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Truth, Paradox, and Nietzschean Perspectivism Author(s): Steven D. Hales and Robert C. Welshon Reviewed work(s): Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 101-119 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744612 . Accessed: 01/03/2012 15:54
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History
Volume
of Philosophy
11, Number
Quarterly
1994
1, January
NIETZSCHEAN PERSPECTIVISM
Steven D. Hales and Robert C. Welshon
to inexplicable no
on the value
2 Nietzsche
truths" and venom
absolute
truth. Moreover, is a univocal then sense the question above texts and of the
seems
becomes is required
choices
mentioned tion
instead and
complexities, and
venom
devotion
variability
is not mere
equivocation, his
of his
finding
distinct senses
distinguish Nietzsche these various has
to
to
different
of those
the constructive
the correct
conception
to humans,
sense
of 'truth'
problems
with
perspectivism as a to ethical,
do theory
not
end
by the or
project, (as
about
predicate
ontological, treatment
epistemological
perspectivism)
is not a topic
extensive
101
102
from Nietzsche. lizing critiques the but
HISTORY
The
OF PHILOSOPHY
he makes are never about
QUARTERLY
truth perspectivism systematically, most of what he and to Power are as says these tanta are his
seldom
more
morality. is found
about were
of truth
only
form as
it is undeniable and
affirms
perspectivism published
writings
that many
of his most
infamous
would be ill-supported without it. So there is at least a prima facie case for digging a little into his views on truth perspectivism. The project of this paper
is to engage plausible tival The in such view we philosophical can from the archaeology, fragments to mold the most writings coherent and of Nietzsche's on perspec
truth. rough are and safely disjointed be ignored that nature by the it tries of Nietzsche's interpreter, the to capitalize essay, more what elaborate is defended writings in part on the on truth the here perspectiv interpretive is subject nature on perspec than behalf what to of
because offered
interpretation Nietzsche's
In this
embedded
developed. Yet
Nietzsche
entail the
of either
adopted by the
for no
theory
left. The
is entailed closely
resembles
the archaeological artifact painting be fully to begin. coherence philosophical that respects to form to reveal recovered, Without with
of piecing
the
restorative in neither
project case
Although must
of Nietzsche's interpretation
thought,
maintaining is, we
desiderata.
philosophers' partially
truth
and
by the imputed
subject
itself. Unfortunately,
to other
truth.3
to perspectives moreover,
perspectivism together
main
domains; to
these
other
However,
it is not
possible
of Nietzschean
NIETZSCHEAN
perspectivism no attempt in a single is made here article, to do and so. The
PERSPECTIVISM
itmust focus be here emphasized is solely at the outset on those passages and
103
that in
which Nietzsche
philosopher related areas
is perspectival. of Nietzsche's
We
propose
to analyze Nietzsche
Nietzsche's
than
is common think
in some
quarters
of Nietzsche
that we
interpreting
as anticipating
or continental
withstand Nietzsche wishes that cision Not virtue. contains diction sistent
demands
among to read
him well
precisely,
greater
is fitting
precision not
Some
component
that
of Nietzsche
the former
that he
is most and since methodology unappealing, ever wished to undermine argumentative of certain unrigorous ridicules on these aspects of logic, the second of Nietzsche strategy, an
though
he as
himself
justification
grounds There
against are
or otherwise
them
responses
entities in the world to which the formulae of logic apply. To put the claim in
contemporary perspectival interpreted to fictitious has only been terms, what Nietzsche entities instance, have there are extra in or non-logical formulae. entities For that we to serve holds the values "logic claims . . . that of terms applies
that 558
only
and WP
"thingness
invented "we
when
logicians
along
without
'it'," arguably
a criticism
variable
of the very
notion
of
104
rests And on
HISTORY
assumptions OTL, that
OF PHILOSOPHY
do not correspond claims
QUARTERLY
to anything that in the real world."
consider
p. 81, where
Nietzsche
the axioms
and
theorems
of logic are "empty husks." All of these claims entail rejection only of the thesis that interpreted logical formulae refer to anything ontologically independent
of perspectives, substantive that any and in particular provocative of his the thesis perspective for Nietzsche about of logic. This is of and course a to advance, truth must it is a thesis But of
interpretation
perspectivism what
respect.
