Case Digest Legislative

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
SECTION 1. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.
GARCIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (237 SCRA 279) FACTS: In Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) in accord with RA no. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992. May 24, 1993: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. In the said petition, they set some conditions which they want to be complied with before they include their municipality with SSEZ. Municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission, which prompted the petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991 whereby they started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution. Hon. Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice- Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan Morong, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative as it will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility. July 6, 1993: COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance July 13, 1993: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Benjaminn Casiano, to hold on the authentication of signatures being gathered by the petitioners
ISSUE:
Is Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong Bataan the proper subject of an initiative? (i.e. Whether or not the power of initiative can be exercised even what is questioned is only a resolution and not an ordinance?) HELD: Petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. RATIO: In a Republican system, there are 2 kinds of legislative power: 1. ORIGINAL- possessed by the sovereign people 2. DERIVATIVE- delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people. One of the lessons the people learned is the folly of completely surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature. Thus, in the new Constitution, a system of peoples initiative was thus installed which endows the people with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body. COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. Thus, on Aug 4, 1989, it approved RA no. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODUCO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA
Which spelled out the requirements for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum; procedure of the local initiative and referendum; and their limitations. It was also intended for the acts to be included as appropriate subjects of local initiatives. LOCAL INITIATIVES- legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose...it may denote something done...as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards and determinations." The law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. Jan 16, 1991: COMELEC also promulgated RA 2300 where it was stated in Sec 5, Art 1 that the power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. Sec 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact. Resolution vs. Ordinance RESOLUTION- used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which to have only a temporary effect ORDINANCE- intended primarily to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general. Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the SSEZ, it is logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO (39 PHIL. 660)
FACTS: The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It was alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. The petitioners were said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro and one Dabalos is said to be under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison of Calapan for having run away from the reservation. In a resolution adopted by the provincial board of Mindoro it was stated that several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro which were all a failure, and that unless other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of the province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating those people, and that it is deemed necessary to oblige them to live in one place, designated in Tigbao, in the interest of law and order .. It was also provided that any mangyan who shall refuse to comply with the order shall be imprisoned upon conviction. The said resolution has been duly approved by the Secretary of Interior and subsequently, the provincial governor approved of the same pursuant to Administrative Order of 1917, enacted by the legislature, ordering the non-Christians to take up their habitation on the site provided and their failure to abide shall be a ground for imprisonment. Petitioner Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable in accordance with Sec. 2759 of Act 2711. The provincial governor and the provincial board directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao. Petitioner however, challenges the validity of the said Administrative Code. It shall be noted that that the substance of the law in question is not new to Philippine law. Antecedent laws make use of the term nonChristians with reference to uncivilized elements of the islands. The court made a long enumeration of antecedent laws before and after the acquisition of the United
States of the Philippine Islands. These laws denote an anxious regard for the welfare of the non Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and settled and consistent practice with reference to the method to be followed for their advancement. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Whether or not Sec 2145 of Administrative Oreder of 1917 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the Petitioners were not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberlty. More so, Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. RATIO: ***Constitutional Issues*** Delegation of Legislative Power. Petitioner contends that the order of the governor, directing the Maguianes to habitate themselves in Tigabo, is an undue delegation of legislative power. The maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected. Judge Ranney in the case of Ohio stressed that: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law which necessarily involveds a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and pursuance of the law. The first cannot be delegated; the latter no objection can be made. As held in Wayman vs. Southard, Discretion may be committed by the legislature to an executive department or official. In the case at hand, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board, and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law and such discretion is indeed necessary. Furthermore, an exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative to delegate powers to local authority. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which are favorable for improving the people who have misfortunes of being backward in the society. Religious Discrimination The words non-Christian have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in the Philippines statute books as a descriptive adjective applied to tribes, people, or inhabitants dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces throughout the islands. It denotes low grade of civilization of the individuals included in the class to which they apply. Liberty: Due Process of Law; Equal Protection Clause Liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, an for that purpose to enter into contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. Liberty as understood in democracies is liberty regulated by law. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizens would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such as assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The authority conferred upon executive officials by the law in question does not unduly interfere with the liberty of the citizen when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. Due process of law and equal protection clause are not violated by the law in question. There exist a law wich is reasonable; it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and it applies to all
members of the same class. Slavery and Involuntary Servitude Slavery and Involuntary Servitude denote a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another. Confinement in the reservations in accordance with the said Administrative Code of 1917 does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. Police Power The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self preservation. The Philippines has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Order of 1917 is a pure exercise of police power and the court cannot declare that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority in enacting the said law. Legislative Intent The fundamental objective of government policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called nonChristians and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization. In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purposes of bthe Government are to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and moralsto begin the process of civilization. In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the Stae is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the resources of the great Island. PELAEZ VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL (15 SCRA 569) FACTS: September 4 to October 29, 1964: President of the Philippines issued EO Nos. 93- 121, 124 and 126- 129 which created 33 municipalities. November 10, 1964: Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice President of the Philippines, instituted a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against Auditor General, to restrain him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities
ISSUE: EO Nos. 93- 121, 124 and 126- 129 are null and void upon the ground that said Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered. RATIO: January 1, 1960: RA No. 2370 was enacted. This act states that barrios may not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by an Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based, provides: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, separate or merge any province, name any new subdivision created and change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed. Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
The power to fix common boundaries may partake of an administrative nature since it involves the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. But the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Although the Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of the law, it is essential that said law should be: 1. Complete in itself o must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
2. Fix a standard o The limits of which are sufficiently determinate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a
total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Thus, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
EASTER SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. POEA (166 SCRA 533) FACTS: Private respondents husband, Vitaliano Saco, was the chief officer of M/V Eastern Polaris. He was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. His widow sued for damages with the POEA under EO No. 1985 and Memorandum Circular No. 2. Thus, she was hereby awarded the sum of P192, 000. The owner of the vessel, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (ESLI), argued that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband wasnt an overseas worker but a domestic employee and consequently, his widows claim should have been filed with SSS, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the memorandum circular issued by the POEA on which they based their decision in favor of private respondent, a valid delegation of legislative power? HELD: The petition is DISMISSED. RATIO: Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforces, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. There are 2 accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power.
1. COMPLETENESS TEST- the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegates the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 2. SUFFICIENT TEST- there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delagate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. The principle of non- delegation of powers is applicable to all the 3 major powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. Thus the delegation of the legislative has become the rule and its non- delegation the exception. The reason for the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding it attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Reasons for delegation of legislative powers are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. Delegated power to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the stature is called power of subordinate legislation. With such power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations. These regulations have the force and effect of law. Thus, Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA, is an exercise of administrative regulation wherein the POEA is mandated to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to fair and equitable employment practices. It was also contended that ESLI has been denied due process because of POEAs Memorandum sustained and applied it as an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with 2 basic powers, 1. quasi- legislative- enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations 2. quasi- judicial- enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Such arrangement cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights in the ANG TIBAY vs CIR case are observed. Whatever doubts regarding the rights of the parties are resolved in favor of private respondent under the principle that those with less in life should have more in law. ARANETA vs. GATMAITAN (101 SCRA 329)
FACTS: On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that using a trawl in fishing caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area. There arose a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. Dec 18, 1953: Municipal Mayors League passed a resolution condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year. March 27, 1954: Municipal Mayors League sent another resolution praying that the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of trawls therein. As a response, President issued the following: EXECUTIVE ORDER DATE PURPOSE EO no. 22 April 5, 1954 Prohibits the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay
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September 23, 1954 November 2, 1954 Prohibits the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, EXCEPT during the typhoon season (to take effect after Dec. 31, 1954)
EO no. 66 (amended EO no. 22) EO no. 80 (revived EO no. 22)
ISSUE: 1. Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau, acting in their capacities as such Government officials, could lawfully be required to post a bond in an action against them; 2. Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay; 3. Whether Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President. HELD: Declared EO Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, valid for having been issued by authority of the Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code and Fisheries Act. RATIO: [Issue # 1] There are 2 requisites to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue: 1. The existence of the right sought to be protected 2. Acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. The action being one against the petitioners as such Government officials, is essentially one against the Government, and to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against the Government, for as regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic of the Philippines. [Issue # 2]: Agriculture and Natural Resources, an executive department and which by law, is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President. Executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department. Consequently, the promulgation of the questioned executive orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, SC declare that EO Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law. [Issue # 3]: DELEGATION OF THE POWER TO CONFERRING OF AUTHORITY OR DISCRETION AS LEGISLATE THE EXECUTION OF THE LAW CONSISTS The authority or discretion as to its execution has to be Involves a discretion as to what the law shall be exercised under and in pursuance of the law Cant be done No valid objection can be made From the provisions of Act no. 4003 as amended by Commonwealth Act no. 471, Congress 1. Declared it unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the territorial waters of the Philippines 2. It authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by the
regulations such restrictions as may be deemed necessary to be imposed on the use of any fishing net or fishing device for the protection of fish or fry eggs. 3. It authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries ot be administered in the manner to be prescribed by him and declared it unlawful for any person to take. Destroy or kill in any of the said places, or in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs 4. Penalize the execution of such acts declared unlawful and in violation of this Act (no. 4003) or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Act no. 4003 is complete in itself and provides sufficient standard to guide the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in implementation of the said law. When the President issued EO No. 80, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of San Miguel Bay and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. SECTION 5. 1.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NOT MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY MEMBERS, UNLESS OTHERWISE FIXED BY LAW, WHO SHALL BE ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES, AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS, AND ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PROGRESSIVE RATIO, AND THOSE WHO, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, SHALL BE ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY-LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. 2.THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST. FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. 3. EACH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT SHALL COMPRISE, AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE, CONTIGUOUS, COMPACT, AND ADJACENT TERRITORY. EACH CITY WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, OR EACH PROVINCE, SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE REPRESENTATIVE. 4. WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF EVERY CENSUS, THE CONGRESS SHALL MAKE A REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS BASED ON THE STANDARDS PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION. MARIANO vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 211) FACTS: 1. Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional. 2. GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, and assailing the statute as unconstitutional on the following grounds: a. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code. b. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
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Section 52: i. Increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter) violates the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three years following the return of every census ii. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title iii. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution the population of Makati is 450,000 3. GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated. ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional. HELD: Yes. Petitions dismissed. RATIO: a. D: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local government unit cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. D: The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati. b. D: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e. Mayor Binay will run again, etc.) Petitioners merely posed a hypothetical issue. Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. c. D: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. D: The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule so as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.
c.
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D: Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719) FACTS: COMELEC issued the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 ON March 26, 2001 where it approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party- list elections. April 10, 2001: Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the names of some herein respondents be deleted from the Certified List of Political parties/ Sectoral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections. Also asked as an alternative that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvasses, and that latters nominees not be proclaimed April 11, 2001: Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for Cancellation of Regisration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. April 17, 2001: Bayan Muna filed a Petition challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution no. 3785 May 9, 2001: Court ordered a consolidation of the 2 Petitions before it
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party- list elections 2. Whether or not the party- list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations 3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. HELD: This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party- list participants. RATIO: [for issue # 1] Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the partylist elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a party- list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. Under sections 7 and 8 of Article XI(C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party- list system. During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party- list system may be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao. o Comm. Monsod stated that the purpose of the party- list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place 3 rd or 4th in
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congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress and consequently, have a voice in the Assembly. RA 7941 provides us with the definitions of the following: o POLITICAL PARTY- an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. o SECTORAL PARTY- an organized group of citizens belong to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Art. 6 Section 5(2) of the Constitution, which includes labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and those added by RA 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. o SECTORAL ORGANIZATION- a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns o COALITION- an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral perties or organizations for election purpose.
[for issue # 2] The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party- list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party- list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations (2) The party- list representatieves shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives including those under the party- list. For 3 consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, of the seats allocated to party- list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. Said provision on the party- list system is not self- executory and is thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves: The key words in this policy are proportional representations, marginalized and underrepresented and lack of well- defined constituencies PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Sec. 5 of the law. The party- list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Sec. 5. The persons nominated by the party- list candidate organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties LACK OF WELL- DEFINED CONSTITUENCEY refers to the absence of traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the marginalized and underrepresented Role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the party- list, Filipino- style Intent is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law
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to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Thus the policy of the implementation of the law will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, to become members of the House of Representatives. Sec 5 of RA 7941 demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party list system. The Party- list System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions RA no. 7941 does not limit the participation in the party- list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society It contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Sec. 6 of RA no. 7941 may participate in the elections. The assertion of the OSG that the party- list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory principle. Its claim that even the super- rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the paty- list system. The OSGs position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. While the mega- rich and overrepresented are numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. Allowing the non- marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party- list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalize and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party- list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. This Court, therefore cannot allow the party- list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. [for issue # 3] What is needed under the present circumstances is a factual determination of whether respondents therein and all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party- list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law. The court deems it proper therefore to remand the case to the Comelec to determine after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations comply with the requirements of law. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719) FACTS: Motion for proclamation filed by various party-list participants. 4 unique parameters of the Philippine party system: o 1st, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list. o 2nd, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives. chan robles virtual law library o 3rd, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats. o 4th, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes. June 26, 2001; the Court promulgated a decision requiring Comelec to commence hearings following the guidelines stated in the said decision. They are also directed by the court to start the
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ISSUE:
hearing of those who look like they have garnered a certain number of votes to qualify for a seat. Furthermore, they directed to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice. Finally, the May 9, 2001 resolution refraining comelec from declaring any winner shall remain in force until after the comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance. July 27, 2001; Comelec recommended certain parties have passed the 8 point guideline and certain parties disqualified. Aug 14, 2001; court issued a resolution partially lifting the may 9, 2001 TRO to proclaim BAYAN MUNA as the first winner in the party list election. Aug 24, 2001; court again issued a resolution partially lifting the may 9, 2001 TRO to proclaim AKBAYAN and BUTI as winning party list groups. Jan 29, 2002; court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously been disqualified by Comelec in its First Compliance Report. Thus, court lifted the may 9, 2001 TRO to proclaim apec and cibac as winners. To summarize, after the Court had accepted and approved the First Partial Compliance Report and its amendments, the following nominees were validly proclaimed winners: BAYAN MUNA (Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza L. Maza), AKBAYAN (Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL (Benjamin A. Cruz), APEC (Ernesto C. Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva). Comelec amended its Compliance Reports by adding 4 more party-list participants (BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified candidates for the May 14, 2001 elections. Nov 25, 2002; OSG contended that NCIA is not a qualified party under the july 27, 2001 report.
