1

THIRD DIVISION

STOLT-NIELSEN MARINE SERVICES, INC. (now STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC.), Petitioner,

G.R. No. 147623 Present: PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, and GARCIA, JJ.

- versus -

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ARIEL C. SANTOS, RICARDO O. ATIENZA and RAMON ALPINO, Respondents.

Promulgated: December 13, 2005

DECISION GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the decision dated March 29, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51046 and its Resolution dated March 2, 2001, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. [2] The assailed decision affirmed the resolution dated August 29, 1997 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) denying petitioners Urgent Motion to Reduce or be Exempted from Filing an Appeal Bond. The factual background of the case may be stated, as follows: In 1978, herein private respondent Ramon Alpino was employed as motorman by petitioner Stolt Nielsen Marine Services, Inc., a corporation based in Connecticut, U.S.A., for the latters vessel M/T Stolt Sincerity. Respondents employment with petitioner, albeit not continuous, lasted until 1984 when he was repatriated to the Philippines after being diagnosed with Cardiac Enlargement, Pulmonary Hypertension and Acute Psychotic Reaction and declared unfit for sea duty. In early 1985, respondent filed a complaint before the Philippine Overseas and Employment Agency (POEA), docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 85-01-039, for recovery of sickness and disability benefits and claim for personal belongings and underpayment of wages against petitioner. Petitioner offered to amicably settle the money claims of respondent, which offer was accepted by respondents sister and attorney-in-fact Anita Alpino by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA). Thus, on March 21, 1985, respondent, through his sister and attorney-in-fact, executed a Receipt and Release whereby he acknowledged receipt of the sum of P130,000.00 representing disability benefits, medical and hospitalization expenses, and damages. On the basis of said Receipt and Release, POEA dismissed Case No. (M) 85-01-039. In December 1987, another complaint against petitioner was lodged by respondent before the POEA for the same causes of action (recovery of sickness and disability benefits and claim for personal belongings and underpayment of wages). The case, docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 87-12-997, was dismissed by the POEA on ground of res judicata.

[1]

On March 14, 1989, respondent filed another complaint against petitioner, this time with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2009, for the Annulment of the Receipt and Release. In his complaint, respondent alleged that he was mentally incapacitated to execute the SPA in favor of his sister Anita Alpino. In an Order dated July 16, 1993, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. Q-89-2009 for insufficiency of evidence. [3] Therefrom, respondent went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTCs judgment of dismissal. In time, [4] respondent moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied by the appellate court. Undaunted, on July 26, 1994, respondent filed a case against petitioner with the POEA for recovery of sickness and disability benefits, allegedly arising from his sickness while under the latters employ. The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 94-07-2223. By reason of the passage of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas [5] Filipinos Act of 1995, POEA Case No. (M) 94-07-2223 was transferred to the NCR-Arbitration Branch of the NLRC and assigned to herein public respondent, Labor Arbiter Ariel Santos. On May 6, 1997, Labor Arbiter Santos rendered a decision declaring invalid and ineffectual the SPA executed by respondent in favor of his sister Anita and the subsequent Receipt and Release signed by the latter in behalf of her brother. In resolving the case, Labor Arbiter Santos ratiocinated as follows: The principal issue to be resolved is whether or not the special power of attorney executed by [respondent] in favor of [his] sister and the subsequent Receipt and Release are valid documents to forestall any claim by [respondent]. After a careful and judicious study of the respective pleadings and pieces of evidence submitted by both parties, undersigned finds that the documents adverted and relied upon by [petitioner] to negate [respondents] claim are shot with loopholes that would render it voidable and unenforceable. First, it is to be noted that [petitioner] did not controvert the merit of [respondents] claim for sickness and disability benefits but relied mainly on the invalid Receipt and Release signed by [respondents] sister as the basis for dismissing [respondents] claim. A cursory look at the documents Receipt and Release and the Special Power of Attorney marked as Annex 1 and Annex 2, respectively, would readily indicate that they were prepared with haste and haphazardly to render it valid and lawful. Both documents were prepared on the same day. In fact, the Receipt and Release was not even executed under oath so that its due execution is put under a cloud of doubt. Secondly, even gratia argumenti that the documents adverted to are valid and were entered into voluntarily, the consideration thereof is oppressive, unreasonable and unconscionable. It is a public policy that where the consideration in a public document is disproportionately unconscionable to the claims of [respondent] who was declared to be mentally unfit, the State should step in to protect the rights of the aggrieved party and declare the same document to be invalid and without force and effect. Thirdly, the consideration of P130,000.00 paid by [petitioner] to [respondents] attorney -in-fact corresponds only to [respondents] claim for lost luggages and should not extinguish [respondents] right to claim for sickness and disability benefits as recognized under insurance health cover before [6] any seaman can board any foreign vessel. The dispositive portion of Labor Arbiter Santos decision states: WHEREFORE, finding the subject documents Annex 1 and Annex 2 of [petitioners] Answer to be invalid and ineffectual, [petitioner] is hereby directed to pay [respondents] claim for sickness and disability benefits.

