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Type-theoretical analysis as a preparation of analyzing expressions of a natural language (A variant proposed by transparent intensional logic (TIL)) Pavel Materna

1. Why types? 2. Montague 3. Tich a) Choice of atomic types b) Functional approach. Molecular types c) Intensionalism d) Constructions e) Parmenides principle f) De re, de dicto g) Higher order types h) Other constructions 4. Type-theoretical analysis 5. Type-theoretical synthesis 6. Difficulties, problems

1. Why types?
Russell s introduction of types (see [Russell 1906]) has been motivated by the need to avoid paradoxes arising due to violating the vicious circle principle . Russell s solution of this problem is connected with a strong intuition concerning our understanding such linguistic phenomena like predication. If some X is predicated of some y, then we feel that y cannot be of the same order as X. Being yellow can be predicated of some particular thing (individual ) and being a colour can be predicated of (being) yellow, but being a colour cannot be predicated of an individual which is yellow. So there are some degrees of predication. Similarly being a dog can be predicated of an individual and being a property can be predicated of being a dog but not, of course, of the respective individual. Russell s hierarchy of types has been formulated in terms of sets and relations. The limitations given by this approach have been excellently summed up and criticised in [Tich

1988, p.68-70]. One of them consists in ignoring other than propositional functions. A predicate can be conceived of as a function, viz. such a function whose values are truthvalues. What happens if we combine a predicate with an object (or an m-tuple of objects)? For Russell, such a combination can be understood if there is a fact corresponding to this combination. So saying that 2 is a prime we combine the predicate prime with the (name of the) number 2, which corresponds with a fact: 2 is really a prime. But what happens if 2 is combined with the predicate odd is not clear. (problem of false sentences.) Not only that. What happens when the function + is combined with the pair <2, 3>? No referring to a fact is possible here. And such functions like + are not members of Russell s hierarchy. A very expressive tool for dealing with functions has been described by A.Church [1940]. His l-calculus, originally typeless and important for investigating the problems of computability (l-definability!), has been connected with type-theoretical hierarchy (to avoid paradoxes). As Manzano 1997 says: The offshoot of this was fantastic, since added to the formalising capacity of the lambda language was the naturalness of type representation. (226) From our viewpoint, the most important contribution of the typed l-calculus to the functional approach in logic consists in the following principle: Analyses based on the functional approach need two fundamental operations: a) creating a function by abstracting, b) applying the given function to an argument. Thus when we want to take into account our linguistic intuition originating in our understanding the predication, we should be able to generalise this intuition so that it captured not only expressions that realise predication but all expressions, including expressions which denote functions other than those ones whose values are truth-values. Thus a type ascribed to (the object denoted by) sin is surely another than the type ascribed to the possible arguments of sin, i.e., numbers, and it is also distinct from the type of being a periodic function. The hierarchy of types accepted in TIL is inspired by Church rather than by Russell in that the types are definable in terms of functions. (See 3.) 2. Montague R.Montague and Montagovians (see [Thomason 1974] ) make up a most influential school of theoretical linguistic and logical analysis of language. Similarly as in TIL, the types are construed as sets of functions. There are two basic (atomic) types: e, t; the former represents

objects (entities), the latter truth-values. Sets of functions over these types are the remaining types. Thus the type (e,t) i.e., the set of functions from e to t represents the classes of objects (for these functions are characteristic functions of classes of objects), (t,t) is the type of unary truth-functions, etc. etc. Since Montague was aware of the fact that the s.c. extensions are not sufficient for analysing expressions of a natural language he wanted to take into account also intensions but instead of introducing the new atomic type for possible worlds he defined only the types of intensions as (s,X) (for X any type) but did not define s as a separate type. Montague s analyses are well-known. They differ in essential respects from TIL, sharing at the same time some features with it, in particular being based on types and functions and respecting in a sense the necessity of distinguishing extensions and intensions. Some critical commentaries to Montague can be found in Tich s work, e.g., in [1988] 3. Tich Transparent intensional logic (TIL), first formulated by Tich in the seventies and finding its most developed form in his [1988], can be characterised by some not just standard features. Since type-theoretical analyses which we want to practice here could be misunderstood without knowing some general principles of TIL, we will try to briefly reproduce them without detailed motivation. i) TIL is an objectual , i.e., anti-formalist system. For TIL, logic is not a study of formal languages; it studies some logical objects like truth-values, individuals, classes, functions, properties, propositions and alike, plus the ways they can be combined to create new logical objects. (See his [1978, p.275].) Formal, artificial languages and any symbols only serve to this primary purpose. One of the reasons why logic (construed in this way) is important is that the mentioned ways of combining , i.e., constructions, can be associated to particular expressions of a natural language and help so perform logical analyses of natural languages. ii) Semantics based on TIL is a PWS (Possible-world semantics). A most natural way how to handle modalities is articulated in terms of possible worlds. Possible worlds, as (maximum) consistent collections of possible facts, are indispensable not only when modalities are to be analysed, but also when we analyse empirical expressions, since the latter cannot denote actual, real objects but only some conditions; so empirical sentences cannot denote truth-values (Frege s error) but truth conditions (= propositions), empirical common nouns cannot denote classes but properties, etc.

iii) One among the possible worlds is the real, actual one. Since to know, which one it is would mean to know all actual facts, which only an omniscient being could do, we cannot know, which among the possible worlds is the actual one. Therefore our logical analyses of empirical sentences cannot calculate their truth-values, they cannot discover the actual population of a property, etc. iv) The universe of discourse, whose inhabitants are individuals, is one and the same in all possible worlds. Most other PWS suppose that universes are world-specific, i.e., that every possible world owns another universe of discourse. (See, e.g., [Kripke 1979] .) v) The preceding point is connected with the way how individuals are construed in TIL. They are bare or naked in the sense that they do not possess any non-trivial, property necessarily. So we can say, e.g., that no wooden table is necessarily wooden, for no wooden table is necessarily a table, even no table is necessarily a table. (This point is against Kripke; see Tich s [1983].) vi) A Parmenides Principle (to be found already in Frege s Grundlagen der An expression E cannot be about an object that is not mentioned in E. Thus the expression the highest mountain is not about MtEverest, semantics of this expression cannot be connected with a factual, empirical information (this holds for any semantics). See point e). Now concrete points necessary for type-theoretical analysis. Arithmetik):

a) Choice of atomic types Since one of the purposes of building up TIL was to make it a good tool for logically analysing expressions of natural language, the choice of the basic, atomic types could not have been entirely arbitrary. The choice it has made is surely nothing absolutely unchangeable, but it is well founded and there are strong intuitions that support it. We will try to articulate some of them. First of all, a natural language is a tool for expressing our claims, convictions, hypotheses, beliefs. A common feature of all such linguistically important entities is that they are expressed by (declarative) sentences. But such sentences are sometimes (among semanticists or epistemologists) called truth-bearers: the distinction between truth and falsity is a fundamental distinction which should be respected by all analysts of a natural language. Thus one of the atomic types is the set of truth-values. How many truth-values do we have? The classical answer is: there are two of them, T(ruth) and F(alsity).

There are, of course, some logicians who use many-valued logics . The latter are perhaps interesting from a formal or technical viewpoint, but the notion of truth, as used in a normal discourse, presupposes the classical standpoint. So the first atomic type, denoted by the Greek letter o, is the set {T, F}. Remarks: 1. In most (maybe all) natural languages there are even particular words denoting truthvalues: So the English Yes denotes T, No denotes F. 2. We cannot expect that the expressions of a natural language would denote concrete objects: we have to be aware of the fact that T, as well as F, are abstract entities. The lowest level of our ascribing properties and alike to objects presupposes that there are some such lowest level objects. These are called individuals and the respective type, i.e., the set of individuals, is denoted by the Greek letter i. Distinguishing between sentences like A new age has arrived. A new age arrives. A new age will arrive. we see that grammatical tenses surely possess the semantic dimension. Time points are to be taken into account. But what are (the members of the set of) time points? One possibility (chosen by TIL) is that time is continuum. This means that the set of time points can be handled in the same way as the set of real numbers. Thus the next choice is the set of time points or of real numbers, denoted by the Greek letter t. The choice of the most controversial fourth atomic type is motivated as follows: What is the semantics of empirical expressions? Let us compare the mathematical (i.e., nonempirical) expression prime (number) with the empirical expression dog. The former expression obviously denotes a class of numbers. The members of this class are independent of time, of course, but moreover, if our world changed somehow (so that, e.g., it contained other events, other natural laws or so), it would have absolutely no influence on which numbers belong to the class of primes. So 2 would be a prime even if there were no forests in Finland etc. The fact of class membership is independent of empirical facts. On the other hand, the fact that some individual is a dog is a contingent fact. To determine whether an individual is a dog we have to inspect the state of the world. Thus empirical expressions do not denote real concrete objects: they denote something like conditions. In our example, dog does not denote a definite class, it denotes a property. The distinction between classes and

properties can be illustrated as follows: Let individuals A1, ,A5000 be the only members of a class X. Let them share (at some time point) the property living in the village Y, so that they are (at that time point) the only inhabitants of Y. Now imagine that some members of X move, change their addresses. What changes is their possessing the property above. What does not is their membership in X. So the class cannot change in any respect, whereas the property being the same property changes its population . This temporal variability, characteristic of empirical expressions like names of properties, could be grasped by saying that, e.g., properties determine classes dependently on time points, i.e., that they can be construed to be functions which associate time points with classes. Such functions from time points to something will be called chronologies. Yet this temporal variability is accompanied with what can be called modal variability: Even at the given time point it is only a contingent fact that the individuals above share the property above. Thus this fact cannot be calculated from our knowledge of the property, because to recognise the actual population of this property we need experience in the sense of a contact with the world. Hence a property could be better construed to be a function which associates every thinkable state of the world with a chronology of classes, and similar considerations can be applied in the case of any empirical expression. The consequence of the above considerations is that a further atomic type is necessary, the type that corresponds to our intuition of possible states of the world; the broadly accepted terminology speaks about possible worlds. The collection of all possible worlds is denoted by w, which is the last atomic type. Remark: Various theories of possible worlds are relevant for philosophical logic. Their construal in TIL is best described in [Tich 1988]. For the purpose of analysing expressions of natural language it is sufficient to assume that whatever consistent collection of all thinkable states of the world (empirical facts ) at the time point t is a possible world at t, and possible worlds are temporal sequences (histories ) of particular possible worlds at particular time points.

b) Functional approach. Molecular types Summing up, we have got four atomic types at our disposal: o, i, t, w. We will show that a (nearly?) sufficient class of kinds of object and, therefore, of kinds of expression to be analysed can be type-theoretically described in terms of these types. First of all we have to define how the compound (molecular ) types are created in terms of atomic types. The main principle underlying the way of combining the latter to get the former can be formulated as the principle of functionality: the dependence of compound entities (e.g.,

expressions) on the particular components can be best modelled as functional dependence. In order to explain this principle we have to recapitulate what is meant by the notion of function. The contemporary notion of function, as used in mathematics, construes functions as mappings; they are set-theoretical entities which can be (in principle) represented as (perhaps infinite) tables where the left n columns are arguments (they are ordered n-tuples if n > 1) and the right column represents values of the function on particular arguments. Partial functions associate every argument (a line in the table ) with at most one value, total functions are a kind of partial functions such that they associate every argument with just one value. Functions defined in this way obey the principle of extensionality: for n-adic functions it is given by the valid formula (f, g are variables ranging over n-adic functions of an arbitrary type): "x1 xn (f(x1, xn) = g(x1, ,xn)) f = g. An earlier notion of function construed functions as rules, instructions determining particular steps of calculations. Functions construed in this way do not obey this principle; to see this consider two following functions-instructions F and G: F(x,y) = (x y) * (x + y) G(x,y) = x2 y2. F and G are distinct instructions and, therefore, distinct functions-as-instructions. We can easily see that they are identical as mappings. Here what we mean by functions are functions as mappings. Functions-as-instructions have been rehabilitated in TIL and got the name construction (see d)). The way of obtaining compound types from atomic types is based on functional approach in the following sense: Atomic types are collections (sets ) of primitive objects (truth-values, individuals, time points/real numbers, possible worlds). Compound types are collections ( sets) of (partial) functions. So the inductive step of the definition of types will be:

