The Beginnings of Luther's Hermeneutics*

by GERHARD EBELING

The Fourfold Sense of Scripture and the Distinction Between Letter and Spirit

linguistic usage of "letter" and "spirit" in the Dictata has shown that here, in fact, the two possible meanings (which were mediated through the tradition of Origen and Augustine) had come in contact with each other and led to the foundation of a new hermeneutic through what was plainly a dizzying whirlpool of correlative terminology. If we penetrate into this complicated process, we see how the origin of Reformation theology was a titanic struggle over the problem of scriptural exposition. And we shall thus correctly estimate the significance of the first Lectures on the Psalms with respect to hermeneutics, even if the result of this struggle cannot yet be grasped as afinishedand firmly established product. For, on a superficial view, Luther stands completely under the spell of traditional expository methods right up to the end of the Lectures, and the concepts of "literal" and "spiritual" do not lose their scintillating ambiguity. Indeed, a note at the beginning of the Gloss257 attests that Luther is conscious of the problem. He clarifies the scheme of the Quadriga (the fourfold sense), and indeed, by means of the same example which had been used as a model since John Cassian258 (to whom we can trace the origin of the Quadriga) and which was taken from Galatians 4, namely, the example of the different possible meanings of Jerusalem.259 And it also remains entirely within the traditional framework when Luther places the fourfold meaning of Babylon alongside it. For the idea that with Christ and the devil two worldwide bodies, two realms, stand in opposition to one another, was one which even the Donatisi Tyconius believed it was necessary to heed with respect to the interpretation of Scripture. The first of his seven rules concerned the Lord and his kind of body, and the last
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concerned the devil and his body. Through Augustine, who had adopted the seven rules of Tyconius in his textbook of hermeneutics, On Christian Doctrine, they became the common property of the Middle Ages, and in his first Lectures on the Psalms, Luther, too, indicates a familiarity with them.260 But what is noteworthy is the following: No sooner has Luther mentioned the great dualism, using the catchwords "Jerusalem" a n ( i "Babylon," than he immediately associates with these opposites his fundamental formula of the life-giving spirit versus the killing letter. This antithesis accords with that of the body of Babylon and the body of the church. And now Luther launches out anew with the execution of the Quadriga, and indeed, with two rubrics next to each other: the one, the killing letter, the other, the life-giving spirit. And yet it is no longer simply that the catchwords "Babylon" and "Jerusalem" are plugged into these two slots respectively, but rather that Luther inserts one and the same word, "Mount Zion," into both slots, just as the complete paradigm of a conjugated verb in a grammar book will show its forms for both moods and all tenses. What is so noteworthy and, with respect to the exegetical tradition, so novel about that? It is that here the fourfold sense of one and the same word is further doubled into evil and good and indeed, that therefore the twofold scheme of killing letter and life-giving spirit cuts right across the fourfold scheme of the senses of Scripture. This is in tension with traditional hermeneutical terminology: It is not that the historical sense is the letter and the allegorical, tropological, and anagogical sense the spirit; rather, it is that whether literally or mystically interpreted, the whole exposition according to the Quadriga stands either under the sign of "killing letter" or under the sign of "lifegiving spirit." Certainly in that place Luther did not bring the problem to its highest possible degree of precision. If he had, as usual, characterized the first sense of Scripture not as the "historical" but rather as the "literal," and lumped together the other three levels of meaning as "spiritual," the problem would have sprung to light in all due clarity. This hint confirms yet again the correctness of the way in which we have posed the question so far. It also demonstrates beautifully the statement that the two hermeneutical schemata (the letter/ spirit and the fourfold sense) are the two arms of a nutcracker with which Luther tries to pry open the hard shell of Scripture in order to reach the sweet kernel of meaning inside. Above all,

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our attention is now fixed upon another problem: could it not be that precisely at the moment when he was working with the traditional fourfold sense of Scripture, he was already moving in a new hermeneutical direction? Even if we had, until now, only paid attention to this letter/spirit scheme, and to how Luther's use of it led to the overcoming of allegorization, we would now have to ask if Luther himself did not recognize something new in those places where he so eagerly allegorizes, and indeed, in the way in which he does so. Thus, it not only appeared by chance in the content, but also in the very method of his exposition according to the fourfold sense of Scripture.

