INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION vs NLRC (Definition of Probation) FACTS Petitioner ICMC is a non-profit organization dedicated to refugee service

at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Morong, Bataan. It engaged the services of private respondent Bernadette Galang on 1/24/1983 as a probationary cultural orientation teacher. After 3 months, she was informed orally and in writing that her services were being terminated because she failed in the performance evaluation of her supervisors during the teacher evaluation program. On 8/22/1983, Galang filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and unpaid wages against petitioner with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, praying for reinstatement with backwages, exemplary and moral damages. On 10/8/1983, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal as well as the complaint for moral and exemplary damages but ordering the ICMC to pay Galang the sum of P6,000.00 as payment for the last 3 months of the agreed employment period pursuant to her verbal contract of employment. Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC. On 8/22/1985, the NLRC, by a majority vote of Commissioners Guillermo C. Medina and Gabriel M. Gatchalian, sustained the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed both appeals for lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition. ISSUE Whether or not an employee who was terminated during the probationary period of her employment is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment RULING NO. Galang was terminated during her probationary period of employment for failure to qualify as a regular member of petitioners teaching staff in accordance with its reasonable standards. Galang was found by petitioner to be deficient in classroom management, teacher-student relationship and teaching techniques. Failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards of the employer is a just cause for terminating a probationary employee specifically recognized under Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor Code. The labor arbiters decision is erroneous. The award of salary for the unexpired portion of the probationary employment on the ground that a probationary employment for 6 months is an employment for a "definite period" which requires the employer to exhaust the entire probationary period to give the employee the opportunity to meet the required standards.

A probationary employee is one who is on trial by an employer during which the employer determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment is made to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become a proper and efficient employee. The word probationary, as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period, but not its length. Being in the nature of a trial period the essence of a probationary period of employment fundamentally lies in the purpose or objective sought to be attained by both the employer and the employee during said period. The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both in dealing with each other during said period. It is within the exercise of the right to select his employees that the employer may set or fix a probationary period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct of the former before hiring him permanently. As the law now stands, Article 281 of the Labor Code gives ample authority to the employer to terminate a probationary employee for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. Nothing would preclude the employer from extending a regular or a permanent appointment to an employee once the employer finds that the employee is qualified for regular employment even before the expiration of the probationary period. There was no showing, as borne out by the records, that there was circumvention of the rights of Galang when she was informed of her termination. Her dismissal does not appear to us as arbitrary, fanciful or whimsical. She was duly notified, orally and in writing, that her services were terminated for failure to meet the prescribed standards of petitioner as reflected in the performance evaluation conducted by her supervisors during the teacher evaluating program. The dissatisfaction of petitioner over the performance of private respondent in this regard is a legitimate exercise of its prerogative to select whom to hire or refuse employment for the success of its program or undertaking. The lower court abused its discretion when it ordered ICMC to Galang her salary for the unexpired three-month portion of her six-month probationary employment when she was validly terminated during her probationary employment. To sanction such action would not only be unjust, but oppressive on the part of the employer. DISPOSITION: The petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the NLRC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it ordered petitioner to pay private respondent her P6,000.00 salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment. No cost.

Phil. Federation of Credit Cooperatives Inc vs NLRC (1998) Facts: - Victoria Abril was employed by PFCCI in different capacities from 1982 to 1988, when she went on leave until she gave birth. When she went back in 1989, after 8 months, another employee had been permanently appointed to her former position of office secretary. She accepted a position of Regional Field Officer. The contract reads: "That the employer hires the employee on contractual basis to the position of Regional Field Officer of Region 4 under FCCI/WOCCU/Aid Project No. 8175 and to do the function as stipulated in the job description assigned to him (her): on probationary status effective February 17/90 for a period not to exceed six (6) months from said effectivity, subject to renewal of this contract should the employee's performance be satisfactory." - Said period having elapsed, respondent was allowed to work until PFCCI presented to her another employment contract for a period of one year commencing on January 2, 1991 until December 31, 1991, after which period, her employment was terminated. - LA dismissed her complaint for illegal dismissal against PFCCI. - NLRC set aside LAs decision and ordered her reinstated to her last position held (RFO) or to an equivalent position, with full backwages from Jan 1, 1992 until she is reinstated. Issue: WON Abril was a probationary employee. Held: No. Abril is a regular employee. It is an elementary rule in the law on labor relations that a probationary employee who is engaged to work beyond the probationary period of six months, as provided under Art. 281 of the Labor Code, as amended, or for any length of time set forth by the employer, shall be considered a regular employee. Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended, allows the employer to secure the services of an employee on a probationary basis which allows him to terminate the latter for just cause or upon failure to qualify in accordance with reasonable standards set forth by the employer at the time of his engagement. As defined in the case of International Catholic Migration v. NLRC, a probationary employee is one who is on trial by an employer during which the employer determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary employment is made to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become a proper and efficient employee.

ESPINA Vs. CA FACTS: M.Y. San Workers Union-PTGWO and M.Y. San Sales Force Union-PTGWO was informed of the closure or cessation of business operations of respondent M.Y. San as a result of the intended sale of the business to respondent Monde M.Y. San Corporation (Monde) and was notified of their termination.

All the employees of respondent M.Y. San received their separation pay and the cash equivalent of their vacation and sick leaves. Thereafter, they signed their respective Quitclaims.

Then respondent Monde commenced its operations. All the former employees of respondent M.Y. San who were terminated upon its closure and who applied and qualified for probationary employment, including petitioners, started working for respondent Monde on a contractual basis for a period of six months.

Subsequently, petitioners were terminated. Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal.

Respondent Monde alleged that petitioners had no cause of action against it, stating thus: The supervisors of Monde conducted an evaluation of the performance of all its probationary employees, including herein complainants. Out of the 116 probationary employees only 74 employees qualified for regular employment. For those who did not qualify for regular employment, including petitioners, respondent Monde gave the remainder of their probationary period, to prove their qualification for regular employment therewith but petitioners either: (a) resigned from their employment with Monde; (b) refused to report for work (c) failed to qualify for regular employment at the expiration of the period of their probationary employment. Labor Arbiter ruled that Monde established a just and authorized cause for terminating the services of petitioners. NLRC affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE: WON M.Y. SAN MONDE ILLEGALY DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS

RULING: There is no dispute that petitioners were probationary employees as stated in their individual contracts of employment with respondent Monde. It must be noted that petitioners were terminated prior to the expiration of their probationary contracts. As probationary employees, they enjoyed only temporary employment status. In general terms, this meant that they were terminable anytime, permanent employment not having been attained in the meantime . The employer could well decide if he no longer needed the probationarys service or his performance fell short of expectations, as a probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is under observation and evaluation to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. During the probationary period, the employer is given the opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of the employee to determine if he has the qualification to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both the employer and the employee in dealing with each other during said period. Thus, as long as the termination was made before the expiration of the six-month probationary period, the employer was well within his rights to sever the employer-employee relationship. A contrary interpretation would defeat the clear meaning of the term "probationary." Thus, respondent Monde exercised in good faith its management prerogative as there is no dispute that petitioners had been habitually absent, neglectful of their work, and rendered unsatisfactory service, to the damage and prejudice of the company.

PHILEMPLOY SERVICE AND RESOURCES INC V. RODRIGUEZ 486 SCRA 302 (2006)

FACTS: Anita RODRIGUEZ applied with respondent PHILEMPLOY Services and Resources, Inc. for deployment abroad as a factory worker. When she was asked to report for work, Ms. Brenda Castro, an official of respondent, demanded from her the sum of P60,000 as placement fee. 1. Since she could not afford such amount, they agreed that she would initially pay P30T as down payment and the balance of P30,000 plus 7% interest every month thereafter through salary deductions. She then paid Ms. Castro the P30T but was not issued any receipt. 2. Thereafter, she executed a contract of employment as a domestic helper of one Chao Hung Ching of Taipei, Taiwan with a monthly salary of NT$14,010, plus free food and accommodation for a period of 1 year. 3. On 13 Jan 1995, she was deployed to Taiwan. As such DH, she worked from 5am until 10pm. Among her chores were to carwash the vehicle of her master, cook the meals, housecleaning and babysitting. On 24 Jan 1995, she had a talk with her master where she was told that she is being sent home due to certain problems. 4. Complainant pleaded that she continue her employment, confronted as she was with the debts she had to pay. But she was sent home the following day. While at the airport, a certain Ms. Go forced her to sign an Affidavit where it stated that her leaving as a DH was voluntary and that she would assume all the obligations for her travel back to the Philippines. 5. She was only paid the sum of NT$1,931 (12 days work). Respondent alleged that it was stipulated and agreed upon in the contract, that she would undergo a 40day probationary period before she becomes a regular domestic helper. Also, she was charged of her placement fees as allowed by law and by the POEA rules and regulations. During the first 10 days of her probationary period, she was observed to be inattentive and incompetent to perform her duties and responsibilities. 6. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Rodriguez. 7. NLRC deleted award of P155,000 for unearned wages since there is no illegal dismissal that took place.

