspondent for Bangla TV) was attacked in 2001 following an article he wrote about Saydees controversial speech in Oldham. In Tower Hamlets, violence also erupted around the East London Mosque where Saydee was delivering a speech in 2001. These incidents illustrate the competition for social and political control between Islamists and secularists in the community context. This competition revolves around the mobilisation of two different imagined communities situated beyond the local ethnic enclaves - on the one hand, a Bengali cultural/nationalist diasporic space and on the other hand, a global religious space, the umma, the global community of Muslim believers. Perhaps more importantly we can talk here of the constitution of a diasporic public sphere. This sphere is highly dependent on collective memory and historical reinterpretations of the 1971 Liberation War and is shaped by the links between some British Bangladeshi groups and the Jamaat i Islami and by the participation of some Bangladeshi leaders within the Awami League and groups like the Nirmul Committee1.

Religion and community politics

National Coordinating Committee for the Realisation of Bangladesh War Ideals and Trials of Bangladesh War Criminals of 1971 (also known as Ekattorer Ghatok Dalal Nirmul Jatya Samanay Shomiti). It was created in Bangladesh in 1992 by Jahanara Imam, the mother of a freedom fighter.

There is a diversity of religious/community groups within the British Bangladeshi diaspora. Some groups may be involved in politics locally, nationally and transnationally whereas other Islamic groups seek to avoid politics and focus on religious activities, such as propagating ( dawah) their own particular understanding of correct Islamic practice. These groups can also be distinguished from the expanding number of Muslim professional groups, which seek to represent Muslims in white-collar professions (medicine, law, engineering etc). These national lobbying groups often have little contact with local Muslim activists. In areas with high levels of Muslim settlement, such as Bradford, Oldham, Birmingham and London, representation has been led by activists associated with particular mosques such as Tower Hamlets East London Mosque or a group attempting to coordinate action between mosques such as the Bradford Council of Mosques. They may link up with local councillors or MPs, who try to appeal to voters on issues which concern them as Muslims, such as the provision of halal food in schools, correct dress, conflict in the Middle East, Iraq, Chechnya and Afghanistan. Youth groups also play an important role among South Asian Muslim communities and in the case of Bangladeshi communities one of the most influential groups is the Young Muslim Organisation (YMO). When it was created, in Tower Hamlets at the end of the 1970s, the YMO sought to offer an alternative to the secular Bengali youth movements. A positive Muslim identity was emphasised in order to raise the self-esteem of young Bangladeshis facing discrimination and exclusion (Neveu, 1993). The YMO was initially controlled by the Dawatul Islam, a group founded just after the Bangladesh War of Liberation by Bangladeshi settlers and strongly influenced by the Islamist political party, the Jamaat i Islam (Andrews, 1993). Until the mid-1980s these Islamist groups had little influence on community politics. However, with the opening of the purpose-built East London Mosque 8

in 1985, religious actors began to gain more legitimacy and the issue of religion started to appear at the centre of local debates about community needs. In 1988, after a factional conflict, members of the Dawatul Islam left the East London Mosque management structure and a new group, the Islamic Forum Europe (IFE), was created. The IFE not only built up its local base but established several branches across Britain, including Oldham and Birmingham, working closely with the YMO, from which several of their keymembers originate. The East London Mosque have been highly successful at building alliances with local government officials and its recent expansion, which resulted in the creation of the London Muslim Centre - used for prayers, recreational facilities and housing has also strengthened its position at a time when funding for secular groups significantly declined. Leaders of the IFE and YMO have also been increasingly involved in social work and youth work through community groups campaigning actively against drug abuse, anti-social behaviour or school truancy. Outside London, partnership between Bangladeshi-dominated groups, such as the YMO or IFE, and local authorities through community-based activities is less significant. In Birmingham, the Handsworth-based IFE has started some educational and drug awareness initiatives among young British Bangladeshis but its influence remains limited, mainly due to lack of membership and resources. In Oldham, however, Islamist activists have managed to acquire a piece of land in the Bangladeshi enclave of Westwood where they were planning to build a new centre (Oldham Muslim Centre) with religious and recreational facilities and inspired by the East London Mosques high profile London Muslim Centre. Since the 1990s the Oldham IFE and YMO have also successfully undertaken small projects targeted at local Bangladeshi youth, in partnership with local authorities and the police. Through groups such as the YMO or IFE some young British Bangladeshis can follow and support the Jamaat i Islami political strategies in Bangladesh.

However, as an IFE member in Oldham points out, their support was not unconditional: If Jamaat gets too strict like the Taliban, I wont support them anymore. I like the work they do, dont get me wrong. They accept a man with a beard, they accept a man without a beard. They accept a lady with a burqua, and they accept a woman normally covered up. But if they have all the power [in Bangladesh] and they change the country like Taliban did, then I will oppose them, even if I am supporting them now.

