Sunteți pe pagina 1din 12

HEGEL'S PRIMARY APPROACH TO THE DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGYA REAPPRAISAL

FRANCIS BAUMLI

Philosophical Forum, Vol 7, 1975-6

I Both the casual and the discerning reader, when poring through the pages of Hegel's Logic, are likely to be enamored by the systematic unity and elegance of the triadic dialectical scheme. But more than one commentator has found it difficult to explain the subtleties of that scheme. The negativity that characterizes dialectical reason, as well as the necessity of resolving initially incompatible opposites through the positive work of speculative reason, has stymied many a student of Hegel's, and perhaps has required a good deal of patience from the more critical reader. But regardless of whether one endorses or rejects the dialectical format of the Logic, it at least is apparent that in this work the progressive movement of dialectic has for its task the resolution or the suspension of contradictory ideas in a unified synthesis which cancels the opposition. This willingness to cancel opposites and thereby limit the law of contradiction has long been a tendency of Eastern philosophy. But, perhaps because of the emphasis on formal logic that has prevailed since Aristotle, the Western thinker has usually been more skeptical about such reasoning. Hence, it is not surprising that some of Hegel's readers cast such a skeptical eye on the methodology of his Logic. Given this uneasiness about the methodology of the Logic, and given that it is so often assumed that the methodologies of both the Logic and the Phenomenology of Mind are alike, it is easy to see why many a reader approaches the Phenomenology with the same qualms. But, while it has long been customary for philosophers to understand the Phenomenology'by applying the clear scheme of dialectic that is so explicitly set forth in the Logic, this may be a mistake. After all, the Phenomenology was published several years earlier than the Logic, and the direction or unfolding of thought is very different in the 225

FRANCIS BAUML

two works. It is my opinion that if the blinders that we so quickly assume when reading the Logic are removed, we will find that the earlier dialectic must be approached differently. This different approach will, I believe, facilitate an understanding of Hegel's very difficult work, and perhaps will also evade some of the prejudices that the more radical dialectic of the Logic causes. The purpose of this paper is then two-fold: to give a statement about some of the more general methodological assumptions of the Phenomenology of Mind, and to outlipe a specific approach to the dialectical scheme of the work. The further problem of reconciling the methodology of the Phenomenology with that of the Logic is a tempting one, but is far beyond the scope of this paper. II Hegel's process philosophy, unlike the dualism of Whitehead's metaphysic, entails a unity of both the process, or generative principle, and the content, or logical stages, of change and growth. One may abstract the logical description of process and call it dialectic, and one may, from a slightly different perspective, refer to absolute spirit as the ultimate and abiding determinateness of that process; but any such abstraction must defer to the basic unity. The dialectical process of movement occurs within the absolute, but the absolute is the process insofar as it defines itself; i.e., attains consciousness of itself, by that very movement. The movement, or attainment of consciousness, is embodied in individual persons and cultures which are finite elements of absolute spirit moving toward fuller consciousness; but this is an immanent movement and may only be described as spirit moving itself. Finite levels of consciousness may for a time halt their movement and endure a long period of stasis, but such periods of stasis, no matter how long they might persist in time, and no matter how great the fear and anxiety may be regarding change, yet will loosen their temporal ties and will follow a higher logic: "Should that anxious fearfulness wish to remain always in unthinking indolence, thought will agitate the thoughtlessness, its restlessness will disturb that indolence." 1 I.e. it is the nature of consciousness to speculate, no matter how limited this speculation may be. Hence, the temporal span of stasis itself is a finite thing which reflects the finitude of the static consciousness. It follows from this that Hegel does not emphasize the temporal order of cultural development. Rather, his emphasis is on the logical, or dialectical order which describes the realm of appearances without referring to their logical continuity. Yet, 226

HEGEL'S PRIMARY APPROACH TO THE DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY

consciousness continually clamors for direction and logical purposiveness. Consciousness, then, confronts time because
Time therefore appears as spirit's destiny and necessity, where spirit is not yet complete within itself; it is the necessity compelling spirit to enrich the share selfconsciousness has in consciousness, to put into motion the immediacy of the inherent nature (which is the form in which the substance is present in consciousness); or, conversely, to realize and make manifest what is inherent, regarded as inward and immanent, to make manifest that which is atfirstwithini.e. to vindicate it for spirit's certainty of self.2