8. CA reversed NLRC decision and reinstated Labor Arbiters ISSUE: WON Rodriguez was a probationary employee during the time of her dismissal HELD: Yes. Petitioner pointed out that they had agreed in their employment contract that Anitas placement was subject to a 40-day probationary period. Anita is deemed to have admitted the existence of this stipulation in the employment contract as she never disputed petitioners assertion in all the pleadings that she submitted to the NLRC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court. Hence, even if it were true that Anitas foreign employer terminated her services after 10 days of her employment, there could be no illegal dismissal as the termination was effected during the agreed probationary period. Indeed, an employer, in the exercise of its management prerogative, may hire an employee on a probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform his work. The employees services may be terminated for a just cause or for his failure to qualify as a regular employee based on reasonable standards made known to him at the time of his engagement. Anita was employed as a domestic helper on a probationary basis. Her foreign employer interviewed her through telephone calls and apprised her of the terms and conditions of her employment as house helper. Upon her arrival at her employers house in Taiwan, her employer apprised her again of her duties as house helper. The findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter which the NLRC and the Court Appeals adopted reveal that Anitas foreign employer was dissatisfied with her performance. The law in protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor selfdestruction of the employer. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute would automatically be decided in favor of labor.

GRAND MOTOR PARTS CORPORATION vs MINISTER OF LABOR FACTS Respondent Balicena was the Branch Manager of the petitioner companys Iloilo Branch. Prior to his employment in Grand Motor, he was the Finance Officer of Warner, Barnes, & Co., when allegedly Mr. Alfredo Cisneros (acting branch manager) induced him to apply for the position of Branch Manager, as their company (petitioner) was looking for a CPA. He applied for the job and was accepted. He started working for the petitioner company on April 1 but resigned from his position in Warner, Barnes, & Co. only on April 28. However, he was terminated only after working for the company for only 4 months because of infractions alleged by the petitioner, such as: He failed to submit promptly the monthly Income and Loss Statement, Comparative Projections & Actual Sales Report; the Comparative Performance Report dated 7/8/1980 on the operation of the Iloilo Branch for the month of June and May, 1980, the Cash Sales of the Iloilo Branch went down to P91,318.41 for June, 1980, as compared with the sales for the month of May, 1980 in the sum of P174,697.77; Belicena in violation of company policy and without clearance from the head office in Cebu, extended personal accounts in favor of 15 persons which as of November, 1980 produced delinquent accounts amounting to P18,435.80; and Belicena claimed lack of knowledge of the vehicular accident caused by a subordinate and failed to provide prompt administrative disciplinary action against the erring employee. They claimed that Balicena is only a probationary employee, which would be observed by the company for 4-6 months and that Balicena knew that there is a possibility that he would not get the job. Balicena on the other hand alleged that he is a regular employee, although he was not able to present any contract establishing his status as a regular employee; that the mishap involving the company's vehicle which was used without his permission and knowledge could not be blamed upon him; that the alleged reports which he failed to send were not reminded to him, verbally or in writing; that his sales for the period April to August, 1980 is higher compared to that for the same period in 1979; and that the

alleged accounts remaining unpaid as of 11/6/1980 would have been collected in full if he were still the Manager, among other things. Regional Director and Minister of Labor ruled in favor of Balicena, ordering his reinstatement, payment of his backwages, and other privileges. ISSUE Whether or not private respondent's employment as Branch Manager was temporary or probationary, and not regular and permanent RULING At the outset, Balicena was a probationary employee: There was no written proof of Balicenas appointment or employment as regular and permanent Branch Manager. There was the fact that he assumed his work as of April 1 but resigned from his previous company only on April 28, meaning that if he was really appointed as regular and permanent then he would have resigned immediately from his old company . But since he was not yet sure of his status in the petitioner corporation, he resigned late. The Court cannot sustain Balicenas claim, the absence of a written contract due to the fact that contracts were given only to those who will pass the probationary period and the rank-and-file employee, not to those managerial ones, are contrary to usual business practice especially in multi-million enterprises as the petitioner corporation . Considering the magnitude of its sales and operation, petitioner corporation must have taken the necessary precautions to test the qualifications, ability and performance of its Branch Manager, but he did not. The conclusion is inevitable that his hiring was temporary. Balicena had never been hired as manager, and the petitioner company and Balicenas former company are engaged in different kinds of business so it was necessary for Balicena to undergo a period of probation to test his qualifications, skills and experience since managing is a new experience for him. The employer has the right or is at liberty to choose as to who will be hired and who will be declined. It is within the exercise of this right to select his employees that the employer may set or fix probationary period within which the latter may test and observed the conduct of the former before hiring him permanently. "The right of the laborer to sell his labor to such persons as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchased labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. DISPOSITION: Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. PETITION GRANTED.

International Catholic Migration Commission vs NLRC (1989) Facts: - Petitioner International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), a non-profit organization dedicated to refugee service at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Morong, Bataan engaged the services of private respondent Bernadette Galang as a probationary cultural orientation teacher with a monthly salary of P2,000.00. - Three (3) months thereafter, private respondent was informed, orally and in writing, that her services were being terminated for her failure to meet the prescribed standards of petitioner as reflected in the performance evaluation of her supervisors - Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and unpaid wages against petitioner with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, praying for reinstatement with backwages, exemplary and moral damages. - Labor Arbiter rendered his decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal as well as the complaint for moral and exemplary damages but ordering the petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P6,000.00 as payment for the last three (3) months of the agreed employment period pursuant to her verbal contract of employment. - Both parties appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission. - The NLRC, by a majority vote, sustained the decision of the Labor Arbiter and thus dismissed both appeals for lack of merit. - Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not an employee who was terminated during the probationary period of her employment is entitled to salary for the unexpired portion of her 6-month probationary employment. Held: There is justifiable basis for the reversal of public respondents award of salary for the unexpired three-month portion of private respondents six-month probationary employment in the light of its express finding that there was no illegal dismissal. There is no dispute that private respondent was terminated during her probationary period of employment for failure to qualify as a regular member of petitioners teaching staff in accordance with its reasonable standards. Records show that private respondent was found by petitioner to be deficient in classroom management, teacher-student relationship and teaching techniques.[8] Failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards of the employer is a just cause for

terminating a probationary employee specifically recognized under Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor Code. A probationary employee, as understood under Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor Code, is one who is on trial by an employer during which the employer determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment is made to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become a proper and efficient employee. The word probationary, as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period, but not its length. Being in the nature of a trial period the essence of a probationary period of employment fundamentally lies in the purpose or objective sought to be attained by both the employer and the employee during said period. The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both in dealing with each other during said period. While the employer, as stated earlier, observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer, on the other, seeks to prove to the employer, that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. It is well settled that the employer has the right or is at liberty to choose who will be hired and who will be denied employment. In that sense, it is within the exercise of the right to select his employees that the employer may set or fix a probationary period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct of the former before hiring him permanently. As the law now stands, Article 281 of the Labor Code gives ample authority to the employer to terminate a probationary employee for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. There is nothing under Article 281 of the Labor Code that would preclude the employer from extending a regular or a permanent appointment to an employee once the employer finds that the employee is qualified for regular employment even before the expiration of the probationary period. Conversely, if the purpose sought by the employer is neither attained nor attainable within the said period, Article 281 of the Labor Code does not likewise preclude the employer from terminating the probationary employment on justifiable causes as in the instant case.