Definition 1 (Types of order 1) i) ii) o, i, t, w are types of order 1. Let a,b1, ,bm be any types of order 1. Then (ab1 bm), i.e., the set of partial functions with values in a and arguments (in general, tuples whose components are, respectively) in b1, ,bm, is also a type of order 1 iii) A type of order 1 is only what satisfies i) and ii). -

Types defined in this way are types of order one. Later ( see g)) we will see that our analyses will in some cases need types of higher orders.

c) Intensionalism We have promised to show that objects and, therefore, expressions denoting objects can be associated with various types derivable from the four atomic types. Further we stated that the compound types are always sets of functions (as mappings). A motivation of this functional approach has been suggested: dependencies are best modelled as functions. Now we will show it via some more or less systematic examples. The following logically relevant and distinguishable categories of objects can be typetheoretically described as follows (types ((at)w) are written atw for any type a): Table 1 Category of objects Numbers Classes of numbers Type t (ot) Example (object) 2 Primes {Plato, Einstein} greater than being black being a sibling of subtracting that some animals are carnivorous Magnitudes ttw the number of planets negation conjunction of individuals the number of planets It is not the case that and Unary truth-functions (oo) Binary truth-functions (ooo) Existential quantifier over individuals (o(oi)) Example (expression) two a prime Plato and Einstein > black a sibling of minus Some animals are carnivorous

Classes of individuals (oi) Binary relations of numbers Properties of individuals Binary relations between individuals Binary arithmetical operations Propositions otw (ttt) (oii)tw (oi)tw (ott)

non-emptiness of a class Some

Comments: 1. Let a be any type whatsoever. The type (oa) is then according to the definition of types the type of classes of objects which are members of the type a, briefly of classes of a-objects. Indeed, (oa) is the set of functions from a to {T,F}, i.e., of characteristic functions of the classes of a-objects: Such a function takes T on those a-objects which belong to the given class, and F for the other a-objects. So (oi) is the set (type) of classes of individuals (in our table one such class is {Plato, Einstein}), (ot) is the type of classes of numbers (here such a class is the class of primes), (o(oi)) is the type of classes of classes of individuals (so $, the existential quantifier, is the class of all nonempty classes of individuals), etc. By analogy, the types of (non-empirical) relations are sets of characteristic functions of these relations, so the type of > is (ott): the members of this type are functions which return T just to those ordered pairs of (real) numbers whose first member is greater than the second. 2. We can immediately state that there is no systematic correspondence between types and parts of speech (p.o.s.). We can surely assume that this holds for any natural language, since categorization of p.o.s. originated, in any natural language, quite independently of type-theoretical analyses, which does not mean that a language could not express the type-theoretical distinctions, so important for logical analyses. To adduce some examples of discrepancy between a linguistic and a type-theoretical classification, let us ask, which p.o.s. is connected with denoting properties of individuals. It is easily seen that not only one: it can be a noun see dog ,(in Czech: pes ) it can be an intransitive verb see to work , pracovat it can be an adjective see black , ern (but the case of adjectives is not that simple, see later). In the case of nouns one can a little complicate the problem, claiming, that is, that the respective property is not denoted by the noun alone but rather by the combination copula + noun, e.g., to be a dog , b t pes . Yet this is compatible with our claim. 3. Types unlike expressions are coarse-grained : they are just sets (of primitive objects or of functions-mappings). Thus determining the type of an (abstract!) object (and, derivatively, of the respective expression) is only a first, most simple step in the logical analysis. If semantics stopped after a type-theoretical analysis has been made, then we would need no semantics. This simplicity of types can be illustrated as follows:

Take the type otw (i.e., ((ot)w) ),the type of propositions, i.e., of functions that associate every possible world with a chronology of truth-values. It is not only so that all possible declarative empirical sentences share this type but there are theoretically infinitely many such sentences which denote one and the same proposition: So the sentences MtEverest is higher than Mont Blanc , Mont Blanc is lower than MtEverest , If 1+1 = 2, then Mont Blanc is lower than MtEverest , If MtEverest is not higher than Mont Blanc, then 1+1 2 , but also MtEverest je vy ne Mont Blanc , Mont Blanc je ni ne MtEverest etc.etc. not only share the propositional type but all of them denote one and the same proposition. Indeed, take any possible world W at any time point T: whenever one of the sentences above is true (false) in W at T, all the other sentences are true (false) in W at T. The truth-conditions are the same (= the proposition is the same). 4. Our table is not (and no such table can be) exhaustive as a list of types possibly exploitable in a language. Neither is it exhaustive as a list of representatives of expressions to which types can be ascribed. Finally, some important categories of expressions pose some interesting (but still open) problems as concerns their typetheoretical description. We can mention interrogative sentences, imperative sentences, indexicals, demonstratives and even proper names. Some other linguistic units (for example tenses, episodic verbs) have been already successfully analyzed but these analyses are rather complicated and whoever wants to be acquainted with them can use some literature (see [Tich 1980, 1980a] ). There are two groups of types in our table. First, types of the form atw.

Definition 2 (Intensions, extensions) The members of the types atw are intensions. The members of the other types are extensions. Our definition of types shows that intensions are functions which associate possible worlds with chronologies of a-objects. Their type indicates the temporal and modal variability we mentioned above. Slightly simplifying we can suggest a criterion of ascribing intensional types to expressions: Unless an expression is a mathematical/logical expression we can classify it with expressions denoting intensions. (Some exceptions can be expected, one of


them is the expression colour: we would say that colour is simply the set of particular colours like white, blue, yellow etc.. But then since these particular rs are properties of individuals, i.e., (oi)tw-objects the type of this set is (o(oi)tw), so no intensional type. This presupposes though that the population of the object colour is fixed, independent of empirical facts. If we can admit that what is called colour can change, or that it is only a contingent fact that there are just those colours we know, then the object colour would be a property of particular colours, rather then a set, and its type would be indeed (o(oi)tw)tw, i.e., an intensional type.) The second group contains the other types. Their members are called extensions. They are members of atomic types, classes, relations(-in-extension), mathematical functions etc. Remark: Montagovians use the idea of distinguishing intensions and extensions in another way. For them any expression possesses its intension and its extension. Thus the word dog can be handled in some contexts as a name of a class, in other contexts as a name of a property. TIL is an intensionalistic theory: every empirical (non-mathematical, if you like) expression denotes an intension, the other expressions denote extensions, both independently of a context. This anti-contextualism is justified, for wherever it seems that the context makes the given empirical expression concern extension, it can be shown that distinct contexts influence supposition rather than meaning or denotation. See f). Intensions can be in general characterised as conditions. Let us compare some intensions with corresponding extensions (examples are objects in the sense of entities independent of a language; the respective expressions can be easily added):

Table 2

Extension/type Example Intension/type individual / i truth-value / o number / t class of individuals / (oi) relation-inextension of numbers / (ott) > Plato T 9 {Mozart, Homer} proposition / otw magnitude / ttw property of individuals / (oi)tw


individual role / itw the most famous teacher of Aristotle that there are nine major planets the number of major planets (being a) composer

relation-in-intension (being) taller than of individuals / (oii)tw

Our intuitive criteria of ascribing types in general and of recognising intensionality in particular can be supported by following considerations concerning the examples in the table: Compare 1. Plato and the most famous teacher of Aristotle. Ignoring for the time being some special problems with semantics of proper names we can say that Plato is something like a label put on an individual. In this case there is nothing what could change Plato s identity : the numerical identity of an individual cannot be influenced by what just happens to be the state of the world. On the other hand the most famous teacher of Aristotle could have been any other individual. Just who was the most famous teacher of Aristotle is of course dependent on the state of the world: it is world-time dependent. This is why we do not a priori determine a definite individual when we use a definite description . 2. T and that there are nine major planets: The extension T is simply the abstract truthvalue. True mathematical sentences can be said to denote it. On the other hand that there are nine major planets can be true only if the given world and time satisfy certain conditions. In other words, the proposition will be true just in those worlds-times where the number of those individuals which have the property being a major planet in them equals 9. Our (actual or real ) world is now among those world-times, which is only a contingent fact which cannot be deduced a priori, it has to be empirically discovered. (It is not a mathematical or logical fact.)


3. 9 and the number of major planets. The number 9 is entirely immune to any influence of empirical facts. Which is the number of major planets is again given dependently on the given world-time. If it were mathematically, a priori derivable, its type would be t. 4. {Mozart, Homer} and (being) a composer. Again, construing proper names as labels, or, better, taking Mozart, Homer simply as particular individuals independent of those properties which we are used to connect with them we can safely claim that no empirical facts can influence that a priori kind of identity which is characteristic of individuals. So we can speak about a class of individuals here. On the other hand, whether somebody is or is not a composer is a fact which is a part of a given world-time, and therefore there is no class of composers: only a property, which generates various classes of individuals in particular worlds-times. Indeed, we are able to recognise that an individual is a composer, but our knowledge does not stem from the knowledge that there is a fixed class of individuals and that the respective individual is a member of it this would be a mathematical knowledge, like if you know that A belongs to the class, say, {A,B, }. 5. > and (being) taller than. The fact that a number is greater than another number is an a priori piece of knowledge. Nothing such can happen in the world what could change the fact that, e.g., 2 is greater than 1. On the other hand, whether an individual A is taller than an individual B, is something which cannot be deducible from the meaning of taller (modal variability, we can rationally admit that A could be not taller than B), and as concerns the temporal variability, everybody knows that if it holds at the time point t that A is taller than B then it can often happen that at some time point t A will be no more taller than B. Remark: In 3. we meet a frequently occurring problem. The expression number can be a tobject but the expression number of denotes another object: it is a function which associates a class of some a-objects with that number which is the cardinal number of that class. So it type is (for a any type) (t(oa)). In Czech no error can arise: number is slo , number of is po et . The criterion that enables us to decide whether the given expression is intensional , i.e., whether the type ascribed to it is of the form atw, consists in deciding whether this expression is empirical. It is, however, only one of the criteria that help us to determine the type. Another criterion consists in making clear the functional character of the dependencies connected with using the expression. In the linguistic area the intuition connected therewith led to the rise and development of categorial grammars ( see, e.g., [Morrill 1994] ). To show a most elementary


example, consider a common noun like prime or its combination with copula is a prime . Using this expression together with a name of a number we get a truth-value. So the type of prime can be derived from this fact: if t will be the type ascribed to the names of numbers and o the type of (an expression denoting) a truth-value, then to get o after combining (is a) prime with a name we have to construe this expression as representing a function with tobjects as arguments and truth-values as values; the resulting type is (ot). (In Montague, where individuals and, e.g., numbers are not type-theoretically distinguished, belonging both to the type e, the resulting type would be (e,t) (see 2.). ) This functional criterion holds primarily in the area of objects. We have just shown, however, that we can ascribe types to expressions, assuming that there is a semantic relation connecting expressions with objects, let it be denoting relation, so that prime denotes (in English) the set of primes, and the latter can be said to be the denotation of the former (see [Church 1956]). Now we will apply such a functional analysis to a more difficult case. We have adduced black as an example of an expression denoting a property. An easy generalisation could suggest that the type ascribable to adjectives should be (oi)tw (or (oa)tw for some other a). But take such expressions which combine an adjective with a noun where the latter denotes a property; now compare, e.g., (being a) big ant and (being a) small elephant ant , as well as elephant , denote properties of individuals. big ant and small elephant obviously denote properties of individuals too. Now if big and small denoted a property, we could therefrom derive the desirable type (oi)tw of the compound expressions under the following condition: the new properties being a big ant and being a small elephant would have to be interpreted as being big and being an ant and being small and being an elephant, respectively. But then our linguistic intuition would be lost: a logical consequence of this reading would be that if an individual is a big ant, then it is big, and if an individual is a small elephant, then it is small. Looking then at a big ant and, at the same time at a small elephant we would have to state that the former is big whereas the latter is small. This absurd consequence can be avoided if the type of big , small and of adjectives in general is changed. Montagovians as well as TIL have realised this change. TIL proceeds as follows:


