The Rule-Following Considerations

Mind Association
The Rule-Following Considerations Author(s): Paul A. Boghossian Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 98, No. 392 (Oct., 1989), pp. 507-549 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255039 . Accessed: 01/09/2013 20:48
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The Rule-Following Considerations'

PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN This is thefifthof our commissioned State of the Art Series INTRODUCTION of interest in the i. Recentyearshave witnessed a greatresurgence of the later Wittgenstein, writings especiallywith those passagesroughly, Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the ##I/38-242 Foundations ofMathematics, section VI-that areconcerned with thetopic ofrules.Much ofthecredit forall thisexcitement, unparalleled sincethe of Wittgenstein in the earlyI96os, mustgo to Saul heyday scholarship It is easyto explain Kripke'sWittgenstein onRulesandPrivate Language.2 why. To beginwith,the dialecticKripkeuncovered fromWittgenstein's is enormously on itsownterms. discussion exciting On Kripke's reading, on rule-following thepassages are concerned withsomeoftheweightiest of meaning, the reality, questionsin the theory questions-involving ofmeaning-that incontemandprivacy reducibility, occupy centre-stage as poraryphilosophy. Furthermore, Kripke represented Wittgenstein and extremely claimsconcerning defending a set of unified provocative fortheseclaimswithpowerand thesequestions. And,finally, he argued floodof articles and bookson the subjectof ruleThe ensuing clarity. and warranted. following was bothpredictable to survey thisliterature. The present paperis theresult ofan invitation on what It couldhavebeenaboutexegetical therecent discussions matters, have had to teachus about the historical Wittgenstein's philosophical witha it is almostentirely concerned views. In the event,however, of ofthephilosophical contributions. Limitations assessment retrospective thata choicebe made; and the philosophical assessment space dictated to do.3Despitea lotofdiscussion, there is seemed themore fruitful thing of Kripke's of the precisenature roomforan improved understanding
1 I am grateful including in thispaper, oftheissuescovered discussion peoplefor helpful to many Richard Allen, LarrySklar, Rorty, Barry Loewer, Fodor,Barry Burgess, Jerry John MarkJohnston, in various and participants SteveYablo, Nick White, Neil Tennant, Saul Kripke, Crispin Wright, Church, Jennifer aredue to Paul Benacerraf, Specialthanks at theUniversity ofMichigan. seminars and David Velleman. 'K'. 2 Cambridge, Harvard Press,I982. Henceforth, University interpretation of come to despairof a satisfactory 3 The main reasonis thatI have actually to appearin of Meaningin Wittgenstein', views.I tryto say whyin 'The Problem Wittgenstein's forthcoming. ed. K. Puhl,De Gruyter, Meaning Scepticism,
Mind, Vol. 98
392
October I989
Press I989 OxfordUniversity
5o8 Paul A. Boghossian
of their to the wider ultimate and of their relation arguments, cogency, in contemporary ofmeaning ofmindand language. discussion philosophy on thethread to a Pulling thatis Kripke's argument leadsquitenaturally ofmany ofthemostsignificant discussion issuesoccupying philosophers in thatlies themainimpetus behind thepresent today; essay. I proceedas follows. In partsI and II, I lay out the essentials of In subsequent I offer of Kripke'sargument. an extended parts, critique it presents, thedialectic on its own terms and independently considered of exegetical A discussion of the critical concerns. literature will be inas appropriate. The moral willnotbe recognizably woven Wittgensteinofmeaning ian:I shallargue theconception that, pace Kripke's intent, that is a realist, and judgement-independent conemerges non-reductionist, one which, sustains no obvious ception, moreover, animus against private language.
KRIPKE
ON MEANING
PROBLEM
AND
THE
SCEPTICAL
The sceptical problem As Kripke seesit,theburden oftherule-following is that considerations it cannot be trueofanysymbol thatit expresses someparticular literally This is the now-famous conceptor meaning. conclusion' he 'sceptical attributes to Wittgenstein:
2.
function by '+'...
is no fact about methat distinguishes between mymeaning a definite [T]here

and mymeaning at all.4 nothing
to be supported? How is sucha radical thesis in effect, Kripke argues, by elimination: all the available factspotentially relevantto fixing the in a given ofa symbol meaning speaker's abouthowthe repertoire-facts hasactually usedtheexpression, facts speaker abouthowhe is disposed to use it,and facts abouthis qualitative mental and history are canvassed, foundwanting. on whatit is foran expression to Adequatereflection wouldbetray, so Kripke us to believe, possessa meaning invites that that couldnotbe constituted fact by anyof those. The claimis, of course,indisputable in connection withfactsabout actualuse and qualitative it is a familiar and well-assimilated phenomena; lessonof, precisely, Wittgenstein's thatneither Investigations, of those in isolation offact or in combination, species it could,either what capture is for a symbolto possess a meaning.Much more important and of a dispositional is Kripke'srejection controversial, however, of account
K., p. 2I.
509 Considerations TheRule-Following meaningfacts.Why are factsabout how a speakeris disposed to use an its meaning? to determine expressionheld to be insufficient First,the idea of meaning Kripke develops two sortsof consideration. character if I meanplus by a wordis an idea withan infinitary something about how I oughtto apply no end oftruths by ' + ', thenthereare literally the term,namely to just the membersof this set of triplesand not to if I am to use it in accord withits meaning.This is not merelyan others, example; it holds forany concept. If I mean of the arithmetical artefact horseby 'horse', then there are literallyno end of truthsabout how it would be correctforme to apply the term to horseson Alpha Centauri, and so on, but not to cows or cats wherever to horsesin ImperialArmenia, theymay be if I am to use it in accord with its meaning.But, Kripke is finite, being the dispositionsof a of my dispositions argues,the totality time. And so, factsabout dispositions finite being that exists fora finite cannotcapturewhat it is forme to mean additionby '+'. stemsfromthe so-called theory The second objectionto a dispositional harderto state,but a of meaning.This objectionis somewhat 'normativity' will do fornow. The pointis that,if I mean something roughformulation of truths thatare generatedas thenthe potentialinfinity by an expression, to applythe about how I ought truths: theyare truths a resultare normative about ifI am to apply it in accord withits meaning,not truths expression, by an expression,it appears, how I-will apply it. My meaningsomething it guaranteesonly that does not guaranteethat I will apply it correctly; therewill be a factof the matterabout whethermy use of it is correct. may be convertedinto a conditionof adequacy on Now, this observation theoriesof meaning: any proposed candidate for being the propertyin virtueof whichan expressionhas meaningmust be such as to groundthe of meaning it ought to be possible to read offfromany normativity use of ofa word,whatis thecorrect property allegedmeaning-constituting Kripke maintains,that a disposithat word. And this is a requirement, to use a speaker'sdisposition cannotpass: one cannotread off tionaltheory for use of thatexpression, in a certainway whatis the correct an expression to be disposed to use an expressionin a certainway implies at most that one will, not that one should. The contentsof thought mental and othercontent-bearing intentions, 3. But whatabout thoughts, is More specifically: in the scepticalargument? states?How do theyfigure solelyto the scepticalthesisdirectedagainstthemas well, or is it confined representation? linguistic could be confined It is hardto see how a convincing meaningscepticism purely to the linguistic domain, given the intimate relation between thought and language. Philosophers divide, of course, on the precise
5 IO
Paul A. Boghossian
Do on the question of priority: natureof this relationand, in particular, the semantic propertiesof language derive from the representational or is it the otherway round?5Whateverthe correct properties of thought, answer,however,therewould appear to be no plausible way to promotea one On the former (Gricean) picture, meaningscepticism. language-specific thoughtcontent, linguisticmeaningwithoutthreatening cannot threaten since it is fromthoughtthatlinguisticmeaningis held to derive; and on the latter (Sellarsian) picture, one cannot threatenlinguisticmeaning threatening thoughtcontent,since it is fromlinguistic withoutthereby meaningthat thoughtcontentis held to derive. Either way, contentand meaningmust stand or fall together. meaningis to have any prospectof If a scepticalthesisabout linguistic of mentalmeaning the possibility succeeding,then,it must also threaten given (or content).Of course,on a Sellarsianview,thatresultis automatic, thatnothing non-mental fixeslinguistic meaning.But on a a demonstration Gricean view mattersare not so simple. Since the Gricean holds that fixedcontent itemsacquire theirmeaningfromthe antecedently linguistic to the effect thatnothingnon-mental fixes of mentalstates,an argument meaningwould leave the Griceanunmoved;he needs to be given linguistic of mentalcontent.Does Kripke a separateargument againstthe possibility see this need and does he show how it is to be met? Colin McGinn has argued thatthe answerto both questions is 'no': ofhisparadox. presentation up a reallacunain Kripke's My third point ... points at thelevelof forKripketo applyhis paradox The pointis thatit is necessary thatis, he has to arguethatthe notionof possessing a determinate concepts; be said,however, is likewise devoidoffactual foundation. . .. It cannot concept oftheparadox howthis extension howthis needis tobe met, that Kripke explains showsthatthe to thelevelof concepts is to be carried out; and brief reflection exercise is by no meanstrivial.6 I think to see why. McGinn is wrongon both counts;it will be worthwhile In fact, the suggestionthat some appropriatelygeneral thoughtor intention the soughtaftermeaning-determining factcomes up constitutes the dispositional accountof meaning before earlyin Kripke's presentation, is consideredand foundwanting:
In theUnitedStates,it is the Griceanview,thatlinguistic expressions acquiretheir semantic and desires, properties byvirtue ofbeing usedwith certain intentions, beliefs, that is most influential; in Britain whereas it appearsto be theSellarsian (Wittgensteinian?) viewthatthinking is a form of internalized speaking-speech inforointerno, as Sellarslikesto putit-that tendsto predominate. For theGricean viewsee H. P. Grice,'Meaning', Philosophical Review, I957; and related papers. See also, S. Schiffer, Clarendon Meaning, Oxford, Press, I972. For the Sellarsianview see his and thePhilosophy 'Empiricism ofMind',in his Science, Perception andReality, London,Routledge and KeganPaul, I963. For a debateon thepriority question see 'The Chisholm-Sellars CorresponMindand Language, ed. A. Marras,Urbana,University dence',in Intentionality, of IllinoisPress,
I972. 6
ColinMcGinn,Wittgenstein onMeaning, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, I984, pp. I44-6.
5II Considerations TheRule-Following time. at someearlier gavemyself I explicitly I maysuppose, This setofdirections, that with thehypothesis as ona slate.It is incompatible onmymind It is engraved additions listofparticular notthefinite quus. It is thissetofdirections, I meant response.7 mypresent and determines justifies in thepast,that thatI performed that And his responseto it seems clear (p. i6ff).The idea is thatthoughts someone may have had concerninghow he is prepared to use a certain a meaningforthatexpressiononly if their will help determine expression is presupposed.But this is equivalentto assuming, correctinterpretation thatthe scepticalchallengehas been met withrespectto Kripke suggests, But how was theirmeaning thatfigurein thosethoughts. the expressions of use, (if history Not by factsabout theiractual or counterfactual fixed? accountof meaningis to be believed); againsta dispositional theargument episodes. Hence on associated experiential and not by factsconcerning the assumptionthat no other sort of fact is relevantto the fixationof meaning by nothing. The troubleis thatit seemsclear; but is it not problematic? The strategy seems to depend on the assumption that thought contents are the identifiablebearers properties,that is, of propertiesof syntactically belongingto a 'language of thought'.And althoughtheremay expressions thisview,still,does Kripke reallywish to restthe be much to recommend scepticalconclusionon so contestablea premiss? we will see below that,althougha forthe scepticalstrategy, Fortunately contestablepremissabout thoughtis involved,it is nothingso rich as a But we will be in a positionto appreciate hypothesis. languageof thought this properlyonly afterwe have examined McGinn's claim that, even it is stillimpossibleto runa Kripkemodel ofthinking, a linguistic granted againstthought. stylescepticalargument
The normativity of meaning

4. McGinn writes: in has no clearcontent issueforKripke, thecrucial The issueofnormativeness, of thought: whatdoes it meanto ask whether my to the language application of a of thought (i.e. theexercise of a wordin mylanguage current employment ofthatword? in thelight ofmyearlier is correct employment concept) particular ofa thought): tothe falsity incorrectness (as opposed theideaoflinguistic here for is using thesameword weareconcerned with) (ofthekind incorrectness linguistic so in ignorance intended from that (and doing with a different originally meaning with a concept in thiswaymakesenseofemploying butwecannot ofthechange), intended it wouldjust be a different thatoriginally content from a different
concept.8
What kind of linguisticmistakeis envisagedhere?. . . There is just no analogue
The idea of mental contentcannot be threatenedby Kripke, McGinn