ESCORPIZO, vs. UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO FACTS Petitioner Esperanza Escorpizo was initially hired by respondent university on June 13, 1989 as a high school classroom teacher. Under the rules of the respondent university, appointment to teach during the first two years at the university is probationary in nature. During the probation period, the teacher is observed and evaluated to determine his competency.Attainment of a permanent status by a faculty member is conditioned upon compliance with certain requirements, such as passing the professional board examination for teachers (PBET). On March 18, 1991, respondent university informed Escorpizo that her employment was being terminated at the end of the school semester in view of her failure to pass the PBET.But before the start of the school year 1991-1992, Escorpizo reapplied and pleaded that she be given another chance. She told the respondent school that she had just taken the PBET and hoped to pass it. As Escorpizos appeal was favorably considered, she was allowed to teach during the school year 1991-1992. However, her continued employment was conditioned on her passing the PBET. Unfortunately, Escorpizo failed again. Undaunted, Escorpizo took the examination a third time.At the end of the school year, respondent university evaluated the teachers performance to determine who would be in the list for the next school year. Escorpizo, not having passed the PBET yet, was not included. Much later, on June 8, 1992, the results of the PBET were released and this time Escorpizo passed said examination. Nevertheless, on June 15, 1992, respondent

university no longer renewed Escorpizos contract of employment on the ground that she failed to qualify as a regular teacher. This prompted Escorpizo to file on July 16, 1992 a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of backwages and reinstatement against private respondents. ISSUE WON the dismissal was illegal since Escorpizo had attained the status of a regular employee having rendered very satisfactory performance as probationary teacher for two years, consistent with the collective bargaining agreement between the respondent university and petitioner union of which Escorpizo is a member HELD: NO Escorpizo was not illegally dismissed. Her contract merely expired. Ratio: A probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is being observed and evaluated to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment affords the employer an opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of a probationer. The word probationary, as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period. While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer at the same time, seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. Reasoning - the rules of the university clearly states that the first two years at the University is probationary in nature and the following conditions must concur in order that a probationary teacher may be extended a regular appointment; (1) the faculty member must satisfactorily complete the probationary period of four semesters or two years, within which his performance shall be observed and evaluated for the purpose of determining his competency and fitness to be extended permanent status; and (2) the faculty member must pass the PBET or an equivalent civil service examination. Escorpizo failed to meet the 2nd requirement to be a regular employee which is to pass the PBET. - Though the CBA does not mention that passing the PBET is a prerequisite for attaining permanent status as a teacher. Nevertheless, the aforecited CBA provision must be read in conjunction with statutory and administrative regulations governing faculty qualifications.It is settled that an existing law enters into and forms part of a valid contract without the need for the parties expressly making reference to it. Further, while contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as

they may see fit, such right to contract is subject to limitation that the agreement must not be contrary to law or public policy. -DECS Order No. 38, series of 1990, a regulation implementing Presidential Decree No. 1006[18] or the Decree Professionalizing Teaching stipulates that no person shall be allowed to engage in teaching and/or act as a teacher unless he has registered as professional teacher with the National Board for Teachers.

GRAND MOTORS CORP V. MOLE 130 SCRA 436 (1984) FACTS: Respondent Balicena was the Branch Manager of the petitioner companys Iloilo Branch. He was the Finance Officer of Warner, Barnes, & Co. (no.2 of the company) when allegedly, Mr. Alfredo Cisneros (the then acting branch manager of the company in Iloilo) induced him to apply for the position of Branch Manager, as their company (petitioner) was looking for a CPA. He applied for the job and was accepted. He started working for the petitioner company on April 1 but resigned from his position in Warner, Barnes, & Co. only on April 28. 1. However, he was terminated only after working for the company for 4 months (April to August). Petitioner company alleged that (a) he failed to submit promptly the monthly Income and Loss Statement, Comparative Projections & Actual Sales Report; (b) the Comparative Performance Report dated July 8, 1980 on the operation of the Iloilo Branch for the month of June and May, 1980, the Cash Sales of the Iloilo Branch went down to P91,318.41 for June, 1980, as compared with the sales for the month of May, 1980 in the sum of P174,697.77; (c) Belicena in violation of company policy and without clearance from the head office in Cebu, extended personal accounts in favor of 15 persons which as of November, 1980 produced delinquent accounts amounting to P18,435.80; and (d) Belicena claimed lack of knowledge of the vehicular accident caused by a subordinate and failed to provide prompt administrative disciplinary action against the erring employee. They claimed that Balicena is only a probationary employee, which would be observed by the company for 46 months and that Balicena knew that there is a possibility that he would not get the job. 2. Balicena on the other hand alleged that he is a regular employee, although he was not able to present any contract establishing his status as a regular employee; that the mishap involving the company's vehicle which was used without his permission and knowledge could not be blamed upon him ; that the alleged reports which he failed to send were not reminded to him, verbally or in writing; that his sales for the period April to August, 1980 is higher compared to that for the same period in 1979; and that the alleged accounts remaining unpaid

as of November 6, 1980 would have been collected in full if he were still the Manager, among other things. 3. Regional Director and Minister of Labor ruled in favor of Balicena, ordering his reinstatement, payment of his back wages, and other privileges. ISSUE: WON petitioner may set the period/obligation of probation

HELD: Yes. The highest previous position he attained was that of Finance Officer. His position with petitioner's Iloilo Branch was his first as Manager. Moreover, Warner, Barnes & Co., private respondent previous employer, and petitioner are engaged in different kind of business. Managing petitioner's Iloilo Branch was entirely new experience for private respondent. It was, therefore, necessary for private respondent to undergo a period of probation to test his qualification, skill and experience." Indeed, the employer has the right or is at liberty to choose as to who will be hired and who will be decline. It is within the exercise of this right to select his employees that the employer may set or fix probationary period within which the latter may test and observed the conduct of the former before hiring him permanently. "The right of the laborer to sell his labor to such persons as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchased labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 'If the employer can compel the employer the employee to work against the latter's will, this is servitude. If the employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employer's will, this is oppression.''

ORIENT EXPRESS PLACEMENT PHILIPPINES vs NLRC FACTS ANTONIO F. FLORES was hired as crane operator by ORIENT EXPRESS PLACEMENT PHILIPPINES for 1 year, subject to a 3-month probationary period. However, after 1 month and 5 days in Saudi Arabia, Flores was repatriated to the Philippines. Consequently, he filed a complaint with the POEA for having been terminated from work for no valid reason. ORIENT EXPRESS and NADRICO countered that Flores was terminated for poor job performance. On 7/14/1992, POEA rendered a decision in favor of complainant. It was observed that neither ORIENT EXPRESS nor NADRICO pointed out the reasonable standards of work required of Flores by which his incompetency was adjudged; much less did they specify how the latter failed to live up to such reasonable standards. Hence, his dismissal was unwarranted. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the POEA decision. In addition, it ruled that the designation of Flores as floorman instead of crane operator for which he was hired violated his employment contract. The NLRC concluded that since Flores never worked as crane operator, his foreign employer could not have observed and assessed his performance as such and then come up with a performance evaluation sheet, especially considering his consistent claim that he was made to work as floorman instead. Subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by ORIENT EXPRESS and NADRICO was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE WON the dismissal of FLORES is valid RULING Under Art. 281 of the Labor Code, the services of an employee hired on a probationary basis may be terminated when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. However, the Court cannot sustain his dismissal on this ground because petitioner failed to specify the reasonable standards by which private respondent's alleged poor performance was evaluated, much less to prove that such standards were made known to him at the time of his recruitment

in Manila. Both private respondent's Agency-Worker Agreement with ORIENT EXPRESS and NADRICO never mentioned that: He must first take and pass a Crane Operators' License Examination in Saudi Arabia before he would be allowed to even touch a crane He would be assigned as floorman pending release of the results of the examination or in the event that he failed; He would be subjected to a performance evaluation by his superior 1 month after his hiring to determine whether the company was amenable to continuing with his employment. Hence, respondent Flores could not be faulted for precisely harboring the impression that he was hired as crane operator for a definite period of 1 year to commence upon his arrival at the work-site and to terminate at the end of 1 year. No other condition was laid out except that he was to be on probation for 3 months. No standard whatsoever by which such probationary period could be hurdled was specified and made known to him. Due process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand of the condition of his employment and of the terms of advancement therein. Precisely, implicit in Art. 281 of the Code is the requirement that reasonable standards be previously made known by the employer to the probationary employee at the time of his engagement, such an essential requirement was not met by petitioner, even assuming that Flores' alleged unsatisfactory performance was true. Besides, unsatisfactory performance is not one of the just causes for dismissal under the Labor Code. DISPOSITION: The assailed Decision and Resolution of NLRC are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Orient Express Placement Philippines.