Empirical adjectives (where this problem arises) being empirical denote intensions. So their type has the form atw, i.e., ((at)w). Let A be such an adjective. They are combined with other expressions, which denote properties, i.e., (oi)tw-objects. Let E be such an expression. In every world W at every time (point) T we apply the adjective first to W (getting the type (at) ) and then to W (getting the type a). What happens, if this result is applied to (the object denoted by) E? We know that the resulting type of doing this procedure in all worlds-times should be (oi)tw. So it should be (oi) in one particular world-time. Summing up: We reduced our problem to the following one: What type must a be if applying A to E with E/ (oi)tw gives the type (oi) ? To answer this question is already easy: we apply A to E (in the given W and T) and the result is an (oi)-object. If the a-object is a function (it has to be, since a is surely a compound type), then its application to an (oi)tw-object results in an (oi)-object only if a is of the type ((oi)(oitw)). And since this procedure repeats in all worlds and times, the resulting type of an empirical adjective will be ((oi)(oi)tw)tw. Now we avoid the absurd consequence mentioned above. A new property arising from the combination of an adjective and an expression denoting a property is not necessarily the same property as that one which would be expected if the adjective denoted simply a property: so from the fact that x is a big something it does not follow that x is big, etc. Exercise: Prove that the same result will be obtained when expressions with cumulated adjectives (a big pink elephant and alike) are analysed. The proper analysis of expressions in TIL presupposes that a type-theoretical analysis has been performed for (most) simple expressions. Since the principle of compositionality is assumed to hold we must be able to unambiguously derive the type of a compound expression from the types of its components. It should be clear that the way the particular expressions are combined to create more compound expressions is given by the grammar of the given language and that from the specific, language dependent character of grammars and universal, language independent character of logic it follows that there are two branches of what can be called logical analysis of natural language: a) a general theory that formulates some principles independent of what is specific for particular languages,


b) application of this theory to particular languages. The tasks to be solved by b) are dependent on the branch a). To solve b) for English tried Tich in his posthumous work (to appear in some future). It is, for every language, a gigantic work to do. The result of such a work done for a language L should be a set of L-specific rules which make it possible to create for any (however complex) expression of L pairs <e, m>, where e is the expression and m is the construction corresponding to e. Here we only suggest some points relevant for a) with an emphasis on type-theoretical analysis and synthesis. The key notion of construction is introduced in the next section. Remark: We adduce types of some important extensions. a) Truth functions: Unary truth functions (in particular negation) (oo). Binary truth functions (ooo). b) Quantifiers. The universal (") and existential ($) quantifiers are type-theoretically polymorph, which means that their type depends on the area over which quantification goes on. In general, the schema of their types is (o(oa)). The universal quantifier is the class whose only member is the class of all a-members. The existential quantifier is the class of all non-empty subclasses of a. c) Identity. Identity ( = ) too is type-theoretically polymorph. The schema is (oaa). It is the class of all such pairs a, b of a-members where a is the same object as b. d) Singulariser. Singulariser (whose linguistic counterpart is commonly called descriptive operator and the symbol of which is the iota inversum, but because of the fact that this symbol is often missing, it is replaced by simple i) is also type-theoretically polymorph; it is a partial function of the type (a (oa)) which is defined on classes containing just one amember and returns this very member, and is undefined on all other classes. -


Constructions What the standard analyses (like Montague see [Thomason 1974], [Cresswell 1985] )

mostly do is that they define some artificial language (l-language or so) and define some rules of translation from the natural language to this artificial language, to show then that we can in many cases demonstrate equivalence of expressions of natural language with their translations . For TIL this way is not viable. There is, first of all, a fundamental theoretical flaw in the mentioned approach: If A, an expression of a language L, is correctly translated as A into a language L , then there must be something what is common to A and A, evidently what is


called meaning (of A and A). Now we can hardly claim that an expression of an artificial language is the meaning of the expression whose translation it is supposed to be. Let A be an expression of a natural language, and A its translation into an artificial language. Suppose for a while that A is really the meaning of A. We can ask: what is the meaning of A ? Is it perhaps A ? But this is an obvious nonsense, for A and A are distinct, so that the meaning of A would be distinct from the meaning of A . The way out which has been chosen by TIL is theoretically very important; but also in practising our analyses it makes it possible to avoid some problems that jeopardise the other approach (see Cresswell s [1975], where the author thinks that variables of possible worlds cannot be used in the object language , since the so-called principle of proximity would be lost). It is the notion of construction which offers the solution. Clearly, if meanings of expressions were construed as expressions (say, of another language), then regressus infinitus is what we get. The only solution can be that meanings are extra-linguistic entities. Constructions, as defined below, are such extra-linguistic entities. TIL assumes that what makes expressions of a natural language meaningful is a system of abstract procedures, which are encoded by the given language and which can be imagined as series of intellectual steps . They are abstract (like, e.g., numbers, functions etc.) and structured, i.e., they contain particular components plus the way they are combined (without this plus they would be mere lists of components). Already by now we can see that infinitely many such procedures can result in constructing one and the same object. To illustrate this fact consider a very simple example: A simple way to the number 2 is simply posing 2. Another such way consists in a calculation 1 + 1, and in infinitely many such calculations, still another way is to say the only even prime , etc. With the exception of the simple posing the procedures we have in our minds consist in making some steps : identifying the number 1, the function adding and applying the latter to the pair <1,1> , or identifying the classes of even numbers, of prime numbers, the intersection, applying the intersection to the pair <even numbers, prime numbers>, identifying the partial function the only x such that and applying it to the result of the intersection, etc. Italicizing the expression applying suggests that there is some way of handling the particular components of the procedures, in this case the operation of applying a function to its arguments. Accepting the general idea of constructions (as characterized but not defined above) we have to ask some questions.


First, we could be interested unless we avoid philosophical questions in knowing what kind of status the constructions enjoy: are they mental, or objective entities? For TIL they are objective, since mental character does not guarantee intersubjective agreement. For anybody who is not interested in such problems this question can seem to be irrelevant. Let it be so. Second, if constructions are extra-linguistic, then a rather practical question arises: Well, let constructions be abstract entities, but how do we communicate with such entities? Without linguistic means it is obviously impossible. Thus a following objection to the notion of constructions can be formulated: Let constructions be something like meaning of expressions. The only possibility how to handle such constructions seems to be to define an artificial language, which is just what has been criticised above. Yes, defining constructions we will define a sort of artificial language , let it be called CL. What is, however, important, is that it will be not the expressions of CL what will be taken to be meanings: The expressions of CL will be only a kind of fixing particular kinds of construction; by the way, if the way of fixation were changed, i.e., if another artificial language CL were chosen, the constructions themselves would remain the same. This is very similar to the case of various distinct notations of truth-functional logic. Whether the language of truth-functional logic is Russellian, Hilbertian, or perhaps a language of Polish notation, the logic itself is the same, it is always the same truth-functional (propositional ) logic. Another analogy: Using the English expression elephant , say, in the sentence Some elephants live in Asia we do not speak about the English word elephant : we speak about elephants, or, more precisely, about the property (being an) elephant. Thus handling abstract extra-linguistic entities need not be a piece of a pseudophilosophical speculation: it can be as well precise as if we pretend to handle chains of symbols in a formal language. We will return to this question after constructions are defined. Before we proceed to the definition proper let us explain some motivation for choosing just those kinds of construction which will be defined. First of all, we have defined an objectual environment consisting of the objects whose types are types of order 1. These 1st order objects (intensions and extensions) are, of course, distinct from the way they are constructed. Expressions of a language can denote them only due to some in general structured way that Frege had in his mind when he introduced the term sense ( Sinn). Thus the role of the first two kinds of construction consists in mediating


between the world of 1st order objects and the world of constructions. This role is played by variables and trivialisation. Further, our functional approach (see section b) ) needs two other kinds, well-known from l-calculi: constructions that apply functions to arguments, here called composition, and constructions that produce functions by abstraction, here called closure. Finally, in section h) we will consider the possibility + usefulness of defining still other kinds of construction. Now we will pre-theoretically characterise particular kinds of construction as mentioned above and afterwards we will formulate the core definition of this chapter. 1) Variables. We have shown that there are infinitely many types (see sections a) and b) ). Now for each of them we have at our disposal infinitely many incomplete constructions: these are variables for the given type, say, a-variables for the type a. They are constructions in that they always construct exactly one object of the given type, and they are incomplete in that they do their job dependently on a total function called valuation: valuations are functions which associate every variable with just one object of the respective type. They can be imagined to work as follows: For every type there are infinitely many infinite sequences of the members of the type. A valuation always selects one such sequence for every type, and then the i-th variable of that type constructs the i-th member of that sequence. Example: Imagine that the (infinite) sequence of the members of o begins as follows: T, T, T, F, T, F, F, . Now let p5 be the 5th o-variable. If the sequence above has been selected by the valuation v, then we say that p5 v-constructs T (since T is the 5th member of that sequence). We have explained the character of variables as constructions without resorting to any reference to a linguistic object. Thus we see that variables like all constructions are no linguistic objects. A standard conception of variables has it that variables are letters, characters, i.e., linguistic objects. For us, the usually used letters like x,y, p,q, f,q, etc., are not variables but only arbitrarily chosen names of variables. To make clear that variables construct objects dependently on valuations we will say that variables (and constructions that contain free variables) v-construct objects, where v is a parameter of valuations.


2) Trivialisation. Trivialisations make constructions from objects : Let X be any object whatsoever (but X may be also a construction, which is important for building up the higher order objects, see section g) ). Then 0X is a construction called trivialization, which constructs just X without any change. From the present viewpoint trivialization is necessary, since the remaining constructions consist of constructions only, not of objects. 3) Composition. The precise definition of composition follows in the definition below. Here an approximate description of its role can be formulated as follows: If X (v-)constructs an m-ary function, and X1, ,Xm (v-)construct arguments (i.e., an m-tuple of the components of the argument) of this function, then the composition (v-)constructs the value (if any) of this function on the argument(s). 4) Closure. Again, here only characteristics: If X (v-)constructs a-objects and x1, ,xm vconstruct b1-, ,bm-objects, respectively, then the closure (v-)constructs a function determined by what object is constructed by X when the respective objects replace the (possibly occurring) variables x1, ,xm. The result is an (ab1 bm)-object. So we have interface with objects ( 1), 2) ), applying function to arguments (3) and creating a function (4). We will have some thoughts about whether this is sufficient later (section h).

Definition 3 (Constructions) i) ii) iii) Variables are constructions. Let X be any object or even construction. Then 0X is a construction called trivialisation. It constructs X without any change. Let X, X1, , Xm be constructions v-constructing (ab1 bm)-, b1-, , bm-objects, respectively. Then [XX1 Xm] is a construction called composition. If the function v-constructed by X is not defined on the objects v-constructed by X1, ,Xm, then [XX1 Xm] is v-improper , i.e., it does not v-construct anything. Otherwise, it vconstructs the value of the function on the tuple v-constructed by X1, ,Xm. iv) Let x1, ,xm be pairwise distinct variables that v-construct b1-, ,bm-objects, and let X be a construction v-constructing a-objects. Then [lx1 xm X] is a construction called closure. It v-constructs the following function F: Let b1, ,bm


be b1-, ,bm-objects, respectively; let v associate xi with bi and be otherwise identical with v; then the value of F on b1, ,bm is the object v-constructed by X; if X is v-improper (see iii) ), then F is not defined on b1, ,bm. v) A construction is only what satisfies points i) iv).