The Fourfold Sense of Scripture and the Christological Meaning of the Psalms The foundation of Luther's application of the Quadriga is the christological meaning of the Psalms. Does the characteristic note of Luther's exposition not lie primarily in this interpretation? The christological meaning of the Psalms was the common property of the tradition. Nevertheless, certain peculiarities of Luther already can be recognized at this point. The power to see everything together, the ability to get a grasp of the many-branched whole which sprouts from the root, and the capacity to concentrate everything on one point, and then to unfold everything from that point outward, distinguishes Luther's thought from the very beginning. It should be observed, tangentially, that what is meant is not only a distinctive, formal, spiritual talent, but rather something which is connected with his unusually intense personal existence and thus also with the great problem of his besetting temptations. This point of view illustrates how, even at the beginning of his professorial career as an exegete, Luther grasped with special intensity this method, which had by then become familiar from the tradition, a method by which, as he himself said, to find one's way around in the dark and holy labyrinth.261 This observation stands in the introduction to the text of the Psalms, which Luther had had printed for the hearers of his lecture course.262 Thus this introduction is the first printed text of Luther. It contains a discussion of the hermeneutical problem as it presented itself to him at the beginning of the Lectures on the Psalms. Sentence by sentence the formulations

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are carefully considered. If we compare this preface with those of other medieval studies of the Psalms (for example the Postil of Hugo Cardinalis,263 which Luther had also used,264 and which announced even in its title that the exposition was pervaded by the Quadriga) then we are immediately struck by the directness with which, at the very beginning, Luther brings the viewpoint of the christological meaning into importance. He begins not with specific discussions about it, but rather ascribes the word to Christ himself. <{The Preface offesus Christ, the Son of God and our Lord to the Psalter of David"265 is set by Luther boldly over the whole work. Five words of Christ, in part put into his mouth from the Old Testament, stand at the beginning and have in view the idea that Christ is the key to the Scriptures.266 Then follow four biblical witnesses to this, each with a citation: from the Old Testament, Moses and Zechariah, that is, the law and the prophets; from the New Testament, the apostles Paul and Peter.267 And Luther's own hermeneutical principles follow upon this as an elaboration of the preceding,268 to some extent as a commentary to the Preface offesus Christ, just as medieval biblical commentaries, in their introductions to the individual books, frequently offered a gloss to the prologues of Jerome.269 First of all, Luther bases the christological exegesis of the Psalter upon its prophetic character.270 For David was a prophet, and every prophecy is to be understood as pertaining to Christ. This, too, is an entirely traditional thought. It is only in the actual execution of the exegesis that the interpretations go against each other. While Lyra only relatively seldom allows the prophetic character of a psalm passage to be considered, Luther polemicizes against those who, in following the rabbis, do not expound the Psalms prophetically but historically. This, naturally, is a judgment against Lyra whom Luther, however, does not name in the printed preface, but mentions by name frequently at other times in the familiar polemic against his judaizing exegesis.271 On the other hand, while someone like Hugo Cardinalis brings out the christological meaning quite regularly, though mostly according to the allegorical sense rather than the historical, Luther deems it important to relate the Psalms to Christ according to the literal sense. In both delimitationsas much against a literal-historical as against an allegorically understood christological exegesisLuther agrees with Faber Stapulensis, to whom, at this point, he is obliged for an important hermeneutical

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stimulus. Because for Faber as well as for Luther, the prophetic sense of the Psalms is the literal sense. But that means that Luther, like Faber, comes to terms with a double sense of the Psalms, and indeed, a double literal sense, the one being the literal-historical sense, the other being a literal-prophetic sense; or, as Luther also says, a rear sense and a frontal sense.272 Luther will not dispute that at times the Psalms are also meant historically, which is certainly demonstrated by the abundant statements about the historical situation at the beginning of the Psalms. But from this kind of observation he throws a bridge across to the literal-prophetic sense, so that under that rubric a historical statement can also be uttered propheticallyand that because to the prophets the deeper mystical sense of the historical situation to which the Psalm mainly refers is unfolded.273 "From that history he prophesies learnedly."274 And therefore the real intention of the prophets is not to relate ancient stories as such, but rather, on the basis of these ancient stories, to look ahead prophetically into the future.275 Thus the relationship of the two literal senses to each other is actually determined through the application of the allegorical scheme of thinking. The literalprophetic sense is the mystical sense of the literal-historical sense. The historical becomes a sign and a parable which points beyond itself.276 In contrast to the historical sense, which lies open to the light of day, the literal-prophetic sense is exceedingly well-hidden.277 The literal-prophetic sense is therefore simultaneously the spiritual sense.278 The prophetic and the spiritual are interchangeable concepts.279 These thoughts fully accord with the hermeneutical principles of Faber. Indeed, in relation to the historical sense, the prophetic sense is the mystical sense. And, too, it is the literal sense, precisely because it lies in the intention of the prophetic author of the Psalms. And in order to demonstrate the literal character of the prophetic sense, Luther is constantly at pains to find, within the text of the Psalms itself, clues that the sense which was really intended was not the historical but rather the prophetic. Whether and to what extent Luther goes in particular directions could only be demonstrated through a detailed and specific comparison with the whole tradition of exposition upon the Psalms. For if one now, with Faber, characterized the christological meaning as the literal-prophetic sense, or, with men like Hugo Cardinalis, as the allegorical sense, he would methodically arrive at the same place: the discovery of

