Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanons Last Najafi Generation

Michaelle Browers

Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies, Volume 5, Issue 1, Winter 2012, pp. 25-46 (Article) Published by ICAS Press DOI: 10.1353/isl.2012.0022

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/isl/summary/v005/5.1.browers.html

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Journal of Shia Islamic Studies

Winter 2012 Vol. V No. 1

Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanons Last Najafi Generation

MICHAELLE BROWERS
Dept. of Political Science, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA browerm@wfu.edu

ABSTRACT: This article reflects on what Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah represented during his lifetime and the significance of his death for Lebanese politics and society. I argue that Fadlallahs death signals the passing of a generation of uniquely independent and authoritative Shii cleric-intellectuals trained in Najaf. Fadlallahs ability to think independently was not only revealed in the realm of politics (where his typically subtle stance on wilayat alfaqih was but one example), but also in his role as a modern mujtahid and the broader societal role he often played. Further, it is the second and third aspects rather than any of the explicitly political stances Fadlallah took that were so key in Fadlallahs continuing relevance and significance for Shii and Lebanese politics. KEYWORDS: Lebanon; Fadlallah, Hizbullah; Arab Shia; wilayat al-faqih. Muhammad Husayn;

The death of a faithful scholar causes a void in Islam that nothing can fill.1 The death of Lebanons most prominent Shii cleric, Husayn Fadlallah on 4 July 2010 was mourned not followers and admirers. Various analysts of Lebanese articulated a sense that something had been lost with passing. According to the Economist, Muhammad only by his politics also this figures

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No one of his stature can now gently counter Hizbullahs claim to represent all Lebanese Shias or question its fealty to Iran. And there is one less ayatollah to challenge Ali Khamenei, Irans supreme leader, in his claim to lead all the worlds Shias. (Economist 2010) Departing from the common media trope of Fadlallah as Hizbullahs spiritual guide, David Schenker (2010) of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy declared that, as the the most credible moral, political, and theological alternative to Hezbollah, Fadlallah stood as the last bulwark against near total Iranian hegemony in Lebanon. While one must question whether Hizbullah has ever been able to claim to represent all of Lebanons Shia or whether Khamenei ever had the stature to substantiate the claim to lead all the Shia or even whether he has attempted to do so for many years it is striking to hear voices, even from those corners which had maligned Fadlallah as the oracle of terror during his life, declaring the moment bittersweet. The notion of a now unchecked Iranian hegemony is belied by the fact that there is not one but a plurality of potential alternatives to Fadlallah. It does seem to be the case that the two most prominent jurisprudential references remaining after Fadlallahs death are Khamenei and Ali Sistani, which would seem to offer very diffe rent choices for Lebanons Shia. The former would seem to carry with it an affirmation of wilayat al-faqih and Irans hand in Lebanon; the latter would involve emulating a cleric who has not only shown limited political engagement but who has declined to speak about the wide range of modern issues undertaken by Fadlallah. Khamenei and Sistani are perhaps the most prominent Shii maraji but not the only possibilities being discussed. As Hilal Khashan (2010: 438) noted, Fadlallahs passing away leaves Lebanese Shias without an indigenous marja . Other Lebanese clerics names have been mentioned as successors of sorts, including two of Fadlallahs former students, Husayn Khashan and Afif Nabulsi, the latter of whom is on good terms with Hizbullah. However, neither of these figures yet has the necessary religious credentials to be considered a marja. Inquiries to Fadlallahs office have led to two other suggestions from outside Lebanon: Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad, the second most senior cleric in Iraq after Sistani, and Muhammad Ibrahim Jannti, an Iranian ayatollah who overlapped with Fadlallah in Najaf, where they were both students. Fadlallahs passing also leaves behind more practical questions

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regarding who would carry on this figures vast networks in Lebanon and elsewhere. Two of Fadlallahs sons, Ali and Jafar, have taken over much of the responsibility for Fadlallahs office and charities (Fadlallahs brother, Muhammad Baqir Fadlallah, is general director of Mabarrat), but both are yet young and neither has sufficiently progressed in their studies to hold much socio-religious authority. Ali is currently giving the Friday sermons at the Hasanayn mosque where his father used to preach (and where he often filled in when his father was ill). Bayynat.org, the official website created by Fadlallahs office in 1997, continues to circulate sermons and fatwas from the late cleric and now includes statements by, and reports on, the activities of Ali Fadlallah; email inquiries sent through the website are still answered, usually through reiteration of one of the late clerics past statements or rulings. It may well be an indication of both the singularity of Fadlallah and the lack of available clerics in the Lebanese sphere capable of fulfilling a comparable role that, shortly after Fadlallahs death, his office announced on their website that it was permissible for those who emulated Fadlallah to continue to do so as long as a living religious authority deemed it permissible. A subsequent statement on 9 July 2010 (bayynat.org) affirmed that it is also permissible for those who have never emulated Fadlallah during his lifetime to start emulating him under the same circumstances. In response to inquiries as to whether or how Fadlallah is to be followed when new issues arise, the office clarified that new issues must be referred to a living religious authority while at the same time affirming that Fadlallah comprehensively covered modern issues so that, at least in the short term, his opinions might suffice (see Inquiries on Emulation). However, the aim of this article is more to examine the nature of the vacuum Fadlallah leaves behind than to speculate over what might fill that space that is, to examine the wider significance of the loss of this public intellectual for Lebanese politics and society. This requires assessing what Fadlallah represented and contributed during his lifetime, as well as attempting to delineate the complex matter of Fadlallahs relationship to Hizbullah. Rather than viewing Fadlallah as a lost bulwark against Iranian hegemony, I argue more broadly that Fadlallahs death marks the passing of a generation of independent Shii cleric-intellectuals that he so well represented. Fadlallahs ability to think independently was not only revealed on occasion in the realm of politics (where his typically subtle stance against wilayat al-faqih, which

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places Lebanese Shia under the authority of Iran, was but one example), but also apparent in his role as a modern mujtahid (a religious authority who was able to generate a large and rich body of rulings, which demonstrated clarity of language, pragmatism, and adaptability to the conditions of modern society) and the broader societal role he often played (e.g., his ability to transcend the realm of Shiism, which allowed him to facilitate dialogue and champion coexistence among Lebanons sects). Further, it is the second and third aspects rather than any of the explicitly political stances Fadlallah took that were so key in Fadlallahs continuing relevance and significance for Shii and Lebanese politics.