The Research and Information Unit is hereby ordered to make the proper computation which will become part and parcel of this decision. SO ORDERED.
[7]

[Words in brackets added].

In compliance with the above directive, herein other public respondent Ricardo Atienza, Acting Chief of Research and Information Unit of NLRC, made a computation of respondent Alpinos claim for sickness and disability benefits as follows: Sickness benefit for October 1979 (Payment for sickness & operation) Injury and sickness for Sept. 1980 (Payment for last finger cut) Sickness benefit for March 1985 (Payment for sickness of Acute Psychotic Reaction) TOTAL AWARD =

US$11,427.32

5,568.42

28,810.60 US$45,806.34
[8]

On July 25, 1997, or seven days after its receipt of the aforementioned Labor Arbiters decision, petitioner filed with the respondent NLRC its Appeal with Attached Urgent Motion to Reduce or be Exempted from Filing Appeal Bond.
[9]

Petitioner argued therein that the money claims of respondent Alpino were already barred

by prescription; that said claims should have been dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on ground of res judicata; and that the validity of the Receipt and Release and the Special Power of Attorney had already been passed upon by the RTC of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-89-2009 and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
[10]

In a Resolution

dated August 29, 1997, respondent NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision and denied

petitioners Urgent Motion to Reduce or be Exempted from Filing an Appeal Bond on account of petitioners failure to post cash or surety bond within the reglementary period. In so ruling, the NLRC reasoned:

The URGENT MOTION TO REDUCE OR BE EXEMPTED FROM FILING APPEAL BOND is denied. Sections 6 and 7, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides: SECTION 6. BOND. In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator and Regional Director or his duly authorized hearing officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award xxx. SECTION 7. NO EXTENSION OF PERIOD. No motion or request for the extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed. The aforequoted provisions are very clear, that all the requirements for the perfection of an appeal must be made and complied with within the reglementary period to appeal, that is: the filing of

the appeal and the posting of a cash or surety bond must be made within the period of ten (10) days. The filing of a Motion to Reduce Bond will not suspend the running of the ten (10) days period. If at all, the movant should have secured the approval of the Commission for the reduction of bond within the same period allowed by law. Considering that the movant failed to comply with the requirements for perfecting an appeal, said motion is therefore denied. The NLRC then decreed: WHEREFORE, the URGENT MOTION TO REDUCE OR BE EXEMPTED FROM FILING APPEAL BOND is DENIED for non-perfection of the appeal. Accordingly, the decision dated May 6, 1997 is AFFIRMED in toto. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC in its decision dated October 28, 1997
[11]

petitioner went to this Court via a petition for certiorari which this Court referred to the Court of Appeals
[12]

