[G.R. No. 134298. August 26, 1999] RAMON C. TAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION PARDO, J.: The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals* affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19,** convicting petitioner of the crime of fencing. Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St., Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her. Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or less, were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainants warehouse some boat spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainants forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one another. Complainant did not file a case against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop. On relation of complainant Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 19, an information against petitioner charging him with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) committed as follows: That on or about the last week of February 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wi lfully, unlawfully and feloniously knowingly receive, keep, acquire and possess several spare parts and items for fishing boats all valued at P48,130.00 belonging to Rosita Lim, which he knew or should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of theft. Contrary to law. Upon arraignment on November 23, 1992, petitioner Ramon C. Tan pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and waived pre-trial. To prove the accusation, the prosecution presented the testimonies of complainant Rosita Lim, Victor Sy and the confessed thief, Manuelito Mendez. On the other hand, the defense presented Rosita Lim and Manuelito Mendez as hostile witnesses and petitioner himself. The testimonies of the witnesses were summarized by the trial court in its decision, as follows: ROSITA LIM stated that she is the owner of Bueno Metal Industries, engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers, bushings, welding rods, among others (Exhibits A, A-1, and B). That sometime in February 1991, after one of her employees left the company, she discovered that some of the manufactured spare parts were missing, so that on February 19, 1991, an inventory was conducted and it was found that some welding rods and propellers, among others, worth P48,000.00 were missing. Thereafter, she went to Victor Sy, the person who recommended Mr. Mendez to her. Subsequently, Mr. Mendez was arrested in the Visayas, and upon arrival in Manila, admitted to his having stolen the missing spare parts sold then to Ramon Tan. She then talked to Mr. Tan, who denied having bought the same. When presented on rebuttal, she stated that some of their stocks were bought under the name of Asia Pacific, the guarantor of their Industrial Welding Corporation, and stated further that whether the stocks are bought under the name of the said corporation or under the name of William Tan, her husband, all of these items were actually delivered to the store at 3012-3014 Jose Abad Santos Street and all paid by her husband. That for about one (1) year, there existed a business relationship between her husband and Mr. Tan. Mr. Tan used to buy from them stocks of propellers while they likewise bought from the former brass woods, and that there is no reason whatsoever why she has to frame up Mr. Tan. MANUELITO MENDEZ stated that he worked as helper at Bueno Metal Industries from November 1990 up to February 1991. That sometime in the third week of February 1991, together with Gaudencio Dayop, his co-employee, they took from the warehouse of Rosita Lim some boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers, brass screws, etc. They delivered said stolen items to Ramon Tan, who paid for them in cash in the amount of P13,000.00. After taking his share (one-half (1/2) of the amount), he went home directly to the province. When he received a letter from his uncle, Victor Sy, he decided to return to Manila. He was then accompanied by his uncle to see Mrs. Lim, from whom he begged for forgiveness on April 8, 1991. On April 12, 1991, he executed an affidavit prepared by a certain Perlas, a CIS personnel, subscribed to before a Notary Public (Exhibits C and C-1). VICTORY [sic] SY stated that he knows both Manuelito Mendez and Mrs. Rosita Lim, the former being the nephew of his wife while the latter is his auntie. That sometime in February 1991, his auntie called up and informed him about the spare parts stolen from the warehouse by Manuelito Mendez. So that he sent his son to Cebu and requested his kumpadre, a police officer of Sta. Catalina, Negros Occidental, to arrest and bring Mendez back to Manila. When Mr. Mendez was brought to Manila, together with Supt. Perlas of the WPDC, they fetched Mr. Mendez from the pier after which they proceeded to the house of his auntie. Mr. Mendez admitted to him having stolen the missing items and sold to Mr. Ramon Tan in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Again, he brought Mr. Mendez to Sta. Cruz where he pointed to Mr. Tan as the buyer, but when confronted, Mr. Tan denied the same. ROSITA LIM, when called to testify as a hostile witness, narrated that she owns Bueno Metal Industries located at 301 Jose Abad Santos Street, Tondo, Manila. That two (2) days after Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop left, her husband, William Tan, conducted an inventory and discovered that some of the spare parts worth P48,000.00 were missing. Some of the missing items were under the name of Asia Pacific and William Tan. MANUELITO MENDEZ, likewise, when called to testify as a hostile witness, stated that he received a subpoena in the Visayas from the wife of Victor Sy, accompanied by a policeman of Buliloan, Cebu on April 8, 1991. That he consented to come to Manila to ask forgiveness from Rosita Lim. That in connection with this case, he executed an affidavit on April 12, 1991, prepared by a certain Atty. Perlas, a CIS personnel, and the contents thereof were explained to him by Rosita Lim before he signed the same before Atty. Jose Tayo, a Notary Public, at Magnolia House, Carriedo, Manila (Exhibits C and C-1). That usually, it was the secretary of Mr. Tan who accepted the items delivered to Ramon Hardware. Further, he stated that the stolen items from the warehouse were placed in a sack and he talked to Mr. Tan first over the phone before he delivered the spare parts. It was Mr. Tan himself who accepted the stolen items in the morning at about 7:00 to 8:00 oclock and paid P13,000.00 for them. RAMON TAN, the accused, in exculpation, stated that he is a businessman engaged in selling hardware (marine spare parts) at 944 Espeleta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. He denied having bought the stolen spare parts worth P48,000.00 for he never talked nor met Manuelito Mendez, the confessed thief. That further the two (2) receipts presented by Mrs. Lim are not under her name and the other two (2) are under the name of William Tan, the husband, all in all amounting to P18,000.00. Besides, the incident was not reported to the police (Exhibits 1 to 1-g). He likewise denied having talked to Manuelito Mendez over the phone on the day of the delivery of the stolen items and could not have accepted the said items personally for everytime (sic) goods are delivered to his store, the same are being accepted by his staff. It is not