Spiritual Guide or Bulwark?

Fadlallah is all too commonly characterized in the Western media and by many Western academic analyses as the spiritual guide, spiritual leader, or even spokesperson for Hizbullah.2 While it is undeniable that Fadlallah has been an important figure, even a direct teacher, and likely even the marja taqlid for many members of Hizbullah, Fadlallah has long denied that he has had any operational or official role in the group and is explicit about his desire to remain independent and above the organizational framework of any party. An issue of al-Ahd dated 10 Muharram 1405 (6 October 1984) offers perhaps the first of what would become many occasions upon which Fadlallah would be quoted as denying he is a leader of Hizbullah or any other group. Certainly, distance from the existing political party affiliation allows him to draw from a wider range of followers, including those who do not subscribe to the policies of Hizbullah or Amal. Fadlallah has further denied that Islam has any such thing as a murshid ruhi. At the same time, Fadlallahs writings and sermons have inspired, added substance to, and justified many of the actions and policies of Hizbullah, particularly throughout the 1980s when he was a regular contributor to Hizbullahs official mouthpiece, the same weekly newspaper in which he offered that early denial of affiliation: al-Ahd.3 However, the oft-repeated trope of Fadlallah as spiritual guide of Hizbullah both oversimplifies and misunderstands the clerics complex relationship with that organization. First of all, Hizbullah officially advocates emulation of another religious authority. The organization adheres to the institution of wilayat al-faqih, as defined by the Ruhollah Khomeini. Hizbullah

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recognized Khomeini as the official marja al-taqlid (religious-legal authority of emulation) of the Islamic Republic. As such, from the beginning Hizbullah paid homage and allegiance to Khomeini. Hizbullahs 1985 Open Letter proclaims: Our behavior is dictated to us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading jurist (wilayat al-faqih) and We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. After Khomeinis death, the same allegiance and respect was accorded to Ali Khamenei, his officially chosen successor.4 Hizbullahs deputy secretary general, Naim Qassem (2005: 51), notes in his recent book that the decision of Jihad is tied to al-wali al-faqihwho determines the rules and restrictions of confrontation (qarar al-jihad murtabit bil-wali lfaqihalladhi yuhaddid qawaid al-muwajaha wa dawabitaha). However, Qassem distinguishes between referring to (or consulting with) the marja and emulating him, in order to suggest that in terms of the private matters of ibadat (ritual practices) and muamalat (daily dealings) members of Hizbullah may refer to or consult with another marja and many members of Hizbullah certainly do look to Fadlallah on various issues. However, when it comes to the public domain of political matters, Qassem is clear that the only marja to emulate is Khamenei, who determines political and legal obligations. Further, while Fadlallah has remained widely respected and was the highest ranking Shii religious figure in Lebanon until his death, his relations with Hizbullah have often been strained. The rift widened after Fadlallah objected to Hizbullahs decision to support Ali Khamenei to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini as Irans Supreme Leader in 1989. However, it would be a mistake to interpret Fadlallahs independence from both Iran and Hizbullah as hostility to either. Most of his agreements with both entities have been quiet and subtle, and his sermons and statements regularly praise and defend the Islamic Republic. So, on some occasions it is apparent that Fadlallah is able to provide a sort of direct check upon the policies and positions of Hizbullah, while on other occasions he seems to lend support to or provide justification for Hizbullahs actions and opinions. More typically, however, Fadlallah seems to have positioned himself outside (or above) the sphere of Hizbullah politics in order to play an entirely different role in Lebanese society. Fadlallah has always cultivated a sense that he was above party and politics. In his own words:

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Regarding Hezbollah, it is known that the generation that represents Hezbollah, is a generation that has been brought up on my thoughts before the eighties, whether in Lebanon or in Iraq, as it is the case with respect to Hezb Addaawah AlIslamia as well as other parties in Iraq. That is because I was born in Iraq and I lived there for many years, and thus many Iraqi Muslims benefited from my books and thoughts. The Lebanese Muslim youths have also benefited from my knowledge before Hezbollah was founded. And when Hezbollah was founded I was not a part of it and I used to tell them: I am not a part of you because I do not engage in party politics. But, when you ask my opinion on some positions, I support them if I agree with them, otherwise I do not support them. (Fadlallah 2007) Several examples of Fadlallah acting independently of, and in ways that countered, Hizbullahs decisions and stances are analyzed below. However, I first want to draw attention to something that Fadlallah subtly identifies as two features that distinguish his thinking from that of Hizbullah: generational difference and the difference made by his experience in Najaf.

