Honeywell Rodgers Presentation PDF

Overview of Overview of
Explosion Explosion
P ti Prevention
Measures
Overview of Explosion Prevention Measures
Slide 1
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Explosion Explosion
Explosion The bursting or rupture of an
l t i d t th d l t enclosure or a container due to the development
of internal pressure from a deflagration
I
S
O
L
Oxidant
L
A
T
I
O
Detection
Dust
F
u
e
l
I
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
Gas
N
Containment
Dust
Containment
Gas
Slide 2
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Explosion Protection Systems Documents Explosion Protection Systems Documents
NFPA 68 Standard on Explosion p
Protection by Deflagration Venting (2007
edition)
NFPA 69 Standard on Explosion p
Prevention Systems (2008 edition)
Invoked by other Standards
including 61 120 484 654 655 664
Slide 3
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
including 61, 120, 484, 654, 655, 664
Explosion Protection and Prevention Explosion Protection and Prevention
There are two distinct phases involved in a
study of any explosion problem study of any explosion problem
Prevention, which deals with the elimination of the
conditions which permit the formation of an
l i i t d th li i ti f ll ibl explosive mixture and the elimination of all possible
sources of ignition
Protection, which deals with reducing the effects of , g
an explosion, the basic purpose of this guide
This talk deals with both aspects NFPA 68
focuses on protection while NFPA 69 offers focuses on protection while NFPA 69 offers
methods for both protection and prevention
Slide 4
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Performance Performance--based approach based approach
Standards offer option for compliance
Performance based design Performance-based design
Establish life safety and property protection
objectives
D fi d fl i h d i Define deflagration hazard scenario
See Chapter 5 of NFPA 68 or 69
Prescriptive-based design Prescriptive based design
Use the equations as presented in Chapters 7, 8,
and 9 to determine vent requirements according
to NFPA 68 to NFPA 68
Use the explosion prevention and protection
methods of Chapters 7 through 14 of NFPA 69
Slide 5
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Explosion Prevention and Protection Explosion Prevention and Protection
Control the Environment within the Protected
Enclosure, such that Deflagration can not occur
Oxidant Concentration Reduction
Combustible Concentration Reduction
Mitigate the Effects of Deflagration, such that the
Protected Enclosure will not be Uncontrollably Protected Enclosure will not be Uncontrollably
breached
Containment (Inherently Safe)
NFPA-68 Venting (Passive) NFPA-68 Venting (Passive)
Foam (Passive)
Suppression (Active)
Prevent Propagation of a Deflagration or
X X X X X
Prevent Propagation of a Deflagration or
Transport of an Ignition Source
Passive Isolation (Flame-Front Diverter, Rotary Valve)
A ti I l ti (I l ti V l Ch i l B i )
Slide 6
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Active Isolation (Isolation Valves, Chemical Barriers)
Explosion Prevention Explosion Prevention
Pre-Deflagration Detection and Ignition Control
Detect using Optical or Concentration sensors
Used for Pre-emptive Shutdown or Modification of p
operations to Prevent Activating a Protection System
Restricted Applicability Restricted Applicability
Can be used independently to reduce frequency of
Deflagrations
Can be used as additional detectors for a Validated Can be used as additional detectors for a Validated
System
Can not interfere with the operation of the Validated
System
Can not be used as the sole detector for a Validated
System
Early Warning
Slide 7
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Early Warning
Prevent Deflagration Prevent Deflagration
by Controlling the by Controlling the
Environment Environment
Slide 8
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Oxidant Concentration Control (Inerting) Oxidant Concentration Control (Inerting)
Slide 9
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Limiting Oxygen Concentration of Selected Dust Samples Limiting Oxygen Concentration of Selected Dust Samples
D t LOC (V l %) Dust LOC (Vol. %)
Pear wood 16.0
Barium dust 13.4
Wood grinding dust 13.0
Zinc stearate 11.5
Polyethylene 10.0
Para-formaldehyde 6.0
Aluminum 5 0 Aluminum 5.0
Slide 10
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Oxidant Concentration Control Oxidant Concentration Control
With C ti O C t ti M it With Continuous O
2
Concentration Monitor
For LOC > 5%:
Max% O
2
= Worst Credible Case LOC 2 vol%
For LOC < 5%:
Max% O
2
= 0.60 LOC
Without Continuous O
2
Concentration Monitor
For LOC > 5%:
M % O 0 60 LOC Max% O
2
= 0.60 LOC
For LOC < 5%:
Max% O
2
= 0.40 LOC
And O
2
Checked on a regularly scheduled basis
Requires Purge Gas Monitoring and
Slide 11
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Alarm for Abnormal Operation
Combustible Concentration Control Combustible Concentration Control
With Continuous Concentration Monitor
Ma Comb stible Concentration = 25% LFL (MEC) Max Combustible Concentration = 25% LFL (MEC)
Requires an Alarm, but not automatic action
With Continuous Concentration Monitor and Safety
Interlocks (automatic change to safe condition)
Max Combustible Concentration = 60% LFL (MEC) ( )
Aluminum per NFPA-484 = 50% LFL (MEC)
Requires Instrumentation to Monitor
Control of Concentration
Slide 12
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Control of Concentration
Predeflagration Detection and Control Predeflagration Detection and Control
Optical system detectors are sensitive to
radiant energy from hot particles, glows,
embers or sparks embers, or sparks
Extinguishing mediums such as water, carbon
dioxide or steam are typically employed dioxide, or steam are typically employed
Stop and diverter valves are also common
Gas sensing systems detect the formation of Gas se s g syste s detect t e o at o o
thermal decomposition gases
Control can be accomplished with alarms,
f automated shutdown, or the release of the
extinguishing system
Slide 13
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Gas Sensing Equipment Considerations Gas Sensing Equipment Considerations
The system shall take air samples at inlets and
outlets and evaluate the differential outlets and evaluate the differential
concentration for selected thermal
decomposition products.
The design shall be based on such factors as:
Process mass flow
Flow velocity
Potential measurement interferences
Equipment volume Equipment volume
Air flow and exchange rate
Sensor response time
Slide 14
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Limitations Limitations
Not for gases or hybrid mixtures
Not for extinguishing or isolating deflagration
flame fronts flame fronts
Permitted to actuate systems including high speed
isolation valves, chemical isolators, deluge valves
9 7 1 see 9.7.1
These systems shall be listed as a complete These systems shall be listed as a complete
system including detection and control
Slide 15
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Mitigate the Effects of Mitigate the Effects of
Deflagrations by Deflagrations by
Containment Containment
Slide 16
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Deflagration Containment Based on P Deflagration Containment Based on P
max max
P
P
R
max
=
P is the maximum pressure developed in a single enclosure deflagration
test
P
The value of R shall be as follows:
P
max
is the maximum pressure developed in a single enclosure deflagration.
P
test
= initial absolute pressure during the test (typically 1 bar)
The value of R shall be as follows:
(1) For most gas/air mixtures, the value of R shall be 9.
(2) For St-1 and St-2 dust/air mixtures, the value of R shall
be 11 be 11.
(3) For St-3 dust/air mixtures, the value of R shall be 13.
A value for R other than the values specified shall be
permitted to be used if such value can be substantiated by
Slide 17
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
p y
test data or calculations.
Design Strength of Vessels to Contain P Design Strength of Vessels to Contain P
max max
(1) If permanent deformation, but not rupture, of the enclosure
can be accepted.
P P R
( )
u
a
mawp
F
P P R
P
3
2
0

