Gegn8502 Iss 1

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Railway Group Guidance Note GE/GN8502 Issue One Date February 1999
Operation of Trams and Light Rail or Metro Vehicles Over Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure
Synopsis This document provides guidance for Train Operators, Station Operators and Railtrack Line in a situation where trams, light rail or metro vehicles operate through services from other administrations onto Railtrack controlled infrastructure.
Signatures
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Submitted by
Nick Howland Standards Project Manager Authorised by
This document is the property of Railtrack PLC. It shall not be reproduced in whole or in part without the written permission of the Controller, Railway Group Standards, Railtrack PLC. Published by Safety & Standards Directorate, Railtrack PLC, Floor DP01, Railtrack House, Euston Square London NW1 2EE Copyright 1999 Railtrack PLC
Richard Spoors Controller, Railway Group Standards
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Railway Group Guidance Note GE/GN8502 Issue One Date February 1999 Page 1 of 17
Contents
Section Part A Issue Record Application Health and Safety Responsibilities Supply Part B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Appendix A References 2 2 2 2 Description Page
Purpose Scope Definitions Associated Guidance Acceptance Procedure Guidance on Light Vehicles Guidance on Heavy Vehicles Guidance on Signalling Systems Guidance on Station Design Guidance on Lineside Signing for Safe Movement of Trains Guidance on Rule Book Requirements Guidance on Radio Systems Guidance on Electrical Power Supplies Guidance on the Safety of People On or Near the Line
3 3 3 4 4 6 9 9 11 13 13 13 14 14
Table of Specific Control Measures at Platforms
16 17
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Operation of Trams and Light Rail or Metro Vehicles Over Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure Part A
Issue Record
This Standard will be updated when necessary by distribution of a complete replacement. Amended or additional parts of revised pages will be marked by a vertical black line in the adjacent margin. Issue 1 Date February 1999 Comments Original Document
Application
This Guidance Note sets out the approach to be followed by all Railway Group Members when it is proposed to operate trams, light rail or metro vehicles on Railtrack controlled infrastructure.
Health and Safety Responsibilities

In issuing this Guidance Note, Railtrack PLC makes no warranties, express or implied, that compliance with all or any Railway Group Guidance Note or Standards is sufficient on its own to ensure safe systems of work or operation. Each user is reminded of its own responsibilities to ensure health and safety at work and its individual duties under health and safety legislation.
Supply
Controlled and uncontrolled copies of this Guidance Note may be obtained from the Industry Safety Liaison Dept, Safety and Standards Directorate, Railtrack PLC, Railtrack House DP01, Euston Square, London, NW1 2EE.
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Operation of Trams and Light Rail or Metro Vehicles Over Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure Part B
1 Purpose
To provide guidance on risk controls in a situation where Light Vehicles (LVs) work through from other administrations onto Railtrack controlled infrastructure and where the need for compatibility with different infrastructure / operating practices means that it is not reasonably practicable to adopt in full the technical and operating practices which normally apply for operation of vehicles on Railtrack controlled infrastructure.
2 Scope
This Guidance Note applies to operations on Railtrack controlled infrastructure only. It does not address safety of operations on infrastructure for which Railtrack is not the infrastructure controller. It applies only to operations where there is through running of LVs from another administration onto Railtrack controlled infrastructure, and covers operation of both the passenger carrying vehicles and any associated service vehicles built to similar standards. It applies to routes where such operations are introduced after 3 April 1999. It does not apply retrospectively to existing operations. It does not apply to international services through the Channel Tunnel. It addresses safety issues which are particular to the operation of LVs. There are many other issues which are common to LVs and HVs , such as the generation of interference currents which may adversely affect signalling and telecommunications. These are not covered in this guidance, other than in general terms as part of the section on Acceptance Procedures.
3 Definitions
Common Section of Route One where LVs and HVs operate over the same tracks or over tracks which are so close together that the swept envelopes of the vehicles overlap or have insufficient clearances between them to meet the requirements of HSE Railway Safety Principles and Guidance. Exclusive Running Operation where, for nominated periods of time, the Common Section of Route is dedicated either to LVs or to HVs. Heavy Rail Route One on which HVs operate. Heavy Vehicle (HV) A rail vehicle which operates on Railtrack controlled infrastructure and which is not an LV. Light Vehicle (LV) A Tram, or a Metro or other Light Rail Vehicle or an associated service vehicle built to similar standards for which exemption from one or more of the Railway Group Standards requirements applicable to HVs has been claimed, as permitted by GM/RT2452. Light Rail Route One on which LVs operate. Limited Exclusive Running Exclusive Running where Light Rail Routes and Heavy Rail Routes cross or are interlaced or merge for a short distance, but where the method of operating is such that a maximum of one train can occupy each track of the Common Section of Route at any given time. RAILTRACK 3