The Najafi Generation

Certainly, Fadlallah emerges from a political generation5 distinct from that of the current Hizbullah generation. Fadlallahs generation was formed in the hawza of Najaf, in a period marked a confrontation between the ulama of Najaf, with its traditional education and strict hierarchical structure, and communists, whose call was prevailing throughout the Middle East. Fadlallah describes a kind of intellectual terrorism (irhab) in this period toward anything Islamic (in Sharaf alDin 1996: 110). It was against this trend that Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (1935-2001), who went on to head Lebanons Higher Islamic Shii Council after Musa al-Sadrs disappearance, began to insist that the very purpose of ijtihad (independent reasoning) is to apply Islamic theory to all spheres of human life (1990: 49). It was also against this trend that Fadlallah began to preach that the jurist who removes himself from contemporary politics risks losing his function as a marja (authority) in other realms of life (Hasani 1993: 103), and that inspiration could be drawn from Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1963-1980) and his engagement

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with social, economic, and political philosophy. This generations most prominent figures graduated from the reformist schools set up by Muntada al-Nashr (Bahadili 1993) and were present in Iraq during the formation of the first revolutionary Shii Islamist party, Hizb al-Dawah al-Islamiyyah (around 1957 or 1958). Fadlallah, as well as Shams al-Din, was born in Najaf and they remained there until the ages of 31 and 33, respectively. Mallat (1993) has captured the Shii internationalism of this moment between the mid-1940s and the 1970s, when Najaf stood as the most respected center of learning for Shia. These generations are discussed and compared at greater length in Browers 2011. Suffice it to say here that there are important differences between the generation of Fadlallah, Shams al-Din, Sadr and others and that of the generation created along with Hizbullah. Although the past and present secretary generals of Lebanons Hizbullah, Abbas al-Musawi (1952-1992) and Hasan Nasrallah (b. 1960), each studied in Najaf, their time at the hawzah was cut short by Iraqi government repression. 6 Despite their role in creating the Dawah party, the Najafi generations first concern was always with the task of formulating a Shii Islamist worldview against competing (secular) ideologies and to make this ideology relevant to the exigencies of modern society. Whereas Shams al-Din and Fadlallah were still studying at the hawzah of Najaf in their early thirties, Nasrallah seems to have entered into party work immediately upon his return from Najaf, first with Amal and then with Hizbullah after it was established. By the age of 32 Nasrallah had been elected secretary general of Hizbullah. The generation which emerged with the creation of Hizbullah has always displayed a preference for direct action over intellectual work and more of a penchant for pragmatic, even strategic, political thinking. Despite the shrinking pool of intellectual-activist clerics from Fadlallahs generation and Hizbullahs seeming domination of Shii politics in Lebanon, the country has always contained multiple points of reference for Shii religious authority, or marjaiyyah (a marja is a senior religious authority with a following, and his office is known as the marjaiyyah). As Rula Jurdi Abisaab (2009: 218) has noted, the power of the ulama relies on how many followers they can attract and, in turn, how much economic power they can generate. Fadlallah certainly wielded great authority by virtue of his close association with Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khui, who he represented in Lebanon for twenty-five years; his ability to offer modern interpretations on a wide range of issues of concern to peoples daily lives; and his extensive

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network of charitable, educational, and other services. 7 However, the emulators of a marja (muqallidun) that is lay the Shia citizens of Lebanon possess some power as well by virtue of their ability to give or withhold support. Of course, that power of the latter is diminished when the field of alternative sources of authority shrinks that is, with the loss of Fadlallah.8 The remainder of this essay will provide various examples meant to illustrate both the independence and singularity of this thinker as he contributed toward the plurality of religious authority in Lebanons religious, social and political spheres.

Fadlallah as a Point of Reference for al-Sahat al-Islamiyyah

The unique character of Fadlallah was clarified for me on 7 May 2009, when I attended a live webcast discussion on End of Life Issues in Medical Care featuring Fadlallah and sponsored by the Medical Faculty and Biomedical Ethics program of the American University of Beirut. Fadlallah has given considerable attention to issues related to religion and medicine/science in his writings, sermons, and fatwas. On this occasion, Fadlallah maintained that, in general, doctors, patients, and family members, do not have a right to end a human life, since no person (only God) owns a human life (la yamliku insan hayatu). However, he argued that, in particular cases, the withholding or removal of life support may be justified, for example, when a person is brain-dead and the machine is the only thing keeping the body going. The most interesting aspect of this discussion was hearing medical students and faculty ask Fadlallah not only about general issues (on the relationship between religion and medicine, for example), but also about specific cases (if patient x is terminal....). His answers sought to join scientific principles (a faith in scientific progress and the possibility of new discoveries) and religious principles (a faith in Gods will being done) which resulted in a call for individuals to exercise individual judgment while taking responsibility for refraining from harm. There was very little in Fadlallahs remarks that struck one as particular to Islam (as opposed to Christianity) and nothing that struck one as particularly Shii (as opposed to Sunni). Rather, Fadlallahs use of generically religious, occasionally generically Islamic, language meant that he came across as something akin to a religious humanist.9 Surprised by the fact that in such a sectarian country a prominent religious figure (who is so clearly associated with one confessional grouping) would be called on to address this difficult issue before such

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a diverse audience, I asked several attending medical faculty and students what they thought of the discussion and what they thought of the decision to invite Fadlallah to hold forth on this topic. The response was generally positive: no one in the room was protesting this invitation and all questions seemed to indicate a real desire to hear Fadlallahs perspective. One man stated that it was entirely natural that Fadlallah would be asked to do this, since he writes widely on these issues and draws from a variety of sources in formulating a very modern and rational approach to these questions. When I asked whether there might be a subsequent discussion with Sunni or Christian thinkers, the man stated firmly that the medical school invited Fadlallah as someone who has written much about the topic from an ethical perspective, not as a representative of a sect.10 Rather than a spiritual guide for one Islamic party, Fadlallahs influence expands over a wider Islamic arena (al-sahat al-islamiyyah) and, as the above example attests, he has occasionally been sought out as an ethical thinker, regardless of sect or religion. Although Fadlallah is often attributed with playing a central role in the conceptualization of the Islamic situation (al-halat al-Islamiyyah) associated with Hizbullahs society of resistance (mujtama al-muqawamah),11 which viewed the state of the Shia community as a problematic to be overcome through the establishment of a religious-political solidarity among Lebanons Shia in a way that both gives meaning to the individual and binds that individual into responsibility for carrying out a collective project, he also contributes toward the creation of an Islamic milieu that transcends the narrow identity frames of Lebanese politics. This is apparent in an August 2009 interview Joseph Alagha (2011: 246) conducted with Fadlallah, when the cleric maintained that Lebanese society was transforming from al-halat al-Islamiyyah to al-sahat alIslamiyyah and voiced his advocacy of latter. 12 Fadlallah characterized the former as a transitory stage that has served its purpose. In the first stage, the aim was to unify the Shia community and activists in the wake of the Iranian revolution under the banner of an overarching Islamic ideology through a top-down revolutionary process. In the early 1990s, Hizbullah shifted toward a more bottom-up strategy that involved participation in the democratic system. According to Fadlallah, this shift in strategy carried with it a different political ethic, based on greater openness toward other communities. Alagha recounts that Fadlallah explained that the concept of al-halat al-Islamiyyah,