pursuant to its September 16, 1998 decision in St. Martin Funeral Home vs. National Labor Relations Commission.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision of March 29, 2000, affirmed the judgment of the NLRC, thus: The law is clear. An appeal, per article 223 of the Labor Code, shall be perfected only upon posting of a cash or surety bond in cases involving monetary award. On perfection of appeal, it is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. In implementing article 223, respondent NLRC however laid down the rule allowing reduction of the amount of bond which it can approve in meritorious cases. There is a caveat however that the filing of the motion to reduce bond does not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal. The plain import of article 223 of the Labor Code and the amended section 6, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure is that the reduction of the bond should be approved within the ten (10) day appeal period and the appellant should exert its utmost diligence to obtain the approval of respondent NLRC before the lapse of the period or else there is a big risk that the appeal will be dismissed for non-perfection of the appeal due to the absence of the appeal bond. This is evident form the last sentence of Section 6, Rule VI that the filing xxx of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal. Thus the present rule is unequivocal that the filing of the motion does not toll the running of the period of appeal and the logical implication and inevitable result is the dismissal of the appeal if the reduction is denied. xxx. Thus respondent NLRC correctly affirmed the decision of Arbiter Santos since the appeal was not perfected due to lack of an appeal bond. xxx xxx xxx

There being no capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise judgment on the part of respondent NLRC, this petition perforce must fall.

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its Resolution of March 2, 2001, petitioner is now with us on the following grounds: I. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, IN EFFECT, AFFIRMING PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN EFFECT, SANCTIONED THE DECISION DATED MAY 6, 1997 OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT LABOR ARBITER WHICH ON ITS FACE WAS MANIFESTLY RENDERED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION IN THAT

A.

AS SHOWN IN THE UNILATERAL COMPUTATION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ATIENZA WHICH FORMED PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT LABOR ARBITERS DECISION DATED MAY 6, 1997, THE QUESTIONED AWARD IN THE AMOUNT OF US$45,806.34 ALLEGEDLY REPRESENTING DISABILITY AND SICKNESS BENEFITS FOR OCTOBER 1979, SEPTEMBER 1980, AND MARCH 1985 IS CLEARLY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AS PRIVATE RESPONDENS COMPLAINT WAS FILED ONLY ON JULY 26, 2994; THE ALLEGED MONEY CLAIM IS ALREADY BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, NOT ONCE, BUT TWICE, AS THE SAME HAD ALREADY BEEN RULED UPON BY THE POEA, THE QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY WHICH THEN HAD THE JURISDICTION OVER SAID CLAIM IN ITS ORDERS, TO WIT

B.

i.

ORDER DATED APRIL 17, 1985 IN POEA CASE NO. (M) 85-01-039 DISMISSING THE CASE WITH PREJUDICE IN VIEW OF THE AMICABLE SETTLEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES; AND ORDER DATED MAY 28, 1988 IN POEA CASE NO. (M) 87-12-997 DISMISSING THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA.

ii.

C.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT LABOR ARBITER EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE DECLARED AS INVALID AND INEFFECTUAL THE RECEIPT AND RELEASE AND THE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY THE VALIDITY OF WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN PASSED UPON BY: i. THE POEA, NOT ONCE BUT TWICE, IN POEA CASE NO. (M) 85-01-039 AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN POEA CASE NO. (M) 87-12-997; THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 104 OF QUEZON CITY IN ITS ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 6, 1991 IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-89-2009 DISMISSING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE; AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ITSELF IN ITS DECISION DATED JULY 16, 1993 IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 35954 AFFIRMING WITH FINALITY THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRNACH 104 OF QUEZON CITY. II.

ii.

iii.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC GROSSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY STUBBORNLY IGNORED THE CURRENT POLICY OF THIS HONORABLE COURT CALLING FOR LIBERAL INTERPREATTION OF ARTICLE 223 OF THE LABOR CODE WITH RESPECT TO THE POSTING OF AN APPEAL BOND AS A CONDITION FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL AND HOLDING THAT A MOTION TO REDUCE BOND BASED ON MANIFESTLY MERITORIOUS GROUNDS IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE THEREOF. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT WITTINGLY AND STUBBORNLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE SUBSTANTIAL MERITS OF PETITIONERS CASE WHICH IMPERATIVELY CALL FOR THE LIBERAL APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 223 OF THE LABOR CODE AS THE VERY FACTUAL BASIS AND GROUNS OF PETITIONERS PETITION ARE THEMSELVES RECOGNIZED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS DECISION OF MARCH 29, 2001.

IV. TH HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISERABLY ABDICATED ITS JUDICIAL POWER OF REVIEW OVER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AND FAILED TO EXERCISE CANDOR IN THE [13] DISPOSITION OF PETITIONERS PETITION. The petition lacks merit.

Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.
[14]

Article 223 of the Labor Code sets forth the rules on appeal from the Labor Arbiters monetary award, thu s: Article 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. xxx. xxx xxx xxx

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Emphasis ours)
[15]

Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC

implements the aforequoted Article. The pertinent

provisions of Rule VI which were in effect when petitioner filed its appeal on July 25, 1997, provides, inter alia, as follows: Section 1. Periods of Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter and the POEA Administrator shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both partieswithin ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter or of the Administrator, and in case of a decision of the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer within five (5) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or th th orders. If the 10 or 5 day, as the case may be, falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a holiday, the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the next working day. (As amended on November 7, 1991) xxx xxx xxx Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. - (a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided on Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal. xxx xxx xxx Section 6. Bond. - In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator and Regional Director or his duly authorized hearing officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the

employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The employer as well as counsel shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until final disposition of the case. The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. The filing, however, of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal. (As amended on November 5, 1996) Section 7. No Extension of Period. - No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.[Emphasis ours] Evident it is from the foregoing that an appeal from rulings of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC must be perfected within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof, otherwise the same shall become final and executory. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected only upon (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee and (2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company and (3) filing of a memorandum of appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites mentioned shall [16] not stop the running of the period for perfection of appeal. Here, petitioner received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on July 18, 1997. From July 18, 1997, petitioner has a limited period of ten (10) days to perfect its appeal. Petitioner filed its memorandum of appeal on July 25, 1997. However, in lieu of the required cash or surety bond, petitioner filed a motion to reduce or be exempted from filing an [17] appeal bond. The NLRC denied the motion and consequently dismissed the appeal for non-perfection. Petitioner now insists that its Motion to Reduce Bond constitutes a substantial compliance of the requirement for perfecting an appeal under Article 223 of the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure. We disagree. The requirement of a cash or surety bond for the perfection of an appeal from the Labor Arbiters monetary award is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and non-compliance therewith is fatal and has the effect of [18] rendering the award final and executory. The reason therefor is explained by the Court in this language: [T]he obvious and logical purpose of an appeal bond is to insure, during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery under the judgment if subsequently affirmed; it also validates and justifies, at least prima facie, an interpretation that would limit the amount of the bond to the aggregate of the sums awarded other than in the concept of moral and [19] exemplary damages. The mandatory filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is evident from the aforequoted provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code which explicitly states that the appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond. The word only makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond to be the exclusive means by which an employers appeal may be perfected. This requirement is intended to dissuade employers from using the appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees just and lawful claims.
[20]

Further, the implementing rules of respondent NLRC are unequivocal in saying that the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal. Thus, petitioner should have seasonably filed the appeal bond within the ten-day reglementary period following its receipt of the decision of Labor Arbiter Ariel

Santos in order to forestall the finality of said decision. Since petitioner failed to post an appeal bond within the reglementary period, no appeal was perfected from the decision of Labor Arbiter Santos, for which reason, the decision sought to be appealed to the NLRC had become final and executory and therefore immutable. It is true that the requirement of posting a bond on appeals involving monetary awards has been given a liberal [21] interpretation in certain cases. However, relaxation of this rule can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the NLRC Rules of Procedure or where the party involved, at the very least, demonstrated willingness [22] to abide by the rules by posting a partial bond. Petitioner did not post a full or partial appeal bond within the prescribed period. Petitioner could have even paid a moderate and reasonable sum as premium for such bond as the law does not require outright payment but merely the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal be dismissed, but still, petitioner failed to do so. Hence, we find no cogent reason to apply the same liberal interpretation in this case. While, admittedly, Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon motion of the appellant, the exercise of the authority is not a matter of right on the part of the [23] movant but lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of meritorious grounds. Nevertheless, even granting arguendo that petitioner has meritorious grounds to reduce the appeal bond, the result would have been the same since it failed to post cash or surety bond within the prescribed period. As payment of the appeal bond is an indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and not a mere technicality of law or procedure, we find the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51046 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181480