Metro or other Light Rail Vehicle A vehicle which operates on a railway network having different infrastructure characteristics and / or operating standards from those of Railtrack. Mixed Running Train operation where LVs and HVs are interspersed on the Common Section of Route. Parallel Running Train Operation where the Light Rail Route and the Heavy Rail Route are totally separate and the Light Rail Route is part of Railtrack controlled infrastructure at discrete points only, for example as a result of the need for Railtrack to control a common level crossing. Tram A flange guided rail vehicle designed to operate wholly or partly on a street tramway.
4 Associated Guidance
Guidance on tramways, and hence in some cases on operations for which there is through running between other administrations and Railtrack controlled infrastructure, is given in Railway Safety Principles and Guidance (Part 2 Section G Guidance on Tramways) published by HSE.
5 Acceptance Procedure
5.1 General Context Operators of trains and stations on Railtrack controlled infrastructure are normally required to have a Railway Safety Case accepted by Railtrack in accordance with the Railways (Safety Case) Regulations 1994. The Railway Safety Case should describe the operation proposed, identify the risks which it presents to the safe operation of Railtrack controlled infrastructure, the control measures to reduce those risks so far as is reasonably practicable and the safety management system to deliver them. Further guidance on the processes involved is contained in GA/RC6503, 6504 and 6505. Many of the risk areas which need to be encompassed in a Railway Safety Case are covered by Railway Group Standards. These contain requirements with which compliance is mandatory for all duty holders of Railway Safety Cases. In view of the importance of establishing clear technical requirements and operating procedures for vehicles as part of a Railway Safety Case, specific process requirements for vehicle acceptance are laid down in Railway Group Standard GO/RT3270. The process of Route Acceptance described in that document requires the presentation to Railtracks Rolling Stock Acceptance Board (RSAB) of a Route Acceptance Safety Case in which it must be demonstrated that the vehicle is intrinsically well engineered, that all issues of compatibility with the infrastructure have been addressed and that a suitable operating regime has been established such that the risks directly associated with vehicle operation have been reduced to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable. The acceptance of the Route Acceptance Safety Case by RSAB is confirmed by issue to the Train Operator of a Certificate of Authority to Operate. This is a condition of its Railway Safety Case for operation of those vehicles which, in addition to the vehicle related issues, would normally address such issues as staff competence, requirements relating to the control of drugs and alcohol usage etc.
Within the scope of a Route Acceptance Safety Case there are many risk areas which are covered by Railway Group Standards. These are largely concerned with the intrinsic behaviour of the vehicle and its compatibility with those aspects of the infrastructure which are standard throughout the system. The requirement is that vehicles must be compliant with all these Railway Group Standards. In RAILTRACK
this case compliance is checked by Vehicle Acceptance Bodies who have been accredited by Railtrack and is confirmed by the issue of a Certificate of Engineering Acceptance. This certificate then becomes part of the Route Acceptance Safety Case which, in addition to Engineering Acceptance, needs to cover such issues as local infrastructure peculiarities or novel aspects of the vehicle which are not dealt with in Railway Group Standards. The part of the submission falling outside the scope of Engineering Acceptance should normally be subject to independent safety assessment before presentation to RSAB. The hierarchy of acceptance is shown in Figure 1. If the Train Operator is also the operator of one or more stations, then its Railway Safety Case should include risks associated with aspects of the station arrangements which are relevant to the operation of trains. If an independent Station Operator is involved, that Station Operator is required to hold such an approved Railway Safety Case. One of the requirements of Railtracks Railway Safety Case is that duty holders of a Railway Safety Case must comply with Railway Group Standards. However, there are procedures (defined in GA/RT6001 and GA/RT6006) by which, if certain conditions are satisfied, non-compliances with Railway Group Standards can be regularised. Acceptance Procedures for Operations Falling within the Scope of this Guidance Note 5.2.1 Arrangements for Mixed and Exclusive Running The vehicle acceptance process in this case is: a) A Certificate of Engineering Acceptance is required, but is based on compliance with the amended list of Railway Group Standards requirements as defined in GM/RT2452 (see Section 6, below). b) A Route Acceptance Safety Case is presented to Railtrack with a Certificate of Engineering Acceptance as supporting evidence. The risks which are normally covered by Engineering Acceptance, but which are in this case excluded from its scope, need to be covered in the Route Acceptance Safety Case, as required by GM/RT2452. A Train Operators Railway Safety Case is required, as usual. Any non compliances with Railway Group Standards not covered by GM/RT2452 are dealt with via the procedure in GA/RT6001 and GA/RT6006. 5.2.2 Arrangements for Parallel and Limited Exclusive Running In this case HSE will normally allow an exemption from the requirement for the Train Operator to hold a Railway Safety Case approved by Railtrack for operation on its controlled infrastructure. This in turn means that compliance with Railway Group Standards is not required. The arrangements which control access to and traversing of Railtrack controlled infrastructure and any issues relating to compatibility of LVs and the infrastructure should be dealt with via local arrangements agreed with the Railtrack Zone concerned, and involving other Train Operators as appropriate. 5.2
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6 Guidance on Light Vehicles

