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The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art.

68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law ChicERLINDA K. ILUSORIO vs. POTENCIANO ILUSORIOFACTS: Erlinda and Potenciano were married on July 11,1942.They had six children. Potenciano is a lawyer who owns extensiveproperties valued at millions of pesos. He was alsothe Chairman of the Board and President of BaguioCountry Club. In 1972, the spouses were separated from bed andboard for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium Manilaand when in Baguio, at Ilusorio Penthouse, BaguioCountry Club. Erlinda lived in Antipolo city. On Dec. 30, 1997, Potenciano lived with Erlinda atAntipolo after his arrival from the US. Their children alleged that Erlinda gave Potencianoan overdose of Zoloft. She gave 200 mg instead ofthe 100 mg antidepressant drug prescribed by thelatters doctor in New York. Because of the overdose, Potencianos healthdeteriorated. On 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for theguardianship over the person and property ofPotenciano due to the latters advanced aged, frailhealth, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. On May 1998, Potenciano did not return to Antipolocity after attending a corporate meeting in Baguiocity. He lived in Cleveland Condo Makati. On March 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petitionfor habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyerPotenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that the respondentsprevented her from visiting her husband and fromgoing home going home to Antipolo. Court of Appeals denied the petition of Erlinda for writof habeas corpus. However, the CA granted visitationrights. The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse thedecision of the Court of Appeals and its resolutiondismissing the application for habeas corpus to havethe custody of her husband, lawyer PotencianoIlusorio and enforce consortium as the wife. On the other hand, the petition of PotencianoIlusorio is to annul that portion of the decision of theCourt of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitationrights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and theCourt of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in dismissingthe petition for habeas corpus?HELD: NO. The essential object of the writ of habeascorpus is to release a person illegally detained. TheCA did not err in dismissing the petition of Erlindabecause a writ of habeas corpus is only grantedwhen there is an illegal and involuntary deprivation offreedom of action.In the case at bar, it was Potencianos choice not toreturn in Antipolo city. He did not request theadministrator of Cleveland Condominium to preventhis wife from visiting him. Even at 86 years old, he isstill of sound mind which means that he can makedecisions for himself. He should not be the subject ofvisitation rights as it will violate his right of privacy.2. Was the order granting visitorial rights proper?HELD: NO. The petition of Erlinda did not include theprayer for visitation rights. The Court of Appealsmissed the fact that the issue involved is betweenhusband and wife, not between children or minorsand parents. The husband or the wife has the libertyto refuse to see each other. No court is empowered as a judicial authority tocompel a husband to live with his wife.Under Article 68 of Family CodeFull Text:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/may2000/139789_ilusorio.htmCIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURAFACTS: Francisco Comille and Zosima Montallana becamethe registered owners of Lot No. 437-A at the cornerof Calle Santa Rosa and Rosario in Zamboanga delNorte on January 1956. Zosima died on October 3, 1980. Francisco and hismother-inlaw, Juliana Montallana, executed a deedof extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. Juliana waived her share consisting of the propertyto Francisco. Since Francisco had no children, he asked his neice(Leticia), his neices cousin (Luzviminda) and awidow (Cirila Arcaba) to take care of his house aswell as the store inside. When Leticia and Luzminda got married, only Cirilawas left to take good care of Francisco and hishouse. Erlinda Tabancura testified that the source of incomeof Francisco solely consisted of rentals from lots. Francisco did not pay Cirila her wages but her familyreceived free board and lodging from him. On January 1991, Francisco executed a Deed ofDonation Inter Vivos wherein he donated 150 sq.meters lot and his house to Cirila. The latter acceptedsuch donation. The deed stated that the donation was being made inconsideration of the faithful services that Cirila hadrendered over the past ten (10) years. On October 1991, Francisco

died. On 1993, the nephews, nieces and heirs by intestatesuccession of Francisco filed a petition for the nullity Page 2 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law Chicof the deed of donation inter vivos. They alleged thatthe donation violated Article 87 of the Family Codebecause Cirila was the common law wife ofFrancisco. The court granted the petition in favor of the heirsbased on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and thedocuments showing that Cirila was the common lawwife of Francisco (Signed documents bearing thename Cirila Comile). Cirila filed a motion for reconsideration stating thatthe Court of Appeals erred in stating that she was thecommon law wife of Francisco based on themisapprehension of facts. According to her, thepresented evidences were only hearsay.ISSUE:1.Whether or not the donation was void.HELD: YES. The donation made by Francisco to Cirilawas void because it was not in accordance with Article87 of the Family Code. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, director indirect, between the spouses during the marriageshall be void, except moderate gifts which the spousesmay give each other on the occasion of any familyrejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to personsliving together as husband and wife without a validmarriage.Respondents having proven by a preponderance ofevidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together ashusband and wife without a valid marriage, theinescapable conclusion is that the donation made byFrancisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of theFamily Code.In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that Cirilawas a common law wife of Francisco based on thefollowing evidences: The application for business permit tooperate a real estate business where in Cirilaused the surname Comile instead of Arcaba. The sanitary permit also showed CirilaComile as signatory. The death certificate of Francisco was signedby Cirila using the surname Comile.In Bitangcor vs. Tan, the Supreme Court ruled thatcohabitation is more than sexual intercourse especiallywhen the spouses are already old and may no longerbe interested in sex. Under Article 87 of the Family Code Full Text:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/146683.htmAYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs.COURT OF APPEALSFACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loanamounting to P50,300,000 from Ayala Investmentand Development Corporation (AIDC). Alfredo Ching, PBMs Exec. Vice President, executedsecurity agreements (Dec. 1980 and Mar. 1981)making himself jointly and severally answerable withPBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. On July 1981, AIDC filed a case to recover the sumof money against PBM and Alferdo Ching. The court rendered judgment ordering PBM andrespondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly andseverally pay AIDC the principal amountof P50,300,000.00 with interests While there was an appeal to the decision of the civilcase, the lower court issued a writ of executionpending appeal. Sr. Deputy Sheriff Magsajo issued anotice of sheriff sale to the Ching spouses on three oftheir conjugal properties. The Ching spouses filed a case of injunction allegingthat the judgment cannot be enforced against theirconjugal partnership. According to them, the subjectloan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugalpartnership. The lower court issued a temporary restraining orderto prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding withthe enforcement of the writ of execution and with thesale of the said properties at public auction.ISSUE:1. Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contractentered into by husband in favor of his employerwithin the contemplation of debts that redound for thebenefit of family?HELD: NO. The loan obtained by PBM and Mr.Ching is a corporate loan, not a personalone. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exerciseof an industry or profession nor an act ofadministration for the benefit of the family.Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit Thepayment of personal debts contracted by thehusband or the wife before or during the marriageshall not be charged to the conjugal partnershipexcept insofar as they redounded to the benefit of thefamily.In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefitsthe respondent family would reasonably anticipatewere the following: The employment of co-respondent AlfredoChing would be prolonged and he would beentitled to his monthly salary of P20,000.00for an extended length of time because of theloan he guaranteed;