Aside from those already validly proclaimed pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list candidates that should be proclaimed winners? Does the clause "total votes cast for the partylist system" include only those ballots cast for qualified party-list candidates? DECISION: Having obtained at least two percent of the total valid votes cast in the last party-list elections, the following qualified participants are declared elected with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. RATIO: Comelec made a mistake in disqualifying COCOFED and BUHAY. COCOFED and BUHAY are qualified. Comelec report on BUHAY was merely anchored on conjectures or speculations. On COCOFED, the bylaws making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of the COCOFED National Board has already been deleted as early as May, 1988. The primary purposes of COCOFED's Articles of Incorporation authorize the organization to help explore and obtain possible technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources, this statement does not by itself constitute such substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or assisted by the government. The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the present cases, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of votes cast during the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide. The votes for these disqualified groups total 8,595,630. Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the total votes cast as reported in the Compliance Reports) will result in a new total of 6,523,185 valid votes cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. This new figure representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will
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now be the basis for computing the two-percent threshold for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to. To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. The Commission recommended for qualification only 42 party-list candidates in its three Compliance Reports. To this figure should be added the two participants that were approved in our January 29, 2002 Resolution, plus another two (BUHAY and COCOFED). The court found that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least two percent of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast.
SECTION 6. NO PERSON SHALL BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND, ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, IS AT LEAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE, ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND, EXCEPT THE PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVES, A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND A RESIDENT THEREOF FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC [G.R. 119976/ SEPTEMBER 18, 1995/ JUSTICE KAPUNAN] FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the 1 st district of Leyte. Private respondent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative of the 1 st district of Leyte, filed a petition for Petitioners disqualification, alleging that she did not meet the Constitutional requirement for residency. Petitioner the 1yr residency required as her Certificate of Candidacy showed ____ years and seven months. Petitioner then filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry seven months to since childhood. This was not accepted for it was filed out of time. It was then filed to COMELEC, where the 2nd Division, by a vote of 2:1, came up with the resolution: 1. Finding the private respondents Petition for Disqualification meritorious 2. striking off petitioners Corrected/Amended Cert. of Candidacy of March 31, 1995 3. Canceling her original Cert. of Candidacy Even the MR to COMELEC was denied. Petitioners reasons for the change: o It should be noted that she was born and raised in Leyte. o She moved to Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. She met Ferdinand Marcos who was then the representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, she followed her husband throughout his political career. o Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace. o After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to her ancestral home as it was sequestered by the PCGG, forcing her to live in different residences. Eventually she returned to Leyte and settled there.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner met the 1yr residency qualification for election purposes. Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections.
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HELD: 1. Qualification on 1 yr residency No. Depending on the justice, there are multiple reasons or opinions. First, the SC said that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous to domicile. In the case Ong vs. Republic, the Courts concept of domicile is to mean an individuals permanent home. She has never lost her domicile, which she had since birth even when she got married. When she got married, the husband has set their domicile and she lost her domicile of Leyte by operation of law but regained such domicile when her husband died. It was further decided that when her husband died, the return to her original domicile was as if there was no interruption. Furthermore, on basis of another opinion, upon the death of her husband, she had the freedom to choose her domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile 2. bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose The absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue. 2. Qualification on 1 yr residency The contention of the petitioner is that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House Representatives in accordance with Art. VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution Doctrine: a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it. Mandatory vs. Directory provision o Difference lies on grounds of expediency; less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law o Statute is construed to be merely directory when the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. AQUINO VS. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400) FACTS: Agapito A. Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati. (Note: he stated his residency period as 0 years and 10 months) Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files petition to disqualify Aquino for lacking residence qualification. COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualify Move Makati and Mateo files a motion for reconsideration. On the election Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto Syjuco, with 35,910 votes.
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ISSUE:
COMELEC grants motion for reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate and determine the winner from the remaining legible candidates.
WON Aquino is legible to run for the said position WON Declaring the winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional HELD: NO to both issues. RATIO: Sec 6 Art VI of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a resident of the district he is representing for at least one year before the elections. Aquino has always been a resident of Conception, Tarlac prior to the elections. Although he leased a condominium unit within the district he will be representing, mere leasing instead of buying the unit is not evident of a strong intention to establish a domicile. Declaring the person who garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner because the choice of the majority is disqualified is against the sovereign will of the people.
DOMINO VS. COMMISSSION ON ELECTIONS (310 SCRA 546) FACTS: Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of May 6, 1998 of the Second Division of the COMELEC, declaring petitioner Juan Domino disqualified as candidate for representative of Sarangani in May 11, 1998 elections and the Decision of May 29, 1998 of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINOs motion for reconsideration. On March 25, 1998, Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Sarangani, indicating that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one year and two months immediately preceding the election. On March 30, private respondents Narcisio Raglifo Jr, Eddie Java, JuanBayonito Jr, Rosario Samson and Dionisio Lim filed with the COMELEC petition to deny due course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that Domino is not a resident much less a registered voter of Sarangani. They had substantiated evidences which include: the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent wherein he claims he have resided in the constituency where he seeks election for one year and 2 months and that he is a registered voter of Sarangani; Voters Registration Record dated June 22, 1997 indication registration in Balara, QC. Respondents Community Tax Certificate dated Jan 15, 1997. Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the 3 rd district if QC where he stated his residence in the constituency where he seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election as 3 years, 5 months an d that he is a registered voter in Balara QC; a copy of the application for transfer of registration records due to change of residence and copy of the sworn application for cancellation of voters previous registration. For his defense, Domino maintained that he had compled with the one year residence requirement and that he has even residing in Sarangani since Jan1997 he showed a copy of the contract lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and respondent as Lessee executed in January 15, 1997, copy if the application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of Residence, CTC of the notice of
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approval of Application. On May 6, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the one year residence requirement a likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy He negates all his protestations that he established residence in SAranganias early as Jan 1997. He lacks one year residence requirement. On May 11, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution 3046 ordering that the cast votes for Domino be counted but to suspend proclamation of winning since the resolution disqualifying him has not yet become final and executor. On September 15,1998 Lucille Chionbian-Solon, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes was allowed by the Court to intervene. Intervenor asks the court to uphold Dominos disqualification and to proclaim her as the representative of Sarangani. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the judgment of MTC of QC declaring the petitioner as resident of Sarangani, not QC is final 2) Whether or not petitioner resided in Sarangani, one year preceding the elections 3) Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition DECISION: the petition is DISMISSED RATIO: The COMELEC has the jurisdiction to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy that will include the residence of the candidate. A decision in an exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata. The MTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared Domino a resident of Sarangani. The term residence as used in law means the same thing as domicile which imports not only intention to reside but also personal presence in the place. Three rules must be born in mind,1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; 2) when once established, it remains until new one is acquired; 3)a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. Domicile requires not just bodily presence but also a declared probable intent to make it ones fixed abode. The lease contract entered in Jan 1997 does not support a change of domicile. Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in QC is further that he was a qualified candidate strengthened by his act of registering as voter in QC. Domino still falls short of one year residency requirement. The COMELECunder Sec 78 Art 9 of the Omnibus Election Code has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy and continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment or disqualification is rendered before the election and the candidate facing the disqualification received the highest number of votes. It is now settled that the candidate who received the second highest number of votes MAY NOT BE PROCLAIMED WINNER in case the WINNER IS DISQUALIFIED. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief.
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DOMINO V. COMELEC (310 SCRA 546) FACTS: This is a special civil action in the Supreme Court where a petition for certiorari is filed. Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections, and won over the petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz lost his Filipino citizenship when he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the US. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippines Citizenship through repatriation. After losing in the May 1998 elections, petitioner Bengson III filed a case of Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI Sec. 6 of the Constitution, which reads: No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner Bengson III argue that HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, (1) when it ruled that the private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact the fact that he has ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part; (2) when it considered the private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship; (3) when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status. He also asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the US and had to reacquire the same by repatriation, based from Article IV Sec. 2 of the Constitution, which expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. HELD: YES. Petition is dismissed. RATIO: There are 2 ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization, which results to the 2 kinds of citizens the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person, who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have been Filipino citizens through naturalization where an applicant has to prove that he possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship become executory only after 2 years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left
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the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to the a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. Filipinos who lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in WW II; (3) service in the armed forces of the US at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipina woman to an alien, and (5) political and economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. In the case at bar, respondent Cruz, is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as a son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioners contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in decision, the term natural-born citizen was first defined in Article III Sec. 4 of the 1973 Constitution where there are two categories of Filipino citizens who are not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. However, in the present Constitution, those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3, Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Consequently, under the present constitution, there are two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with the law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e. did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through the naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. CODILLA V. DE VENECIA (150605, 393 SCRA 639) FACTS: These are petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Petitioners, Sixto Balinguit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent Jose Ong Jr. vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the May 1987 congressional election. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the said district. Petitioners filed election protests. Petitioners contend his qualification as a member of the House of Representatives on the basis of Article VI Sec. 6 of the present Constitution. The HRET declared that the respondent Jose Ong Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however, denied. Hence, these petitions for certiorari. On the issue of jurisdiction The Constitution explicitly provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the respective members, as stated in Article VI Sec. 17. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear, and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these tribunals. It has
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been argued that under Article VI Sec. 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. On the issue of citizenship The grandfather of private respondent, Ong Te arrived in the Philippines from China in 1895 and was able to obtain a certificate of residence from then Spanish colonial administration. Ong Te brought the private respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan, to Samar from China. The respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan filed with Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization, and the same court declared him to be a Filipino citizen. Respondent Ong was then 9 years old. The house of the respondent in Samar was burnt twice and they rebuilt it twice in the same district twice. Ong, after completing his elementary education in Samar, went to Manila to acquire his secondary and college education. He took and passed the CPA Board Examinations and since employment opportunities were better in Manila, Ong found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his full brother, Emil Ong, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention where his status as a natural-born citizen was challenged. Emil was declared a natural born Filipino. Respondent Ongs situation is argued to rest on Article IV Sec. 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of the majority are citizens of the Philippines. Section 2 of the same article also reads in its last sentence: Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. There is no dispute that the respondents mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Thus, the contention lies on whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. The aforementioned provision was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where, one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution, they were both considered as natural-born citizens with legislative intent to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. The petitioners also argue that the respondents father was not validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of oath of citizenship. On the issue of residency The petitioners argue that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore be a resident of the said place. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in its decision on the grounds that (1) respondent Ong is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and (2) respondent Ong is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. HELD: NO. Petition is dismissed. The questioned decision of the HRET is affirmed. Respondent Ong is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. RATIO: On the issue of jurisdiction In the exercise of Article VIII Sec. 1 of the present Constitution, the Court is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not
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that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to the lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET to decide. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same manifest grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court. On the issue of citizenship In relation to Article IV Sections 1 and 2, to expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized. According to jurisprudence that defines election, the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. There is no doubt in this case about respondent Ongs being Filipino when he turned 21. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This cannot be done. An attack on persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to the respondents father as null and void would run against the principle of due process, as he has already been laid to rest and that he has no opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of his father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent chose to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father of the respondent were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship. The same issue on natural-born citizenship has already been decided in the case of the full blood brother of the respondent Ong, which is another reason why the Court cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. On the issue of residency The petitioners argument on this issue is misplaced. It is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. The legislative intent is to adhere to the earlier definition of the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. It is characterized by animus revertendi and that in the case at bar, the periodical journeys made by the respondent to his home province, while studying and later on practicing his profession in Manila, reveal that he always had the animus revertendi. In considering the residence of a person, It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified.
SECTION 7. THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FOR A TERM OF THREE YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION. NO MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
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REPRESENTATIVES SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
DIMAPATRO VS. MITRA JR. (202 SCRA 779) FACTS: Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimapatro was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur in 1987 and thereafter took his oath of office, performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges of being an elected Representative. On January 15, 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Regional Governor of ARMM. COMELEC informed the Speaker and Secretary of the House of Reps (respondents) of Dimapatros filing. The respondents excluded the name of Dimapatro from the Roll of Members of the House of Reps pursuant to Sec. 67, Article 9 of the Omnibus Election Code. He was then excluded from all the proceedings of the House of Reps; was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; his office suite was occupied by another. Petitioner lost in the ARMM elections. He wrote a letter to respondent Speaker and expressed that he intends to resume performing his duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He failed to regain his seat in Congress. Thus, petitioner filed this petition praying that the decision of the Speaker and Secretary of the House of Reps be reviewed. ISSUES: 1.) Whether Section 67, Article 9, of BP Blg. 881 is operative under the present Constitution? 2.) Whether the respondent Speaker and/or Secretary CAN exclude the petitioner from the rolls of the House of Reps, thereby preventing him from exercising his functions as congressman, and depriving him of his rights and privileges as such? HELD: 1.) Yes. Sec. 67, Art. 9 of BP Blg 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation fall within the term voluntary renunciation of office enunciated in Par. 2, Sec 7, Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Its constitutional basis remains written in the 1987 Constitution that once an elective official files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term as expressed in Sec 7, Article 6 of the Constitution. Thus, even when the provisions concerning the shortening of the terms of congressmen were omitted in the 1987 Constitution, the said issue is still covered by Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution. 2.) Petitoners filing of COC is an act of resignation and he is presumed to be aware of the existing laws. The Speaker and/or Secretary of HR are/is authorized to exclude the petitioner from the Roll of Members since they are the administrative heads who perform ministerial functions including the removal of the petitioners name. The mere act of filing the COC for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held and it is not necessary that the other position be actually held since the said filing is an act of voluntary resignation.
SECTION 10.
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THE SALARIES OF SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW. NO INCREASE IN SAID COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE FULL TERM OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES APPROVING SUCH INCREASE. SECTION 11. A SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL, IN ALL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY NOT MORE THAN SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT, BE PRIVILEGED FROM ARREST WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION. NO MEMBER SHALL BE QUESTIONED NOR BE HELD LIABLE IN ANY OTHER PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OR IN ANY COMMITTEE THEREOF.