Which is to say that "It is only spirit in its entirety that is in time, and the shapes assumed, which are specific embodiments of the whole of spirit as such, present themselves in a sequence one after the other/' 3 In other words, no logical order can ever be had in the temporal domain. The gestation of spirit at its temporal levels, may only be rationally understood from the ultimate perspective, and will only be completed therein. This ultimate understanding is identical to the ultimate completion, and thereby involves both the epistcmic and ontological fulfillment of spirit. This fulfillment does not imply that the diversity of knowledge qua spirit collapses into *\ . . the night in which, as we say, all cows arc black. . . ". 4 Rather, absolute spirit is fulfilled because its completed self-consciousness contains the plurality of all logical moments while yet involving a transformation of perspectivea transformation from the limited perspective of finite appearances to the singular and unified perspective of logical continuity. Since finite consciousness is defined as the initial and continuing movement of attention, it would be a mistake to say that consciousness is inactive. But nevertheless, there are varying intensities of commitment to growth in different individual persons. Many persons are more or less satisfied with the caprice of feeling, or empty intuition. They affirm their state of consciousness by a mere claim to consciousness, without affirming any content for that consciousness. Hence, they do not immerse themselves in the mainstream and rigor of philosophical inquiry. This lax attitude is apparent at the various levels of cultural and individual stasis, and can only be overcome by the intangible and perhaps indefinable upsurge of interest or desire. But this upsurge, which injects a vitalistic fervor into one's approach to knowledge, serves to demolish the distance between consciousness and its potential dimensions by moving it toward the transcendental horizon of speculative reason. In this way, consciousness moves toward an embodiment with philosophy, vigorously conjoining its own intellectual existence with the rational system of spirit.5
227

lUNCrS

HAU M LI

This vitalizing tendency is immediately efficacious because the person is not distanced, or removed, from the epistemic and ontological process of speculative reason. No means is utilized for gaining knowledge, because any supposed means itself is a part of knowledge; i.e. the tools of speculative reason are actually identical to that reason, just as one's body is the participant, and not the incidental probe, in any amorous encounter. Furthermore, no medium need be pierced or dispersed in gaining knowledge. The supposedly intermediate styles whicty appear as an incidental veil to be lifted away, are themselves ontpfogic^l ejernents of the very process of reason. They are not a medium precisely because consciousness must embrace and absorb these elements rather than pretend to pierce through them to more elusive stages which, actually, can only be successfully encountered in their turn.6 Although there is no medium or means which are barriers for speculative reason, there nevertheless are various conscious attitudes which might slow the movement of dialectic. Hegel gives a preliminary warning about these dangers for the sake of aiding the individual consciousness. In thefirstof these he points out that, since cqnsciosness is traversing the various logical stages of the dialectic and is thereby continually redefining itself as it embodies new levels of awareness, $ person's self-identity is always being redefined, and any satisfaction? which one might experience is subject to consequent frustration; 44 Because of that," Hegel states, "the road can be looked on as the path of doubt, or more properly a highway of despair/*7 The only way tq avoid this frustration is to cultivate an attitude rather like Augustine's doctrine, of faith seeking reason. Consciousness must realize that the terminus of 4 finite satisfaction is for the sake of a more complete satisfaction. And although subsequent satisfactions themselves are temporary and therefore deceptive, they are so only for the person who gives too much attention to the various determinate stages of rational progression, and does not keep in mind a general commitment to change and transcendence, which can admit a flexible and expansive satisfaction. A second danger to be avoided is unproductive doubt, or the feeling that dissatisfaction with a given level of consciousness casts suspicion on the value of consciousness itself. To avoid this attitude one must look at past levels of consciousness, and therein perceive both the logical continuity and the tendency of prior stages of doubt to discover new levels of consciousness through speculative reason. And a third danger is that a person might avoid new levels of consciousness, not because he doubts the value of, increased consciousness, but because his satisfaction with his present level of understanding is so habitual that it causes him to fear apy fur228