Page 3 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law Chic The shares of stock of the members of hisfamily would appreciate if the PBM could berehabilitated through the loan obtained; His prestige in the corporation would beenhanced and his career would be boostedshould PBM survive because of the loan.However, these are not the benefitscontemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. Thebenefits must be one directly resulting from theloan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off ofthe loan itself.Under Article 121 of the Family CodeFull text:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118305.htmALFREDO CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS: On September 1978, Philippine Blooming MillsCompany (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso loanfrom Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). Alfredo Ching together with two other personsexecuted a continuing guarantee with ABC bindingthemselves jointly and severally liable for the PBMCIobligations. The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 millionpesos. PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted toP12,612,972.88 (exclusive of interests, penalties andother bank charges.) Together with the writ of preliminary attachment, thesheriff levied (seized) the 100,000 common shares ofCity Corporation stocks registered solely to AlfredoChing. Mrs. Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy of the100,000 common shares. According to her, the shares were purchased out ofthe conjugal funds. She also argued that the loan of PBMCI did notredound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership (orfamily).ISSUE:1. Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching istenable.HELD: YES. ABC has the burden of proof to showthat the common shares registered solely to thename of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Justbecause Mr. Chings name appeared as the soleregistrant of the shares in the corporate books ofCityCorp doesnt mean that it is his exclusiveproperty and not to the conjugal partnership.As held in the case of Ayala Investment andDevelopment Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, thecourt said that signing as a surety is certainly not anexercise of an industry or profession. It is notembarking in a business.For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it isimportant to show that the family received benefitsand advantages from the liability incurred. There isno presumption that when a husband entered into anaccommodation agreement or a contract of surety,the conjugal partnership would be benefited.The benefits must be those directly resulting from theloan.Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Chings common shares mustnot be levied because he is not the sole owner ofsuch stocks. The shares belong to the conjugalpartnership.Under Article 121 of the Family CodeFull text:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/apr2000/110844.htmCLEODIA and CEAMANTHA FRANCISCO vs. JORGE andPURIFICATION GONZALESFACTS: The petitioners are Cleodia and CeamanthaFrancisco. They are the children of Cleodualdo and MicheleFrancisco. Mr. and Mrs. Francisco got married on June 12,1986. Their marriage is governed by the conjugalpartnership of gains (under the Civil Code, before theFamily Code). In November 2000, the marriage of the spouses wasdeclared null and void. They entered into a compromise agreement whereinone of the provisions is:Title and ownership of the conjugal propertyconsisting of a house and lot located in AyalaAlabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shall betransferred by way of a deed of donation toCleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when theyreach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old,respectively. After signing the compromise agreement, MicheleFrancisco cohabited with George Matrai at LankaDrive, Ayala Alabang Village. Spouses Jorge and Purification Gonzales filed a casefor Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Attachmentagainst Matria and Michele Franscisco. The Metropolitan trial court ordered Matrai and M.Francisco to pay back the rentals, unpaid telephonebills and attorneys fees. Page 4 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law Chic A notice of sale by execution was issued by thesheriff covering the house and lot property located atAyala Alabang. The grandmother (guardian) of Cleodia andCeamantha filed in the RTC an Affidavit of ThirdParty Claim and a Very Urgent Motion to Stop