Mitsubishi Motors Corp vs Chrysler Phil. Labor Union (2004) Facts: Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the assembly and distribution of Mitsubishi motor vehicles. Chrysler Philippines Labor Union (CPLU) is a legitimate labor organization and the duly certified bargaining agent of the hourly-paid regular rank and file employees of MMPC. Nelson Paras was a member of CPLU while wife, Cecille Paras, was the President of the Chrysler Philippines Salaried Employees Union (CPSU). Nelson Paras was first employed by MMPC as a shuttle bus driver. He resigned and went to Saudi Arabia to work as a diesel mechanic and heavy equipment operator in from 1982 to 1993. When he returned to the Philippines, he was re-hired as a welderfabricator at MMPC tooling shop from October 3,1994 to October 31, 1994. On October 29, 1994, his contract was renewed from November 1, 1994 up to March 3, 1995. Sometime in May of 1996, Paras was re-hired on a probationary basis as a manufacturing trainee at the Plant Engineering Maintenance Department. He and the new and re-hired employees were given an orientation on May 15, 1996 respecting the company's history, corporate philosophy, organizational structure, and company rules and regulations, including the company standards for regularization, code of conduct and company-provided benefits. Paras started reporting for work on May 27, 1996. He was assigned at the paint ovens, air make-up and conveyors. As part of the MMPC's policy, Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after six (6) months, and received an average rating. Later, his supervisor informed Paras that based on his performance rating, he would be regularized. However, the Department and Division Managers, reviewed the performance evaluation made on Paras. They unanimously agreed, along with Paras' immediate supervisors, that the performance of Paras was unsatisfactory. As a consequence, Paras was not considered for regularization. On November 26, 1996, he received a Notice of Termination dated November 25, 1996, informing him that his services were terminated effective the said date since he failed to meet the required company standards for regularization. Issue: Whether or not Paras was already a regular employee on November 26, 1996.

Held: Yes, Paras was already a regular employee. An employer, in the exercise of its management prerogative, may hire an employee on a probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform work. Under Article 281 of the Labor Code, the employer must inform the employee of the standards for which his employment may be considered for regularization. Such probationary period, unless covered by an apprenticeship agreement, shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working. The employees services may be terminated for just cause or for his failure to qualify as a regular employee based on reasonable standards made known to him. Respondent Paras was employed as a management trainee on a probationary basis. During the orientation conducted on May 15, 1996, he was apprised of the standards upon which his regularization would be based. He reported for work on May 27, 1996. As per the company's policy, the probationary period was from three (3) months to a maximum of six (6) months. Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the probationary period of six (6) months consists of one hundred eighty (180) days. This is in conformity with paragraph one, Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that the months which are not designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of thirty (30) days each. The number of months in the probationary period, six (6), should then be multiplied by the number of days within a month, thirty (30); hence, the period of one hundred eighty (180) days. As clearly provided for in the last paragraph of Article 13, in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. Thus, the one hundred eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on November 23, 1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on respondent Paras only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996.He was, by then, already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code

ALCIRA vs. NLRC FACTS: Petitioner Radin C. Alcira was hired by respondent Middleby as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary period for six months. Despite the indication of probationary period in the appointment paper, the dates indicated in the copies in the possession of the petitioner and the respondent, were different, May 20, 1996 and May 27, 1996, respectively. On November 20, 1996, unhappy with petitioners performance, respondent Middeby terminated the formers services. But according to the petitioner he is already a regular employee effective November 16, 1996, using Article 13 of the Civil Code that one month is composed of 30 days, six months total 180 days. Hence, using May 20, 1996 as the reference point, it was already considered a dismissal since it was made after the lapse of his probationary employment. Issue: WON PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT IS EMPLOYMENT FOR A DEFINITE PERIOD RULING: Section 6 (d) of Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code (Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997) provides that: (d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee. We hold that respondent Middleby substantially notified petitioner of the standards to qualify as a regular employee when it apprised him, at the start of his employment, that it would evaluate his supervisory skills after five months.

Conversely, an employer is deemed to substantially comply with the rule on notification of standards if he apprises the employee that he will be subjected to a performance evaluation on a particular date after his hiring. We agree with the labor arbiter when he ruled that: In the instant case, petitioner cannot successfully say that he was never informed by private respondent of the standards that he must satisfy in order to be converted into regular status. This rans (sic) counter to the agreement between the parties that after five months of service the petitioners performance would be evaluated. It is only but natural that the evaluation should be made vis--vis the performance standards for the job. Private respondent Trifona Mamaradlo speaks of such standard in her affidavit referring to the fact that petitioner did not perform well in his assigned work and his attitude was below par compared to the companys standard required of him.

BUISER V. LEOGARDO 131 SCRA 151 (1984)

FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the private respondent GENERAL TELEPHONE DIRECTORY COMPANY as sales representatives and charged with the duty of soliciting advertisements for inclusion in a telephone directory. 1. The records show that petitioners Iluminada Ver Buiser and Ma. Mercedes P. Intengan entered into an "Employment Contract (on Probationary Status)" on May 26, 1980 with private respondent, a corporation engaged in the business of publication and circulation of the directory of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company. Petitioner Ma. Cecilia Rillo-Acuna entered into the same employment contract on June 11, 1980 with the private respondent. 2. Among others, the "Employment Contract (On Probationary Status)" included the following common provisions: The company hereby employs the employee as telephone representative on a probationary status for a period of eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May 1980 to October 1981, inclusive. It is understood that daring the probationary period of employment, the Employee may be terminated at the pleasure of the company without the necessity of giving notice of termination or the payment of termination pay. The Employee recognizes the fact that the nature of the telephone sales representative's job is such that the company would be able to determine his true character, conduct and selling capabilities only after the publication of the directory, and that it takes about eighteen (18) months before his worth as a telephone saw representative can be fully evaluated inasmuch as the advertisement solicited by him for a particular year are published in the directory only the following year. 3. Private respondent prescribed sales quotas to be accomplished or met by the petitioners. Failing to meet their respective sales quotas, the petitioners were dismissed from the service by the private respondent.

4. Petitioners, then, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and claims for back wages, earned commissions and other benefits 5. Regional director of MOLE dismissed the complaints of petitioners except for the claim for allowances. 6. Deputy minister Leogardy of MOLE affirmed the decision of the regional director citing that the petitioners have not attained permanent status since private respondent was justified in requiring a longer period of probation. Leogardo likewise ruled that the termination was valid ISSUE: WON the petitioners are probationary employees

HELD: Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months. The exception to this general rule is When the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed by the employee. In the latter case, there is recognition of the exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer period of probationary employment, such as in the present case where the probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May, 1980 to October, 1981 inclusive, especially where the employee must learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or when the job requires certain qualifications, skills, experience or training. Policy Instruction No. 11 of the Minister of Labor and Employment has clarified any and all doubts on the period of probationary employment. It states as follows:
Probationary Employment has been the subject of misunderstanding in some quarter. Some people believe six (6) months is the probationary period in all cases. On the other hand employs who have already served the probationary period are sometimes required to serve again on probation. Under the Labor Code, six (6) months is the general probationary period ' but the probationary period is actually the period needed to determine fitness for the job. This period, for lack of a better measurement is deemed to be the period needed to learn the job. The purpose of this policy is to protect the worker at the same time enable the employer to make a meaningful employee selection. This purpose should be kept in mind in enforcing this provision of the Code. This issuance shall take effect immediately.

The very contracts of employment signed and acquiesced to by the petitioners specifically indicate that "the company hereby employs the employee as telephone sales representative on a probationary status for a period of eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May 1980 to October 1981, inclusive. This stipulation is not contrary to law, morals and public policy.

INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION vs NLRC (Duration / Exception) FACTS Petitioner ICMC is a non-profit organization dedicated to refugee service at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Morong, Bataan. It engaged the services of private respondent Bernadette Galang on 1/24/1983 as a probationary cultural orientation teacher. After 3 months, she was informed orally and in writing that her services were being terminated because she failed in the performance evaluation of her supervisors during the teacher evaluation program. On 8/22/1983, Galang filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and unpaid wages against petitioner with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, praying for reinstatement with backwages, exemplary and moral damages. On 10/8/1983, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal as well as the complaint for moral and exemplary damages but ordering the ICMC to pay Galang the sum of P6,000.00 as payment for the last 3 months of the agreed employment period pursuant to her verbal contract of employment. Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC. On 8/22/1985, the NLRC, by a majority vote of Commissioners Guillermo C. Medina and Gabriel M. Gatchalian, sustained the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed both appeals for lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition. ISSUE Whether or not an employee who was terminated during the probationary period of her employment is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment RULING NO. Galang was terminated during her probationary period of employment for failure to qualify as a regular member of petitioners teaching staff in accordance with its reasonable standards. Galang was found by petitioner to be deficient in classroom management, teacher-student relationship and teaching techniques. Failure to qualify

as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards of the employer is a just cause for terminating a probationary employee specifically recognized under Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor Code. The labor arbiters decision is erroneous. The award of salary for the unexpired portion of the probationary employment on the ground that a probationary employment for 6 months is an employment for a "definite period" which requires the employer to exhaust the entire probationary period to give the employee the opportunity to meet the required standards. A probationary employee is one who is on trial by an employer during which the employer determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment is made to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become a proper and efficient employee. The word probationary, as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period, but not its length. Being in the nature of a trial period the essence of a probationary period of employment fundamentally lies in the purpose or objective sought to be attained by both the employer and the employee during said period. The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both in dealing with each other during said period. While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer, on the other, seeks to prove to the employer, that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. Nothing would preclude the employer from extending a regular or a permanent appointment to an employee once the employer finds that the employee is qualified for regular employment even before the expiration of the probationary period. There was no showing, as borne out by the records, that there was circumvention of the rights of Galang when she was informed of her termination. Her dismissal does not appear to us as arbitrary, fanciful or whimsical. She was duly notified, orally and in writing, that her services were terminated for failure to meet the prescribed standards of petitioner as reflected in the performance evaluation conducted by her supervisors during the teacher evaluating program. The dissatisfaction of petitioner over the performance of private respondent in this regard is a legitimate exercise of its prerogative to select whom to hire or refuse employment for the success of its program or undertaking. The lower court abused its discretion when it ordered ICMC to Galang her salary for the unexpired three-month portion of her six-month probationary employment when she was validly terminated during her probationary employment. To sanction such action would not only be unjust, but oppressive on the part of the employer.