possible for him to be at his office at about 7:00 to 8:00 oclock in the morning, because he usually reported to his office at 9:00 oclock. In connection with this case, he executed a counter-affidavit (Exhibits 2 and 2-a).[1] On August 5, 1996, the trial court rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RAMON C. TAN is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the AntiFencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 1612, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and to indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the stolen merchandise purchased by him in the sum of P18,000.00. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED. Manila, Philippines, August 5, 1996. (s/t) ZENAIDA R. DAGUNA Judge Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. After due proceedings, on January 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered decision finding no error in the judgment appealed from, and affirming the same intoto. In due time, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration; however, on June 16, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, this petition. The issue raised is whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against petitioner.[2] We resolve the issue in favor of petitioner. Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.[3] Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, w ith intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things.[4] The crime of theft is committed if the taking is without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things.[5] The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.[6] Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecuted as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal.[7] P. D. No. 1612 was enacted to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft. Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, the accused ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. [8] The State may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is malum prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing[9] and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.[10] In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the crime of fencing as follows: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.[11] Consequently, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the existence of all the elements of the c rime charged. [12] Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense.[13] It is an ancient principle of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9).[14] In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of fencing? Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been committed. There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only against the person admitting or confessing.[15] Even on this, if given extrajudicially, the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.[16] Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may such extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against accused.[17] There must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt.[18] Corpus delicti means the body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed.[19] The essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000).[20] In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking.[21] In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.[22]

