The Dialects of Secularization, by Jrgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger Print Email Published on Wednesday, 11 February 2009 19:07

Written by Sally Paddock Hits: 10497 Habermas and Ratzingerreview logoThe Dialectics of Secularization. Jrgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2005. 85 pages. In January of 2004, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, posed this provoking question to his audience at the Catholic Academy of Bavaria: Is relig ion an archaic and dangerous force that builds up false universalisms, thereby le ading to intolerance and acts of terrorism (64)? The context for the question was a debate between himself, then Prefect of the Roman Congregation for the Doctri ne of the Faith, and Jrgen Habermas, a liberal, secular philosopher, receiver of the Kyoto Prize for lifetime achievement, and self-proclaimed as tone-deaf in the religious sphere (11). The Dialectics of Secularization is a transcript of their dialogue in response to the agreed upon subject: The Pre-Political Moral Foundat ions of a Free State . In other words, must a constitutionally-defined free state justify its ethical n orms with an antecedent, universal claim for truth and, thus, compromise its own claim of a neutral world view? On the other hand, how can any religion which do es make universal claims justify those claims in a manifestly plural world witho ut bending towards intolerance, injustice and, in the extreme case, acts of terr orism? One might think Cardinal Ratzinger, staunch defender of Catholicism, woul d be obliged to answer no to his own proposition of religion as an archaic and dan gerous force; and one might think that Habermas would defend his own commitment to a neutral, universally accessible reason as the antidote to claims of any rev elation antecedent to reason. Instead, however, both men promote the limits of t heir respective positions, succeeding in the difficult but worthwhile balancing act of criticizing the presumptuous over-reach of their own tradition while stil l articulating unwavering conviction. Habermas concedes that free, secular states have arisen, at least in the case of his native Germany, from a common religious background and a common language (32) ; but instead of being overly concerned with the past, Habermas is more concerne d with whether such states as they exist now can justify their commitment to neu tral, non-religious principles of reason without falling into the safe arms of t hat which they tried to free themselves from. Can they renew normative presuppos itions from their own resources? Yes, he says. The democratic process is legitim ate because it depends not on a claim but on the constant, corrective communicat ion between the collective decisions of citizens and legislation which guarantee s those citizens basic liberal and political rights. These two partners in the p rocess the legislating citizens and the law itself satisfy the secular, democrat ic conditions of both inclusivity and reason. Therefore, according to Habermas, regardless of whether citizens are themselves motivated by a particular ethic or perceived revelation the liberal state can satisfy its own need for legitimacy i n a self-sufficient manner (29): its uniting bond is no longer an antecedent norm outside of the democratic process but the democratic process itself a communicat ive praxis...exercised only in common and that has as its ultimate theme the cor rect understanding of the constitution (32). Habermas does not claim democracies are perfect or that they eliminate inequality altogether; he simply says that th ey can maintain legitimacy without having to ground themselves in any singular w orld-view or metaphysical understanding. However, he admits, there is a catch. Democracies demand the solidarity and comm itment of their citizens to the process itself. And as society has increasingly become a global society beyond the boundaries of particular political systems, a nd as the global economy is only minimally constrained by the political system,