DISPOSITION: The petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the NLRC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it ordered petitioner to pay private respondent her P6,000.00 salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment. No cost.

Holiday Inn Manila vs NLRC Facts: Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on April 15, 1991, accepted for "on-the-job training" as a telephone operator for a period of three weeks. 1 For her services, she received food and transportation allowance. 2 On May 13, 1992, after completing her training, she was employed on a "probationary basis" for a period of six months ending November 12, 1991. 3 Her employment contract stipulated that the Hotel could terminate her probationary employment at any time prior to the expiration of the six-month period in the event of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her job; (b) to faithfully observe and comply with the hotel rules and the instructions and orders of her superiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel standards. On November 8, 1991, four days before the expiration of the stipulated deadline, Holiday Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the ground that her performance had not come up to the standards of the Hotel. 4 Honasan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was already a regular employee at the time of her separation and so was entitled to full security of tenure. Issue: Honasan was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal, which was made 4 days days before the expiration of the probation period. Held: We find in the Hotel's system of double probation a transparent scheme to circumvent the plain mandate of the law and make it easier for it to dismiss its employees even after they shall have already passed probation. The petitioners had ample time to summarily terminate Honasan's services during her period of probation if they were deemed unsatisfactory.

The employer has absolute discretion in hiring his employees in accordance with his standards of competence and probity. This is his prerogative. Once hired, however, the employees are entitled to the protection of the law even during the probation period and more so after they have become members of the regular force. The employer does not have the same freedom in the hiring of his employees as in their dismissal. Honasan was placed by the petitioner on probation twice, first during her on-thejob training for three weeks, and next during another period of six months, ostensibly in accordance with Article 281. Her probation clearly exceeded the period of six months prescribed by this article. Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force. In the case at bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasan's on-the-job training. When her services were continued after this training, the petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and was qualified to be a regular employee. Honasan was certainly under observation during her three-week on-the-job training. If her services proved unsatisfactory then, she could have been dropped as early as during that period. But she was not. On the contrary, her services were continued, presumably because they were acceptable, although she was formally placed this time on probation. Even if it be supposed that the probation did not end with the three-week period of onthe-job training, there is still no reason why that period should not be included in the stipulated six-month period of probation. Honasan was accepted for on-the-job training on April 15, 1991. Assuming that her probation could be extended beyond that date, it nevertheless could continue only up to October 15, 1991, after the end of six months from the earlier date. Under this more lenient approach, she had become a regular employee of Holiday Inn and acquired full security of tenure as of October 15, 1991. The consequence is that she could no longer be summarily separated on the ground invoked by the petitioners. As a regular employee, she had acquired the protection of Article 279 of the Labor Code

BERNARDO V NLRC (FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY) FACTS: - 43 Complainants are deaf-mutes who were hired by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through an "Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers". - FAR EAST disclaimed that BERNARDO ET AL were regular employees AND that they were hired temporarily under a special employment arrangement due to "pakiusap". - NLRC affirmed ruling of the labor arbiter that BERNARDO ET AL could not be deemed regular employees under Art. 280 of the Labor Code. ISSUES: WON NLRC is guilty of grave abuse of discretion in holding that 1. money sorters and counters working in a bank are not regular employees 2. employment contracts signed and renewed by the petitioners, which provide for a period of 6 months, were valid HELD: 1. YES. Only the employees, who worked for more than 6 months and whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal. Reasoning - According to FAR EAST, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with A80 LC, which provides Art. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include: (c) The duration of employment period; and - FAR EAST entered into contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead

to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank . More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them. - Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified ablebodied person . - Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code - The task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, BERNARDO ET AL performed these tasks for more than six months. - As held by the Court, "Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary appointments, ad infinitum ." The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the employees' fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees. - As regular employees, the 27 petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Therefore, when FAR EAST failed to show such cause, they are deemed illegally dismissed and entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. Considering that the job of money sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged, petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

MITSUBISHI MOTORS V. CHRYSLERLABOR UNION AND NEIL PARAS 433 SCRA 206 (2004) DURATION/EXCEPTION
FACTS: Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) is a domestic corporation

engaged in the assembly and distribution of Mitsubishi motor vehicles. Chrysler Philippines Labor Union (CPLU) is a legitimate labor organization and the duly certified bargaining agent of the hourly-paid regular rank and file employees of MMPC. Nelson Paras was a member of CPLU while wife, Cecille Paras, was the President of the Chrysler Philippines Salaried Employees Union (CPSU). 1. Nelson Paras was first employed by MMPC as a shuttle bus driver. He resigned and went to Saudi Arabia work. When he returned to the Philippines, he was rehired as a welder fabricator at the MMPC. Sometime in May of 1996, Paras was re-hired on a probationary basis as a manufacturing trainee at the Plant Engineering Maintenance Department. 2. As part of the MMPCs policy, Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after 6 months, and received an average rating. They informed him that based on his performance rating, he would be regularized. However, the Department and Division Managers reviewed the performance evaluation made on Paras and unanimously agreed, along with Paras immediate supervisors, that the performance of Paras was unsatisfactory. 3. As a consequence, Paras was not considered for regularization. On November 26, 1996, he received a Notice of Termination dated November 25, 1996, informing him that his services were terminated effective the said date since he failed to meet the required company standards for regularization. 4. CPLU demanded the settlement of the dispute which arose from Paras termination. They argued that Paras was dismissed on his 183rd day of employment, or 3 days after the expiration of the probationary period of 6 months. It was contended that Paras was already a regular employee on the date of the termination of his probationary employment. 5. According to CPLU and Paras, the latters dismissal was an offshoot of the heated argument during the CBA negotiations between MMPC Labor Relations

Manager, Atty. Carlos S. Cao, on the one hand, and Cecille Paras, the President of the Chrysler Philippines Salaried Employees Union (CPSU) and Paras wife, on the other. 6. According to the petitioner, when the termination letter was served on November 26, 1996, Paras was still a probationary employee. Considering that he did not qualify for regularization, his services were legally terminated. ISSUE: WON Paras is a regular employee

HELD: Yes.

An employer, in the exercise of its management prerogative, may hire an employee on a probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform work. Under Art 281 Labor Code, the employer must inform the employee of the standards for which his employment may be considered for regularization. Such probationary period, unless covered by an apprenticeship agreement, shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working. The employees services may be terminated for just cause or for his failure to qualify as a regular employee based on reasonable standards made known to him.

Respondent Paras was employed as a management trainee on a probationary basis. During the orientation conducted on May 15, 1996, he was apprised of the standards upon which his regularization would be based. He reported for work on May 27, 1996. As per the companys policy, the probationary period was from three (3) months to a maximum of six (6) months.

Applying Art 13 NCC, the probationary period of six (6) months consists of one hundred eighty (180) days. This is in conformity with paragraph one, Art 13 NCC, which provides that the months which are not designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of thirty (30) days each. The number of months in the probationary period, six (6), should then be multiplied by the number of days within a month, thirty (30); hence, the period of one hundred eighty (180) days.

As clearly provided for in the last paragraph of Article 13, in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included . Thus, the one hundred eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on November 23, 1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on respondent Paras only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. He was, by then, already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code.