ANTONINO VS. VALENCIA (57 SCRA 70) The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the Congress. FACTS: Gaudencio Antonino then a Senator and Liberal Party head of Davao attributed the loss of LP candidate to the support given by defendant Brigido Valencia then Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the independent LP candidate which divided the LP votes. Antonino was quoted in metropolitan newspapers when he said that had not Valencia sabotaged and double-crossed the LP, its official candidate would have won. On 28 Feb 1964, Antonino while attending a Senate session filed a formal request with a Senate Committee to investigate the actions of Valencia as Sec. of Public Works and Communications in connection with acquisitions of public works supplies and equipments. Copy of the formal request was furnished to the Commission on Appointments with the request that they be considered in passing upon Valencia appointment to the Cabinet. Two-page press release was issued by the office of the Sec of Pub Works and Com and the contents were published or reported on the front pages of 6 metropolitan newspapers. The press release depicted Antonino as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as monetary board member and senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the commission of certain serious offenses in violation of the Constitution and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Antonino then filed the present civil action against Valencia. Valencia filed a counterclaim and claims that he did not issue or cause the publication of the press release and that they were made in good faith and in self defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in character. Lower court ruled against Valencia holding that he caused and was liable for the issuance of the libelous press release and its publication in the papers and rejected his defenses of qualified privilege and defensive libel. Valencia appealed to SC. During the course of the appeal, Antonino died in a plane crash. Sen. Magnolia Antonino as adminastrix substituted her husband as plaintiff-appelle. ISSUE:
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Whether or not the press release is libelous? Whether or not the press release is protected as a qualified privilege communication? HELD: Press release is libelous. Statements released were defamatory and libelous in nature where malice in law is presumed because they were against the honor, integrity and reputation o f plaintiff. Defendant Valencia made his imputations against the plaintiff publicly and unofficially as to be qualifiedly privileged. The malice in the act of the defendant was proven when the Court observed that had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty and not because of malice, the charges should have been filed with the Senate or any of its Committees and not publicized widely by all metropolitan newspapers. Defendantappellants claim of defensive libel is likewise rejected because his argument that he had been libeled by the plaintiff and accordingly the former justified to hit back with another libel is based upon a wrong premise. Plaintiff Antoninos act was not libelous because the letter he sent was a privileged communication because the defendant was charged by the plaintiff in his capacity as a Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the same were filed privately and officially to the Senate and Commission on Appointments. Judgment affirmed. JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG (17 SCRA 87) The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the Congress. FACTS: Respondent was a member of the House who wrote an open letter to the President of the Philippines, and caused this to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. The contents of the letter were mainly to inform the president of the so-called three operational plans under serious study of some officers of the AFP and aided by some civilians. It also describes these plans as an insidious plan or a massive political build-up of then Secretary of Defense Vargas. It also details the various means that has already been mopped out to ensure the success of these operational plans. The letter also suggested that the planners already have in their control several officers of the AFP, included are the petitioners. It was mentioned however in the letter that those mentioned above as already in control of the planners may be unwillingly be only tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. An ordinary civil action for damages was instituted by petitioners against respondent for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter. The trial court dismissed this complaint. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the letter was privileged communication? 2.) Whether or not the letter could be considered libelous? HELD: No. It is not privileged communication. Although the Constitution provides for any member of Congress not to be questioned for any speech or debate therein, in the halls of Congress or elsewhere, this publication doesnt fall into this category. The said expression refers to utterances made by legislators in the performance of their functions, while Congress is in session. In the case a quo, the letter was made while Congress was presumably not in session. Furthermore, he caused the letter to be published in newspapers of general circulation, thus ipso facto he wasnt performing his official duty either as a
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member of Congress or any officer of any committee. No. The fact that the letter suggested that the plaintiffs may be unwilling tools of the plan without having knowledge thereof already in a way exculpate the responsibility of the plaintiffs in the said plans if ever they have any part in the same. This is not derogatory to the petitioners to entitle them to damages, especially that the planners of the operational plans were already clearly suggested. PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689) FACTS: The accused was a member of the lower House when he was convicted of rape. He was confined in the National Penitentiary while his appeal was pending. He was re-elected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend legislative sessions and committee hearings; because his confinement was depriving the electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to attend the sessions in Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress? HELD: No. Election to high government offices doesnt free the accused from the common restraints of general law. The constitution provides that a member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if the offense is punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of this provision. Section 11, Article 6 of the Constitution states that a the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if the reason if a legitimate one. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of imprisonment has constitutional foundations. Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a free man. When the voters of his district reelected him, they had full awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only one of the members of the House of Representatives. Congress continues to function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The issue in this case boils down to the question of equal protection. Election to the position isnt reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. Instant motion is denied.
SECTION 14. NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY PERSONALLY APPEAR AS COUNSEL BEFORE ANY COURT OF JUSTICE OR BEFORE THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, OR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. NEITHER SHALL HE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BE INTERESTED FINANCIALLY IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION, OR ITS SUBSIDIARY, DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE. HE SHALL NOT INTERVENE IN ANY MATTER BEFORE ANY OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR HIS PECUNIARY BENEFIT OR WHERE HE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ACT ON ACCOUNT OF HIS OFFICE.
PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 31)
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FACTS: On May 14, 1979, an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation was held. Petitioner Puyat was among those elected. On May 25, 1979, the other group of directors, led by Acero, instituted a proceeding questioning the said electioj on the ground that the votes were not properly counted. Thereafter, Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for Acero to which Puyat objected due to Constitutional Gorunds which provides that: SEC 11. ART VIII No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel . or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly, or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Govenrment, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or conrolled corporation during his term of office. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called on account of his office. Assemblyman Esatnislao Fernandez did not continue his appearance as counsel but instead filed a Motion for Intervaention. SEC granted the motion on account that Fernandez had 10 shares on the corporation. Thereafter, the Court en banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining SEC from allowing the participation as intervenor of Assemblyman Fernandez. Solicitor General supported the allowing of the intervention. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, may intervene in the SEC Case without violating the Constitution. HELD: The Order granting Fernandez to intervene in SEC Case is reversed and set aside. RATIO: Fernandez acquired a mere 10 shares out of 262, 843 shares. He acquired said shares after the institution of the contested election, after the suit has been filed and a day before he filed a motion to intervene. Realizing that the objection of petitioner Puyat as valid, Fernadez decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, the Court found that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before and administrative body and it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. A ruling upholding the intervention would make the Constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need to do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the interest of the client and then intervene in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done in indirection which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. In brief, the Court held that the intervention of Assemblyman in SEC case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11. Art. VIII of the Constitution. SECTION 16. 1. THE SENATE SHALL ELECT ITS PRESIDENT AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ITS SPEAKER, BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY.
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2. A MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE SHALL CONSTITUTE A QUORUM TO DO BUSINESS, BUT A SMALLER NUMBER MAY ADJOURN FROM DAY TO DAY AND MAY COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ABSENT MEMBERS IN SUCH MANNER, AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES, AS SUCH HOUSE MAY PROVIDE. 3. EACH HOUSE MAY DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, PUNISH ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR, AND, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, SUSPEND OR EXPEL A MEMBER. A PENALTY OF SUSPENSION, WHEN IMPOSED, SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY DAYS. 4. EACH HOUSE SHALL KEEP A JOURNAL OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, AND FROM TIME TO TIME PUBLISH THE SAME, EXCEPTING SUCH PARTS AS MAY, IN ITS JUDGMENT, AFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY; AND THE YEAS AND NAYS ON ANY QUESTION SHALL, AT THE REQUEST OF ONEFIFTH OF THE MEMBERS PRESENT, BE ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL. EACH HOUSE SHALL ALSO KEEP A RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS. 5. NEITHER HOUSE DURING THE SESSIONS OF THE CONGRESS SHALL, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER, ADJOURN FOR MORE THAN THREE DAYS, NOR TO ANY OTHER PLACE THAN THAT IN WHICH THE TWO HOUSES SHALL BE SITTING.
AVELINO VS. CUENCO (83. PHIL. 17) FACTS: Petition of quo warranto. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to declare him the rightful senate president and oust the respondent, Mariano Jesus Cuenco. Feb 18, 1949; the request of senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on the floor on Feb 21, 1949 was granted to formulate charges against the then senate president Avelino. On the day that Tanada was supposed to speak on the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did not immediately open the session, and read slowly the resolution of senator Sanidad and Tanada. When the session finally started, Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with but senator Tirona, Avelinos follower, opposed the motion because of the plan of Avelinos group to delay the session to prevent Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a disorderly conduct broke out in the senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelinos follower, moved for adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to prevent Tanadas privilege speech. Sanidad opposed the motion and moved that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel, abandoned the chair, and walked out of the session hall followed by senator Francisco, Torres, Magalona, Clarin, David, and Tirona. Cuenco was designated to chair the session. Tanada was finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Sanidads resolution no. 68 was read and approved. Tanada yielded the chair to senate president pro-tempore Arranz. Then, Sanidad introduced resolution no. 67 entitled Resolution declaring vacant the position of the president of the senate and designating the honourable Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president of the senate. Resolution no. 67 was approved.
ISSUES: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has, were resolutions nos. 68 and 67 validly
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approved? DECISION: Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. RATIO: The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers and the constitutional grant to the senate of the power to elect its own president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change, or reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside is only acceptable if the majority of the senators want to, such remedy lies in the senate session hall and not in the supreme court. Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and presided by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the departure of the minority senators does not prevent the remaining majority senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863) FACTS: In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months. ISSUES: WON his suspension was constitutional HELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed RATIO: Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof. The question of whether Osmenas speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because no preliminary injunction was issued, the special committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the suspension order. UNITED STATES VS. PONS (34 PHIL. 725)
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FACTS: Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were convicted of the crime of illegal importation of opium. It was alleged in the information that the accused, conspiring together, plotting among themselves did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country and import and introduce in the City of Manila 520 tin cans containing 125 kgs of opium. Each were found guilty of the charged. The accused appealed, but Beliso withdrew his appeal and the judgment has been final to him. On appeal, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1941 was on February 28; that the Act 2381, under which Pons must be punished was not passed or approved on the 28th but on March 1 of that year; that the same is null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be convicted under Act 2381. Whether the adjournment of the legislature be proved by legislative journals or by extraneous evidences. DECISION: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. RATIO: Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. Under Rules 15 and 16 of Legislative Procedure of Philippine Commission the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated in the journal. Furthermore, on page 793 of the Commission Journal, it is stated that: The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914 was approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission as a Chamber of the Philippines. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Philippine Legislature adjourned sine die. The Courts of the Philippines are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is, and to enable them to determine whether the legal requisites as to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right, as well as their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals. When the legislative journal show with certainty the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment. In the instant case, the journal says that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question and the court did not err in declining to go behind the journals. ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268) FACTS: Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means,
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proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996: MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion? MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker? THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved. (Gavel) MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion. MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute. (It was 3:01 p.m.) (3:40 p.m., the session was resumed) THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed. MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and/or challenging the validity of RA 8240. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which will therefore be a violation of the Constitution.
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Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the House. HELD: It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved. But what happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to a law in accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown. In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as long as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown. CASCO PHILIPPINES CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS. GIMENEZ (7 SCRA 347) FACTS: There was enacted a Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Act. The Central Bank of the Philippines issued Circular No. 95 fixing the a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner, Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc, engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues bought imported urea and formaldehyde which are main raw materials in the production of its products and has paid the margin fee. Thereafter, petitioner sought to refund the said margin fee pursuant to to Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board which declared that urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said sale. The Central Bank issued the corresponding vouchers for the refund but failed to give the money on the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board is not within the purview of the said RA. The pertinent provisions of the Republic Act provide: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: X X XVII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Petitioner contends that the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. It shall be noted that the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed that urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is a finished product distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde ISSUE:
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Whether or not Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. HELD: Denied the petition. RATIO: The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by the Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was certified by the officers of the Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. The importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from payment of margin fees being distinct and different from urea formaldehyde as provided in the law. SECTION 17. THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL EACH HAVE AN ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL WHICH SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. EACH ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NINE MEMBERS, THREE OF WHOM SHALL BE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE, AND THE REMAINING SIX SHALL BE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO SHALL BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE SENIOR JUSTICE IN THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE ITS CHAIRMAN. SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC (153 SCRA 67) FACTS: Augusto Sanchez prayed that COMELEC after due hearing, be directed by the Court to conduct a recount of votes cast three months ago in the May 11, 1987 senatorial elections to determine the true number of votes to be credited to him and prayed further for the restraining order directing Comelec to withhold the proclamation of the last four winning candidates on the ground that votes intended for him were declared as astray votes because of the sameness of his surname with a disqualified candidate named Gil Sanchez whose name had not been crossed out from the Comelec election returns and other election forms. He further alleged that he filed an urgent Petition to Recount and/or Re-appreciate Ballots with the Comelec. The Court sustained Comelecs position that it be allowed to complete the canvass of the returns of the senatorial elections estimated to be at 240,000 votes which would then be subject to its resolution of Sanchez pending petition. Restraining order was not issued by the court. Santanina Rasul also a senatorial candidate filed her motion for intervention and opposition to Sanchez petition for recount before Comelec. Rasul and Enrile (ranked 23rd and 24th respectively) prayed in their petition with Comelec that they be proclaimed immediately as duly-elected senators. Comelec deferred action on the two petitions. Motions for intervention were granted filed separately by Rasul and Enrile were granted days after. Sanchez petition for recount was dismissed by the COmelec. Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by intervenors Rasul and Enrile. Rasul was proclaimed as 23 rd senator. Enrile therafter filed with the Supreme Court his petition. Comelec announced its decision reversing its decision to dismiss Sanchez petition for recount. Enrile filed his second petition.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be considered a summary proclamation controversy falling within the Comelecs exclusive jurisdiction or properly pertains to the realm of election protest failing within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to thee election, returns, and qualifications of the members. (Art. 6, Sec 17, Constitution) HELD: Court rules that Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of the ballots cast in the senatorial elections does not present a proper issue for a summary pre=proclamation controversy. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. His allegations of Sanchez votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof once satisfied of their authenticity. Sanchez petition for recount is set aside. ROBLES VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (181 SCRA 780) FACTS: Robles and Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1 st District of Caloocan City in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987. Santos filed an election protest with the HRET, alleging frauds and irregularities in the counting of votes and canvassing of election returns. The HRET issued an order commencing the revision of contested ballots on September 1, 1988. On September 8, Robles filed a Motion to Suspend the revision of ballots. Santos followed with a Motion to Withdraw Protest on September 12. Upon the filing of Santoss motion, the revision of ballots was stopped. Beyond that, no action on the two motions was taken by the HRET when Santos filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Protest on September 14. In effect, Santos, who had backed out from the revision of the ballots, was now pushing again for its revision. On September 19, the HRET granted Santos Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Protest and the revision of ballots was resumed. Robles filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, a petition for certiorari with a prayer for injunction of the revision proceedings was brought to the Supreme Court. ARGUMENTS: Petitioner contended that when private respondent Santos filed his Motion to Withdraw protest dated September 12, public respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case. Hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered the revision on September 19 despite the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not HRET lost jurisdiction over the case upon Santoss filing of a Motion to Withdraw Protest (September 12)
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2. Whether or not the resumption of revision of ballots despite the filing of a Motion to Withdraw Protest constituted grave abuse of discretion by HRET HELD: 1. NO. HRET retains jurisdiction over the case. 2. NO. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion. REASONS: The mere filing of the Motion to Withdraw Protest, without any action on the part of the Tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunals shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It has been intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. Judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the HRET is possible only upon a determination that the tribunals decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or upon showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. The Electoral Tribunal has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved vis--vis the popular will. The resumption of the revision of the ballots did not constitute a grave abuse of discretion as it was intended to resolve beyond doubt who the people have rightfully chosen as their representatives. ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651) FACTS: Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court...and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be. On October 9, 1987, Petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The respondent tribunals was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) senators. On November 17, the petitioner filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the above case on the ground that all of them are interested parties, and respondents. This mass disqualification, in effect, would leave only the three Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral Tribunal. The Motion was denied and hence, this petition for certiorari. ARGUMENTS: Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and norms of fair play and due process require the
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mass disqualification. Further, necessity dictates that an amendment of the Tribunals Rules of procedure permitting the contest to be decided by only three Members is a practicable and unconstitutionally unobjectable solution. ISSUE: Whether or not a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three (3) Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the Constitution HELD: NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to the Constitution. REASONS: Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution, it is clear that in creating a Tribunal composed by Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the SET is 2 to 1 an unmistakable indication that the legislative component cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of senators. The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Refrain from participation must be distinguished from complete absence. Indeed, an individual Member of the Tribunal may recuse himself from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. But a Tribunal cannot legally function as such absent its entire membership of Senators or Justices. LAZATIN VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA 391) FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga in the May 11, 1987 elections. During the canvassing of the votes, respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns and brought the case to the COMELEC. On May 19, The COMELEC ordered the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, yet on May 27, petitioner was proclaimed the winner. Respondent filed two petitions: a) to nullify the proclamation and b) prevent petitioner from taking office. However, the COMELEC did not act on the petitions. On June 30, petitioner assumed office. On September 15, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. The Supreme Court set aside the revocation on January 25, 1988.
