[G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000] HON. RICARDO T.

GLORIA, in his capacity as SECRETARY, AND DIRECTOR NILO L. ROSAS in his capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. BIENVENIDO A. ICASIANO, respondents. DECISION PURISIMA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court brought by Secretary and the Director for the National Capital Region of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), to question the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35505. The Court of Appeals found the facts as follows: "On June 29, 1989, petitioner [private respondent herein] was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino. On October 10, 1994, respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the Philippines that the petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro, on June 17, 1994. On October 12, 1994, the President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria. On October 13, 1994, a copy of the recommendation for petitioners reassignment, as approved by the President, was transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for implementation. On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas, informed the petitioner of his reassignment, effective October 17, 1994. Petitioner requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the latter denied the request. The petitioner prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to the President of the Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a copy of the same to the DECS. However, he subsequently changed his mind and refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President. On October 19, 1994, the petitioner filed the instant petition."[2] On October 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied private respondents prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).[3] On November 22, 1994, it set aside its earlier resolution denying the prayer for the issuance of a TRO; and thereafter, restrained the petitioners "from implementing the re-assignment of the petitioner [private respondent herein] from incumbent Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology."[4]

On December 21, 1994, the Court of Appeals issued another resolution setting the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and enjoining the petitioners from implementing the reassignment of the private respondent. On March 28, 1995, it issued its assailed decision; holding as follows: "WHEREFORE, for lack of a period or any indication that it is only temporary, the reassignment of the petitioner from Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology pursuant to the Memorandum of Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria to the President of the Philippines dated 10 October 1994, is hereby declared to be violative of petitioners right to security of tenure, and the respondents are hereby prohibited from implementing the same. SO ORDERED."[5] Petitioners are now before the Court seeking relief from the decision of the appellate court, contending that: I RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE INSTRUMENTAL IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CIRCUMVENTION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT BY GIVING DUE COURSE AND GRANTING RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN A SUIT PURPORTEDLY FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS BUT ACTUALLY QUESTIONING AN ACT OF THE PRESIDENT. II RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT[6] The pivotal issue for resolution here is whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational School Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of tenure? Petitioners maintain that there is no violation of security of tenure involved. Private respondent maintains otherwise. In taking favorable action on private respondents petition for prohibition, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated: "Notwithstanding the protestations of counsel for the respondents, the reassignment of the petitioner to MIST appears to be indefinite. No period is fixed. No objective or purpose, from which the temporariness of the assignment may be inferred, is set. In fact, the recommendation of respondent Secretary Gloria to the President that the position of superintendent of MIST will best fit his (petitioners) qualifications and experience. (Exh. C-2) implies that the proposed reassignment will be indefinite."[7] Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit. Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where

there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.[8] Petitioners submission that the petition of private respondent with the Court of Appeals is improper for failing to show that petitioners constituted themselves into a "court" conducting a "proceeding" and for failing to show that any of the petitioners acted beyond their jurisdiction in the exercise of their judicial or ministerial functions, is barren of merit. Private respondent has clearly averred that the petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction in reassigning the private respondent in a way that infringed upon his security of tenure. And petitioners themselves admitted that their questioned act constituted a ministerial duty, such that they could be subject to charges of insubordination if they did not comply with the presidential order. What is more, where an administrative department acts with grave abuse of discretion, which is equivalent to a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner, there is a justification for the courts to set aside the administrative determination thus reached.[9] Petitioners contend that the doctrine enunciated in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals[10] -- that "a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status and salary, is in effect, a constructive removal from the service" -- does not apply in the present case for the reassignment in question was merely temporary, lasting only until the appointment of a new Vocational School Superintendent of MIST. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum[11] of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain: "Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138). While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."[12] Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 35505 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Dario vs. Mison (1989) Facts: When President Cory Aquino came into power, she proceeded to reorganize the government, upon which Mison, the Commissioner of Customs sent notices of termination to 394 Customs officials. Some sought reinstatement from the CSC which the latter granted to 279 of them while the others went directly to the Supreme Court. Mison also filed a petition questioning the decision of the CSC. Also, RA 6656 was passed, providing that all officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed. The validity of this law is also put into question. Held: All the parties agree on the validity of reorganization per se, leaving the question only on its nature and extent. Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to th e new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure .At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not obliged to prove anything because the Constitution allows it. Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"-vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason. Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And the separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive , must concur, to wit: 1. 2. The The separation separation must be must due to any not of the be three for situations cause, mentioned and above.