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was mainly concerned with establishing an Islamic state where minorities, such as Christians and Jews, were treated as ahl al-dhimma, that is, residents with limited rights and required to pay a tax in lieu of alms giving (zakat). Ayatullah Fadlallah clarified that in al-saha al-Islamiyya notions such as the Islamic state and ahl al-dhimma are bygone ideological constructs that do not exist anymore. According to him, alsaha al-Islamiyya is a pluralistic Islamic cultural sphere where the concept of citizenship (muwatana) reigns, where all people have equal rights and duties, and where coexistence and mutual respect is the main norm. (Alagha 2011: 246) In fact, Fadlallah has long presented himself as the Shii leader most capable of facilitating dialogue among competing Shii factions and of leading the Shii community into dialogue with other sects in Lebanon. Fadlallah advocates taqrib (the mitigation of inter-Muslim differences) and tawhid (in this case, meaning the unification of all Muslim believers in the Islamic ummah). In the name of unity, Fadlallah has deemed Islamic infighting sacrilegious and ardently called for dialogue among competing Shii factions and among Sunnis and Shia. He has championed cooperation and dialogue between Muslims and Christians, attuned to points of convergence and common grounds upon which all parties agree. He has further championed dialogue and cooperation between Islamist and secular currents in Lebanon as well as elsewhere (e.g., he authorized such cooperation within the Iraqi opposition). Fadlallah argues there are no taboos in dialogue. Muslims should follow the example of the Prophet in engaging in civil dialogue even with polytheists, atheists and those who deny resurrection and/or prophecy (Fadlallah 1996). Fadlallah sometimes even goes so far as dropping the adjectives of Muslim and Islamic to speak of unification of mankind in a universal community. He has often asserted that he stands with every project that seeks to change reality to the benefit of Islam and stands on the side of oppressed people (almustadafin) everywhere (see e.g. Fadlallah 1990). Bayynat.org is full of statements and sermons from Fadlallah calling for dialogue in the face of every conflict as well as accounts of his own engagements in dialogue with religiously, politically, and ideologically diverse actors. What is less clear is whether the role Fadlallah played in regard to dialogue among Lebanese sects and factions was such that his death will have a detrimental impact on Lebanese politics. While

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Hizbullah has also advocated taqrib and dialogue on many occasions, it is certainly the case that Fadlallah and others of his generation (e.g. Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din) give the call for dialogue across divides and without limits and with greater emphasis in their writings and speeches than those of Nasrallahs generation. At least part of the reason must lie in the fact that the latter is more directly embedded in the everyday workings of a political and military struggle with sectarian dimensions. For example, Nasrallah succeeded in aligning his party with Michel Aouns Free Patriotic Movement with a 2006 Memorandum of Understanding (that has endured until now) and in 2008 managed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with Tripolis Salafis (which was abrogated by the Salafis the next day). But his calls for dialogue tend to be at the level of the party, not at a broader societal level: as secretary general of Hizbullah, he hardly has the ability to rise above political-strategic concerns such as defending his party and its interests. Further, Schaery-Eisenlohr (2008: 155) has astutely noted that Fadlallahs claim to transcend sect not only facilitates dialogue and coexistence, but also aims to break the hegemony and ownership other sectarian groups, in particular Christians and Sunnis, have held over public space in Lebanon. At the same time, it is also apparent that Fadlallahs redefinition of the very terms of coexistence involves the rather radical reconfiguring of the meaning of Shiism and its relation to other religions and groups. He does this not only by challenging the monopoly on power other groups might claim and not only by supporting taqrib among Lebanons sects and challenging relations of power among the groups, but also by, on occasion, overcoming and reinterpreting various provocative and exclusionary aspects of Shiism itself. In World of Our Youth, Fadlallah calls on young people to engage in politics, counselling that when they find themselves inspired to play a role in politics they must, study the intellectual, political, and functional manifeso of the party or the movement in question, with respect, on the one hand, to determine the youths affiliation and intellectual and doctrinal beliefs; and, on the other hand, to his concern and involvement in the affairs of the ummah, on the level where it realizes its main goals in staying the proper course. (Fadlallah 1998b: 164-5)

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Fadlallah calls on youth to judge carefully and to avoid affiliating out of fear. But also interesting is what he does not at any point call for: their joining of any particular party or group or even specification that the group or party they join need be Islamist in character.