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On January 28, Respondent received a copy of the Courts decision and consequently filed an election protest with the HRET on February 8. ARGUMENTS: In moving to dismiss private respondents protest on the ground that it was filed late, petitioner cited Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code: A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa...shall be filed...within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election . Using the above rule, Petitioner argued that respondent had only until February 6 to file a protest. Since the protest was filed on February 8, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it. However, the HRET argued that petitioner was able to file the protest on time, citing Sec. 9 of the HRET rules: Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed... within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of proclamation. Using the above rule, the HRET argued that respondent has up February 11 to file a protest. Since it was filed on February 8, the HRET ruled it was within the prescribed period and thus, had jurisdiction over the matter. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest 2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may conduct a Judicial Review of decisions/final resolutions of the HRET HELD: 1. YES. The HRET has jurisdiction over the protest, as it was filed within the period prescribed by Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. 2. NO, except for cases requiring the exercise of the Courts extraordinary jurisdiction. REASONS: Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to the case at bar: Under the 1973 Constitution, Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official. Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the HOR and the Senate in their respective Electoral Tribunals. Exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunals Power: The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. The use of the word sole emphasizes
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the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Following this principle, the HRET, in order to fully exercise its constitutional function may implement its own rules concerning the filing of electoral protests. A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted to the legislative body itself. In the 1935 Constitution, this power was lodged to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose. Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the power of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred when jurisdiction over electoral contests was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of election for all elective national and local officials. The 1987 constitution vested this jurisdiction back to the respective Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives. Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET: So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall as a rule, not be reviewed by the Court. Its corrective power extends only to decisions and resolutions constituting a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Electoral Tribunals. BONDOC VS. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792) FACTS: Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Ermigidio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were rivals in the congressional elections held on May 11, 1987. Pineda was the proclaimed winner, but Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The said tribunal is composed of nine (9) members, 3 of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court, and the remaining six (6) are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties and party list. A decision has been reached by the HRET where Bondoc won over by Pineda; thus the LDP members in the tribunal insisted on a reappreciation of votes and recount of ballots delaying the finalization of the decision at least four months. The reexamination resulted in increase of Bondocs lead over Pineda from 23 to 107 votes. It shall be noted that Congressman Camasura, a member LDP, voted with the Supreme Court Justices to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest; hence, HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation No. 25 declaring Bondoc as the winner. Subsequently, Congressman Cojuanco informed Camasura and Bautista that the LDP expelled them from the party on the ground of betrayal to the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP. Thereafter, Cojuanco informed the House Speaker Mitra of the ouster of the said Congressmen and their decision to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal issued a Resolution canceling the previous decision on the ground that without the vote of Congressman Camasura, who was relieved from the Tribunal, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Sec. 24 of the Rules of Tribunal, and therefore, cannot be validly promulgated. A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Bondoc seeking the following reliefs: 1.) to annul the decision of HRET to withdraw the nomination of Camasura to the HRET.; 2.) issue a writ of prohibition restraining whoever may be designated in place of Camasura from assuming, ossupying, and discharging functions as a member of the HRET,; 3.) writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to return and discharge his functions as a member of the HRET;
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In his answer, Pineda asserts that the Congress being the sole authority that nominates and elects the members of the HRET; hence, it has the power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in representation of the political parties materially changed. ISSUE: Whether of not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant party, change the partys representation in the House Representatives Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the said tribunal in an election contest pending therein. DECISION: SC ruled in favor of Bondoc. RATIO: (Read Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution) The tribunal was created to function as a non partisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Tribunal was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration and to transfer to that tribunal all powers in matter pertaining to contested election of its members. The Tribunal is a body separate from and independent from the legislature. Resolution of House of Representatives violates the independence of HRET. The Resolution of House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to LDP, because he cast a vote in favor of Nacionalista party, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference would reduce the HRET as a mere tool for the advance ment of a party in power. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independenceeven independence from political party to which they belong. In expelling Camasura from HRET for that ground, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Such resolution is therefore null and void. Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as judges, are entitled to security of tenure, just as members of judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec 2.,Art VIII, 1987 Constitution). Membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for just cause, such as, expiration of the members congressional term of office, death, permanent disability, resignation from political party which he represents, formal affiliation with anither political party, removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. The records shows that Camasura has not formally affiliated with another political group; thus, his termination from HRET was not for valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure. CHAVEZ VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (211 SCRA 315) FACTS:
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Petition for review of the decision of the Commission on Elections. May 5, 1992; court issued a resolution in GR no. 104704 entitled Francisco Chavez v. Comelec, et al. Disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for the office of senator. Francisco Chavez filed a motion with comelec to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates and count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor Chavez in favour of Francisco Chavez. May 8, 1992; comelec issued a resolution to remove the name of Melchor Chavez in the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes to Francisco Chavez. Comelec also failed to cancel the name of Melchor Chavez in the list of qualified candidates. Confusion arose as the Chavez votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEI). May 12, 1992; comelec issued a resolution to credit all the Chavez votes in favour of Francisco Chavez. Francisco Chavez was not satisfied of the resolution because he maintains that it did not reach all the precincts. June 4, 1992; court issued a TRO enjoining comelec from proclaiming the 24 th winning senatorial candidate. TRO was subsequently lifted.
ISSUE: Did COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion due to its inaction in deleting Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates? Was there cause of action on the part of the petitioner? Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? DECISION: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. RATIO: The alleged inaction of COMELEC in ordering the deletion of the name of Melchor Chavez does not call for the exercise of the courts function of judicial review. The court can review the decisions or orders of the comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion commited by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of its administrative functions. The failure of comelec to implement its own resolution is administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial interference. Art. 6, Sec. 17 of the constitution provides that the senate and the house of representatives shall each have an electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. x x x The word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the tribunals jurisdiction over election contests. In this case, the senate electoral tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over the case and not the court. Petitioner has no cause of action. The controversy presented being one in the nature of preproclamation. Pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for president, vice-president, senator, and member of the house of representatives according to sec. 15 of republic act 7166. Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political pary or coalition of political paries before the board or directly with the commission in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the election returns. (sec. 241, omnibus election code)
ARROYO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (246 SCRA 384) FACTS:
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Petition for review of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Congressional Candidate private respondent Augusto Syjuco filed an election protest before public respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) 5 days after the Makati Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner Joker Arroyo the duly elected Congressman for Makati in May 11 19992 elections. Essentially premised on alleged irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes and massive fraud, private respondent Syjuco sought the revision and recounting of ballots cast in 1292 out of total 1714 precincts of Makati from which result he aimed to be declared as the duly elected congressman of Makati. Petitioner filed a counter-protest, questioning the residence qualification of private respondent but the case was dismissed by public respondent HRET. Revisions of the ballots was undertaken but not without serious irregularities having been unearthed in the course thereof. Tasked by public respondent HRET to investigate on the matter, former SC Justice Emilio Ganvcayo confirmed the irregularities and that Arroyo was the classic victim of the unlawful exercise. At or about time the revision was completed and the three precincts left unaccounted for, private respondent Syjuco moved for the withdrawal of these remaining unrevised protested precincts on the ground that he has presumably overtaken Arroyos lead of 13559 votes. Reception of evidence followed: Private respondents evidence were all documentary and voluminous at that consisting of over 200,000 pages which are mere photocopies of the original. On the other hand, petitioners evidence consisted of certified true copies of the Revision Reports and election turns. Despite the petitioners objection about the probative value of the respondents exhibit, HRET admitted the evidence for whatever worth they may have. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective memoranda simultaneously. Private respondent now called upon public respondent HRET to decide the case on the basis of what private respondent admits as a truly innovative and NON-TRADITIONAL process- their precinct-level document-based evidences. By reason of the private respondents allegations, public respondent HRET ordered him to cause why his protest should not be dismissed. By a 6-3 vote, public respondent HRET resolved not to dismiss the protest, to continue with the examination and evaluation of the evidence on record, and thereafter to decide and case on the merits. The Resolution was issued on Feb 15 1994. In their dissenting opinion, the 3 justices had to say that the protestants radical shift has no legal precedent; the instant protest shall be decided in accordance with the tradition process of recounting and revision of ballots as provided by the Rules of the Tribunal and by any innovative and non-traditional process denominated as precinct-level document-based evidence alleged in protestants memorandum . Nonetheless, protestant was candid enough to admit in his memorandum that to overcome a substantial margin of well over 12, 000 votes the revision of ballots alone would not suffice and to keep his protest alive has to devise the broader non-traditional determination of the existence of precinct-level-documentbased anomalies even is the same is unauthorized by law. Petitioner moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No hearings were conducted thereafter. The judgements were declared annulling the proclamation of Arroyo, declaring Syjuco as the duly elected representative in view of the massive fraud, irregularities and violation of election laws in conformity with the mandate of COMELEC. to prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices. (par (6) Sec 2 Article9-c 1987 Constitution) Without filing a motion for reconsideration of pubic respondent HRETs decision, petitioner Arroyo filed the instant petition setting the ff issues: ISSUES: Whether or not: Public respondent acted with grave abuse discretion and without jurisdiction when it refused to dismiss HRET Case after Syjuco belatedly changed the theory of his cases and introduced new issues
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The HRETs decision dated Jan25 1995 was rendered in violation of the petitioners right Public respondent acted capriciously and with grave abuse of discretion when it rejected long-standing legal doctrines on elections and annulment; disregard the peoples right to suffrage; ignored the basic rules of evidence; gravely or deliberately misapprehended the facts. DECISION: The petition was GRANTED and public respondent HRETs majority decision was set aside. Syjuco guilty of indirect contempt is fined the amount P1000 to be paid within 5 days from the receipt of the decision. RATIO: However guised or justified by private respondent , this innovative theory introduced for the first time broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what he originally sought-the mere revision of ballots. Private respondent intended to completely abandon the process and results of the revision and sought to rely on precinct-level document-based evidence. This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules After the expiration of the period for filing of the protest; counter-protest or petition for quo warranto, substantial amendments which broaden the scope of the action or introduce an additional cause of action shall not be allowed. The least that HRET could have done thereafter was to conduct further hearing so that Arroyo may have examined, objected to and adduced evidence controverting private respondent Syjucos precinct-level document-based evidence: despite the time within which the parties are allowed to present their evidence as already lapsed. Petitioners right to due process was clearly violated. In an election protest, the protestant, or counter-protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of protest or counter protest. Syjuco is bound by Arroyos victory over him by 13092 votes. He cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on-appeal. Mere photocopied documents as evidence violate the best evidence rule. Certain vital election documents were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the majority decision which as the Tribunal readily admitted, were never offered in evidence by either of the parties. The majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal w/o the participation of the 3 Justices declared that 10484 of the contested signatures are fake. This violates Rule 68 of Tribunals own rules which requires that all questions be submitted to the Tribunal as a body but also in Rule 5 which further requires the presence of at least (1) justice member to constitute a valid quorum. Annulment of election results is done only in extreme cases of fraud. As a guide, Election Tribunal itself has laid down 2 mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns. 1) more than 50% of the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts were involves2) the votes must be shown to be affected by fraud, irregularities and anomalies. HRET annulled 50,000 votes w/o a dint of compliance with these requisites. It also disregarded election results on several precincts on the basis of omissions committed either through mere oversight ot plain negligence on the part of election officials or employees. The bulk of omissions consisted of lack or absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors and SC found that these omissions, administrative in nature, cannot be used a ground to nullify results. This maked private respondent argument that the petition should be dismissed for failure to first fielm a motion for reconsideration untenable. The concerted action of the Tribunal to disregard the rules of evidence makes the recourse for reconsideration nugatory . it is well-settled that a prior motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with is as in the case petitioners fundamental right to due process was
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violated. Rules and uniformity of procedure are as essential to procure truth and exactness in elections as in anything else. Thus with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before the public respondent HRET and its majority decision in the election protest field by private respondent, petitioners proclamation as the winning congressman deemed not to have been challenges at all. And finally, in a Resolution dated March 14, 1995, the Court required Syjuco to explain why he should not be held for indirect contempt since his Addendum which he prepared appear to undermine treh integrity of some Court members: there may also be linkages between protestee Arroyo and Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, about whom unkind rumors are rife that Her Honor is gumagapang in the Supreme Court, for Arroyo. in his explanation, private respondent averred that he merely expressed a simple citizens grievance in accordance to his observations and based on his firm convictions and that his statements were not aimed to undermined the integrity of some Members of the Court. Want of intention is no excuse for language use for it s taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers. Finding respondent statements guilty of indirect contempt. GUERRERO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (336 SCRA 458) FACTS: Special civil action. Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. May 8, 1998; Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy with the comelec, substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas. May 11, 1998; Farinas was proclaimed winner as a member of the house of representatives. May 16; 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration stating that Farinas cannot validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas because he is an independent candidate and Chevylle Farinas is from Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino. June 3, 1998; Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the house of representatives. June 10, 1998; petitioner Guerrero filed his petition-in-intervention in comelec asking that the position of representative of the first district of ilocos norte be declared vacant and special elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy of Farinas. Jan 6, 1999; comelec dismissed Ruizs motion and Guerrros petition-in-intervention. ISSUE: Did the comelec commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the house of representatives? DECISION: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. RATIO: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the comelec when it declared that it ceased jurisdiction over the case when Farinas assumed office. While the comelec is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the comelec and the electoral tribunal of the house of representatives. Under, article 6, sec. 17 of the constitution, the electoral tribunal of the house of representatives has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualification of members of the house of representatives. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the house of representatives, comelecs jurisdiction ceases and the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunal of the house of representatives begins.
