The 1979 Effect

An Epic Tale of Drugs, Terror, and Profiteering

by Rockne Schaller As a result of the evolving legacy of war and conflict in Afghanistan since 1979, a variety of combinant entities have since come into being that warrant closer investigation1. One trend involves the existence of narco terror nexus networks that I affectionately call "Spider Virus Networks". Philosophically radical militants within Islamic terror groups have been benefitting from these networks. They hold the belief that a wider Islamic caliphate should spread worldwide but in the near term, should extend into the boundaries of Russia's southern border areas in the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia2. As a penultimate presence, there are variety of narco terror alliance structures that operate in Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey3. These narco terror structures are a culmination of benefits and limitations between two seemingly at odds entities. Dawood Ibrahim, pictured above, currently represents one of those alliant structures. He makes enormous profits off the poppy trade by utilizing terror groups to secure, transport, or distribute heroin4. Unfortunately, little has been researched about other less known narco terror alliance structures present in both Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus. Future cooperation with the US and Russia would likely produce better data sets on such structures and fill current intelligence gaps. HYPOCRISY OR STRATEGY? In the region of Southwest and Central Asia and the larger Middle East, a variety of terrorist groups specifically Islamic based networks are willing to actively involve themselves with criminal enterprises more specifically the heroin drug trade5. In a religious respect, this would seem to be at odds with traditional Islamic precepts. Yet the leadership within numerous groups, are willing to apply realistic needs of the terror group for larger operating purposes over spiritual tenets in their daily living practices6. Some contributive factors influencing these groups throughout the region are economic. As the wider global economy has experienced a recession, groups have found past sources of charity or trans-global donation to dry up. In addition to this source of revenue shrinking, countries such as Iran has been isolated and punished through the international use of economic sanctions over its nuclear enrichment program7. Other groups, linked to Pakistan, rely on drug trade links that were developed during the Soviet Afghan War. Pakistan has historically relied on US foreign aid to maintain their military and maintain economic investment8.

The stereotypes of these terrorist groups from Islamabad to Istanbul are shrouded in the misperception that these groups constantly plan and hide in rooms with clothes that hid their faces and they only make videos every day. In fact, the leadership of these groups require members to work for or provide supplementary services for drug lords operating out of Afghanistan or for one of the multiple network regional legs of smugglers that transport heroin West to Europe, North to Russia or eastward into Pakistan and India9. Indeed, a number of groups are assigned or contracted to work covertly for both Pakistani or Iranian Intelligence personnel in order to develop vital business relationships in the region and to maintain vital revenue streams, acquire needed arms, weapons, and explosives10. Terror groups also make money through enforcing safe passage details teams to protect heroin loads. Indeed, Islamic leaders like Khan Mohammed11, and Abu Bakar Bashir12 have influenced groups like Hezbollah13, the Taliban14, Jemaah Islamiyah15, and Fatah al Islam16 to participate in such illicit activities. MODUS OPERANDUS INTELLIGENTIA !!! In switching gears, it cannot be overstated that over a 34 year period regional intelligence services have injected themselves into these narco terror alliances with varying degrees of success and disaster. In fact, the former Soviet Union, Iran, the US, and Pakistan have had political motives in not interdicting batting a thousand percent against Afghan drug lords for a variety of reasons. In order for these countries to benefit, both utilize their respective intelligence services to maintain an underground source of revenue. Indeed, Afghanistan is the perfectly dysfunctional profit machine that regional intelligence interests wish to keep dysfunctional for a variety of reasons17. Yet complications and conflict have arisen when other interested parties such as the Former Soviet Union18 and the United States19 have been tempted to brutally control or positively develop Afghanistan into a stable state. In short, recent regional intelligence interests have funded disparate insurgents and terrorists groups to create a pain threshold policy and ultimately aspiring to eject both the former Soviet Union and the US from the country in order for them to regain unfettered access to the poppy trade20. In short, we are in the way of them making money!!! FORMER SOVIET UNION In 1979, the Soviet Union was facing a critical point in maintaining revenue into the country's coffers21. Brezhnev was facing a long time collapse of a traditional arms client in Egypt since the days of Abdul Nasser coming to power. His predecessor, Anwar Sadat was never enamored with Soviet military technology given their failure to produce victories against Israel in 196722 and 197323. A loss of a couple billion dollars of arms contracts would be devastating for the Soviets.