7 K.,
pp.I5-I6.
Op. Cit.,p. I47.
5I2
Paul A. Boghossian
argues,because theprincipal requirement by whichputative reconstructions of thatnotionare to be dispatched-the normativity requirement-has no cogent application to the language of thought.The claim calls for a ofthenormativity somewhat moresearching articulation thesisthanwe have of meaningconsist? attempted so far.In what does the normativity McGinn offers the following characterization: The notion ofnormativeness is a transtemporal Kripke wants captured notion .... We have an accountof this normativeness whenwe have two things: (a) an ofwhat itis tomeansomething account time at a given and(b) an account ofwhat itis to meanthesame thing at different times-since(Kripkean) is normativeness a matter of meaning nowwhatone meant earlier.9 So, the lateruse of the expressionis 'correct',accordingto McGinn, if it then expressesthe same meaningas it did earlier;'incorrect'if, without intendingto introducea change of meaning by explicit stipulation,it expresses a different meaning. It is in such facts as this that the of meaningis said to consist. normativity ofnormativity, howwouldit Supposingthisweretheright understanding mentalcontent affect scepticism? McGinn says thatthe problemis thatwe cannotmakesenseofemploying a conceptwitha different content from that originally intended-it would just be a different concept.But although that is certainly true,it is also irrelevant: whatwe need to make sense of is not a concept witha different fromthatoriginally employing content intended, but employingan expression in the languageof thought with a different contentfromthatoriginally whichis a rather intended, different matter. As it happens, however,it is an idea that is equally problematic. The is thatwe do not have the sortof access to the expressions difficulty of our to us of semanticintentions in language of thoughtthat an attribution respectof themwould appear to presuppose.You cannotintendthatsome expressionhave a certainmeaning unless you are able to referto that of its semanticproperties. expressionindependently But we have no such independentaccess to the expressionsof our language of thought;we do not, forinstance,know what theylook like. So we cannot have semantic in respectof themand, hence,cannotmake sense of usingthem intentions or incorrectly in the sense definedby McGinn. correctly If McGinn's understanding ofnormativity werethe correct one, then,it to see how it could operateat thelevel of thought would indeed be difficult (thoughnot quite forthe reasonshe gives). It oughtto be clear,however, thatthe 'normativity' requirement definedby McGinn has nothingmuch to do withthe concept of meaningper se and is not the requirement that Kripke is operatingwith. We mayappreciatethispointby observing thattherequirement defined
9 Ibid.,p. I74.
5I 3 Considerations TheRule-Following on theoriesof by McGinn could hardlyact as a substantiveconstraint meaning.Any meaning,even where these are theoriessolely of linguistic ofmeaningthatprovidedan accountofwhatspeakersmean by their theory may otherwise times howevercrazy thattheory at arbitrary expressions be would satisfyMcGinn's constraint.In particular,the main theory would easily requirement, on thenormativity allegedby Kripketo founder facts determinate pass it on McGinn's reading: since thereare perfectly about what dispositionsare associated with a given expressionat a given since it is no part of Kripke's intentto deny that there time-or, rather, an expressionhas the same or a are-it is always possible to ask whether McGinn's meaning on a dispositionaltheory,thus satisfying different How to explain, then, Kripke's claim that a dispositional requirement. requirement? founderspreciselyon the normativity theory requirementis not the thesis 5. The answer is that the normativity McGinn outlines.What is it then? that 'green' meansgreen.It followsimmediately Suppose the expression things(the greenones) onlyto these 'green' applies correctly theexpression and not to those(the non-greens).The fact that the expressionmeans truthsabout my somethingimplies, that is, a whole set of normative behaviourwith that expression:namely,that my use of it is correctin applicationto certainobjects and not in applicationto others.This is not, as McGinn would have it, a relationbetween meaningsomethingby an by it at some latertime; it expressionat one timeand meaningsomething by it at some timeand its is rather, a relationbetweenmeaningsomething use at that time. a new The normativity ofmeaning turnsout to be, in otherwords,simply in ofmeaning ofwhether one thinks namefor thefamiliar fact that, regardless possess expressions or assertion-theoretic terms, meaningful truth-theoretic correctness consistsin true of correct use. (On the one construal, conditions was to realizethatthis in warranted use.) Kripke'sinsight use, on theother, ofthe ofadequacyon theories intoa condition observation maybe converted in virtue ofmeaning: determination anyproposedcandidatefortheproperty of which an expressionhas meaning,must be such as to ground the from anyalleged ofmeaning-it oughtto be possibleto readoff 'normativity' ofa word,whatis thecorrect use ofthatword. property meaning constituting in question,a oftherequirement It is easyto see how,on thisunderstanding itwouldseem,one cannotread theory might appearto failit:for, dispositional use ofthat to use a wordin a certain waywhatis thecorrect off a disposition for to be disposedto use a wordin a certain wayimpliesat mostthatone word, to use wordsincorrectly). '0 notthatone should (one can havedispositions will,
10 As weshallsee below, do accounts ofmeaning whether really thequestion dispositional however, to thanthis.I am notheretrying is muchmorecomplicated to thenormativity succumb objection to stateit. butmerely assesstheobjection,
5 I4
Paul A. Boghossian
it aims to promote.''
in placewe arefinally ofthenormativity thesis in 6. Withthisclarification to settlethe question:can Kripkedevelopthe same sortof a position ofthought as he develops meaning-sceptical argument against a language Andtheanswer is: clearly, fixes the against public language? yes.For:what on of Not other of in meaning expressions thelanguage thought? thoughts, of such actual Not factsabout the pain of viciousregress. tokening or factsabout associatedqualitative expressions episodes,forfamiliar of such expresreasons. And not dispositional factsaboutthetokening conditions of of mentalese sincemeaningful sions, for, expressions possess thesamesenseas publiclanguage correct use in precisely expressions do, becausecorrectness cannot be reconstructed dispositionally. So, nothing fixes their meaning. to see,as promised, thatnothing Indeed,we arealso nowin a position ofthought needed.A language so richas a language is strictly hypothesis the of thought modelis composed out of two theses:(a) thatthinking thatmeans thought that p involves tokening an item-a representation is so involved thatp; and (b) thatthe representation whosetokening possessesa combinatorial syntactic and semantic structure. In other of thought contents to a language words, according hypothesis, thought are the semantic of syntactically and semantically properties structured in thesceptical bearers. Butitshouldbe quiteclearthat nothing argument on theassumption depends ofstructure: eveniftherepresentation wereto no internal possess syntax, we couldstillask,in proper Kripkean fashion, what its correctness conditions are and in virtueof what theyare determined. It wouldappear,however, thatthesceptical argument's strategy does presuppose thatcontent properties havesome sortof bearer (evenifnot a structured there necessarily one). For,otherwise, willbe no natural way to formulate ofthought a dispositional theory content, andno natural way to bring thenormativity requirement to bearagainst it. Therehas to be or particular, it neednotmatter which whose something-a state, event, to get tokened undercertain circumstances on a disposition constitutes, ofa certain itspossession Andalthough dispositional theory, content. this commitment it is also very is, I suppose,strictly speaking contestable, natural and plausible. After all, contents do not figure in a mental life exceptas subtended by a particular mode belief,desire,judgement, wish and,hence, arenaturally understood as theproperties ofthestates or events thatinstantiate thosemodes. And so we see thatthe sceptical argument must,can, and does (in intent, anyway) include mental content within thescopeofthescepticism
willhangon it,and sinceit willease exposition, I shallhenceforth l Since nothing write as ifa ofthought language hypothesis weretrue.
TheRule-Following Considerations 5I 5
Theconstitutive nature ofthesceptical problem

7. Havinga meaning is essentially a matter of possessing a correctness And the sceptical condition. challenge is to explainhow anything could possessthat. Notice,by the way,thatI have statedthe sceptical problem about meaningwithoutonce mentioning Kripke's notorious sceptic.That to character, as everyone knows,proceedsby inviting his interlocutor '+'. The defend a claim aboutwhat he previously meant bytheexpression interlocutor innocently assumeshimself to havemeant addition; but the theconcept sceptic challenges himtoprove that in question wasnotinfact fora singularity where is justlikeaddition, quaddition except quaddition, in the interlocutor's arithmetical at a pointnot previously encountered practice. I havedescribed thesceptical couldnot It mayseem, that then, problem to be Kripke's. For Kripke's problem appears be essentially epistemological todefend incharacter-it concerns a speaker's ability a particular meaning I not whereas the have outlined is ascription; problem constitutive, ofmeaning, notourknowledge epistemological-its topicis thepossibility of it. In fact,however, the two problems are the same; Kripke merely the constitutive in an epistemological choosesto present problem guise. abouta givenclass ofjudgements is theview Epistemological scepticism thatour actualcognitive capacities are incapableof delivering justified in that opinions concerning judgements class.Kripke's sceptic is notafter ofthatsort.This is evident from thefact in a thesis thathisinterlocutor, to justify his claimthathe meantaddition beingchallenged by '+', is permitted complete and omniscient access to all the facts about his previous behavioural, mental, and physical history; he is notrestricted to thesortof knowledge thatan ordinary creature, equippedwithordinary cognitive powers,would be expectedto possess.'2 Kripke'ssceptical to promoting unsuited an epistemological scenario is, thus,completely of a constitutive What it is suited for is the promotion scepticism. of For ifhis sceptic is able to showthat, evenwith thebenefit scepticism. is stillunableto justify his interlocutor access to all the relevant facts, thatwouldleaveus no choice claimaboutwhathe meant, anyparticular 13 butto conclude thatthere are no facts aboutmeaning. theproblem is not-not evenin Pace manyofKripke's readers, then,
12 McGinn's failure how the constitutive and epistemological to notethisleads himto wonder the distinct from 'fortheepistemological claimis clearly are related, aspectsof Kripke'sdiscussion metaphysical claim'(op. cit.,p. 149). of theArgument Wright in his 'Kripke'sAccount 13 This pointis made very nicely by Crispin another however, discerns I984, pp. 76I-2. Wright, Language', ofPhilosophy, Against Private Journal to thesceptical problem. I willdiscussthatbelow. dimension sortofepistemological
5I6
Paul A. Boghossian
part-epistemological scepticism about meaning.14But, of course,one mayagreethat theproblem is constitutive in character, it and yetbelieve to havean epistemological dimension. According to Crispin Wright, for in the merepossibility example, Kripkeis not interested of correctness he is interested in thepossibility conditions; ofcorrectness conditions that 5 The problem maybe,at leastin one'sowncase,known non-inferentially. is essentially constitutive in character; butacceptable to it are to answers to an epistemic be subject constraint. I do notwishtoargue aboutthis It doesseemtomethat, at length. once we havecorrected for thedistortions induced there bythedialogic setting, oughtnot to be any residualtemptation to thinkthatepistemological a critical In anycase, considerations areplaying roleinKripke's argument. he adduces intention whatever Kripkemayhavehad, theconsiderations on behalf ofthesceptical to epistemoloconclusion appeartoowenothing gicalconstraints and can be stated their without is help.16 That,anyway, howI shallpresent them.
The 'rule-following' considerations?

8. It wouldnotbe inappropriate towonder at this what all this hasto point do withthe topicof rule-following? is the connection Where,precisely, between theconcepts ofmeaning and content, on theone hand,and the offollowing a rule,on theother, concept I shallarguethat, forged? in an important sense, the answeris 'nowhere', and hence that 'the rulefollowing considerations' is, strictly a misnomer forthediscusspeaking, sionon offer. Many writers seemto assumethatthe connection is straightforward; as reasoning they maybe represented as follows. Expressions cometohave correctness conditions as a result of peoplefollowing rulesin respect of of correctness them;hence,exploring the possibility is tantamount to thepossibility ofrule-following. exploring oftheconcept offollowing But,at leaston theordinary a understanding itcannot be true ofall expressions-in rule, itcannot be true of particular, mentalexpressions-that theycome to have correctness conditions as a result of peoplefollowing rulesin respect of them. The pointis thatthe a rule-as opposed to that of merely ordinary conceptof following
14 For example, McGinn,op. cit.,pp. 140-50; G. Bakerand P. Hacker,'On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke'sPrivate LanguageArgument', Neil Tennant Synthese, 1984, pp. 409-I0. has complained that a convincing Kripke's sceptic doesnotultimately bent-rule supply of reinterpretation his interlocutor's words.See his 'Against Kripkean Tennant Scepticism', forthcoming. maywellbe right aboutthis.But hereagain,I think, the perception thatthisaffects the force of thesceptical problem aboutmeaning is a result oftaking thedialogic tooseriously. setting The constitutive problem aboutmeaning-how couldthere so much as be a correctness condition-can be stated quiteforcefully without theactualprovision of a convincing globalreinterpretation of a person's words. 15 See op. cit.,pp. 772-5. 16 Withone relatively minor to be notedbelow. exception
517 Considerations TheRule-Following
act: it involves the to one is the concept of an intentional conforming attemptto bring one's behaviourin line with the dictatesof intentional conception some graspedrule. CrispinWrighthas decribedthis intuitive veryclearly: involve typically to think, itis natural applying a ruletoa newcasewill, Correctly of the features relevant both to apprehend a double success:it is necessary features, ofthose apprehended in thelight what, situation and to know presented for in thecourse ofa gameofchess, castling willfit orfailtofit therule.Correctly at of chessmen of theconfiguration willdependbothon apprehension instance, (and the that configuration ofwhether and on a knowledge ofthemove, thetime castling at thatpoint.17 courseof thegame)permits previous a rule is the conceptof conceptof following the ordinary As such,however, lie contentful mentalstates;conan act among whose causal antecendents theidea ofa correctness condition, it is a conceptthatpresupposes sequently, help explainit. Since it makesessential not one thatcan, in fullgenerality, whichin turnmakesessential attitude, playwiththe idea of a propositional in thissense presupposesthat rule-following play withthe idea of content, On pain ofregress, ofcorrect application. have conditions mental expressions themselves acquire meaning then,it cannotbe truethatmentalexpressions rules in respectof them. as a resultof anyonefollowing What Kripke's discussion is concerned with is the possibility of so long as we keep thatclearlyin mind,talkof 'rule-following' correctness; verywell: is harmless.Simon Blackburnhas capturedthis perspective The topic is ofrules here. I intend no particular theoretical implications bytalking ofa term, and to andincorrect application there is sucha thing as thecorrect that I there is truth andfalsity. than tosaythat is no more there is sucha thing saythat
of wordsbeing and incorrectness, of therebeingcorrectness shall talkindifferently and of theirobeyingprinciplesof application.Whateverthis is, it rule-governed, the productionof a termfrommere noise, and turns is the factthatdistinguishes utteranceinto assertion into the makingof judgment.'8
THE SCEPTICAL SOLUTION