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GARCIA VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL FACTS: Special civil action. Petition for certiorari. Harry Angping was proclaimed as duly elected representative for the 3 rd district of manila. Petitioners, all registered voters in the district, contested this on the grounds that he was not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. They asked that Angping be declared ineligible. Upon filing the petition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000 filing fee. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) issued a resolution dismissing the petition for quo warranto for failure to pay P5,000 cash deposit required by its rues. Upon receiving the said notice, petitioners paid the P5,000 cash deposit and attached the receipt to the motion for reconsideration they filed with the HRET. Their petition was denied by the HRET on the grounds of rule 32 of the 1998 HRET rules which required a P5,000 cash deposit in addition to the filing fees for quo warranto cases. ISSUE: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? Did HRET commit grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners and refusing to reinstate the same een after the payment of the required P5,000 cash deposit? DECISION: Decision set aside. RATIO: The court may inquire into the issue of HRET by virtue of Art. 8, Sec. 1 of the constitution which has expanded judicial power to include the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. According to rule 32 of the 1998 rules of the HRET, if the cash deposit is below P75,000 payment shall be made within 10 days after the filing of the protest. Petitioners filed their petition with a 28 day delay. In dismissing the petition, the HRET acted judiciously, correctly and certainly within its jurisdiction. The attack of ineligibility is a serious charge. The observance of the HRET rules of procedure must be taken seriously if they are to attain their objective. The litigants are expected to properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the tribunal without being formerly ordered to do so. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in applying its rules strictly in dismissing the petition for quo warranto. SANDOVAL II VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (338 SCRA 770) FACTS: Special Civil Action. Petition for certiorari. Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone congressional district of MalabonNavotas during the May 14, 2001 elections. Sandoval won by a margin of 19,200 votes. May 22, 2001; he was proclaimed by the district board of canvassers of Malabon-Navotas. After taking his oarth of office, he assumed the post at noon of June 30, 2001.June 1, 2001; Oreta filed with HRET an election protest against Sandoval. June 7, 2001; HRET process server Lim served the summons by substituted service upon a certain Gene maga who signed the process servers copy of the summons. July 12, 2001; HRET issued a resolution which took note of Sandovals failure to file an answer to the election protest within 10
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days from date of service of the summons. Aug 6, 2001; Sandoval move for reconsideration for the admission of his answer with counter-protest because Gene Maga who received the summon was neither a regular employee nor responsible officer at his office. HRET denied the petition. ISSUE: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? Was substituted service of summons validly effected on Sandoval II in the election protest filed by Aurora Oreta before the HRET? DECISION: Petition granted. Resolutions of HRET are modified to effect that the answer with counter-protest of Sandoval be admitted to form part of the record. RATIO: Court has jurisdiction by virtue of Art. 8, Sec. 1 of the constitution which expands the judicial power of the court to include the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person. If efforts to find him personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service. Under section 7 of Rule 14 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure, substituted service can be done by leaving copies of the summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. There is absolutely nothing in the process servers affidavit of service indicating the impossibility of personal service of summons upon Sandoval within a reasonable time. Furthermore, Sandoval was a very visible and active member of congress which would only take the process server a little extra work to locate Sandoval. The element of a summon being served on a competent person in charge of petitioners office is missing. Gene Maga was a maintenance man who offered his services not only to Sandoval but to anyone who was so minded to hire his assistance. Thus, not being an employee thereof, he would be an incompetent person to receive the summons in petitioners behalf. Furthermore, Maga was not in charge of petitioners office. Maga had obviously no control and management of the district office as noticeably shown by his occupation as maintenance man. It is unmistakable that the process server hastily served the summons upon petitioner Sandoval by substituted service without first attempting to personally serve the process. In light of the defective and irregular substituted service of summons, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and consequently the period within which to file his answer with counter-protest did not start to run. PIMENTEL, JR. VS HRET (393 SCRA 227) FACTS: In the May 1998 elections, 14 representatives from 13 party-lists are entitled to occupy seats in the House of Representatives. Subsequently, the House nominated contingents for the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Commission on Appointments (CA) however, no party-list representative is nominated for the said constitutional bodies. Sen. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to the Senate requesting the restructure of HRET and CA. No response from the Senate.
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Pimentel files petition for mandamus, prohibition and preliminary injunction with this court. He contends that under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party list representatives are entitled at least 1 seat in HRET and 2 seats in the CA. ISSUE: WON the exclusion of party-list representatives in the HRET and CA is unconstitutional HELD: No. Petition dismissed RATIO: Sec 17 & 18 Art VI of the Constitution provides that in the composition of HRET (6 members of the House) and CA (12 members of the House) there must be a proportional representation from the political parties and the party-list. Since according to the Party-List System Act, the party-list representatives must constitute 20% of the seats in the House, party-list representatives must have 1 and 2 seats for HRET and CA respectively. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme Court rules that it cannot interfere with the exercise by the house of this constitutionally mandated duty unless there is an abuse in discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Party-lists are not unlawfully deprived of the opportunity to be nominated in the HRET or CA. Party-list has no locus standi. Furthermore, HRET and CA have no constitutional powers to reconstitute themselves.
SECTION 18. THERE SHALL BE A COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS CONSISTING OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, AS EX OFFICIO CHAIRMAN, TWELVE SENATORS, AND TWELVE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ELECTED BY EACH HOUSE ON THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION SHALL NOT VOTE, EXCEPT IN CASE OF A TIE. THE COMMISSION SHALL ACT ON ALL APPOINTMENTS SUBMITTED TO IT WITHIN THIRTY SESSION DAYS OF THE CONGRESS FROM THEIR SUBMISSION. THE COMMISSION SHALL RULE BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS.
DAZA V. SINGSON (180 SCRA 496) FACTS: From the May 1987 elections, Raul Daza was chosen as one of the members of the Commission on Appointments (CA) as a representative of the Liberal Party (LP). In September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives (HR). 24 members of the LP shifted to LDP resulting to the swelling of the latter with 159 members and leaving only 17 members with the former. HR revised its representation in the CA withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly formed LDP in the person of Luis Singson. The petitioner challenges this reappointment and the court issued a TRO for Daza and Singson from
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serving in the CA. ISSUE: WON the reappointment of members of the CA is constitutional HELD: Yes. Petition Dismissed RATIO: Sec 18 Art VI of the constitution provides that there shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of, among others, 12 members of the HR elected by the House on the basis of proportional representation. Since there was a shift in the number of members of the LP to maintain proportional representation the House reconstituted CA and awarded LDP the seats. The petitioner argues that LDP is not a stable and permanent party so it is not entitled for seats in the CA. Court held that when COMELEC granted the registration of LDP as a registered political party, LDP is qualified to have seats in the CA maintaining proportional representation. GUINGONA, JR. V. GONZALES (214 SCRA 789) FACTS: In the May 1992 elections, senate composed of the following members with their respective political affiliations and their respective number of proportional representatives in the Commission on Appointments (CA). Political Party LDP NPC LAKAS-NUCD LP-PDP-LABAN Membership 15 5 3 1 Proportional Representatives in CA 7.5 2.5 1.5 0.5
Sen. Tolentino proposed that for the 12 available seats in the CA, 8 seats be given to LDP, 2 for NPC, 1 for LAKAS-NUCD and 1 for LP. It was approved. Sen. Guingona, Jr. files a petition to prohibit the Senate President Gonzales to recognize Sen. Romulo (LDP) and Sen. Tanada (LP) as members of the CA. ISSUE: WON appointment of Romulo and Tanada were constitutional HELD: No. Appointments of Romulo and Tanada are null and void. RATIO: Sec 18 Art VI of the Constitution provides that 12 senators are to be appointed in the CA by proportional representation however, it was not expressly stated that the 12 seats must be filled in order for CA to function. CA can function even if only 10 senators are elected as long as the quorum exists. The election
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of Romulo and Tanada violates the proportional representation clause of Sec 18 Art VI since 0.5 of a representative do not count as 1.
SECTION 21. THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OR ANY OF ITS RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES MAY CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE. THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS APPEARING IN, OR AFFECTED BY, SUCH INQUIRIES SHALL BE RESPECTED.
ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO (87 SCRA 29) FACTS: Buenavista Estate Original San Juan de Dios Hospital owner: Jan 1, 1939 to Jan 1, 1964 Philippine Govt has the option to purchase this property for Php3,000,000 within this period if the Philippine Govt will not purchase this property, it will be disposed in court on June 21, 1944 But if Philippine Govt will opt to purchase the said property, they'll pay the owner the sum of Php3,000,000 San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the property to Ernest Burt for Php 5,000,000 who made a down payment of Php 10,000 and agreed to pay Php 500,000 within one year and the remainder in annual installments of Php 500,000 each Failure to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of Php 10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind the sale to him. Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought Buenavista Estate for Php 4,500,000. Php 1,000,000 was paid to Burt through his attorney- in- fact in the Philippines, the Assoc. Estates Inc. represented by Jean L. Arnault for BUENAVISTA ESTATE
June 29, 1946
Latter part of October, 1949
Tambobong Estate Original owner: May 14, 1946 Feb. 14, 1947 Sept. 4, 1947 February 5, 1948 Philippine Trust Company Philippine Trust Company sold this to Burt for Php 1,200,000, who paid Php 10,000 and promised to pay Php 90,000 within 9 months and the balance of Php 1,100,000 in 10 successive annual installments of Php 110,000 each 9 month period expired without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the estate to RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION by an absolute dead of sale in consideration of the sum of Php 750,000 Rural Progress Administration made a notarial demand upon Bert for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of Php 90,000 within the period of 9 months
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CFI of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burts certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration. Latter part of October, 1949 the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought Tambobong Estate for the sum of Php 500,000, which was all paid to Burt through his other attorney- infact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault for the TAMBOBONG ESTATE.
October 29, 1949: 2 checks payable to Burt aggregating Php 1,500,000 were delivered to Arnault. o That same day, Arnault opened a new account in Burts name with the Philippine National Bank where he deposited the two checks aggregating Php 1,500,000 o On the same occasion, he drew on the same account 2 checks One check for Php 500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc. Another check for Php440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the Senate to determine the ultimate recipient of the sum of Php440,000 o Feb 27, 1950, Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8 to investigate the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estate Deals. o A special committee was created by the said resolution to work on the investigation Arnault refused/ dont want to mention who was the ultimate recipient of the sum of Php440,000 because o His answer might be used against him. Also, he said that it is his constitutional right to refuse to incriminate himself. According to him, such question violates his right as a citizen to have privacy in his dealings with other people. o I dont remember the name; he was a representative of Burt I am not sure; I dont remember the name Without securing a receipt, he turned over the Php440, 000 to a certain person, a representative of Burt, in compliance with Burts verbal instruction made in 1946; that, as far as he know, that certain person had nothing to do with the negations for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he gave him the money on Oct. 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again 2 or 3 items. The last time being in Dec, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39-40 years old, bet. 52- 56. Senate deliberated and hereby committed the petitioner to the custody of the Sergeant- at- Arms and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the Php 440,000.
ISSUES: 1. The Senate has no power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php 440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. 2. Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950 3. Petitioner invokes the privilege against self- incrimination. HELD: The petition must be denied. RATIO:
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[for issue #1] Subject of the inquiry was the questionable expenditure of the Government of Php 5,000,000 of public funs. Thus, its been decided that its within the jurisdiction of the Senate. Power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry/ investigation Once an inquiry is established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self- incrimination. Also, once the jurisdiction is conceded, the SC cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction or the use of Congressional discretion Inquiry should be within the jurisdiction, material/ necessary for the exercise of a power vested by the Congress and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry The ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the information sought from the witness is presumed to be correct. The investigation had not been completed, because due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution no. 8 The bills recommended by this committee had not been approved by the House and might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation. Those bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished This atmosphere of suspicion must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely establish the identity of that person [for issue #2] Court finds no sound reason to limit the power of a legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. Exercising the power to punish for contempt is enables the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committee charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative function. There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. o This power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. Also, its an absurd, unnecessary and vexatious procedure if we are to hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed.