theory
unscathed.
of course
logician,
argument on his
15).
so far as take him to reject seriously. and criticized and views proof A theory, theory we that find it very all to
should
rejects approach
to critique, be claims
the appropriate
in principle
course
Nietzsche
18: "It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts subtler minds." At BGE 22 and 43 Nietzsche recall BGE
even welcomes But challengers who would to infer what he offer their own interpretations for good and backed readers and and perspectives. for diverse contradictory than of his tency appeals texts. and it is sophistry that much less from his desires desire
interpretations readings, to his more For honesty that not that are all fails
by little more
his and
own
among
perspectives are
Nietzsche
it is necessary to defend
(cf. WP
Hence,
and what
Nietzsche's
about
truth
meant
to accomplish
considered
of displacement.6 of displacement.
perspectivism as Nietzsche
of that canons of
NIETZSCHEAN
so too truth perspectivism wrote that helped
PERSPECTIVISM
to punctuate his radical rejection enemies means
105
of nearly
tradition.7 InHATH
dangerous a principled
483 (cf. AC
of truth of attacking
are more
the most
truth
roles.
First,
truth
per
is coherent laid
as fictions, in numerous
a theory passages
inWP,
holds we
including 477, 480, 495, 515, 516, 549, 552, 568, and 636. Nietzsche
that subjects, to suit be said our objects, ends. about at all, constructed and If he things attributes is right, are there all fabricated distinctions that true is nothing Indeed, us over (WP 'metaphysically' there and 568, is no perspective over: cf. TI "[the world] IV). Hence, be to sets On that to a of this be
invent
world fiction, or
as Nietzsche of fictitious
if truth
consists
in correspondence, At best vary room truth elements to be no whose point there question, of fictions former
correspondence would
cannot
for any
insists
on privileged
makes
whether
theory the
truth the
is supported
latter.
of objects are
often
important ethics. He
the
role
that
in
admits
at BGE
it he)
that their
devise
italics): By abolishing any kind of 'absolute' truth that even the new philoso
phers must acknowledge, diverse the absence life, a Nietzsche prepares fear truths new the ground of running allows for different afoul of 'the persons truth.' the living, to develop Moreover, experimental moralities of cosmic life without moral
categorical
imperative."
11, Nietzsche's
Nietzsche and
to advocate ways of
of sampling
perspectives
HATH without permanent allegiance to any particular one (cf. 301, BGE 205, WP 944, 962).
Granted essential is easier the importance clear about when of perspectivism truth contrasted to Nietzsche's as other to be as is possible. The
pref. 4, GS 290,
concerns, Perspectivism cardinal intui it is
perspectivism with
to understand
absolutism.
106
tion of truth
HISTORY
absolutism untrue is that from
OF PHILOSOPHY
is that statements, The are
QUARTERLY
if true, are true for everyone behind and, truth
then
perspective, state
untrue
perspective, distinct
Hence, Truth
is true two
person
persons contrasted
of truth
equivalent either
thesis
some
such
It is this
seems
"This For
those 540,
does sphinx
WP
there
is no
it seems,
'Perspective' precisely. following of view the point individuals)? fundamental the nature perspectives to these mistaken, Maudemarie One
to be
not
be
possible
it the
can begin
problems
by considering e.g.
(pending complex
of
question
difficult, to be?
what all,
Nietzsche Nietzsche
take think
individuated questions
A beginning one
by reviewing
claim
that
a perspective
is a set
of beliefs
exemplifies
us to grant that every belief that can be derived from a [Perspectivism] requires set of beliefs is true, or at least as true as any other belief. For each such consistent a way the world manifests in which set of beliefs may count as a perspective, itself.10 But this view is an infelicitous interpretation we have of Nietzsche and unsupportable so
philosophically.
nothing from is true more 'a statement
than
advocates all,
champions untrue
it. After
this would
if a perspec
NIETZSCHEAN
PERSPECTIVISM
107
of a species,
to do with be false."
condition
be found
inNietzsche's
AC 52, 54, 55).
483, D 89,
of beliefs, the most
Nietzsche's
cal ill effects cursory
reading
(BGE 25, GM III 8,AC 53,WP 457) as proving nothing about truth also inveigh
against identifying perspectives with
between
thesis, about
the former,
on perspectivism is not
A perspective a a
then
a class
of beliefs.