6.1 General Requirements The requirements are set down in GM/RT2452, which: a) Indicates how the list of Group Standards which normally fall within the scope of Engineering Acceptance is modified to take account of the fact that it may not be reasonably practicable for LVs to comply with certain sections of these Standards. b) Specifies what is to be done to control risk in areas where the corresponding Railway Group Standards, or sections thereof, have been removed from the mandatory requirements. c) Indicates how the Route Acceptance process is applied in this case. Guidance is given below on the interpretation of certain requirements of GM/RT2452 and on aspects of other Railway Group Standards where achieving compliance may not be straightforward when operating LVs. 6.2 Wheelset Geometry and Vehicle Suspension Requirements The suite of Railway Group Standards in GM/RM2525 Wheelsets Manual includes, in GM/RT2026 / 8 and GM/TT0089, requirements in respect of wheel profile geometry. For HVs, choice of wheel profile is limited to a small number of designs which have been proven over many years of service operation. The flange back-to-back dimension is standard over the range of these profiles. It is recognised that in LVs these requirements may be too restrictive. In particular, trams normally use grooved rails for street running and perhaps flange running, and because of this there may be compatibility problems both in terms of the wheel profile and the flange back-to-back dimension. GM/RT2452 therefore permits flexibility in the choice of these parameters. However a number of potential hazards arise, and a thorough analysis of the wheel / rail interface behaviour should be carried out before the Railway Group Standard parameters are varied. The potential hazards include: Generation of effective conicities, when running on Railtrack controlled infrastructure, which may lead to dynamic stability problems; Excessive wear of wheels and rails in curves due to a mismatch of the profile geometry; The generation of excessive wheel/rail contact stresses; Inadequate guidance in switches and crossings and at other track features; Inadvertent contact with track components in both plain line and switches and crossings; Increased tendency towards flange climbing derailment; Inadequate performance in degraded modes of the track system e.g. when traversing broken rails.
In assessing the behaviour of vehicle suspensions and their influence on derailment propensity, it should be noted that the relevant Railway Group Standard, GM/RT2141, permits vehicles to be accepted via a fairly simple set of static and dynamic tests. However, these tests have been derived on an empirical basis from many years of experience of the behaviour of existing HVs. This simplified method is therefore restricted in its application to arrangements of which there is appropriate practical experience. Where a vehicle has features such as steering axles, coupled axles, independent wheels, etc, which are untried on Railtrack controlled infrastructure, a more fundamental analysis of the risks should be undertaken, including, as appropriate, measurement of wheel / rail forces in track tests. 6.3 Crashworthiness It is clear that the longitudinal load and crashworthiness requirements of GM/RT2100 will be extremely difficult to meet in cases where: 6 RAILTRACK
a) The vehicle has a low floor / coupler height and thus very limited structural strength at the coupler height specified for HVs. b) There is a need to minimise weight in order to allow high acceleration and the normal heavy rail structural requirements would impose a significant weight penalty. GM/RT2452 therefore permits reduced crashworthiness, provided that this is compensated by the use of a signalling system which provides a very high degree of protection against collisions between LVs and HVs. 6.4 Braking System Performance It is likely that routes carrying light rail traffic will have signalling which is specifically designed for that traffic, so the requirement for vehicles to meet braking curves intended to allow general operation on Railtracks network (see GM/RT2044) is waived in this case. GM/RT2452 sets out the requirements to ensure compatibility of braking and signalling systems in a situation where the normally mandatory requirements are not applied. However, it should be noted that GM/RT2044 also contains requirements relevant to braking system integrity and compliance is required with the latter. 6.5 Vehicle Gauging Requirements The assessment of vehicle gauging envelopes (via the process described in GM/RT2149) and the associated clearances to the infrastructure and to other vehicles (see GC/RT5204) will depend on such factors as the relative size of the proposed vehicles and of those already using the routes in question. In some cases, a relatively simple assessment may suffice. However, it should be noted that the vehicle gauging information, in whatever form, which is supplied to Railtrack should be assessed as part of the Engineering Acceptance process, and the Certificate of Engineering Acceptance should be the confirmation that the Vehicle Acceptance Body is satisfied as to the accuracy of the data which is supplied, in accordance with Section 6.3 of GO/RT3270. As is the case for HVs, there is no requirement for LVs to be compatible with a standard structure gauge provided that the necessary minimum clearances to the infrastructure and adequate passing clearance to other vehicles on adjacent tracks are available. However, it should be noted that LVs may, whilst being of smaller body cross section in the passenger area, be wider than conventional vehicles in the area around the bogies and their under-clearance may also be more restricted. They may also use a pantograph which is wider than the designs commonly used by HVs. All these areas should therefore be given careful attention in checking clearances. If LVs are fitted with retractable mirrors to give the driver a view along the side of the vehicle, then: either a) these should be entirely within the swept envelope used for gauging purposes; or a) there should be an interlock system such that the vehicle cannot move off from rest with the mirrors deployed.
6.6 Visibility and Audibility of Vehicles GM/RT2452 allows a dispensation in respect of the requirement for a minimum 2 of 1m of warning yellow at the vehicle front end in circumstances where this compromises the need to provide the driver with a large field of view for street running and where the vehicle has a low maximum speed and high emergency braking performance. RAILTRACK 7