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the mystical sense of the Psalms. With respect to the means which he employs, even for determining to whom the manifold meanings of the "I" of the Psalter refer, Luther seems to me to proceed essentially according to the traditional model. Yet it must be stated, precisely by a comparison with Faber Stapulensis, that in spite of the widely-known agreement in fundamental hermeneutical thinking, at one decisive point Luther strikes off in another hermeneutical direction.280 If Faber had eliminated the entire apparatus of the Quadriga through the interpretation of the prophetic sense as the essential literal sense and therefore simultaneously as the spiritual sense, Luther in no way drew this conclusion. For Faber, the literal-prophetic sense made the exposition according to the Quadriga quite superfluous. For Luther, on the contrary, the literal-prophetic sense becomes the basis of the Quadriga: "the foundation of the others, the master and the light and the author and the fountain and even the origin."281 Here a penetrating distinction between these two exegetes becomes visible. Hereinthat Luther combines the literal christological exegesis of Faber with the traditional scheme of the Quadrigalies Luther's new and independent hermeneutical approach with reference to the mystical exposition of the Psalms. The first impression of this observation is, admittedly, a negative one. With regard to hermeneutics, is Faber not progressive in comparison to Luther? And has Luther not fundamentally misunderstood Faber's hermeneutical innovation and corrected it for the worse, if he was not satisfied with the literal-prophetic sense, but in spite of that still tacked on allegorically derived meanings? In any case, for Luther, in contrast to Faber's simple distinction of the double literal sense, the hermeneutical problem has turned out to be extraordinarily complicated. One could despair of the work of bringing logical clarity into Luther's hermeneutical terminology. One might be tempted to rest content with the conclusion that the combination of entirely different schemata has led to a dreadful hodgepodge of concepts. Not only is his new letter/spirit scheme (in the sense of two mutually exclusive understandings of human existence) in conflict with the letter/spirit scheme (in the sense of the traditional hermeneutical distinction of verbal and spiritual meanings). But furthermore, yet a third scheme also comes into play, namely the Faberian distinction of a double literal sense, whereby the second literal sense is simultaneously the spiritual sense. Does one scheme not imme-

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diately exclude the other, whereas Luther has mixed them up together? The fact that the Luther of the first Lectures on the Psalms displays what might be called a hermeneutical syncretism is indisputable. The question is only whether the significance of this approach is grasped, if we regard it as an erroneous combination of different influences, and thus whether clarity can be brought to his hermeneutical position, by breaking down his synthesis into its constituent parts. Can we discover an inner foundation which has brought about this combination and makes it into a logically compelling and productive combination? Could it not be that the inclusion of the Faberian hermeneutical scheme is connected with the struggle for the correct hermeneutical meaning of the antithesis of letter and spirit? If we inquire more closely into which of the two literal senses Luther is speaking of when he asserts that the Psalms are to be understood as referring literally to Christ, which is to say, the prophetic sense is the essential literal sense, we notice that the stress is distinctly different from that of Faber. The right to charaterize the christological meaning of the Psalms as the literal sense was determined for Faber through recourse to the intention of the prophetic author of the Psalms. Luther, too, shares this interpretation. The Psalms are composed in the spirit and must therefore also be understood in the spirit and in the prophetic sense. That means that they are truly understood according to the letter. The christological interpretation, which is allegorical in comparison with the obvious historical sense, goes back to the author himself. To expound something mystically which is meant mystically is, in fact, correct literal exegesis. For Faber the hermeneutical problem was thereby resolved. The literal-prophetic sense simply was the spiritual sense. But for Luther the hermeneutical problem was not thereby resolved at all. Certainly in relation to the historical sense of the Psalms, the christological meaning was the spiritual sense; and in relation to the intention of the author it was the literal sense. But now for Luther an entirely different problem sets in. Literal and spiritual are at the same time two mutually exclusive ways of understanding human existence. What, then, is the relation of the christological sense of the Psalms to existence? Is some expression, even a christologically interpreted saying in the Psalms, in and of itself spiritual? Is it not likewise a question of the letterwhich, however, is first of all determined by the exegete's own understand-

