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Hyperbolic Cryptosystem based on

matrices
Bay :Abdelhakim Chillali
June 7, 2009

Abstract:We propose a new problem that is applicable to public key cryptogra-


phy. Based on the hyperbolic curve discrete logarithm problem (HCDLP), it uses
certain elements formed by to matrices with elements in a finite field.
Key words: Public key cryptography, Hyperbolic curve discrete logarithm problem,
Finite field, Diffie-Hellman key...

1 Introduction
Public key cryptographic is the fundamental technology in secure communications.
It was devised by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 to secret key distribution. The mathe-
matical problems more used are the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). In 1985 the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) was proposed independently by
Koblitz and Miller. In this paper, we present the hyperbolic curve discrete loga-
rithm problem as a new cryptographic scheme. Consider a finite field L = Fq with
characteristic p. where a, b ∈ L∗ , let x, y ∈ L, we denote:

L∗ multiplicatif group of L.
y
 x 
Myx = a −1 b −1 .
y x
b +1 a +1

G = {Myx det(Myx ) = 1}
Gq = G mod p.
Myx11 4Myx22 = Myx33
with: (
b2 x1 x2 +a2 y1 y2
x3 = ab2
(1) : x1 y2 +x2 y1
y3 = a

Myx 4 Myx 4 ....Myx = Myx 4l .


| {z }
lf ois
2
!
k +1 k2 −1
−1 −1
Mk = 2k
k2 −1
2k
k2 +1
, k ∈ L∗ .
2k +1 2k +1

m = |Gq |
The next theorem whose proof is evident.
Theorem 1. The set Gq with the operator 4 defined by (1) is a abelien group.
The identity element is M0a , that if M = Myx then N = M−y x
is the inversible
element of M .

1
Remark 1. The HCDLP consists of following for two elements M, N ∈ Gq , deter-
mine the scaler k ∈ Zm such that M 4k = N . It is necessary that M be a generator
of the group Gq .
Assumption 1. Given a group Gq and tow elements M and N ∈ Gq , there exists
non polynomial time algorithm θ(logq) deciding the integer k such that M 4k = N
if such a k exists.
Assumption 2. Given a group Gq and θ(logq) elements Ni on Gq , there exists
non polynomial time algorithm (θ(logq)) deciding the integers ki , such that
4k
N14k1 4N24k2 4.......4Nθ(logq)
θ(logq)
=M

if such ki exist, where M is a random element on Gq .

2 Key distribution protocols


Let Myx be a generator of the group Gq .
A take a private key 1 < l < m, and computes Myxll = Myx 4l , then he transmits Myxll
to B. Similar, B takes a private key 1 < t < m, and computes Myxtt = Myx 4t and
transmits Myxtt to A. Then A and B compute Myxtltl = Myxtt 4l and Myxltlt = Myxll 4t
respectively.
Theorem 2.
xlt ylt xtl ytl
+ = + mod p
a b a b
Prof: Evident
xtl ytl
The secret key is α = a + b mod p

3 Description of The hyperbolic cryptosystem


Let L = Fq with q = pn .
1)Space of lights: P = Gq .
2)Space of quantified: C = Gq .
3)Space of the keys: K = L∗ .
4)Function of encryption:∀α ∈ K ,

eα : P −→ C
Myx 7−→ eα (Mxy ) = Myx 4Mα

5)Function of decryption:∀α ∈ K ,

dα : C −→ P
Myx 7−→ dα (Mxy ) = Myx 4M−α

Remark 2.
dα oeα (Myx ) = Myx 4Mα 4M−α = Myx
Secret key :
α
Public keys:
Espace of lights P
Espace of quantified C

2
Espace of the keys K
Myx a generator of the group P
Fonction of coding eα
Fonction of deciphering dα
Remark 3. The Myxll , Myxtt and m are public and can known by another person,
but to obtain the private key α, it is necessary to solve the problem of the discrete
logarithm in Gq , what returns the discovery of the difficult key α.

