COMMENTARY

Kishtwars Lava of Hatred

Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal

to the texture of the Kashmir conict. Besides, neither VDCs nor SPOs were given any regular training vis--vis weapons and conduct. Village Defence Committees

The Kishtwar communal clashes have become national news with the Bharatiya Janata Party aggressively pushing its viewpoint that Hindus are being victimised. However, the picture on the ground is not so black and white, and can only be understood in the light of the turbid past of communalisation of Kishtwar and the Jammu region on the whole, which was in fact largely fuelled by Hindutva forces and the security establishment in the region.

Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal (anusaba@gmail.com) is Executive Editor, Kashmir Times and a human rights activist based in Jammu and Kashmir.

here does one begin the story of the communal inferno in Kishtwar? From the Chowgan grounds where the conagration started during the Eid prayers, its spillover effect in the rest of Jammu, or from the history of polarisation and divisive politics in this remote town in the midst of hills? Whichever starting point one chooses, the fragmentation and the 9 August communal riots, the actions of various key players who turned Kishtwar into a fertile ground for communal polarisation and divisions are revealed. Kishtwar, one of the most sparsely populated districts of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), has a ratio of 60% Muslims and 40% Hindus, but till the start of counterinsurgency it enjoyed an exemplary secular amity. It was in the beginning of the 1990s when armed militants rst struck in Kishtwar, carrying out communally selective killings, that things began to sour. The town rst saw signs of communal tensions in 1993-94 after a slew of selective killings. The tensions subsided, but the avour of insurgency and counterinsurgency continued to feed into mutual suspicion; the selective killings were reciprocated by the security forces that also cracked down, raided and targeted people selectively. The trend was the norm throughout the Chenab-Valley belt Doda, Bhaderwah, Ramban, GoolGulabgarh and Kishtwar. But it was Kishtwar that was more severely hit. With a scattered population, separated by vast forests, bordering south Kashmir on one side and Kargil on the other, the area provided an ideal setting for militants hideouts and later, for covert operations by security forces. Selective massacres in the region gave security agencies the excuse to build up more troops and militarise civilian areas, through village defence committees (VDCs) and special police ofcers (SPOs); both have added their own complexities
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The VDCs have proved to be the biggest contributing factor in fragmenting society in militancy-affected areas of Jammu. Ofcials, in defence of the communal composition of VDCs, have maintained that only those people who were keen to join the VDC were given membership and arms to defend themselves. Interestingly, this saffronised agenda of empowering a community that is a minority in Jammu with guns to ght or defend themselves against insurgency started during the Congress regime in New Delhi, and people were hand-picked on communal and ethnic lines. That there were no VDCs in Kashmir, where minorities were already reduced to a negligible size after the exodus of the Pandits, is itself an indication. The rst VDC experiment began in the Chenab Valley. The VDCs followed the policy adopted by the army and paramilitary forces, and carried out searches and crackdowns on a selective basis in villages and towns with mixed populations, without any accountability. In the rst phase, on an experimental basis, 200 VDCs were initially sanctioned and created in the summer of 1995. Subsequently, several other VDCs came up in various parts of the state including Rajouri, Poonch, Udhampur and Kathua. In Rajouri-Poonch, the creation of VDCs contributed less to communal polarisation and more to ethnic divisions between Gujjars and Pahari Muslims. Communal division was not preferred as there are very few Hindus in the rural areas of these two border districts their concentration is mostly in the towns. It was after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government came to power in New Delhi that the number of VDCs increased and by 2006 it had crossed the 3,000 mark with half a dozen to a dozen members in each VDC. In the Chenab Valley, 1,200-1,500 VDCs are operating. The exact number of VDC members in this belt is not known, but according to
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the latest ofcial statistics, about 27,000 people are enrolled as VDC members in J&K, largely from the Jammu province. Of these, 90% are Hindus. In Chenab Valley, the proportion of Hindu VDC members is far higher at almost 98%. The Muslims, a minority in the Jammu region, but a majority in the militancyaffected Chenab Valley belt and the border belt of Rajouri-Poonch, found little space in these armed wings of the villages. In several cases, VDC members were found to be involved in cases of extortion and other acts of crime including murder, torture and sexual violence. Many crimes in which they were involved were passed off as militancyrelated incidents. The creation of VDCs, militarising the civilian space in the rural areas, thus caused fear, panic and pushed the disadvantaged Muslims to a situation where they were almost forced to sympathise with the militant outts as a means of security, especially in the days when militancy was at its peak. The VDCs became a terror in their areas, but were also vulnerable. Many militancyrelated killings