RADIN C. ALCIRA vs NLRC, MIDDLEBY PHILIPPINES CORPORATION/FRANK THOMAS, XAVIER G. PEA and TRIFONA F. MAMARADLO

FACTS Alcira was hired by Middleby as an engineering support services supervisor on a probationary basis for 6 months. Apparently unhappy with Alciras performance, the company terminated Alciras services. The issue arises on whether the termination occurred before or after the 6-month probationary period. Both have different contentions as to the hiring dates: Alcira: May 20, 1996 Middleby: May 27, 1996 Further, the appointment paper indicated that the status was probationary and that after 5 months, performance shall be evaluated and any adjustment shall depend on work performance. However, on November 20, 1996, Alcira was not allowed to work. Thereafter, Alcira filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter, contending that he was already a regular employee as of the date he was dismissed. The company presented evidence that showed Alciras poor performance, tardiness, absences, and violations of company rules on wearing of uniform during the probationary period, and said that since he failed to meet the standards, Alciras application to become a regular employee was denied. LA, NLRC, and CA all ruled in favor of the company, upholding the validity of the dismissal. ISSUES WON petitioner was allowed to work beyond his probationary period, and was therefore already a regular employee at the time of his dismissal WON Middleby informed petitioner of standards for regularization at the start of his employment WON Alcira was illegally dismissed when Middleby opted not to renew his contract on the last day of the probationary period

RULING NO. The computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following, thus dismissal on November 20, 1996 was well within the probationary period. The computation of Alcira (using 30 days x 6 months = 180 days) is wrong. As held in CALS Poultry Supply Corp v Roco : Our computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following. In short, since the number of days in each particular month was irrelevant, Alcira was still a probationary employee when Middleby opted not to "regularize" him on November 20, 1996. YES. Section 6 (d) of Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code provides that: (d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement . Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee. An employer is deemed to substantially comply with the rule on notification of standards if he apprises the employee that he will be subjected to a performance evaluation on a particular date after his hiring . - Middleby substantially notified the petitioner of the standards of a regular employee when it apprised him, at the start of his employment, that it would evaluate his supervisory skills after 5 months. - the appointment paper contained the remark that Alcira would be subjected to a performance evaluation is enough notice that the probationary basis of his employment was conditional (conditioned upon his meeting of performance tandards) NO. Although probationary employees are also accorded security of tenure, this protection ends upon expiration of the probationary period. It is settled that even if probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status, they are accorded the constitutional protection of security of tenure. This means they may only be terminated for just cause or when they otherwise fail to qualify as regular employees in accordance with reasonable standards made known to them by the employer at the time of their engagement. But we have also ruled in Manlimos, et. al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission that this constitutional protection ends on the expiration of the probationary period. On that date, the parties are free to either renew or terminate their contract of employment. In this case, Middleby exercised its option not to renew the contract when it informed Alcira on the last day of his probationary employment that it did not intend to grant him a regular status.

DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED. ART. 281. PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT. Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.

Mariwasa Manufacturing Inc vs Leogardo (1989) Facts: Dequila was hired on probation by Mariwasa as a general utility worker on Jan.10, 1979. After the probationary period of six months, MAriwasa informed him that his work had proved unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the required standards and to give him a chance to improve his performance and qualify for regular employment, instead of dispensing with his service then and there, with his written consent Mariwasa extended his probation period for another three months from July 10 to October 9, 1979. His performance, however, did not improve and on that account Mariwasa terminated his employment at the end of the extended period. Issue: WON employer and employee may by agreement extend the probationary period of employment beyond the six months prescribed in Article 282 of the Labor Code Held: Yes. An extension of the probationary period of employment may lawfully be covenanted, notwithstanding the seemingly restrictive language of Article 282. Buiser vs. Leogardo, Jr . 7 recognized agreements stipulating longer probationary periods as constituting lawful exceptions to the statutory prescription limiting such periods to six months, when it upheld as valid an employment contract between an employer and two of its employees that provided for an eigthteen-month probation period. Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months. The exception to this general rule is when the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed by the employee. The extension of Dequila's probation was ex gratia, an act of liberality on the part of his employer affording him a second chance to make good after having initially failed to prove his worth as an employee. Such an act cannot now unjustly be turned against

said employer's account to compel it to keep on its payroll one who could not perform according to its work standards. The law, surely, was never meant to produce such an inequitable result. By voluntarily agreeing to an extension of the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to the completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension

CEBU STEVEDORING vs.REGIONAL DIRECTOR FACTS: - Complainants Gelig and Quijano (COMPLAINANTS) were former employees of the Cebu Customs Arrastre Service (CCAS). Pursuant to an Administrative Order by the Bureau of Customs, CCAS was abolished "for the reason that the objectives for which it was created had already been attained". Consequently, all the employees of CCAS, including COMPLAINANTS, were given their termination separation pay by the Bureau. - After the abolition, all the employees of CCAS, including COMPLAINANTS, were absorbed by CSCI with the same positions that they held in the CCAS. Almost 6 months later, however, COMPLAINANTS were dismissed by CSCI without prior clearance. COMPLAINANTS consequently filed an action for reinstatement with backwages with the Labor Regional Office. The Regional Director ruled in COMPLAINANTS favor, which ruling was affirmed on appeal by the then Ministry of Labor and, subsequently, by the Office of the President. ISSUE/s: 1. WON the CSCI was denied due process due to the lack of hearing before the Regional Director and COMPLAINANTS failure to file their respective position papers 2. WON the COMPLAINANTS were merely casuals and could, therefore, be terminated even without prior clearance from the then Ministry of Labor and without entitlement to separation pay 3. WON the positions occupied by COMPLAINANTS with CCAS are identical with the positions already filled up and being discharged in the main office of CSCI, COMPLAINANTS may be terminated for redundancy

HELD 1. NO - The right to be heard, as a preliminary step essential to the rendition of an enforceable judgment, constitutes a basic element of the constitutional requirement of due process of law. However, while CSCI was not afforded an opportunity to be heard by oral argument on its position paper due to its absence at the scheduled hearing, it is likewise true that it was required to, as in fact it actually did, submit a position paper which, together with the evidence presented during the hearing, became the basis of the questioned order of the Regional Director. From this order, CSCI appealed to the Labor Minister, and then to the Office of the President. It is, therefore, apparent that CSCI was not denied adequate remedies from the alleged procedural infirmities surrounding the Regional Director's order. The entire record of the case was reviewed and duly considered on appeal, which appellate proceeding remedied any inadequacy in the procedural due process with which the trial proceedings are being faulted. 2. NO - We agree with the Regional Director that COMPLAINANTS could not be considered probationary employees because they were already well-trained in their respective functions. While COMPLAINANTS were still with the CCAS they were already clerks with 10 years of service, on the average. They were, therefore, experienced workers. Findings of quasi-judicial agencies (like the Labor Regional Office) which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, even finality where such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3. NO - Despite Art. 283s provision on termination of employment due to redundancy and retrenchment, records fail to establish clearly that the positions occupied by COMPLAINANTS are identical with those presently existing in CSCI's office. CSCI also kept COMPLAINANTS in its employ for almost 6 months without raising this issue. CSCI does not mention which positions are allegedly duplicated by the positions held by COMPLAINANTS. CSCI does not even explain why COMPLAINANTS should be the ones to be terminated, without regard to the comparative lengths of service, qualifications and performance of all employees concerned.

- CSCIs claim of financial losses is untenable since it appears that it absorbed and employed for almost 6 months, without any intimation of supposed financial distress, the majority of the former employees of CCAS. It never advised COMPLAINANTS of a company retrenchment program; the first time this supposed program was mentioned was when CSCI was trying to justify the dismissal of COMPLAINANTS before the labor arbiter. CSCI presented a Statement of Operations, which, however, remains an uncorroborated and self-serving piece of evidence.

