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Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 12:29:58 -0400
From: "" <pzelikow@9-11 commission. gov> 41
To: "" <dlevin@usdoj.gov>4|
Cc: "" <dmarcus@9-1 1commission.gov> "" <mhurley@9-11commission.gov>4F
Subject: Fwd: DoD Litmus Test Responses

Dan --
A heads up for you on some DOD dpcuments. The attached internal message is
self-explanatory. This sounds like a matter that should be manageable.
Philip
----- Forwarded message from "" <bjenkins@9-llcommission.gov> -----
Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2003 11:37:05 -0400
From: "" <bjenkins@9-llcommission.gov>
Reply-To: "" <bjenkins@9-llcommission.gov>
Subject: DoD Litmus Test Responses
To: "" <dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov>, "" <sdunne@9-llcommission.gov>

Dan,

Regarding DOD, we have not received any documents on what Team

Tea 3 would call
the "litmus test" responses (Document 6, paragraphs 1, 2, 4). However, there
are documents sitting in the document processing facility that are "under
review" in response to these paragraphs. For example, Pat's latest list notes
approximately 254 pages of information on one part of paragraph 2 that is at
the facility, she also notes 915 pages of information on one part of paragraph
1 that is at the facility. However, some of these documents have been in the
facility since July. Pat informed me a few weeks ago that the problem with
most of the documents were related to Executive Privilege issues, but as I
understand it, the EP issue has been resolved. I have not been able to get a
good answer as to what is the hold up and it might be good to know exactly
what is the problem in shaking the documents out of the facility.
DOD has responded to some of the Document 6 questions asked related to
budgeting (three paragraphs) and a couple of paragraphs related to questions
put forth by Team 2. Answers to relevant policy issues, however, are not as
forthcoming.
Bonnie

----- End forwarded message -----

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http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?index=l 780 9/1 8/03

Team 3: Agency Performance on Litmus Test Items

CIA:

The Litmus Test items we identified for DCI Document Request 8 were: Items 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 8, and 18.

First,CIA has been quite responsive for the majority of the 40 requests contained in Doc
Req8.

It's performance on the Litmus Test items specified above, however, has been less strong.

Item 1 concerns PDB's and production is a policy issue for the White House. Of the
other Litmus items—2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 18—CIA has produced documents only in
response to item 5. That item requested documents or presentations used to prepare the
DCI for meetings with the National Security Advisor, SecDef, SecState, and Director of
the FBI. CIA has produced about 20 substantive pages. These include meetings that the
DCI had with the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State from January 2001 through
September 2001 (nothing after September 11). The 20 pages are of strong interest and
include discussions of the UAV and policy toward Taliban and Saudi Arabia.

We have been told that CIA does not have documents responsive to items 2,3, 4, and 6.
We suggest that we obtain a certification from CIA to that effect.

CIA has noted that there are no docs responsive to item 18 (agendas for meetings
between DCI and SecDef or Dep SecDef), although some documents pertaining to DCI
and Sec Rumsfeld CT discussions were included in part of the production responsive to
item 5.

With regard to item 8, CIA notes that the request for documents on the 1993 WTC attack
and the 1996 Khobar Towers attack were part of its response to DCI Doc Req 6; and that
it has no docs responsive to the Document Request 8, Item 8 for in-house studies on the
East Africa bombings, the Millennium Plot, or the attack on the Cole.
Team 3: Agency Performance on Litmus Test Items

FBI:

The Team 3-generated FBI document request was FBI Document Request 9. The
Commission sent the request to the FBI on July 3.

On August 26, we identified Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 of that request as our Litmus Test.

With regard to overall response, to date we have received two installments of documents,
one on July 25 (primarily non-Litmus related materials), and the other on August 29.
Roughly 400 pages have been provided to date. Some of this information has been very
helpful in gauging certain aspects of CT policy, however, we feel more needs to be
produced, especially guidance and communications from the Director-level. We would
also like to see more information relating to FBI cooperation with foreign counterparts.

FBI Litmus Test Items:

Item 1 (substantive policy documents relating to general CT policy and specifically the
al-Qaida threat): We have received some information but expect more. If there is not
more, then we would like a certification to that effect.

Item 2 (opinions on lethal force against UBL and al-Qaida): no response thus far.