Some senior members of the IFE were involved in this political party or its student wing (Islami Chatra Shibir) in Bangladesh before coming to Britain during the 1980s and 1990s. They share the same ideological orientations based upon a scripturalist approach of Islam which aims to cover every aspect of social and political life. This vision involves the construction of clear-cut boundaries to preserve an authentic religious ethos free from the traditions of Pirs (saints) and Sufism, which were seen as encouraging such un-Islamic tendencies as shirk (association) or bida (innovation). Furthermore, given the importance attached to politics at local, national and transnational levels, Islamists affiliated to the IFE and Jamaat i Islami are also keen to distance themselves from the Tablighi Jamaat, which has been influential in the Indian sub-continent and the South Asian diaspora. Indeed, while the Tablighi Jamaat also rejects Pir and Sufi traditions, it concentrates on missionary and preaching work and tries to avoid any involvement in politics (Metcalf, 1996). The Tabligh has a base in Tower Hamlets but it is even more influential in Birmingham through a network of mosques and madrassahs, mainly supported by Pakistani and Gujarati residents, and in Oldham, where it is based in several mosques run by Pakistani and/or Bangladeshi management committee. In the highly Bangladeshi-populated area of Westwood in Oldham, the Tablighis based at Al-Khazra Markazi mosque are criticised by 10

the members of IFE and YMO whose offices and prayers rooms are located nearby. A clear distinction is made between the apolitical stance of Tabligh and the continual efforts of YMO and IFE to accumulate political capital and community legitimacy within the local public sphere. Another major difference highlighted is linked to the crucial issue of adopting effective strategies to attract young British Bangladeshis, as this YMO leader explains: There are not many groups reaching out to the youth. Basically its us and the Tablighi Jamaat. But the methodology they have is not adapted to change the society. They dont include the women, its not a wide way of doing dawa. For example, if you want to reach the youth, you need to include certain activities, like football. Any sports, its not their field. But there are Tablighis who are more reformed, they are into sports and everything, mostly Pakistanis. But unfortunately most Bangladeshi ones theyre not, they have very negative views about the work that we are doing. Some of them, who are very extreme in their practice, you can say that theyre still living in the cave. They need to come out and see how the society is changing. Groups associated with the East London Mosque and the London Muslim Centre are seen as offering a positive role model by the YMO/IFE activists in Birmingham and Oldham, mainly because these London groups have managed to legitimate their claims to represent the Muslim community in a local public sphere dominated by secularists for decades. The London groups are also admired for the partnership which they had forged with government institutions and the way they have voiced their concerns about religious needs and Islamic identity in the debates about multiculturalism, both locally and nationally. Besides the lack of financial resources and the weakness of their links with government institutions, Bangladeshi Islamists outside London also mention another obstacle in their path - the popularity of the Barelwi-orientated Fultoli movement. Led by the Pir Abdul Latif Chowdhury (born in the village of Fultoli, Sylhet) this movement has a strong following especially in Oldham

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and Birmingham. The Sylheti spiritual leader is said to be a descendant of Shah Kamal, one of the disciples of Shah Jalal who brought Islam to Sylhet during the 14th century. A number of religious centres have adopted this Barelwi-oriented movement in terms of beliefs (great emphasis on the Sunna the way of the Prophet) and practices (rituals of Urs and Milad), such as the Shah Jalal mosque in Aston, Birmingham, the Al Jalaliah madrassah in Chadderton, Oldham or the Jamme Masjid mosque in Brick Lane. Abdul Latif Chowdhury travels regularly to Britain to preach at waz mahfil (religious conference) in mosques or large community halls and many mosques and madrassahs across Britain have benefited from his financial support. Radical Islamist groups, such as Hizb at-Tahrir or the recently dismantled group Al Muhajiroun have also been active in Bangladeshi enclaves, but have failed to make much impact (Glynn, 2002; Begum and Eade, 2005). Defined by Roy (2004) as adopting neo-fundamentalist or Salafi ideologies, they avoid getting involved in local or national mainstream political arenas and thus remain at the margin of the public community sphere. A Bangladeshi Islamist in Birmingham, makes here a clear distinction between the IFE, to which he belongs, and these groups: Hizb at-Tahrir and Al Muhajiroun - they will not last long. Problems in Bosnia, the present situation in Iraq, its more emotional and emotions dont last long. They dont have many followers, but whatever they have, they are very active, because of this emotion. The people who have a strong ideology behind them, they will last long like the IFE. Its not the activities that will last long, its the ideas that will last long. But if you have emotion and no intellectual background - like Hizb atTahrir, they have no scholars, nothing, its empty - you will not last long.