4 Numerical Example for HCDLP


p = 41, a = 2, b = 5, n = 1, m = 40
26
G41 =< M31 >, The identity element is M02
Exchange of the key deprived between A and B:
A take a private key:
l = 13 < 39
Calculation:
13 26 413
M23 = M31
Send to B:
13
M23
And calculation:
13 15 413
M18 = M10
B take a private key:
t = 21 < 39
Calculation:
15 26 421
M10 = M31
Send to A:
15
M10
And calculation:
13 13 421
M18 = M23
Calculation of the secret key:
13 18
α= + = 6 mod 41
2 5
Message with envoy:
28
me = {M18 , M40 , M27
23 34
, M36 }
Encryption:
Mxy x
 e6 (My ) 
39 40
M28
18
 1 0 
15 37
M04
 39 17 
28 13
M23
27
 17 30 
28 25
M34
36 27 30

3
Message received:
       
28 25 28 13 15 37 39 40
mr = { , , , }
27 30 17 30 39 17 1 0

Decryption:
 Mxy  d6 (Myx )
39 40
M28
18
 1 0 
15 37
M04
 39 17 
28 25
M34
36
 27 30 
28 13
M23
27
17 30
Remark 4.
15 13
logM31
26 M
10 = 21 , logM31
26 M
23 = 13

5 Example for cryptography


p = 3, a = b = 1, n = 3, m = 26.
α root of the polynomial X 3 + 2X + 1
P = G27 , C = G27 , K = F∗27
Mα2α+2
2 a generator of the group P
Exchange of the key deprived between A and B:
A take a private key:
l = 12 < 25
Calculation:
4l
Mαα+1
2 = Mα2α+2
2

Send to B:
Mαα+1
2

And calculation: 2 2
4l
Mα2α +2 2α +2
2 +2α+2 = M2α2 +α+1

B take a private key:


t = 20 < 25
Calculation: 2
2α +2 2α+2 4t
M2α2 +α+1 = Mα2

Send to A: 2
2α +2
M2α 2 +α+1

And calculation: 2
α+1 4t
Mα2α +2
2 +2α+2 = Mα2

Calculation of the secret key:

β = 2α2 + 2 + α2 + 2α + 2 = 2α + 1

2
eβ (Myx ) = Myx 4Mα2α +2
2 +2α+2

4
2
2α +2
dβ (Myx ) = Myx 4M2α2 +α+1

Lets x = iα2 + jα + k and y = lα2 + mα + n, we denote Myx bay ijklmn.

Table of the Symbol Encryption

Mxy Symbol eβ (Myx ) Encrypt Symbol


001000 a 202120 h
010112 b 010220 c
010220 c 012210 d
012210 d 211110 s
012122 e 010112 b
122110 f 021210 q
122222 g 112102 m
202120 h 011101 j
202212 i 001000 a
011101 j 221102 z
011201 k 202212 i
112200 l 122110 f
112102 m 022101 w
002001 n 101212 v
020112 o 021122 r
020220 p 020112 o
021210 q 020220 p
021122 r 122222 g
211110 s 221200 y
211222 t 012122 e
101120 u 002001 n
101212 v 022201 x
022101 w 101120 u
022201 x 112200 l
221200 y 011201 k
221102 z 211222 t
Let’s crypt the message me with A, which will be sent to B. Example me:=”bonjour”.
A transforms the message m to the following message with reference to table, it sends
the message to B mr:=”crvzrng”.

Remark 5. We implemented the encryption, decryption..in maple.

References
[1] Akiyama, K., Goto, A.:(2006). A Public-key Cryptosystem using Algebraic
Surfaces (Extended Abstract). PQCrypto Workshop Record.
[2] Akiyama, K., Goto, A.:(2008).An improvement of the algebric surface Public-
key Cryptosystem,Proceedings of SCIS.
[3] Miller, V.:(1986). Use of elliptic curves in cryptography, in:Advances in
cryptography-CRYPTO 85, Lecture Notes In Computer Science, vol. 218,
Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp. 417-426.
[4] Koblitz, N.:(1987). Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems, Mathematics of Computa-
tion 48 203-209.

5
[5] Joan-Josep, C., Francisco, F., José-Francisco, V., Antonio, Z.:(2006). A non-
lineear elliptic curve cryptosystem based on matrices, Mathematics of Compu-
tation 174 150-164.
Dept. of Mathematics. FST of fes
E-mail address: chil2007@voila.fr

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