Item 3 (Director, Dep Director communications with foreign counterparts in relation to

al-Qaida): we have received a small amount of information (a few pages of notes and
documents), mostly related to the Khobar investigation, and some Cole material. If there
is no more, then we should ask for a certification.

Item 4 (FBI staff communications with certain foreign governments in relation to al-
Qaida, UBL, etc.): we are in receipt of a very small amount of documentation in
connection with this item, none of which has shed much light on our investigation. If
there is no more, we should request a certification to that effect.

State:

The Team 3-generated document request to State was State Document Request 3. The
Commission sent the request on July 2.

On August 26, we identified Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 as our Litmus Test.

With regard to overall response to date, it is evident that the State Department has made a
substantial effort to respond to our request. We have seen a number of excellent
documents and hope to see even more in future tranches. State has sent over nearly 1,300
documents in response to our request.

State Litmus Test Items:

Item 1 (substantive policy memos, briefing packets, and guidance documents to or from
SecState and/or Dep SecState): We have received helpful documents, including a
quantity of cables, in connection with this item—some good briefing materials for DCs
on CT and regional issues. However, we would like to see more documents issued
containing guidance from SecState. We have just taken delivery of a new batch of
documents and have been advised that this will include documents which were circulated
at the highest level.

Item 2 (DOS communications with Taliban reps): State has provided a handful of
documents which touch on this issue. We expect more. If it's the case that State does not
hold more records on this subject then we would recommend requesting a certification to
that effect.

Item 3 (DOS communications with Pakistani and/or Saudi officials relating to UBL, al-
Qaida, and/or Taliban): State has provided some extremely helpful documentation on
these issues, but in limited quantity. We expect more to be produced, especially DOS
communications with Saudi Arabia on the UBL issue. If we do not receive any more on
this we would should request certification that no more records are available.

Item 4 (DOS communications with Pakistan's ISFD): State has provided a small number
of helpful documents. We would expect more to be produced, or a certification from
State that no additional documents exist.

DoJ:

The Team 3-generated document request to the Department of Justice was DoJ
Documents Request 2. The Commission sent the request on July 2.

On August 26, we identified all Items as our Litmus Test.

With regard to overall response to date, we have received over 7,000 pages of documents.
While some of these are helpful for outlining DoJ's general CT concerns (both domestic
and international), we have not yet received high-level policy documents related to UBL
or the al-Qaida threat.

DoJ Litmus Test Items:

Item 1 (substantive policy memos, briefing packets, and guidance documents to or from
AG or Deputy AG): We have received some policy guidance memos circulated to or
from the AG's or Deputy AG's office. Much of this relates to the USG's 5-year
interagency plan on terrorism. Such information is of value, but we are still need more
AG of Deputy AG policy documents, especially those relating to al-Qaida threat.

Item 2 (DoJ's assessment of the legality of the use of lethal force): To date we have
received no documents on this.

Item 3 (DoJ policy guidance coming to or going from the DoJ as a result of East Africa
Embassy bombings or the attack on the Cole): We have received documents related to
FBI investigations of these attacks but no high-level policy guidance.

Item 4 (AG and Deputy AG communications with senior foreign officials): To date we
have received no documents related to this request.

Items 5 (Directives on funding for CT programs): We have received a substantial

number of funding proposals and budgetary guides relating to both DoJ and it
subdivisions and to the FBI.

Items 6-10: We expect more documentation on these items and suggest that the Front
Office raise these items at the appropriate level of DoJ.
Mail:: INBOX: agency performance on "litmus test" items Page 1 of 1

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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 18:29:37 -0400
From: "" <dmarcus@9-11commission.gov>^?
To: "" <teamleaders@9-11commission.gov>4P'
Cc: "" <frontoffice@9-11commission.gov>4|
Subject: agency performance on "litmus test" items
Reminder -- while the Commissioners have seen the agency letters of Sept. 5,
and heard your reports on where things stand, they are still anxious to know if
there are any significant holes in agency production of litmus test documents
(other than the nigh-level policy documents that have been promised in the
nexty two weeks). Please let Steve or me know by noon Thursday if you have
identified such holes (and what they are).

http://kinesis.swisnrnail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&niailbox=INBOX&... 9/17/03
Mail:: INBOX: Re: Fwd: agency performance on "litmus test" items Page 1 of 1