citizens are losing hope in the process itself. There is, currently, no law whic h can guarantee human rights in the global sphere. Therefore, the secular state is beginning to break apart as people increasingly feel compelled to act in thei r own self-interest. And the external threat of states and citizens not committe d to democracy only increases this de-stabilization, he says. Habermas does not give in at this point, though. He does not say that the secular forces of commun icative reason do not work in a global, plural society. He simply says that the forces should be treated undramatically, as an open, empirical question (38). And, he also says, reason has its limits and must become aware of them. First of all, according to Habermas, reason can not claim to know what may be tru e or false in the contents of religious traditions (42). More than acknowledge th e existence of religions and respect the possibility of various claims, however, Habermas admits that there is something to learn from religious traditions, som ething which reason does not provide, something with substance. Religions, he sa ys, have kept alive and continue to reformulate contextual interpretations of re demption, of salvitic exodus from a life that is experienced as empty of salvatio n (43); this, he says, is impossible for experts of secular reason alone. What se cular society must learn to do with these contextual interpretations is make the substance of biblical concepts accessible to a general public that also includes those who have other faiths and those who have none (45). When secular systems c an learn to do this to internalize contributions of religious traditions and to not ignore the individual voices which claim religious convictions, then they ca n begin the process of having those individuals trust in the democratic process, even if in doing so they have to give up the idea of a post-metaphysical societ y in favor of a post-secular one. For the uniting bond of the secular democratic process depends on the faith and commitment of the people to that process. Ratzinger, for his part, did not champion his own religion or any metaphysical b asis as the legitimating force behind western democracies. Neither, however, did he agree that the secular forces of communicative reason should be treated as a n open, empirical question: he agrees with Habermas that secular reason and reli gious convictions should learn from each other but he also demands, in a way, so mething more than that, something more active, something as revolutionary to sec ular democracies as secular democracies were to the European churches. Ratzinger opens his discussion with a brief analysis on the dynamics of power an d law. The law, he says, cannot be the arm of the strong; for law is the only th ing built strong enough to oppose those with power. It offers strength to those that are weak, it is the antithesis of violence because the true function of the law is equality for all. Law needs a just, legitimating force, according to Rat zinger, because revolt against the law will always arise when law itself appears to be no longer an expression of a justice that is at the service of all but...t he product of arbitrariness and legislative arrogance (58). Democratic systems of law, he says, are now under suspicion, not because they have never had legitima ting force but because those veteran forces are no longer suited to what he sees are new vulnerabilities in society. The pace of global interconnectedness is qu ickening; world views are colliding at an alarming rate and with those collision s comes a fear of losing what is most precious to each world view. But where Hab ermas suggested that people of religious world views can come to trust in the pr otection of secular systems, Ratzinger suggests that those systems of reason may now be defunct. This brings Ratzinger to his question of whether religion is to be blamed for th e acts of terrorism and intolerance that occur when conflicting world views coll ide. He does not answer this question directly, he leaves it open and, in a way, admits that it is often true. But he also takes this question and directs it at reason: might reason also be a dangerous, archaic force, responsible for intole rance and acts of terror? Reason has taken humanity not just as far as the atomi c bomb, but even further, to the point where man is now capable of making human b

eings, of producing them in test tubes...man [has become] a product...he is no l onger a gift (65). One could debate whether selective breeding of human beings is a new phenomenon or not, but it is hard to argue with Ratzinger's point that th e pace of the effort is out of control, that the sense of life being a gift is d isappearing. He is right, then, when he asks: Does this then mean that it is reas on that ought to be placed under guardianship? But by what or by whom? (66) His suggestion is not that religion can once again rear its head as the public s avior of a process gone astray. Yet neither does he believe that the answers are found in a debate between secular reason and religion, specifically his religio n or even western religions; Ratzinger goes further than Habermas and suggests t hat the classic debate between a neutral secular reason and a Christian-dominated world view in the west is not even a universal debate. Western rationality and u niversal claims of Christian revelation must both be called into question. Both are global in their reach but are de facto not universal....[Western culture] as a whole comes up against its limitations when it attempts to demonstrate itself ( 75-76). What does Ratzinger suggest, then? He admits that there are pathologies in religion, but demands a similar admission from secular reason. He agrees with Habermas that secular reason and the Christian religion (specifically) need to learn from each other. He also believes that they need to be willing to learn fr om ideas and commitments foreign to them both. This learning process has to be m ore than something abstract though; it has to involve something that does not ye t exist. Ratzinger does not propose much in the way of what that something could be but he offers hints as to what he thinks it needs to subject itself to. Soci ety, he says, has focused its recent attempts of justice and equality on the bro adening protection of human rights. To learn from each other, maintain individua l convictions and create an effective, legitimating force, suggests Ratzinger, h uman rights need to be coupled with some sort of human obligations. Both Ratzinger and Habermas have radically different world views any agreement o n their part does not betray that fact or try to cover it up for the sake of a q uiet tolerance of the other. In their dialogue, however, they each find a way to engage in relationship with the other's world view without neutralizing, soften ing or making their own view seem illegitimate. This offers hope to readers who are engaged in either a similar debate with peers or even in an internal debate within their own traditions. But readers should not be deceived: the book is not an easy read and neither was the process that enabled Ratzinger or Habermas to articulate their convictions an easy one. A lifetime of thoughtful work, discipl ined study and unique life-experience characterizes both men. The book is a less on of patient energy that is useful as a tool for any potentially explosive dial ogue. What is interesting, though, is that both Ratzinger and Habermas expressed a willing hope for something that neither of them yet experience as manifest. H abermas is asking people to commit to the ideal of a political process that can only become ideal when people commit to it there has to be an element of trust i nvolved, trust in something that does not yet even exist. And Ratzinger is sugge sting that what has brought history this far has not been something stagnant and , in fact, cannot be stagnant for the world to continue to hang together. Inhere nt in the specific positions they propose is their mutual commitment to somethin g new, and their simultaneous commitment to continually redeem what is old. Sally Paddock Boston University