What
is it? Any
plausible
answer
claims
is in the a means is then "we can 517).
a perspective. if persons
a person
of mastering only
of coming have
comprehend
ourselves
495,
cf. WP
In itself,Nietzsche
categorize perspectives, ated whenever it and
or creates
consistency not be
constraints And,
on perspectives; as noted,
constraints,
individuated.
adopt
a perspective
yet
believe
an
dependency answer
Indeed, WP 259:
Nietzsche "all
individuates evaluation
perspectives from a
narrowly.
is made
of the
individual, will be
a faith, will be
entities
which
or create
to offer a domain
hierarchy
of loci of power,
level
of which
of which
a perspective.
108
HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY II
QUARTERLY
about
truth
is the target
of a frequently
encountered
or self-referentially by Danto: in which statements then untrue much both obtain can be
is either inconsis perspectivism self-referentially or both. Asimple version of the argument paradoxical, is a perspective, only then there are perspec is some in are untrue in a perspective; statement has and if perspectivism is true the form of a self-ref Paradox paradoxes, the statement of
if perspectivism
perspectives erential
it is untrue that every is in others. The argument like the Liar Paradox are members there are no
of which because
consistently would
is not worked
in any detail.
statement as a thesis
between
conditions
explicit.
In what
that will
will
be
called
Other are
with
Since
is in one
claim
that the
is true
rendering in all
which either
perspectives
in all
perspectives. in in
or perspectivally, of perspectivism is true absolutely or it is true in all perspectives true or untrue is either untrue there thesis in others. Suppose that which perspectivism has the same if there then is true truth value is a statement of perspectivism value in all in all
all perspectives. in all perspectives which Thus statement is true. to put tives, shows help
is some
the same
truth is true
if perspectivism in an
equivalent is untrue.
form, This
if perspectivism
perspectivism perspectivism
critics so
is self-refuting. Suppose
in any
is true
in all
perspectives,
viz.,
in some
perspective is some
is true.
absolutism
of absolutism and
there
in which ex hypothesi
perspec in which
in the perspective
NIETZSCHEAN
absolutism statements tives; that is true, are since there are there
PERSPECTIVISM
distinct perspectives that in which is true in which is all
109
of those
untrue.
Hence, statement it
there
this, we
perspectivism
of putting
the argument Now consider 'p' true? When if and at all then
is as the
follows. statement an
Suppose
that
absolutely. When
absolutely' truth
To get is 'p'true
conditions
absolutely? then
only
if 'p' is true
perspectives.
perspectives absolutism
true, only
is true. is true
Transitivity and the supposition that perspectivism is true yield the truth of
absolutism. perspectivism contradictories perspectives, graphs back. then Perspectives problem perspectivism perspective absolutely, then there or that perspectivism in which for the defender is untrue, are only it is true is true perspectivism of perspectivism, that two is, in which possibilities: then true that in some is perspectives true so consider not-perspectivism either but untrue pose is true. in no in In is abso is true peculiar a state a this and is self-contradictory: absolutism both be are true. no conditions are they contradictories is true reached two
cannot
if perspectivism conclusion
contradiction
results
perspectivally
a perspective
not-perspectivism is true
If not-perspectivism not-perspectivism is a
lutely,
absolutism
is true.
perspectivally. statement; is true, question statement is only truth thesis ment true truth and is
perspectivally'
very
it is self-contradictory.
Consider:
with
perspectives. be are
a statement perspectives
After is untrue.
in which there is no
value that
existence problem of
'perspectivism
true
address passages
here
about
However,
sensitive
110
to the general that Nietzsche makes does
HISTORY
charge
OF PHILOSOPHY
and threat that
QUARTERLY
he was views aware on to some truth. extent
of self-reference, constituted a a
to his to this
to provide error
response his
charge.