It is recognised that there are potential conflicts in respect of vehicle front end lighting between Railway Safety Principles and Guidance part 2 section G Guidance on Tramways and GM/RT2180 as follows: a) The height of the headlamps; b) The use of the central (upper) lamp as a headlamp or a marker light; c) The use of brake lights and high intensity fog lamps. For trams, GM/RT2452 permits the headlamp height to be below the 1500mm minimum figure applicable to HVs, but requires the height to be as close as is practicable to the maximum recommended figure (1200mm) for highway operation. Where the requirements of tramway running dictate the use of the upper lamp as a headlamp operating at an intensity which does not allow compliance with the requirements (relating to glare) of Section 6.4 of GM/RT2180, the upper lamp should be capable of being switched so as to operate at low intensity when on Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure. Where LVs are fitted with brake lights and/or high intensity rear fog lamps, a risk assessment should be carried out in order to determine whether these should be switched off when running on or parallel to Railtrack controlled infrastructure. The factors to be considered in the assessment should include: a) The length of the route over which the use of brake lights/fog lamps may cause problems for the drivers of other vehicles; b) The density and types of traffic involved; c) The nature of the signalling system; d) The complexity of the arrangements which are required in order to achieve the switching on and off, and the risk associated with failure of the switching system or its incorrect use, when on-sight running is involved In order to meet the minimum requirements for audibility which are laid down in GM/RT2180, whilst achieving a warning which is in keeping with the environment in which a tram runs (see Railway Safety Principles and Guidance Part 2, Section G) it may be necessary to incorporate a switching arrangement to change the volume and character of the warning provided by the horn. Where reasonably practicable, the change over should be automatic or associated with some other driver initiated change, so as to minimise the risk of error. 6.7 Overhead Electrification Warning Line The requirement in GM/RT2181 is based on clearances required for 25kV ac overhead systems and on the wire height limits generally applicable to Railtrack infrastructure. Where a different voltage / non standard wire height is employed, GM/RT2452 permits the warning line height to be varied outside the normal limits, based on a risk assessment.
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7 Guidance on Heavy Vehicles
GO/RT3270 places an obligation on Railtrack, and on all the Train Operators involved, in respect of the arrangements necessary to allow safe operation. In particular, where there are changes to the infrastructure or to operating procedures as a result of the need to operate particular vehicles, Railtrack are required to inform all Train Operators who are potentially affected and to ensure that, where appropriate, each submits a revised Route Acceptance Safety Case to RSAB. In respect of the operation of LVs, examples of issues affecting operation of HVs might be: a) Running safety at switches and crossings or other track features where it is proposed to modify to a non - standard design in order to allow compatibility with LV wheelset geometry. b) Enhancements to the braking system performance of HVs or addition of systems to improve available adhesion. c) Fitting of SPAD Protection systems to HVs. d) Operating restrictions on HVs at stations with low platforms. Note that the obligation on other Train Operators still remains even where the LVs operate without a Railway Safety Case approved by Railtrack (Section 5.2.2). In a situation where, for example, there are modifications to Railtrack controlled infrastructure in the Common Section of Route over which there is Limited Exclusive Running, the effect of those modifications on the safety of other vehicles needs to be assessed via the Route Acceptance process.
8 Guidance on Signalling Systems