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ing of human existenceas to whether this expression is understood literally or spiritually? Thus the statement that the Psalms speak about Christ according to the letter has for Luther a peculiar ring to it. Certainly it stands in agreement with Faber that the christological meaning of the prophetic intention of the author is justifiably taken as the literal sense. But Luther asks at the same time: What is thereby gained for the understanding? For even though I know exegetically that the Psalm speaks about Christ, I have thereby merely arrived at a bare fact. But as yet it has not been stated at all what this fact means for my understanding of existence. It is manifest in Luther's application of the expression, "according to the letter," in relation to christological exposition that he is thinking relatively little about the Faberian problem of how the prophetic sense relates to the wording of the text, and much more about the problem of how the fulfillment that takes place in Christ relates to the prophetic sense. Not only does Luther consider it to be important that some expression in a Psalm literally means Christ, but also and above all that Christ quite literally is the fulfillment of the expression. It appears to be only a question of an insignificant nuance. Faber says: The Christ event is really meant. Luther says this too, but above all he accentuates it thus: What is meant has really happened in Christ. "Hoc est in christo ad literam factum."282 And thus not merely, "Hoc est de christo ad literam dictum." Thus, from being a characteristic of prophetic meaning, the expression "according to the letter" simultaneously comes to be for Luther a characteristic of the fulfillment of the prophetic word. Certainly these are closely interconnected. But it is characteristic that for Luther the accent is displaced in this way. For now the question must certainly be posed: What then does the prophetic word mean for existence if it is already fulfilled, if it thus does not refer to the hearer but rather to something that is purely external to him, and thus likewise to a historical factnot, indeed, to a historical fact of the Old Testament, but instead to a historical fact which today is a past event while for the prophet it was still a future event? What for the prophet was not yet given according to the letter but which he had only in the spirit is now present according to the letter. And behind this stands the further thought: If the meaning of the word is only prophetic, then certainly the existential situation of whomever now hears it is a matter of indifference. For the fulfillment takes place in the arena of the factual and that which is purely external and

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thus in the arena of the letter. As long as one has the fulfillment only over against himself as an objective fact, one relates himself to it literally, not spiritually. Now it becomes clear why for Luther the literal-prophetic sense is not the end point as it is for Faber, but is really only the starting point of the exposition of the Psalms, and why for him the scheme of the double literal sense becomes relatively unimportant while the Quadriga is indispensable. For saying that the Psalms refer to Christ according to the letter, does not at all express what this means. It is not that the meaning of the christological exposition of the Psalms would thereby be relativized. On the contrary: now the principal sense in the labyrinth of the Psalms is elucidated, the sense by which the general exposition is to be accomplished283 and from which the meaning of the text is unlocked.284 Indeed, one could say that it is no longer the Psalms but rather Christ that is the text. Thereby, an important realization is obtained: the Quadriga does not directly disclose the different possible meanings of the text of the Psalms. Rather, it only serves for the development of the christological sense of the Psalms. For Luther it is thus, strictly speaking, only a scheme for the interpretation of christology. Its application is then justified if Christ underlies it as the literal sense. Through this rigorous christological connection Luther has given to the Quadriga a rule of application which is not manifest within the tradition. In a note at the beginning of the Gloss, Luther writes: "In scripture, the allegorical or tropological or anagogical senses are of no value unless the same thing is explicitly said elsewhere in the historical sense. Otherwise, scripture would become a plaything."285 This carries weight only as a general standing principle and does not imply any incipient criticism by Luther of the Quadriga. For hereafter, allegory was only limited by the viewpoint that it may bring nothing to light which is not also proven elsewhere directly through the Scripture and which belongs to the content of the Christian faith. Yet how much that could include! How diffuse were the goals toward which the Quadriga could point! Naturally examples for this are also to be found in Luther himself. But it is important that he quite obviously begins to regulate the Quadriga from the opposite end, namely, from a single point of departure: Christ is the principal sense of Scripture, "the foundation of the others, the master and the light and the author and the fountain and the origin."286 Thus the inner connection of the Quadriga, and

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virtually its inner logic, was dictated by the structure of christology. Instead of possible meanings struggling against each other, a unified whole is produced: "In this manner do all four senses of Scripture flow together in one most copious stream."287 And in place of all these fanciful notions stands one foundamental governing thought, namely, that God makes all the holy writers agree in their picture of his Son.288 Thus, the theological concentration in the handling of the Quadriga comes to its fullest value especially when, using this method, Lutherto my knowledge, this also is new in comparison with the traditiongives a christological interpretation of major individual theological concepts such as the work of God, the justice of God, or God's justification, and from there on develops this in all directions. Indeed, Luther can even draw the four consecutive meanings together as if by a great clamp and write: <fHec omnia Christus simul. "289