Remark: As for the point v), see, however, section h). Examples. A sufficient number of examples will be given in the following sections. Some most simple illustrations follow: Let x1 be a variable v-constructing real numbers (i.e.: ranging over t ). Let a particular valuation v associate x1 with the number 2. Then x1 v-constructs 2, whereas 0x1 constructs (i.e., v-constructs for every valuation v) just the variable x1. Notice that x1 is a t-variable, for 2 is a t-object. On the other hand, 0x1 is not a variable, it is a construction which constructs the variable, i.e., another construction. Our definitions do not make it possible to ascribe a type to constructions: the latter are not 1st order objects. Ascribing types to constructions will be enabled by a ramified hierarchy of types, section g). Let > be the greater_than relation between real numbers, so >/ (ott). The construction [0> x 00] (x ranging over t) v-constructs truth-values: T if x v-constructs a positive number, F otherwise. Notice that the type of the object constructed by the construction is unambiguously given by the types of the objects constructed by its components. We have [ 0> x 00] o (see Definition 3 iii) ). Now consider the construction [lx [0> x 00]]. According to the Definition 3 iv) this construction constructs a function which takes the value T on those numbers for which the following composition takes T, and F on the other numbers. Again, we can see that the type of this function, i.e., (ot), is unambiguously derivable from the types of the objects constructed by the components of the construction, (ott) t t


here it suffices to derive it from the type v-constructed by the composition and the type t which x ranges over (we omit the outermost brackets):

lx [0> x 00] t (ot) Remark: We recapitulate the distinction between a construction and the artificial expression that guarantees its fixation. In our last example we can illustrate this claim as follows. This construction does not contain brackets, does not contain l, and whereas the artificial expression contains two occurrences of x, the construction itself contains one occurrence of x only writing lx we only fix what the construction does, we do not add a new occurrence of x to the construction itself. Let div be the dividing function, so div/ (ttt). Let x, y be again numerical variables. Consider the construction [0div x y]. It obviously v-constructs the result of dividing the number v-constructed by x by the number v-constructed by y. Now we will bind the variable x via the following closure: lx [0div x y]. Let v associate x with 6 and y by 4. The closure ignores v as concerns x (see Definition 3 iv)), so that it v-constructs the function which takes any number k to the result of dividing k by 4, i.e., by the number v-constructed by [0div x y]. Thus we can see that the valuation influences only those variables which are not in the scope of l. (It does not influence the variables which are inside a trivialization either, but before the section g) we cannot formulate the general definition of free and bound variables.) Let us consider the construction [0div x 00]. Clearly, for every valuation v this construction v-constructs nothing, i.e., it is (v-)improper. The closure lx [0div x 00], however, is not improper: it constructs a function which is on each argument undefined. Some examples of simple closures: Let x range over a type a. o


The closure lx x constructs the identity function over a. The closure l x 02 constructs the constant function which associates every member of a with the number 2. Let x, y range over t. Compare the following closures: a) lxy [0> x y], b) lyx [0> x y], c) lx[ly [0> x y]] The closure a) constructs the function that takes T on such pairs <m, n> of numbers where m is greater than n, and F otherwise. It constructs, therefore, the same relation as does 0>. The closure b) constructs the function that takes T on such pairs <m, n> of numbers where n is greater than m, and F otherwise. So it constructs the same relation as does 0<. The closure c) constructs the function that takes every number m to (what [ly [0> x y]] vconstructs, i.e.,) the function which takes every number n to T iff m is greater than n. So it takes, e.g., the number 2 to the class of all numbers n such that 2 is greater than n, in other words, to the class of all numbers less than 2. (We can see that c) constructs a function which models the same dependency as does in another way the function constructed by a). ) The definition of constructions will be extended in section g) (and perhaps in h) ). Before, however, we will exemplify using constructions of intensions by analysing the already mentioned Parmenides Principle and the problem of de re vs. de dicto suppositions. e) Parmenides principle We already know that this principle can be formulated as follows: An expression E cannot be about an object that is not mentioned in E. It could seem that it is an entirely obvious principle. Yet violating it is often very tempting. A semantic analysis of an expression should result in showing a structure (construction) that identifies (constructs) just what the expression is about. A consequence thereof is that empirical expressions should be analysed so that the respective construction constructed an intension rather than its value in the actual world-time (see section c) ). This is very important because of one of the main purposes of analysis: to make it possible to make just the correct inferences. To illustrate this claim observe the following premise:


The highest mountain is in Asia. If its analysis did not obey Parmenides principle, then it could easily enable us to draw the conclusion which, of course, does not follow. Now we will derive a construction underlying our premise to show that Parmenides principle blocks the incorrect inference above. It will be a particular illustration of the procedure that will be more thoroughly described in chapters 4 and 5. Remark: One could wonder why we speak about a construction . Why not the construction ? We will return to this question in the beginning of chapter 4. A. Type-theoretical analysis. The easiest expression to be type-theoretically analyzed is obviously mountain. It is an empirical common noun, so it is about a property of individuals. So we have M(ountain) / (oi)tw Simplifying a little, we can take the expression is in Asia as denoting a property of individuals too. So we have (being in) A(sia) / (oi)tw Now the expression the highest is more difficult to submit to a type-theoretical analysis. Let us try. First, whether something is the highest object of some kind is dependent on empirical facts. So we can say that whatever object is denoted by the highest, its type will be atw for some type a. Second, let us suppose (for simplicity s sake) that the superlative (the est, in Czech nej ) indicates that the object which is the highest one is always at most one. And since high (more or less) can be only individuals (from the viewpoint of our type-theoretical classification, and ignoring possible metaphoric usage), we could consider the possibility of the type itw. Yet this hypothesis is counterintuitive. Individuals according to our stipulation are mere pegs of properties. The expression the highest individual is highly problematic. We can see that the highest is in any rational context accompanied with a common noun; this syntactic fact is justified by the semantic fact that being the highest always means being the highest among some objects (individuals) possessing some property: being the highest tower is not the same as being the highest mountain. Thus the individual which is the highest one with respect to one property is not automatically the highest individual with respect to another property. But MtEverest is in Asia.


properties themselves are functions from possible worlds and times to classes, so that comparing heights is always possible only among the members of some class, i.e., of the value of the given property in some world-time. Thus claiming that some object is the highest one means claiming that it is the highest member of a class. But if which individual is the highest one is dependent on a given class, then we can say that it is a function from classes of individuals to i. Not forgetting that all this is dependent on worlds and times we come to the result that a in our case is (i (oi)). So we have (the)H(ighest) / (i (oi))tw. B. Type-theoretical synthesis. We recapitulate: The three objects whose constructions should combine to make up a construction underlying the whole expression are H / (i (oi))tw, M / (oi)tw, A / (oi)tw . The whole expression should denote as an empirical expression a proposition, i.e., an otwobject rather than a truth-value: not taking this into account means not obeying Parmenides principle: no truth-value is mentioned in the sentence. Hence our task is now to find such a construction which would construct an otw-object and whose subconstructions would be the constructions constructing the three objects above. (This task is an instance of the task typetheoretical synthesis.) A useful definition will determine subconstructions:

Definition 4 (Subconstructions) Let X be a construction. i) ii) iii) iv) v) X is a subconstruction of X. X is a subconstruction of 0X. If X is [YY1 Ym], then Y, Y1, , Ym are subconstructions of X. If X is lx1 xm Y, then Y is a subconstruction of X. If X is a subconstruction of Y and Y is a subconstruction of Z, then X is a subconstruction of Z (transitivity). As we already suggested the rules of the transition from an expression to the underlying construction, in particular the rules governing the combining of subconstructions to get the required construction, are language dependent, i.e., they will be distinct for distinct languages. Having a linguistic input plus the rules we should get the desired construction practically


automatically. We will solve our task without possessing such rules (for English), we have to suppose their existence and give some general hints, the only advantage thereof being that such general hints may support solving similar tasks for other languages as well. The linguistic input should make it clear that in our case the being in Asia is predicated about some object which in turn is determined by the expression the highest mountain. Now a temptation we mentioned above consists in our confusing some piece of empirical knowledge (the highest mountain is surely MtEverest) with what the expression really says; it does not mention MtEverest, and the information contained in it is not an information about MtEverest: it informs us that whatever mountain is the highest one it is in Asia. The sentence would say the same thing even if MtEverest were not the highest mountain. (In that case, what could change would be at most the truth-value, the meaning would remain the same.) Now what is certain is that being in Asia is predicated about some individual; but no definite individual can occur (via its trivialization) in the resulting construction, for no definite individual is mentioned in the sentence (Parmenides principle). The problem has to be solved with H / (i (oi))tw and M / (oi)tw at our disposal. Let us begin from the other end: The resulting construction should construct a proposition. To construct an otw-object (i.e., an ((ot)w)-object!) means to construct a function from possible worlds to chronologies of truth-values. The basic procedure of constructing functions is a closure. Thus let us choose once for all two variables: w ranging over w, and t ranging over t. The resulting construction will obviously possess the following form: lw[lt X], where X (v-)constructs truth-values. (We will abbreviate this notation by lwlt X.) Now the truth-values v-constructed by X have to be mediated by possible worlds and times, i.e., the variables w and t must be present in X, otherwise the resulting construction would produce a trivial proposition, i.e., a constant function associating every world-time with one and the same truth-value, which contradicts the fact that the sentence is an empirical sentence. So the predicating of A to that indefinite individual is in fact applying, for every world-time, the class of those individuals that happen to possess the property being in Asia in the given world-time to that individual. We have therefore (abbreviating [[Xw]t] by Xwt) lwlt [0Awt Y], where Y is a construction v-constructing that indefinite individual, or better, that individual which is the result of applying H in the given world-time to the class which is the value of the


property M in the given world-time. But this is already the solution of our problem, for we have lwlt [0Awt [0Hwt 0Mwt]]. An easy algorithm checks the type-theoretical adequacy as follows: lw lt [[[0A w t w] t] [[[0H ((oi)t) t (oi) (oi) o t w The principle of this algorithm is clear: Let X (v-)construct an (ab1 bm)-object and let X1, ,Xm (v-)construct respectively b1, ,bm-objects. Then [XX1 Xm] (v-)constructs an a-object. Let X (v-)construct an a-object and let x1, ,xm v-construct b1-, ,bm-objects, respectively. Then lx1 xm X (v-)constructs an (ab1 bm)-object. Notice that the composition itself v-constructs a truth-value. Yet we cannot calculate the truth-value of the sentence, since the composition contains free variables w, t. And this is as it should be: in the empirical case the truth-value of a sentence depends on possible worlds (modal variability ) and on time points (temporal variability ). Therefore the resulting type must be an intensional type, here the type of propositions, i.e., truth conditions . These truth conditions can be read off from the construction: in our example we can see that the respective proposition is true in such worlds-times W, T where the class of those individuals that are in Asia in W at T contains the individual which happens to be in W at T the highest one in the class of those individuals which are mountains in W at T. No other information is given in particular we are not informed about MtEverest. (ot) ((ot)w) w] t] [[0M t w] t t (oi) i t]]] (oi)tw w t (i (oi))tw w (oi)tw w ((oi)t)

((i (oi))t) t (i (oi))

f) De re, de dicto The TIL-like analysis is anti-contextualistic: it presupposes that any disambiguated expression has the same meaning (and, therefore, denotes the same object) in any context. It


could seem, however, that there are strong arguments against. We will argue that at least one kind of them can be refuted in the following way. Compare the sentences Some politicians are honest. Honesty is a virtue. The expression honesty is in English the substantialised form of the adjective honest (in Czech, for example, we can observe the similar case estnost, estn ). For TIL the meaning of both grammatically distinct expressions is the same. It is not as if the second sentence gave honesty another meaning and/or type than the first sentence w.r.t. honest. In both cases honest(y) denotes a property of individuals, so its type is (oi)tw. The following analysis will demonstrate that the distinction does not concern meaning or type, but so-called supposition only. Analysis: Some $ / (o (oi)). P(olitician) / (oi)tw, H / (oi)tw, V(irtue) / (o (oi)tw) (let virtue be a class of properties; an alternative analysis would consider virtue to be a property of properties). A standard conception needs also / (ooo). (One can construe quantifiers in such a more natural way that no conjunction is necessary in existentially quantified constructions.) The first sentence is empirical. So we have (x ranging over i) lwlt [0$ lx [0 [0Pwt x] [0Hwtx]]]. The second sentence is not empirical due to our choice of the type for V. We have [0V 0H]. Now let us ask: Can we see any distinction between H in the former construction and H in the latter? Well, let us accept that in our simplified analysis the meaning of honest(y) is 0H. (Nothing essential would change if the construction underlying honest(y) were a complex construction inspired by some definition.) In this respect no distinction can be observed. Yet one distinction is easily seen. In the first construction the property H is applied to w and (then) to t. No such application happens in the second construction. It means that the truth-value vconstructed by the respective composition in the first construction does and in the second composition does not depend on value of H in a given world-time.

