Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs COMELEC (2006) (Political Law) Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs. COMELEC | G.R. No.

162759 | August 4, 2006 Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, sought registration and certification as overseas absentee voters however they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US that as per a COMELEC letter to DFA dated September 23, 2003, they have no right yet to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the oneyear residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV of the Constitution. When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement, the COMELEC replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted for the petitioners and that they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency under the Constitution. Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections because of COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on April 1, 2004 a petition for certiorari and mandamus. On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC filed a Comment praying for the denial of the petition. Consequently, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections. On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so, observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic. Issue: Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering that under the circumstances the same has already been rendered moot and academic? Held: The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but only insofar as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered in the petition is the propriety of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, which however, remains unresolved. The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189. [Ruling on the main issue: Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual citizens may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. The Court granted the instant petition and held that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in R.A. No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.]

Macalintal vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003] Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a memer of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. He claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayer and as lawyer. R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention: That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution; That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

Issue: 1. 2. 3. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution

Ruling: 1. No, Sec 5(d) is valid. The Court has relied on the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioners claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.

2. Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency, granting merit to petitioners contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President and Vice-President. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice -President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.

3. Yes, Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization.

The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.

G.R. No. 181377

April 24, 2009

RODANTE MARCOLETA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DIOGENES OSABEL G.R. No. 181726 April 24, 2009

ALAGAD PARTY-LIST, represented by DIOGENES S. OSABEL, president vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Facts: Due to infighting within Alagads ranks, Osabel and Marcoleta parted ways, each one claiming to represent the partys constituency. For the 2007 National and Local Elections, the warring factions of Osabel and Marcoleta each filed a separate list of nominees for Alagad at the Commission on Elections (Comelec). With Alagad again winning a part-list seat in the House of Representatives, the Marcoleta and Osabel blocs contested the right to represent the party in the 14th Congress.1 Osabel, purportedly the bona fide president of Alagad, sought the cancellation of the certificates of nomination of the Marcoleta group.2 By Omnibus Resolution3 of July 18, 2007, the Comelecs First Division, then composed of Commissioners Resurreccion Borra and Romeo Brawner, resolved the dispute in favor of Osabel, The controversy was then elevated by the Marcoleta group to the Comelec En Banc which, by Resolution4 of November 6, 2007, reversed the First Divisions Omnibus Resolution and reinstated the certificates of nomination of the Marcoleta group. In the voting, however, there were only two (2) commissioners who concurred in the Resolution while three (3) commissioners dissented For thus failing to muster the required majority voting, the Comelec En Banc ordered a rehearing of the controversy on November 20, 2007.6 Subsequently, by Order of February 26, 2008,13 the Comelec En Banc acknowledged that no rehearing had yet been undertaken and reiterated the earlier order of suspension of the February 5, 2009 First Division Omnibus Resolution. The Comelec En Banc, also therein resolving the prejudicial question raised by Osabel on whether there was a necessity of a rehearing, held in the affirmative. A rehearing of the controversy between the parties was thereupon calendared for March 4, 2008. From the records, it appears that the scheduled rehearing did not push through in view of the filing in the interim of the present petitions by the contending parties. Issue: The Court now proceeds to resolve G.R. No. 181726 filed by Alagad. The twin issues to be determined are whether the Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering a rehearing of the controversy; and in suspending the implementation of the Order of February 5, 2008 for lack of rehearing. Held: The petition fails. While at first impression, the November 6, 2007 Resolution of the Comelec En Banc seems to have affirmed the First Divisions ruling, the said Resolution merely reflected the manner of voting of the Comelec members.

From the 2-3 voting, it is readily discerned that the Comelec En Banc cannot overturn the First Division on mere two assenting votes. On the other hand, the same situation obtains in the case of the dissenters, there being a shortage of one vote to sustain the First Divisions findings. To break this legal stalemate, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that: Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Majority, in this case, means a vote of four members of the Comelec. The Court in Estrella v. Comelec20 pronounced that Section 5 (a)21 of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A22 of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the members of the Comelec, and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. Alagads reasoning that a rehearing is unnecessary since it garnered "a majority vote of the quorum" does not thus impress. The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three commissioners to affirm the Resolution of the First Division, cannot do away with a rehearing since its Rules clearly provide for such a proceeding for the body to have a solicitous review of the controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their arguments.23 The propriety of a rehearing now resolved, the issue of whether the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the effects of its En Banc Order of February 5, 2008 for lack of a rehearing comes to the fore. From the records as well as the admission of inadvertence on the part of the Comelec, there is likewise nothing gravely abusive of the Comelecs assailed action. For the most part, the Comelec was well within its authority to order a re-hearing, it having the inherent power to amend or control its processes and orders before these become final and executory.25 It can even proceed to issue an order motu proprio to reconsider, recall or set aside an earlier resolution which is still under its control.26 The Comelecs own Rules of Procedure authorize the body to "amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice,"27 and even to suspend said Rules or any portion thereof "in the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission."28 Thus, the supposed lack of proof of service on the adverse party and lack of notice of hearing of Marcoletas ex parte motion to rectify deserve little consideration in invalidating the Order of February 12, 2008. Moreover, that Alagad even moved to execute the Comelecs February 5, 2008 Order on the same day the ex parte motion to rectify was filed (February 12, 2008)29 all the more justified the Comelecs action. The Comelec, confronted with a glaring procedural lapse, lost no time in rectifying its action by suspending the effects of an earlier resolution and scheduling a mandatory rehearing. To be sure, this negates any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its part in order to correct a lapse. Let the case be REMANDED to the Comelec En Banc for it to proceed with utmost dispatch with its intended rehearing and render the appropriate decision on the case at the earliest opportunity.