Saleby Execution but this was denied. The motion forreconsideration was also denied to the petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition of certiorari with the Courtof Appeals. The arguments of the petitioners are as follow:a. They are the rightful owners of the house and lotas it was donated to them by virtue of theCompromise Agreement entered into by theirparents.b. Their parents already waived their rights on thesaid property.c. The obligation of Michele did not redound to thebenefit of the family.d. Michele Franciscos obligation is a joint obligationbetween her and Matrai.ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred inaffirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court toproceed with the execution, levy and sale of thesubject property.HELD: YES. The Court finds that it was grave errorfor the RTC to proceed with the execution, levy andsale of the subject property.To begin with, the RTC should not have ignored thatthe property in question is in the name of "CleodualdoM. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco." Onits face, the title shows that the registered owner ofthe property is not Matrai and Michele butCleodualdo, married to Michele. The liability incurredby Michele arose from a judgment rendered in anunlawful detainer case against her and her partnerMatrai.Furthermore, even prior to the issuance of the Noticeof Levy on Execution on November 28, 2001, therewas already annotated on the title the followinginscription: Entry No. 23341-42/T-167907 -Nullification of Marriage: Title of ownership of theconjugal property consisting of the above-describedproperty shall be transferred by way of a Deed ofDonation to Cleodia Michaela U. Francisco andCeamantha Maica U. Francisco, as co-owners whenthey reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) yrs. old tothe condition that Cleodualdo, shall retainusufructuary rights over the property until he reachesthe age of 65 yrs. Old.From the foregoing, it is clear that both Michele andCleodualdo have waived their title to and ownershipof the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners.The property should not have been levied and sold atexecution sale, for lack of legal basis.Under Article 124 of the Family CodeFull text:http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisions%20/%20Signed %20Resolutions&docid=12227532972067470223 HEIRS OF CHRISTINA AYUSTE v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste onSeptember 24, 1961. The couple resided in Manila but they operated amachine shop in Lucena City. This business wasmanaged by Rafael Ayuste. The couple purchased on August 1982 a parcel ofland with an area of 180 square meters on which aresidential house was built situated at Lucena Cityfor Mr. Ayustes temporary residence. A deed of sale was executed and signed by theparties and filed with the Register of Deeds ofLucena City. The property was purchased fromspouses Pedro and Aida David. On February 1987, Mr. Ayuste, with the consent ofMrs. Ayuste sold the said parcel of land forP40,000 to Malabonga. Mr. Ayuste died on 1989 and Christina Ayustefound out that the parcel of land was sold by herdeceased husband without her knowledge orconsent. In 1990, she filed a petition to for the annulment ofthe sale, cancellation of the title issued in the nameof private respondent and for the payment of moral,exemplary and actual damages. In her complaintChristina Ayuste alleges that her signature on thedeed of sale was forged. The RTC granted the petition of Mrs. Ayuste. Both parties appealed in the Court of Appeals forthe decision rendered by the RTC.ISSUE:1. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to theannulment of the contract of sale entered into byRafael Ayuste without the consent of ChristinaAyuste?HELD: The trial court erred in giving due course tothe action for annulment of sale. The Deed ofAbsolute Sale executed on February 27, 1987 by andbetween defendant-appellant and plaintiff-appellantshusband is declared VALID and BINDING upon theplaintiff-appellant.The only issue which remains to be resolved iswhether petitioners are entitled to the annulment ofthe contract of sale entered into by Rafael Ayustewithout the consent of Christina Ayuste. Page 5 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law Chic Under the Civil Code, although the husband is theadministrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannotalienate or encumber any real property of theconjugalpartnershipwithouthiswifesconsent, subject only to certain exceptions specifiedin the law. The remedy available to the wife in caseher husband should dispose of their conjugalproperty without

her consent is laid down in Article173 of the Civil Code which states that:The wife may, during the marriage, and within tenyears from the transaction questioned, ask the courtsfor the annulment of any contract of the husbandentered into without her consent, when such consentis required, or any act or contract of the husbandwhich tends to defraud her or impair her interest inthe conjugal partnership property. Should the wifefail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after thedissolution of the marriage, may demand the value ofproperty fraudulently alienated by the husband. A sale of real property of the conjugal partnershipmade by the husband without the consent of his wifeis voidable. The action for annulment must bebrought during the marriage and within ten yearsfrom the questioned transaction by the wife.In the present case, the deed of sale was executedon February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died onOctober 13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2,1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint withthe lower court asking for the annulment of thesale. Although the action was filed within ten yearsfrom the questioned transaction, it was not broughtduring the existence of the marriage which wasdissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989.Clearly, the action for annulment filed by ChristinaAyuste was barred for having been filed out of time.The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the saleafter the death of her husband is not material. Under Article 173 of the Family CodeFull text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/118784.htm HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR REYES v. CIPRIANO and FLORENTINA MIJARESFACTS: Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960 but hadbeen separated de facto since 1974. In 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold a property(lot) to spouses Mijares for P40,000 on 1983. She also found out that Vicente misrepresented herin the MTC declaring that she died on March 22,1982 and that the heirs left are him and the 5 minorchildren. On September 1983, the court granted guardianshipover the minor children to Vicente and authorized thelatter to sell the estate of Ignacia on October 1983. On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel,sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding thereturn of her share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed onJune 4, 1996 a complaint for annulment of saleagainst respondent spouses. In their answer, respondent spouses claimed thatthey are purchasers in good faith and that the salewas valid because it was duly approved by the court. Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended thatwhat he sold to the spouses was only his share. On February 15, 1990, the court a quo rendered adecision declaring the sale of lot void with respect tothe share of Ignacia. It held that the purchase priceof the lot was P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente toreturn thereof or P55,000.00 to respondentspouses. Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decisionpraying that the sale be declared void in its entiretyand that the respondents be ordered to reimburse toher the rentals they collected on the apartments builton Lot No. 4349-B-2 computed from March 1, 1983. Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondent spousesappealed the decision to the Court ofAppeals. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and shewas substituted by her compulsory heirs.ISSUE:1. Whether or not the sale is valid, void or merelyvoidable?HELD: Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, thegoverning laws at the time the assailed sale wascontracted, provide:Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a noncompos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civilinterdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, thehusband cannot alienate or encumber any realproperty of the conjugal partnership without the wifesconsent. If she refuses unreasonably to give herconsent, the court may compel her to grant the same.Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage andwithin ten years from the transaction questioned, askthe courts for the annulment of any contract of thehusband entered into without her consent, when suchconsent is required, or any act or contract of thehusband which tends to defraud her or impair herinterest in the conjugal partnership property. Shouldthe wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirsafter the dissolution of the marriage, may demand thevalue of property fraudulently alienated by thehusband. In the case at bar, it is clear that the lot is a conjugalproperty of Ignacia and Vicente. Therefore, the sale Page 6 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law Chicof said lot to the Mijares spouses, without theknowledge and consent