January 30, 2009

JOSEFINA CADA, Petitioner, vs. TIME SAVER LAUNDRY/LESLIE PEREZ, Respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Josefina 2 Cada assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 December 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 94616, which 3 declared the Resolutions dated 30 November 2004 and 28 February 2006 of the National Labor Relations 4 Commission (NLRC) as null and void on the ground of lack of proper service of summons on respondent Leslie Perez 5 6 (Perez). In its Resolution dated 30 November 2004, the NLRC affirmed the Decision dated 16 March 2004 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 05-06071-03 in finding that petitioner Josefina Cada was illegally dismissed by respondents Perez and Time Saver Laundry (TSL). The Petition at bar stemmed from a Complaint dated 21 May 2003 filed before the NLRC by petitioner against respondents for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary, nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, separation pay and attorn eys fees. The Complaint was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 05-06071-03. Respondent TSL is a sole proprietorship engaged in the laundry business. Respondent Perez is the owner/proprietor 8 of TSL. Petitioner alleged that she was employed by the respondents on 28 September 2002 as Presser, receiving a salary ofP220.00 per day. She worked for 12 hours a day, from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., but she was not paid overtime pay. She also did not receive holiday pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, 5 days service incentive leave pay (SILP), and 13th month pay. While she was working on 7 May 2003, the management called her attention for quarreling with her co-employee. Without giving her an opportunity to explain and defend her side, petitioner was sent home and prevented to work further, compelling her to file the Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents. Respondents failed to appear for the entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter heard the case ex 9 parte directing the petitioner to file her position paper. On the basis of the petitioners position paper, the case was submitted for decision. In its Decision dated 16 March 2004, the Labor Arbiter ruled: WHEREFORE, finding complainant to have been illegally dismissed, she is entitled to payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as aforestated and backwages. Accordingly, respondents Time Saver Laundry and Leslie Perez are hereby ordered to pay complainant the following: 1. P 7,280.00 - separation pay 2. P80,563.17 - backwages from May 7, 2003 to date of this decision which will further be computed until finality of this decision 3. P 5,670.00 - salary differentials from September 28, 2002 to May 7, 2003 4. P 5,670.60 - ECOLA 5. P29,534.38 - overtime pay P128,718.75 - TOTAL 6. P12,871.88 - 10% of the total award as and by way of attorneys fees.
7 1

10

P141,590.63 - TOTAL MONETARY AWARD All other claims are ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.
11 10

On 21 June 2004, respondents appealed to the NLRC essentially arguing that they were denied due process on the ground of improper service of summons and that the monetary award in favor of petitioner was without basis. Respondents appeal was docketed as CA No. 040723-04. The NLRC issued its Resolution dated 30 November 2004, sustaining the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was illegally dismissed: Conclusively of first impression, [herein petitioner] filed her verified complaint on May 21, 2003, alleging among others, the fact of her dismissal on May 7, 2003. Thereafter, [petitioner] submitted her verified Position Paper which takes the place of her direct testimonies which substantiate her claim for illegal dismissal, stating with particularity the facts attending her illegal dismissal as follows: "x x x. On May 7, 2003, while working, her attention was called to the Office by Management and accused her of quarreling with an employee of the Company. From there, and without giving her an opportunity to explain and defend her side, was sent home and prevented to work further. x x x" (Complainants Position Paper, p. 1, Record, p. 13) In this jurisdiction, it is the unwavering rule that the "onus probandi" to show that the dismissal of an employee from service is for cause and due process rests upon the shoulders of the employer. Failure to discharge this burden, the dismissal is tainted with illegality. At bar, [herein respondents] failed to discharge this burden. A mere denial that they did not dismiss the [petitioner] is not a sufficient measure of the required proof to belie or controvert the latters assertion that she was dismissed from service, much less, illegally; more so, when [petitioner] satisfactorily narrated the ultimate facts attending her dismissal. In fine, for want of just or authorized cause and in the absence of due process, the dismissal of [petitioner] from 12 service is therefore tainted with illegality. The NLRC did not give credence to respondents argument that they were denied due process: The issue interposed by the [respondents] that their right to due process was denied in the discernment of the present dispute is now rendered moot and academic as We give (sic) them the opportunity to explain and be heard through the judicious resolution of the substantive merits of this case: "The party who has had ample opportunity to present its side of the controversy not only before the Labor Arbiter but also the NLRC on appeal, it cannot interpose lack of due process for what the fundamental law abhors is simply the 13 absolute absence of opportunity to be heard." (CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, 303 SCRA 99). The NLRC then determined the monetary awards to which petitioner would be entitled to: Finding the dismissal of [petitioner] as illegal, she is entitled, under Art. 279 of the Labor Code, to reinstatement and full backwages. However, considering that reinstatement would not be in the interest of the parties as there is now of ruptured and strained relationship exists between them, it is more appropriate to award separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement. In the absence of proof of payment on the [petitioners] money claims as these were not substantially belied nor controverted by [respondents], the awards for salary differential, overtime pay, SILP and 13th month pay are hereby affirmed. The claim for attorneys fees is granted based on salary differential, overtime pay and ECOLA pursuant to Article 111 of the Labor Code. All other claims, for lack of factual or legal basis, are DISMISSED.
14

