aith and Moralit

Ih" gooa is the foundation and the goal of all moral striving.
Ethics, then, whether philosophical or theological, must in some r,l'av be
specific about what the good is and where it can be found. The basic convic-
tion of Christian faith is that God is good. God is the only center of value, the
fired point of reference for Christian morality. As a result, our convictions
about God, which are formed and mediated by the experience of the Israelite
community, Jesus, the apostolic community, and the subsequent tradition of
the church ought to make a difference in the moral life.
To say that our convictions about the good are based on our beliefs about
God puts us at the heart of relating faith and morality. After establishing the
basic Christian conviction that God is the center of value, this chapter drau's
out the implications for relating faith and morality. In light of many argu-
ments o\rer how one can claim some distinctiveness for Christian morality,
this chapter presents one way of relating faith and morality so that religious
beliefs might play an integral role in moral reflection.

God-The Center of Value

The convictions of philosophers about the good have long influenced
moral dispositions and actions. For Aristotle, the good is happiness; for
hedonists it is pleasure; for utilitarians it is in v'hat is most useful. The
scholastic philosophy of the Roman Catholic tradition sets uP an identitv
betu,een "good" and a "being's orvn perfection" (ST. I, q.5). That is, the
nature of the good is the full actualization of anv being's Potential, or to
achieve perfection. The innate tendencv u'ithin the human person to seek
perfection is the ontological basis for the fundamental moral obligation-to
realize one's potential, or to be all that one can be. Actions are moral which
flou, out of this innate tendencv and contribute to the full actualization of
human potential (agere sequitur esse). With faith inf<rrming reason on the nature

41
 I;aith and Morality 45
44 Reason Inforntcd llY I''uith

(lod's (from "mores" or "custor-r-rs") means tcl make "cLtstouarv," tir u'e might say
<lf the gooil, thc beliei'er sces (iocl as thc iullncss tll being antl .sces of our lives thc expericnces u'hich u'e have of
is lovc' "to ritualize," in the actions
actions as goocl ltecause thev flo$ frtim tl-rc dir,inc nature-\\ihich loved by Clod. In this sensc, thc nroral lifc is likc u''orship
knou,ing ancl being
clhristians, or theologians, rhcn, arc not clistinguisheci by _thc
1-'i61
"f It is a response to an experience of Gocl. 'lhe n'roral life has a differcnt qualitv
having convictions ,,b,,ut'thc g.od. Rather., thev arc distinguished
bi'' thc
-l-he (lhristian convicti.n about the goocl is when an a-areness of i;oct is lost: sin becomes the infraction clf a rule rather
kinds of convicrirxrs the1,, havei from Ciod; moral actions beconte so many "u'orks" of
than the turning au,ay
governecl by the religious bcliefs expres-sed in the stories of the llible,
espe-
of moral rightn"r.'ttth"i than grateful responses to the goodness. of Clod; moral
ii"tty ir-, Je.ru., arrd-frrther expoundecl i. thc the.logical tradition the
deliberaiion becomes a comliuter-like problem-sr-rlving rather than a praverful
chuich. The basic Christian conviction about *,hat is good and where it crn
to (lod as discernment of what God enabies and requires.
be found is that God is good. Anything elsc is go<)d onll']n relation
'fhe monotheistic faith of Christianitv For the christian believer, then, morality cannot but be closely related
a reflecrion or mediati-on of God. 'T'he Christian cannot do justice
always a to experiences of God and beliefs about God.
tolerates only one cenrer of value.lAll other forms of goodness are
of God' So' to establish to his or her moral experience and moral worldview u'ithout seeing all things
derived good.r.r, dependent uPon the prior goo<1ness (]od in some way as the
as being dependent on God and without referring to
anythinf other than the GocL of Abraham, Isaac, Jacotr' and Jesus as the source I"d goal of it all. God is the horizon u'ithin u'hich the believer sees and
center of value is idolatrous.
values all tlhings. As a result, the moralitv of those u'hose imagination is
The goodness of God is disclosed in scripture, pre-eminently in Jesus -the
religious beliefs of the Judaeo-Christian tradition has a
knorvl- influenced by
the christ. our knou,ledge of God's goodness is gir,en, then, in our
of human experience in distinctively theological element to it.