By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It can only mean, then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution - the first stage. We are on the second stage - that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document. What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolution ary powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from Executive Order No. 17, which established

safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that accompanies reorganizations notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such removals would have been valid and unquestionable. Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service. Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that would have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that the Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right. Lastly, reorganizations must be carried out in good faith. In this case, Mison failed to prove that the reorganization was indeed made in good faith because he hired more people to replace those that he fired and no legitimate structural changes have been made. To sum up, the President could have validly removed officials before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution even without cause because it was a revolutionary government. However, from the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State did not lose its right to reorganize resulting to removals but such reorganization must be made in good faith.

Mayor v. Macaraig [Mar. 5, 1991]

24 SEP Mayor v. Macaraig Fact: RA No. 6715 Declaring Vacant all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations Commissions The old positions were declared vacant because of the need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and upgrade their qualifications, ranks and salar ies or emoluments. Issue: The constitutionality of the provisions of RA No. 6715.

Held: The petitioners have the right to remain in office until the expiration of the terms for which they have been appointed, unless sooner removed for cause provided by law. A recognized cause for removal or termination is the abolition by law of his office as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions, or clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment. Abolition of office is not the same as declaring that office is vacant. The latter would constitute an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.

Case Digest on Canonizado v. Aguirre 323 SCRA 312 November 10, 2010

FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police Commission when Republic Act. No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, took effect. Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of the incumbent commissioners were deemed expired. Petitioners claimed that this violated their security of tenure. HELD: Petitioners are members of the civil service. Republic Act No. 8551 did not expressly abolish the positions of petitioners. Under RA No. 6975, the National Police Commission was under the Department of Interior and Local Government, while under Republic Act. No. 8551 it is made an agency attached to the Department of Interior and Local Government. The organizational structure and the composition of the National Police Commission remain essentially the same except for the addition of the Chief of PNP as exofficio member. The powers and duties of the National Police Commission remain basically unchanged. No bona fide reorganization of the NPC having been mandated by Congress and insofar as RA 8851 declares the office of the petitioner as expired resulting in their separation from office, it is tantamount to removing civil service employees from office without legal cause therefore, it must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.

Civil Service Commission vs Dacoycoy To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Facts: In 1995, George P. Suan, Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Quezon City, a complaint for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism against respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy. After a formal investigation, the CSC promulgated its resolution on January 28, 1997 finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the CSC found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CSCs resolution was reversed ruling that the respondent did not appoint his two sons; hence, respondent was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism. 2. Who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case

Held: Yes. The law defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. The word relative and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority;

b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. It is true that Dacoycoy did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended to DECS Region VIII the appointment of Rito Dacoycoy as driver and appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was the respondent who recommended Mr. Daclags authority to appoint first level positions. It was also the respondent who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito and even rated his performance as very satisfactory. Further, Ped, listed him in his job description as his next higher supervisor. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions. Clearly he is guilty of nepotism. Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that The basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling t o restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive. If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the outstanding civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law. 2. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. The Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service. (Civil Service Commission vs. Pedro O. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999) Debulgado vs. CSC (G.R. No. 111471 September 26, 1994 ) Digests

Facts: Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. Mayor appointed his wife, petitioner Victoria T. Debulgado, as General Services Officer, that is, as head of the Office of General Services of the City Government of San Carlos. Victoria was one of three (3) employees of the City Government who were considered for the position of General Services Officer. Before her promotion in 1992, she had been in the service of the City Government for about thirty-two (32) years. She joined the City Government on 3 January 1961 as Assistant License Clerk. Through the years, she rose from the ranks, successively occupying the following positions: (a) Assistant Chief of the License & Fees Division, from 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1973; (b) Chief of the License and Fees Division, from 1 July 1973 to 1 January 1981; (c) Cashier, from 2 January 1981 to 30 June 1989; and (d) Cashier IV, from 1 July 1989 to 30 September 1992. On 1 October 1992, petitioner Victoria assumed the new post, and commenced discharging the functions, of General Services Officer of San Carlos City and receiving the regular salary attached to that position. Congressman Tranquilino B. Carmona of the First District of Negros Occidental, called the attention of the CSC to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife. From the report submitted by Director Jesse J. Caberoy of the Iloilo City-CSRO No. 6, the Commission found that petitioner Mayor was the lawful husband of the appointee, petitioner Victoria, the two (2) having been married sometime in 1964. Director Caberoy also reported that the appointment papers prepared by the Office of the City Mayor of San Carlos were submitted to the Bacolod City CSC-Field Office on 28 October 1992, and that the appointment was thereafter approved by Director Purita H. Escobia of that CSC-Field Office. Acting on the report of Director Caberoy, the Commission, in its Resolution No. 93-1427 dated 13 April 1993, recalled the approval issued by Director Escobia and disapproved the promotion of petitioner Victoria to the position of General Services Officer of San Carlos City upon the ground that that promotion violated the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments. Mayor and petitioner Victoria contend that the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in withdrawing and disapproving petitioner Victoria's promotional appointment. Petitioners assert that Victoria can no longer be removed from the position of General Services Officer without giving her an opportunity to be heard and to answer the charged of nepotism. Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated by personal reasons when he appointed his wife to the new post. He states that his wife was the most qualified among the candidates for appointment to that position, she having worked for the City Government for thirty-two (32) years and being highly recommended by the OIC-Treasurer of San Carlos City. Issue: WON the right to due process of Victoria Debulgado was violated when her appointment was revoked even though she was a legitimate candidate for the position. Held: Petition DISMISSED Ratio: Section 6 of Rule XVIII, of the "Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws," issued on 27 December 1991, implementing, among other things, the abovequoted Section 59, provides as follows: Sec. 6. No appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal government or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters shall be made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. A textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to make any distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments. Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal government, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned or controlled corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 itself. For the appointee, whether in an original or a promotion appointment, may in fact be quite loyal and efficient and hard-working; yet that circumstance will not prevent the application of the prohibition certainly in respect of the original appointment. The Court is not unaware of the difficulties that the comprehensive prohibition