The Tropological Sense But these observations grasp the distinction of Luther's use of the Quadriga only partially. In the published preface to the text of the Psalms, immediately afer the explanation of the christological exposition, comes an instruction for its further development. What is asserted about Christ in his Person according to the letter must be allegorically understood about the church, which conforms to him in all things. And the same thing holds good tropologically in whatever is spiritual and interior to man: it is against whatever is carnal and external to man. This is exemplified at the beginnings of the first three psalms.290 If we ponder in what prominent place this statement is found, we should pay close attention to the fact that Luther omits the fourth, the anagogical sense of Scripture. Since Luther copiously explains the anagogical sense later on in the course of the lectures, though mostly with reserve, it is certainly all the more striking that he omits it in the published programmatic hermeneutical introduction, thus going contrary to the form laid down by the tradition. Obviously that must be connected with his theological interpretation of eschatology. Not that eschatological thinking was foreign to him. I have already referred once before to the characteristically eschatological orientation of his concept of faith. Faith has to do with the future, not with the present, and

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often seems to be almost identical with hope. Yet the same thing holds good here that I already observed about the prophetic sense. For the anagogical sense is certainly nothing other than a prophetic sense, the fulfillment of which is still to come. The anagogical sense refers, as all purely prophetic expressions, to facts, that is, to something which lies outside of human existence. But if the essential intention of the word is not to communicate something about the future, but rather to orientate the reader toward the future, and indeed, in such a way that he understands himself from the point of view of the future, then the essential scope of the anagogical sense becomes important only in the tropological sense. It would be a profitable exercise to go through Luther's interpretation of eschatology in the first Lectures on the Psalms. It would expose a conspicuous tendency toward the realization of eschatology in the here and now of the Word. But I must abandon this matter here, as well as any inquiry into the allegorical sense, with which the question of the concept of the church stands in the closest connection. Instead of that, the tropological sense requires a much closer inspection. For all the lines of the hermeneutical problem converge for Luther just here. Since the meaning of tropological exegesis for the genesis of his theology (particularly his christology and doctrine of justification) have already been suitably stressed in Luther research,291 I can confine myself essentially to working out its hermeneutical structure. According to the traditional understanding, the tropological or moral sense of Scripture is to show, along with its other meanings, the relationship of the Word to the individual person. "The moral sense says what is to be done," as it is said in the familiar medieval jingle on the fourfold sense of Scripture. Therein already lies a definite, fundamental perception of what kind of relationship obtains between the Word and human existence. The Word stands against the individual as doctrine, as advice, and as law, and it aims at the actual behavior of the person. Inasmuch as the relationship between God and the person is constituted through the Word, the being of God is thus interpreted as demand [einfordern], the being of the person as action [ein handeln]. Only through a radical transformation of this interpretation of the tropological sense of Scripture could it become for Luther the pivotal point of his hermeneutic. I proceed from the symptoms of this transformation and ask first about its cause. Luther interprets the

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human being as a being who understands himself in one of two ways. Aside from human existence which understands itself, everything has the character of objective facts. This is so because the "being a fact" becomes a "becoming" as soon as the fact moves into the horizon of human existence. "For as long as something is not recognized as a fact, it is not yet a fact for him or with him, but it becomes a fact with him when it is recognized that it is a fact."292 Furthermore, because the facts viewed by human existence receive their form in each case according to the self-understanding of the human being, the form of the things is all things in all.293 That holds good for Scripture as well: it preaches as the hearer is disposed.294 "Because of what sort anyone is, ofthat sort is for him God, the Scripture, the creature." And finally because the facts influence human existence in the way they are considered in the light of the understanding of human existence.. . ."what is feared to be of a certain kind, is for that person of that kind."296 "Love makes all things easy and enjoyable, even those that are difficult and sad."297 Therefore, assertions about human existence are not assertions about an objective fact, but rather about an event which becomes existential only as it is recognized to be so. Thus Luther frequently interprets verbal assertions about the human person cognitively: "Thus we are not confused, because we do not know ourselves to be confused." 298 For only what touches the selfunderstanding of a person strikes at the root of his human existence. And only through a change in self-understanding does a change in his existential situation really begin. On the other hand, Luther understands the being of God as an action [handeln] 2nd a selfcommunication: "Non tantum est, sed etiam operator."299 And this response is identical with self-communication: "The acts of God are his words . . . for to God doing and speaking are the same."300 Where he acts directly, there he showers down his essence, which is pure goodness.301 "For this is the essence of God: not to accept goods, but to bestow [dare] them, and therefore to return good for evil."302 Therefore his proper works are spiritual works of redemption and justification,303 that is, the works which are not facts but acts.304 This understanding of the being of God necessitates a causative interpretation of the assertions about him. If the matter concerns God's descending, ascending, sleeping, forgetting, and turning away to someone, this is not to be understood as an expression about God in his own nature or in his own emotion, but rather