edge of Jesus in scriptur.] ttt.t in the interpretation
form the Morality for ihe religious believer is not authorized merely by social
lig"ht of jesrrs and the scripture. The convictions \ve have about God
The conviction that God is good, the conventions, or merely by the desire for self-fulfrllment, or merely b1'' the
pi.supforitions of the moral life. basic
of for morality' makcs requirements of general rrrl"s of conduct which reason demands. Though all
o.rly ..nt., of value and the fixed point reference
(]od of th"s. are legiiimate waVS to authorize morality' they are not.sufficient
Chiistian morality an obiective -o.riity" It also makes responding to
an
from a theological point of view. From a theological point of.r.'ierv, God
unconditional moral obligation. morality. As a result, moral responsibilities are not
aurhorizes
Moreover, the beliel in God as rhe cenrer of value gives the christian a "rrJ..qrri..r
merely to oneself or other persons' nor are they only to the demands for
reason for being moral. As James Gustafson suggests, the christian
ans\vers
the question,
,.frny b" moril?" in terms of his or her experience. and helief in ratio;Iiry. They are, rathlr, responsibilities to God. Moral actions are
they cause to self or others, or because
thegoodnes'ofGod.TheChristianismoralbecauseGodisgood,and iudged wrong not becarrse of harms
ih.y: ,'iolrr. ritional rules of conduct. Actions are wrong bgcausg they are not
becairse the goodness of God, always and everywhere present to us,
enables 'rhis theological di-
p.op"rly responsive to what God enables and requires.
and requires".r, ro b. responsible foi the goodness of the world.2 This c.nvic-
tion abtut the goodness and presence .f God yields a normative statement *."rio" disiinguishes the morality of persons who live by religious beliefs
from those who do not. Also, the theological point of view most distinguishes
about the moral life informed by faith: Huma' moral striving ought to
be
know of the goodness a moral theologian from a moral philosopher'
rcsponsive to God and to be governed bvrvhat we can
To say th"at morality is closily related to erperienccs of God.and beliefs
of ilod and of God's ou,n go-otl activitv. The basic question this perspective
to about God is not to t"y ihrt faith is the sole source of moral knowledge or the
raises for morality is "Whit is God enabling and requiring me to he and
must be a necessary only justification of moral activity. To say that religious beliefs have an
do?" To answer this question, ongoing discernment
role to play in moralitf is not to sav that they have the only role' To
fcature of the moral life in order to discover the r'v'ays which would be most "rr.nii"l
make morality .bt"iy dependent on faith would require that one be religious
rcsponsive to God. oi arriving at moral wisdom and of living in a moral
in order to b. ."p"ble
From a thcological perspecrive, u,'hat God "enables and requires"r of us
u,av. The Catholic tradition has nor maintained such a complete dependence
lrccomes the norm if the moial life. Whether one experiences God, hou' one
of morality on faith. It holds to a relative autonomY for faith and morality.
cxperiences God, and u.hat beliefs <lne holds about God u'ill hal'e a pervasilc,
Faith informs reason, but it does not replace it. Faith and reason are the two
thlugh not exclusive, effect on the sort ofPerson one is and what one d<les'
'l'he -extent to which we lack a vivid sense of God's loving Presence (or gracc), sources of moral knov,ledge to u,hich the catholic tradition appeals..
r'"'ither. Moralitv itself In the renewal of mJral theologV, the moral manuals rvere criticized for
1o that extenr the tclne and quality of our moral lives
 47
46 Reason Informed I\ Faith Faith and A4oralit.y

-ll-ris u'ould be a prePosterous expectati(ln unless it rvere

know the thosc ,,vhq ti1l.
concentrating too much on rcasonr or natural lau", as the u'ay to a religious
adher- possible to understancl right and wrong, good and bacl, apart from
purposes of ilod and to live in communion with God' The manuals'
committnent.
Ln.. ao natural law resulted in giving too little attention to ways of conceiving
so, if one doe s not have to be religious to be moral, what dif-ference can
morality and of doing moral ,!g".iiorl informed by faith, such as including and the
or and ought one's religious beliefs makc f<rr the sort of person one.is
the full range of one's-religious beliefs for shaping one's moral PersPectiver forces us to look at the kind of
kincls of acrions onc does? This question
Pr(rcess of
"religious imagination in the making a
the signific"ance of one's of faith and rnorality is not as
what dependence moralitv has on faith. The relaticln
moral"fudgment, and the dyiamic of riroral discernment for knowing sometimes makes it seem.
theology is simple and as direct as ordinarr. discourse
God requires. Reason inforined by faith in the renewal of moral
to moral
trying to bring such considerations to the forefront' The challenge
of faith and reason The Debate 0n the Distincti'oeness
tn.otlgy tod"i li., in maintaining the proper relationship
for d#rmining what corrrtit rt"", moially good character and right moral of Cbristian Moralitl
action. This brtgs us to the issue of relating faith and morality' number of christian theologians have sllown an interest
In recent years a
on the
in the relatior'rrttip of faith and morality by contributing to the debate
Faith and MoralitY morality. 'ihe earll' years of the renewal of moral
distinctiveness of Christian
insighi' faith .ught to affect morality. The early
sense that theology pursued a common
Most people who hold to Christian religious beliefs have a held for a morality which would be different from a
way understand them- ar renewal
their beliefs orlght to make a difference in the they.