What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the minds grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words should know denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.[23] Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilty of fencing.[24] Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential elements of fencing, and thus petitioner is entitled to an acquittal. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20059 and hereby ACQUITS petitioner of the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 92-108222 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 111343 August 22, 1996 ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and LOURDES DU, respondents. ROMERO, J.:p Petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. is accused of violating Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, in an information which reads: INFORMATION The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of Violation of Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (Presidential Decree 1612), committed as follows: That on or about a week prior to October 25, 1986, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, with intent to gain for himself, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously purchased and received dismantled farrowing crates made of GI pipes, valued at P20,000.00, knowing the same to be the subject of thievery, thereby committing an act of "fencing," in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof Lourdes Farms, Inc., represented by Lourdes Du. Contrary to law. Davao City, Philippines, January 19, 1987. (SGD.) ANTONINA B. ESCOVILLA 4th Asst. City Fiscal 1 Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City using the business name "Dunlao Enterprise." On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunate Mariquit and Carlito Catog, both employees of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, to go to petitioner's premises together with police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verify information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat. Upon arrival at petitioner's compound, the group saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside the compound. They also found assorted lengths of G.I. pipes inside a cabinet in petitioner's shop and another pile outside the shop but within the compound. After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms and had been stolen from it, petitioner voluntarily surrendered the items. These were then taken to the police station. On February 16, 1987, Criminal Case No. 14655 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 9, accusing petitioner of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. On March 13, 1987, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY. Trial ensued and on May 30, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: PREMISES CONSIDERED and the evidence being sufficient, this Court finds ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO SR., GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Six (6) Years, Eight (8) Months, One (1) Day as minimum to Seven (7) Years and Four (4) Months as maximum of Prision Mayor with all the accessory penalties provided by law. SO ORDERED. 2 Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On May 10, 1993, the appellate court promulgated its decision 3 affirming the judgment of the trial court. Hence, this petition. Petitioner states that the appellate court erred: (A) IN NOT FINDING THAT AT LEAST TWO (2) ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED, NAMELY, THE ALLEGED PURCHASE BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE GI-PIPES AND HIS ALLEGED KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR BEING STOLEN ITEMS, WERE NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE; (B) IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT, A DULY LICENSED SCRAP METAL BUSINESSMAN FOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) YEARS, HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT ANY CRIMINAL INTENT IN POSSESSING AS TEMPORARY CUSTODIAN OF SAID GI-PIPES BY BRINGING THEM INSIDE HIS BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT, WHOSE INSIDE PREMISES WERE OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW, BEFORE DARK SET IN ON THE DAY THEY WERE BROUGHT TO HIM BY WELL-DRESSED JEEP-RIDING MEN WHO MERELY OFFERED SAID ITEMS TO HIM FOR SALE BUT WHO FAILED TO RETURN TO HIS ESTABLISHMENT UNTIL POLICE OPERATIVES WENT TO HIS BUSINESS PREMISES A FEW DAYS THEREAFTER. 4 In brief, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to establish the fact that, in receiving and possessing the subject items, he was motivated by gain or that he purchased the said articles. Further, he questions the alleged value of the stolen properties stating that they are worth a lot less than what the trial court declared them to be. Under Presidential Decree 1612, 5 "fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

There is no question that the farrowing crates and assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found in the premises of petitioner. The positive identification by Fortunato Mariquit, an employee of Lourdes Farms, Inc., that these items were previously owned by it gave rise to a presumption of fencing under the law: Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. In the instant case, did petitioner Ernestino Dunlao succeed in rebutting this presumption? We hold in the negative. First of all, contrary to petitioner's contention, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D. 1612. The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called "acts mala prohibita." 6 This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? 7 When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. 8 In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals 9 involving violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, we said: On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element was not clearly established by the People's evidence and he, therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368 [1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in the body of the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he remains indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick-up (People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil, 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supraat P. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special stature like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil; 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58) because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense (U.S. vs. Siy Gong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 [1915]; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1 Aquino, supra at p. 52). Secondly, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner, as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing. 10 It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence but he failed to do so. All petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal, was a mere denial and his incredible testimony that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his establishment and left them there. A There was a jeep loaded with G.I. pipes where he approached me with the G.I. pipes but I refused to buy and instead requested me that they will unload those G.I. pipes in front of my establishment. Q Now, did you have a talk with that person whom you said arrived aboard the jeep which was carrying G.I. pipes? A We had a talk requesting me that they will just unload the G.I. pipes but we have never talked that I am going to buy those G.I. pipes. Q Can you recall what did the man tell you as he asked you to allow him to unload those G.I. pipes? A He told me that he would just leave them temporarily and he will come back but it took a long time, he failed to come back. Q What time, more or less, of the day was that when the unloading of the G.I. pipes was made, was it in the morning or afternoon? A I can remember it was in the afternoon but I am not certain as to the time. Q Can you estimate the time in the afternoon? A May be around 2 or 3 o'clock but I am not certain, it was in the afternoon. Q You said that man who unloaded the G.I. pipes did not return anymore and so, what did you do with the G.I. pipes that were unloaded in front of your establishment? A That was already late in the afternoon, around 5:30 up to 6:00 o'clock, we are about to close, so what I did I have it brought inside my compound for safekeeping. 11 In the Lim 12 case, we held that: . . . the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1612 . . . must be upheld in the light of petitioner's shallow demurrer premised on a denial and alibi, since a disputable presumption on this score is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence. The Court notes that the stolen articles were found displayed 13 on petitioner's shelves inside his compound. If petitioner were merely keeping the farrowing crates and G.I. pipes for the men aboard the jeep, why did he display them? When a storeowner displays articles, it is assumed that he is doing so with the intention of selling them. Furthermore, the Court finds it strange that petitioner did not even bother to ascertain the identity of the person or persons who deposited the articles with him. We quote with approval the trial court's observation that: The narration of how the items were simply dumped at the compound of the accused; the fragile and vague statement that the unidentified party unloading the items would bring more items at some indefinite date; . . . that accused caused the pipes to be brought inside the compound of his own volition without any such arrangement with the strangers; that the latter did not return thereafter; that some of the items delivered by the strangers were distributed in and around the compound and in cabinets inside the building already cut in short pieces; that accused cannot produce any proof of ownership by the persons who simply unloaded the items then left without coming back these are matters which common sense and sound business practices would normally clarify in the face of the express provisions of the Anti-fencing Law. . . . And when the accused took it upon himself to protect and transfer inside his compound items unloaded by total strangers without any agreement as to how the items would be sold or disposed of nor how soon agreement would be compensated, a rather dubious aura of illegitimacy envelopes and taints the entire transaction. Lastly, petitioner questions the value of the stolen articles as found by the trial court and as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. He contends that the pipes were worth only P200.00, not the P20,000.00 alleged in the Information. Prosecution witness Carlito Catog testified on the value of the stolen pipes stating that, as he worked as purchaser for Lourdes Farms, he was knowledgeable about their true worth. He also explained the basis of the estimate of the said articles: 14 Q Now, those G.I. pipes which you said you saw in the premises of Mr. Dumlao and which you earlier mentioned as having been identified by you as coming from Lourdes Farms, can you tell the Honorable Court, more or less, how much did you buy those pipes? A I arrive at the amount of Fifty Nine Thousand (P59,000.00) as my estimate. Q Fifty Nine? A Fifty Nine Thousand Pesos (P59,000.00). Q And can you tell the Honorable Court what is your basis of making this estimate? A The G.I. pipes were made into piggery crates, we use the 3/4 inch by 20 feet G.I. pipes in fabricating. We use 6 lengths of those pipes at the cost of P80.00 per crate. So, we arrive at the amount of P480.00 of the materials, the G.I. pipes used in fabricating crates, plus the cost of fabrication which we paid to the one making at P700.00 per crate, so we arrive at P1,180.00 per crate and the number of crates per