A Critic of Wilayat al-Faqih

While Fadlallah supported Khomeini and the Islamic revolution in Iran, he has never accepted Khamenei as the wali al-faqih or marja for all Shia and his relationship to the concept wilayat al-faqih has always contained tensions, particularly in light of his consistent insistence upon the independence of clerical thinking (e.g., in J. Fadlallah, 1997: 35-37) and upon the plurality of guardian jurists (e.g., Fadlallah 2009a: 3137). Fadlallahs independence of the institution is apparent in the fact that he personally followed Abu al-Qasim al-Khui, who was already an established marja with widespread social institutions when Khomeini declared himself a marja. He also served as Khui s representative in Lebanon until that clerics death in 1992. According to Khashan (2010: 429), Fadlallah then briefly followed the teachings of Muhammad Rida Gulpaygani until his death in December 1993. Not approving of Tehrans appointment of Muhsin Araki after Khomeinis death, Khashan maintains that Fadlallah then followed Ali Sistani. 13 After Araki died in December 1994, the Islamic Republic named Khamenei the supreme leader, which again did not meet with Fadlallahs approval. Part of the issue lay in his disagreement with the idea that the supreme guide could only be Iranian. Fadlallah maintained that qualifications, without regard to nationality, should be the determining factor in selecting a marja (Hasani 2003: 153). Thus, in 1994, Fadlallah decided to claim marja status for himself, despite the exhortation of Ahmad Jannati, who flew to Beirut as Khameneis personal envoy with the task of dissuading Fadlallah from declaring his marjaiyyah. As the highest ranking Arab marja, Fadlallah cultivates a considerable following throughout the region. Many Shia in Lebanon, Syria and various Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Iraq, view him and not Khamenei as the model for emulation (marja al-taqlid). He has offices in Syria, Iran, the U.K, Germany and the Ivory Coast (Maktab Fadlallah 2003). In his writings on wilayat al-faqih, Fadlallah tends to diminish or relativize the theorys importance rather than rejecting it outright. He diminishes its importance at the level of practicality (1990). Fadlallah

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argues that all practicable routes toward the establishment of Islamic government should be pursued, but the idea of governing according the decisions of the mujutahid is not seen by him as very practical. Fadlallah refers to wilayat al-faqih as a juridical theory (nazariyyah fiqhiyyah) not a belief (aqidah). Further, in light of the fact of the silence of the faqih and the fact of the multiplicity of fuqaha, as well as the fact of the inevitable contradiction of their decisions, Fadlallah deems the notion of an absolute jurist is untenable. All jurists, no matter how wise, remain fallible, like all other believers. While arguing in some of his speeches and writings that Khomeinis interpretation can be justified in the interest of safeguarding the community (e.g. 2000b, esp. 163-5), Fadlallah seems to prefer Muhammad Baqir al-Sadrs notion of the governance of the ummah by itself as opposed to absolute wilayah. According to Fadlallah, the marjaiyyah should not be tied to one nation. He argues that that the Iranians have been monopolizing the institution of marjaiyyah for too long and suggests that wilayat al-faqih should rotate among the most learned of the Shia. He seems to attribute to the faqih a role more like that of the Catholic pope, as he argues for for strong involvement of the clergy in politics, but argues that they should possess wide influence, not govern directly (Hasani 1993: 95-96). At the same time, he argues that while the authority of the jurist is neither general nor absolute, in the event of a leadership vacuum the jurists mandate may be imposed in the name of the public interest (1994: 144). Thus, he at once localizes (or nationalizes) political authority at the same time he renders the authority of the marjaiyyah transnational. There have also been occasions when Fadlallah has taken the party to task for claiming to hold a monopoly on truth. For example, Nasrallah gave a speech prior to the 2005 election in which he declared it a taklif al-shari (an obligation based on Islamic law) for Shia to vote for the list Hizbullah endorsed.14 Fadlallah replied by using his 31 May 2005 column, The Stance of the Week, to vehemently criticize the use of taklif shari in the elections, arguing that such practices exploit Islamic concepts for political purposes (Fadlallah 2005). According to Fadlallah, God has granted each person an independent mind for which we are each individually responsible. While an individual of religious learning might be able to advise Muslims not to vote for corrupt candidates, the individual must decide for his or herself which candidate is corrupt and which is not.15 Here again we see a conflict between those Islamists who

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appropriated the Iranian interpretation of the marjaiyyah and wilayat al-faqih and members of the Najafi school associated with the attempt of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to offer a modern interpretation of a politically committed marjaiyyah, which is not confined to any single political structure or states (such as Iran), and a wilayah that holds political leadership within the domain of the state, such that the existence of many wilayah within the larger Islamic ummah is legitimated.

A Mujtahid for his Times

Fadlallahs life is replete with examples of what Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008: 76) identifies as his tendency to set himself apart from Hizbullah and ultimately from the Iranian religious elite. According to ShaeryEisenlohr, one of the main ways Fadlallah creates boundaries between his followers and those of Hizbullah is by justifying and practicing an approach to religious tradition and history based on scientific and rational methods against what he and his followers have come to identify as traditional Iranian approach to scholarship. Fadlallah has been central in developing an Islamist discourse to address many contemporary issues. He is confortable addressing complex contemporary matters with nuance and depth, but in a language comprehensible to the modern individual, such as the challenges and opportunities posed by such issues as secularism, pluralism, democracy, scientific and technological progress, and cultural Westernization. My sense is that Fadlallahs reconsiderations of Islams relationship to political and social life challenges the applicability of the best versions of each conception. It is clear that he emphasizes individual responsibility and allows for flexibility in synchronizing jurisprudence with changing social norms. One of Fadlallahs most oft-quoted phrases from the Quran is verse 13:11: Verily God does not change what is in a people until they change what is in themselves. Fadlallah interprets this not as a call to focus only on the self and let God take care of the rest (a flight from politics to the self) but as an activist principle that at once overturns the materialist principle (al-qaidat al-madiyyah) of change reality and you will change yourself to change yourself and you will change reality and history (1985: 174-5), at the same time it refutes the notion that human actions are governed by unalterable or predetermined laws (al-qawanin al-hatmiyyah) (1998a: 28). One example that well illustrates this: Fadlallah has long taken a