",,.*fi. its primary source would be the
religious commitment .rr,.,."1 law, or secular morality because
selves and condirct their lives. The conviction that our How-
of ways' Bible and its most imporranr feature would be the guidance of faith.
sanctions certain kinds of moral behavior shows itself in a number of renewal almost reversed the direction of
Brothers Karamazots,Ivan expresses ever, a reaction to this first phase
For example, in Dostoevsky's classic, The
This the renewal efforts.
the attituie that if God dols not exist, then everything is permissible. "natural"
have no morality unless we believe that some Seeking ro preserve the tradition that grounded morality in
can be taken to mean that we ushered in
considerations, some theologians of the late 1960s and early 1970s
forms of behavior are sanctioned by God' identified
the movement of "autonomJus ethics'" In Europe this movement
is
ordinary experience also evidences some sort of relationship between United
would largely with Alfons Auer, Josef Fu9hs, -and Bruno Schuller' In the
faith an6 *oi"lity. How often we hear remarks such as, "A Christian its
never think that way," or, "Thar was certainly a christian thing to do." Such Sti't.., Charles E. Currarrand Richard A. N4cCormick are prominent
nuances to
defenders.a While each of these theologians contributes his ou'n
remarks suggest that the speaker assumes christianity at least entails
and
about the way of approaching the issue of distinctiveness, each shares with the
sanctions moral behavior, and, perhaps, that something distinctive
of view, others the main features of this movement'
Christian morality can be identifiLd either at the level of one's point
Autonomous ethics emphasizes the human Person as the dircoverer of
in one's reasons for acting, or in one's actions themselves'
morality over God as the ret"ealer of it and the common morality of all people
Anothersignofth"econr,ictionthatacertainmoralityisentailedin be able
who are over rh; specific morality of Christians. Its concern is that Christians
religious beliefsls the disappointment one feels with religious P:'PJ. of
the authen- to dialogue u'ith all p"opt. of good v'ill and to agree on common-matters
not commendably moral. s".h reaction assumes that practice is
^ public iolicy. So th" *o,r.*i.tt stressed that every demand.of
.Christian
tic test of the sincerity and depth of a person's faith"
Religious ,.hoof, ,r. sign that morality is in some way related to *o..lity *,]rt b. accessible to e\reryone through reason. Its claim is that the
".roth., .orlr.ni of Christian and non-Christian morality at the ler.'el of concrete
rcligion.'so-" p"r.nts wanr a religious education for their children because means that
norms and values is substantively the same. Stated boldly, this
irr"i r,op. that learning abour God and the Bible will make their children specific content to the moral solutions
lrctter in a moral sense.
in. f"., of being a Christian offeis no
which are not also available to the non-Christian. What
to of human probiems
c)n the other hand, it is aiso true that one does not need to be religious a distinctive context in rvhich one lives
to be by the fact, a moral person does christian faith does do is to provide
llc moral. As surprised as some seem m<tiivation for living morally, a self-understanding
rvho the moral life, a religious
ilot need to have any religious affiliation. In fact, society exPects those u'ith
responsible for their conduct as are informed by faith, a*nd a speci{ic religious intentionalitv, namelv union
hrrvc no allegiance to any ieligion to be as
 Reason In.fortned IIY Faith
48
(]ocl. In shgrt. faith left the specilic content <lf morality untouched' I)istin-
moralitV from its context rellects a very ltxtse
guishing the spccitic content o1-
iJu.io"i1'ip bcr*,ern thith ancl moralityi. .,\s a rcsult, Christian moralitl' coulcl
entirely
casily be detached from christian faith ancl presented to the rvorld as
and accessible for anyone to us^c in addressing the problems of the
rcasonable
u'orld.
A stiff opposition toauronomous ethics appeared,in the movement of
,,faith-ethics,'i e"tension of the early phase of renewal which had begun in
"n
thc lg40s and 1950s. Joseph Ratz-inger and Philip Delhaye are two of its
lcading represenrarives-.i Tie faith-eihics movement stresses that Christian
faith as
,.,.,orrli"ty .rr'r.,o, be completely discovered by reason but relies on
such a bearing on moral discernment that
rvcll. Its main thesis is that fait-h has
only be understood within the framework of faith.
sorne moral solutir-rns can
It claims that the conrenr of Christian morality cannot be converted entirely
into philosophical ethics. In short, the distinctiveness of Christian ethics
.,^nnot be limited to context, motivation, moral self-understanding, or inten-
tionality. If the source of christian morality and the norms for moral living
the midst of faith, then christian morality can and ought to have a
,,.,.. f.o-
tlistinctive content.