Although as
of claiming
perspectivism perspectivism
to be absolutely perspectivally
to believe
22: "Supposing
enough to make
is only
well, so
much the better." There is also BGE 43: "itmust offend [the] pride [of the new philosophers], also their taste, if their truth is supposed to be a truth for
everyman route pitfalls. . . . 'My judgment takes as has true. To does just claim is my seem been judgment': no one else is easily some entitled to
it that iswhat the philosopher of the futuremay perhaps say of himself." The
that Nietzsche However, promising, argued, the and thesis it avoids conspicuous cannot of perspectivism self-contradiction. for Nietzsche's unfortunately that that problem of thinking interpret succumb that to per
defenses.
apparently
makes,
saved
from paradox
by affirming the a multiplicity to the charge Lawrence to Nietzsche the danger can
recognizes
of truths,"
with
from OTL,
there the
ontologically
privileged Hinman
language claim
particular
assessed.16
truth this a
is fundamentally at least in
a property part by
language according to
Hinman, by declaring the theory itself to be a dead metaphor that has become
canonical, Nietzsche man's allowed tivally fixed, "to defense and obligatory logical language.18 about is really true same This approach the claim permits But that Hin he is avoid difficulties against self-referentiality."19 only so long as thing. it is simply He calls must
game.17
Nietzsche
of Nietzsche
perspec it as a
Nietzsche's adopt
that
"[Nietzsche]
. . . "20 A "an
that
calling solution:
offers
this
rejection."22 only
of perspectivism?is
perspectivally
NIETZSCHEAN
Two tivism, other offered recent answers to the Nehamas
PERSPECTIVISM
self-referential problems
111
posed with two class But by perspec more he first,
by Alexander
and Maudemarie
Clark,
turn first to Nehamas. When We confronted sophisticated.23 to accomplish offers up a modal that is supposed argument show Paradox is in the is not appears more how the and, same paradox second, class as of perspectivism show how the paradox as shown the Liar, is not in the same is to be resolved. earlier, if the is still and is
the Liar
anyway.
Nehamas's and
argument even
tautology
argument
a red herring.
believes
paradox.
into
a
is not
modal
while Clark paradox. a 'minimal that ture true ski's
thesis, pointing out that Nietzsche may allow that it ispossibly untrue
maintaining declares Her that that it is actually interpretation on a distinction theory true, is irrelevant.24 is immune between what from she the calls her rests of perspectivism introduced of truth'and The Davidson's former doctrine
defense
'metaphysical true
quasi-Tarskian is the whose abilities derives theory "'S' and thesis "na are
correspondence statements
of truth.'25 to Kantian
entails
sentences argues
Nietzsche, but
of truth,
claims
not only
minimal of WP,
argue and
only
plausible
of truth; it neither
perspectivism;
is nor must
by Nietzsche.27
Ill
Given surprise Nietzsche's pends upon the difficulties in avoiding believe and the that avoiding paradox there are of perspectivism, at least The and defined in which two ways one absolutisms as the thesis and it may here be a to learn that we of defending de of differ that for
perspectivism
paradox. was
developed
between
perspectivisms
every
it is
true, strong
some
it is untrue.
is a quite
way replace
thesis
quantification so we
is a weaker
Henceforth one
weak
statement
perspective
112
it is true, with weak and
HISTORY
some
OF PHILOSOPHY
in which some
QUARTERLY
Note the that same nearly that it is consistent truth all value in
it is untrue. have
statements
all perspectives, have their statements have truth there offered are
can maintain
statements some
nevertheless some
absolutely. in all
statements about
perspectives.
is the view
on Nietzsche's several
behalf. to this proposal. The The first is that against to him makes and it talks weak that so the paradox Nietzsche's the claims refutes only strong about itself. some is
There
advantages results
is resolved that
argument attributing
requires strong
perspectivism since
about
it need with
Indeed, the
accepting are
thesis
perspectivally solution
is defused
if re
statements
perspectivism
to the paradox.
of weak of paradox is an advantage perspec deny that avoidance might on the grounds aim in discussing that Nietzsche's truth and its perspec over truth. But such to generate and puzzlement is precisely paradox confuses the potential purposes results uses can be of perspectivism served by with presenting and both that its content. Legiti and puzzles are activities is itself paradoxi
by in
of a long-held
view,
However, advancing delighted. a paradoxical for although of a discovery, as a the of e.g. way poverty illustrating itself count as an acceptable truth positive that Nietzsche and not merely is just such intended
a theory
help theory may or way of a strategy theory. Since his to be an acceptable example, entail he
in of
it cannot
texts
or negative not
is
served
by an
interpretation
paradox.
perspectivism
Likewise,
that tivism the price
of whatever
appeals
to bivalence
of perspectivism, to relapse
truths, itmust
into the very militancy perspectivism and its admission only confirms
to avoid.
be emphasized that weak or non-bivalent bivalent logic, are shared across perspectives
Nietzsche himself claims about their place in human thought (recall WP 522).