A non-factualist of meaning conception
that no word could have the 9. Having established to his satisfaction of expressing a certainmeaning,Kripke turnsto askinghow this property
1 and the CentralProjectof Considerations Rule-Following 'Wittgenstein's CrispinWright: I989, Basil Blackwell, ed. A. George,Oxford, on Chomsky, in Reflections Linguistics', Theoretical
II
My onlydisagreeI984, pp. 281-2. Strikes Back',Synthese, 'The Individual Blackburn, 18 Simon conditions. withtruth conditions of correctness its identification mentwiththispassageconcerns or justification conditions proof one speciesof a correctness condition; are simply Truthconditions instances. further supply conditions
p. 255.
518 Paul A. Boghossian
conclusion is to be accommodated.The question is urgent,in his view, to be not merelyshockingbut paradoxibecause the conclusionthreatens to theeffect cal. The troubleis thatwe would ordinarily takea remark that therecould not be any such thingas the factthatI mean something by the ' + ' sign, to entail that thereis nothingI could mean by the use of that across all signs and all people, the claim sign. Applied quite generally, becomes the seeminglyparadoxical and self-refuting thesis that no one could mean anything by theiruse of linguistic expressions. A scepticism about meaningfactswould appear to be, then,primafacie anyway,an unstableposition.Sustainingit requiresshowingthatwhat it asserts does not ultimately lapse into a formof pragmaticincoherence. of our ordinary What is called for, in other words, is a rehabilitation practice of attributing content to our thoughtsand utterances,which conservesthe scepticalthesisthatthereare no factsforsuch nevertheless attributions to answerto. That is whatthe 'sceptical solution'is designed to do. It is allegedto have thefollowing startling consequence:theidea ofa language whose meanings are constitutedsolely out of an individual's considered'completelyin isolationfromany wider speaker's properties, to which he may belong', is incoherent.'9 community The scepticalsolutionhas two partsthatare usefully distinguished. The firstconsists in the suggestion that we replace the notion of truth conditions, in our intuitivepicture of sentence meaning, by that of conditions. The second consists in a description of the assertibility conditionsformeaning-attributing assertibility sentences, in the course of which it is argued that it is essential to such sentences that their conditionsadvertto the actions or dispositionsof a commuassertibility nity. The adjustmentrecommendedin the firstpart is supposed to help because if we supposethatfactsor truth conditions are of the essenceof meaningful it willfollow from theskeptical conclusion assertion, thatassertions that anyone are meaningless. evermeansanything On theother hand,if we applyto these thetests . . . no suchconclusion assertions Allthat follows. is needed suggested to legitimize assertions thatsomeonemeanssomething is thattherebe roughly circumstances underwhichtheyare legitimately specifiable assertible, and that the gameof asserting themhas a role in our lives.No supposition that'facts to thoseassertions is needed.20 correspond'
19 Following we maycall thistheconcept Goldfarb, of a 'solitary language'. See his 'Kripkeon on Rules', Wittgenstein ofPhilosophy, theideaofa solitary 1985. Goldfarb goeson to saythat Journal is moregeneral language thanthatof a Wittgensteinian 'private language', forthelatter essentially involves theidea ofnecessary to another. It is hardto assessthis, unintelligibility becauseit is hardto knowhow to interpret 'necessary unintelligibility'. Surelyit cannotmean: a languageto whose predicates no twopeoplecould attach thesamedescriptive conditions. Andit is notclearwhat it is to mean,if notthat.For usefuldiscussion see C. Wright, 'Does Philosophical Investigations I.258-6o Suggest a Cogent Argument Against Private inSubject, Language?', Thought andContext, ed. P. Pettit and J.McDowell,Oxford, Clarendon 20 K., pp. 77-8. Press,I986.
sentence The proposed account is, in effect,a global non-factualism: termsand significance is construedquite generallyin assertion-theoretic possessed no invidiousdistinction is drawnbetweenthesortofsignificance by meaning-attributing sentencesand thatpossessed by sentencesof other types.
language The argument againstsolitary

io. The argument against 'solitary language' emerges, according to Kripke, fromthe observationthat,so long as a speakeris consideredin conditionsto judgementsto the isolationwe can assign no assertibility effect that he has misapplieda symbolin his repertoire: at oneperson as we cango alone,thisis as far [I]fwe confine ourselves to looking which we can saythat, evenifhe inclines under .... Thereareno circumstances what circumstances said'5', orvice-versa . . .. Under tosay'125', heshould have alonecan say at his mindor behavior can he be wrong? No one else by looking ifhe does notaccordwithhis ownintention'; the something like,'He is wrong are no facts abouthimin argument was thatthere wholepointof theskeptical he accords withhis intentions or not.21 virtue ofwhich of error,however,is essentialto our ordinary The possibility concept of meaning,and can only be accommodatedif we widen our gaze and take and betweenour imaginedrule-follower intoconsideration the interaction Were we to do so, Kripke continues,we could a linguisticcommunity. introduceassertibility conditionsforjudgementsabout errorin termsof in the or lack of it, betweena given speaker'spropensities the agreement, use of a termand the community's. Since, however,thiswould appear to notionsof errorand be the onlyway to give substanceto the correlative no one considered wholly in isolation fromother speakers correctness, And so a solitary language is impossible. could be said to mean anything. Let us turn now to an assessmentof the various central aspects of Kripke's argument. III ARGUMENT LANGUAGE
ASSESSMENT
OF THE SOLITARY
AGAINST
and solitary accounts Constitutive language

i i. Kripke is veryclear about the limited, natureof the whollydescriptive explicationsof the view: scepticalsolution,at least in his 'official'
are madeand ofmeaning attributions We haveto see underwhatcircumstances exhortawhatroletheseattributions Wittgenstein's playin ourlives.Following
21
K., p. 88.
520
Paul A. Boghossian
tionnot to think but to look,we will not reasona priori about the role such statements to play; rather ought we will findout whatcircumstances actually license suchassertions and what rolethislicense actually to plays.It is important realizethatwe are not looking and sufficient fornecessary conditions (truth for following a rule, or an analysisof what such rule-following conditions) 'consists in'. Indeedsuchconditions wouldconstitute to the a 'straight' solution skeptical and havebeenrejected.22 problem, It is important to see that the counselled modesty-we will not reason a prioriabout the role such statements ought to play-is compulsory. The conditionsmay not be understoodto providethe content(or assertibility truthconditions)of the meaning-attributing sentences,on pain of falling preyto the accepted scepticalconsiderations. (That is whythe solutionon has to be sceptical:it has alreadybeen conceded thatnothingcould offer cogentlyamount to the fact that a meaning sentencereports).It would appear to followfromthis,however,thatthe scepticalsolutioncan do no morethanrecordthe conditions underwhichspeakersin factconsiderthe attributionof a certain concept warrantedand the endorsementof a particular responseappropriate.The Wittgensteinian exhortation 'not to thinkbut to look' is not merely(as it may be) good advice; the modestyit counsels is enforcedby the factthat truthconditionsforthese sentences has been jettisoned.For how, in the absence of a conceptionof the truth conditions ofmeaningattributing sentences, could theprojectofproviding an account of their assertion conditionsaspire to anythingmore than descriptive adequacy? Were we equipped with an account of theirtruth of course,we mightbe able to reasona prioriabout whattheir conditions, assertion conditions oughtto be and, hence, potentially, to revise the forassertion conditions actuallyacceptedforthem.But without thebenefit of such an account there is no scope for a more ambitious project: a descriptively adequate account of the actual assertionconditionsforsuch sentencesis the most one may cogentlyaim for. If this is correct,however,we ought to be puzzled about how the scepticalsolutionis goingto delivera conclusionagainstsolitary language of the requisite modal force: namely, that there could not be such a language.For even ifit weretruethatour actualassertibility conditions for sentencesadvertto the dispositions meaning-attributing of a community, the mostthatwould licensesayingis thatourlanguageis not solitary. And thiswould be a lot less thanthe resultwe were promised:namely, thatany possible language has to be communal. Communal assertibility conditions? thisworry I 2. Putting to one side, let us ask whether it is in facttruethat, if we accept the sceptical conclusion, we cannot introducesubstantive
22
K., pp. 86-7.
thatdo not advertto the conditionsformeaning-attributions assertibility that of a community of speakers?It appears,on the contrary, dispositions not only can we introducesuch conditions,but have actuallydone so.23 Consider the following: to assertof Jones thathe means additionby '+', (A) It is warranted provided he has responded with the sum in reply to most queries posed thus far. arithmetical (A) is, of course,quite rough:roomhas to of our practice, As a description of systematic deviations,the greaterimportbe made forthe importance But all these to simple cases, and manyothersuch factors. ance attaching may be safelyignoredforthe purposeof raisingthe following refinements of criticalquestion:what in the scepticalconclusionrules out attributions against form(A)? It had betterrule themout, of course,if the argument for(A) advertsto no one otherthanthe languageis to be sustained, solitary individual.But as Goldfarbpointsout, thereappears to be nothingin the scepticalconclusionthatwill rule it out.24 It can hardlybe objected that of the of 'sum' is being presupposedin the statement the interpretation solutionto condition, forthescepticalsolutionis not meantto be a straight the problem about meaning; as Kripke himselfsays, in fendingoffa condisimilarimaginedobjectionto his own account of the assertibility tions: in our lives of a certain the utility is doingis describing WhatWittgenstein As in the in ourownlanguage. givethisdescription he must Necessarily practise. in another form oflifemight a participant case ofanysuchuse ofourlanguage, in a non-standard in the description terms (such as 'agreement') applyvarious unless solution toWittgenstein's be an objection way.... This cannot 'quus-like' at all.25 from anyuse of language he is to be prohibited factual Nor is thereany problemin the assumptionthatit is a genuinely matterwhat any two numbers sum to; as Kripke himselfrepeatedly emphasizes, the sceptical argumentdoes not threatenthe existence of facts.But how,then,is (A) to be ruledout,and theargument mathematical language preserved? againstsolitary though parasiticon I3. Could it perphapsbe arguedthat(A) is permissible of fact, As a matter conditions Kripke outlines? thecommunalassertibility just the opposite seems true.26 runs as folaccount of meaning-attributions Kripke's communitarian lows: Jones's to meanaddition by 'plus' onlyifhe judgesthat SmithwilljudgeJones togive.... he is inclined with those toparticular addition agree answers problems
23
24 26
op. cit.,and in McGinn,op. cit. bothin Goldfarb, is canvassed This sortofrejoinder 25 K., p. I46. Ibid. thispointis derived. which in McGinn,op cit.,pp. I85-7, from This is argued
522
Paul A. Boghossian
IfJones inagreement with consistently fails togive responses Smith Smith's, will that hedoesnot mean addition EvenifJones judge didmean itin by'plus'. injudging the past, thepresent will deviation justify Smith that hehaslapsed.27 to thisaccount, I willjudgethat means addition According then, Jones by 'plus' only ifJones uses'plus'enough in thesamewayI am inclined times to use it. As a roughdescription of our practice, and manyimportant refinements One of therefinements aside,thisseemsacceptable enough. thatis calledfor, however, exposesthefactthatKripke's communitarian on thesolitary conditions are parasitic and nottheother conditions, way round. It wouldbe absurd for me,under conditions I hadgoodreason to where believethatI had becomeproneto making arithmetical mistakes-perhapsowing to intoxication or senility or whatever-to on agreement insist for with with oftheconcept me as a precondition crediting Jones mastery ofaddition. Andthiswouldappearto showthat, at a minimum, Kripke's communitarian account to read: mustbe modified to assert ofJones (B) It is warranted thathe meansaddition by '+', providedhe agreeswithmy responses to arithmetical queries,
I have beena reliablecomputer underconditions where of sums.
But thismodification wouldseemimmediately toreveal that thereference to 'my own responses' is idle, and thatthe basic assertion I condition acceptis just(A): It is warranted to assertof Jonesthathe meansadditionby '+', provided he has responded withthesumin reply to mostarithmetical queries posedthusfar. It wouldappear, in other that theacceptability words, ofthecommunitaris ianconditions strongly on theacceptability ofthesolitary parasitic ones, and nottheother wayaround. In sum:bothbecauseitis difficult togenerate (impossible?) constitutive results outofnon-constitutive accounts, and becauseouractualassertibilityconditions formeaning ascriptions appearnotto be communitarian, I conclude that thesceptical solution does notyielda convincing argument against solitary language.
IRREALIST
CONCEPTIONS
IV
OF MEANING
I4. The argument against wassupposed solitary language toflow from the of sentence adjustedunderstanding significance forced by the sceptical conclusion. The sceptical conclusion hasitthat itcannot literally be true of
2
K., p. 9I.
Considerations 523 TheRule-Following any symbolthatit expressesa particular meaning:thereis no appropriate factfora meaning-attributing sentenceto report.The scepticalsolution's recommendation is that we blunt the forceof this result by refusingto thinkof sentencesignificance in termsof possession of truthconditions, or a capacity to state facts. We should think of it, rather,in terms of possession of assertibility conditions. But is this solution forced? Are there not, perhaps, other ways of accommodatingthe sceptical conclusion? at leastat The solutionon offer is bound to strike one as an overreaction, of nonfirst blush,in two possiblerespects.First,in thatit opts fora form factualism,as opposed to an error theory; and second, in that the solelyto the recommended non-factualism is global,ratherthanrestricted region of discourse meaning talk that is directly affectedby the scepticalresultit seeks to accommodate. reactionto the news that Semantically speaking,the most conservative of being a witchis not to adopt a non-factualist nothinghas the property an error conceptionof witchtalk,it is to offer conceptionof such talk.An error conception of a given region of discourse conserves the region's semantical appearances predicates are still understood to express properties, declarative sentencesto possess truthconditions;the ontological discoveryis taken to exhibit merely-the systematic falsityof the region's (positive,atomic) sentences.28 be understoodto consist Could not the moralof the scepticalargument in an errorconceptionof meaning discourse?It could not, for an error with errorconceptionsof other conceptionof such discourse,in contrast regions,is of doubtfulcoherence.The view in question would consistin the claim thatall meaning-attributions are false:
(i)
For any S: FS means thatpl is false.
of the truth But the disquotationalproperties predicateguaranteethat(i) entails