Furthermore, momentum toward a US brokered peace agreement with Israel's Monacim Begin virtually would assured the potential for Egypt to potentially begin buying US military hardware24. Moscow would later seek to ensure this revenue flow by training and funding a group of intellectuals and military personnel to assassinate Anwar Sadat25. The Soviets cloaked their involvement by assembling the assassins who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood26. Ironically, one those captured from the Sadat assassination was very young Ayhmin Zawahiri, the lone surviving leader of today's original Al Qaeda group27. Despite the death of Sadat, Egypt came under the control of Hosni Mubarak28. Moscow gambled that Mubarak would retreat on the potentially staying with Soviet arms, they failed. Mubarak became a stout ally of the US over the next 25 years along with modernizing their military with US hardware29. It cannot be overstated that the Soviets could not fund their operations the same way the US could given their differently structured economies. Despite this setback for the Soviets, 1979 presented another opportunity for the Soviets to maintain a revenue source that would empower the KGB to maintain worldwide intelligence operations against the U.S. A political crisis had arisen in Afghanistan that Moscow felt required military intervention30. This military invasion, as it was widely viewed by the international community, drew the ire of the US. It is seemingly obvious that the Soviets felt an active involvement in the Afghan Poppy Trade would more than provide enough revenue for their efforts against the US and fund their intervention within Afghanistan31. Moscow, if this had been their hidden course of action, would find such a decision as disastrous after a 10 year stalemated effort against the US backed Afghan mujahedeen32. Indeed, the victory over the Soviets was the later catalyst for Islamic radicals throughout the Middle East and Central Asia to recruit and train what would later become the pan global terror group of Al Qaida33. IRAN Since 1979, Tehran has been steadily increasing its role in covertly facilitating the heroin drug trade. This seeming hypocrisy is not without reason. Tehran's stance toward the US and the West has not enamored itself to the rest of the world34. Indeed, Iran been involved with state sponsored terrorism that has been directed at both Israel and the US35. Consequently, Iran has been heavily sanctioned over the years and has been forced to continue to find covert means to maintain a hidden source of revenue. Tehran's hidden logic would concern finding ways to procure and purchase equipment and other parts for their controversial nuclear program36.

In addition, their proxy terrorist group Hezbollah has received annual budgets from Tehran and revenue provided by the Afghan heroin trade has been a steady answer to Tehran's revenue shortfalls37. If anything, Tehran would rather divert the heroin drug trade routes north and south but intercept the drug shipments either in the Indian Ocean, Caspian Sea, or along the Turkmenistan Iran border areas38. As further reinforcement of this ongoing activity, Terror and Financial Intelligence Chief David Cohen of the US Treasury indicates that General Gholamreza Baghbani is an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Qods Force(IRGC-QF) officer and the current chief of the IRGC-QF office in Zahedan39. who qualifies under the Kingpin Act. He operates in southeastern Iran, near the Afghan border. General Baghbani allowed Afghan narcotics traffickers to smuggle opiates through Iran in return for assistance. For example, Afghan narcotics traffickers moved weapons to the Taliban on behalf of Baghbani. In return, General Baghbani has helped facilitate the smuggling of heroin precursor chemicals through the Iranian border. He also helped facilitate shipments of opium into Iran40. He is certain not be alone among other IRGC Qods force that is operating a similar trade off in areas along and through the Caspian Sea41, Northeastern Iran or along its southern Shores interdicting heroin shipments out of Pakistan in the Indian Ocean. PAKISTAN Pakistan currently has around 44 terror groups within its borders42. Some of those groups are in a concerted guerilla effort to eject the Indian population in the disputed territories of the Jammu and Kashmir regions43. This requires substantial funding along with maintaining secure drug trade routes in and out of Afghanistan44, as well as deploying a sizeable asymmetric terror army along the Indian Pakistani border45. Pakistan does not have many exportable items to trade with, and whilst they are historical enemies with India, they had in the past, feared a spillover effect from the Soviets during the Afghan War46. Thus began a long established foreign aid relationship between Pakistan and the US for both economic goods and US military equipment47. In the midst of arming and staging Afghan mujahedeen from Pakistan, the Pakistani ISI was administrating "Operation Cyclone" in the form of US covert arms and aid from Islamabad48. This covert interaction helped develop and foster many ties that were later nurtured in the form of established drug ties to Afghan drug lords and a future revenue source that self served the Pakistani Intelligence Service or ISI49. This relationship served to secure their western flank and train terror groups to promote their interests against India in Jammu and Kashmir50. UNITED STATES he United States since 1979, has had a track record in Afghanistan as a protector, avenger, and developer of the Afghan state. As a point of precision, since 2001 the United States rightly involved itself in Afghanistan to overthrow and battle terrorist entities that had been operating within and near the Afghan Pakistan border region51. The one unlikely ally, aside from Coalition partners and a vast military force, the US was equipped was the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act of 1999 which it has since applied to new groups or individuals in the