Definition 5 (de re, de dicto) Let X be a composition and Y a subconstruction of X. Y is said to be in de re supposition in X iff the value of what is v-constructed by X in a world W at the time point T


depends on the value of what is v-constructed by Y in W at T. Otherwise Y is in de dicto supposition in X. (The terminology is borrowed from medieval philosophy, where a somewhat distinct meaning was connected with both terms.) From the definition we can infer that a subconstruction which is in the de re supposition is always applied to w and t. Now a question arises: Does it hold that a subconstruction in the de dicto supposition cannot be applied to w, t ? Surprisingly, the answer is negative. To show it we need to explain a special kind of contexts called attitudes. More about attitudes will be said in section g) and then in chapters 4, 5. Already now we can, however, explain one kind of analysis of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are relations which are denoted by such expressions like believe, know, doubt, think etc. . Let B be such an attitudinal verb. The schema of the attitudinal sentences is X Bs that Y. What type can be ascribed to B? There are two possibilities, one of which will be referred to in section g). Here we will choose such an interpretation of attitudinal verbs which seems at first sight to be the most natural one: construing these relations as empirical relations linking individuals with propositions we get B / (oiotw)tw. Let us analyze from this viewpoint the sentence Charles believes that the richest man is happy. We are here not involved in solving the difficult problem of semantics of proper names, so let Charles be an individual; Ch(arles) / i. The type of the richest is obviously the same as that of the highest, so R(ichest) / (i (oi))tw. Being a man and being happy are properties of individuals, thus M(an) / (oi)tw, H(appy) / (oi)tw. According to the type of B and the linguistic intuition, believing is an empirical binary relation between individuals and propositions. The individual is here Charles, the proposition that the richest man is happy is analyzed in the same way as the proposition denoted by The highest mountain is in Asia:


lwlt [0Hwt [0Rwt 0Mwt]]. The sentence above that refers to Charles belief is thus analyzed as follows: lwlt [0Bwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Hwt [0Rwt 0Mwt]]]]. Now the subconstruction which constructs the proposition that the richest man is happy is in the de dicto supposition, and this fact corresponds to the fact that Charles believing is independent of the values of H, R, M in the worlds-times where his believing takes place. Yet each of the constructions constructing these intensions is applied to w, t in the resulting construction. So we have to state that the de dicto context makes of subconstructions containing de re suppositions subconstructions with de dicto suppositions w.r.t. the context. In this sense a de dicto occurrence can contain applications to w, t. Two features of such believing etc. de dicto are characteristic and important for logical inference: a) Let a premise Bill_Gates is the richest man. be added to the premise Charles believes that the richest man is happy. Can we deduce from these two premises the conclusion Charles believes that Bill Gates is happy. ? Surely not. Charles may believe what he believes without knowing Bill Gates, without knowing who is the richest man. The proposition that the richest man is happy is distinct from the proposition that Bill Gates is happy, and no logical connection obtains between them. b) Does from Charles believes that the richest man is happy. follow that there is some individual such that Charles believes of him/her/it that he/she/it is happy ? (The respective construction being lwlt [0$ lx [0Bwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Hwt x]]]] ). Imagine that there is no richest man. (you can admit it at least when there are more rich people with the same amount of money at their disposal, or when there are no rich people at all). In this case the conclusion would be false: Charles simply cannot believe of some non-


existent entity that it is happy, whereas his de dicto belief is immune to existence or nonexistence of the richest man. These two features ( a) and b) ) distinguish believing as referred to in de dicto supposition from believing as referred to in de re supposition. The latter can have one of the following linguistic forms: Charles believes of the richest man that he is happy. or, equivalently, The richest man is such that Charles believes of him that he is happy. If we had at our disposal the rules that transform particular syntactic structures of English to our constructions (i.e., properly speaking, to operations of creating functions and applying them to arguments) we could now automatically fix the resulting construction. Here we have to resort to linguistic intuitions or perhaps use some linguistic structure as defined in some linguistic school (the most adequate structure would be probably offered by a categorial grammar). Let us try without rules: Both sentences speak about believing of (somebody). Especially the second sentence makes it clear that this time the class of those individuals of which Charles believes them to be happy is applied (in each world-time) to the richest man. So the form of the construction will be (x ranging over i): lwlt [[lx ] [0Rwt0Mwt]]. Now [lx ] will, for every world-time, construct the class of those individuals of which Charles believes them to be happy, i.e., [lx [0Bwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Hwt x]]]]. The resulting construction is lwlt [[lx [0Bwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Hwt x]]]] [ 0Rwt 0Mwt]]. Now unlike in the case of de dicto supposition the value of what is v-constructed by the composition [lx [0Bwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Hwt x]]]] [ 0Rwt 0Mwt] is dependent on what is v-constructed by [0Rwt 0Mwt]. Therefore, the situation sub a) above, when the premise Bill_Gates is the richest man. is added, has to be evaluated distinctly: Suppose that the proposition denoted by this premise is true in all worlds-times W,T, where the proposition denoted by the first premise is true. Then the conclusion Charles believes of Bill Gates that he is happy.


will be true as well: that Bill Gates is a member of the class of those individuals who are believed by Charles to be happy is surely fulfilled in W at T. Notice that the possible fact that Charles does not know that Bill Gates is the richest man is irrelevant here, because this time the construction [0Rwt 0Mwt] is outside the scope of Charles believing, it is rather we as those who refer to this believing who know that the richest man is Bill Gates. Formally, the premise Bill_Gates is the richest man. expresses the construction lwlt [0= 0Bill_Gates [0Rwt 0Mwt]]. Thus we can substitute 0Bill_Gates for [0Rwt 0Mwt] in the first premise without any problems and get the conclusion. Similarly, as for b), if there is no occupant of the office the richest man in W at T, the premise will not be true in W at T, and otherwise such an individual exists it is just the occupant of the role of the richest man in W at T. One of the consequences of our distinction between de re and de dicto suppositions is: The de dicto case does not follow from the de re case, and the de re case does not follow from the de dicto case. This claim is demonstrated by our analysis of the features a) and b). Besides, counterexamples can be easily given: The non-deducibility of de dicto from de re: Imagine that Charles belief (in W at T) concerns the man who is the richest man (in W at T) but that Charles does not know that he is the richest man (in W at T). Then de re holds unlike de dicto. The non-deducibility of de re from de dicto: Imagine that Charles believes that the richest man is happy but at the same time he would be surprised if informed that such and such individual actually is the richest man. Maybe Charles would say: Well, if I knew that this man is the richest man, I would not claim that he is happy. In this case Charles belief was de dicto without being de re.


g) Higher order types Having defined types of order 1 (Definition 1) and trivialization (Definition 3) we have made it possible to construct such objects whose type cannot be determined; we can say that these object do not possess types of order 1. For a most simple example see any variable, say, a numerical (over t ranging) variable x. We could speak about a t-variable, but t is the type of the objects v-constructed by x, not of the variable itself. This could be an innocuous fact, because x, as well as any variable, does not construct itself, but a s soon as we begin to use trivialization we are able to construct variables and any constructions. Consider 0x. According to Definition 3, ii), this construction constructs x. So what is the type of the object constructed by 0x? This will be possible to say after our hierarchy of types has been extended to a ramified hierarchy . (How far is this hierarchy similar to Russell s ramified hierarchy can be seen from a comparison made by Tich in [1988, p.68-70].) The Definition 6 below is structured as follows: First, types of order 1 are defined (referring to Definition 1), second, a connecting link defines constructions of order n, third, types of order n + 1 are defined. No vicious circle arises.

Definition 6 (Types of order n) T1 Types of order 1 : see Definition 1. Cn Let a be a type of order n. i) If x is a variable that v-constructs a-objects, then x is a construction of order n. ii) iii) iv) v) Tn+1 If the type of X is a, then 0X is a construction of order n. If X, X1, ,Xm are constructions of order n, then the composition [XX1 Xm] is a construction of order n. If x1, ,xm, X are constructions of order n, then lx1 xm X is a construction of order n. A construction of order n is only what satisfies i) through iv). Let *n be the collection of all constructions of order n. i) ii) iii) *n and every type of order n is a type of order n+1. If a, b1 , ,bm are types of order n+1, then (ab1 bm) is a type of order n+1. A type of order n+1 is only what satisfies i), ii).


Remark: and every type of order n in Tn+1 means that in the case when the original types in (ab1 bm) are not of the same order, then we can and have to shift the orders of them so that all of them are of the same (the highest) order. (Similarly for applying points iii) and iv) in Cn. We now illustrate Definition 6 by some simple examples. 1) Let us return to our numerical variable x. Since x v-constructs numbers, i.e.,t-objects, and since t is a type of order 1, x is a construction of order 1 (Cn, i) ). It is, therefore, a member of *1, and its type is of order 2 ( Tn+1, i) ). So 0x is construction of order 2 and its type is of order 3. 2) Let Pr be the class of all proper (i.e., for all v v-proper) constructions of order 1, so Pr / (o*1). We will determine the types of following two constructions. [0+ x 01] [0Pr 0[0+ x 01]]. + is a function of type of order 1 ( (ttt) ). Hence 0+ is a construction of order 1 and its type is of order 2. x, as a numerical variable, is a construction of order 1 and its type is of order 2. 1 is a t-object, type of order 1, so 01 is a construction of order 1 and its type is of order 2. So the first construction is of order 1 (Cn iii) ) and its type is of order 2. Now Pr is an (o*1)-object and its type is according to Tn+1, ii), of order 2. Therefore, 0Pr is a construction of order 2, and its type is of order 3. Finally, 0[0+ x 01] is a construction of order 2 and its type is of order 3, so that [0Pr 0[0+ x 01]] is a construction of order 3 and its type is of order 4. This hierarchy is very intuitive. Types of order 1 are types of objects over the basis o, i, t, w; no construction can possess such a type. To mention the constructions which (v-)construct the 1st order objects we use constructions that construct the former: these are constructions of second order. To mention the constructions of second order we use constructions of order 3, etc. etc.

Definition 7 (Higher order objects) Higher order objects (HOOs) are objects of a type of order n for n > 1. Thus HOOs are constructions and such (ab1 bm)-objects where at least one type from among a, b1, bm is a type of order n > 1.


Now it could seem that there is no need in HOOs when expressions of a natural language are to be analysed. It could seem that such artificial expressions like the class of proper constructions are highly artificial and professional and that we never meet really natural expressions which would have to be analysed in terms of HOOs. We must state that this impression is wrong: One of the difficult problems with analyses is the problem of analyzing attitudes. We have already mentioned this problem and have shown that one of the possibilities is to interpret attitudes as relations between individuals and propositions (in general, between individuals and intensions). We will see in chapters 4 and 5 that a very important variant of these analyses consists in taking attitudes to be relations linking individuals with constructions. Then, of course, HOOs are indispensable components of our analyses. Now we can define free, l-bound and o-bound occurrences of variables. Definition 8 (free, l-bound, o-bound occurrences of variables) Let X be a construction. i) ii) iii) If X is a variable x, then x has a free occurrence in X. If X is 0Y, then every occurrence of x in Y is a o-bound occurrence in X. If X is a composition [YY1 Ym], then every occurrence of x in X which is a free, o-bound, l-bound occurrence in Y, Y1, , Ym, is a free, o-bound, l-bound occurrence in X. iv) If X is lx1 xm Y, then if x is one of x1, ,xm and its occurrence in Y is not a obound occurrence in Y, then its occurrence is l-bound in X. If x is not one of x1, ,xm, then every occurrence of x which is not l- or o-bound in Y is free in X. The specific form of boundness, the o-boundness ( boundness by trivialization ) has a very important feature: Having a construction X which is the result of correctly substituting in X l-bound occurrences of a variable by occurrences of another variable we can state that both constructions are equivalent. (See the a-rule in l-calculi.) Substituting in X o-bound occurrences of a variable by another variable always results in a non-equivalent construction.