=
P
mawp
= enclosure design pressure [barg (psig)] according to
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, i.e. the maximum
allowable working pressure allowable working pressure
F
u
= ratio of ultimate stress of the enclosure to the allowable
stress of the enclosure per the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code; For vessels fabricated of low-carbon steel and
low-alloy stainless steel, F
u
equals approximately 3.5
P
0
= worst case initial vessel pressure
Slide 18
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
P
a
= atmospheric pressure
Design Strength of Vessels to Contain P Design Strength of Vessels to Contain P
max max
(2) If permanent deformation of the enclosure cannot be
accepted.
P P R
0

( ) y
a
mawp
F
P P R
P
3
2
0
=
F
y
= ratio of the yield stress of the enclosure to the allowable
stress of the materials of construction of the enclosure per the
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; For vessels
fabricated of low-carbon steel and low-alloy stainless steel, F
y
equals approximately 1.75
E l ( l) h ll b i t d t Enclosures (vessel) shall be inspected at
least every 3 years More frequent than
ASME d
Slide 19
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
ASME code
Deflagration by Deflagration by
Venting Venting
Slide 20
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
2007 Equations Summary 2007 Equations Summary
| |
/
P
Basic
75 . 0
L A
| |
| | 1 54 . 1 1 10 1
max
4 / 3
3 / 4
4
0
+ =

red
St stat v
P
P
V K P A
Enclosure L/D ( )
2
0
95 . 0 exp 2 6 . 0
red
v
v
P
D
L
A
A
- -
|
.
|
\
|
- =
Vent Panel Mass
2 . 0 3 . 0
5 . 0 6 . 0
0
0075 . 0 1
red
St
v
v
P V n
K M
A
A