11

In the end, the NLRC decreed: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of 16 March 2004 with modification on the award of attorneys fee is 15 AFFIRMED. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 November 2004 Resolution of the NLRC. They followed this up with a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration which only reiterated the arguments presented in their 17 appeal. In a Resolution dated 28 February 2006, the NLRC denied respondents Motion and Supplemental Motion for 18 Reconsideration. Thereafter, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94616.
19 16

of the Revised Rules

In its Decision dated 17 December 2007, the Court of Appeals held that respondent Perez was indeed denied due process based on the following ratiocination: As above-quoted, service of summons in cases before the Labor Arbiters shall be served on the parties personally or by registered mail, provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court. In this case, since [herein respondent] Leslie Perez is the sole proprietor of Time Saver Laundry, service of summons must be made to her personally or by registered mail. The bailiff chose to serve the summons personally upon [respondent Perez]. However, said service of summons was invalid as it was not personally received by [respondent Perez] herself. The records show that the summons was received by one Alfredo Perez on June 7, 2003. It appears that Alfredo Perez is a co-employee of [herein petitioner]. x x x. xxxx Considering that there was no proper service of summons upon [respondent Perez], the Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction over his (sic) person. Perforce, the proceedings conducted and the decision rendered is nugatory and without effect. xxxx The lack of proper service of summons clearly deprived [respondent Perez] of her right to due process of law. She should have been afforded her day before the labor arbiter. She was deprived of her right to be heard and to present evidence which are essential ingredients of due process of law. While it is true that the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC are not bound by technical rules of evidence and procedure, such should not be interpreted so as to dispense with the 20 fundamental and essential right of every person to due process of law. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated November 30, 2004 21 and February 28, 2006, respectively, of public respondent NLRC are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Aggrieved, petitioner comes before us
22

with the following assignment of errors:

I THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE ON QUESTION OF LAW AND SUBSTANCE DETERMINABLE BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT II THE COURT OF APPEALS IN DECIDING, HAS DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED JUDICIAL 23 PROCEEDINGS DEROGATORY TO THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONER. We determine that the fundamental issue for our resolution in the present Petition is whether there had been improper service of summons upon respondent Perez which renders the judgment by the NLRC against her null and void. We rule in the negative.