HEGEL'S PRIMARY APPROACH TO THE DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY

ther consciousness. Of course, the active consideration of further consciousness entails some dissatisfaction with the present level; but if one combines the present dissatisfaction with a fear of any remedy, then a rather unhappy state of alienation is the result. This is a difficult problem to overcome but its best remedy is to introduce consciousness to new levels of being by a preliminary and vicarious acculturation. This is accomplished through the contemplation of highly abstract philosophical concepts; i.e., turning one's attention to the more general facets of the dialectic in order to overcome one's fear through a gradual familiarization. This familiarization will eventually approach a forthright immersion in the process which will manifest itself as love of knowledge.8 But despite these tendencies which might frustrate the activity of consciousness, there are several facets of the dialectical process which, in addition to the fact that there is no means nor medium between consciousness and its activity, serve to quicken and encourage growth. The first of these is that as consciousness moves forward in acquiring further consciousness, it is never encumbered by the possibility of error. Error, or falsehood, has no meaning within the perspective of absolute spirit since spirit, by containing all its finite moments, unifies and reconciles them. And falsehood has no meaning with regard to the speculative progress of consciousness, no matter how finite it may be, since in the dialectical movement, antithetical stages of knowledge are also reconciled. If the idea of falsehood makes any sense within Hegel's system, it only refers to those times when consciousness might cast a backward glance at its prior and more limited states. Prior states, since they do not suffice to describe the present state of consciousness, do not fulfill its nature and therefore, in a sense, are false to it. But this idea of falsehood actually describes neither the epistemic nor ontological orientation of consciousness. It only refers to a rather incidental posterior, or rearguard, action whereby consciousness, by its progressing activity, acts in accord with the process of absolute spirit and thereby resists any regressive tendencies. Any concern with falsehood, as will be emphasized further, is only a limited perspective which is immersed in doubt. Once the doubt is removed, any idea of falsehood also drops out of the picture.9 A second characteristic of the dialectical process which encourages the transcending activity of consciousness is the realization of purposiveness. As consciousness negotiates the various levels of the dialectic, it is encumbered by the continual frustration of satisfaction. But this frustration is transformed into an aid when consciousness realizes that, could it only attain a level of complete fulfillment, its satisfaction would be complete and consciousness would not have to transcend itself further. 229

FRANCIS BAUMLI

This desire for complete satisfaction and the resulting intensity of dialectical movement serves to focus attention toward the absolute, enamoring the notion with hopes for uniting with its object.10 Third, knowledge which is acquired at a certain level of consciousness is not lost as the person moves to a higher plane of awareness. Hence, the person need not experience a sense of loss or abandonment when consciousness expands its boundaries. Each movement is a means for supplying further intelligibility to prior understanding, as well as injecting novel awareness. Dy providing this further intelligibility, consciousness retains prior experiences in a single embodiment, just as the absolute, at the final stage, contains all prior levels of consciousness. As Hegel says,
These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this equal necessity of all moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole.11

It is the logical past which makes up the logical presentxwhich, in its turn, points the way to the logical end. Without this on-going inter-contingncy, the Absolute would be lifeless, lacking both its completed unity and its finite levels which provide the moving process toward that completion. This retentive aspect of consciousness means that the person embodies the assimilated, synthesized knowledge of all his prior experiences, holding the "wealth of the bygone life" present in *'recollection.**12 This recollection is not an intricate, difficult process wherein the attention of consciousness intermittently returns to various moments of its prior life; rather, recollection here means that the logical past is lived or expressed in the present. The past is not external because it is embodied; hence; retention of prior consciousness is tacit and manifest by virtue of this embodiment.13 Although the transcending task of consciousness is aided by this retentive quality, it nevertheless might appear that consciousness would initially be discouraged by the long and difficult path it must traverse before attaining absolute consciousness, or spirit. But the task is not so difficult as it first appears. Although the particular person is an embodied construct of knowledge who stands at a certain locus on the logical road to spirit, he travels a road that has already been negotiated, either by other members in his own culture, or by other cultures.14 And the knowledge which these previous individuals have already assimilated may be trans230