Definition 9 (equivalent constructions) A construction X is equivalent to the construction Y iff either X v-constructs for all valuations v the same object as Y, or X and Y are for all valuations v v-improper.

Example: Compare following two pairs of constructions (x, y range over t): a) lx [0> x 00], b)

ly [0> y 00]

[lx [0> x 00]], 0[ly [0> y 00]]

Both constructions under a) construct one and the same function, viz. the class of positive numbers; they are equivalent; the occurrence of x (y) in them is l-bound. The constructions under b) construct distinct, even if equivalent constructions: so they are not equivalent; the occurrence of x (y) in them is o-bound (see Definition 8, ii), iv) ). The role of trivialization is now well visible. If what we are interested in is what is constructed by a construction X, then we use X as our way to the object. If we are interested in the construction X itself, then we have to construct X, which in the easiest case happens via trivializing X. Now we can return to a recent question: can we say that in a really natural language we are sometimes interested in a construction itself ? And our answer is again: an attitude can be interpreted as being sensitive to the way the proposition is given, i.e., just to the respective construction. This will be seen in chapters 4, 5.

h) Other constructions TIL is an open ended theory. This means that we are invited, among other things, to consider possibilities of enlarging a) the class of atomic types, b) the class of constructions. Here we refer to two points in this respect. 1. Constructions not mentioned in the preceding text. The original form of TIL, as used in Tich s articles before 1988, considered 1st order objects to be constructions sui generis; objects were constructions that constructed themselves. The transition to the ramified hierarchy (see section g) ) showed that it was necessary to introduce a new construction which would shift the order of the given entity. So trivialization came into being . Trivialization also made it possible to reject the stipulation according which objects were a kind of construction. Tich , however, has introduced in [1988] two other constructions: execution and double execution. Here they were not mentioned because in our opinion they are not indispensable in most contexts. So only briefly:


Execution, 1X, v-constructs what X v-constructs; so if X is no construction, then 1X is improper, otherwise it is identical with X. (Thus it is a sort of a filter , rejecting nonconstructions and doing the same job as the respective construction.) Double execution, 2X, works as follows: if X is a v-proper construction which v-constructs a v-proper construction Y, then 2X v-constructs the object v-constructed by Y; otherwise it is vimproper. An example: Let c be a variable which ranges over numerical constructions (i.e., over (o*1) ). Let a valuation v associate c with the construction [0> x 00] and x with the number 2. Then

c constructs just the variable c,


c v-constructs [0> x 00],

c v-constructs what [0> x 00] v-constructs, i.e., the truth-value T.

(We have a theoretical possibility to inductively define executions of any degree , of course.) Execution, as well as double execution, may have a certain importance in highly theoretical contexts. Our analyses can do without them. 2. Other types and constructions. Applying TIL analyses in the area of conceptual (database) modeling (see [Du 2000] ), resulting in building up a data model HIT, has shown that what is badly needed in the practice of answering users queries is to have at one s disposal functions whose values are m-tuples for m > 1. Since the type schema for functions in TIL is (ab1 bm), where a is a type according to Definition 1, no function can satisfy this requirement. Thus a new type, a tuple type has been introduced in the HIT model. This type is, properly speaking, the Cartesian product of the types b1, ,bm, and has been denoted by (b1, ,bm). Then the functional type has been defined as (ab) for any type a; b could be, of course a tuple type. This made it possible to have all functions monadic without the Schoenfinkel reduction (which does not work in the case of partial functions, as has been demonstrated in [Tich 1982] ). Having, however, a new type is only a necessary prerequisite of the analyses proper. We have to be able to construct the objects of the new type. For this reason two new kinds of construction have been defined. First, a tuple construction: Let X1, ,Xm be constructions vconstructing b1-, ,bm-objects b1, ,bm respectively. Then (X1, Xm) is a construction vconstructing the m-tuple <b1, ,bm>. And for 1 i m, the projection constructions are


defined, v-constructing the object v-constructed by the ith member of the tuple construction Y. Projections are denoted, say, by Yi. Thus, e.g., the construction ( 0Day, 0Month, 0Year)2 constructs the class {January, February, ,December}. 4. Type-theoretical analysis a) General remarks We will illustrate the general principles of the TIL approach on declarative sentences. As for the interrogative sentences see [Tich 1978]; no text analysis will be performed (this task is very complicated and transcends the resources that the present form of TIL has at its disposal). The particular steps to be always realised can be in general described as follows: I. Identification of particular simple meaningful components. (In absence of the rules mentioned immediately before the final Remark in section 3c) we have to use our linguistic intuition only.) II. III. IV. V. Determining the kinds of objects denoted by these components. Ascribing types to these objects (see in particular section 3c) ). Fixing by some letters these objects and by trivialising the latter (via 0A , where A is the letter chosen for this fixation). Making up a list of the resulting trivialisations together with the respective types. The point V. is what will be the input into the synthesis (Ch. 5). Remark to the point IV: This step is a pure didactic necessity . It is, of course, an illusion only when we assume that the construction underlying a simple expression is a simple construction , i.e., a trivialization of an object-non-construction. Such an assumption is absurd, as we can see on the following example: In English we have a simple expression (a) prime (in Czech: prvo slo). Our point IV. makes us write down, e.g., 0P. But this would mean that the class of primes would be constructed without using other constructions, such as those ones which identify the function divide, an existential quantifier etc. In an abstract level, we can, of course, if we like, suppose that an abstract procedure is able to do it. Analyzing, however, expressions of a natural language we have to suppose that many simple expressions are only definienda, abbreviations which can be understood only in virtue of our knowledge of definiens, which always expresses a more complex construction than definiendum. Solving problems of this kind has to be postponed. See [Materna 1998] for some relevant points in this respect.

b) Some simple examples A. Meaningful components: Charles, smokes. Kinds of objects: Charles as a proper name obviously denotes some individual (here we can ignore the problems with proper names, as well as the fact that the sentence itself does not offer a definite clue which individual it is). smokes is a form of smoke; it denotes a property of individuals (an individual does or does not smoke). Ascribing types: The types are, respectively, i, (oi)tw. Trivialising:

Charles smokes.

Ch, 0S. Ch i, 0S (oi)tw.


Remark: The dots in the List mean that the construction (v-)construct an object of the respective type. So A a reads A (v-)constructs the object of the type a . On the other hand A / a reads A is of the type a . Thus while we write 0Ch i , we must write Ch / i and 0Ch / *1 . B. Some men are bachelors. Meaningful components: some, men, (are) bachelors. Remark: One could be tempted to classify with meaningful components separately are and bachelors. From the logical viewpoint, however, bachelor cannot be semantically


distinguished from to be a bachelor. (All such remarks ought to be replaced by systematic rules, of course.) Kinds of objects: Variant A: The standard way how to define semantics of some consists in taking the existential quantifier (as denoted by some) to be the class of non-empty classes (here: of individuals). To choose this variant means to interpret the sentence as The class of those individuals that are men and bachelors is not empty. Which means that a new implicitly present meaningful expression has to be taken into account, viz. and. Variant B: Notice that some men can be understood as something what is predicated of bachelor. This interpretation can seem to be a little more complicated but its asset is clear: we need no further implicit and, which is not present in the sentence. Some is then a function whose application to a class (here: of individuals) results in the class of such classes that share with the give class at least one member. Both variants: men is a grammatical form of man, which obviously denotes a property of individuals. bachelors is a grammatical form of bachelor, which again denotes a property of individuals. Ascribing types: Variant A: (some) (o (oi)). Plus conjunction (ooo) Variant B: (some) ((o (oi))(oi)) Both variants: (men) (oi)tw, (bachelors) (oi)tw. Trivializing:

$ (Variant A), 0$ (Variant B), 0M, 0B, 0 $ (o(oi)), 0 (ooo) (Variant A), 0$ ((o (oi))(oi)) (Variant B), 0M (oi)tw, B (oi)tw.

0 0

C. Meaningful components: no, animal, (is) rational

No animal is rational.

Remark: a) The standard analysis of no presupposes that the semantics of a sentence of the form No A is B.

has to be construed as the semantics of the sentence For all x, if A(x), then B(x). Then, of course, the quantifier which should correspond to For all x would have the same type as $ in the preceding example. So we would have to work with " / (o(oi)). The unnaturalness of this approach is obvious: The second sentence surely functions (semantically, truth-functionally) just as the first does, but the mechanism is another. To replace a sentence S with an L-equivalent sentence S does not mean that doing semantic analysis of S can replace doing semantic analysis of S. (See [Tich 1994] ) In our case, analysing the second sentence we need to use implication. The first sentence does not contain any expression corresponding to implication. This consideration leads us to choosing the Variant B for analysing the quantifier corresponding to no. (See the Remark to Pegasus in section d). ) b) We have shown that the type of empirical adjectives should have the form ( (oa) (oa)tw)tw. This holds in English (similarly in Czech) if the adjective is in the attributive position. As a complement it simply denotes a property, type of the form (oa)tw. In English (as well as in Czech) there is a grammatical, context-independent criterion: the adjective together with copula serves as a (potential) complement. Thus rational denotes, properly speaking, another object than is rational (or: being rational). The latter simply denotes a property. Kinds of objects: no denotes according the preceding Remark a) the function which being applied to a class A returns the class of those classes which are disjoint with A animal, as well as is rational, denote a property of individuals. Ascribing types: (no) ( (o(oi)) (oi)) (animal) (oi)tw (is rational) (oi)tw Trivialising:

N, 0A, 0R N ( (o(oi)) (oi)), 0A ... (oi)tw, 0R (oi)tw .


c) Existence


D. Meaningful components: Pegasus, does not, exist. Kinds of objects:

Pegasus does not exist,

Can Pegasus denote an individual? Hardly. We understand the word only knowing that it should be a winged horse. Thus Pegasus denotes an intension only, an individual role , does not followed by a verb plays the role of negation. exist surely denotes a property; the well-known philosophical objections to this claim are justified only if exist were applied to individuals, or, in general, to extensions. To exist is, however, a property of intensions, and it is possessed by an intension in a world W at the time T iff at least one object plays the role (in W at T) determined by the intension; if the intension is a property, then to exist means that such an object is a nonempty class. In our case existence is a property of individual roles, and an individual role possesses this property in W at T iff at least one individual plays the role in W at T. Ascribing types: (Pegasus) itw (does not) (oo) (exist) (oitw)tw Trivialising:

P, 0, 0E P itw, 0 (oo), 0E (oitw)tw


Remark: If we decided to interpret Pegasus as a name of an individual, then the natural temptation to analyse our sentence as a formula of 1st order predicate logic would result in a contradiction: $x (x = P). Here P would be an individual constant , and since the formula is the negation of the valid formula $x (x = P), our analysis would make us believe that our sentence which is, intuitively, a true sentence is actually a contradiction. (Unless we used a free logic , which is a high price to be paid.)