against nepotism would impose upon petitioner Victoria and others who maybe in the same position. It is essential to stress, however, that the prohibition applies quite without regard to the actual merits of the proposed appointee and to the good intentions of the appointing or recommending authority, and that the prohibition against nepotism in appointments whether original or promotional, is not intended by the legislative authority to penalize faithful service. It follows that the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria by her husband, petitioner Mayor, falls within the prohibited class of appointments: the prohibited relationship between the appointing authority (petitioner Mayor) and the appointee (wife Victoria) existed at the time the promotional appointment was issued. It is scarcely necessary to add that the reasons which may have moved petitioner Mayor to issue the prohibited appointment are, as a matter of law, not relevant in this connection. There were no administrative charges in respect of which petitioner Victoria would have been entitled to notice and hearing. The Commission, in approving or disapproving an appointment, only examines the conformity of the appointment with applicable provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualifications. In any case, Victoria was afforded an opportunity to be heard when she filed a motion for reconsideration with the Commission and there challenged the disapproval by the Commission. The action of the Commission was, in other words, taken in implementation of Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 and the relevant Implementing Regulations. Because the promotional appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it was null and void as being contra legem. De Rama v. Court of Appeals (Ynares-Santiago, 2001) Facts: Mayor Conrado de Rama won as mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon. One of the first things he did upon assumption of office was to write the Civil Service Commission and seek the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. According to him, said appointments should be recalled as they were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Evelyn Abeja. The CSC denied his request saying that the appointments of the 14 employees were made in accordance with law and that the sec.15, art.VII of the Constitution which is being relied upon by Mayor de Rama, pertains only to the appointments of the outgoing President and not of local elective officials. Upon appeal to the CA, Mayor de Rama filed a supplemental pleading to the appeal alleging that the appointments were also tainted with fraud since the former mayor did not follow the rule in sec.80 of Ra 7041 that appointments can only be made within 4 months from the publication of the vacancies.
1

Issue: WON the appointments made by the former mayor should be recalled. Held and Ratio: NO. The CSC has correctly ruled that the appointments were made in accordance with the law. It was already too late for Mayor de Rama to claim that appointments were tainted with fraud since he did not raise this in his first complaint, which only relied on his allegation that the same were midnight appointments. Only the CSC has the power to recall the appointments upon grounds 2 mentioned in the Revised Administrative Code. However, none of the grounds exist to warrant the recall of the said appointments. To grant the mayors request is to violate the security of tenure of the appointed employees. Aside from this, the Court ruled that it was error for Mayor de Rama to invoke the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. According to the Court, this only pertains to appointments made by an outgoing President and is not applicable to appointments made by an outgoing mayor.

1
2

Angelica Paglicawan

Sec.20, rule VI that appointments may be recalled on any of the following grounds: a. non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit Promotion Plan b. failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board c. violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or d. violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

Mendoza, dissenting: The prohibition against midnight appointments is not limited to those made by an outgoing President. The same covers those made by outgoing elective officials since midnight appointments in general are bad because they are made hurriedly, without due deliberation and careful consideration of the needs of the office and the qualifications of the appointee. Moreover, the offend principle of fairness, justice and righteousness.