HEGEL'S PRIMARY APPROACH TO THE DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY

ferred to the present individual in a way that lightens his task and shortens its duration. As Hegel says:
The particular individual, so far as content is concerned, has also to go through the stages through which the general mind has passed, but as shapes once assumed by mind and now laid aside, as stages of a road which has been worked over and levelled out. Hence it is that, in the case of various kinds of knowledge, we find that what in former days occupied the energies of men of mature mental ability sinks to the level of information, exercises, and even pastimes, for children; and in this educational progress we can see the history of the world's culture delineated in faint outline. This bygone mode of existence has already become an acquired possession of the general mind, which constitutes the substance of the individual, and, by thus appearing externally to him, furnishes his inorganic nature. In this respect culture or development of mind, regarded from the side of the individual, consists in his acquiring what lies at his hand ready for him, in making its inorganic nature organic to himself, and taking possession of it for himself.15
i

In other words, difficulties which prior individuals have experienced are presented to the present individual in analogical, rational terms which may be assimilated rather spontaneously, without the effort prior individuals have experienced. This is
Because the substance of individual mind, nay, more, because the universal mind at work in the world, has had the patience to go through these forms in the long stretch of time's extent, and to take upon itself the prodigious labor of the world's history, where it bodied forth in each form the entire content of itself, as each is capable of presenting it; and because by nothing less could that all-pervading mind ever manage to become conscious of what itself isfor that reason, the individual mind, in the nature of the case, cannot expect by less toil to grasp what its own substance contains. All the same, its task has meanwhile been made much lighter, because this has historically been implicitly accomplished, the content is one where reality is already cancelled for spiritual possibilities, where immediacy has been overcome and brought under the control of reflection, the various forms and shapes have been already reduced to their intellectual abbreviations, to determinations of thought pure and simple.16

This is to say that when the stumbling-blocks of blind speculation and the agony of doubt are ameliorated by the help of education, the individual embraces the knowledge of his culture by a virtually spontaneous assimilation, and as a result, travels the same steps of the dialectic at a much faster rate. Taking this last point into account, and reiterating the first three points, these aids to the dialectical process may be summarized as: the dialectical guarantee of truth which relegates apparent error to the status of finite truth, purposive awareness, the dialectical retention of prior
231

FRANCIS HAUMLI

knowledge, and the rather spontaneous assimilation of cultural understanding. These four aspects of rational speculation, since they ease the task of consciousness, give concrete support to Hegel's rather abstract exhortationsthat the person avoid any attitudes which might cause alienation, sterile doubt, or despair. With this support, the individual is less likely to think he is encumbered by a means, or medium, which appears to stand between himself and further consciousness, flence, his commitment to self-realization is more active ajid concrete, giving him a sense of courage and vitality which reflects the immanent tendency toward completion which is the very process of absolute spiift. S III These various guidelines serve as a general methodological basis for Hegel's phenomenological ontology. They describe the nature of Hegel,'s doctrine of absolute spirit, and prescribe both advice and dogma for the sake of easing the toil of finite consciousness. But Hegel's jdi!alecjtical scheme is a more precise attempt to describe how the various movements of finite consciousness, as it aspires to higher levels of knowledge, are realized. The immediate purpose of this paper, then, is to describe Hegel's dialectic as it occurs in the Phenomenology of Mindi This description is abstracted from an entire reading of the work, and may appear to be rather general; but it would not be very reasonable to exemplify this proposed interpretation here since a single application would, by itself -, exceed the present length of this paper. Therefore, trusting that the reader will be generous enough to recall his reading of the Phenomenology for the sake of tieing this theory in with an example, I wish to propose the following interpretation of Hegel's earlier dialectic: 1) At any stage of the dialectic, whether at the first moment of awareness or a later level, consciousness attains a finite and temporary satisfaction prior to further dialectical progression. At such points* the person understands a given construct of knowledge which is the basis of his being. At any one point, the person, in his understanding and his being, embodies, in an organized and active way, all the past experiences he has negotiated in the logical continuity toward complete self-consciousness. 2) The temporary satisfaction, attained at any logical echelon, is only a partial, or virtual, thing. An element of dissatisfaction always persists. The virtual satisfaction which consciousness has attained tends to become boring to the attentive activity of consciousness, and dissatisfac232