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[for issue # 3] The ground upon which the witness claim is based is too shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford him safety. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Its also unbelievable that he gave Php440,000 to a person unknown to him Since according to the witness himself, the transaction was legal, and that he gave the Php440, 000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, court cant find a basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. It is the witnesss clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizens obligation; consistent of course with is right under the Constitution. BENGZON V. DRILON (235 SCRA 630) FACTS: RA 910 was amended by RA 1797 which provides for the adjustment of salaries or retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. RA 3595 amended RA 1568 provided for identical benefits as RA 1797 provided for members of the Constitutional Commission. Retirement benefits to Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Justices. PD 578 was enacted by President Marcos which extended similar benefits to the members of the AFP. Two months later, PD 644 was issued by President Marcos repealing Section 3-A of RA 1797 and RA 3595. Under PD 1638, President Marcos restored the readjustment of the retirement benefits of enlisted men and officers. A later decree, PD 1909 was also issued providing for the readjustment of the pensions of members of the AFP who are retired prior to Sept. 10, 1979. adjustment for retirement benefits was not restored for retired Justices of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of RA 1797 and RA 3595 which President Aquino vetoed. Believing that Congress Act was trying to circumvent her veto back in 1990, the President vetoed some of sections she believed would bring back RA 1797. ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential veto of items in the GA Act providing for adjusted retirement benefits for members of the judiciary is constitutional? HELD: No, not known to President Aquino, PD 644 never became law because it was not published prior to its promulgation in accordance to the ruling in Tanada v. Tuvera. Therefore, it follows that RA 1797 continues to be in effect not having been repealed by PD 644. In vetoing the said sections Pres. Aquino is in effect vetoing RA 1797 which was passed 35 years prior to that date. Also, the invalidity of PD 644 was ruled upon with finality by the Supreme Court and a veto of the said items in the GA Act is tantamount to a reversal of that decision. Clearly, the President has no power to do both. For it to do so would be to give it legislative powers to repeal laws as well as allow it to diminish the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary by dictating how its money should be spent in spite of its powers of
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augmentation. The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is not absolute. The power to disapprove any item in the GA Act does not grant the authority to veto a part of the item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. Petition granted. The questioned veto is set aside as illegal and unconstitutional. NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. VS. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD OF DUMAGUETE (155 SCRA 421) FACTS: NORECO II is an electric cooperative having its principal place of business in Dumaguete. Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete conducted an investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities in the City of Dumaguete. The inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation and use by NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city. Petitioners were required to attend and testify at the investigation which they failed to do. Petitioners were being held liable for legislative contempt due to their failure to appear in the said investigation. A subpoena and the Order complained of were signed by Respondent Antonio Uypitching, as Chairman of the Committee on Public Utilities and Franchises and Co-Chairman of the respondent Ad Hoc Committee. The petitioners moved to quash the subpoena alleging that Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete has no power to investigate the alleged inefficient power lines. ISSUES: Whether or not the Congress has the power to punish non-members for contempt. Whether or not the subpoena is validly issued. HELD: There is no constitutional grant to Congress to punish non-members for contempt. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government unit like the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power. However, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Vocal Government Code granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Therefore, the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners for contempt. Since the respondent Sangguniang Panlunsod of Dumaguete and respondent Ad Hoc Committee are without power to punish non-members for contempt, the subpoena issued compelling the petitioners to attend and testify in the investigation was declared null and void for being ultra vires
SECTION 25. 1. THE CONGRESS MAY NOT INCREASE THE APPROPRIATIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AS SPECIFIED IN THE BUDGET. THE FORM, CONTENT, AND MANNER OF PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW. 2. NO PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE EMBRACED IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS
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BILL UNLESS IT RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO SOME PARTICULAR APPROPRIATION THEREIN. ANY SUCH PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITS OPERATION TO THE APPROPRIATION TO WHICH IT RELATES. 3. THE PROCEDURE IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS SHALL STRICTLY FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE FOR APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES. 4. A SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL SHALL SPECIFY THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED, AND SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY FUNDS ACTUALLY AVAILABLE AS CERTIFIED BY THE NATIONAL TREASURER, OR TO BE RAISED BY A CORRESPONDING REVENUE PROPOSAL THEREIN. 5. NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED AUTHORIZING ANY TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATIONS; HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE HEADS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS MAY, BY LAW, BE AUTHORIZED TO AUGMENT ANY ITEM IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES FROM SAVINGS IN OTHER ITEMS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE APPROPRIATIONS. 6. DISCRETIONARY FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR PARTICULAR OFFICIALS SHALL BE DISBURSED ONLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES TO BE SUPPORTED BY APPROPRIATE VOUCHERS AND SUBJECT TO SUCH GUIDELINES AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW. 7. IF, BY THE END OF ANY FISCAL YEAR, THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE FAILED TO PASS THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR THE ENSUING FISCAL YEAR, THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THE PRECEDING FISCAL YEAR SHALL BE DEEMED RE-ENACTED AND SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE AND EFFECT UNTIL THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL IS PASSED BY THE CONGRESS. GARCIA VS. MATA (85 SCRA 208) FACTS: Eusebio Garcia is a reserve officer on active duty of the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332. At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain. On June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Petitioners reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial proceedings; From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he has neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Government in any capacity; As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary petitions with the offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, and the President, respectively, but received reply only from the Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General. The petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status basing his allegations on Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is constitutional. HELD: Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines provides:
After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of five consecutive years: PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on active duty for more than two years on the date of the approval of this Act except those whose military and educational training, experience and qualifications are deemed essential to the needs of the service, shall be reverted to inactive status within one year from the approval of this Act: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their request; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any such reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at least five of active commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's authorized base and longevity pay in the rank held at the time of such reversion for every year of active commissioned service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a gratuity under the provisions of this Act shall not except during a National emergency or mobilization, be called to a tour of active duty within five years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the Secretary of National Defense is authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve officers who are qualified military pilots and doctors; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Department of National Defense notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary and any unexpended balance of certification to accounts payable since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose of the appropriation shall be made available for the purpose of this paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the Secretary of National Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress as to the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph.
The said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein, and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.
A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. It was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general appropriation act. The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject. if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect. Upon the foregoing dissertation, Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was declared as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is as though it has never been passed. Petitioner no longer having legal basis for such claims, his petition was denied.
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DEMETRIA VS. ALBA (148 SCRA 208) FACTS: Petitioners, who filed petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction questioning the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 as concerned citizens of the Philippines, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interest may be affected. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and general agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Petitioners claim that it is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. ISSUES: Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Whether or not the Judiciary may encroach with the exercise of functions of the legislative and executive departments. HELD: (1)The first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Section 16 authorizes the President to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices; however, first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one departments, bureaus, offices and general agencies of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Indeed, such provision in question is null and void. (2)The law provides the doctrine of Separation of Powers as well as Checks and Balances to ensure that no abuse of power shall take place. Therefore, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ (235 SCRA 506) FACTS: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions.
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Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid? HELD: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.
SECTION 26.
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1. EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF. 2. NO BILL PASSED BY EITHER HOUSE SHALL BECOME A LAW UNLESS IT HAS PASSED THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS, AND PRINTED COPIES THEREOF IN ITS FINAL FORM HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ITS MEMBERS THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE, EXCEPT WHEN THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES TO THE NECESSITY OF ITS IMMEDIATE ENACTMENT TO MEET A PUBLIC CALAMITY OR EMERGENCY. UPON THE LAST READING OF A BILL, NO AMENDMENT THERETO SHALL BE ALLOWED, AND THE VOTE THEREON SHALL BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, AND THE YEAS AND NAYS ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD (151 SCRA 208) FACTS: Tio filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry on the following grounds: (1) Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof; (2) The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution; (3) There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6; (4) There is undue delegation of power and authority; and (5) There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not. ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree Bo. 1987 is constitutional. HELD: (1) Section 10 is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. The express purpose of the decree to include taxation of the video industry is to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms and is therefore not a rider.
(2)A tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters
the activities taxed. The tax imposed by the decree is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the decree to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
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(3) The 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch.
(4) The grant in Section 11 of the decree of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation.
(5) Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the decree is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.
Therefore, the decree in question is constitutional.
For reference:
PREAMBLE OF PD 1987: 1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues; 2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year; 3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses and theaters throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide displacement and unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses and theaters;
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4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the Government to create an environment conducive to growth and development of all business industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated investment of about P3 Billion; 5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms; 6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being; 7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to curb these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright laws; 8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch; ... (Numbering of paragraphs supplied). PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO (227 SCRA 703) FACTS: This is a petition to declare the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7354. The main target of this petition is Section 35 of RA 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation.
SEC. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulation or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly. All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, republic acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087, and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice-President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
These measures withdraw the franking privilege (free mail) from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The first objection is based on Art. VI, Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution, which provides that Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. RA 7345 is entitled An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith. It is the submission of the petitioners that Sec. 35 of RA 7345 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes. The second objection was that the second paragraph of the repealing clause was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. It appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, which provides that:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately after, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
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Petitioners stress that Section 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment. The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause. It is alleged that RA 7345 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representative, COMELEC, former Presidents of the Philippines, widows of former Presidents, National Census and Statistics Office, and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices or officers. Equal protection of the laws, embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution, simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The respondents argue that the considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 7345 is unconstitutional on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes [Article VI Sec. 26(1)]; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage [Article VI Sec. 26(2)]; (3) and it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary [equal protection of laws in Article III Sec. 1]. HELD: YES. The petition is partially granted. The franking privilege of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices shall be restored. On the first objection, the title of the challenged act does not violate the Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. If the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. According to Cooley, author of Constitutional Limitations, the repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. On the second objection, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. The Court declines to look into the petitioners charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became RA 7354 and that the copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted in accordance with Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. On the third contention on equal protection of laws, the argument of the respondents that the considerable volume of mail of the Judiciary justifies the withdrawal of its franking privilege, is selfdefeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly. The Court states, at this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The Court is unable to disagree with the respondents that Section 35 of RA 7345
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represents a valid exercise of police power. On the contrary, the Court finds its repealing clause to be discriminatory and that it denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. In sum, the Court sustains RA 7345 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, the Court annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution that no person shall be deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO, JR. (237 SCRA 324) FACTS: These are two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109298, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, known as Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme (SNIT), amending the certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, and in G.R.109466, the validity of Sec. 6, Revenue Regulations, promulgated by public respondents pursuant to the said law. G.R. No. 109289 Petitioner claims that the enactment of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
Article VI Sec. 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Article VI Sec. 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall embrace evolve a progressive system of taxation. Article III Sec. 1 No person Shall be deprived of x x x property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.
The full text of the title of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme reads:
An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In the Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Revenue Code, as Amended.
Section 21(f) Tax on Citizens and Residents indicate, a tax is imposed upon the taxable net income of self-employed and/or professionals engaged in the practice of their profession in accordance to the tax schedule provided by the law. The Schedular approach is a system employed where the income tax treatment varies and made to depend on the kind or category of taxable income of the taxpayer. Section 29 Deductions from Gross Income indicate specific direct costs that are allowed to be deducted from the taxable income. Petitioner asserts that RA 7496 attempts to tax single proprietorship and professionals differently from the manner it imposes tax on corporations and partnerships and thus violates Article VI Sec. 28(1) of the Constitution. The Court views the legislative intent of the amendatory law to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. Global treatment is a system where the tax treatment views indifferently the tax base and generally treats in common all categories of taxable income of the taxpayer. Petitioner gives an extensive discussion on the merits of the law, illustrating, what he believes to be an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those covered and those who are not by the amendatory law. G.R. No. 109446 The questioned regulation reads:
Sec. 6. General Professional Partnership The general professional partnership (GPP) and the partners
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comprising the GPP are covered by RA 7596. Thus, in determining the net profit of the partnership, only the direct costs mentioned in said law are to be deducted from partnership income. Also, the expense paid or incurred by partners in their individual capacities in the practice of their profession which are not reimbursed or paid by the partnership but are considered direct costs, are not deductible from his gross income.
The objection of the petitioner lies is focused on the administrative interpretation of public respondents that would apply RA 7496 or SNIT to partners in general professional partnerships. According to the National Internal Revenue Code, partnerships are either taxable partnerships or exempt partnerships. The GPP is an example of an exempt partnership and that it cannot be similarly identified as corporations nor even considered as independent taxable entities for income tax purposes. The Code states that a general professional partnership must be formed for the sole purpose of exercising a common profession, no part of the income of which is derived from its engaging in any trade business; otherwise, it is subject to tax as an ordinary business partnership or, which is to say, as a corporation and thereby subject to the corporate income tax. A general professional partnership, unlike an ordinary business partnership (which is treated as a corporation for income tax purposes and so subject to the corporate income tax), is not itself an income taxpayer. Here, partners themselves, not the partnership (although it is still obligated to file an income tax return [mainly for administration and data]), are liable for the payment of income tax in their individual capacity computed in their respective and distributive shares of profit. ISSUES: In G.R. No. 109289, whether or not RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme is unconstitutional. In G.R. No. 109446, whether or not public respondents have exceeded their authority in promulgating Sec. 6, Revenue Regulations, to carry out RA 7496. HELD: NO. Petitions are dismissed. G.R. No. 109289 Article VI Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us have been sufficiently met. The contention that RA 7496 violates Article VI Sec. 28(1) clearly forgets that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to RA 7496. Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (a) the standards that are used are substantial and not arbitrary, (b) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (c) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (d) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class. This classification implied in the legislative intent of the amendatory law to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations is not arbitrary and inappropriate. On the point raised by the petitioner on what he views as an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those covered and not covered by the amendatory law, the court cannot freely delve into those matters which, by constitution fiat, rightly rests on the legislative department. With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects), and situs (place) of taxation.
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The due process clause may be correctly invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of tax power. No such transgression is so evident to the Court. G.R. No. 109446 Under the Tax Code, the general professional partnership is deemed to be no more than a mere mechanism or a flow-through entity in the generation of income by, and the ultimate distribution of such income to, respectively, each of the individual partners. Section 6 of the Revenue Regulation, alleged to carry out RA 7496, did not alter, but merely confirmed, the above standing rule as now so modified by RA 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual income taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership. TOBIAS VS. ABALOS (239 SCRA 106) FACTS: This is a petition to render Republic Act No. 7675 unconstitutional. RA 7675 is also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly urbanized City to be Known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 7675. Pres. Ramos signed it into the law on Feb. 9, 1994. Pres. Ramos signed RA 7675 into the law on Feb. 9, 1994. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994 where the people of Mandaluyong was asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under RA 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population.18,621 voted yes whereas 7,911 voted no. By virtue, of these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Article VIII Sec.49 of RA 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Sec.49 of RA 7675 embraces two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2)the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. The second aforestated subject is not germane tot the subject matter of RA 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Thus, the one subject-one bill rule has not been complied with. Petitioners assert that there is no mention of the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, which is allegedly violative of Article VI Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution. Petitioners also argue that Section 49 has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI Sec. 5(1).