Nietzsche may consistently endorse both perspectivism and proof theory.
NIETZSCHEAN
Moreover, critique to ground absolutist cians of all weak perspectivism insistence has
PERSPECTIVISM
systematic there are benefits for Nietzsche easily strong only and
113
his
of morality Nietzsche's
enough moral
facts,
interpretations of phenomena
proclamations stripes of science are not,
(BGE
what
108, TI VII
other is claimed with truth,
1,WP
on their
religious
types,
perspectivism lack
consistent
an interpretation" (BGE 14, cf. WP 636). All that weak perspectivism imposes
are minimal perspectivally; Nietzsche Still, axioms just wants there are boundaries it does of statements the provocative that have and truth not preclude substantive
to advance. the in all, perspectivism or across all, of inference for humans again at WP thesis itself and and absolutely logical that is for
true and
to say
perspectivism
for a statement However, absolutely (although speculates section, laws of logic, thought off1
although about
are
nothing 616,
follows Nietzsche
perspectives acteristically argued accept claims, cannot Nietzsche's inability logic of On Nietzsche far that only Note are true fewer all not the
it should on the
in the first
Nietzsche a position is
he makes
explicit according
522, scheme
"rational throw
is
extra
nothing
that we take
to adopt
perspective Truth
in order Lie
(this we Sense).
to be
Hence,
or absolute
have
thought.
Many
attributed
to Nietzsche
a small that
few are.32 in characterizing of perspectives truths that are are absolute or true truths truths. human truths we do not say that they
is that that
there
attempt
to talk
truth
is to
still is a the
of failing perspectives
something rightly of
perspectives.
about
claiming
true outside
114
perspectives, thing insistence
HISTORY
but extension true, there
OF PHILOSOPHY
of this that fear prevents
QUARTERLY
them from saying that any as
is absolutely that
in all
perspectives.
repeated serve
is nothing
of interpretations
perspectives.
"it seems of
knowledge
no matter
they
the first
knowledge
perspective, second
Nietzsche conflates
extra-perspectival forges Nietzsche outside group However, tives, their a strict considers of the human perspectives, Nietzsche statements perspective. objection truths
distinction
individual
in all
humans
no matter
what
Another absolute
to the kind
suggested to Nietzsche
interpretation is mistaken.
is that After
attributing all, he
any
of any
proclaims that untruth is a condition of life (GS 110, 121, BGE 4,WP 483, 487, 493, 507, 514), and declares that "everything is false! everything is permitted!"
(WP truths that 602, cf. GM III 24). Hence, so the objection to say 487 that cited goes, there earlier: has there are no but absolute nothing however to do with conflict is for humans; is true. Recall it may Grant that be it is more the passage accurate from WP is falsity,
frequently
necessary truth."
this
only superficial and can be explained away with less difficulty than might be
expected. metaphysical available constants, endorsed untruth cannot and For the thesis untruth there are is a condition no non-fictional, of interpretation And this proposal, than untrue, are no the of life is a variation extra-logical we The of the entities thesis to serve as
However,
predicates as
of our true
human
perspectives. are
of life thus
to no more beliefs
claim
for they
true,
there
It is precisely
extra-perspectival
truth
NIETZSCHEAN
Nietzsche ridicules and and rejects outright: true.
PERSPECTIVISM
no matter how even that essential a belief
115
is for true
enhancement
if it is absolutely is such
spectival truth and non-truth is a fiction, and it is this kind of truth that is an
illusion of which we have forgotten at worst. and that it is an illusion, of this a worn out metaphor with there truths, of
extra-perspectivally
there
extra-per
(OTL p. 84). Finally, it is the search for such truth an sich thatNietzsche finds
quixotic being, statements at best within and absurd But all is consistent the set of humbler that are true in all non-dogmatic Indeed, perspectival "untruth human
perspectives.
is a condition
thinks is a
an ade
interpretation thesis
to say of these to
First, by his
considered Nietzsche
view. never
passages
it is unfair passages
to assign found
in his
is to claim
that Nietzsche
paradox are WP
minimally
jointly 481, to do
for the last, although it should be noted that the first two options
consistent, for example, We such a thing." are accept the "we are the the last that two. "facts any such truths, as is precisely fact this "in one are that what there is not, only to as declares
interpretations. want denying perspective truths presented claim claim are that and still that
cannot
establish
itself:"
perhaps
Passages in order
best
understood
there
absolute
statements
denizens that
must
to live, but
there
or
structure cannot no
to the
is equivalent allows
truths.