of Ignacia Reyes, isvoidable. The action to annul the sale made on 1983was filed on 1986 which is within the prescriptiveperiod under Article 173.The Court finds that respondent spouses are notpurchasers in good faith. They already know aboutthe discrepancies and irregularities in the deathcertificate presented by Vicente. The said errorsshould have prompted them to question the sale andpertaining documents.In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Deed ofSale executed by Vicente and respondents wasannulled. The guilty husband is asked to paydamages to Mijares spouses and to his children(petitioners).Full text:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/143826.htmROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF APPEALSand ROMULO NICOLFACTS: Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against ErlindaNicol. On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decisionordering Erlinda to pay damages to the petitioners. The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient topay the damages. The sheriff levied and auctioned the property ofErlinda. An auction sale was held with the petitioners as thehighest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued infavor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda,Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment ofcertificate of sale and damages with preliminaryinjunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff. He argued that there was no proper publication andposting for the auction sale. He also claimed that thejudgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted toP40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained theP500,000 worth of property for only P51,685. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition ofRomulo Nicol. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of theRTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to acton the complaint filed by the respondent in this case. The petitioners filed a petition where they said thatthe Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse ofdiscretion for reversing the decision given by theRTC.ISSUE:1. Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arisingfrom her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugalpartnership.HELD: NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not chargeableto the conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of absolute community whereliabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of acrime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolutecommunity of property, in the absence orinsufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in thesystem of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugalpartnership of gains has no duty to make advancepayments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wifearising from her criminal liability is chargeable to theconjugal partnership. The Supreme Court does notagree to the contention of Mr. and Mrs. Buado.In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the carwhich was claimed by the third party complainant tobe conjugal property was being levied upon toenforce "a judgment for support" filed by a thirdperson, the third-party claim of the wife is propersince the obligation which is personal to the husbandis chargeable not on the conjugal property but on hisseparate property. Hence, the filing of a separateaction by Romulo Nicol was proper.The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.Full text:http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_145222_2009.html DAVID and LORENZA PELAYO vs. MELKI PEREZFACTS: David Pelayo sold two parcels of agricultural landlocated in Panabo to Melki Perez on January 1988. The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Loreza Pelayo, wife of David, and another onewhose signature is illegible witnessed the executionof the deed. Mrs. Pelayo signed only the third space in the spaceprovided for the witnesses. Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and secondpages but the latter refused. As a result, Mr. Perez instituted an action for specificperformance. Perez countered that the lots were given to him bydefendant Pelayo in consideration of his services ashis attorney-in-fact to make the necessaryrepresentation and negotiation with the illegaloccupants-defendants in the ejectment suit Page 7 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law Chic Defendant Pelayo said that the deed was without theconsent of Mrs. Perez and invoked Article166 of theCivil Code to support his argument.ISSUE:1. Did Mrs. Pelayo expressed his consent in the deedof sale executed by Mr. Pelayo?HELD: The Supreme Court said that