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Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 18:51:13 -0400
From: "" <bjenkins@9-11commission.gov>4|
To: "" <mhurley@9-11 commission.gov> ^
Cc: "" <team3@9-11commission.gov>4|
Subject: Re: Fwd: agency performance on "litmus test" items
Mike,

I just received an update from Pat on DOD documents. I will review it this
evening and call you tomorrow on a proper DOD response.
Bonnie
Quoting "" <mhurley@9-llcommission.gov>:
> team3mates:
>
> we need to go over this on Thursday morning.
>
> Mike
>
> ----- Forwarded message from "" <dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov> -----
> Date: wed, 17 Sep 2003 18:29:37 -0400
> From: "" <dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov>
> Reply-To: "" <dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov>
> Subject: agency performance on "litmus test" items
> To: <teamleaders@9-llcommission.gov>
> Reminder -- while the commissioners have seen the agency letters of Sept. 5,
>
> and heard your reports on where things stand, they are still anxious to know
> if
> there are any significant holes in agency production of litmus test documents
>
> (other than the high-level policy documents that have been promised in the
> nexty two weeks). Please let Steve or me know by noon Thursday if you have
> identified such holes (and what they are).
>
>
> ----- End forwarded message -----

http://kinesis.swishniail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&... 9/17/03
 Team 3 Document Request Tracker
9/11 Closed by Statute

CIA
Document Request # 8

Item* Short Title Status

Office of the DCI

1 PDBs
2 Requests related to PDBs
3 Briefing packages for
Principals and Deputies
Committee Meetings
4 Docs or presentations
given by DCI to Pres or VP
5 Docs or presentations used 8/8—1 lemail asking if we're interested in packets for meetings
to prepare DCI for that were cancelled (yes!); no booklets for FBI meetings 1/01-9/01
meetings w/ NSA, SecDef, (they didn't start making books until later /02).
SecState, Dir. FBI 8/25 Docs on the way by 8/29.
6 Materials relations to
discussions between DCI
and senior-level foreign
intell. or other officials
7 Transition Team material 8/19 Nos. 080413-080416. At CIA reading room.
8/26 Nos. 0800581
8 After-action reports for 7/15 (a) and (b) correspond to items already responded to from DCI#6
terrorist strikes: (a) 1993 (MacEachin) 1 .(a) on WTC and 2. on Khobar
WTC attack, (b) Khobar
Towers, (c) 1998 East 8/25 "No docs responsive" ("no in-house studies—most of this done
Africa, (d) USS Cole, (e) by outside entities".)
Milennium Plot, (f) 9/1 1
9 NIC analytic reports 7/24 Nos. 80027-80068 delivered to K Street
10 IG reports 7/15 3 IG reports re. CTC already provided responsive to DCI#5
(MacEachin). Asks if we want additional items.
11 OGC reports re. DCI 8/25 Docs on the way ("we're sorting through production.")
authority
12 Jeremiah report 8/5 No. 80363. At CIA reading room
13 Organizational charts 7/23 No. 80001 organizational charts and related materials delivered
to K Street.
As of 8/1 1, ODCI, CIA, DI, CTC, TTIC (2003) at K Street; S&T in
process.
8/25 Docs on the way ("The overall org charts are coming which
should cover all the entities—this should be complete production.")
8/26 Nos. 0800582-0800584 & 080061 1
14 (a) DCI's Strategic Intent 7/23 Nos. 80006-80010 responsive to (a) and (b), including a written
(b) CIA's strategic response from the ADCI/AP regarding (c), delivered to K Street
direction
(c) DCI's intelligence
priorities framework
15 DCI's annual report on 1C 7/23 Nos. 80002-8005, 80025 & 80026 delivered to K Street
8/26 Nos. 0800585-0800587 (?)
16 DCIDs 7/23 Nos. 8001 1-80020 delivered to K Street
17 DCI's annual performance 8/1 1 "We don't believe we have anything responsive
evaluation of NSA, NIMA,
NRO
Page 1 of4
Created by A. Albion
Last updated August 14,2003
 Mail:: INBOX: head up re: DCI Talking Points Page 1 of 1

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INBOX: head up re: DCI Talking Points wove | copy UN* message to
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Date: Thu, 11 Sep200315:27:26 -0400
From:[ |@ucia.gov>*
TcM Dan Marcus <dmarcus@9-11 commission.gov>9, "dcampagna@9-11 commission.gov' <dcampagna@9-
11commission.gov>*, Kevin Scheid <KScheid©9-11 commlssion.gov>*, Melissa Coftey <mcoffey@9-
11commission.gov>*, Mike Hurley <mhurley@9-11commission.gov>*. Philip Zelikow <pzelikow@9-
11commission.gov>*, Steve Dunne <sdunne©9-11commission.gov>*
Cc: Bob Morean <roberpm1 @ucia.gov>*, "Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov' <Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov>*
Subject: head up re: DCI Talking Points
All: just a heads up, the paralegals are now preparing the DCI Talking
Points w/meetings with SecDef & sec State. They will be available in
the reading room at some point tomorrow. There are 2 sec oef meetings
that are solely made up of compartmented material for which only Albion,
Jenkins & Hurley are read on & I'll retain them here in my office for
them to review (per a telecon w/Kevin Scheid of 9/11/03). Also recall
that there are no D/FBI from that time period (although they met, they
just didn't keep advance books at that time). Per 9ur letter, pan Levin
will work with you on the talking points for the Rice meetings, | |
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 Team3

Report to Commissioners
V>
September 10, 2003

Team 3 — Counterterrorism Policy Team

• First, a reminder of what we are responsible for, what I am responsible f o r . . .

Our Goal: Produce the most objective, and authoritative review of U.S. Policy
Decision-making regarding al-Qaida with emphasis on the years 1998 through 9/11 1
but also a review of how the fight has gone since then, and produce a limited number I
of concrete, feasible recommendations that address big problems that we identify. // '/'

• In the short time we have available, I want to tell you about this with an emphasis
on substance.

• There are 4 elements to what I want to report to you this morning:

1) What we have done substantively?

2) What we have learned from what we have done?

3) How we are learning it?—Here I'll tell you a couple of procedural points of interest

4) Where we are going?

*And a word about problems -•

\t have we done substantively?

A big step forward that we have taken is producing a detailed outline for Team
3 's monograph. I think it's instructive to say a word about our approach^ \, OA i

Outline: Our first effort didn't get us where we wanted to be. Tried to figure out
yx\ h°w to tell the story. One way was to address the questions that we wanted to V
 answer. Why didn't we stopAQ before 9/11? What were the problems? Have
they been fixed? Seemed to lack clarity, i

So, we took another tack.

We started by creating a timeline of key events and decision points— a very

detailed one, it's about 35 pages and we add to it daily.

• We then used that to construct a detailed chronological outlirie for the narrative.
Into that chronological outline we insert at what seem to us (to be the right points
discussions of the various issues the administrations and agencies faced, and the
reasons for the decisions they took.

• An advantage of this approach is that when you review our monograph, you may
decide that no, in fact, this discussion would be better raised in another part of the
narrative, where it will flow better. Those judgments can be made and the
changes done easily, I think. Our job will be to get the individual stories right.
They are "ornaments" that can be hung in the narrative.

• We are still getting feedback from the front office on this but I believe we have
the basis for an approach that will serve us well on this very complicated task: ,
How to tell the story fairly, and fully. 1 •/;• & ^^rcJ(^-f . GuPfir*O(S^- <?^v
~ r

Here are some highlights from the outline: "h

These are broad brush strokes, the outline is detailed and runs to 9 pages

US Counterterrorism Policy 1998 -

Background to East Africa bombings and their aftermath
Details for a proposed May 1998 raid to capture UBL in Afghanistan. (This is one of
the discussions)

Embassy bombings and reprisal stikes.

Discussion: What options were considered
Discussion: What covert actions did the Clinton administration use to try to knock out a-
Q's senior leadership?.
Discussion: How did aQ affect U.S Saudi relations? Did we have the right Saudi policy?

Fall 1998: Warnings to Clinton and other senior officials of possible UBL attacks inside
the U.S.
Discussion: White House asking for more military options

The Road to the Millennium

What have we learned from what we are doing?
One recurring theme we have found in our review of DoD, for example is the belief in
Dod for a long time that the CT effort "is not fundamentally a military problem." This is
reflected not only in the fact that DoD did not adequately plan for a military operation
against al-Qaida beforejg/ljhut also that there was no military response to Khobar
Towers, thdE|H&a^^ta§arafeto»or the Cole. DoD believed, it seems, the task belonged
toothers. "

Insert other key findings from other Agencies

V
Use of the armed UAV. That some of these things that the press reports there are
interagency squabbles over are actually moving ahead at the same time. Objectively,
they may not be slowing things down. They are moving on parallel tracks. And that
reasons for deployment of certain systems may have far more to do with legitimate
operational concerns, than what have been characterized as juvenile or trivial fights. I
think this important. We don't accept these as the definitive account, either; but they
represent points of view.

How are we learning what we are learning?

We have completed 12 substantive interviews. They have been substantive. We have
produced substantive, high quality memo's for the record on them.

We have completed 12 briefings, many of which I call ABIs, or "all but interviews".
Trying to keep our minds open. How did people view their jobs? Pre-9/11. How they
view them and are doing them post-9/11. What impediments, if any, were in their way?
Or are still in their way. What things did they do right? What things might they have
done wrong.

Two recent key interviews, both at CIA, and at senior levels. One Monday, one Tuesday.

We are getting to levels that the JI never got to. Partly, because it may not have been in
the JI's mandate, but also, I'm not sure they knew of these people. If you are looking at
intelligence failures, it may make sense to be down in the weeds. But they missed some
people higher up that have illuminating stories to tell.

We obtained details, and I think a point of view, that has not been told to anyone else in
the U.S. government.

Been through the open source and JI, those were goals. Now deeply into documents, and
interviews.
Discussion: How did aQ and Taliban affect U.S.-Pakistani relationsraid to cab
Discussion: Did DOJ and FBI ensure a robust legal/law enforcement strategy?
Discussion: Sanctions on the Taliban
Discussion: CT budget
Discussion: CiA teams working with Northern Alliance.
Discussion: The attack on the USS Cole

US Counterterrorism Policy, Nov 2000 - January 2001: The Transition

Outgoing officials views on aQ by Agency
Incoming officials views on aQ by Agency
Discussion: What briefings for incoming administation? Guidance? Was the baton
passed properly.
Structure of CT Policy making

US Counterterrorism Policy, Jan-Sept 2001: The Bush Administration and

AQ before 9/11
Prioriities
Clarke's drive for an interagency review.
How was assessment on Cole reached?. Why was there no response?
Grappling with Taliban
Homelend security concerns
Summer 2001: CT resources and preparations
Deputies and aQ
The summer of threat
Diplomatic efforts
Predator debate
Draft NSPD-9
Sept 4 Principals Meeting

US Counterterrorism Policy, Sept 11-20, 2001: The Immediate

Aftermath of 9/11 —We will do this day-by-day

Analysis and Conclusions

J0
Problem Areas ^,c f^rAS.

Current US CT Policy r
V^ ^
AJLV I
Recommendations ^*
Where are we going? Near term
About 100 people on our B List.

About 35 on our A List. Front office role.

Upcoming domestic travel: CENTCOM, SOCOM, JSOC

Where are we going mid-term?

Scheduling all high level meetings, in close concert with Front Office. Nothing wildcat
here.

Big round of hearings for top people in Bush administration and top people in Clinton
Administration. Private interviews before we do these with everyone.

Now, a word about documents

PDB's other key related memos. I want to put it into perspective. Work is going on.I
anticipate that some of the focus on this is that

There will come a point, a drop-dead date if you will, not have documents and not have
key interviews. We are aware of this and it will from the perspective of Team 3

I have 5 people, including myself, full time, and time to do the interviews, because we
can break up into teams of 2.

Submit new Doc Reqs to all agencies parallel language wasn't captured in first request

Problems for us
There are always specific problems that we resolve. One is to ensure that we get the
highest quality documents from the right levels. I believe the process is in place to make
that happen. Anything that can be done to accelerate that will obviously help.

The big problem for us is really the volume of this undertaking for us and the complexity
of the issues. We don't underestimate that. We are challenged by it and not daunted.
And we are moving forward with determination. I think we are in good shape to meet
expectations including time deadlines. There's not a lot of give to it, though. It's a
problem but one that we are confronting.
 Interviews/Briefings

19 completed with T3 Leading

T3 has "2d Chaired" roughly half a dozen others

B'fings (10 completed)

Goodson
Daadler
Destler
Cambone
Feith
Hawley
Longstreth
Ochmanek
Sigler
Karzai

Interviews (9 completed)

Andersen
Shaloff
Shinn
Weinbaum
Benjamin
Tucker
Grandrimo
Campbell
Smith

Upcoming Interviews (6 in the next two weeks)

Martin Indyk (fmr. Ass't Sect. Of State for the Near East)

Gayle Smith (fmr. NSC director for Africa)

Robert Oakley (fmr. Amb. To Pakistan/Somalia; Former Coordinator for Counter

Terrorism at DoS. After retirement in 1992, acted as advisor to UNOCAL on their Afgh.
pipeline project)
Mark Steinitz (Current director for Terrorism Analysis at State's INR)

Kenneth Pollack (fmr. NSC director for Near East Affairs)

Gregory Newbold (fmr. Director of Operations with JCS)

To: Philip, Chris, Dan, Steve:

What follows are the points I intend to make to Commissioners tomorrow regarding
Team 3's progress and activities. I am providing them to you now for your advance
review.

Update on Team 3 (Counterterrorism Policy Team):

1) We have sent major document requests to CIA, DoD, State, FBI, and DOJ. The
requests are both broad and deep. We believe they wi}l capture the documents and
ii\?
records necessary for our research in the coming m&Hmin The due dates for receipt of
the documents range from July 15-17. fin each of them we have asked tor a roiling
production. We are in frequent contact with the POCs at each of the Agencies
regarding the requests (making clear we are more than ready to clarify, answer
questions, etc., to facilitate timely responses).

2) We have 2 requests in to EOF. The 1st request has been answered in full. The 2nd
request is still pending. We have been told that we will be given access to documents
contained in the 2nd request this week. We will begin our review of the documents as
soon as access is confirmed. A 3rd EOF document request—another rather substantial
request—is with the Front Office. [Philip: I defer to you to provide details to
Commissioners on arrangements with EOF.] \\ . 6r ^

3) We are preparingome next round of document requests./me contents of Wtfich will

depend in part on the responses to the requests currently pending and in part on what
we learn as our research continues. <? \\&i\) Team 3 has compiled a Ijgfbf the people we will interview

interviews in July. And are also planning an aggressive interview schedule in

August. ( -

Team 3 members have been hard at work reviewing and taking detailed notes on the
Joint Inquiry report, as well as the other key documents the Commission holds. We
are also going through principal secondary sources.

We are also framing questions for upcoming interviewees.

7) We have put together a rough outline for Team 3's monograph to guide our work.

8) We eagerly await Team Member Alexis Albion's clearances, and we expect that to
occur later this week. „.- Ju,-U» <NM* tx,»x*l

Philip: As noted above, I assume you will respond to Commissioners' questions

regarding EOF cooperation and/or how we are handling document requests made to EOF.
Team 3 has completed its big salvo of document requests. As noted above, we have an
aggressive interview plan and schedule. Things appear to be on track.
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Philip Zelikow

Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2003 3:01 PM
To: Commissioners
Cc: staff
Subject: CBS Transcript of Interview with Governor Kean

Commissioners and Staff ~

Attached you should find a partial transcript of the CBS interview with Governor Kean. We got it
earlier today, when they posted it in order to answer our criticisms.

The interview was conducted on December 3, so does not include some events that occurred after that
(such as the Cleland resignation and Kerrey appointment).

This transcript was prepared by CBS and is obviously a rush job. Also, it is only a transcript of the
portion of the interview. It does not include most (we think about three-quarters) of the material they
taped at Drew University (including about Kean as university president, in his classroom, etc.). CBS
decided which portions to transcribe, not us.

Even so, I invite you to read the CBS transcript and circulate it to anyone who is interested. The
material that got on the news is near the end; you can judge the context for yourself.

Our Chairman has a well-founded reputation for fairness and integrity. I think a reasonable reader of
this transcript will see why.

Philip Zelikow
Executive Director
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

P.S.: The Governor did mix up the number of pages to which we have access with the number of
documents (and that number of pages is also out of date). The Governor was also misinformed about
the number of interviews conducted so far and still to go. It would be more accurate to say that we have
conducted nearly 800 interviews or briefings and have about 200 still to go.

12/22/2003
Part 1: Interview With Thomas Kean
Dec. 19,2003

This appointment was different, part time it was something I didn't feel you could turn down. — I
mean, this was one of the greatest national tragedies ever to happen to our country and

If you are asked to answer the questions, to resolve the issues, to finally issue a report to the
American people, which will hopefully make people safer in the end, I didn't see any way I could
say no.

We've got two jobs really. One is historical. We've got to answer all the questions, what happened
on 9/11, how did it happen, why did it happen, and secondly, we've got to make
recommendations — and those recommendations, coming out of our research, coming out of
history, will hopefully make the American people feel safer.

There have — only been three investigations like this in American history, the first was the Pearl
Harbor investigation and that report. The second was the Warren commission on the
assassination of President Kennedy, and the third is this report on 9/11.

So to me it has great importance in that historical context. I think the Warren commission, they
went as fast as they could because they were scared. Scared that people thought Fidel Castro
was involved, that Russia had been involved, some thought the mafia had been involved, and
questions had to be answered right away. If a foreign power had been involved, it might have
been ....

So the Warren commission really rushed their report and there were some problems because of
that. There are still some questions left unanswered, and those questions bedevil us to this day.

We've been given a timeline and it's a tight timeline, we're supposed to finish by the end of this
May, and we're going to — try and do it, but there's an enormous amount of material to cover,
there's seven specific areas Congress has specifically asked us to look at and we've got to look
at them all fully and completely and do so with integrity.

Q: What are those areas?

It's everything from — money laundering to immigration reform to visas to response of NYC and
Washington to the attack itself, to the history of al Qaeda, the intelligence agencies-the FBI, the
CIA, did they really do their job and if they didn't how did they fail, airline safety? — Defense, all
those areas, and they're all specifically outlined by Congress, Congress told us this is what we
have to do.

So we have various task forces deep into each of these subjects. Congress was limited to the
intelligent functions of the United States government. This was the congressional committee on
intelligence, — they weren't able to get a number of documents they wanted. Particularly from the
Office of the President because there's a historic separation between the presidency and — the
Congress. And the president has always been upheld, when he asserts presidential privilege in
those areas by — the courts.

We don't have the same constraints. We're an independent commission, one of only three in
history, and we feel we have to see everything in order to give the American people what they
really need to know, so we've been doggedly saying there isn't — a material or a piece of paper
having to do with 9/11 which we don't have to see.

Q: How close did you come to issuing subpoenas to the White House?
Mail:: INBOX: further subpoenas? Page 1 of 1

124.11MB/476.84MB (26.03%)
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2003 17:35:48 -0400
From: "" <dmarcus@9-11commission.gov>^
To: "" <teamleaders@9-11 commission.gov> <ff
Cc: "" <frontoffice@9-11commission.gov>4|
Subject: further subpoenas?
This will elaborate on what I reported at yesterday's Team Leader meeting. The
Commission on Tuesday not only voted to issue a subpoena to the FAA (which was
served this afternoon), but also instructed me to canvass all team leaders to
determine whether there are other instances of agency non-production of
important documents that merit consideration of issuance of a subpoena, what
we are interested in is instances in which an agency, despite having been put
on notice by us that their production is (or is suspected to be) deficient in a
signifcant respect, has failed to come forward with responsive documents or has
responded inadequately. The public statement the commission issued, together
with the Gonzales memo to agencies, should produce a heightened sense of
urgency among the agencies in completing responses to outstanding requests over
the next week or so. You should take advantage of the current atmosphere to
remind agencies about the remaining holes they need to fill, and consider
whether any remaining problems are serious enough to warrant consideration of a
subpoena.
Please send an email to Steve and me by the end of next week (Oct. 24)
letting us know whether you believe a subpoena for any of the documents you
seek should be issued, and if so, why.

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?Horde=cc3dc08f7f52bd704203b03... 10/16/03
 Report to Commissioners

We are interviewing

We are researching documents

Primary sources

Key travel for more interviews

Have submitted our outline and re-tooled it