Nietzsche
further
perspectivism values
some
statements
truth
absolutely.
consider
Nietzsche's
classical, acceptance generated 517). And
to be master
the multiplicity
of sensations"
it permits even
of absolute of the
Clearly,
if dispelling
fog of misinterpretations
116
perspectivism he promotes admitted
HISTORY
puts the that in the us
OF PHILOSOPHY
position there
QUARTERLY
Nietzsche pressing is only pertain other relations Nietzsche that much work.36 is after when issues To one raised by of
in a better
perspectival remain
life, untouched
by our
reiterate
what
truth
perspectivism
touched
and has to be
recent
scholarship remains
these to address
in future
NOTES
1. Abbreviations HATH for Nietzsche's All (Lincoln: texts are as follows: ed. and trans. Marion Press, Faber 1984; and of Nebraska Stephen edition:
original
D P
trans. R.J. Hollingdale University (Cambridge: Cambridge Daybreak, 1881). Press, 1982; original edition: on the Struggle Between Reflections Art and Knowl "The Philosopher: in Philosophy and Truth: Selections From Nietzsche's Note edge" ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale books of the Early (London: 1870's, Press Humanities 1979). International, in a Nonmoral in Philosophy Sense" and Truth: "On Truth and Lie From Nietzsche's ed. and Notebooks Selections 1870's, of the Early trans. Daniel Breazeale Humanities Press (London: International, 1979). The ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann Gay Science, 1882). Books, 1974; original edition: ed. and trans. Walter Thus Zarathustra, Spoke Nietzsche (New York: Viking Penguin, 1885). (New York: Vintage Kaufmann, 1954; original in The edition:
OTL
GS Z
Portable BGE GM AC TI EH WP
ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann and Evil, Good (New York: Beyond 1886). Books, 1966; original edition: Vintage ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann On the Genealogy (New of Morals, York: Vintage 1887). Books, 1967; original edition: ed. and trans. R.J. Hollingdale The Antichrist, (New York: Viking Pen 1895). guin, 1968; original edition: ed. and trans. R.J. Hollingdale The Twilight (New York: of the Idols, 1889). 1968; original edition: Viking Penguin, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann Ecce Homo, (New York: Vintage Books, 1908). 1967; original edition: ed. and trans. Walter The Will toPower, 1968). (New York: Vintage Books, Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale senses in chapter
Schacht's discussion of these different 2. See for example Richard and Kegan 2 of his book Nietzsche 1983). (London: Routledge Paul,
NIETZSCHEAN
3. We kinds we do not deny of perspectivism that there are relations or that Nietzsche
PERSPECTIVISM
117
focus here
only on perspectivism see Robert and an application, perspectivism and the Health of the Soul," International thank Richard Schacht for pointing
between truth perspectivism and the other interesting things to say about them. Again, as a thesis about the nature of truth. For reflections has C. Welshon, Studies "Nietzsche's in Philosophy, last remarks. Peculiar vol. 24
pp. 77-89. out the need for these delicacy reflections. But of some just what Nietzsche there is one aspect rejects from logic. See below for of his critique of logic that might
of perspectivism does the interpretation being offered here. Consider: against the thesis that every statement has a truth-value, and this reject bivalence, 34 offer some prima is either true or false? WP truth-value 516, 535, and BGE facie not one bit for the interpretation of perspec evidence that he does. Still, this matters tivism N.B.: offered here. The status of bivalence is irrelevant to the thesis of perspectivism formulated rather in this paper. some of Nietzsche's results
assume that he rejects bivalence and infer interpreters or from this. Some argue that views which reject bivalence reject thereby an axiom of any logic and so entail rejection replace "binary oppositions" of all logic. Others the need for a novel logic argue that rejection of bivalence supports are paradigms in which and paradox of logicality. Still others argue that contradiction remarkable sanctions of bivalence inconsistency rejection ideas." Maudemarie "unconstrained play among Cambridge often use or what Clark, an is euphemistically called on Truth and in her Nietzsche
1990) p. 66 uses the first argu Press, University Deconstruction all three; cf. John Ellis, Against citations for textual of these claims. Princeton 1989) (Princeton: Press, University are uniformly fallacious. of bivalence entails these arguments Rejection Unfortunately, logics that remainintuitionist logic; there are plenty of alternative rejection of bivalent and van Kleene, by Lukasiewicz, logics of the sort proposed logics and many-valued Fraassen other are be defined logics despite by introducing than true or false.