8.1 Exclusive Running Exclusive running is a method of shared use of a section of railway which is ideally suited to the situation where there is a requirement for a residual heavy rail service on part of a route which is otherwise a metro or light rail network or a tramway. It may be for example that night-time or off-peak freight paths are required which will occupy a section of railway which is normally operated by LVs. However if the Common Section of Route has intermediate signalling for use by HVs, this should be used to control the LVs unless an alternative system providing an equivalent level of safety is used. This is a point of principle whereby levels of protection afforded by existing systems must not be degraded. Traffic patterns between heavy and light rail may vary to such an extent that additional signalling may be required to cater for closer headway between light rail vehicles. Where such signalling is overlaid, it should not compromise the performance of the HV system but may be of a form appropriate to the LV mode. However, full line of sight operation is unlikely to be acceptable on an otherwise signalled railway. 8.2 Limited Exclusive Running In this case the method of exclusion should positively prevent encroachment by the other mode. Although signalling appropriate to each mode may be used to enable access to the section when it is available, the other mode should be excluded by physical means such as the lie of points. It is equally important that after the use of such a section of railway by each mode, the proof of clearance of the section by that mode and the availability of the section to the other is guaranteed in both the normal and degraded conditions (equipment failures). 8.3 Mixed Running In this situation, the consequences of a collision would be very significantly worsened by incompatibility of vehicles from each mode, even at relatively low RAILTRACK 9

speeds. Reliance on signal observation alone is therefore unlikely to provide sufficiently low collision probability to reduce the risk as far as is reasonably practicable, and GM/RT2452 requires additional protection systems to be provided. The protection arrangements provided for each mode should be compatible with those of the other mode and be appropriate to the performance characteristics of the vehicles concerned (particularly their braking performance). In situations where either the LV or HV systems are not otherwise fitted with suitable protection arrangements*, and these are being adopted for the purpose of shared running, their use should not necessarily be limited to protecting against collisions between light and heavy vehicles. The ranking of protection may however be considered to be in the following order of importance: a) Protection against collision where an HV hits an LV; b) Protection against collision where an LV hits an HV; c) Protection against collision between similar vehicles. 8.4 Parallel Running Here the signalling arrangements will depend on the nature of the part of Railtrack controlled infrastructure involved and the local operating arrangements which are proposed. 8.5 Train Detection In applications where track circuits, axle counters or treadles are proposed, careful consideration should be given to aspects of LV design which may have an adverse effect on the operation of such train detection devices. This should include: the effect of low axle load on wheel/rail electrical continuity and on the ability to operate treadles; any features, such as the presence of resilient elements in wheels or the absence of an axle in independent wheel designs, which may necessitate the provision of additional equipment to ensure electrical continuity between wheel treads; the influence of wheel profile geometry, including flange depth, thickness, etc, on wheel/rail electrical continuity and on the ability to operate axle counters and treadles; the effects of very short or long inter-axle spacings which could cause loss of detection by track circuits.
Where LVs are required to be capable of being scanned by hot axle box detectors, consideration should be given to the ability of the wheels to operate the detectors which activate the system. 8.6 Trailable Points If the Railtrack controlled infrastructure includes trailable points (e.g. Train Operated Points as described in GK/RT0065, run back catch points or spring points) there should be an assessment to confirm that the LV can drive the points fully to the reverse position. Issues to be considered include the axle loading and the flange profile. It should be noted that return spring pressures on Railtrack controlled infrastructure may be higher than those encountered in infrastructure which is purpose built for LVs. *Such as full Automatic Train Protection (ATP), trainstop systems, Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) or other forms of train protection.
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8.7 Degraded Modes In view of the potentially severe consequences of a collision between an LV and an HV, the assessment of the method of operation when the signalling / protection systems are in degraded mode should receive particular attention and appropriate control measures implemented so that the associated risk is reduced so far as in reasonably practicable.
9 Guidance on Station Design