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strictly scientific approach to determining the Islamic lunar calendar. While most Muslim leaders both Sunni and Shii rely upon actual sight of the moon, Fadlallah reasoned that one could rely upon accurate astronomical calculations to determine the beginning and end of the lunar month (2006). As a result, he is able to announce in advance the start and end of the month of Ramadan by consulting observatory centres throughout the world. On at least two occasions, 1999 and 2002, Fadlallah declared the beginning of the Eid al-Fitr celebration (marking the end of Ramadan) on a day that coincided with that of the (Sunni) Mufti of the Lebanese Republic, but which was a day before the declared Eid of Iran (and hence Hizbullah). This meant that followers of Fadlallah, along with Lebanons Sunnis were able to begin feasting and celebrating a full day before the end of the month of fasting for followers of Hizbullah. As Alagha (2011: 197, n. 36) notes, this split the Dahiya, Hizbullahs main constituency in Beirut, between Hizbullahs adherents of the Iranian religious authority and Fadlallahs followers. While one might interpret this approach as a strategy to be the first or set the tone for declaring the end of fasting (and certainly Fadlallahs announcements were always well publicized), it also reveals his modernity, his desire to use science in order to facilitate regularity and consistency. According to Fadlallah (2006), whether or not the moon appears is based on the universal order and not human sight and whether it is possible to see the moon is more accurately determined by Islamic astronomical calculations than by the naked eye of individuals throughout the world. But the main reason a scientific method is better, Fadlallah argues, is that it offers a way of unifying the months and celebrations of Muslims.16 During his lifetime, Fadlallah voiced comparatively progressive positions on the rights of women and youth, aimed in affirming their agency. Among his many fatwas, or religious edicts, on family law, he argued that women have the right to marry, the right to work, and even the right to defend themselves from domestic violence. On International Womens Day in 2007, Fadlallah (2008a) further affirmed womens right to self-defence (womanhood seen as exemplifying the oppressed and her rights entailing those of resistance).17 Fadlallah (1995) argues for womens right to fully participate in politics and even hold leadership positions in an Islamic state. He also directly confronts the view that women are deficient in comparison to men. Lara Deeb (2010) has analyzed the ways in which Fadlallahs jurisprudence in regard to listening to music and temporary marriage reveals his attunement to

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the needs of youth and has developed over time toward permitting young people an expanded space for experimenting with different choices. Many of Fadlallahs views seemed to adapt with the times. One example that has been well researched by Morgan Clarke (2007a: 2008) is Fadlallahs views on issues related to reproduction, including artificial insemination and cloning. Though Fadlallah opposed the use of donor sperm, he has declared the permissibility of using donor eggs for in vitro fertilization. Until recently this was on the condition that the husband of the recipient married the egg donor, even if through the institution of a temporary marriage. Now it seems Fadlallah has relaxed even this requirement (2007b). This would permit anonymous donations, as well as allow sisters to donate and receive eggs, a very common scenario which was ruled out on the previous position as Islamic law prohibits a man from marrying two (or more) sisters simultaneously. Muhammad Husayn Fadlallahs deference to science and reason, relatively progressive views on the rights of women and youth, calls for pluralistic and accountable governance, and commitment to dialogue with those of different ideologies and faiths, has at times put him at odds with both political hardliners and the religious establishment. However, his ability to address the interests and concerns of a wide sector of Lebanons Shia, including women and youth, has also made him one of Lebanons most influential public intellectuals prior to his death.

Lebanon after Fadlallah

After the summer war of 2006, there were reports of a (temporary) thaw in relations between Hizbullah and Fadlallah. According to the International Crisis Group (2007: 7) report, out of a desire to preserve the resistance in the face of attacks, Fadlallah toned down his public criticism of Hizbullah and Hizbullah began giving greater coverage to Fadlallahs Friday sermons on its television station, al-Manar. As the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) dealing with the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri got closer to issuing its first indictments and speculation grew that members of Hizbullah would be named, sectarian tensions grew. Initially there was a sense that, in the great Lebanese tradition of compromise, a number of minor officials from Hizbullah would be described as rogue operators so that

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individuals, rather than the party, could be held to account. This offer was allegedly made by Prime Minister Saad Hariri to Nasrallah shortly after Fadlallahs death. However, Nasrallah used a 9 August 2010 press conference to attempt to implicate Israel, rather than Hizbullah, in the assassination. By the end of October 2010, Nasrallah was warning that whoever cooperates with the STL is working against the Resistance. In January 2011, Hizbullah members pulled out of government, thus leading to a collapse. One can only speculate as to whether this might have evolved differently had Fadlallah still been alive. Many analysts have argued that Hizbullah would probably have welcomed a negotiated solution that left Hariri as prime minister with Lebanese government support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Even if indictments had been issued against Hizbullah members, having the son of the assassinated former leader still running a government in which Hizbullah and its allies were participating would have at least achieved the Lebanese goal of consensus politics. As it is, even though Hizbullah has installed a prime minister of their choosing, so long as Saad Hariri and his Future Movement remain excluded from government the harder it becomes for Hizbullah to claim that it is working for the good of the republic as a whole, rather than representing distinctly sectarian interests. The rancour of Lebanese politics is high. In such a context one needs leadership that champions dialogue, cooperation, and civility. Even more essential may be the existence of voices from within Lebanons Shia community that can on occasion challenge Hizbullah with Fadlallahs unique combination of religious authority and intellectual independence.18

References
Abisaab, R. J. (2006). The Cleric as Organic Intellectual: Revolutionary Shiism in the Lebanese Hawzas, in Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years ed. Houchang Chehabi, London: I. B. Tauris, 231-258. (2009). Lebanese Shiites and the Marjaiyya: Polemic in the Late Twentieth Century, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies XXXVI, no. 2, 215-239. Alagha, J. (2006). The Shifts in Hizbullahs Ideology, Amsterdam University Press. (2010). Wilayat al-Faqih and Hizbullahs Relations with Iran, in Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies X, 24-44. (2011). Hizbullahs Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto. Amsterdam: Pallas Publications.