The specific details of this debate need not detain us here.6 F-or our
*" .r."d only to attend to a related issue stimulated by this
l)rtrposes,
il.,lrate-a. unilerstanding of how faith qualifies morality. Inother.words, I
Irrrr asking, "What real diflerence can and ought the qualifier'Christian'make
wlrcn we put it before 'ethics' or'moralitv'1"
All tire particiPants in the debate acknowledge that morality is in some
of
rv,ry dependenr on some aspect of christian faith. Given the complexitv
t,,,r1., frith and moralitv, we can readily expect the dependence to oPerate in a
rvirlc variety of ways. James J. Walter has sorted out seven ways that chris-
ti:rn moralitv d.pe.tds-upon iaith, (1) empirical, (2) Iinguistic, (3).logical'
(4)
,'t,logical, (5) epistemoiogical, (6) psychological, and (7) normative'7 In the
rlcbarJon the disiinctiveness of Christian ethics, the most problematic issues
(how to account for the "therefore" which links
lx.t'rilin to logical dependence
,r,,,r'ality ,oi^i,n; and to epistemological dependence (how to knou'' what
(.oullts io. .ont..r, in morality). These tu'o cannot be easily separated.
t,itking Moralitl to Faith
l)hilosophers of language tell us that belief statements' such as "God is
( lrrirror', n.:1.116 is I-oid,"-are not like scientific statements, which are flat,
Ir,stnlrlc asseitions that something is true. Rather, statements of religious
lrr.licl'involr,e the believer in commitments of certain kinds.8 Thus, the "there-
Faitb and Morality 49
fore" u'hicit links morality tcl religious belicfi is not bV \\/ay of a strict infcr-
-lhe inference is madc tty r"'av of what Donald lJ.
cncc of s),llogistic logic.
Evans calls "thc logic of self-involvement."e Whereas syllogistic Iogic is col-
cerned rvith the relation betu,een propositions, the logic ofself-involvcnlent is
concerned with the ways in which language may involve something more
-lhe
than merely making an assertion about the u'ay things are . sclf-involving
statement commits the speaker to a certain fitanner of living and to having
certain attitudes and feelings.r0 To say, for example, "God is Creator," in-
volves the believer in certain kinds of activity (obedience), certain aft;frrdcs
(reverence), and certain feelings (awe). Therefore, to commit oneself to cer-
tain religious beliefs is to do more than to assert that such-and-such is the
case. Part of the meaning of a religious belief is to commit the believer ttr
certain intentions, attitudes, and future actions which are consistent u'ith
II
what the belief asserts.
In addition to implying a particular style or spirit, the attitudes cx-
pressed in a religious belief are linked wirh a worldview which, in turn,
influences the way the believer perceives the situation in which a moral
decision has to be made. The religious statement or belief is a perspectite on
the situation, or, as Donald Evans calls it, an "onlook," expressed by the
linguistic form "I look on fi as )."t7 As Evans explains, when we look on r as y
". . . *. assume that there is an appropriate waY of thinking and behavinq in
relation toJ, so that rve are committing ourselves to a similar way of behar-ing
and thinking in relation to f."rr For example, the good Samaritan looked on
the victim in the ditch as himself and so took care of him in the vuay he u'ouid
take care of himself. For this reason, Jesus holds him up as a model of u'hat it
means to love God and neighbor as you love yourself. Therefore, "onlcxlks"
provide not only a way of knowing the situation at hand but also an implicit
iommitment to behave in a certain way. In short, through onlooks, ". ' '
deciding-that and deciding-to,'is' and'ought,' come together."i4
Scripture and theological tradition provide an abundance of religious
onlooks through parables, symbols, and creeds. When religious beliefs form a
great part of the framework within which the moral agent looks on experiencc,
they become a powerful influence on moral character and action. By governing
the moral imagination, they connect the many dimensions of experience u'ith
certain values and intentions entailed in the beliefs to shape the r.val one
interprets the experience and responds to it. Since onlooks nuance one's con-
ception and evaluation of circumstances in favor of certain iudgments, the use
of religious symbols in the moral life eliminates the possibility of ever iudging
and acting on the basis of a neutral description of a situation. By means of the
imaginative process, the moral agent combines the most relevant aspects of the
situation with the attitudes and actions u'hich are entailed in the religious
 5l
Reason Informed BY Fairh Faith and |[oralit.1,
50

then' t'ill The degree of a person's existential irrr'olr,ement depends on manv fac-
svrrrbol. UsingaChristiansymbolof somesorttolookonasituation' tors.
-I'he bllogical, psychological, and social-cultural conditioning on an
tictcrmine to some extent what one sees and what one does' individual have a grear deal to do with the extent to which one is abie to
for the
1-he. insights of the sociology of religion make a similar claim appropriate ancl lirl'e by the value component of reiigious beliefs' For exam-
l'unction of religious symbols. pio* tn. piint of vieu' of sociology'
religious
influence the pi., ,o*. people are too psychologicaliy crippled' or too turned in on them-
lrcliefs girre a particulai view of what it means to be human; they s.lu.s, to be morally ,".rri,i,r. people.'i Thi decisiveness of religious beliefs
attitudes one ought to have toward the world; they help "t i*tll,lt: *: on one,s moral life also depends . gi."t deal on the depth or sincerity
of one's
fo1 tn a
rrrorally relevant iactors of a situation; they can provide reasons 1-cttn8 commitmenr to faith. As James Gustafson puts it, "Proper doctrine without a
one to the
ccrtain way; and, they are co-determintis of tht response
makes
passionate relationship to the God whom the doctrine seeks to
delineate
symbols in his or her
world.rr So the person who holds Christian religioui irardly leads to Christian moral intentions and actions'"18
whose imagina-
inragination will look on the world differently than someone it this point, a few examples will help to illustrate how morality is
he or she may
tion is not influenced by Christian beliefs' Consequently' Iinked, at leasi intellectually, to religious beliefs about God's nature, will, and
rcspond differently.