HEGEL'S PRIMARY APPROACH TO THE DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY

tion tends to eclipse satisfaction. As dissatisfaction becomes more apparent, consciousness, which is no longer willing to rest tranquil with its basis of being and Knowledge, begins to feel inadequate to itself. This is the beginning of an unhappy state which, if not actively resisted, will degenerate to a state of alienation. This unhappiness is experienced as an inner lacking, which translates into the attitude of desire. This desire is motivated by the mental pain, or anxiety, that unhappiness causes. It expresses itself as a tendency to escape from the center of the self and move to the periphery, or horizon, of consciousness. As desire reaches beyond the periphery of present consciousness, it apprehends further possibilities of knowing and being which are not yet specifically grasped. These possibilities serve as encouragement, or as a vague promise that alternatives exist, even though they may not appear to be viable ones. If the person is at an advanced stage of consciousness, with many experiences behind him, then this tendency toward apprehension may further be encouraged by the sense of continuity, or purposive activity, which the person has encountered in those previous experiences. 3) Consciousness, in this attempt at escape, flees to a very different level of understanding which may loosely be called its opposite, or its contradiction. This polarity of the new mode of consciousness with the old is established by the very fact that consciousness, in making such a violent effort to break with its nature, tries to find a way of knowing and being; i.e., living, which is radically different from the old. Consciousness embraces its new understanding, affirming it as true; but because the new status has been embraced as a reaction to the old, the sense of repugnance for the old way of understanding means that consciousness perceives the two levels as utterly incompatiblebelieving that neither can be true without the other being false, and that neither can be false without the other being true. Hence, from the perspective of the finite consciousness, the new level of understanding is thought to be the logical contradiction of the old. 4) Unfortunately, the new level of understanding, because it was accepted hastily, as a mere reaction to the old, offers little in the way of satisfaction or ontological familiarity to consciousness. Hence, the person must actively search, within the context of his present understanding, for sufficient rational grounds to justify his leap of faith and to solidify the new belief. 5) Very quickly, consciousness begins to discover that its desires for further knowledge are not satisfied. This is because the persisting sense of dissatisfaction reflects the prior level of understanding and therefore is seeking relief on foreign territory. In other words, the motivation for
233

FRANCIS BAUML1

seeking to make the present level of understanding more concrete has its roots in a prior level of understanding, even though the rejection of the prior status, and the consequent fixation with the present one, would presuppose that the roots of the persisting doubt were established in the present level of understanding at the moment it was conceived. The sense of doubt and dissatisfaction, as well as the activity of desire, quickly loses direction. As the person continues his efforts for resolving the difficulties, the painful anxiety becomes more find more persistent, driving the person to a state of unhappiness that threatens to approach complete alienation. This is why Hegel calls the road of the dialectic the pathway of despair. 6) As dissatisfaction becomes more and more diffuse, one\s.faith in the new level of awareness is lessened, and a sense of doubt is attached to the new state of knowledge. But this doubt, concomitant with the old sense of dissatisfaction, also is diffused along the entire spectrum of belief, and hence it permeates any sense of satisfaction with the present given as well as the persisting sense of dissatisfaction with the old bplief. As a result, consciousness has no loyalty for either the old or the new given. Attention, which desires the tranquility of satisfaction,ivascillates between the new and the old given, and by the very fact that it is nolonger in a state of flight from a given that is repugnant to its desires, he., because dissatisfaction marks both givens, there is no tendency to see the two givens as contradictory. At this point, it is not that both appear to.be false; rather, concern with truth or falsity drops out of the picture since the opposition, no longer externalized as a logical conflict, persists only as an internalized feeling of unhappiness. For this very reason, the periphery of consciousness is cleansed; it is now ready to solve its problems, not by a flight, but by an attempt to confront dissatisfaction on its own grounds, thereby filling the immediate needs of consciousness with new attentive awareness without dispensing with its present state of awareness. Unhappiness has chastened consciousness, and brings a new feeling: of responsibility about one's entire beingthe embodied unification of one's past in the present. 7) Since the attention of consciousness no longer attempts to flee beyond its periphery and leave the present state of being behind, the idea of contradiction, which hinges on the sense of opposition between truth and falsity, is not relevant to the new attempt at knowledge. Both the cancelation of this concern for contradictories, plus the chastisement consciousness has undergone which encourages a tolerant and even grateful acceptance of the person's present state of being, are rather automatically brought to bear on the secondary level of awareness which
234