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ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7675, specifically Artivle VIII Sec.49, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution: It contravenes the one subjectone bill rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution. Article VI Sec. 5(4) states Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. Article VI Sec. 5(1) states the present limit of 250 members in the House of Representative. HELD: NO. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of RA 7675 necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. The constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article Vi Sec. 26(1) should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject. The contention that there is no mention of a census to show compliance with minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify the separation into two legislative districts of San Juan/Mandaluyong does not suffice to strike down the validity of RA 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional process, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts, At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. As to the contention that Section 49 of RA 7675 in effect preempts the right of congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since the petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon, and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI Sec. 5 (1) shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA 7675 must be allowed to stand. The petitioners additional argument that RA 7675 resulted in gerrymandering, which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worth of credence. Hon. Zamoras constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSN., INC. VS. GIMENEZ (15 SCRA 479) FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association Inc, a non profit civic organization, duly incorporated under the Philippine law, filed a petition for preliminary injunction enjoining Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of the House of Congress from passing in audit vouchers and from countersigning
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the checks of treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator of former members of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836. Petitioner contends the following: 1. the provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of Sec 2(1) of Art VI of the Constitution; 2. the provision on retirement and gratuity is a circumvention of the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of the Congress during their term, contrary to Art VI, Sec 14. of the Constitution 3. the provision is a class legislation because it allows members and officers of the Congress to retire after 12 years of service while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after 20 years of service. 4. the provision on sick and vacation leave is a another attempt of legislators to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The Solicitor General filed its answer and contends that: 1. the grant of retirement pensions and benefits does not constitute forbidden compensation. 2. the title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of the Constitutions which provides that no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 3. the law does not constitute class legislation 4. certain indispensable parties were not included in the petition 5. the petitioner has no standing to institute the action 6. the payment of the commutable sick and vacation leave is not an indirect scheme to increase the salary. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to institute the petition Whether of not the law in question is violative of the Constitution. RULING: 1st point: Petitioners standing to institute the suit. The Petitioner can validly institute the suit. In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality pf statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. 2nd point: Whether or not RA 3836 violates Sec 14, Art VI of the Constitution. The Constitutional provision in Section 14, Art Vi includes in the term of compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question . Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded emolument as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services which is annexed to possession of an office, salary, fees, and perquisites. It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until the expiration of the full term of all members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and House of Representatives, to take effect upon approval of the said Act. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all Members of the Senate and the House of representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition
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in Sec 14, Art Vi of the Constitiution. 3rd point: Violation of equal protection clause. RA 3836 is patently discriminatory and therefore violate the equal protection clause. Firstly the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House of representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such as governors of provinces and the members of the provincial boards and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities. Secondly, all members of the Congress under RA 3836 are given retirement vbenefits after serving 12 years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and emplpyees aee given retirement benefits after 2o years . In the third place, all government officials and employees are given only one retirement benefits irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under RA 3836 Members of the Congress will b entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years of salary. Lastly, RA 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the GSIS. Most grantees of the retirement benefits under various retirement laws have to be a member or must al least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to GSIS 4th point: Title of the RA 3836 not germane to the subject matter. Par 1 Sec 21, Art VI of the Constitution provides: No bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of Sec 12, subsection of the Commonwealth Act 186, the retirement benefits are granted to members of the GSIS who have rendered at least 2o years of service regardless of age. This provision is related and germane to the subject of the Commonwealth Act 186. On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of RA 3836 refers to members of the Congress and to elective officers who are not members of the GSIS. To provide retirement benefits therefore, for these officials would relate to subject not germane to the Commonwealth Act 186. In short, RA 3836 violates three constitutional provisions namely: the prohibition regarding increase in salaries of Members of the Congress; equal protection clause; and prohibition that the title of the bill shall not embrace more than one subject. INSULAR LUMBER CO. VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS (104 SCRA 710) FACTS: These two cases are appeals by way of certiorari from the previous decision of the Court or Tax Appeals ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund to the Insular Lumber company the amount of P10,560,20 instead of P19,921.37, representing 25% of the specific tax paid on manufactured oil and motor fuel utilized by the said company in the operation of its forest concession in the year 1963. The undisputed facts: Insular Lumber Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of New York, USA, and duly authorized to do business in the Philippines, is a licensed forest concessionaire. The company purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession, sawmill, planning mills, power units, vehicles, dry kilns, water pumps, lawn mowers, and in furnishing free water and light to its employees, on which specific tax was paid. The company filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a claim for refund of P19,921.37 representing 25% of the specific tax paid on the manufactured oil and fuel used in its operations pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Republic act No. 1435. Commissioner denied the Companys claim for refund on the ground that the privilege of partial tax refund granted by Sec. 5 of RA 1435 to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions
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is limited to a period of five years from June 4, 1946, the date of effectivity of said Act. Consequently, oil used in such concessions after the said date are subject to the full tax prescribed in the National Internal Revenue Code. The Company filed a petition for review before the respondent court. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec. 5 of RA 1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. Out of the P19,921.37 claimed, representing 25% of specific tax paid, respondent court found out that only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. However, respondent court did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the Companys right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, the Company was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. The Commissioner contends the unconstitutionality of the first proviso in Sec. 5 of RA 1435 based on Article VI Sec. 21(1) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides No bill which may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. RA 1435 is entitled An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The Commissioner argues that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Sec. 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers, and that this partial exemption is not clearly expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. The Company argues that the operation of the sawmill is not merely incidental to the operation of the forest concession but is indispensable thereto, or forms part thereof. ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals erred in their decision on the following grounds: In the Appeal by the Commissioner That the first proviso in Section 5 of RA 1435 invoked by Insular Lumber Company as legal basis for its claim for tax refund is null and void for being unconstitutional in relation to Article VI Sec. 21 (1) of the 1935 Constitution. In not holding that the partial exemption under RA 1435 is limited only to five years counted from June 14, 1956, the date of approval and effectivity of the said act. In not holding that Insular Lumber Company used the questioned oils and fuels after the exemption has already lapsed or expired and hence, no longer in force. In holding that the Company is entitled to the tax refund of P10,560.20 In the Appeal by the Company That the Company is not entitled to claim a partial refund of the specific tax paid on manufactured oils used in the operation of its sawmill. That the Companys claim for refund on the specific tax paid on oils used during January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 has already prescribed. In ordering that the Company is entitle only to the tax refund of P10,560.20 instead of P19,921.37 as claimed by the petitioner. HELD: NO. Petition denied and the judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals affirmed. Appeal by the Commissioner
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The Court finds no merit on the argument on the unconstitutionality of RA 1435. The said Act deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of RA 1435, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of Article VI Sec. 21(1) of the 1935 Constitution is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. This does not seem to this Court to have been ignored in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by the Congress which passed it. Furthermore, in deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled, every presumption favors the validity of the Act. It is very apparent that the partial refund of specific tax paid for oils used in agriculture and aviation is limited to 5 years while there is no time limit for the partial refund of specific tax paid for oils used by miners and forest concessionaires. The Court finds no basis in applying the limitation of the operative period provided for oils used in agriculture and aviation to the provision on the refund to miners and forest concessionaires. Appeal by the Company The Court agrees with the Court of Tax Appeals that the operation sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession. By the very nature of their operations, they are entirely different business ventures. It very clear form the language of Section 5 that only miners or forest concessionaires are given the privilege to claim the partial refund.
SECTION 27. 1. EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL, BEFORE IT BECOMES A LAW, BE PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT. IF HE APPROVES THE SAME HE SHALL SIGN IT; OTHERWISE, HE SHALL VETO IT AND RETURN THE SAME WITH HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE HOUSE WHERE IT ORIGINATED, WHICH SHALL ENTER THE OBJECTIONS AT LARGE IN ITS JOURNAL AND PROCEED TO RECONSIDER IT. IF, AFTER SUCH RECONSIDERATION, TWO-THIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF SUCH HOUSE SHALL AGREE TO PASS THE BILL, IT SHALL BE SENT, TOGETHER WITH THE OBJECTIONS, TO THE OTHER HOUSE BY WHICH IT SHALL LIKEWISE BE RECONSIDERED, AND IF APPROVED BY TWOTHIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THAT HOUSE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW. IN ALL SUCH CASES, THE VOTES OF EACH HOUSE SHALL BE DETERMINED BY YEAS OR NAYS, AND THE NAMES OF THE MEMBERS VOTING FOR OR AGAINST SHALL BE ENTERED IN ITS JOURNAL. THE PRESIDENT SHALL COMMUNICATE HIS VETO OF ANY BILL TO THE HOUSE WHERE IT ORIGINATED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF RECEIPT THEREOF, OTHERWISE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW AS IF HE HAD SIGNED IT. 2. THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO VETO ANY PARTICULAR ITEM OR ITEMS IN AN APPROPRIATION, REVENUE, OR TARIFF BILL, BUT THE VETO SHALL NOT AFFECT THE ITEM OR ITEMS TO WHICH HE DOES NOT OBJECT.
GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, JR. (191 SCRA 452)
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FACTS: Petition for prohibition/mandamus attacking the constitutionality of presidential veto of section 55. Section 55 of the General Appropriations Bill FY 1989
Sec. 55. Prohibition against the restoration or increase of recommended appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by congress: no item of appropriation recommended by the president in the budget submitted to congress pursuant to article VII, section 22 of the constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the presided in the budgetshall be deemed to have been disapproved by congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this act.
Dec 16, 1988; congress passed general appropriations bill for FY 1989. Dec 29, 1988; president signed the bill into law but vetoed 7 special provisions and section 55 which is a general provision. The reason of the president in vetoing such section is because it violates Article 6, Section 25 (5) of the constitution. Furthermore, section 55 not only nullify the constitutional and statutory authority of the president, but also the senate president, speaker of the house, chief justice, and the heads of the constitutional commissions to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Feb 2, 1989; congress mentioned in a resolution that the veto by the president of section 55 is unconstitutional which means section 55 will be in effect. April 11, 1989; petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed. A similar provision was vetoed by the president. It appears in the general appropriations act of 1990. Instead of section 55, such provision was located in section 16 of the said bill. It must be noted that the 1989 appropriations act, the use of savings appears in section 12, separate and apart from section 55; whereas in the 1990 appropriations act, the use of savings and the vetoes provision have been comingled in section 16 only, with the vetoed provision made to appear as a condition or restriction. The petitioners cause is anchored on the following: 1. The presidents veto power does not Cover provisions, that she exceeded her authority when she vetoed sec 55 (FY 89) and sec 16 (FY 90) because they are provisions 2. When the president objects to a provision, she cannot item-veto but instead veto the entire bill 3. The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions 4. The power of augmentation in article 6, section 25 (5) of the constitution has to be provided for by law, which means the congress has also the power to determine restrictions The veto power of the president can be found in article 6, section 27, of the constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the president of section 55 of the 1989 appropriations bill and subsequently of its counterpart section 16 of the 1990 appropriations bill, which are all provisions, is unconstitutional and without effect. DECISION: Petition dismissed. The questioned presidential veto is constitutional. RATIO: The argument that the president may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. The same argument also overlooks the constitutional mandate that such provision is only limited in its operation to
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some particular appropriation which it relates as stated in article 6 section 25 (2) of the constitution. The constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative, and in this respect it is a grant of power in the executive. The legislative has the affirmative power to enact laws; the chief executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the legislature. It follows that the chief executive must find his authority in the constitution. Thus, such act of the president is constitutional and does not hamper with the legislative function. Settled is the rule that the executive is not allowed to veto a condition or restriction of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. For this rule to apply, conditions or restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matter which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an appropriations bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. With this, section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90) are held to be inappropriate conditions. They are general law measures more appropriate for separate legislation. They do not show the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. Considering that section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90) are not really conditions, they can be vetoed by the president. If the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the constitution is crystal clear. A presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of members of congress as stated in article 6, section 27 (1) of the constitution.
SECTION 28. 1. THE RULE OF TAXATION SHALL BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE. THE CONGRESS SHALL EVOLVE A PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM OF TAXATION. 2. THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO FIX WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS, AND SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS AS IT MAY IMPOSE, TARIFF RATES, IMPORT AND EXPORT QUOTAS, TONNAGE AND WHARFAGE DUES, AND OTHER DUTIES OR IMPOSTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT. 3. CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND PERSONAGES OR CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO, MOSQUES, NON-PROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENTS, ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION. 4. NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE PASSED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS.
GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (211 SCRA 219) FACTS: Nov 27, 1990, President issued EO 438 which imposed, additional 5% taxes and charges for imports including crude oil and other oil products. Subsequently increased to 9% by EO 443 on Jan 3, 1991. On July 24 1991, Dept of Finance requested Tariff Commission (TC) to initiate the process required by the
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Tariff and Customs Code for the imposition of a levy for crude oil and other petroleum products covered by Sec 104 of Tariff and Customs Code as amended. TC scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of their respective positions. Meantime, EO 475 was issued on Aug 15, 1991 reducing taxes to 5% except for the crude oil and other products which remained at 9%. After the hearing, the President issued EO 478 on Aug 23, 1991 which levied a special duty of P.95/liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imptd oil products. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 475, 478 and argues that they are violative of Sec 24, Article VI of 1987 Constitution which states that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills for the increase of public debt, bills of local application and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Not the president). Vilative also of Sec. 401 which authorizes the president for such act only to protect local industries but not the purpose of raising addtl revenue for the govt. ISSUE: 1) constitutionality of EO 475 and 478 2) legality of EO 475 and 478 DECISION: Prohibition and /mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner RATIO: 1) it does not follow that EO 475 and 478 are prohibited to the President. Accdg to, Sec28, (2) of Article VI of the Constitution , the Congress may by law authorize the President to fix within special limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. The Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and Sec 104 and 401 are the provisions which the President invoked in promulgating EO 475 and 478 Sec 104- imptd articles have to pay the rates of duty indicated in this Section Sec 401- A.for the interest of national economy, general welfare/ national security and subject to the limitations, the president, upon the recommendation of NEDA is empowered to a) increase not lower than the basic of 10% nor higher than 100% or remove rates b) to establish quota 30 to impose addtl duty B. public hearing by the Commission before recommendation C. the power of the President to increase or decrease rates There is nothing in Sec 104 or of 401 that suggests an absolute authority. Custom duties in the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities. the levying of custom duties protects local industries and simultaneously produces govt revenues. Increased tariffs in the case at bar must have protected the local crude oil industry as well. Protection of consumers is an impt dimension of the national economy, general welfare and national security and so customs duties may be reduced or removed for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices that may be otherwise impose upon the community. CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFROM ADJUDICATION BOARD ( 215 SCRA 86) FACTS: Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the proceedings and
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decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated Sept 4, 1989 and to set aside the decision of the CA dated Aug 20, 1990 affirming the decision of the DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of Central Mindanao University (CMU) land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to disqualified beneficiaries on the ground of lack of jurisdiction Complainants, calling themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers Organization (BIFFALO) under the leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso against the CMU, before the Department of Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the CARP. CMU is an agricultural educational institution run by Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school in 1910 and expanded into the Bukidnon National Agricultural High School and was transferred to its new site in Managok Malaybalay, Bukidnon. In the early 1960s it was converted into a college with Campus at Musuan, until it became what is known as the CMU. Jan 16 1958, Carlos Garcia, issued a Proclamation 476 withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus what is now the CMU. Several tribes belonging to the cultural communities opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands. So the grant to school was reduced from 3401 hectares to 3000 hectares. Resolution 160, had kilusang SArilign Sikap Program under which the land resources were leased to its faculty and employees .the faculty and staff combined themselves to groups of five members each to cultivate 4-5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project and the CMU provided technical know-how and training. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and land use participation fee. This carries out its educational objectives, train its students and maintain various activities which the government appropriation could not adequately support. The contract prohibits the establishment of houses and to use the land as a collateral for any loan. Petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became president of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the business project for production of corn, rice and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom where the complainants were laid-off when this project was discontinued. Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of EO 17m the reorganization law of the CMU. In 1968, Chua launched a self-help project called CMU-income enhancement program( CMU_IEP) to develop unutilized land. The CMU would provide the use of 4-5 hectares of land to a selda in turn would pay to the CMU P100 as service fee and P1000/hectare as land rental fee; 400 kg of the produce per year would be donated to the CMU Integrated Development Foundation. In the middle of 1987, CMU allowed the former employees and workers to participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants. The one year contract expired on June 30 1988. Some were renewed some were asked to vacate and this led to the filing of the complaint. DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. ISSUES: Whether or not 1) DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Declaration of Status of Tenants and Coverage of land under Carp 2) CA committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming DARAB DECISION: The SC finds a grave of abuse of discretion by CA and DAR adjudication Board, hereby declares the decision of CA and DARAB affirming the decision of the quasi-judicial body as null and void and hereby
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order that they be set aside with costs against the private respondents. RATIO: Obrique claimed that they are tenants of the CMU or landless peasants claiming a part of the CMU situated at Sinalayan Bukidnon and Musuan Bukidnon. The Supreme Court agree with the DARAB that Obrique et al are not tenants. There was not landlord-tenant relationship between the CMU and the faculty. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land participants fee in consideration for the assistance given to the participants. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and their settlement on the CMUs land was without legal authority. Squatters means any person entering upon lands of other, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land. Illegal detainers may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. However, the Board held that the respondent University failed to show that it actually uses the questioned area tot the exclusion of others nor did it show that the same is directly used without any intervening agency or person and tjhat the use of land are essentially for educational purposes. The pertinent provisions of RA 6657 aka CAR lar of 1968 are as follows Sec4- the Comprehensive agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and !) 229 including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture Sec 10- EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS- lands actually directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watershed, and mangroves, national defense , school sites, and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosques sites and Islamic Centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, govt, and private search and quarantine centers and all lands with 18% slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this act The 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990 is not covered by the CARP because: 1) It is not alienable, and disposable land of the public domains 2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress 3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU 4) It is exempt from coverage under Sec 10 RA 6657 Under Section 4 and Section 10, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. The DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMUs titled school site. The DARABs order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was without legal authority.
EO 129 A Sec 13- AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD-there is hereby created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall assume the powers and functions with respect to adjudication of agrarian reform cases under EO 229 and the EO. Sec 17- QUASI JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR- the Dar is hereby vested with quasi0judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters including implementation of Agrarian Reform. Sec 5- the DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.
Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded for future beneficiaries. Going beyond what was asked by
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the complainants who were not entitled tot eh relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. CIR VS. LINGAYEN GULF ELECTRIC POWER CO, INC. (164 SCRA 27) FACTS: Respondent taxpayer, Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co, Inc operates an electric power plant serving Binmaley and Lingyen in Panagasinan, pursuant to the municipal franchise granted it by their respective municipal councils under Resolution Nos. 14 and 25 of June 29 and July 2, 1946, respectively. Sec 10 provide that: The said grantee in consideration of the franchise hereby granted, shall pay quarterly into the Provincial Treasury of Pangasinan, one per centum of the gross earnings obtained thru this privilege during the first twenty years and two per centum during the remaining 15 years of the life of said franchise. Feb 24, 1948- President approved the franchise Nov 21, 1955- BIR assessed against and demanded them from the private respondent P19293.43 as deficiency in taxes from 1946-1954 Sept 29, 1956- private respondent requested for a reinvestigation of the case that instead of incurring a liability, it made an overpayment The Commissioners denied the conference that the petitioner requested. Aug 21, 1962- Commissioner demanded from private respondent P3616.86 as deficiency franchise tax Oct 5, 1962- private respondent protested the assessment and requested reconsideration but was denied Pending the hearing RA 3843 was passed on June 22, 1963, granting the private respondent, legislative franchise= 2% of the gross receipts payable quarterly Sept 15, 1964 the respondent court ruled that the provisions of RA 3843 should apply and accordingly dismissed the claim of the CIR ISSUES: Whether or not: 1) the 5% tax prescribed in Sec259 of the National Internal Revenue Code assessed against private respondent realized before the affectivity of RA 3843 2) Sec 4 of RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the uniformity and equality of taxation 3)Sec 4 RA 3843 is valid, whether or not it could be given retroactive effect so as to render uncollectible the taxes in question which were assessed before its enactment 4) The taxpayer is liable for P3025.96 for Jan 1, 1946-Feb 29, 1948 DECISION: The decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED. RATIO: It is the contention of the CIR that the private respondent should have been liable for the 5% franchise tax on gross receipts prescribed in Section 259 of the Tax Code, instead of lower franchise tax because Sec 259 of the Tax Code was amended by RA 39 on Oct 1, 1946. The franchise of the respondent was existing at the time of the amendment since the franchises were accepted on March 1, 1948 after the approval of the president on Feb 24, 1948. However, RA 3843 granted the private respondent a legislative franchise in June 196r, amending, altering or even repealing the said municipal franchises, providing only a 2% tax and effective further upon the date the original franchise was grated. The private respondent was liable to pay only the 2% franchise tax, effective from the date the original municipal franchise was granted.
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The petitioner submits that the said law was unconstitutional insofar as it provides 2% tax for the respondent while other taxpayers similarly situated were subject to 5%. A tax in uniform when it operates with the same force and affect in every place where the subject of it is found. However, RA 3843transfered the petitioners power plant from the class provided for in Act 3636. Thus it was only effected transfer of a taxable property from one class to another. The 5% tax in Section 259 was never intended to have a universal application. The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case, therefore holding the law constitutional. RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law for it provides that it is effective upon approval of the franchise. The private respondent therefore is only liable for the payment of percentage and fixed tax rates as seller of light, heat and power, P3025.96. But the respondent paid the amount of P34, 184.36 which were very much more than the amount due. CIR vs. COURT OF APPEALS (298 SRCA 683) FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) allowing the Young Mens Christian Association of the Philippines (YMCA) established as a welfare, educational and charitable non-profit corporation to claim tax exemption on the latters income from the lease of its real property. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to Private Respondent YMCA in the total amount of P415,615.01 for taxes. YMCA filed a letter regarding their protest on the assessment. CIR denied the claims of YMCA. YMCA filed a petition for review at CTA. The CTA issued a ruling in favor of YMCA. Dissatisfied with the CTA ruling, the CIR elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), which initially decided in favor of CIR. YMCA asked for reconsideration and the CA reversed itself in favor of YMCA. The ruling reads: The court cannot depart from the CTAs findings of fact, as they are supported by evidence beyond what is considered as substantial. CIRs Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner CIR argues that while the income received by the organizations enumerated in Sec 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) is, as a rule, exempted from the payment of tax in respect to income received by them as such, the exemption does not apply to income derived from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income. Rentals, therefore, derived by a tax exempt organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal, is not, exempt from income taxation even if such income os exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives. Private respondent YMCA also invokes Art. VI Sec. 28 par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, which exempts charitable institutions from the payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source. It also invokes Article XIV Sec. 4 par. 3 of the Constitution, claiming that the YMCA is a nonstock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. ISSUE: Whether or not the income derived from rentals of real property owned by YMCA is subject to income tax under Sec. 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code and Article VI Sec. 28 par. 3 and Article XIV Sec. 4 par. 3 of the Constitution. HELD:
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YES. The petition is granted. The latter decision of the Court of Appeals in reversed and set aside. The initial decision of the Court of Appeals in reinstated, insofar as it ruled that the income derived by petitioner YMCA from rentals of its real property is subject to income tax. The exemption claimed by YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of the last paragraph of then Section 27 of the NIRC, which mandates that the income of exempt organizations (such as the YMCA) from any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to the tax imposed by the same code. On the constitutional issue, according to Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former constitutional commissioner, what is exempt is not the institution itself x x x; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes. Fr. Bernas also adhered to the same view that the exemption created by the said provision pertained only to property taxes. The Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by YMCA to prove that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. Also, YMCA cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions within the purview of Article XIV Sec. 4 par. 3 of the Constitution because under the Education Act of 1982, the technical meaning of educational institution which is the school system, is synonymous with formal education. Thus, it refers to the hierarchically structured and chronologically graded learnings organized and provided by the formal school system and for which certification is required in order for the learner to progress through the grades or move to the higher levels. The Court examined the Amended Articles of Incorporation and ByLaws of the YMCA, but found nothing in them that even hints that it is a school or an educational system. The Court finds no basis for granting YMCA exemption from income tax under the constitutional provision invoked.
SECTION 29. 1. NO MONEY SHALL BE PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT IN PURSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW. 2. NO PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY SHALL BE APPROPRIATED, APPLIED, PAID, OR EMPLOYED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FOR THE USE, BENEFIT, OR SUPPORT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH, DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR OF ANY PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OTHER RELIGIOUS TEACHER, OR DIGNITARY AS SUCH, EXCEPT WHEN SUCH PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OR DIGNITARY IS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMED FORCES, OR TO ANY PENAL INSTITUTION, OR GOVERNMENT ORPHANAGE OR LEPROSARIUM. 3. ALL MONEY COLLECTED ON ANY TAX LEVIED FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL FUND AND PAID OUT FOR SUCH PURPOSE ONLY. IF THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH A SPECIAL FUND WAS CREATED HAS BEEN FULFILLED OR ABANDONED, THE BALANCE, IF ANY, SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS (110 PHIL 331) FACTS: Wenceslao Pascual, Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted an action for declaratory relief, with
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injunction, assailing the approval of the Republic Act No. 920, entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works and the Donation made by Jose Zulueta, who at the time of the passage and approval of the said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines. RA 920 (Act appropriating funds for public works) was enacted in 1953 containing an item (Section 1 c[a]) for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals (the projected and planned subdivision roads, which were not yet constructed, within Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C. Zulueta). Antonio Subdivision was a private property of Zulueta. Zulueta donated said parcels of land to the Government 5 months after the enactment of RA 920, on the condition that if the Government violates such condition the lands would revert to Zulueta. The provincial governor of Rizal, Wenceslao Pascual, questioned the validity of the donation and the Constitutionality of the item in RA 920, it being not for a public purpose. ISSUES: Whether or not the item in RA 920 is constitutional. Whether or not the donation made by Zulueta was valid. HELD: It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public purpose. The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occupying, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute. Herein, inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged to Senator Zulueta at the time RA 920 was passed by Congress, or approved by the President, and the disbursement of said sum became effective on 20 June 1953 pursuant to Section 13 of the Act, the result is that the appropriating sough a private purpose and hence, null and void. The land on which projected feeder roads are to be constructed belongs to a private person, an appropriation made by the Congress for that purpose is null and void, and a donation to the Government, made over 5 months after the approval and effectivity of the Act for the purpose of giving a semblance of legality to the appropriation, does not cure the basic effect. As a result, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS VS. QUIJANO-PADILLA (389 SCRA 353) FACTS: The Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the " Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list and the appropriate of funds therefore "in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters." Subsequently, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No. 00-0315 approving in principle the Voter's Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS). The VRIS Project envisions a computerized database system for the May 2004 Elections. Bidding for the supply and installation of information technology equipment and ancillary services was held. Private Respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation was declared the winning bidder, the bid amounting to P6.588 Billion Pesos and was given the Notice of Award. However, under Republic Act No. 8760 the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELECs modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos. Due to that fact, COMELEC can no longer
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pursue the project with Photokina since they do not have sufficient funds for the said project. Meanwhile, Photokina wrote several letters requesting the formal execution of the contract, but to no avail. Due to that fact, Photokina filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages against the COMELEC and all its commissioners claiming that since it was the winning bidder and was given the Notice of Award, the COMELEC must formalize the contract and since the latter failed to perform its duty under the contract has caused Photokina to incur damages in the preparation of the bid and draft of the contract. ISSUES: Whether or not Mandamus is the proper remedy of Photokina in the case at bar. Whether or not Photokina can compel COMELEC to formalize the contract. HELD: Mandamus applies as a remedy only when petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. Here, the alleged contract, relied upon Photokina as a source of rights which it seeks to be protected, is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also it is illegal and against public policy. Since Photokinas bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void, the petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where the disbursement of public funds is concerned.
SECTION 30. NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED INCREASING THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT AS PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION WITHOUT ITS ADVICE AND CONCURRENCE.
FABIAN vs. DESIERTO (295 SCRA 471) FACTS: Teresita Fabian was the major stockbroker and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent, Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED). PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those under the FMED, and Agustin, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled Fabian into an amorous relationship, which lasted for some time. During the said relationship, Agustin gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
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When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Eventually, Fabian filed an administrative case against him on July 24, 1995. She sought Agustins dismissal for violating Sec 19, RA no. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Sec 36 of PD no. 807 (Civil Service Decree) Jan 31, 1996: Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. But Deputy Ombudsman, Hon. Jesus F. Guerrero, exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges. Based from Sec 7 of Rule III of AO No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved from all administrative charges, the decision of the ombudsman is FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE. Fabian is arguing that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. For Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770 states that all administrative disciplinary cases of the Office of Ombudsman MAY BE APPEALED TO THE SC by filling a petition of certiorari within 10 days from the receipt of the written notice of the order in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But RA no. 6770 violates Sec 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent. Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raise at any time or on the courts own motion. Thus, if a statute on which a courts jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid. RATIO: Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasijudicial agencies. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rulemaking power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
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In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. o If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. But if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure o If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter. For this reason a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. Therefore, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared.
HELD: WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect. The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a petition for review under Rule 43.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

EO no. 66 (amended EO no. 22) EO no. 80 (revived EO no. 22)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

June 29, 1946

Latter part of October, 1949

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Therefore, the decree in question is constitutional.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTS ARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT