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AneomarxistApproachtotheSociologyofNationalism.

Doomed NationasanddoomedSchemes

AneomarxistApproachtotheSociologyofNationalism.DoomedNationasand doomedSchemes

bySilvaMenari


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Source: PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:1/1987,pages:7989,onwww.ceeol.com.

A NEO-MARXIST APPROACH TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF NATIONALISM. DOOMED NATIONS AND DOOMED SCHEMES
Silva Meznari The neo-Marxist ideological community in contemporary sociology1 has lately defined Marxisms failure to (analytically) approach nationalism as one of the blank spots in its main theoretical scheme, namely, historical materialism. One could almost say, considering how widespread and vigorous the discussions about this assumed failure are, that neo-Marxists are examining the future response of historical materialism to modernity according to its theoretical capability to conceptualize and explain modern nationalism. The explanatory theory (historical materialism) expressed in the metaphor of base and superstructure may be somewhat further clarified, if we indicate briefly what it could mean in the relation to two important problems, religion and nationalism, or religious and national conflicts . . . Relatively little Marxist work has so far been done on either religion or nationalism.2 Perry Anderson goes even further; by reopening the loop between Marxist theory and mass practice in the advanced countries we might recreate some of the conditions that had once formed the classical canon of historial materialism in the generation of Lenin and Luxemburg . . . and shift the whole center of gravity of Marxist culture towards the set of basic problems posed by the movement of the world economy . . . [and] the meaning and function of the nation,3 which, among other problems, had been systematically neglected for many years. Even the most orthodox of Marxists are today prepared to concede that there is little to be found in Marxs writings relevant to the interpretation of the rise of nationalism . . . While there is a very large literature on nationalism, theoretical interpretations of the phenomenon have been notoriously lacking.4 A majority of neo-Marxists seem to concede that Marx and Marxists writings about the nation, the nation-state, and nationalism were mainly of a tactical nature; that the problem has received confused treatment and that it survived in Marxism only through a still more confusing and abstract analysis, penned by none other than Stalin.5 It is difficult to resist the conclusion recently reached by Tom Nairn that the theory of nationalism represents Marxisms great historical failure.6 Nonetheless, as Giddens and Nairn would have it, other traditions of Western thought have for the most part not done much better.7 Despite the stockpile of the non-Marxist literature on the topic of nationalism in contemporary societies, the very nature, meaning, and function of todays nation has not been sufficiently examined.8 One of these failures, virtually without rival in the attention devoted 79

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nations without history (geschichtslose Vlker).9 This dichotomized scheme provided the following cluster of European nations: a) nations with history revolutionary nations England, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Spain, Scotland, Scandinavian states. Albanians, Bohemians, Bulgarians, Croats, Estonians, Livonians, Rumanians, Ruthenians, Serbs, Slovenes, and various remnants of scattered groups in Europe (Basque, Bas Bretons, Welsh).

non-a)

nations without history: counter-revolutionary

This distinction was made in Engels articles on the 1848 revolutions in Europe;10 national groups without history, Engels wrote, had not developed viable state systems in the past. Therefore, during the revolutionary year of 1848 they lacked the ability and energy to achieve their own independent states. Their role in world history has long since been played out, and their fate in the future of Europe is to perish from the stage of history, thus clearing the way for the great civilized nations of central Europe to pursue their own revolutionary development. This development of the great nations is far more important than the struggle of these small, crippled and impotent national groups for independence.11 Why was this dichotomized distinction so widely recognized as a failure of Marxisms understanding of nations and of their future in Europes development? The reason for this probably does not lie in its blatantly abortive predictive power; the same weakness might be attributed to various other schemes in the history of social thought. In this respect, such an obvious faux pas would certainly not deserve the series of analytical works which for decades have been questioning its premises. Thus established the dividing line, starting with contemporary ethnic borders between Poland and Germany, and following the borders between Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, and South Slavs is factually the border between Eastern and Western Europe, which was established as the main division of two economically and socially different spaces from the time of the second serfdom in the XVIth century. It appears that Marx and Engels added a political and developmental justification to a developmental pattern that had already taken place in Europe.12 Thus supporting the already existing dividing line with their own taxonomy of nations they in fact created a typology of developmental patterns for European nations which, until the end of the Second Internationale, served as a prevailing model of political development for the European Left. This dividing line continues to surface as inalterable reality. Even the most superfluous glimpse of this dichotomy could reveal that its relevance is not diminishing. On the contrary, somehow it continues taking on various labels (even walls), to shape modern European history into two antagonized worlds.

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Along this line, confined now to their legitimate borders, the lives of national groups are still negotiated. From Poland to Bulgaria, after the Second World War, having ceased to bargain over physical spaces by military forces, Eastern and Western negotiators negotiate over areas of influence. With two exceptions,13 Czechoslovakia and Eastern European countries are still negotiable commodities among the superpowers. At this level of analysis Marxs and Engelss dichotomy does not appear to be wrong. We can manipulate the labels of historic or non-historic nations by giving them for instance the status of indicators of social development or of degree of conflict or consensus within these nations. Still, the overall picture would retain its basic contours from the time it was drawn a century and a half ago. Therefore, we could conclude that however ridiculous at first sight, whether this dichotomization is judged a failure or not, it is more or less a matter of ones taste for facts. Where are we to search, then, for the failure of historical materialism to conceptualize the nation? The answer could be there is no failure, because historical materialism has had no conceptual room for a theory of the nation. Within this scheme, both orthodox and neo-Marxists could not reach far beyond the functional statement that the nation is an historical phenomenon that appeared on the contemporary historical stage together with an industrialized class society which is capitalism.14 Without going further into the possibility of historical materialism to provide the necessary schemata for a theory of nationalism, I would only concede to the assertion of Gerald Cohen: in assigning explanatory primacy to productive forces Marxist theory of history becomes a coherent story. Perhaps history is not really coherent, but Marx thought it was, and he said the development of material power made it to.15 For the neo-Marxist sociology of nations and nationalism this statement could have a double message. First, do not search for the possibilities of a theory of the nation within the existing primacy scheme of historical materialism, implying that there is still lofty space in the superstructure for ideologies, symbolic universes and human agencies. Second, there is no need to lean on the benefit of the bias and wait for the next interpretation of the basic Marxist scheme to provide us with a new, clarified discourse within the security of that which is known. The chances of such a coupure to appear soon are slight. What lies ahead of us is to move sociology out of the fetters, as Marx would put it, of the dominating scheme, to preserve its structure and change its content, thus, if nothing else, to acquire an altered model of nations in history.16 This is what some historians and sociologists are already doing.17 Only if historical materialism is regarded as embodying the more abstract elements of a theory of human Praxis, snippets of which can be gleamed from the diversity of Marxs writings, does it remain an indispensable contribution to social theory today.18 This direction could be pursued if we keep in mind that it is still necessary to take into account the analytical power of finer distinctions of production relations proper, of different strictly material conditions in different European regions: if the problem cannot be solved that way, then so much the worse for historical materialism, not for the

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claim that historical materialism distinguishes between base and superstructure.19 (1) A Case Study: Positional-historical ideology of the nation

The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether it is possible to determine the generation and articulation of a particular national ideology. The elaboration presented here assumes: (a) general definition of nationalism as the existence of symbols and beliefs, everyday practical consciousness, ideologies which are propagated by elite groups and held by many of the members of regional, ethnic and linguistic categories of population, which imply a communality among them and at the same time, a boundaries-defining processes against others;20 (b) that nationalism is both an inclusive and a positional-historical ideology, in the latter form constituting the position within an international system; (c) that the main accent of a given nationalist ideology may lie on an inward or outward oriented differentiation of communality, and (d) that there is no single criterion which forms the focus of communality. The topos of our analysis are national ideologies of the two Yugoslav nations without history, the Slovenes and the Croats. The time of formation of these ideologies is of particular importance here; we decided to look into the formation of their national ideological universes in a period between 1850 and 1940. At the beginning of this period these nations entered the European political scene: at its end, before the Second World War, the new power container entered into the formation of these universes. This was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia; it organized national ideologies in quite a specific manner which will not be dealt with centrally in this paper.21 During the period of formation of national ideologies (18501940) both processes, that of inclusive and of positional-historical definition of the nation were going on, and, in fact, were overlapping. The importance of this formative period was confirmed in findings of empirical research on national ideologies in Slovenia.22 It was found that (1) these processes of positioning the nation within the European and Yugoslav space are ongoing, and (2) that the basic ontological dimensions of positioning are more or less similar to those from the previous century. Among both elites and ordinary subjects, in both political decisionmaking processes and everyday practical consciousness perceptions of the nations historical position operate: being small, numberless; being without a viable state system throughout a history; being threatened by the environment, either Balkans or European; being, even, without indigeneous Slovene (Croat) bourgeoisie and, therefore, without an experience of political struggle for independence. It is as if the negative, oppressive European heritage of the nation without history, and therefore of the nation without a future, still has a certain impact on the ideologies of the nation-formation. Hence, it became rather important to investigate the period of these nations early formation in the first decades of this century. Particular attention, we decided, should be paid to these ideologies which were of decisive significance in perceiving and

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explaining this European heritage of doomed, peripheral nation(s). Therefore, works of some prominent writers and public figures will be presented here: Miroslav Krlea, Ivan Cankar, Edvard Kocbek, Edvard Kardelj were among those who confronted the issue of a European space; they tried to delineate its role in Slovene and Croatian nation formation and, combining the procedure of historical positioning of the nation within the European as well as Yugoslav space, they tried to define the inclusive and exclusive social spaces of each nation. They all tried to answer basic questions: What exists who are we in relation to this European world; who are we as national and political subjects; what patterned our ambitions, hopes, fears; how was Europe, imposing its Herrenmoral on us, successful in subjecting us and thus forming a specific Sklavenmoral? Our history, wrote the Sloven writer Kocbek, does not reveal even the most mediocre passion; it is not even capable of defining its own mission in the world; nor does it rest on a major religion or a common temperament. Even our land appears convex rather than concave, it has no true fulcrum as either a geographic or a moral center. Therefore we have no centripetal thinkers, no figures, who crystallize our fate, no people convinced of their originality. In the entire course of our history, we have known only apostolic leaders and universal ideas which the people scattered more than gathered together; even today we beget agitators, travelling salesman, polemicists. We have never treated our national borders as a scale, as a link, as a measure of things, or as an inspiration; we have rather experienced them as temptation, timidity or smuggling. The nostalgia of the Slovenes outside their homeland is sheer sentimentality, a longing for the polka and strudel, not a responsibility for the heritage which, for instance, for the Irish and Basques is almost mystical.23 To mutter something about Europe, about the European way of thought, about the European duties of citizens toward themselves. What Europe? I would like just once to hear what that Europe is in reality? Where is that Europe situated? What does that Europe want? How have I offended that Europe? When? Why?24 For Kocbek, it is not even legitimate to ask about national being there is no element which could define national space, there is not even the capability and motive to do it. According to him, history has no common ground for Slovene people; there was no passion, nor religion; land is physically fugitive, so are thinkers; leaders are universally oriented, mere agitators, predestined to be too universal to be nationally, and too national to be universally accepted; borders are for smugglers, heritage for emigrants. Krlea and Cankar, on the other hand, faced the negative image Europe imposed on the Slavs, while trying to define the inner national and class space in relation to Europe. Doing so, both were advocating the only plausible solution of emancipation of South-Slavs, through communality within the federal Yugoslav state. The most influential writer and polemicist in the thirties, Krlea not only questioned Europe and the subjection of South Slavs to its particular patterning; questioning the national and social space of Slavs Krlea provided

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a certain logic of change of the prevailing Sklavenmoral of the national ideologies among Slovenes and Croats. (2) Sleeping vagabonds and the European prince

Cabals; freebooters; petty squabblers; ignorant fanatics; bloody rotten tyrants in wholesale and retail; dying agricultural race; Vlkerabflle; butchers (of Europe); and outlaws of Europe.25 These words greeted the appearance of Slovenes and Croats on the European historical stage. At the time this might not have been an ideology, but it certainly became one later, particularly during the eventful history of the European workers movement. The facts behind these reports were vexatious as well. Slovene, Croatian and Serbian soldiers, together with Russian troops, were used by the Monarchy to overthrow the revolutionary Hungarian government and to help fight against uprisings of workers in Vienna during 1848 and 1849. In Vienna, Karl Marx wrote in November 1848, Croat freedom and order has conquered and the subjects celebrated the victory with arson, rape, pillage, with nameless atrocities. The victory of kroatischen Ordnung und Freiheit in Vienna was conditioned by the victory of the honetten Republic in Paris ... In both, the armed Lumpenproletariat were against the working and thinking proletariat.26 Croats, together with Czechs, Slovenes, and similar riff-rarr strangled German freedom, while the Tsar was omnipresent in Europe.27 Where, asked Engels, was the history of the Slovenes? of Croats? of Czechs? Since the eleventh century, he argued, the South Slavs had lost all appearances of political independence ... Out of these remnants, he asked, one would have wanted to assemble a strong, independent, viable nation? According to Engels, their languages were almost extinct, confined to the communication of groups of village people. In towns, the indigeneous groups had everywhere been replaced by German, Hungarian, and Italian bourgeoisie. Therefore, the projected South Slav empire would not be unfied but torn apart into fragments of national groups and delivered into the hands of the Italian bourgeoisie of Trieste and Fiume, and the German bourgeoisie of Laibach and Agram.28 Furthermore, thought Engels, these people could not have been united because of the ancient hatred among Austrian and Turkish Slavs. . . . these people knew each other for centuries as pickpockets and bandits, . . . hated each other in spite of the fact that all were related.29 Krlea reacted in his own way to such a gloomy interpellation of South Slavs. He clearly distinguishes among the bearers of the ideologies of this time. His subjects are Peasants, Radicals, Bourgeoisie, whose space, physical and mental, is defined by remote ideas of what Europe was, whose symbolic space is myth, ritual, witchcraft, fairies. Thus, the new Yugoslav state, established 1918, was born when everything was suffocated in its own dirt, all our ideas were adjusted to the petit-bourgeois realities . . . everything would remain unchanged, as it was in the past, with the sole difference that, instead of the Counts Khuen or Tisza or Franz Josef I, some new faces would rule . . . 30

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Subjects? These beggars, intellectual good-for-nothings, blueblooded fools, scribblers abounding in unhealthy ambitions . . . insignificant merchants dealing in horseshoes and patent nails, stout chief clerks, jewelers, shoedealers, freethinkers, bankrupt bankers, state finance administrators, smugglers, descendants of umbrella manufacturers, forgers of workers insurance certificates, retired military court judges . . . 31 To the thus described cluster of the bourgeoisie, which was the supposed bearer of the newly formed national ideological and economical space, Krlea added The People signs attributed to the peasant-worker, assigning him the position in the historical worlds around him. He, Pannonian coachman, together with million such coachmen, whose way of thinking had certainly not changed for the last two thousand years, who are livestock breeders, whose worlds are separated by incomprehensibly wide gulfs from Europe. They live in a world without duration in time, without any inner driving motive, truly purposeless. Existence amidst objects and events, they are confused and stick to concrete facts, but even that only partially . . . [This coachman] was neither a Catholic nor a supporter of the Emperor, not a Russian prisoner of war. He was neither a patriot, nor a citizen; he believed neither in God nor in the Church; he served with Hungarian regiments all over the world . . . in Galicia, in Russia, he had been at Tehran and Tiflis, at Tashkent . . . he fought against those red Moscovites . . . 32 Such a subject is a part of public opinion, influenced by babblings of former radical intellectuals, by their lectures, talks about the cooperative movement, the founding of consumer unions, the parties, the masses, the universal suffrage, the elections, the mandates . . . 33 (3) Nation as non-position in history

According to the accounts of Kocbek and Krlea, inner national space is an undifferentiated dwelling of non-subjects; their universe is covered, structured by the types of interpellations that constitute main forms of subjectivity existential, historical, positional; but at the same time, they do not respond to the interpellations other than in a negative way, by withdrawing from or destroying the social worlds. The relation of Krleas individual/subject toward the Prince is a relation of non-position; his subjects are not reflecting upon their ideological interpellations. They, together with other coachmen, live in the world without duration, amidst objects and events . . . If there is a stronger existential component, it is not reducible to revolution or class consciousness; it appears, as Kocbek shows, as deference, as ideology of being small, without major ideas or religion, without leaders . . . Keeping in mind both the negative European interpellation of the South Slavs and their own evaluation of their position in European worlds, we could argue that both positions disclose a high degree of congruence. The difference between them lies probably in their respective ideological universes. Europes positioning of the South Slavs out of modern history has probably had a special function in the universalisation of modern European ideologies. The

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South Slavs positioned themselves within European history, but on the side as Hegel would say of the labour of the negative. Their historical positioning within European history was settled, in their interrelation, through subjection and by rendering work of self-interrogation and selfinterpretation. This wrenching work of negative and the destructive was nevertheless the process of self-understanding, which succeeded in defining the ideological universes of Slovene and Croat nations as a non-position in history At this point, we should consider the essential failure of historical materialism in dealing with the ideologies of nation(alism); the primacy scheme does not include the labour of the negative in its explanatory apparatuses on ideology. It could not conceive of the non-position in history as position as well. What should be explained is the positioning process as such, its internal dynamics, its own centers, fulcrums of the national social world. The primacy scheme could not grasp the positioning-inhistory process as a particular organization of human subjectivity. The question What is Europe to me? What am I to Europe? triggered subsequent labour on defining what could be communality among South Slavs. Krlea, Cankar, Kardelj, Josip, Broz, each started to search for their own solution, sharing the common ground in defining Yugoslav communality as essential in overcoming the non-position in history. Thus the Yugoslav case could be a model in showing how the labour of the negative helped constitue the actual processes of ideological mobilization in overcoming non-position in history. Previously established delimitations made it possible for the Partys solution of the national question in Yugoslavia to be successfully implemented as a main mobilizational force during the liberation war. The works on delimitations, on depicting subjects enabled the Partys theorecticians and organizers to set a common agenda for the masses, to interpellate them as subjects in making their own national histories. It allowed them to sum up the dominant aspects of the national crises during the war identifying the crucial target as first, national, and second, as class-social and to define what could be achieved in solving the national problems in Yugoslavia (federal state as a goal). The Party succeeded in mobilizing nations, because it efficiently fused and condensed several ideological national discourses into a single major threat an existential one. Elements of the class ideology as in all successful revolutions, have been fused and sometimes hidden behind national types of ideological mobilization. (4) Conclusion

We return now to the main question of this paper, namely, from what standpoints might neo-Marxist sociology approach the ideological universe of nations? a) it seems that the ideological universe of nations must be scrutinized as a dynamic element of the formation of a particular social space; which

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means to analyze the power of (national) ideology in the processes of social change; b) these processes should be dealt with as a particularity of defined social spaces; it is not conceivable, so far, to install any universal laws in addressing national(isms). Let us mention the most popular failure on this account Marxs prediction about the future of Czechoslovakia; c) the ideology of (national) universe should be approached as an ongoing process of interpellation, in which two opposed subjects are involved: the subject of history and the Prince. We would agree with the originator of this idea, G. Therborn, that ideologies not only subject people, they also speak to them and qualify them for conscious social action. I would like to conclude by paying tribute to the Yugoslav writers whose works I used for this analysis. As was noted, the work of Krlea, Kocbek, Cankar, preceded that of the normative paradigm developed later on by Yugoslav communists. Nevertheless, the importance of their work was not consumed by the actual success of the Partys fusing discourses on the national question. The relevance of their works for the recent development of national ideologies in Yugoslavia could be epitomized by Krleas revelations on how ideologies of nation(alism) are generated and articulated, and about their future. In his completed opus he clearly stated that nationalism known in the Balkans is a conventional, mythical type of consciousness, which does not have the space for the production of the surplus of meaning. Ideologies of nation(alism) often have ambitions to confine subjects within the borders of pre-given worlds; within such borders, humans could produce only the surplus of non-meaning. If, and only if, the ideology of nation(alism) is capable of overcoming such borders, if it is capable of producing a surplus of meaning over the pre-given worlds, it could exist also as human. Borders, which Krlea had in mind, are not only physical, these borders are also unquestioned interpellations. Being Slovene, being Croat, being national proletarian . . . are nationally defined positions in history which, according to Krlea, should be continually questioned on the ground of the eternal heresies of self-determination.
NOTES
1. Term used by Goran Therborn, for somewhat different purpose; here it is used to describe a community of sociologists and historians who, as a common social-philosophy, share the need to re-think historical materialism as a critique of contemporary sociology. See: Goran Therborn, Science, Class and Society (Verso/NLB: London, 1980). G. Therborn, op.cit. p. 40. Perry Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1984), p. 19. Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. 1 (University of California Press: Berekeley, 1981), p. 11, 13. Horace B. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism (Monthly Review Press: London/NY, 1967), p. 112 and passim. Tom Nairn, The modern Janus, in: The break up of Britain (NLRB: London/NY, 1977), p. 329. A similar standpoint was expressed by Theodor Shanin in his paper presented recently to Wilson

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

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Centers colloquium: Natsional nost: the case of the missing term and of alternative approaches, 1984, MS. 8. See, for example, recent issues of Canadian Review of Studies of Nationalism, and particularly problems of delimitations of ethnic, kinship and national consciousness as evolutionary sequences in the development of collective identity, problems raised in the disputes over the notion of nation, between L. Snyder and K. Symmons-Symonolevicz. Cf. CRSN, Vol. X, No. 2, Fall 1983 9. According to Alexander Koyr, distinction was first made by the Russian writer Polevoi (1857), who attempted to offer a justification in the Slavophile spirit for the destiny of Russia; see: Alexander Koyr, La philosophie et le probleme national en Russie au debut du XIX siecle (Gallimard: Paris, 1976), quoted by Samir Amin, Class and nation (Monthly Review Press: London, 1980); The distinction was further used by: G. W. F. Hegel, Encyklopdie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, in Grundrisse, and also in: Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Smtliche Werke (Froman: Stuttgart, 1949), paragraph 549, p. 497. The term was also used by: Karl Kautsky, Die Befreiung der Nationen, Die Neue Zeit, Vol. 2, No. 8, May 1917, pp. 184-185; F. Engels, K. Marx, Neue Rheinische Zeitung, (N. Rh. Ztg.), Editorials, November 1848February 1849, Nos 137, 184, 194, 222, 223; Karl Marx, Revolution and Counter-revolution in Europe; Germany, dispatches in: New York Daily Tribune (NYDT), February May 1852; See also: Charles Herod, The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought (M. Nijhoff: The Hague, 1976), p. 41. 10. F. Engels, N.Rh.Ztg, FebruaryMarch 1849. 11. F. Engels, Ibid. 12. The impact of such a development in Europe is analyzed also by: Samir Amin., op. cit.; Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (NLB/ Verso: London, 1979); Robert Brenner, Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe, Past and Present, No. 70, 1976; Brenner debate; A Symposium on Development in Pre-industrial Europe, Past and Present, Nos. 7880, and 85, 1978-1979; Anthony Giddens, op.cit., p. 187; Ivan T. Berend and Gyrgy Ranki, Economic development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries (Columbia University Press: NY/London, 1974). 13. Albania and Yugoslavia. 14. A. Giddens, op. cit., p. 182. 15. Gerald Cohen, Karl Marxs Theory of History; A Defense (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1978), p. 150. 16. also in A. Giddens, op. cit., pp. 190-193. 17. see, for instance: P. Anderson, op. cit.; A. Giddens, op. cit.; G. Cohen, op. cit.; G. Therborn. op. cit.; and Goran Therborn, The Ideology of Power and Power of Ideology (Verso and NLB: London, 1982), 2nd printing; Norman Geras, Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend (Verso and NLB: London, 1983); Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (Columbia Press: NY, 1982). 18. A. Giddens, op. cit., p. 2. 19. G. Cohen, op. cit., p. 248. 20. A. Giddens, op. cit., p. 190. 21. Edvard Kardelj, The National Question in Yugoslavia and the Revolution, STP, Belgrade, Vol. XIX, No. 45,1979; Also in: Josip Broz Tito, The National Question (STP: Belgrade, 1983); Paul Schoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (Columbia University Press: NY, 1968); Steven Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia (Princeton University Press, 1983); Joseph Rotschild, East-Central Europe between the Two World Wars, (University of Washington Press, 1974), pp. 201280. 22. Project: The Changing Identity of a Small Nation within the Multinational Socialist State, (Progress reports), Institute for Sociology University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana 1980, 1981, 1982. 23. Edvard Kocbek, Krogi navznoter (Inward circles) (Slovenska Matica: Ljubljana, 1977), p. 18. 24. Miroslav Krlea, On the Edge of Reason (Vanguard Press, NY, 1976). 25. Descriptions given by Karl Marx, Die Revolutionre Bewegung, N.Rh. Ztg., Nos 137, 184, 1848; Karl Marx, Revolution and Counter-revolution in Europe, New York Daily Tribune, April 24, 1852, p. 6; Congress discussed Non-intervention resolution, Editorial, New York Daily Tribune, February 17, 1852. 26. K Marx, N.Rh.Ztg., No. 137, 1848. 27. K Marx, N.Rh.Ztg., No. 184, January 1849. 28. F. Engels, Der Panslavismus, N.Rh.Ztg., No. 223, February 1849.

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29. F. Engels, ibid. 30. M. Krlea, On the Edge of Reason, p. 75. 31. M. Krlea, op.cit., pp. 43 and 49. 32. Miroslav Krlea, The Return of Philip Latinowicz (Vanguard Press: NY, 1969), pp. 5255. 33. M. Krlea, On the Edge of Reason, p. 74.

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