9.1 General Context Hazards are introduced into the rail network by platforms which are significantly lower than the 915mm above rail height which normally applies on Railtrack controlled infrastructure. a) Low platforms will make trespass easier and passengers may assume it is safe to cross the tracks since this may be permitted elsewhere on the route operated by LVs. b) HVs passing low platforms will also add hazards which may not occur on other parts of the route operated by LVs. c) Where a low platform is positioned adjacent to tracks carrying HVs, the HVs may overhang the platform. This introduces a new risk in that people on the edge of the low platform may be struck by the HV and it increases the risk of people being swept up by the slip stream of HVs travelling at high speeds. There are fundamentally two types of station which may require low platforms on shared track routes: a) Light Vehicle Stations b) Joint stations Stations served by LVs only. Stations served by HVs and LVs.
Joint stations will need separate platforms if light rail requires a lower platform height. Both types of station can be: either Parallel or Series Low platforms are situated on tracks which are used by HVs in a track sharing sense (i.e. including interlaced track, etc). The tracks with low platforms are separated for exclusive use by LVs e.g. on a loop.
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9.2 Low Platforms The following principles should apply to low platform provision in all cases: a) They should be designed, built, operated and maintained so to reduce risk so far as is reasonably practicable considering all the hazards likely to occur at their specific locations. b) The platform edge is recognised to be a danger area and should be clearly identified as such to the public and ample platform width provided to avoid the need for people to occupy it except when boarding and alighting from LVs. c) Trespass should be discouraged by all reasonably practicable means. It is not practical to prevent trespass at all locations. Any anti-trespass measures dictated by the use of low platforms should be additional to those required by GC/RT5201. d) Measures should be taken to avoid passengers becoming confused and behaving in a manner that would put them at risk through not realising that they are at a station used by HVs. e) No new pedestrian crossings should be provided at shared track stations unless either: - operation of HVs is confined to night time or rare occasions and special arrangements are made to positively keep people off low platforms at such times or; - safety is assured by other means. f) Low platforms should not be used where there are exposed top contact conductor rails which would present a hazard to people on the platforms or to trespassers. g) Low platforms will normally be under CCTV surveillance and a means provided so that the station operator can take action, including public address warnings, if dangerous situations occur. 9.3 Specific Control Measures at Platforms The table in Appendix A gives an indication of some of the measures which might be applied in order to achieve these principles. Not all of these will apply at specific locations and further measures may be required in some cases. The numbers in brackets indicate the principle(s) to which the measure applies. (Principle a applies in all cases). 9.4 People with Mobility Impairment and Disabilities All measures should take into account people with mobility impairments and disabilities. In many cases this will require duplication so that, for example, a warning is given by audible, visible and touch sensitive means. 9.5 Factors for Consideration The need for the above measures will depend on factors such as: Train service levels Types of trains Speed of trains Electrification systems Use of station Likelihood of trespass Proximity to existing crossing points and their nature LV service characteristics Extent of overhang of platforms Visibility Site constraints
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The responsibility for the implementation of suitable arrangements will lie with all the LV Operators concerned, with the Station Operator and with Railtrack.
10 Guidance on Lineside Signing for Safe Movement of Trains