(2)
For any S: [Si has no meaning.
(i)
implies,thatis, thatno sentencewhatever possesses a meaning.Since, to begin with, however,a sentencecannotbe false unless it is meaningful thisin turnimpliesthat(i) cannotbe true:forwhat (i) says is thatsome sentences are false.29 sentences namelymeaning-attributing
28 See JohnMackie,Ethics:Inventing London, Penguin,I977, forsuch a Rightand Wrong, ofmoraldiscourse. conception see his 'Eliminative has beenadvocated ofmeaning by Paul Churchland; 29 An error conception is elaborated ofPhilosophy, I98I . This argument and thePropositional Attitudes', Journal Materialism AprilI990. Philosophical Review, forthcoming in my'The Statusof Content', and defended
So it appearsthatKripkewas right to avoid an error of conception fare any meaningdiscourse.But does his non-factualist conception better? ofa non-factualist I5. The canonical formulation view-and theone that is Kripkehimself declarative sentence favours-hasit thatsometargeted not genuinely A non-factualism truth-conditional. about meaning, consists, thatis, in theviewthat pl is nottruth-conditional. (3) For anyS, p: rS meansthat As I noted above, however, the projectivism recommended by the solution is intended to applyglobally: it is notconfined to sceptical solely sentences. meaning-attributing Thus,
(4) For any S: rS[ is not truthconditional.
a view?Why does he not suggest Whydoes Kripkeadopt so extreme that we abandon a truth-conditional modelfor merely semantic discourse, while for oftherest preserving it,as seemsnatural, at leastsomeregions of language? Kripkedoes notsay.But it maybe thathe glimpsed thatthe oftheprojectivism globalcharacter is in fact forcedin thepresent case.30 For consider a non-factualism aboutmeaning-the solely viewthat, since there is no suchproperty as a word'smeaning something, and henceno suchfact, no meaning-attributing sentence canbe truth-conditional. Since thetruth-condition ofanysentence S is (in part, anyway) a function ofits a non-factualism meaning, about meaning will enjoina non-factualism abouttruth-conditions: what truth-condition S possesses couldhardly be a ifthat in virtue ofwhich factual matter it has a particular truth-condition is notitself a factual And so we haveit that(3) entails: matter. pl is nottruth-conditional. (5) For all S, p: rS has truth-condition of the disquotational of the truth However,since,courtesy properties a sentence oftheformrS has truth-condition pl is trueifand predicate, onlyif S has truth-condition p, and since(5) has it that rS has truthcondition it follows pl is never that simply true, (4) For anyS: rSi is nottruth-conditional justas predicted. It is, then, a fascinating consequenceof a non-factualism about that itentails a global meaning, in thisrespect, non-factualism; ifno other, a non-factualism aboutmeaning from distinguishes itself a similar thesis
30 Somewhat different are givenforthisbothin Crispin arguments Wright's 'Kripke'sAccount', Ioc. cit.,pp. 769-70 and in my 'Meaning, Content and Rules',in PartI of myPh.D. Dissertation Essayson Meaning and Belief, Princeton, I986.
525 Considerations TheRule-Following about any othersubject matter.CrispinWrighthas suggestedthatit also problematic: rendersit irremediably views couldbe applied that projectivist tosuppose itis coherent that itis doubtful between fact-stating be drawn thedistinction For,however exactly quiteglobally. ittocomeby want willpresumably theprojectivist discourse, andnon-fact-stating class;a fortheformer failto qualify statements thatcertain wayof a discovery to is notitself instance, for argument, oftheskeptical oftheconclusion statement
be projective.31
withWright'ssuggestionthattheremust be It is hard not to sympathize withinthescope thesisthatis itself something unstableabout a projectivist clear to me in But it is also not entirely it recommends. of theprojectivism would have consists.To be sure,a global projectivism whatthe instability thatno sentencepossesses a truth to admitthatit is no morethanassertible here,it is condition.But whatis wrongwiththat?If thereis an instability one. not a transparent about meaningis i6. In fact,however,I do believe thata non-factualism Rather,the reasonshave unstable,but not because of its global character. to do with the clash between what you have to suppose about truthin and whatyou have to thesisabout anything, a non-factualist orderto frame suppose about truth as a result of accepting a non-factualismabout meaning. I have developed the argumentfor this in some detail elsewhere;32here I have space only to sketchits outlines. thesisabout, say, the good: Consider a non-factualist (7) All sentencesof the form rx is goodl are not truth-conditional. The pointthatneeds to be keptin focusis thatthesentenceof whichtruth sentence.For this declarative conditionsare being denied is a significant of which the in of truth terms that the concept factimmediately implies thatA. J. concept be deflationary is cannot the thesis framed non-factualist follows: as described Ayersuccinctly as a 'real quality'or a 'real relation'is due, like most of truth conception
. . .. There are philosophicalmistakes,to a failureto analyze sentencescorrectly ... to say that p is true is simply a way of assertingp.... The traditional
real . . [but] seemsto standforsomething in which theword'truth' sentences does notstandforanything.33 thattheword'truth' has shown ouranalysis If the concept of truthwere, as Ayer claims in this passage, merelythe concept of a device for semantic ascent, and not the concept of some genuineproperty some 'real relation' thata sentence(or thought)may enjoy, then non-factualismis nowhere a coherent option. For on a of truth,a sentencewill be truth-conditional understanding deflationary
of Content', 32 In 'The Status 3" Ibid., p. 770. loc. cit. 33~ A. J.Ayer, Language, Truthand Logi'c,New York,Dover,I952, P. 89.
provided onlythatit is apt forsemantic ascent;and it will be apt for semantic ascent provided onlythat it is a significant, declarative sentence. But it is constitutive ofa non-factualist thesis precisely thatit denies, of sometargeted, significant, declarative that sentence, itis truth-conditional. It follows, therefore, thata non-factualism about any subjectmatter presupposes a conception of truthricherthan the deflationary: it is to holding committed thatthe predicate 'true' standsforsome sortof language-independent forwhich property, eligibility willnotbe certified purely bythefact that a sentence is declarative and significant. Otherwise, therewill be no understanding its claim that a significant sentence, in form, declarative failstc.possesstruth-conditions. So we haveitthat thesis truth that anynon-factualist presupposes is,as I shallhenceforth put it,robust. But,now,noticethatjudgements about an objectpossessesa robustproperty whether could hardly fail to be factual. If P is somegenuinely robust thenit is hardto see how property, there ofthematter couldfailtobe a fact aboutwhether an object hasP. It does not matter if P is subjective or otherwise dependent upon our responses. So long as it is a genuine, language-independent property, judgements aboutit willhaveto be factual, willhaveto be possessed of robust truth-conditions. In particular, if truth is a robust property, then abouta sentence's judgements truth valuemust themselves be factual. But we sawearlier-see(5) above-thata non-factualist thesis aboutmeaning impliesthat judgements about a sentence'struthcannot be factual: a certain whether is true cannot sentence be a factual ifitsmeaning matter is not.And thisexposesthecontradiction we havebeenstalking: a nonfactualism aboutmeaning boththattruth is robust and thatit is implies not.
I7 It is hard to do justice to theissuesinvolved within theconfines ofthe I do hope,however, present essay.34 thatthe preceding discussion has in sowing succeeded somedoubtsaboutthecogency of irrealist conceptions of meaning-whether in the formof a non-factualism about as in thesceptical or an error as suggested, for meaning, solution, theory, instance, by Churchland. of theclaimis boundto arousesuspiThe uncompromising strength cion. Irrealist of otnerdomainsmay not be particularly conceptions or plausible, but they are notincoherent. appealing Whyshouldmatters standdifferently withmeaning discourse? The source oftheasymmetry is actually notthat hardto track down.It in thefact consists error that and non-factualist theories aboutany subject matter claims certain abouttruth andtruth-conditions, presuppose that an error ornon-factualist directed conception at ourtalkofmeaning precisely itself endsup denying. Not surprisingly theensuing result is unstable.
34
Again,fora moredetailed treatment see 'The Statusof Content', loc. cit.
thatthe presupposes thesisaboutany subjectmatter Thus, an error But an errorthesis directed targetsentencesare truth-conditional. entails thedenialofthatpresupposiat ourtalkaboutmeaning precisely a presupposes matter aboutanysubject tion.Thus,also,a non-factualism precisely at our directed But a non-factualism oftruth. robust conception thedenialofthatpresupposition. entails talkaboutmeaning then,theywould show thatthe are correct, if theseconsiderations way appears tobe no stable there be sustained: conclusion cannot sceptical about meaning. of accommodating the claim thatthereare no truths to theargument that appeared mustbe wrong, therefore, with Something lead us to it. Whatcouldit be?
V
REDUCTIVE
ACCOUNTS
OF MEANING
ofgrounds, the on a number has beenfaulted argument i8. The sceptical being: mostimportant of meaning do not dispositional accounts against That its arguments work. facts. naturalistic all theavailable That it neglects to consider on an unargued reductionism. That itsconclusion depends claim they issuefrom a naturalistic perspective: The first twoobjections even granted a failsto establish its thesis, argument thatthe sceptical The final concedes andproperties. objection tonaturalistic facts restriction is but chargesthat the scepticalargument of naturalism, the failure ofmeaning. construal anti-reductionist against an appropriately powerless the andin thenext thenaturalistic objections, In thispartI shallexamine the secondkindand will not discussthemin any detailhere.All the
anti-reductionist suggestion. I should say at the outset,however,thatI see no meritto objectionsof
thatKripkeignoresvariousviable thatI have seen to theeffect suggestions reduction bases formeaningfactsseem to me to reston misunderstanding. Colin McGinn, forexample, claims that Kripke neglectsto considerthe that possession of a concept mightconsist in possession of a possibility certainsort of capacity. Capacities, McGinn explains, are distinctfrom constraint.35 dispositionsand are bettersuited to meet the normativity outlinedabove. Warren of normativity This restson themisunderstanding Goldfarb charges that Kripke neglectsto consider causal/informational to a failure This derivesfrom of meaning.36 accountsof the determination of meaningis simplyone see that,in all essentialrespects,a causal theory of meaning,an account thatis, of course, theory species of a dispositional
3 See McGinn,op. cit.,pp. I68-74.
36
See Goldfarb, op. cit.,n. I3.
528 Paul A. Boghossian thatthis connectionis extensively discussed by Kripke. It is unfortunate the sceptical obscured in Kripke's discussion.Because Kripke illustrates problem throughthe use of an arithmetical example, he tends, underrole versionsof a dispositionalaccount standably,to focus on conceptual of meaning,ratherthan on causal/informational versions.This has given rise to the impressionthat his discussion of dispositionalism does not covercausal theories.But the impression is misleading.For the root form of a causal/informational theorymay be given by the followingbasic formula:
0 means (property) P by predicate S iff (it is a counterfactual supporting generalization that) 0 is disposed to apply S to P. Dispositions and meaning: finitude
19. The singlemostimportant strandin the scepticalargument consistsin the considerations against dispositionaltheoriesof meaning.It would be hard to exaggeratethe importanceof such theories for contemporary philosophyof mind and semantics:as I have just indicated, the most influentialcontemporary theories of content-determination 'informational' theories and 'conceptual-role' theories are both forms of a for dispositionalaccount.37In my discussionI shall tend to concentrate, the sake of concreteness, on informational of thecontentofmental theories symbols;but theissues thatariseare generaland applyto anydispositional theorywhatever. The root formof an information-style dispositionaltheoryis this:
I am disposed My mentalsymbol'horse' expresseswhateverproperty to apply it to. to suggestingthat therewill Kripke's firstobjection amounts,in effect, in what my dispositions always be a serious indeterminacy are, thus renderingdispositional propertiesan inappropriatereduction base for meaningproperties. For, Kripke argues,if it is indeed the property horse thatI am disposed to applythetermto, thenI should be disposed to apply it to all horses,includinghorsesso faraway and so farin the past thatit would be nonsense to suppose I could ever get into causal contactwith them.Otherwise, whatis to say thatmy dispositionis not a dispositionto or some such?But no one can apply the termto the property nearbvhorse,
37For correlational theories see: F. Dretske, andtheFlowofInformation, Knowledge Cambridge, MIT Press,I98I; D. Stampe,'Towardsa Causal Theoryof Linguistic Representation', Midwest Studiesin Philosophy, vol.2, Minneapolis, of MinnesotaPress, I977; Jerry University Fodor, Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MIT Press,I987. For conceptual roletheories see: H. Field, 'Logic, Meaning andConceptual ofPhilosophy, I977; Ned Block, 'Advertisement for a Semantics Journal Role', forPsychology', vol.Io, Minneapolis, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, ofMinnesota University Press, I986.
Considerations 529 TheRule-Following have a disposition to call all horses 'horse', for no one can have a dispositionwithrespectto inaccessibleobjects. The argument does not convince.Of course, the counterfactual If I were now to go to Alpha Centauri,I would call the horses there 'horse', is false.If I werenow to go to Alpha Centauri,I probablywould not be in anypositionto call anything by any name,forI would probablydie before I got there.But that by itselfneed not pose an insuperableobstacle to are such that ascribingthe dispositionto me. All dispositionalproperties their exercise the holding of the relevant counterfactualtruth is on theabsence ofinterfering or equivalently, on the conditions, contingent presence of ideal conditions.And it certainlyseems conceivable that a willrenderthecounterfacsuitableidealizationofmybiologicalproperties tual about my behaviouron Alpha Centauritrue.Kripke considerssuch a responseand complains: in this? How in theworldcan I tellwhat But howcan we haveanyconfidence brainmatter? .. . Surely such with extra wouldhappenifmybrainwerestuffed shouldbe left fiction writers and futurologists.38 speculation to science thatone can have no reason for If the pointis supposed to be, however, definedover ideal conditionsunless one knows acceptinga generalization would be true if the ideal conditions exactly which counterfactuals obtained, then, as JerryFodor has pointed out, it seems completely For example,no one can claim to knowall of whatwould unacceptable.39 the conditionsover be true if molecules and containersactuallysatisfied that does not preventus from which the ideal gas laws are defined;but if were their volume would vary know there ideal gases, claimingto that, on no one claim to know the them. can with Similarly, inversely pressure I a to if were modified as to survive so all of whatwould be true trip Alpha Centauri;but that need not preventus fromclaimingto know that,if I were to survivesuch a trip,I would call the horses there'horse'.40 Still, it is one thingto dispel an objection to a thesis,it is anotherto in no positionnow to show that provethethesistrue.And we are certainly trouble is that not every true The we do have infinitary dispositions. of the form. counterfactual If conditionswere ideal, then,if C, S would do A to S the dispositionto do A in C. For example, can be used to attribute one can hardlycredit a tortoisewith the abilityto overtakea hare, by out thatifconditionswereideal forthe tortoise if,forexample, pointing
38 39 40
K., p. 27. See 'A Theory Part II, p. I5 (manuscript). of Content', op. cit. ofKripkeon thisscoresee Blackburn, criticism For a related
530 Paul A. Boghossian it weremuch biggerand faster-thenit would overtake it. Obviously,only certainidealizationsare permissible;and also obviously,we do not now knowwhichidealizationsthoseare. The set of permissible counterfactuals is constrained by criteria of whichwe currently lack a systematic account. In the absence of such an account,we cannotbe completely confident that ascriptions of infinitary dispositions are acceptable,because we cannot be completely confident thatthe idealized counterfactuals needed to support such ascriptionsare licit. But I thinkit is fairto say that the burden of proofherelies squarelyon Kripke's shoulders:it is up to him to show that the relevantidealizationswould be of the impermissible And this variety. he has not done.
Dispositions and meaning: normativity