+ =
Partial Volume
(locally dusty)
H
H
- =

1
3 1
0
r
r
v
v
X
X
A
A
Vent Ducts
0 v
( )
4 . 0
2
8 . 0
1
18 . 1 1
K
K
E E
A
A
v
- - - + =
Slide 21
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
( )
0
2 1
0
K
A
v
Basic Equation Basic Equation
| | 1 54 . 1 1 10 1
max
4 / 3
3 / 4
4
0
+ =

red
St stat v
P
P
V K P A
where:
A
v0
= vent area calculated from the basic equation (m
2
)
P
stat
= nominal static burst pressure of the vent (bar)
K
St
= deflagration index (bar-m/sec)
V = enclosure volume (m
3
) V enclosure volume (m )
P
max
= maximum pressure of a deflagration (bar)
P
red
= reduced pressure after deflagration venting (bar)
Slide 22
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
PP
red red
and Vent Area and Vent Area
Slide 23
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Enclosure L/D Correction Enclosure L/D Correction
(
| |
75 0
(
(

|
.
|
\
|
+ = ) 95 . 0 exp( 2 6 . 0 1
2
75 . 0
0 1 red v v
P
D
L
A A
V = 12.35 m
3
L/D = 2 63
V = 12.35 m
3
L/D = 3 71
No correction if L/D < 2
Location of vent along central axis
L/D = 2.63 L/D = 3.71
Slide 24
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Location of vent along central axis
determines the effective L/D
Effect of Excessive Turbulence Effect of Excessive Turbulence
Formulas in NFPA 68 further assume that u is
10% of the mean flow velocity prior to ignition
No correction if max velocity is <20 m/sec
1
tan
2
7 . 0
36
20 ) , max(
1
v
axial
v
A
v v
A -
(
+ =
36
(
Axial Flow Velocity Tangential Flow Velocity Axial Flow Velocity Tangential Flow Velocity
V
L Q
v
air
axial
-
=
60
) 14 . 3 ( 2
max tan_
Nr
v
- -
=
V
60
max tan_ tan
5 . 0 v v - =
Slide 25
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Vent Panel Inertia Vent Panel Inertia
Correction Threshold is 5% effect on Vent Area
( ) ( )
67 . 1
3 0 2 0
(
(
|
|
|
V
Panel Inertia Correction
( ) ( )
5 . 0
3 . 0 2 . 0
67 . 6
(
|
|
.
|
\
|
= >
St
red T
K
V
n P M M
] 0075 . 0 1 [
2 0 3 0
5 . 0 6 . 0
2 3
St
v v
P V
K M
A A

+ =
Limitations:
M < 40 kg/m
2
2 . 0 3 . 0
red
P V n
M < 40 kg/m
75 < K
St
< 800 bar-m/sec
Higher Inertia Panels per Annex G (FM)
Slide 26
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Higher Inertia Panels per Annex G (FM)
Partial Volume Partial Volume
Dust concentrations in some process equipment and
buildings are inherently or by housekeeping limited
to only a fraction, X
r
, of the enclosure volume.
H X
H
H
- - =

1
3 1
3 4
r
r v v
X
X A A
A
v4
= vent area for partial volume deflagration
A
v3
= vent area for full volume deflagration
X = fill fraction
Venting is not required if Xr <
X
r
= fill fraction
= P
red
/P
max
Slide 27
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
g q
Vent Ducts Vent Ducts
Roof
Permit vent discharge to be
directed to a safe location
I i d t
Vent
Roof
Rain
Cover
Increase required vent area
Duct
Vent
Duct
Idealized
Vent
Cover
Vent
Cover
90
o
Elbows
Real
Process
Enclosure
Process
Enclosure
Real
Life
Slide 28
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Floor Floor
Vent Ducts Vent Ducts

( )
K
E
.
E
.
Av
4 0 8 0
18 1 1+ =
Where:
( )
Ko
K
E
.
E
.
.
Avo
4 0
2
8 0
1
18 1 1 + =
A L P
+ + + + =
A
K
outlet
K
elbows
h
D
L
f
K
inlet
U
P
K
2
2
1