the petitionerexpressed her consent to the Deed of Absolute Salewhen she fixed her signature on the document.The consent need not be expressed. It can beimplied. In the present case, although it appears onthe face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed onlyas an instrumental witness, circumstances leading tothe execution of said document point to the fact thatLorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugalproperty and consented to the sale.Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still ineffect on January 11, 1988 when the deed inquestion was executed, the lack of marital consent tothe disposition of conjugal property does not makethe contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Saidprovisions of law provide:Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a noncompos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civilinterdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, thehusband cannot alienate or encumber any realproperty of the conjugal property without the wifesconsent. If she refuses unreasonably to give herconsent, the court may compel her to grant thesame.Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, andwithin ten years from the transaction questioned, askthe courts for the annulment of any contract of thehusband entered into without her consent, whensuch consent is required, or any act or contract ofthe husband which tends to defraud her or impair herinterest in the conjugal partnership property. Shouldthe wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,after the dissolution of the marriage, may demandthe value of property fraudulently alienated by thehusband.Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid untilthe court annuls the same and only upon an actionbrought by the wife whose consent was not obtained.The petition of Mr. and Mrs. Pelayo was denied.Under Articles 166 and 173 of the New Civil Code.Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jun2005/141323.htm HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ SR. vs.PLARIDEL and DOLORES MINGOAFACTS: The petitioners are the heirs of Domingo Hernandeznamely Sergia Hernandez (surviving spouse),Domingo, Jr. and Maria Leonora Wilma (children). Mr. and Mrs. Hernandez were awarded a realproperty by the Philippine Homesite and HousingCorporation (PHCC) by way of salary deduction(Central Bank.) The real property was later awarded to DoloresCamisura who then sold the said property to theMingoa spouses. In April 1983, Mr. Hernandez died intestate. When Mr. Hernandez died, his heirs found out thatthe title of the property was already registered tothe respondents. On February 1994, the petitioners filed a complaintagainst respondents. They are praying for the annulment and/ordeclaration of nullity of the Dead of Absolute Sale ofReal Estate. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of thepetitioners.ISSUE:1. Whether or not the title of the subject property in thename of respondent Mingoa may still be reconveyedto the petitioners.HELD: Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the wife may file for annulment of a contract entered intoby the husband without her consent within ten (10)years from the transaction questioned. Petitionersfiled the action for reconveyance in 1995. Twelve (12)years have lapsed since such discovery, and theyfiled the petition beyond the period allowed bylaw. Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, togetherwith her children, filed the action for reconveyance,the conjugal partnership of property with Hernandez,Sr. had already been terminated by virtue of thelatter's death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore,petitioners action has prescribed.In sum, the rights and interests of the spousesHernandez over the subject property were validlytransferred to respondent Dolores Camisura. Sincethe sale of the conjugal property by Hernandez, Sr.was without the consent of his wife, Sergia, the sameis voidable; thus, binding unless annulled. Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her right toask for the annulment of the sale within theprescribed period, she is now barred fromquestioning the validity thereof. And more so, she isprecluded from assailing the validity of thesubsequent transfers from Camisura to PlaridelMingoa and from the latter to Melanie Mingoa. Page 8 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law ChicTherefore, title to the subject property cannotanymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by reasonof prescription and laches. The issues of prescriptionand laches having been resolved, it is no longernecessary to discuss the other issues raised in thispetition. Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/146548.htm ANTONIO and

LUZVIMINDA GUIANG vs. COURTOF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZFACTS: Judie and Gilda Corpuz were married on December1968 in Bacolod City before a judge. Mr. and Mrs. Corpuz purchased a lot in Koronadal,South Cotabato. In April 1988, the couple sold one half portion of theirlot to spouses Mr. and Mrs. Guiang. Gilda Corpuz went to Manila on June 1989 to searchfor employment abroad but she became a victim ofan illegal recruiter. While she was in Manila, Mr. Corpuz (the husband),sold the other half of their residence to spousesGuiang (petitioners). The daughter of Mrs. Guiang sent a letter to Gildaand the latter replied that she does not consent thesale. In March 1990, Gilda went home. She lived in theirresidence with their children but the husbanddisappeared. The children said that Mr. Corpuz hada new wife already. As a result, Mr. and Mrs. Guiang filed a complaintagainst respondent for trespassing. Gilda field for the declaration of nullity of the deed ofsale. The trial court held that the deed of transfer of rightsand amicable settlement are void. The CA affirmedthe decision of the lower court.ISSUE:1. Whether or not the deed of transfer of rights wasvalidly executed, or it not, ratified by the execution ofthe amicable settlement.HELD: The disposition or encumbrance isvoidable. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, thehusband cannot generally alienate or encumber anyreal property of the conjugal partnership without thewifes consent. The alienation or encumbrance if somade however is not null and void. It is merelyvoidable. The offended wife may bring an action toannul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, theprovision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines, to wit:Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage andwithin ten years from the transaction questioned,ask the courts for the annulment of any contract ofthe husband entered into without her consent,when such consent is required, or any act orcontract of the husband which tends to defraud heror impair her interest in the conjugal partnershipproperty. Should the wife fail to exercise this right,she or her heirs after the dissolution of themarriage, may demand the value of propertyfraudulently alienated by the husband.This particular provision giving the wife ten (10)years during [the] marriage to annul the alienation orencumbrance was not carried over to the FamilyCode. It is thus clear that any alienation orencumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when theFamily Code took effect by the husband of theconjugal partnership property without the consent ofthe wife is null and void.Insisting that the contract of sale was merelyvoidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified bythe contending parties through the amicablesettlement they executed on March 16, 1990. Theposition is not well taken. Doctrinally and clearly, avoid contract cannot be ratified.Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jun1998/125172.htm THELMA JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA and EDILBERTO CAMAISAFACTS: Thelma Jader-Manalo saw an advertisement in theclassified ads section of the newspaper BulletinToday (April 1992 issue). The advertisement was about the sale of the ten-doorapartment owned by Mr. and Mrs. Camaisa. Thelma was interested in the purchase of lot so shenegotiated to purchase the property through a realestate broker Mr. Ereno. The parties agreed in a hand-written contract. Themode of payment agreed was installment. The following day, both the parties met and signedthe typewritten contract. Manalo issued UCPBchecks. After one day, Norma called Thelma Manalo and saidthat they are cancelling the sale because thespouses need spot cash and not checks. Thelma filed a complaint to compel Norma to sign thecontracts to sell.ISSUE:1. Whether or not the husband may dispose of aconjugal property with the wifes written consent. Page 9 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law Chic HELD: The law requires that the disposition of aconjugal property by the husband as administrator inappropriate cases requires the written consent of thewife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article124 of the Family Code provides:Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of theconjugal partnership property shall belong to bothspouses jointly. In case of disagreement, thehusbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourseto the court by the wife for a proper remedy, whichmust be availed of within five years from the date ofthe contract implementing

such decision.In the event that one spouse is incapacitated orotherwise unable to participate in the administrationof the conjugal properties, the other spouse mayassume sole powers of administration. These powersdo not include the powers of disposition orencumbrance which must have the authority of thecourt or the written consent of the other spouse. Inthe absence of such authority or consent thedisposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,the transaction shall be construed as a continuingoffer on the part of the consenting spouse and thethird person, and may be perfected as a bindingcontract upon the acceptance by the other spouse orauthorization by the court before the offer iswithdrawn by either or both offerors. The properties subject of the contracts in this casewas conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to beeffective, the consent of both husband and wife mustconcur.The Supreme Court said that being aware of thetransaction is not consent.Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if thewritten consent of the other spouse cannot beobtained or is being withheld, the matter may bebrought to court which will give such authority if thesame is warranted by the circumstances. However, itshould be stressed that court authorization under Art.124 is only resorted to in cases where the spousewho does not give consent is incapacitated.In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove thatrespondent Norma was incapacitated to give herconsent to the contracts. In the absence of suchshowing of the wifes incapacity, court authorizationcannot be sought.Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/147978.htm HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK vs.MIGUELA C. DAILOFACTS: Miguela and Marcelino Dailo were married on August1967. During the marriage, the spouses purchased a lotsituated in San Pablo City from Dalida. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor ofthe husband (exclusion of his wife). On December 1993, Marcelino executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one LilibethGesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loanfrom petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bankto be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot inSan Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan inthe amount ofP300,000.00 from petitioner(Homeowners Bank). As security, Gesmundo executed on the same day aReal Estate Mortgage constituted on the subjectproperty in favor of petitioner. All the two transactions were made by Marcelinowithout the knowledge and consent of Miguela Dailo. The loan remained outstanding upon maturity. HSLBinstituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on themortgaged property. The said bank was the highestbidder. In December 1995, Marcelino Dailo died. Her wifefound out that the house and lot in San Pablo citywas already mortgaged. As a result, she filed apetition for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage andCertificate of Sale, Deed of Sale and damagesagainst petitioner. The petitioner prayed for the dismissal of thecomplaint on the ground that the property in questionwas the exclusive property of the husband. HSLBalso contended that the loan obtained by Marcelinoredounded to the benefits of the Family.ISSUE:1. Was the disposal of the property executed byMarcelino valid?HELD: NO. In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, theSupreme Court held that the sale of a conjugalproperty requires the consent of both the husbandand wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code,this Court declared that the absence of the consent ofone renders the entire sale null and void, includingthe portion of the conjugal property pertaining to thehusband who contracted the sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to theinstant case. As shall be discussed next, there is nolegal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Codeas an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code. Page 10 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law ChicRespondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. weremarried on August 8, 1967. In the absence of amarriage settlement, the system of relativecommunity or conjugal partnership of gains governedthe property relations between respondent and herlate husband. With the effectivity of the Family Codeon August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on ConjugalPartnership of Gains in the Family Code was madeapplicable to conjugal partnership of gains alreadyestablished before its effectivity unless vested rightshave already been acquired under the Civil Code orother laws.The basic and established fact is that during hislifetime, without the knowledge and consent of hiswife, Marcelino

Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estatemortgage on the subject property, which formed partof their conjugal partnership. By express provision ofArticle 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of(court) authority or written consent of the otherspouse, any disposition or encumbrance of theconjugal property shall be void.The burden of proof that the debt was contracted forthe benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lieswith the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Eiincumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he whoasserts, not he who denies, must prove).On the issue about the loan redounded tothe benefit of the family, the Supreme Court heldthat the petitioner did not assert such contentionwhen they filed their complaint in the lower court.When a party adopts a certain theory in the courtbelow, he will not be permitted to change his theoryon appeal, for to permit him to do so would not onlybe unfair to the other party but it would also beoffensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice anddue process.Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/153802.htm PATROCINIA and WILFREDO RAVINO vs. MARY ANNVILLA ABRILLEFACTS: The respondent Mary Ann Villa Abrille is married toPedro Villa Abrille. The spouses have four children. In 1982, the spouses purchased a parcel of land inJuna Subdivision, Matina, Davao city with an area of555 square meter. The property is registered undertheir names. Adjacent to the said lot is a parcel of land owned andacquired by Pedro before the marriage. Mr. and Mrs. Villa Abrille built a house on Lot 7(owned by both spouses) and Pedros lot. They alsomade improvements such as poultry house andannex. In 1991, Pedro had illicit relations with anotherwoman and neglected his family. As a result, Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgagetheir movables to support the family. Pedro sold the property (house and two lots) toPatrocinia and Wilfredo Ravino without the consent ofMary Ann. While Mary Ann was out, Pedro and armed membersof the CAFGU transferred the properties of the familyfrom the house to an apartment. Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed acomplaint for Annulment of Sale, SpecificPerformance, Damages and Attorneys Fees withPreliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro andherein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of DavaoCity. During the trial, Pedro declared that the house wasbuilt with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravinatestified that they bought the house and lot fromPedro, and that her husband, petitioner WilfredoRavina, examined the titles when they bought theproperty. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Mary Ann Villa Abrille(sale of share is valid, payment for damages).When the petitioners appealed, the CA modified thedecision.ISSUE:1. Whether or not the property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugalproperty. Whether its sale by Pedro was validconsidering the absence of Mary Anns consent.HELD: There is no issue with regard to the lotcovered by TCT No. T-26471, which was anexclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired byhim before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, thelot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann.The house built thereon is conjugal property, havingbeen constructed through the joint efforts of thespouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP toconstruct the house.Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugalproperty concluded after the effectivity of the FamilyCode on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124of the same Code that now treats such a dispositionto be void if done (a) without the consent of both thehusband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spousesinability, the authority of the court. The particularprovision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten(10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrancewas not carried over to the Family Code. It is thusclear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugalpartnership property by the husband without theconsent of the wife is null and void. Page 11 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law ChicHence, just like the rule in absolute community ofproperty, if the husband, without knowledge andconsent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such saleis void. If the sale was with the knowledge but withoutthe approval of the wife, thereby resulting in adisagreement, such sale is annullable at the instanceof the wife who is given five (5) years from the datethe contract implementing the decision of thehusband to institute the case.Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed

the action forannulment of sale within five (5) years from the dateof sale and execution of the deed. However, heraction to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugalhouse and lot and does not include the lot covered byTCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging toPedro and which he can dispose of freely withoutMary Anns consent. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners are notbuyers in good faith. The sale of the conjugalproperty was annulled while the sale of Pedrosexclusive property was valid. When a contract isdeclared void, there must be a restoration of thesubject of the said contract.Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_160708_2009.htmlMANUEL and LETICIA FUENTES vs CONDRADO ROCAFACTS: Sabina Tarroza owned a 358-sq. m. lot inZamboanga city. In October 1982, the said lot was sold to TarcianoRoca (her son) but the latter did not transfer theregistry of title to his name. In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to Manuel andLeticia Fuentes. The parties entered into an agreement to sellprepared by Atty. Plagata. The said agreement wasto take effects six months after April 29, 1998. In the agreement, Tarciano required the Fuentesspouses to pay for a down payment of P60,000 forthe transfer of lot title. Within six months, Tarciano was to clear thestructures and occupants of the lot. At the same time,he needs to get the consent of his estranged wife toagree with the sale. The petitioners agreed to pay theremaining P140,000 or P160,000 upon Tarcianoscompliance to the agreement. Atty. Plagata met Rosario (Tarciano) and asked herto sign the agreement of sale. The contract of sale was perfected and the Fuentesspouses became the owner of the said property. In 1997 (after 8 years), the children of the Rocaspouses filed a complaint against petitioners prayingfor the annulment of sale and reconveyance of thelot.ISSUE:1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the documentof consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of theirconjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;Whether or not the Rocas action for the declarationof nullity of that sale to the spouses alreadyprescribed; and Whether or not only Rosario, the wifewhose consent was not had, could bring the action toannul that sale.HELD: The Court of Appeals found out that thesignature of Rosario was forged. The Supreme Courtheld the same. There is dissimilarity between thespecimen signature of Rosario and that of seen in theagreement of sale.Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the lawthat applies to this case is the Family Code, not theCivil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario gotmarried in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal propertyto the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a fewmonths after the Family Code took effect on August3, 1988.When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil code put inplace the system of conjugal partnership of gains ontheir property relations. While its Article 165 madeTarciano the sole administrator of the conjugalpartnership, Article 166 prohibited him from sellingcommonly owned real property without his wifesconsent. Still, if he sold the same without his wifesconsent, the sale is not void but merely voidable.Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the saleannulled during the marriage within ten years fromthe date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirsmay demand, after dissolution of the marriage, onlythe value of the property that Tarciano fraudulentlysold. The Supreme Court ruled that the deed of sale datedJanuary 11, 1989 by Tarciano T. Roca, executed infavor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L.Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga Cityissued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant tothat deed of sale are declared void.The Fuentes spouses are buyers in good faith.Therefore, they are not required by law to pay anyamount of damages to the Rocas. However, theRocas are indemnified to reimburse the cost ofimprovements made by the Fuentes to the property.Full text:http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_178902_2010.html Page 12 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law ChicJOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER vs. ISMAEL and FLORAFERRERFACTS: Josefa is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer. Alfredo Ferrer is the half brother of respondentsManuel and Ismael Ferrer. Before Alfredo got married, he purchased a piece oflot and applied for a loan with the Social SecuritySystem (SSS) to build improvements on the property(residential house and two-door apartment). The loan was fully paid during the marriage of