12

The NLRC Rules governing the issuance and service of summons provide : Sec. 3. Issuance of Summons. Within two (2) days from receipt of a case, the Labor Arbiter shall issue the required summons, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint/petition and supporting documents, if any. The summons, together with a copy of the complaint, shall specify the date, time and place of the conciliation and mediation conference in two (2) settings. Section 6. SERVICE OF NOTICES AND RESOLUTIONS. a) Notices or summonses and copies of orders shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; Provided further, that in cases of decisions and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel/representative by registered mail; provided further that in cases where a party to a case or his counsel on record personally seeks service of the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party shall be deemed effected upon actual receipt thereof; provided finally, that where parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of complainants, as maybe practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224(a) of the Labor Code, as 25 amended. (Emphasis supplied.)1avvph!1.net Sec. 6. Proof and completeness of service. The return is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect after such 26 time. Sec. 5. x x x (b) The bailiff or officer serving the notice, order, resolution or decision shall submit his return within two (2) days from the date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return, his name, the names of the persons served and the date of receipt, which return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of the records of the case. In case of service by registered mail, the bailiff or officer shall write in the return, the names of persons served and the date of mailing of the resolution or decision. If no service was effected, the serving officer shall state the reason therefor in the return. Based on the foregoing rules, notices or summonses shall be served on the parties to the case personally. The same rule allows under special circumstances, that service of summons may be effected in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court regarding service of summons read: RULE 14 SUMMONS Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it by tendering it to him. Sec. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the proceding section, service may be affected (a) by lea ving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. As borne by the records, summons and notices were served on respondents under the circumstances described below: 1) Summons to respondents dated 27 May 2003, received by Alfredo Perez, employee of TSL and uncle of 27 respondent Perez, on 7 June 2003 as shown by the bailiffs return dated 10 June 2003 ; 2) Notice of Hearing set on 10 July 2003, received for the respondents by Beth Diapolet, Cashier at respondent TSL, on 1 July 2003. During the hearing, only the petitioner and her counsel appeared, 28 respondents failed to appear ;

24

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3) Notice of Hearing set on 31 July 2003, received for the respondents by Beth Diapolet, Cashier at respondent TSL, on 26 July 2003 as shown by bailiffs return dated 28 July 2003. Petitioner and counsel appeared but the respondents did not appear. During this hearing, the Labor Arbiter required the parties to file 29 their position paper ; 4) Notice of Hearing set on 20 August 2003, received for the respondents by Vivian Bon, Supervisor at 30 respondent TSL, on 13 August 2003 as shown by the bailiffs return dated 15 August 2003. Only the petitioner appeared and filed her position paper. The Labor Arbiter set the case for hearing anew on 18 September 2003; 5) Notice of hearing and to file position paper set on 18 September 2003 with a warning that upon failure to appear on this date, the case will proceed ex parte. This notice was received for the respondents by Beth Diapolet, cashier at respondent TSL on 15 September 2003 as shown by the bailiffs return dated 17 31 September 2003. Again, respondents did not appear before the Labor Arbiter or file their position paper on the date indicated in the notice; and 6) Notice of Hearing set on 9 October 2003 with a second "Warning." This was received for the respondents 32 by "Benjie," delivery boy at respondent TSL, on 3 October 2003 as shown by the bailiffs return dated 6 33 October 2003. Following the explicit language of the NLRC Rules, service of summons on respondent Perez should be made personally. But was personal service of summons practicable? Conversely, was substituted service of summons justified? Obviously, in this case, personal service of summons was not practicable. By respondent Perezs own 34 admission, she was out of town during the entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Given this admission, she would be unable to personally receive the summons and later the notices from the Labor Arbiter. Thus, even if the bailiff would return at some other time to personally serve the summons on respondent Perez, it would still yield the same result. To proceed with personal service of summons on respondent Perez who unequivocally admits that she was out of town during the entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter would not only be impractical and futile - it 35 would be absurd. While we are not unmindful of the NLRC rules which state that service of summons should be made personally, considering the circumstances in the instant case, we find that service of summons at TSL, 36 37 respondent Perezs place of business, amounts to substantial compliance with the Rules. In the fairly recent case of 38 Scenarios v. Vinluan, service of summons by registered mail at therein petitioners place of business was considered valid. This Court declared in the said case that technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in quasi-judicial proceedings; only substantial compliance is required. That the summons was served in the premises of therein petitioners office was enough to convince the court that the service of said processes was completed and resultantly, 39 the requirement of notice has been served. In quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC and its arbitration branch, procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. The constitutional requirement of due process with respect to service of summons only exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be 40 expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the 41 requirement of justice is answered, the traditional notion of fair play is satisfied, due process is served. To apply the technical rules on service of summons would be to overturn the bias of the Constitution and the laws in favor of labor. In labor cases, punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules maybe relaxed in the interest of the working man; it should not defeat the complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties. This Court is ever mindful of the underlying spirit and intention of the Labor Code to ascertain the facts of each case 42 speedily and objectively without resort to technical rules. In Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, presumption of regularity in the service of summons and other notices, to wit:
43

we expounded on the

[U]nless the contrary is proven, official duty is presumed to have been performed regularly and judicial proceedings regularly conducted. This presumption of the regularity of the quasi-judicial proceedings before DOLE includes the presumption of regularity of service of summons and other notices. x x x. Moreover, it is a legal presumption, based on wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed; that the proceedings of a judicial (and quasi-judicial) tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial (quasi-judicial) acts 44 and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed. The burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct, if any, is on the part of respondents who, in this case, clearly failed to discharge the same.