V
duct
L Av
Tdisch
Th
E
= =
1
Iterative Solution
V Tdisch

4 3 3 4
54 1 1
4
10
2
/
V )
/
P t t ( K t
Av
Tdisch
Tc
E

= =
Slide 29
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
4 3 3 4
54 1 1
/
V )
/
Pstat . ( Kst
Tdisch
+
Vent Discharge Vent Discharge
Enclosure Volume: 2.8 m
3
Vent Area: 2 ft x 3 ft
Cornstarch 500 g/m
3
K
St
: ~ 200 bar-m/sec K
St
: 200 bar-m/sec
Courtesy of Fike Corporation
Flame Pressure Particulate Toxic Products
Correlations provided for Fireball Hazard Zone
b
| |
b
n
V
a D
|
.
|
\
|
=
Warning Signs are Required Restrict Access
Dust Correlations provided for Pressure Rise for
Exterior Venting and for Venting inside a Building
Slide 30
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Warning Signs are Required Restrict Access
Ural
Flame Flame- -Arresting Arresting && Particulate Particulate--Retention Vent Retention Vent
Slide 31
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Flame Flame- -Arresting & Particulate Arresting & Particulate--Retention Vent Retention Vent
Device must be listed
A documented risk analysis forms the
basis of safety and should include:
P i it f l Proximity of personnel
Volume of room
P ibilit f b tibl i t t i t Possibility of combustible mixtures exterior to
the equipment
Possible toxic emissions Possible toxic emissions
P
red
Slide 32
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Deflagration by Deflagration by
Suppression Suppression
Slide 33
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Active Suppression Active Suppression
Slide 34
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Suppression System Considerations Suppression System Considerations
Design shall be deflagration tested
L ti d b f d t t Location and number of detectors
Volume of suppressant
Time to detect Time to detect
Suppressant discharge pattern
Suppressant efficiency Suppressant efficiency
Explosibility of the combustible material
Physical characteristics of the equipment Physical characteristics of the equipment
Design Methodology Verification by 3
rd
Party
Slide 35
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Design Methodology Verification by 3 Party
Prevent Propagation of Prevent Propagation of
a Deflagration by a Deflagration by
Isolation Isolation
Slide 36
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
f
Interconnected Vessels Interconnected Vessels
Deflagration and Pressure can Propagate
Upstream and Downstream
If Enclosure A is Required to be Protected and
it i I t t d t E l B b li it is Interconnected to Enclosure B by a line
containing [fuel] that could transmit Flame or
Pressure then PROTECT Enclosure B
X
Isolate B from A
A B
Isolate B from A
Vent B (within very limited conditions in NFPA-68)
Design B to Contain the Deflagration
Use Foam in B to Quench the Deflagration
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Slide 37
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Use Foam in B to Quench the Deflagration
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Isolation Isolation -- Application Application
For the interruption of flame and pressure
spread between interconnected vessels spread between interconnected vessels
Active isolators require detection and
control control
Passive isolators respond to pressure
change change
Slide 38
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Applications for Isolation Devices Applications for Isolation Devices
Slide 39
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Active Isolation Techniques Active Isolation Techniques
Chemical isolators
Fast-acting gate valves
Actuated float valves
Pinch valves
System Design Verification by 3
rd
Party
Slide 40
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Active Isolation Design Tests Active Isolation Design Tests
Deflagration tested
Detection conditions and positioning Detection conditions and positioning
Barrier location
Entire range of flammable concentrations Entire range of flammable concentrations
Time to detect
Possible ignition locations in protected system Possible ignition locations in protected system
Time to establish barrier
Flame speeds and pressure p p
Time for flame front to reach barrier
Pipes and ducts must withstand P
red
Slide 41
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
p
red
Chemical Barriers Chemical Barriers
Slide 42
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
A Detailed Look A Detailed Look--Chemical Injection Chemical Injection
Chemical Barrier
Injects extinguishing agent into the pipe prior to the Injects extinguishing agent into the pipe prior to the
arrival of the flame front
Systems have one or more detectors, a controller,
and agent injection equipment
Actuation based on pressure or radiant
Suppressant containers have fast release so signal Suppressant containers have fast release so signal
to injection happens in milliseconds
Design elements
Size and number of containers
Time, location, temperature, suppressant
Slide 43
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Chemical Barriers do not Isolate Pressure
Fast Fast--Acting Mechanical Valve Acting Mechanical Valve
Slide 44
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