Few aspects of Kripke's argument have been more widelymisunderstood than his discussion of the 'normativity'of meaning and his associated criticismof dispositionaltheories.This is unsurprising given the difficulty and delicacyof the issues involved.In whatsense is meaning a normative notion?Kripke writes:
20.
SupposeI do meanaddition ofthis by' + '. Whatis therelation tothe supposition question howI willrespond to theproblem '68 + 57'?The dispositionalist a gives ofthis if' + ' meant account relation: I willanswer descriptive then addition, 'I 25'. But this is not the rightaccountof the relation, whichis normative, not ifI meant descriptive. The point is notthat, addition by + ', I willanswer 'I25', ifI intend butthat, toaccord with of' + ', I should mypastmeaning answer 'I25'. finiteness ofmycapacity, Computational and other error, factors disturbing may lead me notto be disposed to respond as I should, butifso, I havenotactedin accordance withmyintentions. The relation ofmeaning and intention to future actionis normative, notdescriptive.4' The fact that I mean somethingby an expression,Kripke says, implies to use thatexpression, truths about how I ought truths about how it would be correct forme to use it. This much,of course,is incontestable. The fact that'horse' means horse impliesthat'horse' is correctly applied to all and onlyhorses:the notionof the extensionof an expressionjust is the notion of what it is correctto apply the expressionto. It is also truethatto say that a given expressionhas a given extensionis not to make any sort of simple remark about it. In particular, of course,it is not to say descriptive that,as a matter of fact,the expressionwillbe applied onlyto thosethings which are in its extension.Kripke seems to think,however,that these observations by themselves ought to be enough to show thatno dispositional theory of meaning can work. And here matters are not so straightforward.
41
K., p. 37-
53I Considerations TheRule-Following
above: theory mentioned Let us beginwiththe verycrude dispositional I am disposed to apply it to. This is a 'horse' means whateverproperty There are two of course, but the reasons are instructive. hopeless theory, is thatthe theory difficulty of them,and theyare closelyrelated.The first by it. is bound to get theextensionof 'horse' wrong.Suppose I mean horse I have a dispositionto call horses 'horse'. But it will Then, presumably, dark also be true that there are certain circumstances sufficiently horseylookingones such that,I nights-and certaincows sufficiently to call those cows 'horse' too. am disposed, under those circumstances, this is a dispositionto make a mistake,that is, to apply the Intuitively, not in its extension.But our crude dispositional expressionto something withthe I meanbyan expression theproperty theory, giventhatit identifies to, lacks the resources by I am disposedto apply the expression property which to effectthe requisite distinctionbetween correctand incorrect I withwhatever If whatI mean by an expressionis identified dispositions. I am disposed to am disposed to apply the expressionto, theneverything apply the expressionto is, ipsofacto, in the extensionof that expression. But thisleads to the unacceptableconclusionthat'horse' does not express horseor cow. the property horsebut ratherthe disjunctiveproperty Any theorywhich, like the There is a related conceptual difficulty. simplyequates under consideration, crude dispositionaltheorycurrently how it would be correctforme to use a certainexpressionwithhow I am the very of definition, disposed to use it, would have ruled out, as a matter ifthe idea was fondof remarking, of error.And as Wittgenstein possibility seems ofcorrectness is to make sense at all, thenit cannotbe thatwhatever right. rightto me is (by definition) One would have thoughtthese points too crucial to miss; but it is surprisinghow little they are appreciated. In a recent, comprehensive of conceptualrole theories,Ned Block has written treatment one that rolesemantics] theorists, ofa choicethatmustbe madeby [conceptual role be shouldconceptual has had no discussion (as faras I know):namely, in ideal or normative or shouldit be tied to whatpeople understood terms, notto comment on thismatter ... becauseI'm notsure do? . .. I prefer actually
what to say .
42
This ought to seem odd. If conceptual role is supposed to determine preyto Kripke's meaning,thentherecan be no question,on pain of falling an expression'sconceptual role with a subject's objection,of identifying actual dispositionswith respectto that expression. show, then, that no dispositional The objections from normativity I meanby theproperty thatassumes the simple formof identifying theory I am disposed to call 'horse', can hope to succeed. 'horse'withtheproperty What did not assume this simple form? But what if a dispositional theory
2I.
42
Ned Block, op. cit.,p. 63I.
532
Paul A. Boghossian
dispositions withthatproperty to will be guaranteed to be dispositions bothof the objections from applythe expression correctly, normativity canvassed so far wouldappeartohavebeenmet.Therewillbe no fear that theequation willissuein falseverdicts aboutwhattheexpression means. And,sinceit is onlyM-dispositions thatare guaranteed to be correct, it willno longer is right: follow thatwhatever seemsright thosedispositions notpossessing M willnotbe dispositions toapply theexpression towhat it meansand willbe free, to constitute to applythe therefore, dispositions expression falsely. At thispointtwoquestions sucha property arise.First,is there really M? And, second, supposingtherewere, is therereallyno more to thenormativity ofmeaning thanspecifying capturing sucha property? Now, Kripkeis clearly sceptical abouttheexistence of an appropriate I will consider M-property. thatquestionbelow. But morethanthis, Kripke seems to thinkthat even if therewere a suitablyselected theextension thatcaptured of an expression disposition that accurately, couldstill notbe identified ofmeaning, disposition thefact it with because stillremains of a disposition truethattheconcept is descriptive whereas ofmeaning theconcept is not.In other toKripke, evenif words, according there werea dispositional that covaried with a meaning predicate logically theonefact couldstillnotbe identified with theother, for predicate, they ofdistinct A number arefacts ofwriters sorts. havebeeninclined tofollow himin this.SimonBlackburn, forinstance, has written:
43 It is occasionally suggested thatit wouldbe enoughif possession of M weresufficient forthe correctness. But thatis notright. If onlysufficiency disposition's wererequired we wouldnotknow, of a definition simply by virtue of M, theexpression's For although meaning. we wouldknowwhat properties were definitely part oftheexpression's meaning we wouldnotknow ifwe hadthem all. And so we wouldnothaveevena sufficient condition fortheexpression's a givenmeaning. possessing
dispositions with respectto that expression that possess M? For, since
if,instead ofidentifying I meanby'horse'with what theentire ofmy range in respect dispositions of 'horse',it identified it onlywithcertain select dispositions. Provided the theory specified a principle of selection that outonly theextension-tracking andprovided also that picked dispositions; in terms it specified thatprinciple thatdid notpresuppose thenotion of or extension, meaning wouldit notthenbe truethattheobjections from had beendisarmed? normativity toputmatters Let us try a little more precisely. If a dispositional theory is to have any prospect of succeeding, it mustselectfrom amongthe I have for 'horse',those dispositions whichare meaningdispositions In other it mustcharacterize, in non-intentional and determining. words, ofM is necessary non-semantic a property M suchthat: terms, possession for to applyan expression in accordwith andsufficient a disposition being itscorrectness conditions.43 Givensucha property, couldwe not however, thensafely equatemeaning with:thesetof something by an expression
533 Considerations TheRule-Following they we succeedin identifying dispositions I shareKripke's viewthatwhatever which we mean.They for selection ofa function couldat mostgiveus standards rule. to a previous ofwhat it is to be faithful an account provide us with couldn't tothetask areinadequate dispositions Kripke, I do notthink It is justthat, unlike mustbe.44 they Indeed,I think of providing standards. specifisubstantive the successful, envisaging Blackburnhere is explicitly the extensionsof expressionscorrectly. cation of dispositionsthatmirror of factsabout meaningas groundsfor character But he citesthe normative But what preciselyhas been leftover, denyinga dispositionalreduction. once the extensionshave been specifiedcorrectly? of themeaningof One might have a thought likethis.A properreduction correctly, it would also specify its extension an expression would notmerely is an extension namely, a correctness reveal that what it is specifying be cannotdo. There might theory condition. And thisis whata dispositional so that of expressions; covarywiththe extensions thatlogically dispositions in questionthe expressions' correctness one could read offthe dispositions factdoes not amountto the meaningfact, conditions. But the dispositional of any disposition, because it never follows from the mere attribution use; specified, that thereare factsconcerningcorrect howeverselectively of an extension.To be told whereasthis does followfromthe attribution that 'horse' means horseimplies that a speakerought to be motivatedto only to horses;whereasto be told, forinstance,that apply the expression underwhicha speakeris disposed to thereare certainselectcircumstances apply the expressiononly to horses,seems to carryno such implication. It is not clear thatthisis in generaltrue.Perhaps theM-dispositionsare those dispositionsthat a person would have when his cognitivemechanisms are in a certainstate; and perhaps it can be non-question-beggingly of certified thatthatstatecorrespondsto a stateof theproperfunctioning If so, it is conceivablethatthatwould amountto a nonthosemechanisms. circular specificationof how the person would ideally respond, as comparedwithhow he actuallyresponds;and, hence,thatit would suffice forceof an ascriptionof meaning. forcapturingthe normative There is clearly no way to settle the matter in advance of the considerationof particulardispositional proposals. What we are in a positionto do, however,is state conditionson an adequate dispositional theory.First, any such theorymust specify,withoutpresupposingany semantic or intentionalmaterials,propertyM. This would ensure the Second, it must show how possession of theory'sextensionalcorrectness. thatdeservesto be called a an M-dispositioncould amountto something motivated to correctness condition, somethingwe would be inherently
in aremadebyWright concessions Back',loc. cit.,pp. 289-9I. Similar Strikes "4 'The Individual a on Following 10c.cit.,pp. 77I-2; and by JohnMcDowell,'Wittgenstein his 'Kripke'sAccount', I984, p. 329. Rule',Synthese,
534 Paul A. Boghossian satisfy. This would ensure the intensional equivalence of the two propertiesin question, thus paving the way foran outright reductionof meaningto dispositions. What property two sortsof proposal: mightM be? There are, in effect, one, long associated with Wittgenstein to specifyM by seeks himself, exploiting the notion of a community; the other, of more recent provenance,attempts to defineM in termsof the notionof an optimality condition.I shall begin with the communitarian account.
The communitarian account