It is essential that lineside signing be designed in such a way as to minimise driver confusion, given the different types of traffic using a route. Unless the layout / operating arrangements are so complex that it will lead to an over proliferation of signs, consideration should be given to a system in which all signs apply either to LVs alone or to HVs alone, with each type of sign being distinctively identified. Lineside speed restriction signs on Railtrack controlled infrastructure are conventionally in miles/h with figures displayed on a white background in a red circle. Many LV systems operate in km/h. In order to provide continuity for the drivers of both types of vehicle, separate signs should be provided for HVs and for LVs. The design of speed restriction signs applicable to LVs should ensure that there is minimum risk of driver confusion through the use of a distinctive shape and colour The diamond shape illustrated in Appendix A Figure 11 of HSE Safety Principles and Guidance - Part 2 Section G Guidance on Tramways - should be used where trams operate, but care should be taken to ensure that there is no confusion with the signs which are used on Railtrack as radio channel markers. It is the responsibility of the LV Operator and Railtrack to agree the arrangements. Railtrack must ensure that other Train Operators are fully involved, as required by GO/RT3270.
11 Guidance on Rule Book Requirements

When LVs operate over a section of the Railtrack network, the following guidelines apply: a) As far as is practicable, there should be minimum change from the Railtrack Rule Book GO/RT3000, but it is recognised that some local variation may be necessary. b) Any special requirements associated with the particular operation should be the subject of local instructions. c) Particular care should be taken in the arrangements whereby staff are informed of the applicable rules so as to ensure that staff of Railtrack and of all the Train Operators concerned (and of their contractors, where appropriate) are fully aware of the requirements and of their responsibilities, and of the areas in which these apply. It is the responsibility of Railtrack and all the Train Operators to agree appropriate arrangements.
12 Guidance on Radio Systems

A secure system of radio communication should be provided between the driver of LVs and the signaller controlling the movement of vehicles in order to support Driver Only Operation (Passenger) during normal operation and in emergencies. This is in line with existing requirements for Driver Only Operation of passenger trains and with GO/RT3410.
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Where the basic radio systems used by Railtrack and the other administrations over which the vehicles operate are not compatible, arrangements should be put in place such that: a) A signaller requiring to send a general broadcast call to all vehicles on the route should be able to do so via a single action which will cause the message to be received in the appropriate cabs of all the vehicle types. b) A driver wishing to send an emergency call to the Railtrack signaller or the control centre of the other administration(s) over which the vehicles operate should be able to use one handset and console for all such messages and the design of the console should be such as to minimise errors in the routing of messages.
13 Guidance on Electrical Power Supplies

Where there is a proposal for an electrification system specifically for use by an LV operator and the requirements specified in the appropriate Railway Group Standards cannot be met, GA/RT6001 or GA/RT6006 should be used. It may be convenient, particularly in a situation where the supply system is used for light rail vehicles only, for the electrical supplies to be controlled not by Railtrack but by the external administration as an extension of its existing system. In this case it will be necessary for Railtrack to demonstrate in its Railway Safety Case the adequacy of the system employed to control the power supply (including the arrangements for contacting the control room for emergency switching purposes) and the competence of the staff involved.
14 Guidance on the Safety of People On or Near the Line