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about its effect on us, as an expression about what he causes to happen.305 "Arise, O Lord," is to be understood as "Show yourself in action."306 "do not be silent," means, "Act, that one may not be silent about you."307 "The way of God is how he makes us to walk."308 God is, indeed, holy in himself. But that is only rightly understood if it is simultaneously interpreted to mean that he makes others holy.309 And that holds true in the same way about concepts like judgment, righteousness, virtue, and wisdom of God, "It is that through which we are wise, strong, righteous and humble, or judged."310 Thus, something decisive becomes clear: the proper works of God are not aimed at facts but rather at human existence. God's works, in the proper sense, are those which he effects in us.311 But if God's proper and immediate action [handeln] is an intervention into human existence, then certainly the causative interpretation must become identical with the cognitive. "God knows the thoughts of men, that they are vain," simultaneously means that he causes us to know that our thoughts are vain.312 "He remembers us"; that is, "he brings it about that we remember him."313 "He turns us to dust"; that is, "he leads us to the realization that we are dust."314 "God ascends not in nature, but rather in our knowledge and love."315 ThefirstLectures on the Psalms are full of examples of this existentialist interpretation of theological expressions, that is, for Luther, tropological exposition. God's activity and a person's self-understanding of existence stand in indissoluble correlation. God thus acts through the Word, and this activity is inseparably causative and cognitive: causative while it is cognitive, and cognitive while it is causative. But through existentialist interpretation, a definite direction is indicated for tropological exposition. An example can eludicate this brightly: "Turn away your wrath" is not to be understood as a plea for a change of the facts outside of human existence, but rather as a plea for the conversion of human existence.316 Thus, Luther never loses sight of the fact that the conversion of human existence is effected by God's own conversion with respect to human existence, that is, through the incarnation and the Cross.317 So to be converted to God means to be converted to Christ.318 And by this is disclosed both the right and the necessity of existentialist interpretation. Christological interpretation is its presupposition. And, in turn, christological interpretation calls for existentialist interpretation. "Adventus in carnem ordinatur etfit propter istum spiritualem: alioquin nihil profuisset."319 The event of the in-

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carnation signifies nothing else than the Cross. Thus the tropological exegesis fastens Christ and human existence together. "God's righteousness . . . , interpreted tropologically, is faith in Christ."320 That is the fundamental principle of Luther's doctrine of justification in the first Lectures on the Psalms. And thereby, for Luther, "the tropological sense is the ultimate and principally intended sense of Scripture."321 But that means at the same time: the scheme of the Quadriga is shattered from within. Reduced to the point on which the whole question turns: he has finally proven the literal-prophetic sense and the tropological sense to be identical. For in Christ God and man are one. Therein lies not only a negative hermeneutical consequence, namely, the abandoning of the Quadriga; but also a positive one, namely, that the assertions about God in Scripture are to be interpreted existentially, that is, as assertions of faith. This analysis of the hermeneutical problem at the beginning of Luther's theological development has not come close to exhausting the profuse material. Many questions and problems remain in connection to the material. In spite of this deficiency and limitation, I hope I have contributed something to the clarification of the question of how the genesis of Reformation theology is connected with the hermeneutical problem and why it led to a radical change in the history of hermeneutics.

NOTES 257. On the following see 55:1.1, 4.36^ (3.n.2off.). 258. E. V. Dobschutz, "Vom vierfachen Schriftsinn," in Harnack-Ehrung. 1921, i. Probably Luther took over the paradigmatic treatment of Jerusalem according to the fourfold sense of Scripture from Lyra, cf. Evangelische Evangelienauslegung, 131 . 8. 259 Evangelische Evangelienauslegung, ^. Further references there. 260. 3:285.29^ 552.23^ 6i2.29f, 619.37^ 627.351. Luther indeed never mentions the name of Tyconius. The rules were common property of the Middle Ages. They are treated in detail, e.g., also by Lyra in the second prologue to his Postil, even if it is done there in dependence on the report which Isidor of Seville gives in his Sententiarum de summo bono libri tres. Cf. Evangelische Evangelienauslegung, 132f. Luther was familiar with the rules of Tyconius also from Augustine's De doctrina Christiana. This work was contained in the col lection of the writings of Augustine which Luther worked through when he was Sententiarius in Erfurt. Cf. O. Scheel (see above . 3) 405 (ill. 4). A bad confusion on this point is found in K. Bauer (see above n. 3) 23, when he says in regard to Luther's lectures on Romans, "Principally he has given up allegory by now. Instead the rules of Lyra are being observed for the interpretation of Scripture. He refers to the rules of Tyconius, also repeated by Lyra,