By the way, a good point concerning the distinction between the decoding of the way a natural language works and the formalisation thereof in terms of an artificial language can be found in [Tich 1994]: instead of studying real languages we investigate toy languages invented by ourselves for our own convenience. (the analyst) wants to demonstrate that for any semantic trick one can pull in natural English a similar trick can be pulled in his toy language. He is not interested in how these tricks are pulled in English. He does not see his task as that of deciphering the code of the natural language. He is a formaliser, not a codecracker. We have already seen a good illustration of this quotation in the preceding section, where we tried to show that the phrase every A is B, or No A is B should not be construed as being synonymous with the phrase for all x, if x is A, then x is B. d) The who/which E. The woman who killed Marat Meaningful components: The who, woman, kill(ed), Marat Kinds of objects: The ... who (in Czech we would have Sg + kter) encodes in English the descriptive operator ; from any class that contains just one member it selects this very member and is undefined on the other classes. woman denotes a property of individuals kill denotes a binary relation-in-intension between individuals. We do not take into account the problem of tenses here. Marat is a proper name; simplifying a little we can admit that it denotes an individual. Ascribing types: (the who) (i (oi)) (woman) (oi)tw (kill) (oii)tw (Marat) i Trivialising:


i (the iota inversum, used for the descriptive operator since Russell, is not available; we hope Wo, 0K, 0M i (i (oi)), 0Wo (oi)tw, 0K (oii)tw, 0M i

that i as a type and i as the partial function characterised above cannot be mutually confused),


e) Modalities F. Necessarily, all wooden tables are wooden Meaningful components: necessarily, all, wooden, table(s) Kinds of objects: (to hold) necessarily (that) is predicated about propositions; it is a class of propositions, containing one proposition only, viz. that one which is true in all possible worlds-times. (Similarly, possibly denotes the class of propositions which are true in at least one world-time, contingently denotes the class of those propositions which are possible but not necessary.) all, as a word for the universal quantifier, can be construed as denoting the class of those classes which are identical with the respective type (so that it contains just one member), or as denoting the function which, applied to a class K, returns the class of all superclasses of K. Here we choose the first option, mainly for simplicity s sake. Then we need, of course, the implication, denoted by . wooden, as an adjective in the attributive position, denotes the function which, applied to a possible world and then to a time point, returns the function that associates any property with a class of objects that possess this property. (See section 3c.) On the other hand, in the position of a predicative complement, i.e., (are) wooden, it denotes a property (of individuals). Here, however, we will associate wooden in both occurrences with this latter type; the analyticity of the sentence will be explicitly obvious, and, on the other hand, no such absurdity as in the case of big mice and small elephants can be expected. The price to be paid is, of course, that not only implication, but also conjunction will be needed. table denotes a property of individuals. Ascribing types: (necessarily) (ootw) (all) (o(oi))


(wooden) ( (oi)(oi)tw)tw (table(s)) (oi)tw ( (are) wooden) (oi)tw Trivializing:


N, 0", 0W, 0T, 0, 0


N (ootw), 0" (o(oi)), 0W (oi)tw, 0T (oi)tw, 0 (ooo), 0 (ooo) G. All wooden tables are necessarily wooden.

Meaningful components: See F. Kinds of objects: See F, Ascribing types See F. Trivializing: See F. List: See F. Remark: a) The case G. differs from the case F. The synthesis leads in the former case to a construction of a proposition which is false in all worlds-times where there is at least one wooden table. In the latter case (F.) it leads to a construction of the proposition TRUE. b) The construction [0N lwlt X] is equivalent to [0"lw[0" lt X]], where "/ (o(ow)), " / (o(ot)) and X o.

f) Propositional attitudes H. Charles knows that 1 + 1 = 2 Meaningful components: Charles, know(s), 1, 2, +, =


Kinds of objects: Charles will denote simply an individual; this simplification does not play any important role in our contexts. 1, 2 denote numbers, = denotes identity relation, + denotes the adding operation. know denotes here an empirical relation between individuals and constructions that construct truth-values.

Ascribing types: (Charles) i (know(s)) (oi*1)tw (1, 2) t (+) (ttt) (= ) (ott) Trivialising:

Ch, 0K, 01, 02, 0+, 0= Ch i, 0K (oi*1)tw, 01 t, 02 t, 0+ (ttt), 0= (ott) I. Charles thinks that the Pope is sick.


Meaningful components: Charles, think(s), the Pope, (is) sick Kinds of objects: Charles see H. think denotes an empirical relation of the same type as know. the Pope is not a name of the actual Pope: it denotes the pontifical office. (is) sick denotes property of individuals. Ascribing types: (Charles) i (think) (oi*1)tw (Variant A), (oiotw)tw (Variant B) (oi)tw

(the Pope) itw ( (is) sick)



Ch, 0Tk, 0P, 0S Ch i, 0Tk (oi*1)tw, 0P itw, 0S (oi)tw J. The Pope is such that Charles thinks that he is sick.


Meaningful components: See I.; further is such that, he Kinds of objects: is such that can be conceived of as meaning is a member of the class of those x (for which it holds that) . Thus it only indicates that a class (i.e., the characteristic function of a class) has to be applied (via composition) to it. he belongs to anaphora here; it concerns that individual which is the occupant of the role denoted by the Pope. It denotes a variable. Ascribing types: is such that without any type, see above. (he) i Trivialising:

P, 0Ch, 0Tk, x, 0S P itw, 0Ch i, 0Tk (oi*1)tw (Variant A), (oiotw) (Variant B), x i, 0S (oi)tw.


5. Type-theoretical synthesis a) General remarks Now we will show some principles of synthesis, compensating the absence of general rules for English by linguistic intuitions. The scheme of our activity has the following form: i) ii) iii) iv) Ascribing type to the particular example from Chapter 4. (Mostly it is otw.) Defining the task of combining the members of the respective LIST so as to get a construction constructing the object of the type given by i). Performing the task from ii) with assistance of some principles of TIL and linguistic intuitions. Type-theoretical check-up.


b) Some simple examples A. Charles smokes. Ascribing type: otw (Empirical sentence.) Defining the task: To combine 0Ch i and 0S (oi)tw (List) so as to get a construction constructing an otwobject (proposition). Performing the task:

S constructs a property (of individuals). 0Ch constructs an individual. The resulting

construction of the proposition that Charles smokes constructs a function which associates every possible world with the chronology of truth-values. Thus it has the form lwlt A, where A v-constructs truth-values and contains free variables w and t (and no other free variables). Applying 0S to w and (then) to t we get the class of individuals that smoke in w at t. Applying the construction of this class to 0Ch we get the truth-value T or F according to whether the individual Charles does or does not belong to the class of smokers in w at t: [0Swt 0Ch]. But this construction satisfies the characteristics of A above, so that the resulting construction is lwlt [0Swt 0Ch]. Indeed, the proposition constructed by this construction is true just in those worlds-times where Charles is a member of the class which is the value of the property S in the respective world-time.

Type-theoretical check-up:




[[[0S ((oi)t)

w ] t] w t (oi) o



i (ot)

t w


B. Ascribing type: otw (Empirical sentence.) Defining the task:

Some men are bachelors.

Variant A: To combine 0$ (o(oi)), 0M (oi)tw, 0B (oi)tw, 0 (ooo) so as to get a construction which constructs an otw-object. Variant B: To combine 0$ ((o(oi))(oi)), 0M (oi)tw, 0B (oi)tw so as to get a construction which constructs an otw-object. Performing the task: The resulting construction has the form (see the task A.) lwlt A, where A v-constructs truth-values and contains as free variables just w and t. Variant A: Here 0$ constructs the class of non-empty classes (of individuals). Thus A has to have the form [0$ lx X], where X v-constructs truth-values and contains as free variables just w, t, and x, x ranging over i. It is easily seen that X has to be a combination of 0M, 0B and 0. Since $ in Variant A reads There is at least one x such that is M and B, the analysis of X gives [0 [0Mwt x] [0Bwtx]]. Thus the resulting construction is


lwlt [0$ lx [0 [0Mwtx] [0Bwtx]]]. Type-theoretical check-up: Remark: If a construction X v-constructs an atw-object, then our check-up replaces Xwt a for the previous [[X w ] t] at a l w l t [ 0$ lx [0 [0Mwt o (ooo) o i (o(oi)) o t w Variant B: Here 0$ constructs the function which, applied to a class K (of individuals) returns the class of all such classes (of individuals) which overlap with K. Thus A in the resulting construction has the form [[0$ 0K] 0L], where L is a class which overlaps with K. We can see that applying 0$ to K corresponds to the phrase some men. Hence K can be interpreted as 0Mwt, and L as 0Bwt. Our construction is then lwlt [[0$ 0Mwt] 0Bwt]. Type-theoretical check-up: (ot) ((ot)w) (oi) (oi) o x] [0Bwt o o x]]] t atw w

(oi) i

(oi) i


lwlt [[0$ ((o(oi))(oi))

Mwt ] (oi)

Bwt] (oi)

(o(oi)) o t w (ot)


C. Ascribing type: otw (Empirical sentence.) Defining the task:

No animal is rational.

To combine 0N ((o(oi))(oi)), 0A (oi)tw, 0R (oi)tw so as to get a construction of an otw-object. Performing the task: The solution is analogous with that one of the previous task, Variant B: 0N constructs a function which, applied to a class K (of individuals), returns the class of all classes disjoint with K. Thus the resulting construction has the form lwlt [[0N 0K] 0L], where L is a class (of individuals) disjoint with K. The role of 0K is obviously played by 0Awt, the role of L by 0Rwt. So we have lwlt [[0N 0Awt] 0Rwt]. Type-theoretical check-up: See the previous example.

c) Existence D. Pegasus does not exist. Ascribing type: otw (Empirical sentence.) Defining the task:


To combine 0P itw, 0 (oo), 0E (oitw)tw so as to get a construction of an otw-object. Performing the task: Again, the resulting construction has the form lwlt A, where A v-constructs truth-values. With respect to our interpretation of does not as denoting negation we can construe A as [0 B], with B v-constructing truth-values. Applying 0E to w and (then) to t, we get the class of itw-objects (individual roles ) which are occupied in w at t. Thus to get the construction B that constructs o-objects we have to apply

Ewt to a itw-object, i.e., here to 0P. The result is lwlt [0 [0Ewt 0P]].

Type-theoretical check-up: lw lt [0 [0Ewt (oitw) (oo) o t w d) The who / which E. The woman who killed Marat Ascribing Type: itw (Empirical definite description.) Defining the task: To combine 0i (i(oi)), 0Wo (oi)tw, 0K (oii)tw, 0M i so as to get a construction constructing a itw-object. Performing the task: Constructing an empirical object our construction has the form lwlt A, where A v-constructs an individual. At first sight we could be tempted to use 0M, but this way evidently leads nowhere. The only other possibility is to use 0i. Then A has the form (ot) ((ot)w) o




[0i B], where B v-constructs a class of individuals. This class should possibly contain just one member (in order to let the resulting construction construct an individual). A subtask consists then in constructing such a class via combining 0Wo, 0K, 0M. Now the class of those individuals who killed Marat in w at t is v-constructed as follows: [lx [[0Kwtx] 0M]]. Yet those individuals have to be women, so that we need unfortunately still conjunction (which cannot be found in the surface structure of the expression, so that our type-theoretical analysis is perhaps not the most desirable one). Using conjunction we get [lx [0 [0Wowt x][0Kwt x 0M]]] playing the role of B above. Thus we have got lwlt [0i [lx [0 [0Wowt x][0Kwt x 0M]]]]. Type-theoretical check-up: lw lt [ 0i [lx [0 [0Wowt x] [0Kwt (oi) o (ooo) o i (i(oi)) i t w (it) ((it)w) o (oi) (oi) o i (oii) o o x 0M ]]]] i i

e) Modalities F. Necessarily, all wooden tables are wooden. Ascribing Type: o (Non-empirical sentence.) Defining the task: To combine 0N (ootw), 0" (o(oi)), 0W (oi)tw, 0T (oi)tw, 0 (ooo), 0 (ooo) so as to get a construction of a truth-value. Performing the task:

N constructs the class of propositions (containing just one member, the proposition True). [0N lwlt A],

Thus the resulting construction has the form of a composition: where A v-constructs truth-values and contains w and t as the only free variables. For x ranging over i A has the form [0" lx [0 [0Bx][0Cx]]], where B should be a subclass of C. Indeed, let B be the class of those individuals which are in w at t wooden tables, and C be the class of individuals which are wooden in w at t. So we have [0Bx]: [0 [0Wwtx][0Twtx]] and [0Cx]: [0Wwtx]. The resulting construction is then: [0N lwlt [0"lx [0 [[0 [0Wwtx] [0Twtx]] [0Wwtx]]]]]. Type-theoretical check-up: [ 0N l wl t [ 0 " l x [ 0 [[0 (ooo) o (ooo) o i (o(oi)) o t w (o(otw)) o (ot) (ot)w) (ot)w) (oi) (oi) o [0Wwt (oi) o x][0Twt i (oi) o (oi) o i x]] [0Wwt i x]]]]]

G. All wooden tables are necessarily wooden. Ascribing type:



(Empirical sentence; necessarily does not concern the whole proposition.)