the suggestion indulging neither does Nietzsche: and in the end Nietzsche is Nietzsche's though 6. Kant 7. Cf. Ken cal Research, 8. We This that that
For each such logic consistency may rejection of bivalence. additional rules of inference to govern formulae with values can scarcely of non-bivalent One imagine a proponent logic that consistency bivalence lapses simply because lapses. And goes beyond that only a nihilist nihilism. rejects logic altogether battle 353. (WP 24),
truth be known
Gemes,
"Nietzsche's
vol. 52 (1992),
of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenologi Critique of this rhetoric. pp. 47-65 for a good discussion "Untrue" is the negation of "true." "untrue" to be contradictories. to bivalence, instead Therefore contraries Those who reject bivalence hold of contradictories, but they do not claim we are not assuming and that "untrue" however.
"false" mean
the same
"is a statement," "is let R be a one place predicate 9. Let P be a one place predicate "is true in." The thesis of perspectivism let T be a two place predicate (1) Vx3y3z(Px-?(Ry&Rz&Txy&~Txz)) is simply the denial of perspectivism, (2)~(Vx3y3z(Px-*(Ry&Rz&Txy&~Txz))) the following may be restructured (3) 3xVyVz~(Px-KRy&Rz&Txy&~Txz)) (4) 3xVyVz(Px&~(Ry&Rz&Txy&~Txz)) (5) 3xVyVz(Px&((Ry&Rz&Txy)->Txz))
Absolutism
viz.
Absolutism
118
In English, perspective, 10. Clark, that and (5) then op.
HISTORY
states that
OF PHILOSOPHY
there in all. is some statement
QUARTERLY
such that, if it is true in any
it is true
cit., p. 139. It should be mentioned interests are and practical sets are to be commensurable
our central points. of persons former thesis, but not the latter, has to do with intentional attitudes a perspective. of course has the within Nietzsche interesting things to say about and intentional attitudes what they are, their formation, their truth, their justification, this affects 11. The things the consequences here and 12. We take
does add the provisos in perspectives (p. 133), But none of (p. 141 et passim).
of state in the same way that possible worlds determine the truth values perspective are not possible worlds, but they seem in possible world semantics. ments Perspectives in an analogous is elaboration of this intuition to be intensional entities way. Further a logical apparatus for this technical not possible without inappropriately developing paper. 13. Arthur 14. Alan 1990) Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher and the Question (New York: Macmillan, of Interpretation 1965), p. 80. Schrift, Nietzsche p. 153. ibid., p. 153. Philosophy is from pp. and 197-8. Pheno (New York: Routledge,
ones but we do not have space to consider those of having particular the nature of truth anyway. they are of little interest in determining a within to determine the truth values of statements perspectives
15. Schrift, 16. Lawrence menological 17. Hinman, 18. Hinman, 19. Hinman,
and Truth," "Nietzsche, Hinman, Metaphor, 43 (1982): pp. 179-199. The quotation Research ibid., ibid., ibid., pp. 189-191. p. 194. p. 192.