religio.us symbol activity. Without pretending to be exhaustive, James Gustafson in his book
One comes to know the self-involving meaning of the Can Eihics Be Chriitian?
re driws out some of the moral implications of certain
*|1th f.orled try those
by participating in the life of the community f in the moral life beliefs about God. Three of his examples will suffice here'
lrcliefs. This points to-the important role.of ihe Church
which we will consider in Ch'apter 14' Also, one comes
to know rhe self-
of developing a personal God as Creator
inu,,tuing meaning of a religious belief by means
"God'
,,p"nn"ri ,.rd *ffi"nity with In turn, the importance for developing a
The person nurtured by the Judaeo-christian tradition perceives that
importance of prayer'- private,ti9 li'.glgitil: norhing -ii.h ."ist, has chosen to be, but that all is radically dependent
on
,',i1rpn. with God poi.tr, ,o the
,,,','.i o,f,., spiritual disciplines itttegral part of the moral life- We will rhe sou"rce of being, God the creator. The belief that God is creator
engenders
"s "n and in It entails
nlect this in the treatment of the use of siript:tt^tl '\t moral life a sense of dependlnce upon one another, and ultimately upon God.
"g"i.,
r hc t rcatmJnt of the discernment
of spirits at the end of the book' the self-awaieness of human persons as stewards of creation who seek to
I)racticing one's faith, i.e., p"riicipating in- the life of the tnT:l 119 pr.r.ru. the good u'hich God has created' It also provides a reason for being
t'xercising , r!grrl", discipline of prayer, expands one's capacity to percelve .no."l, ,r"..r.[, to express one's allegiance to the "": yh: provides all things'
of cre-
tlrc rncan"ing oireligious teliefs Uy ai...tt"g one's sensibilities
and imagina- Dependence ,lro .n[.nd.rs an attitude of living with the limitations
and of
tion ro tn.".etigio.ri symbol or..onlook." wh"t happens in
relationship to atei reality, of being critical about ourselutt attd what we produce'
personal relation- fort.ri.rg irrt..d.p.rri.nce with one another and with all creation' Our eco-
-h", happens when we develop a {eep
( irxl is analogoris ,o
for their children when we lose a sense of inter-
rlrip with otf,ers. Fo. rnotlT.'nd father's love logical iorr...r* teach us what is at stake
"*"*p1.,," re- J."p"rrd"n.. and fall ro rhe remptation of radical self-sufficiency' Self-
their understanding of the children and what their well-being
,t,,*1ifi.,
tril;arenrs,lo,,. both what they see in their children and how criticism caurions against any inseniitivity to the tendency to dominate
others
;l;;i;;;. ^fftt, we
our faith in like or any segment oi creation. Self-criticism also checks any tendencies
r'i,.y ,clrt. to th.-. James Gustafson claims that practicing of
what believing in God eternally valid. The sense
,,,*u,.,", qualifies oui perceptions and sensibilities of creation
*ignihru". to absolutize any human as
t6 d.iende.r.e also engenders the disposition to trust in God' This virtue re-
rrtrtlrlcs and requires.
while rve may claim that religious beliefs entail certain inten- leases the freedom to risk something new and to act under
conditions of less
I lowever,
logic of self- to provide
lions, attitudes, and actiorls as part of their meaning' the than complete certainty with the clnfidence that God continues
irrv'lvcment does not guarantee ihat the believer u'ill become existentially ,r"- portibilities for sustaining the well-being of creation'
morally is not necessar-
irrv.lvctl in his or her piofessed beliefs. How one lives
one holds. More than logic is in-
ilv Prerlictable from lhe religious beliefs God as Benefcent
self-involvement does not
,;,f rj*f i' living morally. In oiher u'o1ds, existential
The belief that God is beneficent is the belief that God gives freelY and
self-involvement. More than the rational
ru,t,essirrily ...o*pr.,y linguistic in love. No one has ro earn God's love. We onlV have to appropriate and
to become
ii,iti,u ,,, i.n* *o.rl inf".J.r..t from religious beliefs is necessary participate in r.vhat (iod gives freely. The belief that God wills
the well-being
it rtt,,rl,rtlv scnsitive and morally committed person'
52
Reason Infornted llY lt'aith Itaith and Morality 53

of all calls lorth the pivotal virtue of the moral lifc-gratitude . hi

thnnkful- L aith and Character
.,"r, a, G<_rcl for gifts freely' bestou,ed, we ought to use our gifts fbr thc u'ell-
'lhe What one pcrceivcs in a situation, and the rcsllonsibilities one bclicvcs he
being of all. Wf,at *'e h"ue received freely, we ought to give tieelv'
or she has, depencl on one's character. Character in turn shapes one's deci-
of God giving graciously implies that we ought.to care for u'hat sions and acti<tns. As so<ltr as we ir-rclude character and vision as important
"rpJi.rr..