For all form of shared running and for parallel running in a situation where the LV and HV routes are not separated by a fence or other barrier, the risk to trackside workers and to passengers detrained in emergency should be assessed and measures put in place to reduce the risk so far as is reasonably practicable. The risk assessment should consider, as a minimum the following: electrification systems, in situations where the equipment has characteristics which differ from those of the standard equipment used on Railtrack controlled infrastructure or where an adjacent system is electrified but the Railtrack controlled infrastructure is not; the availability of places of safety and in particular how the safe use of these may be affected by traffic on an adjacent system; variations in the speed and character of trains; the effectiveness of trackside warning systems for both HVs and LVs.
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FIG 1 - ACCEPTANCE PROCESS FOR RAIL VEHICLES
Confirmation of compliance with vehicle related Railway Group Standards
Issue of Certificate of Engineering Acceptance
BOUNDARY OF ENGINEERING ACCEPTANCE Confirmation that vehicle related risks not within the scope of Engineering Acceptance have been reduced to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable. (Includes issues arising from local infrastructure peculiarities)
BOUNDARY OF ROUTE ACCEPTANCE SAFETY CASE
Confirmation that the Train Operator has processes in place to control operations within limits imposed by the Route Acceptance Safety Case
Issue of Certificate of Authority to Operate
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Operation of Trams and Light Rail or Metro Vehicles Over Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure Appendix A
Specific Control Measures at Platforms
Measure Use parallel rather than series arrangement Interlaced track Small projections along platform edge at LV doorway positions Platform edge treatment Platform surface colouring Use standard platform treatments (edge and colouring) on rest of LV system Design stations to have a railway character Stagger platforms to avoid temptation to cross line other than at designated crossing point Stagger platforms to minimise joint station risks Provide or make use of existing grade separated means of crossing the line and design layout so these are at the natural crossing point Use arris rail or other unfriendly walking surfaces on the track and at the ends of low platforms Fences between tracks, at back and ends of platforms Speed limits Other restrictions on HV operation including a requirement to sound horn Staffing stations (permanent or temporary) Platform signage, warning notices Public address CCTV Visual warnings (flashing lights, etc) Lockable gates on access to platforms Inhibit access to edge of low platform when HV passes
Station Type Either Either Either Either Either Either Either Either Joint Either
Parallel / Series Series Series Series Either Either Either Either Series Either
Principle (see section 9.2) b,d,f b b b d d d b,c,d b c,d,e,f
Either
Series
c,d,e,f
Either Either Either Either Either Either Either Either Either Joint
Either Either Either Either Either Either Either Series Series Series
c,d,e,f b,c,d b,c,d,e,f b,c,d,e,f,g b,c,d,e,g b,c,d,g b,c,g b,c,d,g b,c,d,e,f b
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Operation of Trams and Light Rail or Metro Vehicles Over Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure References
GA/RC6503 GA/RC6504 GA/RC6505 GA/RT6001 GA/RT6006 GC/RT5201 GC/RT5204 GK/RT0065 GM/RM2525 GM/RT2026 GM/RT2028 GM/RT2044 GM/RT2100 GM/RT2141 GM/RT2180 GM/RT2181 GM/RT2452 GM/TT0089 GO/RT3000 GO/RT3270 GO/RT3410
Code of Practice for Processing Railway Safety Case Applications Guidance on Railway Safety Cases for Validation and Acceptance By Railtrack Guidance on Submitting Material Revisions to Railway Safety Cases Railway Group Standards Change Procedures Derogations from Railway Group Standards Lineside Security Structure Gauging and Clearance Train Operated Points Wheelsets Manual Wheelsets: In Service Safety and Maintenance Attention Wheelset Design Braking System and Performance for Multiple Units Structural Requirements for Railway Vehicles Resistance of Railway Vehicles to Derailment and Roll-Over Visibility and Audibility of Trains on the Track Overhead Line Equipment (OLE) Warning Line on Traction and Rolling Stock Acceptance of Trams and Light Rail or Metro Vehicles for Shared Running on Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure Geometric Interfaces Between Railway Wheelsets and Track Master Rule Book Route Acceptance of Rail Vehicles Train Radio Communication Railway Safety Principles and Guidance Part 2 Section G Guidance on Tramways - Published by HSE
RAILTRACK
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Nick Howland Standards Project Manager Authorised by

Richard Spoors Controller, Railway Group Standards

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Table of Specific Control Measures at Platforms

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Health and Safety Responsibilities

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6 Guidance on Light Vehicles

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8 Guidance on Signalling Systems

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9 Guidance on Station Design

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10 Guidance on Lineside Signing for Safe Movement of Trains

11 Guidance on Rule Book Requirements

12 Guidance on Radio Systems

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13 Guidance on Electrical Power Supplies

14 Guidance on the Safety of People On or Near the Line

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FIG 1 - ACCEPTANCE PROCESS FOR RAIL VEHICLES

Confirmation of compliance with vehicle related Railway Group Standards

Issue of Certificate of Engineering Acceptance

BOUNDARY OF ROUTE ACCEPTANCE SAFETY CASE

Issue of Certificate of Authority to Operate

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