A PRIME SECURITY SERVICE INC V. NLRC AND OTHELLO MORENO 322 SCRA 283 (2000) FACTS: Private respondent Othello Moreno worked as a security guard for a year with Sugarland Security Services Inc, a sister company of petitioner. He was rehired as a security guard on January 30, 1988 by the petitioner and assigned to the same post at the U.S. Embassy Building; that he was among those absorbed by the petitioner when it took over the security contracts of its sister company with the U.S. Embassy 1. Private respondent Othello Moreno filed a complaint against petitioner A Prime Security for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction and underpayment of wages. 2. Moreno alleged that he was forced by petitioner to sign new probationary contracts of employment for 6 months and further alleged that on August 1, 1988, his employment was terminated. 3. Moreno also claimed that during his employment, the amount of P20.00 per month was deducted from his salary allegedly for withholding tax, and the salary he was receiving was only P2,187.00 a month, which was way below the P2,410.17 stipulated in the PADPAO memorandum of agreement. 4. On the other hand, petitioner, A Prime Security, alleged that the private respondent was hired on January 30, 1988, on a probationary basis, and he signed an authority to deduct from his salary any reimbursement for any loss or damage caused to properties of the client; a. that he was given a copy of petitioners rules and regulations which provide that sleeping on post is punishable by warning, suspension and dismissal and he was caught sleeping on post on March 17, 1988, for which he was sent a memorandum giving him a last warning; b. that on March 25, 1988, he figured in a quarrel with another security guard, which resulted in a near shootout; c. that at the end of his probationary employment, he was given a psychological test and on the basis of the foregoing, petitioner told him that his probationary

employment had come to an end as he did not pass the company standard and therefore, he could not be hired as a regular employee. 5. LA handed down a decision in favor of complainant. The respondent was ordered to reinstate the complainant to his former position and accord to him the status of a regular employee, and to refund to the complainant the deduction it had made from his salary in the amount of P20.00 per month. 6. NLRC affirmed the decision with a slight modification: the refund of the deductions made by respondent from complainants salaries in the amount of P20.00 per month was vacated and set aside. ISSUES: 1. WON private respondents employment with A Prime Security Services, Inc. was just a continuation of his employment with Sugarland Security Services, Inc 2. WON private respondent is a regular employee of petitioner 3. WON private respondents dismissal is illegal HELD: 1. YES. On the issue as to whether the private respondent is a probationary or regular employee, the Court holds that the latter became a regular employee upon completion of his six-month period of probation. Private respondent started working on January 30, 1988 and completed the said period of probation on July 27, 1988. Thus, at the time private respondent was dismissed on August 1, 1988, he was already a regular employee with a security of tenure. He could only be dismissed for a just and authorized cause.

There is no basis for subjecting private respondent to a new probationary or temporary employment on January 30, 1988, considering that he was already a regular employee when he was absorbed by A' Prime from Sugarland, its sister company. The Court cannot sanction the practice of some companies which, shortly after a worker has become a regular employee, effects the transfer of the same employee to another entity whose owners are the same, or identical, in order to deprive subject employee of the benefits and protection he is entitled to under the law. The allegations of the private respondent that Sugarland is a sister company of A Prime and that the latter absorbed the security contracts and security guards of Sugarland with the U.S. Embassy were neither denied nor controverted by the petitioner before the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioners failure to deny that Sugarland is its sister company and that petitioner absorbed Sugarlands security contract and security personnel assumes overriding significance over the resignation theorized upon, evincing petitioners design to ignore or violate labor laws through the use of the veil of corporate personality.

2. YES. The complainant became a regular employee upon completion of his six-month period of probation. Private respondent started working on January 30, 1988 and completed the said period of probation on July 27, 1988. Thus, at the time private respondent was dismissed on August 1, 1988, he was already a regular employee with a security of tenure. He could only be dismissed for a just and authorized cause. There is no basis for subjecting private respondent to a new probationary or temporary employment on January 30, 1988, considering that he was already a regular employee when he was absorbed by A Prime from Sugarland, its sister company.

3. YES. The dismissal of complainant, a regular employee, was without any just, legal and valid basis. What is more, he was not given a chance to contest his dismissal. He was deprived of an opportunity to be heard. The dismissal of private respondent was presumably based on the results of his behavioral and neuropsychological tests and on his violation of a company rule on sleeping on post. With respect to the behavioral and neuropsychological tests, the Court agrees with NLRCs assessment: "Complainants result of his behavioral research and neuropsychological test to our mind, is of no moment, considering that the said test appeared to have been conveniently contrived to be conducted , and the result produced on the very day of his dismissal, in question. So also, private respondents alleged violations of sleeping on post, and quarrelling with a co-worker, may not be proper grounds for dismissal, as the same were first infractions.

INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION vs NLRC (Termination and Salary) FACTS Petitioner ICMC is a non-profit organization dedicated to refugee service at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Morong, Bataan. It engaged the services of private respondent Bernadette Galang on 1/24/1983 as a probationary cultural orientation teacher. After 3 months, she was informed orally and in writing that her services were being terminated because she failed in the performance evaluation of her supervisors during the teacher evaluation program. On 8/22/1983, Galang filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and unpaid wages against petitioner with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, praying for reinstatement with backwages, exemplary and moral damages. On 10/8/1983, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal as well as the complaint for moral and exemplary damages but ordering the ICMC to pay Galang the sum of P6,000.00 as payment for the last 3 months of the agreed employment period pursuant to her verbal contract of employment. Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC. On 8/22/1985, the NLRC, by a majority vote of Commissioners Guillermo C. Medina and Gabriel M. Gatchalian, sustained the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed both appeals for lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition. ISSUE Whether or not an employee who was terminated during the probationary period of her employment is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment RULING

NO. Galang was terminated during her probationary period of employment for failure to qualify as a regular member of petitioners teaching staff in accordance with its reasonable standards. Galang was found by petitioner to be deficient in classroom management, teacher-student relationship and teaching techniques. Failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards of the employer is a just cause for terminating a probationary employee specifically recognized under Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor Code. The labor arbiters decision is erroneous. The award of salary for the unexpired portion of the probationary employment on the ground that a probationary employment for 6 months is an employment for a "definite period" which requires the employer to exhaust the entire probationary period to give the employee the opportunity to meet the required standards. We find unmeritorious public respondents argument that the security of tenure of probationary employees within the period of their probation justified the award of salary for the unexpired portion of her probationary employment . The termination of private respondent predicated on a just cause negates the application in this case of the pronouncement in the case of Biboso vs. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. , on the right of security of tenure of probationary employees. Upon inquiry by the then Ministry of Labor and Employment as a consequence of the illegal dismissal case filed by private respondent before it, it was found that there was no illegal dismissal involved in the case, hence, the circumvention of the rights of the probationary employees sought to be regulated as pointed out in Biboso vs. Victorias Milling Co., Inc., is wanting. There was no showing, as borne out by the records, that there was circumvention of the rights of private respondent when she was informed of her termination. Her dismissal does not appear to us as arbitrary, fanciful or whimsical . Private respondent was duly notified, orally and in writing, that her services as cultural orientation teacher were terminated for failure to meet the prescribed standards of petitioner as reflected in the performance evaluation conducted by her supervisors during the teacher evaluating program. The dissatisfaction of petitioner over the performance of private respondent is a legitimate exercise of its prerogative to select whom to hire or refuse employment for the success of its program or undertaking. It was thus a grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent to order petitioner to pay private respondent her salary for the unexpired three-month portion of her six-month probationary employment when she was validly terminated during her probationary employment . To sanction such action would not only be unjust, but oppressive on the part of the employer as emphasized in Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., vs. Pambusco Employer Union, Inc.

DISPOSITION: The petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the NLRC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it ordered petitioner to pay private respondent her P6,000.00 salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment. No cost.

Orient Express Placement Philippines vs NLRC Facts: - Antonio Flores was hired as crane operator with a monthly salary of US$500 for 1year subject to a 3month probationary period. After 1month and 5days, he was repatriated to the Philippines. He filed a complaint to POEA fro having been terminated for no valid reason. His employers Orient Express and Nadrico (the foreign principal) claimed that he was terminated for poor job performance as shown in his performance evaluation sheet. - POEA decided in favor of Flores held that when the ground invoked for dismissal of an employee was incompetence or poor job performance, it must be shown that the reasonable standards of work prescribed by the employer were made known to the employee. The dismissal was unwarranted because the employers failed to point out the reasonable standards of work required. - NLRC affirmed POEA decision on appeal. It also ruled that the designation of Flores as floorman instead of crane operator for which he was hired violated his employment contract. Orient Express and Nadrico filed for MFR but it was denied. Issue: Whether or not private respondent was validly dismissed for poor job performance and uncooperative work attitude. Held: No. Flores was not validly dismissed. Under Art. 281 of the Labor Code, the services of an employee hired on a probationary basis may be terminated when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement.

Petitioner failed to specify the reasonable standards by which private respondent's alleged poor performance was evaluated, much less to prove that such standards were made known to him at the time of his recruitment in Manila . Neither private respondent's Agency-Worker Agreement 9 with ORIENT EXPRESS nor his Employment Contract10 with NADRICO ever mentioned that he must first take and pass a Crane Operators' License Examination in Saudi Arabia before he would be allowed to even touch a crane. Neither did he know that he would be assigned as floorman pending release of the results of the examination or in the event that he failed; more importantly, that he would be subjected to a performance evaluation by his superior one (1) month after his hiring to determine whether the company was amenable to continuing with his employment. Hence, respondent Flores could not be faulted for precisely harboring the impression that he was hired as crane operator for a definite period of one (1) year to commence upon his arrival at the work-site and to terminate at the end of one (1) year. No other condition was laid out except that he was to be on probation for three (3) months. As aforesaid, no standard whatsoever by which such probationary period could be hurdled was specified and made known to him . Due process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand of the condition of his employment and of the terms of advancement therein. Precisely, implicit in Art. 281 of the Code is the requirement that reasonable standards be previously made known by the employer to the probationary employee at the time of his engagemen t, as correctly suggested by the POEA. Obviously, such an essential requirement was not met by petitioner, even assuming that Flores' alleged unsatisfactory performance was true. Besides, unsatisfactory performance is not one of the just causes for dismissal under the Labor Code.