h"s been given to .,., ought to ihare it freely' iustly, and lovinglv'
""i'*. we remember that God is the aspects of morality and not iust norms and values guiciing dccisions leading to
'l'his is es[ecially rrue when ultimate good, the
we must pav attention to all that shapes thc m<lral character lrom
center of value, and rhat ro be like God is to live within the good we most ".iiorrr,
u,hich decisiot"ts tnd acti{)ns derive.
'fhe Christian nlysteries, symbols, or
desire. what has been given to us is not for serving our own interests at the
srories which one appropriates through lii'ing in the Christian communitv
expense of others. we"are to be concerned for the well-being of others the
influence one's moral imagination. They form, in part at least' the perspec-,
way God has been concerned for ours. tive from which decisioni and actions are made. According to Charles E.
Curran, the fivefold Christian mysteries of creation, sin, incarnation, redemp-
God as End ofAll C]rearion tion and resurrection destiny are the constitutive elements of a Christian
perspective, horizon, or "stance" as he prefers to call it'20
The belief that God is the end of both human Persons as u'ell as the rest since all evaluations are made in the light of some criteria, christian
about
of creation engenders a sense of direction in the moral life. This belief religious beliefs, such as those used by Charles Curran, can serve as provid-
Human
God is famililr to Roman Catholics reared on the moral manuals. ing-some of the "light" in which interpretations are made. Because of one's
persons are to acr in accord with their final end---communion with
God. To
God ,.iigio.rs srance, a Christian may make a different choice than a non-believer,
irru. on.', fundamental intention in the moral life oriented toward gives
o. i. o. she may make the same choice but for different reasons. For exam-
life !['hich has -chrirtian
a sense of integrity and coherence ro the moral life. The moral ple, the -"y , approaches the medical oPtions and the suffering
God as its eni is guided by those principles which are in accord with flod's
-hi.h "..o-pany the condition of terminal cancer may be influenced by the
purposes. AIso, it"seeks to realize those moral values which are in accord
with
paschal mysr;ry of Jesus and the symbols of the cross and resurrection. The
what God values. More specifically, to be oriented toward God who is iying Chiistian need not try to stave off death at all costs because Christian
loving, who is just, and who wills the well-being of creation is to be oriented fr.fiis insist that death is not as final as it mat' seem. f-hrough symbols ol
in oni's moral life toward what benefits the well-being of the human commu- faith, the Christian may face death with hope because of his or her belief that
nity and the interdependence ofall creation' death does not have the last u,ord. Part of what it means to have a Christian
These are bur thr.. .*".rrples of moral implications from beliefs about
character is to be able to live u'ith the disposition of hope u'ithout crippling
God. Others could be given. In the next chapter I will pick up on the master anxiety. So when one's religious beliefs inform one's basic stance toward the
.,God is louei as it has been formulated in the trinitarian doctrine
image of world, his or her moral reaicning, iudgment, and behavior r.r'ill inevitablv be
and"show its implications for understanding the human person as a moral qualified by religious faith. AS long as one's religious stance is part of the
agent. overall visiin linked to one's iustification of a moral position, we can rightly
include it as part of the content of morality.
Christian Faitb and tbe
Content of Moralitl Faith and Actions

On the basis of linguistic and sociological analysis, then, u'e havc an
insight into hou, religioui beliefs can qualify the content of moralitv. I have
,lr.idy inrroduced nihat pertains to the content of morality in the first chap-
,", u.,i.. the heading "The Range of Interest of Moral Theology." J-l-rere I
slxrwed that the .o.r,..ra of morality includes all that pertains to the morality
of treing (u,hich deals with character), and to the morality of doing (which
tleals with action and decision-making). Christian faith informs both aspects'
Making a moral decision is also qualified by faith, but not in the sense
that faith gives the Christian an additional capacitv for discernment. James
Gustafson insists that the Christian must relv on the same processes of dis-
cernment as anyone else.rr However, Christian faith aids in discernment by
helping the believer to order a plurality of values, to remain focused on basic
humarivalues, and to rank moral options. In these 11'xvs and others, Christian
beliefs help one to make a decision. Of course, the same Practical conclusion
 Foith Faith and Morality 55
54 Reason In.fornrcd BY

only informs experience and leads to action, but ncw experienccs mal also icad
niay be achieved apart from Chrisrian faith, but this does not dcnv that
to a weakened or to a more profound religious ccimmitment. The religious
Christian beliefs can also assist in determining a moral iudgment for the
person's understanding of God arises ottt of the symbols rve use to express the
Christian.