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in which he obviously assumes the hermeneutical principles of Lyra, advocating the literal meaning. The "observance" of these rules which Luther employed already in the Dictata (a fact that eluded Bauer) has nothing at all to do with avoding allegory. 261. 55:1.1, 6.22-24 (3:13.41*.) 262. 55:1.1, 6.1-10,15 (3:12.11-13, 32). Cf. the edition and commentary of this section by E. Vogelsang in BoA [Luthers Werke in Auwahi, ed. by Otto Clemen] 5:46.8-48, 12.I have dealt with the Praefatio in greater detail: "Luthers Psalterdruck vom Jahre 1513," Zeitschrift fr Theologie und Kirche 50 (1953) (43-99) 80-99. A certain overlapping unfortunately could not be avoided with respect to the function of these expositions in the two essays. 263.1 used the edition of 1498-1502, the second volume of which contains the Exposition of the Psalms. 264. 4:27.27. Cf. . . Meissinger, Luthers Exegese In Der Frhzeit (Leipzig: Heinsius, 1911), p. 86.
265. 55:1.1, 6.1-3 (3'-3)

266. 55:1.1, 6.4-9 (3 4-9) 267. 55:1.1, 6.-2 (3:12.20-13.3). 268. 55:1.1, 6.22-,5 (3:13.4-32). 269. Thus, for example, in the Glossa Ordinaria. 270. 55:1.1, 6.25-8.7 (3:13.6-13). 271. Cf . . Meissinger (see above . 264), 86. F. Hahn, Zeitschrift fr Systematische Theologie 12 (1934/35):i7if. J. Hilburg, "Luther und das Wort Gottes in seiner Exegese und Theologie, dargestellt auf Grund seiner operationes in psalmos 1519/21 in Verbindung mit seinen frheren Vorlesungen," Diss. Marburg/Lahn 1948,54f. 272. 4:475.1fr., uff., 3:73.32fr".
2

:2

73 4-*476-Ioff 274. 55:1,1, 48.12 (3:73-33) 275. 3:i88.i2ff., 284.27fr"., 299.271F., 543.36fr*., 544.i6fF., 610.35fr., and so forth.
2 6 7 3 : 55-3 6ff 277. 4:492.6. 278. Compare the remarkable change of expression in 4:379.35-39: In principali sensu et literali... m spirituali sensu et principali. 279. 4:226.25^ 280. The following observation, which is in my opinion decisive for the relationship between Faber's and Luther's hermeneutics, has not been recognized by F. Hahn in its significance. 281. 4:305.6-8. 282. 4:42-33 166.311"., 175.21. Cf. y^s-itf. 282. 55:2.1, 62.i5fF. (3:46.17fr.). 284. 55:1.1, 6.32-34 (3:i2.34f.). 285. 55:1.1, 4.20-22 (3.11.33-35). 286. 4:35-7f287. 55:2.1, 63-iof. (3*.46.28f.). 288. 55:2.1, 6 3 .i 5 f. (3:46.32^). 289. 3:369.1-10. 290. 55:1.1, 8.8ff. (3:13.14fr.). 291. E. Hirsch (see above . 24) 167 (33^) . Holl. Ges. Aufs. I: 546. E. Vogelsang (see above . 26) passim. F. Hahn, ZSTh 12 (934/35)65. E. Seeberg, Luthers Theologie II:6ff.
2

9 2 3 : 43537-39 93 4 : 5 I I I l f f 294. 3:443.nf., 310.206.; 4:511.116. 295. 4:483-7*" 2 9 6 3:436-6f.