22. The idea thatcorrectness withone's fellows consistsin agreement has a in thestudyofWittgenstein. Even beforethe current distinguished history concern with a 'rule-following problem', many commentators-whether rightly or wrongly-identified communitarianism as a centralthesisof the later writings. As a response to the problemabout meaning,it foundits in Wright's Wittgenstein most sustained treatment on the Foundations of Mathematics.45 Which of the manydispositionsa speakermay have with respect to a given expressiondetermineits meaning?Or, equivalently, which of the many dispositionsa speaker may have with respect to an expressionare dispositionsto use it correctly? Wright'scommunitarian account furnishes the following answer:
language save by reference to theauthority ofcommunal assenton thematter; and forthecommunity itself there is no authority, so no standard to meet.46 It is important to understand that,accordingto the proposal on offer, the correct application of a term is determined by the totalityof the community's actual dispositionsin respectof thatterm.The theorydoes not attempt, in specifying the communaldispositionsthatare to serve as the constitutive arbitersof correctness, to select fromamong the community's actual dispositionsa privilegedsubset. There is a reason forthis. Communitarianism is a response to the perceived inabilityto definea at the level of the individual,between correctand incorrect distinction, dispositions.The suggestionthat correctness consistsin agreementwith the dispositionsof one's community is designed to meet this need. The proposal will not serve its purpose, however,if the problemat the level of the individual is now merely to be replayed at the level of the
4 Harvard Cambridge, University that writings suggest Wright no Press,i980. (His morerecent longerholds this view.) See also Christopher Peacocke,'Reply: Rule-Following: The Natureof Wittgenstein's in Wittgenstein Arguments', on Following a Rule,ed. Holtzman and Leich,London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, I98I. 46 Ibid., pp. 2I9-20.
incorrect. . .. None of us can unilaterally make sense of correctemployment of
whichalone it makessense to thinkof individuals' responses as correct or
... it is a communityof assent which supplies the essential backgroundagainst
TheRule-Following Considerations 535 A communitarian community. does not want it to be a further question whether a given actual communal disposition is itself correct. The proposal must be understood,therefore, as offering the folowing characterization of M: M is theproperty ofagreeing withtheactual dispositions of thecommunity. How does the proposal fare with respect to the outlined adequacy conditionson dispositionaltheories? Consider firstthe 'intensional' requirement,that possession of the favoured M-property appear intuitivelyto resemble possession of a command the sort of correctnesscondition. Does communal consensus responsecharacteristic of truth? A number of criticshave complained against communitarianism that communalconsensusis simplynotthesame property as truth, thatthereis no incoherencein the suggestionthat all the members of a linguistic in the off-track community have gone collectively, but non-collusively, This is, of course,undeniable.But the applicationof a givenpredicate.47 communitarian is not best read as offering an analysis of the ordinary but a displacement of it. His thought notionof truth, is thatthe emaciated notionof truthyielded by communitarianism is the best we can hope to considerations. The crucial question, expectin lightof the rule-following then, is not whethercommunitarianism captures our ordinarynotion of truth, forit quite clearlydoes not; it is, rather, whether communitarianism offers any concept deservingof that name. This is a large question on which I do not propose to spend a lot of time.48Althoughthereare subtle questionsabout how much of logic will be recoverablefromsuch a view, and whetherit can be suitablynonarticulated reductively (can 'non-collusiveagreement'be definedwithout I am preparedto grant,forthe sake of the use of intentional materials?), thatthe proposaldoes not fareall thatbadlyin connection with argument, the 'intensional'requirement. Non-collusive communal agreementon a judgement does usually provide one with some sort of reason for not witha decisiveone); it the judgement embracing (even if,unliketruth, thusmimicsto some degreethe sortof responsethatis essentialto truth. Wherecommunitarianism fails,it seemsto me, is not so much hereas with the extensional requirement. Consider the term 'horse'. What dispositionsdo I have in respect of this expression?To be sure, I have a dispositionto apply it to horses. But I also have a disposition,on sufficiently dark nights,to apply it to the factsare clear. 'Horse' deceptively horseylookingcows. Intuitively, means horseand my dispositionto apply it to cows on dark nightsis
See Blackburn, op. cit. For a moreextensive discussion see my Essayson Meaningand Belief,loc. cit.; see also Blackburn, Spreading theWord, Oxford, Oxford University Press,I984, pp. 82ff.
4 48
536 Paul A. Boghossian mistaken.The problem is to come up with a theorythat delivers this and in purelydispositionalterms.The communitarresultsystematically those which ian's idea is that the correctdispositionsare constitutively community's disposiare the What, then, agree with the community's. tions likelyto be? The community,I submit, however exactly specified,is bound to exhibitpreciselythe same dualityof dispositionsthat I do: it too will be horseylookingcows on dark disposed to call both horsesand deceptively horsey looking all, ifI can be takenin by a deceptively nights'horse'. After cow on a dark night,what is to preventI7,000 people just like me from The point is impostor? being takenin by the same, admittedly effective, theyarise because of the we make are systematic: thatmanyof themistakes disguises,and so forth-that effective presenceof features bad lighting, have a generalizable and predictable effecton creatures with similar cognitive endowments. (This is presumably what makes 'magicians' possible.) But, then, any of my dispositions that are in this sense mistaken,are bound to be duplicated at the level of the systematically for The communitarian, however,cannotcall themmistakes, community. they are the community's dispositions. He must insist, then, firm that 'horse' means not horse convictionto the contrary notwithstanding, horseor cow. but, rather, The problem, of course, is general. There are countless possible special and thereis nothing impostors undercountlesspossibleconditions; about the term'horse'. The upshot would appear to be that,accordingto none of our predicateshave the extensionswe take communitarianism, instead.Which is to wildlydisjunctive themto have, but mean something is bound to issue in false verdictsabout the say that communitarianism on an meanings of most expressions,thus failingthe firstrequirement adequate dispositionaltheory. It seems to me thatwe have no optionbut to rejecta pure communitariof our the extensions anism. If we are to have any prospectof identifying expressions correctly,it will simply not do to identifytruth with ' dispositions, we communalconsensus.Even fromamong the community ifwe have to selectthosewhichmay be consideredmeaning-determining, of meaning.Which is to say thatwe are still are to have a plausible theory was supposed to provide:the specification lackingwhatcommunitarianism M such that,possessionof M by a dispositionis necessary of a property forthat disposition'scorrectness. and sufficient we lack any Of course, once we have abandoned communitarianism, motive for definingM over communaldispositions; nothing-at least nothingobvious-tells against definingAMdirectlyover an individual's the way the voluminousliterature on this Which is precisely dispositions. topic approachesthe problemand to a discussionof whichI now propose to turn.
TheRule-Following Considerations 537
Optimaldispositions
23. The literature supplies what is, in effect, a set of variations on a basic theme:M is theproperty of: beinga disposition to apply (an expression)in a certain type 49 The idea behindsuch proposalsis thatthereis ofstu a certainset of circumstances call them 'optimality conditions' under which subjects are, for one or another reason, incapable of mistaken judgements;hence, we may equate what theymean by a given (mental) expressionwith,the properties theyare disposed to apply the expression Different to,underoptimalconditions. proposalsprovidedifferent characterizations of the conditionsthatare supposed to be optimalin thissense. Fred Dretske, forexample, holds that optimal conditionsare the conditions under which the meaning of the expressionwas firstacquired. A numberof otherwriters subscribeto some formor otherof a teleological proposal: optimality conditionsare those conditions definedby evolutionarybiology-under which our cognitivemechanismsare functioning just as theyare supposed to.50 Now, Kripkeis very short withsuchpossibleelaborations ofa dispositional theory. He briefly considers thesuggestion thatwe attempt to define idealized will revealthe futilitv of dispositions and says that'a littleexperimentation of the such an effort'." But, surely,this underestimates the complexity problems involved and failsto do justiceto the influence thatsuch proposals WhatKripkeneeds,ifhisrejection ofdispositional is currently exert. accounts to succeed,but does not reallyprovide, is a set of principled considerations of non-semantically, non-intentionally againstthe existence specifiable optiof thissection mality conditions. What I wouldliketo do in theremainder is forthatconclusion. to beginto sketch an argument Severalspecific problems of an optimality forspecific versions have receiveddiscussionin the theory an argument with a more literature.52 Here, however,I want to attempt could general sweep:I wantto arguethatwe havereasonto believethatthere not be naturalistically conditions specifiable under which a subjectwill be disposedto apply an expression onlyto whatit means; and, hence,thatno at specifying can hope to succeed.53 such conditions attempt
There is one exception to this generalization:JerryFodor's recent proposal has it that S's are those that serve as an 'asymmetric dependence base' for S's other meaning-determining dispositions. See his 'A Theory of Content', Part II, forthcoming.In 'Naturalizing Content', in Meaning in Mind: EssaYs on the Wfork forthcoming Fodor, Oxford,Basil Blackwell, I argue of/jerry as confrontstandard optimalityversions. that this theoryis subject to the same difficulties 50 For theories of this form see: David Papineau, Reality and Representation, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, I987; J. Fodor: 'Psychosemantics', .MS, MIT, I984. I shy awaayfromsaying whetherR. and OtherBiological Categories, Mlillikan, Cambridge, MIT Press, I987, presentsa Language, Thought theoryof this form. 51 K., p. 32. 52 Against Dretske see Fodor, Psjychosemantics, loc. cit.; against teleological theoriessee my Essays on Meaning and Belief, and Fodor, 'A Theory of Conteint',Part I, loc. cit. 5 This amounts to saying that such theoriescannot meet the extensional requirement;so I shall not even consider whetherthey meet the intensionalone.
somecare.Consider outwith to laytheproblem 24. It willbe worthwhile repertoire. Neil and a particular expression, say,'horse',in Neil's mental to token 'in thebelief thatexpression And supposethatNeil is disposed horsey mode' both in respectof horsesand in respectof deceptively that'horse'for furthermore, Let it be clear, looking cowson darknights. whenhe applies'horse'to and thaton thoseoccasions Neil meanshorse, a cow fora horse.Now, thethought to his mistaking cows,thisamounts is a set is thatthere theory ofa dispositional an optimality version behind underwhichNeil cannotmake conditions specifiable of naturalistically Under thoseconof presented items.54 in the identification mistakes ofhimonlyif in front that there is a horse he wouldbelieve then, ditions, thoseconditions, 'horse' under in turn that, implies there is one.But that it of the property willget tokened (in the beliefmode) onlyin respect means: look at the out what any expression So, to figure expresses. are conditions to,when toapply theexpression Neil is disposed properties of The end result is a dispositional reconstruction in thissenseoptimal. Neil to be disposed Neil to meanhorse by'horse'is for facts: for meaning two are optimal. Clearly, to call onlyhorses'horse',whenconditions conditions mustreallybe mustbe satisfied: (i) the specified conditions itwillbe false that thepossibility oferror-otherwise, suchas to preclude 'horse'willgetappliedonlyto whatit means;(ii) underthoseconditions theuse of naturalistically, without theconditions must be specified purely thetheory willhaveasor intentional materials-otherwise, anysemantic a reconstruction of. it was supposed to provide sumedthevery properties to satisfy bothofthese to argueis thatit is impossible WhatI propose conditions simultaneously. and objective contents Optimaldispositions non-intentionally is aftera non-semantically, 25. The dispositionalist true, a priori willbe suchas to yield setofconditions 0, which specifiable
of the form: equations optimality
R: O-(S judgesRx-+Rx). S and concept (8) For anysubject be sucha setof conditions? Could there Notice,to beginwith,thatwhereR is the conceptof an objective forR, evenif 0 equations we oughtnot to expectoptimality property, stiff constraints imposedby a were not requiredto meet the rather and in non-semantic specification reductive dispositionalism-namely, objective non-intentional terms. thevery idea ofa wholly For,intuitively, relation) (object, is theidea ofa property property (or objector relation)
from a desire tosimplify 5 This restriction toperceptually fixed beliefs stems partly exposition and from a desire to consider suchtheories at their partly strongest.
539 Considerations TheRule-Following of any givenperson'sabilitiesor judgements: whosenatureis independent froma in otherwords,thereis no necessaryfunction forsuch a property, given person's abilitiesand judgementsto truthsabout that property.55 is witha class of contentsforwhichtheredoes exista range The contrast authoritasubjectsare necessarily such that,appropriate of circumstances Philosophersdistive about those contentsunder those circumstances. of fallwhere,but it is typicalto think agree,ofcourse,about whatcontents about pain about shape as whollyobjectiveand of judgements judgements class. Let us call this exampleofthecontrasting as representing an extreme contents.56 versus inaccessible a distinction betweenaccessible of theory We are now in a positionto see, however,thata dispositional meaning, by virtue of being committedto the existence of optimality equations for every concept, is committedthereby to treatingevery the concept as if it were accessible. It is thus committedto obliterating betweenaccessible and inaccessiblecontents. distinction Of course, this objection will not impress anyone reluctant to place. I countenancewholly objective, inaccessible contentsin the first to arguing against the dispositional theoryon neutral turn, therefore, ground:forany concept,subjectiveor objective,it is impossibleto satisfy of a set of condidispositionalism'sbasic requirement:the specification subjects are immune from error about judgements involving that concept.
such that,under0, terms, and non-intentional tions0, in non-semantic,
holism and belief Optimaldispositions