human experiences u,hich open us to the realitv of God-such as loving,
Christian beliefs also directly influence decision making and ac-tion at the
creating, iudging, and doing good. For exampie, the belief that God is benefi-
level of specific obligations whicir arise because one is Christian' J'his rvould
cent is evoked and enabled by analogt' to human exPeriences of goodness
include icts directed to God, such as prayer and worship, as rvell as acts
through one's family and friends. Occasions for thankfulness in human experi-
which are proper to belonging to a ceitain Christian community, strch as
ence are (at their depths) occasions of thankfulness to God present and working
providing a religious .dn.*tiioti. Also included under obligations u,hich arise
in and through those human experiences. Hourever, the graves of Auschwitz,
only *itf,in a C'hristian consciousness would be those which come out of the
the bombing of Hiroshima, the arms race between the superpowers, the starv-
t.rihirrgt ofJesus, such as the call to renounce power' to do penance' to seek
ing children in Ethiopia, and apartheid in South Africa, for example, are
the goo"<l of others and not one's own good, and to love your enemies. There-
incidents of malice which detract from any easy claims about God's benefi-
forel certain limited moral obligations are specifically dependant on being
cence. They force one to raise questions about the validity and worth of the
Christian and would not always also be iustified on the basis of rational self-
belief "God is beneficent." All of a sudden, in the face of such horrendous
interest.
expressions of evil, believing in God as beneficent becomes a problem.
In conclusion, then, Christian beliefs are not accidental or incidental to
How does one face such a challenge to one's belief about God and the
the morality of the Christian. James Gustafson's analysis of the distinctive-
adequacy of one's religious symbols? One extreme is to let go of one's beliefs
ness of Chiistian ethics provides a succinct picture of what is at stake. For
as untrue. This is to lose one's faith. The other extreme is to deny the validity
him, Christian beliefs can and do make a difference at the level of the three
of one's experience of the world and to hold on to one's faith as the only
substantive concerns of ethics.22 First, at the level of the good, Christian
source of truth. In between these extremes is a way of understanding the
beliefs offer distinctive reasons for being moral based on one's experience of
relation of faith and morality which lets one's beliefs become a challenge to
the reality of God in Jesus and through the Spirit as the ultimate good.
see new dimensions of the world at the same time that one's experiences of
Second, at the Ievel of the person, moral character can be distinguished by
the world open up nerv dimensions of religious belief itself.2i
the perspectives, dispositions, affections, and intentions which Chr:istian be-
liefs engender. Third, at the level of criteria of iudgment, Christian heliefs James Walter speaks of such a relationship as a "critical-dialogical" one.z+
This means that faith and morality remain relatively autonomous but continu-
offer a distinctive point of reference used to give guidance or to provide
In some instances, these points of reference indicate ously interact to shape and reshape the understanding of one another- While
criteria for moral
".tio.tt. religious symbols give form and content to moral experience, moral experi-
courses of action which may not satisfy the desire for rationality or rrniversal
ence moves toward faith in order to give new insight into the content of the
applicability, but they do have a binding force on those committed to Chris-
religious symbols and to correct any misPerceptions which might be con-
tian beliefs which have shaped a Christian imagination. In short' Christian
tained in them. But the religious symbols people ultimately use to express
morality cannot be converted completely into a rational ethics. If it could,
their experiences of God and to interpret their moral experiences are the ones
then the experience of God in Christ, and the mediation of that experience
which make sense or "ring true" to their human experience.25 If the symbols
through s..iptrrr", the church, and human experience, would hav,e no particu-
used to express the nature and actions of God do not find confirmation in and
Iar ethical significance for the Christian community. To be a Christian be-
through one's own experiences, then we should not be surprised to find that
liever carries a particular commitment to becoming a certain sort of person
the reasons for being moral, the principles and values inferred from these
living a \r,ay of life which entails certain reasons for being moral and certain
svmbols, and the actions required hry them will have no persuasive Po\\/er
practices u'hich follow from Christian beliefs"
over one's life. But if the st'mbols do ring true in the moral agent's life, then
we can expect that his or her moral life will be truly qualified b-v religious
l'aith and Moralitl: beliefs and will receive content from them.