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It has not escaped our attention the respondents denial of receipt of the notices from the Labor Arbiter, yet they were able to receive a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision and file a timely appeal with the NLRC. Indeed, respondents were able to seek the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter when they seasonably filed their appeal before the NLRC. A party who has availed himself of the opportunity to present his position cannot claim to have been denied due process. Despite such opportunity, respondents failed to convincingly 45 establish that their defense is meritorious. We must emphasize that even though respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, they were eventually able to argue their case on appeal before the NLRC. In their appeal, respondents had the opportunity to substantiate with evidence their claim that they did not receive the summons and notices from the Labor 46 Arbiter, and that petitioner was not illegally dismissed. Article 223 of the Labor Code allows an appeal from a decision of the Labor Arbiter "if serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable injury to the appellant." The NLRC, in the exercise of its appellate powers, is authorized to correct, amend or waive any error, defect or irregularity in substance or in form. This Court had previously allowed evidence to be submitted on appeal, emphasizing that, in labor cases, technical rules of evidence are not binding. The NLRC in fact went over the arguments of respondents but it remained unconvinced. Necessarily, respondents contention that they were denied due process because of improper service of summons and notices is devoid of merit. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of . What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the 47 opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. Equally without merit is respondents' assertion that they were not afforded due process when the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision based only on the evidence adduced by petitioner. The authority of the Labor Arbiter to render judgment based solely on the evidence adduced by a complainant is explicitly sanctioned by Section 2, Rule V of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which provides: Section 2 of Rule V: Sec. 2. x x x. xxxx In case of non-appearance of the respondent/s during the first conference, a second conference shall proceed. Nonappearance of the respondent during the second conference shall immediately terminate the mandatory conciliation/mediation conference. The complainant shall thereupon be allowed to file his position paper as well as submit evidence in support of his cause or causes of action after which, the Labor Arbiter shall render his decision on 48 the basis of the evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied.) Undoubtedly, respondents were afforded ample opportunity to be heard. Despite any purported procedural flaw that may have marred the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, it should be deemed rectified in the subsequent proceedings in the NLRC, to the Court of Appeals, and before this Court. Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Granted. The Decision dated 17 December 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94616 is reversed and set aside; and the NLRC Resolutions dated 30 November 2004 and 28 February 2006 in CA No. 040723-04, affirming with modification the Decision dated 16 March 2004 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 05-06071-03, are reinstated. Costs against respondents. SO ORDERED.

15

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998 ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

REGALADO, J.: The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner 1 of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, 2 the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no 3 jurisdiction over the case. Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; 4 and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner. On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to 5 the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was 6 denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the present petition alleging that 7 the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree ( P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect. We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines. On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its 8 promulgation. Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor 9 and Employment for program and policy coordination only. Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391

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subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for. Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the 10 NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls 11 arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is 12 to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then 13 seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if 14 filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65. Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows: Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: (1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of 15 the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit: Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise: (1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

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(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.: 1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction. 2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied). 3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission. This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the 17 NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication. The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter. A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have
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reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more 18 particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech reproduce the following excerpts:
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from which we

The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals . However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours) xxx xxx xxx Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal. In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court: . . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic rights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of cases pending. In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber. xxx xxx xxx Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by the said 20 sponsor and the following proceedings transpired:

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Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court. The President. Is there any objection? ( Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President. The President. Is there any objection? ( Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President. Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments. The President. Is there any objection? ( Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied). xxx xxx xxx Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and 21 being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed. The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, 22 the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20, 1995, inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed. The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent 23 original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495. Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning: On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed. Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by 24 minute resolutions. While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

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Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, 25 this pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. should be taken into account: One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.