HEGEL'S PRIMARY APPROACH TO THE DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY

consciousness first fled to. But at this point the second level is not eagerly and prematurely embraced; rather, it is given the attention and consideration that is due any novel mode of knowledge. It is here that a synthesis occurs as understanding moves to an endorsement of the new level of knowledge. Because the two logical levels are no longer construed to be incompatible, consciousness perceives them both as viable perspectives which, rather than alternatives, are equally relevant to the fulfillment of consciousness. One truth is added to another, conjoined by a singular act of logical generosity and ontic growth which-provides the feelings of satisfaction and wonder that are proper to any insight. 8) By virture of the synthesis, consciousness attains a new state of being, or knowledge. Again, a virtual satisfaction has been attained, which will persist, as at thefirstlevel, until dissatisfaction again upsets the equilibrium. IV The main aspect of this dialectic is that, unlike the usual interpretation of the Logic, there is no tension which persists after the synthetic resolution. There remains no sense of struggle between laws of thought, nor between a law of thought and a unifying ontic principle. Contradiction is neither vanquished nor resolved; rather, a shift in perspective renders it totally irrelevant. The perspective of falsity is merely afiniteand rather alienated attitude about the self and its desires for satisfaction. Within the dialectical struggle, the old idea of opposition between truth and falsiiy is transformed into the unifying composition of truth becoming an addition to further truth. Truth then is understood as the progressive accruement of ideas. And contradiction, rather than being a struggle between formal laws of thought that is so often thought to characterize the dialectic of the Logic, is understood in the Phenomenology as the doubt which consciousness has about its capabilities for attaining further knowledge without at the same time rejecting its present level of understanding. When doubt is finally overcome after a rather trying period of reorientation, the dialectic movesbut not in terms of victory; rather, in the spirit of discovery and creative annexation. If there are some who believe this description of the dialectical process in the Phenomenology also serves as a proper characterization of the dialectic in the Logic, I would not reject such a thesis outright. But putting further questions about this thesis aside for the present, one point 235

H i A. NCI S BAU M LI

does deserve being made. This is that, perhaps because the subject matter of the Logic is approached in a way that is less phenomenologically intimate, it is easier to construe its dialectic as a more austere activity in which logically contradictory metaphysical doctrines are resolved only by continual recourse to more powerful ontological principles. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that those who understand Hegel's dialectic of the Logic this way, make a mistake if they also apply it to the Phenomenology of Mind, Institute of Discourse, Ltd. Maryville, Missouri

NOTES G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J, B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), p. 138; & see pp. 92-98, 106. (AH subsequent references are this work.) 2 p. 800. 3 p. 689, & see pp. 689-690, 800-803. 4 p. 79, & see pp. 798, 800, 804. 5 See pp. 67, 70-77, 82-83. See pp. 131-135. 7 p. 135. 8 See pp. 70, 80-82, 116-118, 125-127, 137. 9 See pp. 84-85, 98-104, 132-133. 10 See pp. 83-84, 137-138. 11 p. 68, & see p. 69. 12 p. 76. 13 See pp. 89, 94. 14 See p. 89. ,s pp. 89-90. 16 pp. 90-91.
1

236

S-ar putea să vă placă și