War on Terror52. This has been evidenced in its application toward those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and more recently Iran53. Most likely, Iran's recent ten year effort in building a counter narcotic smuggling wall had more to do with stopping and co opting US compromised Afghan drug lord assets. The US had compiled a listed of around 50 Afghan drug lords54 for targeting recently and applied the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act for each case encountered in Afghanistan. Indeed, drug lords such as Hajji Jumma Khan had been part of a collection effort against terrorists in the area55. At one point, Khan was being flown stateside to interview with CIA and DEA in New York and being treated out to lavish shopping sprees and dinners. Unfortunately, as administrations change or source of intelligence dries up, the US then applies the sanction of the Kingpin Act to these individuals. Indeed, the criticism has been the US was not truly applying a true interdiction effort against the drug lords themselves. The US was willing to deal with drug lords who traveled and smuggled drugs into Iran56 to collect against a regional interest . Such an objective would be logical for both the US and Iran to measure and counter measure in the field. CONCLUSION In essence, the exponential nature of today's narcotics and terrorist groups can be traced to the year 1979. It was a seemingly lost year in terms of relevance, yet I would beg to differ. The Iranian Revolution, Soviet Efforts to stop the loss of revenue in Egypt and Afghanistan, created circumstances that grew over 34 years into larger spider network of illicit profiteering that has created new terror groups, supported others, and has sustained a large end user market for heroin addicts in Europe and Russia. The dirty truth about its expansion is that everyone is involved: international intelligence services, criminal groups, and terrorists alike are only interested in getting an edge and not creating a solution to problems in the larger global arena. There is no perfect answer to stopping terror or its funding because of international self interests. As for the role of intelligence in this phenomenon, an agency both friendly and hostile do not deal with saints but with sinners and shadowy unsavory types who are willing to report what each side needs. In this mass confusion we call the War on Terror is a simple lack of direction and precision. SOURCE LIST 1. Rollins, John, "International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Threats, Policy, and Considerations" Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2010. 2. Department of Monitoring, Kavkaz Center," Zionists sound the alarm: a war for Islamic Caliphate is going on in the Northern Caucasus", October 9 2009, http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2009/10/09/11055.shtml 3. Rollins, John, "International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Threats, Policy, and Considerations" Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2010.

4. S Balakrishnan, "Dawood Ibrahim in Jeddah, will return to Pakistan soon", ZeeNews: IndiaTimes, August 10, 2013 5. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Drug trafficking and the financing of terrorism," November 21, 2012, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/drug-trafficking-and-the-financing-ofterrorism.html 6. Yahya Birt, "Being a Real Man Drugs, Criminality and The Problem of Masculinity," http://www.sunnipath.com/Library/Articles/AR00000206.aspx in June, Islam: 2001

7. Arms Control Association (ACA), "The Impact of Sanctions on Iran's Nuclear Program," ACA Briefing Series, 'Solving the nuclear puzzle', March 9, 2011 8. Center for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-pakistan-numbers "Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers,"

9. David M. Luna, " Narco-Trafficking: What Is the Nexus With the War on Terror?," Department of State. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/110828.htm , October 8 2008. 10. Alireza Nader and Joya Laha, "Iran's Balancing Act in Afghanistan," http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP322.pdf , December 21, 2010 11. Rollins, John, "International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Threats, Policy, and Considerations" Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2010. 12. Rollins, John, "International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Threats, Policy, and Considerations" Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2010. 13. Rollins, John, "International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Threats, Policy, and Considerations" Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2010. 14. Rollins, John, "International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Threats, Policy, and Considerations" Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2010. 15. Rollins, John, "International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Threats, Policy, and Considerations" Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2010. 16. Rollins, John, "International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Threats, Policy, and Considerations" Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2010. 17. Amy Waldman. "Afghan Route To Prosperity: Grow Poppies," http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/afghanistan/drug_trafficking /index.html , April 10, 2004. 18. Russian Invasion http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/russia_invasion_afghanistan.htm of Afghanistan

19. Sean Carberry. "U.S. Hands Over Nation-Building Projects To Afghans," http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/05/16/177323526/U-S-Hands-Over-Nation-Building-ProjectsTo-Afghans , May 16, 2013.