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Bahadili, A. (1993). al-Hawza al-Ilmiyah fi al-Najaf, Beirut: Dar al-Zahra. Bayyanat.org (2010). Statement from the Juristic Office (9 July) <http://english.bayynat.org.lb/funeral/funeral_09072010.htm>. Accessed 30 December 2011. Bayynat.org. (n.d.) Inquiries on Emulation <http://english.bayynat.org.lb/Issues/ Iss_emulation.htm>. Accessed 30 December 2011. Braungart, M. & R. Braungart (1991). The Effects of the 1960s Political Generation on Former Left-and Right-Wing Youth Activist Leaders, in Social Problems 38, no. 3, 297-315. Browers, M. (2011). Hizb al-Dawa and Hizbullah: Accounting for the Formation of and Change between Two Political Generations of Lebanese Shiis. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Washington, DC, 2 December 2011. Clarke, M. (2007a). Closeness in the age of mechanical reproduction: debating kinship and biomedicine in Lebanon and the Middle East, in Anthropological Quarterly 80:2, 379-402. (2007b). The Modernity of Milk Kinship, in Social Anthropology XV, no. 3, 1-18. (2008). New Kinship, Islam and the Liberal Tradition: Sexual Morality and New Reproductive Technology in Lebanon, in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute XIV, no. 1, 153-169. Deeb, L. (2010). Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Shia Youth in Lebanon, in Journal of Shia Islamic Studies III, no. 4, 405- 426. Economist (2010). He Tried to Calm Things Down (10 July), 48. el-Husseini, R. (2008). Women, Work, and Political Participation in Lebanese Shia Contemporary Thought: The Writings of Ayatollahs Fadlallah and Shams al-Din, in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East XXVIII, no. 2, 273-282. Fadlallah, J. (ed.) (1997). Hadith Ashura, Beirut: Dar al-Malak. Fadlallah, M. H. (1985). Ma al-Hikmah fi al-Khatt al-Islam, Beirut: Dar al-Malak. (1990). Harakat al-Islamiyyah, Beirut: Dar al-Malak. (1994). Ara fi al-Marjaiyyat al-Shiiyyah, Beirut: Dar al-Rawda. (1995). al-Marah bayna Waqiiha wa Haqqiha fi al-Ijtima al-Siyasi al-Islami, Beirut: Dar al-Thaqalayn. (1996). Hiwar fi al-Quran, n.p., 5th ed. First published 1979. (1998a). Tafsir min Wahy al-Quran-Vol. 13, Hud, Yusuf, Beirut: Dar al-Malak, 2nd ed. (1998b). World of Our Youth, Montreal: Organization for the Advancement of Islamic Knowledge and Humanitarian Services: Dar al-Malak. (2000a). al-Zahra al-Qudwah, Beirut: Dar al-Malak. (2000b). al-Faqih wa al-Ummah, Beirut: Dar al-Malak.

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(2003). Fiqh al-Shariah, Beirut: Dar al-Malak. (2004). Responsibility in Islam. <http://english.bayynat.org.lb/fridayspeeches/ ke19112004.htm>. Accessed 30 December 2011. (2005). al-Mawqif al-Usbu (31 May). <http://arabic.bayynat.org.lb/nachatat/ ahd31052005.htm>. Accessed 30 December 2011. (2006). Friday Speech (20 October). <http://english.bayynat.org.lb/ fridayspeeches/ke20102006.htm>. Accessed 30 December 2011. (2007). The Pluralism of Authority is a Pluralism Based on Intellectual, Cultural and Jurisprudential Aspects. <http://english.bayynat.org.lb/Archive_news/ Interviews17112007.htm>. Accessed 23 January 2012. (2008a). In the spirit of Ashoura and the International Womens Day. <http://english.bayynat.org.lb/se_002/islamicinsights/womanday1.htm>. Accessed 30 December 2011. (2008b) The Independence of the Mind in Islam. <http:// english.bayynat.org.lb/fridayspeeches/ke_18042008.htm>. Accessed 30 December 2011. (2009a). al-Masail al-Fiqhiyyah: al-Ibadat, Beirut: Dar al-Malak. (2009b). Corruption on Earth is an Act of Man <http:// english.bayynat.org.lb/FridaySpeeches/ke_15052009.htm>. Accessed 30 December 2011. Harb M. (2006). Pious Entertainment in Beirut: Al-Saha Traditional Village, ISIM Review XVII, 10-11. Harb M. & R. Leenders (2005). Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, Terrorism and the Politics of Perception, Third World Quarterly XXVI, no. 1, 173-197. al-Hasani, S. (1993). al-Maalim al-Jadidah lil-Marjaiyyat al-Shiiyyah: Dirasah wa Hiwar ma Ayat Allah al-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadl Allah, Dar al-Malak, 2nd ed. al-Husayni, M. T. (2007). al-Ithbat al-Qadai: al-Shahadah, Beirut: Dar al-Malak. International Crisis Group (2007). Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis, in Crisis Group Middle East Report LXIX (10 October). Kassem, H. (2009). Lebanons Ayatollah: An Interview with al-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, in Contemporary Arab Affairs II, no. 1, 26-37. Khashan, H. (2010). The Religious and Political Impact of Sayyid M. H. Fadlallah on Arab Shiism, in Journal of Shia Islamic Studies III, no. 4, 427-441. Maktab Samahat al-Marja as-Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (2003). al-Muassisah al-Marjaiyyah, Injazat wa ml, Beirut. Mallat, C. (1993). The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shii International, New York: Cambridge University Press. Qassem, N. (2005). Hizbollah: The Story from Within, London: Saqi Books. Saad-Ghorayb, A. (2002). Hizbullah: Politics and Religion, London: Pluto Press.

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Sankari, J. (2005). Fadlallah: The Making of a Radical Shiite Leader, London: Saqi. Schenker, D. (2010). Passing of Shiite Cleric Fadlallah Spells Trouble for Lebanon, in Christian Science Monitor (9 July). Shaery-Eisenlohr, R. (2008). Shiite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities, New York: Columbia University Press. Shams al-Din, M. M. (1990). al-Ijtihad fi al-Islam, in al-Ijtihad IX, no. 3, 15-55. Sharaf al-Din, H. (1996). al-Imam al-Sayyid Musa al-Sadr: Mahatat Tarikhiyyah Iran, alNajaf, Lubnan, Beirut: Markaz al-Imam Sadr. Stewart, D. (2001) The Portrayal of an Academic Rivalry: Najaf and Qum in the Writings and Speeches of Khomeini, 1964-78, in L. Walbridge, The Most Learned of the Shia: The Institution of the Marja Taqlid, New York: Oxford University Press, 216-229.