According to him, young Bangladeshis need to engage with British society but on the basis of a strong Islamic identity:

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A British identity is important and should be important for the Bangladeshi youth. On the other hand, if they neglect their Islamic identity, it will be like assimilation. Even though they will participate in the mainstream activities, it will not benefit the Muslim community, because they dont regard themselves as strong Muslims, not as much commitment. But you cant survive here in isolation; to live here you need to have both identities, British and Muslim. The main point I want to make about the youth is that they have to take both British identity and Muslim identity seriously

Hybridity and urban (sub)cultures: reinterpreting the tradition of Eid

Finally, the social dynamics of locality and identity are examined here in relation to young British Bangladeshis and more particularly the ways in which they reinterpret the tradition of the main religious festivals of Eid ul Adha and Eid ul Fitr. On the day of Eid ul Adha, an animal has to be slaughtered, divided into parts and then equally distributed to kin, friends and poor people as zakat (charity). The other festival of Eid, called Eid ul Fitr, marks the end of Ramadan and charity and donations are also important on that day. In addition to their deep religious signification, both Eid festivals contribute to socialisation and the consolidation of links between families and friends, as, for instance, clothes or money (salaamis) are given to children, food is shared when relatives and neighbours invite each other for the traditional greetings (Eid Mubarrak). As Alexander (2000) and Garbin (2004) have shown, it is possible to differentiate several elements in the event of Eid, regarding the way it is lived and experienced by the young British Bangladeshis. There is, first, the religious moment, with the prayers at the mosque when, for the occasion,

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everyone is dressed up in new clothes (Sharwani, Punjabi and Shalwar Kameez for the females if they attend the service). Then, after the prayers, it is time for the visits to family members, followed by the traditional meal. Finally, young people usually spend time with their friends either in their homes or outside, where they occupy visibly the public space, generally outside the gaze of the parents and morrubis (elders). One of the most widespread practices of these youth during Eid day is to go cruising. It generally means for them travelling across (and, to a lesser extent, outside) London in cars usually rented and driven by the oldest teenagers of the peer group, listening to loud music (hip hop, RnB, Bhangra, etc.) and sometimes waving Bangladeshi flags. We can therefore say here that the British Bangladeshi boys and girls participate in the reinterpretation of tradition through this public experience of amusement, fun and good time outside the sphere of the Bengali community social control ( shomaj). In other words, the religious tradition has been given a new signification through a specific urban social practice, the cruising, very close to what we could call a subcultural use of public space. The event is also a great visible expression of cultural hybridity among Bengali and other South Asian Muslims youth. The emergence of fun spaces defined by their transgression and sinful potentialities 2 (Werbner, 2002) is indeed closely linked to a bricolage within a cosmopolitan space, where national, cultural, ethnic and traditional religious references are reappropriated, combined, entangled or in creative and innovative tension. Of course, such ways of celebrating Eid are strongly criticised by the most religious youth or members of the shomaj including religious leaders. The extract below, which appeared just before an Eid in a magazine sold at the East London Mosque, shows the nature of these critiques:
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Werbner points out that the logic of these fun spaces could be defined by the relationship between sin and fun: If to if to have fun is to sin, then being sinful is fun (2002, 189).

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For many of the Muslim youth, Eid has become an opportunity to flaunt their hired cars up and down the streets of London, Bradford, Manchestera display that even Top-Gear cannot match! Eid for the Police force in Britain means they have to be on high alert, as the hired cars start to spin their wheels, many lose control resulting in fatal accidents. A more recent phenomenon is the hired limousine with tinted mirrors (leaving you wondering whats happening inside!). [] The pulling over of cars to chat up the opposite sex, the loud playing of music, the flying of national flags, and the desperate effort to walk in style with those skin tight jeans makes you wonder whatever happened to modesty and humility! This is all done in Muslim communities with no respect for the elders. [] The month of obedience and discipline cannot be followed by a day of disobedience and licentiousness. [] In the excitement of the day, many Muslim youth fall into the traps of shaytan [Satan], their hearts inclines towards evil and their eyes are attracted towards sin. (Insight, 1 (3), 2001).

Conclusion

One of the main objectives of this paper was to show how the local/global dialectics of spatialisation among Bangladeshis in Britain relate to different political and community contexts. While the tensions between Islamists and secularist over the reinterpretation of the 1971 Liberation War have been projected in a relatively similar ways in several Bengali urban enclaves, the degree of institutionalisation of cultural and religious political projects is clearly not the same in the different localities. While we must be careful not to analyse these tensions only in terms of a simple binary opposition (Islam vs. secularism), it is also important to say that the process of institutionalisation has encouraged actors and community leaders to establish such sharp distinctions and clear-cut boundaries. The purity and authenticity of these dominant categories of identification, which rely on a diasporic collective memory but also on a transnational scope and

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materiality, are nevertheless challenged by young British Bangladeshis in their hybridised politics of everyday life or in the reinvention of religious traditions through the creation of fun spaces, as we have seen.

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