20. Omar Samad. "Irans Influence in Afghanistan After U.S. Pullout," http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/jan/17/iran%E2%80%99s-influence-afghanistan-after-us-pullout January 17 2013. 21. David G Fivecoat."Leaving the Graveyard: The Soviet Union's Withdrawal from Afghanistan" http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/Research/Docs/Fivecoat_GalleyProof.pdf 22. The Jewish Virtual Library. "The Six Day War: Background and Overview" http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/67_War.html 23. "The Yom Kippur War http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/yom_kippur_war_of_1973.htm of 1973,"

24. Ernesto Londono, " In debate over military aid to Egypt, contractual issues loom large for U.S." The Washington Post, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0725/world/40863675_1_military-aid-egypt-military-coup July 25 2013 25. Christopher M Andrew Vasili Mitrokhin. "The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and The Battle for the Third World." Page 156, 165 26. Christopher M Andrew Vasili Mitrokhin. "The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and The Battle for the Third World." Page 156, 165 27. JR Nyquist. " Ayman al-Zawahiris Russian Adventure," Financial Sense, http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nyquist/ayman-al-zawahiris-russian-adventure July 16 2002. 28. ABC News, "Mubarak Elected President of Egypt, http://abcnews.go.com/Archives/video/oct-14-1981-mubarak-elected-president-egypt-11543320 posted Sept 2 2010 "

29. Ernesto Londono, " In debate over military aid to Egypt, contractual issues loom large for U.S." The Washington Post, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0725/world/40863675_1_military-aid-egypt-military-coup July 25 2013 30. Russian Invasion http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/russia_invasion_afghanistan.htm of Afghanistan

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35. Omar Samad. "Irans Influence in Afghanistan After U.S. Pullout," http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/jan/17/iran%E2%80%99s-influence-afghanistan-after-us-pullout January 17 2013. 36. Arms Control Association (ACA), "The Impact of Sanctions on Iran's Nuclear Program," ACA Briefing Series, 'Solving the nuclear puzzle', March 9, 2011 37. Democratic Underground, "Iran 'needs nuclear power," http://www.inthenews.co.uk/news/news/energy/iran-needs-... , December 27 2006. 38. "Iran Forerunner in counter Narcotics Efforts," http://217.25.54.55/en/News/80713789/Art_&_Culture/Iran_forerunner_in_counternarcotics_efforts 39. US Treasury Department, "Treasury Designates Iranian Qods Force General Overseeing Afghan Heroin Trafficking Through Iran," http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1444.aspx , March 7 2012 40. US Treasury Department, "Treasury Designates Iranian Qods Force General Overseeing Afghan Heroin Trafficking Through Iran," http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1444.aspx , March 7 2012 41. US Treasury Department, "Treasury Designates Iranian Qods Force General Overseeing Afghan Heroin Trafficking Through Iran," http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1444.aspx , March 7 2012 42. South Asia Terrorism Portal, "List of Pakistani Terror Groups," http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/Pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm, August 14, 2013. 43. Kashmiri Pandit Network, "With love from Pakistan...A Bird's Eye View of the Pakistani Terrorist Machinery Details On The Extensive Pakistani Terrorist Network Directed At Kashmir," http://ikashmir.net/pakistan/machine.html , August 14 2013. 44. Louise I. Shelley and Nazia Hussain, "Narco-trafficking in Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Areas and Implications for Security," The National Bureau of Asian Research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=410 , December 2009 45. The Strategy Page, "The Secret War That Does Not Exist," http://www.strategypage.com/%5Cqnd%5Cindia%5Carticles%5C20130810.aspx August 14, 2013 46. Steven Weisman, "Russians said to step air and artillery strikes within Pakistan," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/05/15/world/russians-said-to-step-up-air-and-artillery-attacksinside-pakistan.html , May 14, 1985. 47."Operation Cyclone," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone 48. "Operation Cyclone," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone 49. The Strategy Page, "The Secret War That Does Not Exist," http://www.strategypage.com/%5Cqnd%5Cindia%5Carticles%5C20130810.aspx August 14, 2013

50. The Strategy Page, "The Secret War That Does Not Exist," http://www.strategypage.com/%5Cqnd%5Cindia%5Carticles%5C20130810.aspx August 14, 2013 51. The Guardian, "Pakistan says suspected US drone strike kills five people on Afghan border," http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/28/pakistan-drone-strike-kils-five 52. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Overview-of-the-ForeignNarcotics-Kingpin-Designation-Act 53. US Treasury Department, "Treasury Designates Iranian Qods Force General Overseeing Afghan Heroin Trafficking Through Iran," http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1444.aspx , March 7 2012 54. Joseph Fitsanikis, "Largest Afghan narcotrafficker http://intelnews.org/tag/haji-juma-khan/ December 15 2010. was CIA, DEA informant,"

55. Joseph Fitsanikis, "Largest Afghan narcotrafficker was CIA, DEA informant," http://intelnews.org/tag/haji-juma-khan/ December 15 2010.http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tg1444.aspx 56. Michael Kreiger, "How the CIA Enriches Warlords, Drug Dealers and the Taliban in Afghanistan," http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2013/04/29/how-the-cia-enriches-warlords-drug-dealers-andthe-taliban-in-afghanistan/ April 29, 2013