A Detailed Look A Detailed Look Mechanical Valve Mechanical Valve
Fast acting mechanical valves provide a
positive mechanical seal to prevent flame and positive mechanical seal to prevent flame and
pressure propagation
One or more detectors, a control panel, and fast
acting valve that can withstand P
red
Actuated by pressure or radiant
Design elements Design elements
Detector specifications and location
Distance to valve
Temperature and pressure
Limitations
Slide 45
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Externally Actuated Float Valve Externally Actuated Float Valve
Slide 46
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
A Detailed Look A Detailed Look Float Valve Float Valve
Actuated float valve isolates by means of a
moveable plug that is actuated by pneumatic moveable plug that is actuated by pneumatic
discharge from a pressurized container.
One or more detectors, control panel, pressure
container for actuation
Actuation by pressure or radiant
Design elements Design elements
Detection specification and location
Distance to the valve
Temperature, flow, pressure, maximum dust load
Limitations
Slide 47
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Externally Actuated Pinch Valve Externally Actuated Pinch Valve
Slide 48
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
A Detailed Look A Detailed Look Pinch Valve Pinch Valve
The pinch valve isolates by means of a
collapsible elastomer bladder actuated by collapsible elastomer bladder actuated by
pneumatic discharge from a pressurized
container.
One or more detectors control panel pressure One or more detectors, control panel, pressure
container for actuation
Actuation by pressure or radiant
D i l t Design elements
Detection specification and location
Distance to the valve
Temperature, flow, pressure, maximum dust load
Limitations
Slide 49
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Passive Isolation Passive Isolation
The interruption of flame and pressure
migration in pipes or ducts by means of migration in pipes or ducts by means of
devices such as:
Flame front diverters
3rd Party Verification
Flame-front diverters
Passive float valve
Rotary valves
3rd Party Verification
X X X X X
Rotary valves
Flame arresters (various types)
X X X X X
Slide 50
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Flame Flame- -Front Diverters Front Diverters
Rupture Disk Explosion Door Rupture Disk, Explosion Door
Self-Closing Door
Used for Combustible Dust Pneumatic Transport p
Lines; examples are shown here.
Slide 51
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Flame Front Diverter Design Flame Front Diverter Design
Combustible material data
Type of protection on interconnected vessels
L ti f di t l ti t th l Location of diverter relative to other vessels
Piping details (i.e. length, size, strength)
Proximity to elbows valves other turbulence Proximity to elbows, valves, other turbulence
items
Flow velocity Flow velocity
Divert flame-front to a safe place
Capable of withstanding P
red
Capable of withstanding P
red
Deflagration tested
Slide 52
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Flame Front Diverters do not Isolate Flame
Flame Front Diverter Limits Flame Front Diverter Limits
Not permitted as the only means of
isolation if the intent is to completely stop isolation if the intent is to completely stop
flame propagation
Not for gases if detonation is possible Not for gases if detonation is possible
Not for toxic products
Not for indoor use
Slide 53
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Rotary Valves Rotary Valves
A itt d t b d i l ti d i i Are permitted to be used as isolation devices in
dust handling systems
Design considerations: Design considerations:
Explosibility characteristics of the combustible
material
Size, strength, and characteristics of the equipment
Type of deflagration protection on equipment
P P
red
Slide 54
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Rotary Valve Design Criteria Rotary Valve Design Criteria
Flame quenching by close clearance valves, or
Product blocking by product layer above valve Product blocking by product layer above valve
Valve body and rotator made of metal strong enough to
withstand P
red
K
St
and P
max
of the dust
Valve shall be pressure tested by a third party
Rotator shall have at least 6 equally spaced vanes Rotator shall have at least 6 equally spaced vanes
At least 2 vanes on each side of the housing shall be at
minimum clearance at all positions
External bearings
Explosion detection interlock to stop rotator
Slide 55
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Rotary Valve Limits Rotary Valve Limits
Close tolerance valves shall be designed
to have a clearance between vane tip to have a clearance between vane tip
and body 0.2 mm
Material blocking above valves with Material blocking above valves with
greater clearance is required to be at
least 0 3 m least 0.3 m
Not for gases or hybrid mixtures
Slide 56
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell
Questions Questions
A
B
A
B
Slide 57
Oct 2010
Sam Rodgers
Honeywell

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