The Cold War and U.S.

Diplomacy

The Cold War and U.S. Diplomacy Tracy N. Robbins Strayer University

The Cold War and U.S. Diplomacy Abstract

President Dwight D. Eisenhowers Eisenhower Doctrine sought to halt the spread of communism and required states and countries to either denounce allegiance with communism or be considered an enemy of the United States.

The Cold War and U.S. Diplomacy The Cold War and U.S. Diplomacy

President Dwight D. Eisenhowers diplomatic efforts included the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was brought about by a crisis in the Middle East, wherein the Soviet Union was attempting to spread communism. Specifically, the catalyst for the Eisenhower Doctrine was the Suez war in 1956, when Britain, France, and Israel failed to deter the national ization of Egypts Suez Canal (Jankowski 2005). Because of this, Britain was no longer seen as a Western force and Eisenhower, along with his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, believed that the Soviet Union would take advantage of the situation and attempt to turn the Middle East into a communist region. The Eisenhower Doctrine was created to thwart any further action by the Soviet Union to turn the Middle East into a communist region and to contain the radical Arab nationalism of Egyptian President Gama Abdel Nasser, discrediting his policy of positive neutrality (Yaqub 2003). Eisenhower and Dulles believed that Nasser hated the West and would be an easy and willing ally for the Soviet Union to expand communism. Eisenhower sought to strengthen the United States ties with Arab nations by providing military and economic aid as well as protection and lure them away from Nasser, the Syrian government and other Nasser allies in the region. For the United States, the issue was the spread communism. Eisenhower essentially gave the Arab states an ultimatum to side with the U.S. or side with communism when he declared that they should, stand up and be counted. It was Eisenhower and Dulles belief that because the U.S. had assisted Egypt in the Suez Canal situation, Arab states would see the U.S. as a country willing to help weaker states and see the Soviet Union for what it was a communist country attempting to take over and nationalize Egypt. What actually took place was the Arab states essentially opposed U.S. nationalism more than they opposed international communism. In the end, the Eisenhower Doctrine sought to

prevent a Soviet takeover of the Middle East but its strategy failed (Yaqub 2003). Eisenhower and Dulles did not realize the lack of Americas political strength in the Arab states and failed to realize the support of Nasser. Nassers influence was so strong that many Arab states thought it better to align with Nasser than be allies of the U.S. because Nasser would essentially label them enemies. Another reason for the failure of U.S. influence in Egypt was due to the fact that the Arab states were fickle. In other words, even if they did truly support the U.S., they were so fearful of others opinions and suspicious of one anothers intentions that they would not commit to the U.S. In essence, the Arab states were true to their stereotype of refusing to unite for any constructive purpose and failed to consider the moral cowardice of the Arabs (Yaqub 2003). The Eisenhower Doctrine failed to consider that the Arabs did not understand Western ideals. Cultural and religious ideals were more important to the Arab states than the Western ideals of freedom and democracy. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles set out to prevent Soviet expansionism and the expansion of communism. The Eisenhower Doctrine was their tool to do just that. Essentially, the Eisenhower Doctrine required states and countries to choose sides between communism or U.S. democratic diplomacy. The call to stand up and be counted required states and countries to either denounce their allegiance to any communist regime and communist ideals or they would be considered an enemy of the United States. Also, a country being threatened by communist takeover could ask the U.S. for assistance from its military to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism (Milestones n.d.).

The only real test of the Eisenhower Doctrine came when President Eisenhower sent troops to Lebanon in response to a request from Lebanons President Chamoun. Chamoun requested military assistance to stave off attacks from groups who had ties to Syria and Egypt and were known to have communist interests. Essentially, this was a show of the U.S. proving it would protect its interests in the Middle East. This show was more directly toward the Soviet Union ensuring the Soviets would understand that the U.S. meant business (Milestones, n.d.). However, President Eisenhower never actually named this response to be a enactment of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Eisenhower Doctrine was set in place by President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State Dulles in order to prevent further spread of communism. Although the Doctrine itself was never truly used, it did require states and countries to stand up and be counted as either a supporter of the U.S. or a supporter of Nasser and all things communist. If a state or country did not stand up, then it was assumed to be pro-communist by the U.S. Eisenhower and Dulles, however, failed to see that Arab states preferred allegiance to culture and religion as opposed to that of international communism. Therefore, the Doctrine was essentially ignored.

The Cold War and U.S. Diplomacy References

Jankowski, J.P. (2005). The Eisenhower Doctrine in its American and Middle Eastern Contexts. Diplomatic History, 29: 885888. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00524.x Milestones. n.d. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Retrieved from http:// history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/EisenhowerDoctrine Roskin, M.G. & Berry, N.O. (2010). IR: The New World of International Relations. 8th Edition. Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ. Yaqub, S. (2003). Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East. University of North Carolina Press. Retrieved from http://uncpress.unc.edu/browse/page/122.