Alfredoand Josefa using conjugal funds. According to the petitioner, spouses Ismael and FloraFerrer asked Alfredo to sign his last will andtestament which turned out to be a contract of sale. The sale involved the property acquired by Alfredobefore the marriage but was fully paid using theconjugal funds. Alfredo filed with the RTC a Complaint for theAnnulment of the said sale against respondents. TheRTC dismissed the petition because it found out thatthe terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are notcontrart to law, morals, good customs and publicpolicy. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Courtaffirmed the decision. Alfredo died on September 1999. Josefa filed a petition for the reimbursement for thecost of improvements in Alfedos lot.ISSUE:Whether or not Josefa Ferrer must be reimbursed by therespondents.HELD:No. Petitioner failed to show that there is an obligation on thepart of the respondents to respect or not violate her right. TheSupreme Court ruled While we could concede that CivilCase No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouseas contemplated in Article 120[22] of the Family Code to bereimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation toreimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of theentire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part ofthe purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold bythe owner-spouse. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining theownership of the improvements that are made on theseparate property of the spouses at the expense of thepartnership or through the acts or efforts of either or bothspouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and anyresulting increase in value are more than the value of theproperty at the time of the improvement, the entire property ofone of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership,subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of theowner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, saidproperty shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of theimprovement. The subject property was precisely declaredas the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article120 of the Family Code.What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite theallegations contained in the Complaint that they are thebuyers of the subject premises, are not petitioners spousenor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse uponwhom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costsrested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation toreimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse whoexpended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwisestated, respondents do not have the obligation to respectpetitioners right to be reimbursed.In the case at bar, the respondents has not obligation to payany cost of improvements to Josefa Ferrer. Therefore, thepetition is denied.Full Text:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/november2006/166496.htmELENA MURRER vs HELMUT MERRERFACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller andrespondent Helmut Muller were married in Germanyon September 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned bythe parents of respondent. In 1992, the spouses decided to move and residepermanently in the Philippines. During that time, Helmut Muller inherited the house ofhis parents which he sold. The proceeds of the salewere used to purchase a parcel of land in Antipolo,Rizal and the construction of the house (P528,000and P2,300,000 respectively). The Antipolo property was registered under the nameof Elena Murrer. Due to incompatibilities and respondents allegedwomanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouseseventually separated. On September 1994,Helmut Muller filed for aseparation of property before the Regional Trial Courtof Quezon city. On August 1996, the trial court rendered a decisionwhich terminated the regime of absolute communityof property between the spouses Muller. The court also decreed the separation of propertiesbetween the spouses and ordered the equal partitionof personal properties located within the countryexcluding those acquired by gratuitous title. Helmut Muller said that he is not praying for thetransfer of ownership of the property but of thereimbursement of his personal funds. Page 13 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law ChicISSUE:1. Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitledto the reimbursement of the funds used for theacquisition of the Antipolo property?HELD: NO. Mr. Muller is

not entitled to thereimbursement of the funds used to purchase theAntipolo property.The Constitution prohibits alien from acquiring privatelands in the Philippines for the conservation of thenational patrimony. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an impliedtrust was created and resulted by operation of law inview of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save forthe exception provided in cases of hereditarysuccession, respondents disqualification fromowning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not evenan ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where thepurchase is made in violation of an existing statuteand in evasion of its express provision, no trust canresult in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. Further, the distinction made between transfer ofownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futileexercise on respondents part. To allowreimbursement would in effect permit respondent toenjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowedto own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.The Supreme Court held that the respondent cannotseek reimbursement on the ground of equity where itis clear that he purchased the property despiteconstitutional prohibition.Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_149615_2006.htmlVIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILANFACTS: Virgilio and Dita Maquilan are spouses who once hada blissful married life. They were blessed to have one son. Their marriage turned bitter when petitioner Virgiliodiscovered that private respondent was having illicitsexual affair with her paramour. The petitioner filed a case of adultery against privaterespondent Dita Maquilan and the paramour. Dita Maquilan and her paramour were convicted ofthe crime charged and were sentenced to sufferimprisonment. Private respondent, Dita, filed a Petition forDeclaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution andLiquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains andDamages on 2001. During the pretrial of the said case, petitioner andrespondent entered into a Compromise Agreement. Partial settlements are as follows:- P500,000.00 of the money deposited in thebank jointly in the name of the spouses shall bewithdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust oftheir common child, Neil Maquilan, with thedeposit in the joint account of the parties. Thebalance of such deposit, which presently standsat P1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn anddivided equally by the parties; - The store that is now being occupied by theplaintiff shall be allotted to her while the bodegashall be for te defendant. The defendant shallbe paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share inthe stocks of the store in full settlement thereof. - The motorcycles shall be divided betweenthem such that the Kawasaki shall be owned bythe plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be forthe defendant;- The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiffwho shall pay the defendant the sum ofP75,000.00 as his share thereon and in fullsettlement thereof;- The house and lot shall be to the commonchild. The petitioner filed for Omnibus Motion praying forthe repudiation of the Compromise Agreement on thegrounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligentlyand judiciously apprise him of the consequentialeffects of the said agreement. The RTC and CA dismissed the petition of Mr.Maquilan. ISSUE:1. Whether or not the partial voluntary separation ofproperty made by the spouses pending the petitionfor declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.HELD: YES. The petitioner contends that theCompromise Agreement is void because itcircumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse,who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage,from sharing in the conjugal property. Since therespondent was convicted of adultery, the petitionersaid that her share should be forfeited in favor of thecommon child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of theFamily Code.To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law todisqualify the spouse convicted of adultery fromsharing in the conjugal property; and because theCompromise Agreement is void, it never became finaland executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since adulteryis a ground for legal separation, the CompromiseAgreement is therefore void. These arguments arespecious. Page 14 The Law Chic | www.thelawchic.com Persons and Family Relations Cases (Art. 68 141) - Case Digest Prepared by The Law ChicMoreover, the contention that the CompromiseAgreement is tantamount to a circumvention of thelaw prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in theconjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law andjurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.The

conviction of adultery does not carry theaccessory of civil interdiction. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was notintelligently and judiciously informed of theconsequential effects of the compromise agreement,and that, on this basis, he may repudiate theCompromise Agreement. The argument of thepetitioner that he was not duly informed by hisprevious counsel about the legal effects of thevoluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake orvitiation of consent, as now claimed by the petitioneras his basis for repudiating the settlement, couldhardly be said to be evident.

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