C riticnl- Dialogical Re lations hip The movement back and forth between religious symbols and experi-
ence is at the heart of the life of the church and is the basic dynamic of any
So far, we have seen hou'faith qualifies morality. But the relationship
minisrry of the word. Chapter l2 takes up the role of the church in the moral
berween faith and morality is not all one way. One's religious commitment not
56 Reason Informed I).y l"aith
life . At this point only need to indicate that the church is necessarv fiir the
u,'e
moral life to Lre informed effectivcly by rcligious beliefs. Tl're church is both a
community of belief and a communitl' of action. As a community of trelief it
supports the religious self-understanding of its members and a religitlus ull-
derstanding of human experience. As a community of action, it r.r'itnesses to
the moral meaning of religious beliefs and, in so doing, it provides hrtman
support to sustain beliefs and to enrich their meaning e\ren in the frr:e of
conllict.26 If we are to live as moral Persons informed by our faith, we will
only be able to do so as active members of a believing comrnunity.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that when the nature and locus of the good is
God, then one's moral life will inevitably be qualified by the experiences one
has of God and the beliefs one holds about God. While the Christian tradition
does not make morality entirely dependent on religion, it challenges any
attempt to separate too cleanly "religious acts" (such as believing in God) and
"moral acts" (such as seeking the well-being of creation). If one is religious in
the Judaeo-Christian way, then the sort of person one ought to be and the
kinds of actions one ought to do can and ought to be qualified by one's
religious beliefs. Experiences of God and beliefs about God are integral to the
tone and quality of the moral life. The moral challenge to Christians is to
open their moral imaginations to the symbols of Christian faith and to allow
their moral vision and its demands to be influenced by them.
But to say that faith informs morality does not mean that all who share
the same religious beliefs will draw out the same moral implications. A
certain plurality of moral responses is possible within the Christian commu-
nity. Christians can and do differ on the moral meaning of their faith. The
one faith supports a stress on different elements of the moral life. One of the
great challenges to Roman Catholic moral theology is to show the ways that
the central symbols of faith should be interpreted so as to bring the moral
meaning of faith into clearer focus.
Since faith and morality intersect in the moral agent, we need to turn
next to an understanding of the human person and those asPects of moral
character which are subiect to the influence of the religious beliefs by which
one lives.
lr,lotes
1. The expression is from H. Richard Niebuhr. See especially his
"The Center of Value," Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York:
Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 100-l 13.
Faitb and Morality 57
2. I am fbllou'ing thc sense of the rcligic)us rcason for bcing moral as
clevcloped by James M. (lustafson, "I'heolosv and llthics," Christian Ethics
and the Communiry (Philadelphia: United Church Prcss, 1971), p. 88.
l. I am follou'ing this expression of Clustafson's to cxPress thc norma-
tive requirement of an ethics centerecl on God. He favors itover Karl Barth's
"what God commands" or Paul Lehmann's "ri'hat Clod is doing" because it
better respects the transcendence of God and the freedom of the moral agent
to dctermine one's own actions. Furthermore, since the presence of God is
always filtered through human mediations, u'e do not have the absolute
..rt"inty that we know u'hat God "commands" or is "doing." To discern
rvhat God "enables" requires other resources of moral knowledge, not just the
resources of revelation. For Gustafson's use of this expression and his criti-
cism of the others, see Oan Ethics Be Christian? (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1975), pp. 156-157.
4. The debate on rhe distinctiveness of Christian ethics was opened by
Alfons Auer in Germany wrth Autln7me Mrtral und Christlicber Glaube (Dtssel-
dorf: Patmos-Verlag, 197 l). For some of the maicir articles which express the
movement developing autonomous morality as well as the counter-movement
of faith-ethics, see the collection edited by Charles E. Curran and Richard A'
McCormick, Readings in Moral Theologl No. 2: Tbe Distinctiveness of Christian
ErDlcs (Ramsey: Paulist Press, 1980).
5. See, for example, their representative articles in ibid.
6. The debate on the distinctiveness of christian ethics is u,ell summa-
rized and assessed by Vincent MacNamara , Faith and Ethics (Washington:
Georgerown university Press, 1985). Also, see Lucien Richard, Is There a
Christian Ethics? (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1988).
7. James J. Walter, "The Dependance of Christian Morality on Faith:
A Critical Assessment, " Eglise et Th1ologie l2 ( I98l): 237 -277 .
8. See, for example, Dallas High' Language, Persons, and Belief (New
York: oxford universitv Press, 1967), chapter 5, "Belief Utterances," pp.
133-163, and chapter 6, "I Believe in. .': creedal and Doctrinal Under-
standing," pp. 164-184. Also, J. L. Austin, Ho'** to do Things with Words, ed'
J. O. Urmson (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962).
9. Evans developed this kind of logic most thoroughly in his book by
rhe same title, The Logic of self-Inaolaement ([-ondon: SCM Press, Ltd., 1963).
10. Donald D. Er,ans, "Philosophical Analysis and Religious Faith:
Some Retrospective Reflections," Faith and the Contemporarl Epistemologies,
eds. Jean-Louis Allard, Frangois l)uschesneau, and Jean Theau (ottau'a,
University of ottau,a Press, 1977), p. 12. L\lso, his "Differences Retween
Scientific and Religious Assertions," Science and Religion, ed. Ian G. Barbour
(New York: Harper & Rou', 1968), pp. 101-111.
11. Evans, The I'ogic of Setf-lnuoloetnent, pP. ?7-46; and, "Differences