of the processes derivesfromthe holisticcharacter 26. The basic difficulty belief which fix belief. The point is that, under normal circumstances, fixationis typicallymediated by backgroundtheory-what contents a thinker is preparedto judge will depend upon what othercontentshe is arbitrarily prepared to judge. And this dependence is, again typically, robust: just about any stimuluscan cause just about any belief,given a suitablymediatingset of backgroundassumptions.Thus, Neil may come because of his to believe Lo, a magpie,as a resultof seeing a currawong, belief that that is just what magpies look like; or because of his further are magpies;or because beliefthatthe onlybirdsin the immediate vicinity the Pope says goes and his beliefthatthe Pope of his beliefthatwhatever
in Subject, ofPerception', Error and theObjectivity 'Cartesian TylerBurge, See, forexample, 5 Clarendon Press,I986, p. I25, fora Oxford, ed. J. McDowell and P. Pettit, and Context, Thought an property. of objective oftheconcept formulation similar one. It nota constitutive distinction, thatthisis an epistemological 56 It is important to appreciate by ourbest constituted thatit is therefore is accessible, thefactthata content from does notfollow from thefactthatwe are authoritative to conclude aboutit. (I takeit no one is tempted judgements we makeaboutthem.We shallhave by thejudgements aboutour pains,thatpainsare constituted claimsofthissortlateron in thepaper. occasion to discussconstitutive
saysthatthispresented is a magpie. And so on. The thought currawong can gettriggered in anyofan that is a magpie something bya currawong indefinite number of ways,corresponding to the potentially indefinite number of background thetransition. beliefs whichcouldmediate Now, how does all this bear on the prospects fora dispositional of theory A dispositional has to specify, theorist without use of semantic or in whicha thinker intentional a situation will be disposedto materials, think, of magpies. But theobservation that onlyin respect Lo, a magpie beliefs arefixed that a thinker willbe disposed holistically implies to think Lo, a magpie in respect ofnon-magpies, ofan indefinite number provided onlythatthe appropriate beliefs are present. an background Specifying condition for'magpie', willinvolve, optimality at a minimum, therefore, a situation characterized ofall thebeliefs specifying which bytheabsence fromnon-magpies could potentially mediatethe transition to magpie beliefs.Since, however, therelooks to be a potential infinity of such clusters of belief, a non-semantically, mediating background non-intentionally specified situation is a non-semantically, optimality non-intentionin which allyspecified situation itis guaranteed that noneofthispotential infinity of background clusters of beliefis present. But how is such a situation to be specified? Whatis neededis precisely whata dispositional wassupposed toprovide: theory a setofnaturalistic namely, necessary and sufficient conditions forbeinga beliefwitha certain content. But, of course,if we had thatwe would alreadyhave a reductive theory of meaning-wewouldnotneeda dispositional theory! Which is to saythat, ifthere is to be anysortofreductive story aboutmeaning at all,it cannot taketheform ofa dispositional theory. VI ANTI-REDUCTIONIST CONCEPTIONS MEANING An argument fromqueerness? considerations 27. If these are correct, there wouldappearto be plenty of reasonto doubt the reducibility of content properties to naturalistic But Kripke's properties. sceptic doesnotmerely drawan anti-reductionist he concludes, far more conclusion; that there radically, simply couldnotbe any content properties. Suppose we grantthe anti-reductionism; what the content justifies scepticism? Not, of course, the anti-reductionism by At a minimum itself. one of two further things is needed.Eitheran totheeffect independent that argument only naturalistic properties arereal. a frontal assaulton theirreducible Or, failing that, in question, property thatit is, in Mackie'sphrase, showing somehow inherently 'queer'.
meaning?
OF
Considerations 54I TheRule-Following is thathe The singlegreatest weaknessin Kripke's scepticalargument fails to bring offeitherrequirement.He does not even tryto defend a reductionist principle about the intentional;and his brief attemptat a and unconvincing: 'queerness' argumentis half-hearted addition by 'plus' is a by arguing thatmeaning Perhaps we maytryto recoup, Perhapsit is simply a thanwe havearguedbefore. stateevenmoresui generis orheadaches orany'qualitative' tosensations primitive state, nottobe assimilated ofa uniquekind ofitsown. todispositions, buta state states, nortobe assimilated in an appropriate and ifit is taken Such a movemayin a sensebe irrefutable, it leavesthenature wayWittgenstein mayevenacceptit.But it seemsdesperate: stateof 'meaning addition by of thispostulated state the primitive primitive It is notsupposed to be an introspectible state, "plus"'-completely mysterious. ofcertainty whenever it are awareofit with somefair degree yetwe supposedly mean thathe does,at present, occurs.For howelse can each ofus be confident in is the logical difficulty implicit additionby 'plus'? Even more important as I think notmerely that argues, Wittgenstein Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. thealleged'qualitative' state showsthat we havesaid hitherto, thatintrospection butalso thatit is logically ofunderstanding is a chimera, impossible (or at least forthere to be a stateof 'meaning thatthere logicaldifficulty) is a considerable addition by "plus"' at all. contained in ourfinite minds. It Such a statewouldhaveto be a finite object, in myexplicitly table.... of each case of theaddition thinking does notconsist which ina quus-like ofa finite state notbe interpreted could way? Can weconceive How couldthatbe?57 There are several problems with this passage. In the firstplace, it the appropriate anti-reductionist suggestion.I take it thatit misconstrues reallyis not plausible that there are 'primitivestates' of meaningpublic The process in certainways,one stateper expression. language expressions by which the inscriptionsand vocables of a public language acquire an enormousarrayof complexprocess involving meaningis a manifestly appropriatepropositionalattitudes the outlinesof which may arguably be found in the writingsof Paul Grice and others.58A plausible antireductionismabout meaning would not wish to deny that there is an content and to be told about the relationbetweenlinguistic interesting story what it maintains,rather,is that there is no interesting mentalcontent; properties. propertiesto physical/functional reduction of mental content in otherwords,at some appropriate level Accordingto anti-reductionism, mental content propertiesmust simply be taken for granted,without otherwisedescribed. with properties prospectof identification for this suggestion?The Does Kripke manage to create a difficulty thatmay be so construed. passage containsa couple of considerations The first chargeis thatwe would have no idea how to explainour ability
"
58
K., pp. 51-2. See thepaperscitedundern. 3 above.
542
Paul A. Boghossian
to knowour thoughts, if we endorsed a non-reductionist conception of their content. Now, no one who has contemplated theproblem of selfcan failto be impressed knowledge But I think that byitsdifficulty.59 we wouldbe forgiven we allowedthisto driveus to a dubiously if,before coherent irrealism aboutcontent, we required on theorder ofa something proofthatno satisfactory epistemology was ultimately to be had. no suchproof. He merely that Kripke, however, provides notes thenonof contentful phenomenal character statesprecludesan introspective accountof their epistemology. And thisis problematic fortworeasons. First,because theremay be non-introspective accountsof self-knowledge.60And second,becauseit does notobviously follow from the fact thata mental statelacksan individuative phenomenology, thatit is not to theanti-reductionist second is that Kripke's itis objection suggestion utterly mysterious how therecould be a finite state, realizedin a finite that mind, contains information nevertheless aboutthecorrect applicabilityof a sign in literally no end of distinct situations. But, again,this to insisting amounts thatwe findthe idea of a contentful merely state without problematic, adducing anyindependent reasonwhywe should. mental with We knowthat states contents arestates with general infinitary normative it is precisely characters; withthatobservation thattheentire ifhe is topulloff discussion began. WhatKripke needs, an argument from is somesubstantive distinct from queerness, hisanti-reductionargument, istconsiderations, why notcountenance we should suchstates. Butthis he does notprovide. None of this should be understood as suggesting that an antireductionism aboutcontent is unproblematic, forit is farfrom it. There are, forexample, and serious, familiar, difficulties an antireconciling reductionism aboutcontent properties with a satisfying conception oftheir causal efficacy.62 But in the contextof Kripke's dialectic, the antireductionist suggestion emerges as a stable responseto the sceptical one that is untouched conclusion, seemingly by all the considerations in the latter's favour. adduced
5 For discussion of someof thedifficulties see my'Content and Self-Knowledge', Philosophical Topics, SpringI989. 60 See, forexample, and Self-Knowledge', Tyler Burge,'Individualism of Philosophy, _7ournal November I988, and D. Davidson,'Knowing One's Own Mind', Proceedings oftheAPA, January
61 It is interesting to note, incidentally, that one ofthemorestriking examples oftheintrospective discernment of a non-qualitative mentalfeature is providedby, of all things, an experiential I havein mind phenomenon. thephenomenon, muchdiscussed ofseeing-as. byWittgenstein himself, We see theduck-rabbit nowas a duck,nowas a rabbit; we see theNecker cube nowwithone face forward, nowwith And we knowimmediately another. howwe are seeingthese precisely objects as, whenwe see them nowin one way, nowin theother. But thischange of'aspect', although manifestly insomething introspectible, is nevertheless nota change for qualitative, thequalitative character ofthe visualexperience remains thesameevenas theaspectchanges. 62 See below.
introspectible.6'
I987.
McDowell on privacyand community of meaning, does that conception a non-reductionist 28. If we endorse disturbnothingin our considerations mean that the rule-following A number whohavefound ofwriters conception ofthatnotion? ordinary so; not thought have certainly attractive suggestion an anti-reductionist lessonsforthe important in thoseconsiderations theyhave discerned while rejecting of meaning, of the possibility correctunderstanding of in virtue question: answers to the constitutive reductive substantive possessmeaning? whatdo expressions that: has written McDowell,forexample, John
we can dig downto a levelat to think it is a mistake lights, By Wittgenstein's notions(like 'following for normative whichwe no longerhave application according to therule').63
to McDowell'sWittgenstein, according thetemptation, We haveto resist levelat are at thedeepest of'bedrock' 'of howthings to form a picture the place of [meaning]in the which we may sensiblycontemplate world' which does not alreadyemploythe idea of the correct(or use ofan expression. incorrect) him to a McDowell does not takethis to commit Oddly,however, about no substantive results from which a position aboutmeaning, quietism of meaning can be gleaned.On the forthe possibility the conditions moralof therule-following he claimsthatit is the discernible contrary, can existonlyin the and hencemeaning, thatcorrectness, considerations ofa private thepossibility thusprecluding ofa communal practice, context He writes: language.
in But it is difficult, warnsus not to tryto dig below'bedrock'. Wittgenstein a web liesdownthere: as itwere, a senseofwhat, him, to avoidacquiring reading without describable usingthenotion and 'inner' episodes, offacts aboutbehavior of the of meaning.One is likelyto be struckby the sheer contingency of on which,in this vision,the possibility between individuals resemblances seemsto depend meaning
And:
the below 'bedrock'would undermine disorderliness It is truethata certain bear So theunderlying ofrule-following. contingencies ofthenotion applicability ....65 to thenotion ofrule-following relation an intimate
of thefamiliar WittgenMcDowell'scharacterization This is, of course, in communal ofagreement responses a certain measure claimthat steinian to be motivated? But howis sucha thesis formeaning. is a precondition to theconstitutive answers of substantive How, in lightof therejection
63
64 Ibid., p. 348.
a Rule', loc. cit.,p. 34I. on Following 'Wittgenstein 65 Ibid., p. 349.
544 Paul A. Boghossian question, is it to be argued for? The claim that communal practice is on the concept claim; merereflection necessary formeaningis a surprising constitutive ofmeaningdoes notrevealit. And what,shortof a substantive account,could conceivablygroundit? view consideredabove. Consider the contrastwith the communitarian answerto a substantive question,offers That viewengagestheconstitutive of forthe necessity argument thereby, a straightforward it, and generates, with in conformity is said to consist a communalpractice:since correctness and with it meaning,are possible only where one's fellows,correctness, in But McDowell, rightly thereare otherswithwhom one may conform. thatcorrectapplicationmightbe analysed myview,rejectsthe suggestion in termsof communaldispositions.Indeed, as I have alreadynoted, he normsare accountofcorrectness: rejectstheverydemandfora substantive partof the 'bedrock',beneathwhichwe mustnot dig. But ifwe are simply forgranted,unreduced and to be allowed to take the idea of correctness in terms of, say, actual and without any prospect of reconstruction truthsabout communal use, how is the necessityof an counterfactual From what does the demand 'orderly communal'practiceto be defended? for orderliness flow? And from what the demand for community? McDowell's paper containsno helpfulanswers.66
of meaning judgement-dependence Wright on the