estimate, which we recovered from the premises of Mr. Dumlao is about more or less 50 crates. So, we arrive at Fifty Nine Thousand Pesos (P59,000.00). The trial court, however, based its decision on the amount of P20,000.00 as alleged in the information, instead of the appraisal of P59,000.00 made by Mr. Catog. The Court believes that P20,000.00 is a more realistic estimate of the value of the stolen pipes. Petitioners claim that the pipes were worth only P200.00 is not credible considering that it took a truck to haul off the entire load from petitioner's premises, as testified to by Fortunato Mariquit. 15 Q How did you bring the G.I. pipes from the place of Mr. Dumlao to the police station? A We loaded them in a dump truck owned by Federico Jaca. Q Now, what was the quantity of the pipes that you were able to bring from the place of Mr. Dumlao to the police station? A Almost a truckload. Q What did you say, it was a dump truck? A Almost a load of a dump truck. Q After reaching the police station, what happened? A We unloaded it in the police station and we went home. In line with our ruling in the Lim case, 16 petitioner should pay Lourdes Farms, Inc. represented by its owner Mrs. Lourdes DU, the sum of P20.000.00 minus the value of the pipes and farrowing crates recovered and in the custody of the police, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ordered to pay Lourdes Farms, Inc., represented by Mrs. Lourdes Du, the sum of P20,000.00 minus the value of the recovered pipes and farrowing crates, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. THIRD DIVISION MEL DIMAT, Petitioner, G.R. No. 181184 Present: - versus ABAD, PEREZ,* and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA,

Promulgated:

January 25, 2012 x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about the need to prove in the crime of fencing that the accused knew or ought to have known that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery. The Facts and the Case The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law[1] before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02-202338. Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgados wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH -569 forP850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Gallerias parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG. For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle.

On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him to an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal. The court also ordered him to pay P850,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit. On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 29794[2] the RTC decision but modified the penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum, thus, the present appeal. The Issue Presented The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla. The Ruling of the Court The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or th eft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and ( 4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.[3] Here, someone carnapped Mantequillas Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00. Dimats defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42126134 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. But Dimats defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis. Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent.[4] Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts. Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentinos failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt. Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the case. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR 29794. SO ORDERED.