Dela Cruz vs. NLRC Facts: On May 27, 1996, petitioner Florencio de la Cruz, Jr. was hired by private respondent Shemberg Marketing Corporation as senior sales manager, a newly created position in line with the companys objective of product positioning in the consumer market. However, on Sept. 14, 1996, petitioner was informed that his services were terminated. His request for a meeting with Shembergs VP and to be furnished a 30-day written notice was denied by management. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal., non-payment of salary, backwages, 13th month pay and damages. Private respondent answered that petitioners dismissal was premised, among others, on his unauthorized reimbursement of the plane tickets of his wife and child, resulting to loss of trust and confidence of the company. Labor arbiter ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed and granted his claim for separation pay, backwages and unpaid wages. Upon appeal, NLRC modified the decision, deleting the award for separation pay and backwages. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

WON petitioner was legally dismissed, as he was a probationary employee.

HELD: YES Petitioner was hired by Shemberg on May 27, 1996 and was terminated on Sept. 14, 1996. A281 LC provides: Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working , unless it is covered in apprenticeship[ agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards, made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. The evidence on record clearly shows that petitioner was well informed of the standards to be met before he could qualify as a regular employee. Attached to his appointment papers was a job description of sales manager. A probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is under observation or evaluation to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. During the probationary period, the employer is given the opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of the employee while the latter seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both the employer and the employee in dealing with each other during this period. There is no dispute that petitioner, as a probationary employee enjoyed only a temporary employment status. This not having been attained in the mean time. The employer could well decide he no longer needed the probationary employees service or hi performance fell short of expectation. As long as the termination was made before the expiration of the 6-month probationary period, the employer was well within his rights to sever the employeremployee relationship. A contrary interpretation would defect the clear meaning of the term probationary. In this case, Shemberg had good reason to terminate petitioners employment. Petitioner was holding a managerial position in which he was tasked to perform key functions in accordance with an exacting work ethic. His position required the full trust and confidence of his employer. While petitioner could exercise some discretion, this obviously did not cover acts for his own personal benefit. He committed a transgression which betrayed the trust and confidence of his employer reimbursing his familys personal travel expenses out of company funds.

CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE V. CA AND DIANA BELO 437 SCRA 171 (2004) FACTS: In 1992, Ms. Diana Belo, a teacher of Chiang Kai Shek College since 1977, applied for a leave of absence for the school year 1992-1993. Upon submitting her application, she was informed of the school policy that if she takes a leave of absence, she is not assured of a teaching load upon her return. She was likewise informed that only teachers in active service may enjoy the privilege and benefits provided by the school, such as free tuition for the teachers children. Ms. Belo, nonetheless, took her leave of absence. In May 1993, she attempted to return to CKSC and signified her readiness to teach for the coming school year. However, she was not allowed to return. Hence, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, among others, against CKSC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but the NLRC disagreed. The Court of Appeals upheld the NLRCs ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON private respondent Belo enjoys security of tenure as a full time teacher

HELD: Yes. It must be noted at the outset that Ms. Belo had been a full-time teacher in petitioner CKSC continuously for fifteen years or since 1977 until she took a leave of

absence for the school year 1992-1993. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, for a private school teacher to acquire a permanent status of employment and, therefore, be entitled to a security of tenure, the following requisites must concur: (a) the teacher is a full-time teacher; (b) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (c) such service must have been satisfactory. Since Ms. Belo has measured up to these standards, she therefore enjoys security of tenure. The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due notice and hearing.

NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that Ms. Belo was constructively dismissed when the petitioners, in implementing their policies, effectively barred her from teaching for the school year 1993-1994. The three policies are (1) the non-assurance of a teaching load to a teacher who took a leave of absence; (2) the hiring of non-permanent teachers in April to whom teaching loads were already assigned when Ms. Belo signified in May 1993 her intention to teach; and (3) the nonapplicability to children of teachers on leave of the free tuition fee benefits extended to children of teachers in service. Case law defines constructive dismissal as a cessation from work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. When in the school year 1992-1993, the petitioners already applied to Ms. Belos children the policy of extending free tuition fee benefits only to children of teachers in service, Ms. Belo was clearly discriminated by them. True, the policy was made known to Ms. Belo in a letter dated 9 June 1992, but, this only additionally and succinctly reinforced the clear case of discrimination.

LA CONSOLACION COLLEGE, SR. ROSALINDA BAYLA, SR. CELIA BAYONA, REODITA MABAYAG, JUDITH VERDADERO and JOSE BAYOGUING vs NLRC and JOSE DE LA PEA, III

FACTS LCC initially employed Jose de la Pea III as a CAT Commandant and YCAP Coordinator for school year 1975-1976. Prior to his resignation in 1980 and despite demands by LCC for him to submit a syllabi in YDT I, II, III, and CAT I containing course objectives, subject matter, content, concepts, skills, activities and evaluation not later than 11/12/1979, respondent de la Pea failed to comply. Later, de la Pea applied to LCC again and for the positions of CAT Commander and YDT Instructor, positions he held for 11 years prior to his resignation from LCC. However, he was appointed as a classroom teacher in physical education and health, a position he never held during his previous employment with LCC. The written contract of employment between LCC and respondent de la Pea expressly provided that the employment was for 1 academic year, that is, from June 1992 to March 1993. Respondent de la Pea accepted such condition. On 7/14/1992, petitioner Jose B. Bayoguing, Jr., a member of the academic team tasked to evaluate the performance of the schools teachers, reminded respondent de la Pea in writing to comply with the requirements and standard operating procedure of the school, namely: timely submission of lesson plans, class records and other papers, attendance at regular monthly meetings, and informing the school of absences. However, de la Pea ignored the reminder without any valid reason, and continued to defy these requirements and procedures. On 11/27/1992, de la Pea called an

emergency meeting of faculty members and in said meeting, respondent de la Pea berated petitioner Bayoguing, shouted invectives, ridiculed and threatened Bayoguing with bodily harm. On 2/8/1993, respondent de la Pea petitioned for reinstatement as a faculty member for SY 1993-1994. However, it was denied. Consequently, the academic team composed of informed respondent de la Pea of his unsatisfactory performance and advised him that the school would no longer hire him for the incoming school year. On 6/9/1993, respondent de la Pea filed a complaint against LCC for illegal dismissal, moral damages and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, holding that at the time respondent de la Pea was dismissed, he had not attained regular status. The Labor Arbiter also found respondent de la Pea guilty of serious misconduct and gross disobedience which were just causes for termination of service. On appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC rendered a resolution reversing the decision of the labor arbiter. The NLRC held that respondent de la Pea attained regular status at the time he was dismissed and that LCC failed to prove the existence of just cause to warrant his dismissal. LCC then filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, but the NLRC denied the motion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether respondent Jose de la Pea was a regular or permanent employee of LCC RULING We reverse the NLRC decision having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. Respondent Jose de la Pea did not attain permanent status. There is a written contract defining the period of employment of respondent de la Pea. Clearly, the employment was not permanent but for a specified duration of one school year. In resolving the issue of whether or not respondent de la Pea was permanent employee of petitioner, it is the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, not the Labor Code, which is applicable. This was settled in University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC , where we ruled that for a private school teacher to acquire permanent status in employment the following requisites must concur : (1) the teacher is a full-time teacher; (2) the teacher must have rendered 3 consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must have been satisfactory A school year begins in June of one calendar year and ends in March of the succeeding calendar year. The written contract of respondent de la Pea stated that he shall be employed by the LCC for the school year June 1992, up to March 1993, a fixed term of ten months. It is also important to note that respondent de la Pea was a new hire

having previously resigned from the school and was holding the position of classroom teacher for BED for the first time. Respondent never denied the fact that he failed to comply with the requirements of the school, hence, his employment was not renewed. Neither did he attain permanent status. Clearly, respondent was not illegally dismissed. DISPOSITION. Petition is GRANTED. The Court REVERSES and sets aside the decision of the NLRC.