claimed the lives of VDC members or members of their families, their ears and noses chopped off or their throats slit. Such cases have fuelled mistrust and suspicion on both sides. Special Police Ofcers The SPOs, unlike the VDCs, are spread throughout J&K, mainly comprising surrendered ultras. However, in Jammu, particularly the Chenab Valley area, a sizeable chunk of hand-picked Hindus are also part of this ad hoc wing of the police force. Even though the SPOs have been crucial in counter-insurgency operations, as it helped the police form good intelligence networks, there have been cases of double-crossing and desertions, besides human rights violations, extortions and fake encounters. There are about 25,000 SPOs operating in J&K, other than an unknown number of those whose services were regularised as part of the police force, most of whom are in the Chenab Valley. Hindutva-VDC-SPO Nexus The Sangh parivar has maintained good liaison with the VDCs and a section of the SPOs. While in power, the BJP-led
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National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government contributed by multiplying their numbers and thus seeking their lifelong allegiance. This continues to be maintained through the party and other Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) afliates using these forces for expanding their bases in regions where saffron parties previously had a minimal presence. In 2004, when 11 VDC members from Hill Kaka area of Operation Sarpvinash fame were mowed down by militants, the NDA governments union minister of state for home, S P Jaiswal said that government would strengthen the VDCs and provide them with the banned AK-47 ries. The BJPs push for the creation of more VDCs, increasing pay scales of SPOs, regularising them and empowering them with better weapons sometimes with direct references to defence of Hindus has become shriller since the party has been out of power, even as this period coincided with the sharp decline in militancy. In 2006, BJPs Sahib Singh Verma, in Jammu for the Save Doda, Save Nation campaign, said that his party would pay a civilian Rs 1 lakh for killing a militant and a million for killing 10 and in case he sacrices his life, the BJP will pay Rs 2 lakh to his family. The saffron brigades interference in the landscape of Kishtwar and rest of the Chenab Valley is mostly built on the edices of militarisation of the area and the more pliable militarised units of VDCs and SPOs, facilitated by the communal divides these units perpetuate. BJPs recent open support to VDC-member turned inspector, Shiv Mohan Sharma, arrested in Kishtwar on charges of running a militant module further adds to the debate about its role. There is reason to believe that a part of the police and the administration may be backing Sangh parivar in fomenting trouble, either due to communalisation of the force and the administrative setup or due to other short-term vested interests. Whether the arrested inspector was part of a larger nexus and enjoyed the patronage of some of his higher ups is not known, but the ease with which rebrand Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)
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leader Praveen Togadia was escorted in and out of the border town of Rajouri last summer to make his hate speech, arouses a great deal of suspicion. As it is, VHP, Bajrang Dal and Shiv Sena have become convenient tools in the hands of the State administration in Jammu to oppose any kind of dissent, human rights violations discourse or talk of dialogue. Communal Politics in Jammu An interrogation of the larger communal politics of the entire Jammu region and the backdrop of the complex dispute of J&K is essential for an understanding of this recent phenomenon of communal polarisation. The Jammu province contributed a great deal to the mayhem of 1947 on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC), altering greatly the demographic prole of the region. The Indian administered part of Jammu is left with the dark legacy of the butchery of Muslims and their subsequent ight. Kishtwar interestingly did not fall prey to the machinations of divisive politics at that time even as neighbouring Bhaderwah witnessed large-scale bloodshed. Barring some incidents of Hindu-Sikh conagration (during the Punjab militancy), Jammu, apart from some aberrations, largely maintained communal amity till the 2008 Amarnath land row, when the lines between region and community became blurred. At the centre of the row lay the blunders of several political groups by which the saffron parties, who were already quietly broadening their political base through co-option of migrant Kashmiri Pandits, activated the overzealous cadres of RSS, Bajrang Dal and VHP. From their traditional bases in Jammu and Udhampur, in pursuit of their policy of horizontal and vertical expansion, they were making inroads into the hilly districts, mostly with the aid of the ofcially militarised civilians. The communal divides were played up by whipping up a frenzy against Kashmir and militancy; the Kashmir dispute and separatists being seen as potential catalysts in diluting and dwarng the regional aspirations. While they may have ended up weaning away Hindus from the hilly districts of Jammu, this further