and Perspectival 20. George "Nietzsche Stack, Interpretation," Today, Philosophy is from p. 221; the second from p. 238. The first quotation vol. 25 (1981), pp. 221-241. it should be noted that at the end of his article (cf. p. 240), Stack claims that However, In "the paradoxes satisfactorily." by his thinking cannot really be resolved generated section Nietzsche III we show that this last claim of Stack's is mistaken the paradoxes facing can be resolved. op cit. p. 55. ibid., p. 56. as Literature 1994 issue. (Cam
Nietzsche: 23. See Clark, op cit., and Alexander Nehamas, Life 1985). Press, University bridge: Harvard on Nietzsche's 24. See our "Nehamas Theory of Truth," March, 25. Clark, 26. Clark, 27. See Philosophy 28. See op. cit., pp. 30-31. p. 41; cf. also p. 45. Clark's Research, Nietzsche March option. of Maudemarie
ibid., and
our "Review
and
Philosophy,"
of the other
absolutism: absolutism:
3xVyVz(Px&((Ry&Rz&Txy)->Txz)) VxVyVz(Px&Ry&Txy->(Rz->Txz))
Weak
is the is the negation and strong absolutism of strong perspectivism, absolutism and weak perspectivism ofweak perspectivism. It is clear how weak absolutism negation are consistent behalf. and indeed we advocate them both on Nietzsche's
NIETZSCHEAN
PERSPECTIVISM
119
is a specific theory devised 31. Perspectivism own idiosyncratic for Nietzsche's philo to be a semi-apparent and is not supposed sophical purposes linguistic fact or intuition. to tailor perspectivism As such, it is legitimate to suit whatever claims philosophical and ends he wishes. Whether it works to solve other paradoxes with which the paradox
of perspectivism is most is a matter that neither can nor needs be closely associated here. Granted, restricted to solve other analyzed quantification might be extended well-known such as Russell's or the liar, but of set-membership paradoxes, paradox restricted quantification (as suggested by Russell's theory of types) to exclude problem atic cases is not the most popular to these paradoxes. solution There is a belief that
the possibility of unrestricted in a language, whether it be preserving quantification or some class, is worthwhile. about all sets, or this sentence, If so, it is ad hoc to rule that a syntactic string cannot 'say of itself that it has certain properties, particularly In general, a ban on self-reference the property of untruth. to avoid works although some of the paradoxes, it seems to be a case where the cure is worse than the disease. the alternatives to the distinction between theory of types, Alfred Tarski's comes to mind. Although we think that the obviously the paradox of perspectivism, it is more technological
Among
object-and meta-level languages Tarski treatment would dissolve than needed. But in brief: guage (say, a particular (much language
we
Based
"Mathematical Russell, sketchy.) For the theory of types, see Bertrand Logic as on The Theory of Types," Logic and Knowledge (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956). The locus classicus of the Tarski in of Truth is, of course, his "The Concept approach in Logic, Semantics, Formalized Hack Metamathematics Languages," (Indianapolis: ett Publishing in the Tarskian "Outline Co., 2nd ed. 1983). Also spirit is Saul Kripke, we of a Theory of Truth," Journal vol. 72 (1975), pp. 690-716. In general, of Philosophy, think that the problems are harder to solve than the one facing the other paradoxes so more complex and more controversial solutions are needed for facing perspectivism, them. of an overarching that we are all forced to advocacy perspective that we believe is partly for Danto's of responsible misreading as a pragmatist. Danto "In the interests of life and survival, we are writes, to affirm the body of beliefs which constrained sense and reject for common passes 32. It is Nietzsche's humans conflicts with this" (Danto, op. cit., p. 75). Danto may be right that this is of Nietzsche's The views, but he is wrong to think it simple pragmatism. representative are ones that are absolutely class of statements in mind that Danto has true for they are true in all human 33. On (London: the nature Hutchinson, op. of category mistakes, 1949), p. 16 et passim. perspectives. see Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind
be within the range of its own quantifier. Colloquially put, every time the perspectivism thesis within the language its level over which the thesis would level and up to a ranges, quantifier get booted out of that language the paradox could never get generated. (We realize that these remarks higher one. Hence tried to put are
the perspectivism thesis would be a sentence in the metalan or German), of English in the which says of sentences partition or German) of the rest of English that they all have their truth object can contain both its own truth values view no language On Tarski's perspectivally. to refer to its own expression. and the means Thus the perspectivism thesis predicate itself could never
Nietzsche;
cit., p. 132.
36. We Ernest Nussbaum, Sosa, Richard Schmitt, Jaegwon and an anonymous referee for for Kim, Victor Caston, History of Philosophy Quarterly of this paper and for helpful discussions. criticisms of ancestors