Defining the task: To combine 0N (ootw), 0" (o(oi)), 0W (oi)tw, 0T (oi)tw, 0, 0 so as to get a construction of a proposition. Performing the task: The resulting construction has the form lwlt [0" lx [0 A B]], where A, B v-construct truth-values. Obviously (see F.) A is [0 [0Wwtx] [0Twtx]] and B is [0N lwlt [0Wwtx]], so that the result is lwlt [0" lx[0 [0 [0Wwtx] [0Twtx]] [0N lwlt [0Wwtx]]]]. Type-theoretical check-up: l w l t [ 0" l x [ 0 [ 0 (ooo) o w (ootw) (ooo) o i (o(oi)) o t w (ot) otw (oi) (oi) o [0Wwt x] [0Twt o o t x]] [0N (ootw) lw lt [0Wwt (oi) o (ot) otw otw o x]]]] i (o(oi)) (ooo) (ooo) (oi) i (oi) i

f) Propositional attitudes H. Charles knows that 1 + 1 = 2 Ascribing type: otw (Empirical sentence)


Defining the task: To combine 0Ch i, 0K (oi*1)tw, 01 t, 02 t, 0+ (ttt), 0= (ott) so as to get a construction of a proposition. Performing the task: The resulting construction has the form lwlt A, where A v-constructs a truth-value; we have to apply 0K to (first, w, t and then to) a pair <an i-object, a construction>. Ch is the i-object, the equality above is what expresses the construction. So we have lwlt [0Kwt 0Ch 0[0= [0+ 01 01] 02]].. Type-theoretical check-up: lw lt [0Kwt (oi*1)

Ch i

0 0

[ = (ott) (ott)

[0 +

1 01]


(ttt) t t t t o *1 *1

t t

(oi*1) o w t I. Ascribing type: otw (Empirical sentence) Defining the task:

i otw

Charles thinks that the Pope is sick.

To combine 0Ch i, 0Tk (oi*1)tw, 0P itw, 0S (oi)tw so as to get a construction vconstructing a proposition. (Variant A), 0Tk (oiotw)tw (Variant B). Performing the task: Variant A: The resulting construction has the form lwlt A,


where A v-constructs a truth-value. We have to apply 0Tk to (w,t and then to) the pair <an individual, a construction>; Ch is the individual, the construction (which has to be constructed) v-constructs the proposition that the Pope is sick, i.e., its form is lwlt [0Swt 0Pwt]. Thus we have lwlt [0Tkwt 0Ch 0[lwlt [0Swt 0Pwt]]]. Type-theoretical check-up: Exercise Variant B: The only (however important) distinction (compared with Variant A) consists in taking the individual to proposition instead of construction. Therefore, the resulting construction will be lwlt [0Tkwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Swt 0Pwt]]]. J. Charles thinks of the Pope that he is sick. ( = The Pope is such that Charles thinks of him that he is sick.) The distinction between I. and J. is dramatic. We can formulate our linguistic intuition according to which neither J. follows from I. nor I. follows from J. For take first I. Suppose that Charles has read in some newspaper that the Pope is sick and believes it, but he has no idea who the Pope is. If he happens to meet him he can suppose that he is a healthy man. So I. is true whereas J. is false. Now take first J. Charles meets a man and immediately comes to the conclusion that the man is sick. He does not suspect, however, that he met the Pope. Then J. is true unlike I. So our analysis of J. has to be distinct from the analysis of I. Let us try. of the Pope , The Pope is such that : these phrases indicate that something is predicated about the Pope. The property ascribed to the Pope is to be such an x that Charles thinks that x is sick. This property is constructed as follows (Tk has to be of the type (oiotw)tw this time, and we compare J. with I., Variant B, of course): lwlt lx [0Tkwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Swt x]]] To apply the property to the Pope means to put it into de re supposition, i.e., to apply it first to w and then to t and finally to the occupier of the office of the Pope in w at t, So we have lwlt [[lwltlx [0Tkwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Swt x]]]wt] 0Pwt], which can be simplified (see the b-rule in l-calculi) as follows:


lwlt [lx [0Tkwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Swt x]]] 0Pwt] . Now when we compare this construction with the resulting construction from I., i.e., with lwlt [0Tkwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Swt 0Pwt]]]. then we could ask the question whether the latter is not the result of executing the composition [lx ] 0Pwt from I. (according to the b-rule). If so, our claim that neither the de re version can be derived from the de dicto version nor vice versa would be refuted. But this is not the case. The variables w, t in 0Pwt are free in that composition but they would become bound by the (internal ) closure [lwlt [0Swt ] if the b-rule were executed, which is forbidden ( collision of variables ). Therefore, before the composition is executed, the variables w, t have to be renamed. The correct execution of the composition leads then to the result lwlt [0Tkwt 0Ch [lwlt [0Swt 0Pwt]]], which differs from the construction from I. (de dicto) and makes the truth value of the proposition constructed by this construction in W at T dependent on who is the occupier of P in W at T. 6. Difficulties, problems a) Idioms Analysis of idioms is the easiest problem among all the thinkable problems. Idioms can be defined as such complex expressions the meaning of which is not derivable from the meanings of particular subexpressions. In Czech, star mldenec , in English old maid (= spinster) are examples. Idioms behave as simple expressions. b) Simple expressions See 4a). A choice has to be done of some simple expressions which will play the role of primitive expressions ; thereafter the remaining expressions are considered to be definienda and the respective constructions are those associated with the respective definiens. In practice this is a very tedious task a good realisation of which, however, makes it possible to detect semantic interrelations which would be otherwise hidden (which would essentially limit the deductive force of the text). c) Ambiguous expressions (homonymy) Ambiguous expressions possess at least two distinct readings . In terms of our approach this means that such an expression expresses at least two distinct concepts, i.e., two distinct constructions.


Case 1.: The ambiguous expression is simple. See b). Case 2.: The ambiguity arises due to grammatical (syntactical) ambiguity. Each respective construction has to be associated with the expression in question. The context helps to disambiguate. One of the two meanings of bank is surely eliminated when the sentence The bank of Thames is pretty . d) Prepositions Analysing expressions containing prepositions is, in general, a rather hard task. Returning to our example The highest mountain is in Asia we can see that besides our solution according to which in Asia is simply a name of a property (to be in Asia) another way of analysis is thinkable, viz. to separate in and Asia . A complication arises: we have to analyse is separately and in would have to get the type (ii) or (ii)tw. Similar problems can be expected in other cases of occurrence of prepositions. A final, systematic solution will come as soon the TIL approach is applied to analysis of a particular language, which is, of course, a highly complicated project. See [Tich 1994] and [Tich 1994a]. e) Indexicals, demonstratives This is an autonomous problem to be solved by a separate study. Interesting theoretical hints can be found in [Kaplan 1974]. No final solution is known as yet but provisional solutions are well thinkable. f) Proper names As Kripke has it, there are two kinds of proper name: some of them are natural part of the language (they can be found, e.g., in vocabularies), in particular this are geographical and astronomical names (the Moon, Europe). They should behave like simple expressions but at least some of them could be considered to be something like disguised descriptions (cf. the famous Fregean problem with morning star = evening star !). The other proper names are personal names, and here also two kinds can be distinguished: a) common personal names like we all possess, b) famous names : historical names, fictional names. The names sub a) could be perhaps handled as pragmatic variables (see [Materna 1998] ), an interesting theory of names sub b) can be found in [Tich 1988], where also the famous theory of Kripke (in [1979] ) is criticised. g) Anaphora, donkey sentences Pronouns play double role. They are used as indexicals/demonstratives, or else they are placeholders referring to objects having been named before. This second role makes of them

anaphora. Simple cases are solvable by intuition, which does not mean that some general rules have to be formulated. Some cases are puzzle-like : in particular, the so-called donkey sentences, which got their name from the paradigmatic example Every farmer who possesses a donkey beats it. The problem consists in the fact that a standard , on the predicate logic based formalisation ends with the unacceptable situation where y which is beaten becomes a free variable outside the scope of the existential quantifier: "x ((F(x) $y (D(y) P(x,y)) B(x,y)). True, a formula which satisfies the truth-conditions given by the sentence can be easily found: "xy ((F(x) D(y) P(x,y)) B(x,y)) but the structure of this formula cannot be derived from the structure of the sentence which uses the existential phrase a donkey . There are some attempts to solve this problem (e.g., in terms of game-theoretical semantics (GTS, Hintikka) ) but from the viewpoint of TIL they are unsatisfactory.

h) Text Analysis of a text is much more complicated than analysis of an expression. Only for an example, the anaphoric role of pronouns can be related to expressions foregoing the given expression. Classically A man went on the street. He whistled. Surely, an analysis could instead analyse the sentence There was a man and he went on the street and whistled. Here the integrating role is played by the existential quantifier, but this analysis is not an analysis of the minitext above, where we would hesitate to represent A by the existential quantifier.


References: [Cresswell 1975] Cresswell, M.J.: Hyperintensional Logic. Studia Logica XXXIV,1, 25-38 [Cresswell 1985] Cresswell, M.J.: Structured Meanings. Semantics of Propositional Attitudes. MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.) [Du 2000] Du , M.: Conceptual Data Modelling Using Transparent Intensional Logic. In: O.Majer, ed.: Topics in Conceptual Analysis and Modelling. Prague, Filosofia [Kaplan 1977] Kaplan,D.: Demonstratives. An essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals. In: J.Almog, J.Perry, and H.Wettstein, eds.: Themes from Kaplan. Oxford UP 1989, 481-563 [Kripke 1979] Kripke, S.: Naming and Necessity. In: Davidson, H. and G. Harman, eds.: Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd ed., D.Reidel, 259-356 [Materna 1998] Materna, P.: Concepts and Objects. Acta Philosophica Fennica 63,Helsinki [Morrill 1994] Morrill, G.V.: Type Logical Grammar. (Categorial Logic of Signs.) Kluwer, Dordrecht [Russell 1908] Russell, B.: Mathematical Logic as based on the Theory of Types. In: J.V.Heijenoort: From Frege to Gdel. Harvard UP, Cambridge (Mass.), 150-183 [Thomason 1974] Thomason, R.H.: R.Montague: Formal Philosophy.Yale UP, New Haven [Tich 1978] Tich , P.: Questions, Answers, and Logic. American Philos. Quart. 15, 275-284 [Tich 1980] Tich , P.: Logic of Temporal Discourse. Linguistics and Philosophy 3, 343-369 [Tich 1980a] Tich , P.: The Semantics of Episodic Verbs. Theoretical Linguistics 7, 264-296 [Tich 1982] Tich , P.: Foundations of Partial Type Theory. Reports on Mathematical Logic 14, 52-72 [Tich 1988] Tich , P.: The Foundations of Freges Logic. de Gruyter, Berlin, New York [Tich 1994] Tich , P.: Cracking the Natural Language Code. From the Logical Point of View 2, 6-19 [Tich 1994a] Tich ; P.: The Analysis of Natural Language. Ibidem, 42-80