Notes
1 A hadith of Imam al-Sadiq, recorded in Muhammad ibn Yaqub Kulayni, al-Kafi I, ch. Loss of a Scholar, 38, no. 2. 2 Saad-Ghorayb (2002: 6) lists numerous scholars making such claims, a compilation which has been revised and expanded by Alagha (2006: 325, n. 122). At the same time, a number of scholars, including Saad-Ghorayb and Alagha, challenge and complicate this notion. 3 al-Ahd first appeared in 1984, but changed its name to al-Intiqad in 2001. According to Alagha, the name change corresponded to a shift in orientation: conveying a secular image by dropping the Quranic substantiation (5:56), on the right side, and removing the portrait of Khumayni and Khaminai, on the left side (2011: 197, n. 2). 4 However, Alagha (2010) acutely notes subtle shifts over time in Hizbullahs interpretation of and relationship to wilayat al-faqih. 5 By generation, I mean what sociologists refer to as a political generation. As Braungart & Braungart (1991: 297, 299) argue: an age group is transformed into a political generation when a bond is created among its members based on their unique growing-up experiences in society and a shared feeling that they have a mission to perform by changing [or resisting change to] the political status quo. In the present cases, age proved less significant in the formation of each political generation than it did when the figures studied in Najaf and the circumstances under which they took up political work. 6 Musawi seems to have arrived in Najaf from Lebanon in 1969. Nasrallah did not arrive until 1976. However, both were expelled by 1979. See Stewart (2001) and Abisaab (2006) for excellent discussions of the shift from Najaf to Qum as an intellectual centre and the Lebanons development of its own hawzah system, respectively. 7 Fadlallah established both Jamiyyat Usrat al-Takhi (Society of Brethren Family) and Jamiyyat al-Mabarat al-Khayriyyah (Charitable Philanthropic Society). The latter began with funding from Khui and today operates not only in Lebanon but throughout the world. 8 Abisaab (2009: 218) further argues that the muqallidun far from being passive, have

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manipulated the competition among the maraji and demanded a greater involvement of mujtahids in affairs pertaining to their livelihood and security, as well as having resisted the imposition of one designated marja by one center on all Shiite emulators. Here, too, the ability of the emulators to do this is undermined with the loss of Fadlallah. AMAL offers an alternative Shii political reference. But the party has lost considerable religious authority first with the death the Musa Sadr (d. 1978) and Nabih Berris assumption of role as head of the party, and further with the death of Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (d. 2001). 9 Husayni (2007) argues that Fadlallah is distinct for developing general principles from the entire Quran rather than focusing only around 500 verses that deal explicitly with jurisprudence. 10 Fadlallahs Fiqh al-Sharia (2003) is a good example of the breadth and modernity of his thinking. Fadlallahs writings on matters such as human cloning and reproductive issues is well covered by Clarke (2007a, 200b, 2008). 11 According to Harb & Leenders (2005: 191), This hala groups the adherents (multazimin) to two major religious references (marjaiyyat): Fadlallah and Khamenei (or his Lebanese delegate, Nasrallah). 12 One must note, in this regard, that in 2001 al-Saha, a traditional village consisting of restaurants, cafs, terraces, shops, a wedding hall, a motel, a small museum, a library, a childrens playground and prayer rooms, was established in Beiruts southern suburb of al-Dahiya, by al-Mabarrat, Fadlallahs philanthropic organization. See Harb 2006. 13 It is hard to imagine Fadlallahs (by then well-established) views on the centrality of political activism would sit well with his emulation of Sistanti, who oscillates between passive and activist positions, with a seeming preference for the former. That and the fact that they are only separated by five years in age along with the lack of any corroborating evidence leads me to question this claim. 14 The speech was broadcast on 25 May 2005, on al-Manar. 15 See also on Bayynat.org: Fadlallahs (2008b) sermon on The Independence of the Mind in Islam, sermon on Responsibility in Islam (2004), and sermon on Corruption on Earth is an Act of Man (2009b) where he states that responsibility for political corruption is on the shoulders of all those who sell their votes without even studying the candidates. 16 Bayynat.org has clarified that the establishment of the beginnings of the lunar months, such as the beginning of the month of Ramadan and the first day of Eid alFitr, is not considered part of the new upcoming issues [which would require reference to a living religious authority], and the emulators of His Eminence, Sayyed Fadlullah (ra) out to follow his ruling on the issue. In other words, followers of Fadlallah should continue to follow the scientific predictions of when it is possible to see the moon rather than worrying about whether the moon has actually been seen (Inquiries on Emulation). 17 El-Husseini (2008) demonstrates three aspects of Fadlallahs lauding of Fatimah as a role model distinguishes him from Iranian views. First, he views Fatima as a role model not only for women, but for all Muslims. Second, where Khomeini praised Fatimah for her virtue and modesty, Fadlallah emphasizes Fatimahs actions, particularly the way in which she represents a political activist who used all available opportunities without losing . . . any of her Muslim virtues (Fadlallah 2000a: 203). Third, whereas women associated with Hizbullah, following the Iranian lead, tend to give

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greater emphasis to Zaynab in contemporary discourse, Fadlallah gives greater emphasis to Fatimah (2000a: 275). 18 The author would like to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for this journal for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and the National Endowment for the Humanities, which provided the author with a fellowship during 2010-2011, when this article was first drafted. Any views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the National Endowment for the Humanities. The use of the word last in the title of this article is not meant to suggest that this author precludes in any way the possibility of Najafs resurgence as the centre of intellectual activity for a future generation of clerics.

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