that: conception about theanti-reductionist has written 29. CrispinWright a to Kripke'sScepticmayseemto provide flat-footed [t]hissomewhat response I . . . In fact, and on thecontrary, of 'loss of problems.' though, goodexample is acute,and is one of think therealproblem Argument posed by theSceptical is notthat ofanswering the fundamental Buttheproblem concerns. Wittgenstein's answer given howand whythecorrect The problem is thatofseeing Argument.
can be correct.67
suggestionis that there are importantconstitutive Wright's intriguing question we shelved some resultsto be gleaned fromthe epistemological are simplyto be takenfor pages back: namely,how, if contentproperties
66 Thoughsee hisremarks which I do notunderstandon a 'linguistic community I am afraid inmere tojustanyone), accessible [that] is conceived as boundtogether, notbya match externals (facts hereecho,I think, own.The main Wittgenstein's butbya meeting ofminds'. McDowell'sproblems his rejection of difficulty confronting a would-beinterpreter of Wittgenstein is how to reconcile ofmeaning, is to saythat substantive constitutive accounts especially see Zettel #i6:'The mistake constitutive and transcendental there is anything that meaning something consists' with theobvious the rejection It is fashionable to soft-pedal of pretensions of the rule-following considerations. part. But this constitutive questions, representing it as displaying a mere'distrust' on Wittgenstein's is tiedtoextremely ignores thefact that therejection ofanalyses andnecessary andsufficient conditons viewof important first-order theses aboutmeaning, including, most centrally, thefamily-resemblance concepts. 67 'Wittgenstein's of Theoretical consideration and theCentral LinguisRule-Following Project
tics', Ioc. cit., p. 237.
545 Considerations TheRule-Following either in experientialor granted, without prospect of reconstruction to terms,can theybe known?As we saw, Kripke attempted dispositional opponent. Wright, use this question to embarrasshis anti-reductionist projectin mind. Pressingthe epistemohowever,has a more constructive logical question will reveal, so he claims, that facts about content are 'judgement-dependent'. essentially What does it mean for a class of facts to be judgement-dependent? Wright'sexplanationis framedin termsof a failureto pass the 'order-oftest': determination test concernsthe relationbetweenbest judgeThe order-of-determination subject to theirparticular made in whatare, withrespect ments-judgements truth. and circumstance-and ofbothjudger idealconditions matter, cognitively ... which pass the test, is a standardconstituted Truth, for judgements For judgecognitive pedigree. concerning of anyconsiderations independently true and is no distance between being ments failthetest, there bycontrast, which what we judgeto be true is constitutively for suchjudgements, beingbest;truth, undercognitively idealconditions.68 whenwe operate to the We may explain the contrast Wrighthas in mind here by recurring idea of an accessible content(see above). An accessible contentis one about which subjects are necessarily authoritativeunder cognitively Now, a question may be raised about the correct optimalcircumstances. explanationfor this authority:is it that, under those optimal circumstances, subjects are exceptionallywell-equipped to track the relevant, facts?or is it, rather,that judgementsunder constituted independently the facts in question? A fact is those circumstancessimply constitute if the latter. if the former, judgement-dependent judgement-independent The contrast,then, is between facts which are constitutedindependentlyof our judgements,howeveroptimal,and factswhich are constiideal tutedprecisely by the judgementswe would formunder cognitively circumstances.And the claim is that facts about content have to be construed on the latter model. Pace Kripke, the target of the ruleis not the realityof contentfacts,but, rather,a considerations following if you thinkthesecome to the same (or Platonist, judgement-independent Best judgements constitutively thing) conception of their constitution. of sentencesascribingcontentto mentalstates; determine the truth-value which confer statesof affairs constituted theydo not trackindependently truthor falsity upon them. conceptionof contentby Wrightarguesforthis'judgement-dependent' model. Drawing available on the alternative the epistemologies attacking an intereston Wittgenstein's actual text,Wrightreconstructs extensively and inferential concepagainstboth introspective ing set of considerations exhaustingthe epistemologies tions of self-knowledge, thus, presumably,
68
Ibid.,p. 246.
546 Paul A. Boghossian available to his opponent. So long as facts about our mental states are construedas independent of,and, hence, as trackedby our self-regarding judgements, we can have no satisfactory explanation of our abilityto know them.On the assumption, then,thatKripke's unstablecontentirrealism is to be avoided at all costs,thatleaves the judgement-dependent conception as the only contender.So goes Wright'sargument. and difficult Wright'sdiscussion raises a number of interesting quesall 'cognitive discussiondestroys tions.Is it reallytruethatWittgenstein's accomplishment' theoriesof self-knowledge? Supposing it does, does this Are inevitably driveus to a judgement-dependent conceptionof content? therenot otherconceptionsthatwould equally accommodatethe rejection of a tracking none of thesequestionscan be epistemology? Unfortunately, of the presentessay. Here I have adequatelyaddressedwithinthe confines to settle for raising a question about whethera judgement-dependent conceptionof content could everbe the cogentmoral of any argument. mental is thatwe must not construefactsconcerning 30. The suggestion and thatthisis to be accomplished content as genuineobjectsof cognition, by regardingthem as constituted by truthsconcerningour best judgements about mental content. Well, what does this amount to? For illustrative purposes,Wrightoffers the case of colour.What would have to be true,iffactsabout colourare to judgement-dependent? We would need, to secure the accessibility of colour facts,and so a firstand foremost, biconditionalof the following form: if C: S would judge x to be blue+-+x is blue. But not just any biconditionalof this form will serve to secure the accessibility of colour. For example,unless restrictions are placed on the permissible specificationsof C, every propertywill turn out to be accessible; just let C be: conditions under which S is infallibleabout colour. So, it must be further requiredthat C be specifiedin substantial formulation. terms,avoidinga 'whatever-it-takes' ofcolour the accessibility Now, whatit would taketo groundnotmerely What is needed, as Wrightpoints facts,but their judgement-dependence? out, is that thequestion whether theC-conditions, so substantially specified, aresatisfied in a case is logically ofanytruths thedetails particular independent concerning ofthe extension of colourconcepts.69 This seems right.For unless the specification of the C-conditions,or, indeed, of anything else on the left-hand-side, is precludedfrompresupposing facts about the colours of objects, it will remain entirelyopen whethersubjects' judgements,formedunder the relevantC-conditions,
69
Ibid.,pp. 247-8.
547 Considerations TheRule-Following of the conditions factsabout colour. For satisfaction reallydid determine would always presuppose some antecedescribed on the left-hand-side theclaim thatit thusundermining of colourfacts, fixedconstitution dently is preciselytruthsabout best judgementthatfixthose facts. are in orderas well.70 But it is, I trust, No doubt, otherrequirements seeinghow factsabout mental alreadyclearthatthereis a seriousdifficulty on judgementthe statedrequirements contentcould conceivablysatisfy dependence. For it is inconceivable,given what judgement-dependence in the case of mentalcontentshould amountsto, that the biconditionals be freeof any assumpthat theirleft-hand-sides the requirement satisfy tions about mental content. For, at a minimum, the contentof the said to fixthe factsabout mental contenthave to be presupjudgements will alwayspresuppose posed. And thatmeans thatany such biconditional of constitution by best of mentalcontentquite independent a constitution judgement. the start.A should have been clear from difficulty In a way,an intuitive a conception of a given fact is, by definition, 'judgement-dependent' by our conception of that fact according to which it is constituted The idea is clearlyappropriatein connectionwithfactsabout judgements. the chic or the fashionable;familiar,though less clearly appropriate,in connection with facts about colour or sound; and, it would appear, impossibleas a conceptionof factsabout mentalcontent.For it cannotin by our judgements generalbe truethatfactsabout contentare constituted about content: facts about content, constitutedindependentlyof the are presupposedby the model itself. judgements,
and prospects robust realism Conclusion: -problems

designatethe view thatjudgementsabout meaning realism 3I. Let robust Then the moral of and judgement-independent. are factual,irreducible, to robustrealism this paper-if it has one-is thatthe major alternatives are beset by veryserious difficulties. that judgeIrrealism-the view, advocated by Kripke's Wittgenstein, mentsabout meaningare non-factual-appears not even to be a coherent variant,as promoted,for example, by Paul option. (An error-theoretic Churchland,seems no better.) versionsof realism appear to be false. The proposal that Reductionist about meaning concern communal dispositionsis unsatisjudgements not merelybecause, implausibly,it precludes the possibilityof factory themeaning but because it appears bound to misconstrue communalerror, of every expression in the language. The rathermore promising(and more popular) proposal,thatjudgementsabout meaningconcerna rather
70 For a veryilluminating thatwould have to be met,see ibid., of the conditions discussion pp. 246-54.
also appearsto confront serious certainsort of idealizeddisposition, in a difficulties: it is hardto see howtheidealizations are to be specified non-question-begging way. ofmeaning a judgement-dependent seemsnotto And,finally, conception ideaofconstitution because thevery be a stable option, bybestjudgement ofmeaning. a judgement-independent appearsto presuppose conception is too facile a It is sometimes said thatan anti-reductionist conception It is hardnotto sympathize response to theproblem aboutmeaning. with Butiftheconsiderations thealternatives thissentiment. canvassed against andifitis true the'rule-following' leavean arecorrect, that considerations itis hard, alsotoagree anti-reductionist conception untouched, ultimately, norreducible. it.Meaning tobe neither with properties appear eliminable, to livewiththatfact. it is timethatwe learned Perhaps I do notpretend thatthiswillbe easy.Robustrealism harbours some the solutions to whichappearnot to be trivial. unanswered questions, First:whatsortof roomis leftfor There are threemain difficulties. ifreductionist areeschewed? Second: aboutmeaning, theorizing programs an anti-reductionism aboutmeaning how are we to reconcile properties witha satisfying oftheir causalor explanatory conception efficacy? And, our (first-person) ofthem? finally: howare we to explain knowledge I cannot, ofcourse, hopeto address anyofthesequestions adequately here.A fewbrief remarks willhaveto suffice. I cannotsee that an antiTo begin with the last questionfirst, reductionist conception of contenthas a specialproblemabout selfno onehasa satisfactory knowledge. As far as I amconcerned, explanation ofourability to know ourownthoughts.7' But I do notsee that theantiembarrassment If anything, it reductionist needfeel aboutthis. anyspecial are better forhimthanforhis opponent. seemsto me, theprospects A reductionist would have it thatmeanings are fixedby certain kindsof that thesort offact couldhardly be known observationdispositional fact, that thereductionist is committed, ifhe is ally.It wouldappearto follow of self-knowledge, to an inferential to have a substantial epistemology that worse conception-aconception maybe, as I haveargued elsewhere, thanimplausible.72 The anti-reductionist laboursunderno comparable burden. As forthe chargethattherewould be nothing leftfora theory of it seemsto me simply to be, ifreductionism is eschewed, false. meaning Let me heremention that survive therejection justa fewofthequestions of reductionist For one thing, as I have stressed, a nonprogrammes. is bestunderstood as a thesis reductionism aboutmeaning aboutmental notaboutlinguistic So anti-reductionism, as I undermeaning, meaning. standit,is notonlyconsistent butpositively a theory about with, invites,
"
See my'Content and Self-Knowledge', loc. cit.
72
Againsee myibid.
549 Considerations TheRule-Following the relation between thought and language. How do public language play in that symbolscome to acquire meaningand whatrole does thought withwanting in mysenseis consistent process?Secondly,anti-reductionism otherpeople. The by whichwe interpret a generalaccountof the principles important work of Quine, Davidson, Lewis, Grandy,and otherson the neitherneeds, nor is best understoodin theoryof radical interpretation of the Its propergoal is the articulation aspirations. termsof,reductionist the speech and employin interpreting successfully principles we evidently is about mentalcontent an anti-reductionism mindsof others.And, finally, consistentboth with substantivetheoriesof the nature of the perfectly is, of whatmakesa givenmentalstatea belief, attitudes-that propositional as opposed to a wish or a desire;and withthe claim thatthe graspingof certainmental contentsdepends on the graspingof others,and so with of mentalcontent. of the compositional structure theories There is hardlyany fear,then,thatwe shall run out of thingsto do, if in the theoryof mentalcontent. we foregoreductionist programmes thereis thequestionofmentalcausation:how are we to Finally,though, witha satisfying about contentproperties reconcilean anti-reductionism It is a view long associated with conception of their causal efficacy? Wittgenstein himself,of course, that propositionalattitudeexplanations are not causal explanations.But, whetheror not the view was Wittgenfew adherentstoday. As Davidson showed, if stein's, it has justifiably are to rationalizebehaviourat all, then attitudeexplanations propositional they must do so by causing it.73 But propositionalattitudesrationalize partlyby virtueof theircontent-it is partlybecause Neil's beliefis that attitude thereis winein his glass, that he reaches forit; so, propositional have a genuine commitus to holdingthatcontentproperties explanations action. But, now, how is an causal role in the explanationof intentional to accord thema genuinecausal about contentproperties anti-reductionist to the essentialincompletrole withoutcommitting implausibly, himself, eness of physics? foran anti-reductionist This is, I believe, the single greatestdifficulty proveits undoing. conceptionof content.It may be thatit will eventually work But the subject is relativelyunexplored, and much interesting remainsto be done.74 University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI, USA
ofPhilosophy Department
PAUL
A. BOGHOSSIAN
48109
Oxford Oxford, and Events, Reasons and Causes', in his Essayson Actions 73 See 'Actions, Press,i980. University 7' For some I987, Journal ofPhilosphy, 'MindMatters', recent seeE. LePoreandB. Loewer, papers Topics, SpringI989. More',Philosophical Fodor,'MakingMind Matter andJerry

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Mind Association

The Rule-Following Considerations'

Press I989 OxfordUniversity

5o8 Paul A. Boghossian

is no fact about methat distinguishes between mymeaning a definite [T]here

ColinMcGinn,Wittgenstein onMeaning, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, I984, pp. I44-6.

The normativity of meaning

What kind of linguisticmistakeis envisagedhere?. . . There is just no analogue

The idea of mental contentcannot be threatenedby Kripke, McGinn

Op. Cit.,p. I47.

Theconstitutive nature ofthesceptical problem

The 'rule-following' considerations?

517 Considerations TheRule-Following

THE SCEPTICAL SOLUTION

518 Paul A. Boghossian

language The argument againstsolitary

and solitary accounts Constitutive language

K., pp. 86-7.

521 Considerations TheRule-Following

For any S: FS means thatpl is false.

of the truth But the disquotationalproperties predicateguaranteethat(i) entails

For any S: [Si has no meaning.

524 Paul A. Boghossian

526 Paul A. Boghossian

Again,fora moredetailed treatment see 'The Statusof Content', loc. cit.

527 Considerations TheRule-Following

See Goldfarb, op. cit.,n. I3.

Dispositions and meaning: normativity

53I Considerations TheRule-Following

Ned Block, op. cit.,p. 63I.

dispositions with respectto that expression that possess M? For, since

The communitarian account

incorrect. . .. None of us can unilaterally make sense of correctemployment of

whichalone it makessense to thinkof individuals' responses as correct or

... it is a communityof assent which supplies the essential backgroundagainst

TheRule-Following Considerations 537

538 Paul A. Boghossian

such that,under0, terms, and non-intentional tions0, in non-semantic,

holism and belief Optimaldispositions

540 Paul A. Boghossian

K., pp. 51-2. See thepaperscitedundern. 3 above.

543 Considerations TheRule-Following

a Rule', loc. cit.,p. 34I. on Following 'Wittgenstein 65 Ibid., p. 349.

of meaning judgement-dependence Wright on the

tics', Ioc. cit., p. 237.

and prospects robust realism Conclusion: -problems

548 Paul A. Boghossian

See my'Content and Self-Knowledge', loc. cit.

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