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alienated the Muslims, who naturally found reason to become more inclined towards Kashmir, despite the cultural and linguistic differences. The ground, ever since, has been fertile for fanatic and fascist forces from all sides to strengthen their cadres and contribute to communal polarisation. Recent Divisiveness While the events in 2008 played the most crucial role in honing up communal divisions, the events thereafter are signicant in adding to the alienation of the Muslims of Jammu. The 2010 killings in Kashmir caused massive despair and anger, exacerbated by horrifying stories of torture, arrests of youth under the Public Safety Act and concocted charges, some of these against youth from the Chenab Valley. Afzal Gurus hanging further contributed to the fears and the sense of persecution, especially as the saffron-brigade-backed elements went into celebratory mode. The much more recent Gool killings (in Ramban district) of four civilians at the hands of the Border Security Force (BSF) and police in July added to the sense of hurt, humiliation, anger and alienation. While some areas in Chenab Valley including Ramban and Doda witnessed spontaneous strikes by both communities, in the rest of Jammu, the Gool killings inspired partial hartals Jammus Shaheedi Chowk was the epitome of that divide where the Muslim-majority area was completely shut and on the other side the Hindu-majority area was open as usual, functioning briskly. The signs of a are-up (could have been in any part of Jammu if not Kishtwar) were visible for quite some time, especially the last few months, coinciding with the rise of Narendra Modi in BJP and his projection as the prime ministerial candidate followed by his Hindu nationalist and kutte ka baccha remarks. The BJP in Jammu has been pretty vocal about strengthening the VDCs and a new dimension to the politics is the discourse about outsiders settling in Jammu city. Afliates of the RSS have of late been making passing references about Burmese Muslim refugees and in the same breath references are made to migrants from Doda,
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Rajouri and Poonch. A similar use of xenophobic ambiguity, without any clear denition of outsider, is apparent in Kashmiri-separatist leader Syed Ali Shahs recent call for not giving houses on rent to outsiders, following which he talks about Bihari labourers and their involvement in crimes. Increasing ceasere violations at the borders have added a potent spice to this recipe of disaster. However, not to be missed are the mysterious events in Kishtwar itself the killing of a boy and a rape case, allegedly by VDC members, the arrest of an encounter specialist inspector Shiv Mohan Sharma on charges of running a militant module and the BJPs open defence of him, the mysterious incidents of stone pelting and ring by unidentied masked persons. Eid Incidents The events of 9 August in Kishtwar need to be contextualised against this backdrop of communal politics in Jammu and the two-decade-long history of communal divisions in Kishtwar, as well as the recent incidents inside and outside Kishtwar. As for what happened in Kishtwar and how everything started, there remains contention with different eyewitness accounts. The contention is mostly centred on azadi slogans and emboldened VDC members, and the question of who started stone pelting and ring. An argument being pedalled by the BJP in the aftermath of the violence is that Muslims caused the provocation with slogans, green ags and some posters of Afzal Guru pasted a day before, and in turn arrogating to themselves the right to retaliate violently against something they deemed anti-national. The are-up of communal tensions in the rest of Jammu was the handiwork of rumours and propaganda mostly coming from the BJP, which tried its best to rake it up at the national scene by projecting it as a onesided attack on the Hindu minority and started this the very moment the tensions started in Kishtwar, while a mute administration watched. It was easy projecting the one-sided case with selective gures of casualties and losses to the torched-shop owners. While most shops in Kishtwar town belong to Hindus, the rst ofcially
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declared dead person turned out to be a Hindu. The two others who died belonged to the other community. It did not take much time for the BJP to woo the important Jammu-based traders organisations, which had earlier repented playing into the hands of the BJP in 2008. Finally, after an initiative taken up by their Kashmiri counterparts, four days later the traders withdrew their call of an indenite bandh, abandoning the Sangh parivar. Kishtwars electoral politics may also be instructive of who could have stoked these res and why the administration was silent initially. Communal tensions in the region are designed to suit mostly the BJP and to some extent the National Conference, whose candidate Sajjad Kichloo virtually controls the Islamic institutions in the area. Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence network is alive in J&K and its role in inaming passions cannot be ruled out, especially in view of the ongoing tensions at the LoC. However, the role of Kashmiri separatists remained constructive, barring the rst days strike call against attacks on the Muslims. The statements that followed sought to address both the communities and talked about losses on both sides; only the policy of VDCs, which has already formed part of the demilitarisation discourse, came under sharp criticism. Even the Congress, which usually, in a bid to regain its base in Hindu majority Jammu region, plays the soft-Hindutva appeasement card, desisted from playing any divisive role. The Congress understood that allowing the res to be fanned would be detrimental to the interests of the party, both in and outside the state. The sample of responses in the aftermath of the Kishtwar incident is enough to show who stoked the res and sought to reap its harvest.

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