2

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297. 4-.387.5f., 264.1fr*. cf. also the use of the term, reputare, 4:389.2. 298. 3:443.10fr., 45o.27f., 526.if., and so forth. 299. 4:262.32^ Compare especially with reference to the concept of God, 3:406.38fr. 300. 3:i52.7f. 301. 55:2.1, 45.6fr. (3:35.76.). A Gyllenkrok, Rechfertigung und Heiligung in der Frhen evangelischen Theologie Luthers, (Uppsala: Lundequistska, 1952), 13, has remarked on the statements above that one "has to distinguish two things within the tropological exegesis of Luther, first the theological statements about God's and Christ's work second the statements about existence or nature of God." And, he claims that "Luther has already at an early time used the tropological application of the former statements," while a corresponding application of the existence statements are found only later in the Lectures on the Psalms. I stressed earlier the statement from the larger context which is cited in this note, namely 55:2.1, 45.1517 (3:35.i6f.): For God is so good that whatever he immediately does, is nothing but the highest joy and delight. Gyllenkrok considers this the simple statement that God's action is good because he himself is good so that it is not at all a "transvaluation of a theological statement of existence." According to him, it is not by accident that all the examples cited by me, "which truly show that Luther interprets God's existence as action, are of a much later date." The distinction to which Gyllenkrok points seems to me to be quite problematic for a detailed investigation of what is the distinctiveness of Luther's application of the tropological interpretation, how it originated and how it developed. In the treatment above I have limited myself to a summarizing characterization of the date in the first Lectures on the Psalms without asking the question concerning an internal chronological differentiation. To examine Gyllenkrok's assumption would necessitate a repeated thorough investigation of the entire text of the Dictata. However, one would also have to consider the relationship to the tradition. In the present essay I had been satisfied, without proving it in detail, with the statement that Luther's understanding of the tropological interpretation has been transformed thoroughly in comparison with the tradition and that this is conditioned by the way in which here the christological interpretation enters into a connection with causative and cognitive interpretation of theological statements. Neither the christological interpretation in itself is something new, nor do the causative and the cognitive interpretation of (primarily anthropomorphous) statements about God lack a prototype in the tradition. Cf., e.g., the material in 55:1.1, 14. 236. and as well as 55:2.1, 42.if. and K. Only after a thorough investigation of the relationship to the tradition in this point, can one approach the answer to that question which is the real interest of Gyllenkrok, namely how the origin of the application of tro pological interpretation which is characteristic of Luther is related to the discovery of the understanding of the righteousness of God. In the discussion above, I did not intend to make findings concerning the chronological development of that which I established there as the hermeneucal structure. The more subtly the genetic and tradition-historical method of investigation is applied, the more insight we will gain in my opinion into the complexity of a process which escapes punctilious fixation. Finally in regard to the quotation I cited, I concede to Gyllenkrok that it is not a direct proof for the interpretation of God's existence as self-communication. I had not claimed the passage for this. It served only as a connecting link between the statement on the action of God as self-communication and the statement that the true works of God are the spiritual works. All together this was to lead to the application of causative and cognitive interpretation. Those who consider the context will recognize that 55:1.1, 45.6-46,14 (3:35-7-32) belong definitely into this connection. 302. 4:269.25. 33- 3 : 53- 2lf 304. 3:156.2^ 305. 3:114.266., 247.356.
306. 3:195.2., 491.i7f., 74.20, 192.20.

307. 3:628.6.

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308. 3:529.33. 309. 4:238.1, 162.nf. 310. 3:465.33-55; 4:22.36, 197.34t 311. 3:541.39 312. 3:592.36-38. 33- 3:539-7f314. 4:i7 I - 2 3 f 315. 3:124.7. In referring to this passage, A. Brandenburg (see above n. 31), 139., thinks: "Here it is clearly evident that a fact in the events of salvation, the ascension, i.e., a historical eventaccording to the title of the Psalm and the context it cannot be in doubt that Christ's ascension is here at least includedis not only made present cognitively but that it becomes existent as such at all only in the recognition." I consider even the formulation of the problem, which here is decisive according to Brandenburg, 136, as quite unsatisfactory: "Can in Luther the distinctiveness of a converging of 'objective' reality of salvation and 'subjective' appropriation of salvation in the word be found? Does the 'objective' work of salvation stand in itselfand does the word bring me knowledge of it in an intentional, represented manner, or is it so that the work of salvation takes place for the first time here and now in the word ofjudgment and gospel?" Even a modern exegetical "actualism" and "existentialism" which Brandenburg constantly has in view probably does not assert the latter. That Luther did not have the slightest doubt concerning the unique event character of the events of salvation, such as cross and resurrection of Christ, results (leaving aside the theological weightiness which for him depended on it) already from the fact that those modernly conceived alternatives had to be completely foreign to the thinking of a person in the 16th century. Unnecessarily let me point to Luther's gloss on Ps. 17:1 (the above statement is found in the scholion on Ps. 17:11), 3:112.34.: . . . because it completely took place on the day of the passion of Christ, therefore it must be understood on and for that day that these things are done for him by God which he has told in that Psalm. Cf. the annotation on Faber's Quine. Psalt. Ps. 17:1: And yet these things which are put below, have not taken place in David's liberation but in Christ's passion and resurrection. Therefore they must be understood as referring to Christ. For the rest Luther does not interpret Ps. 17:10 (He [i.e., God] rode on a cherub), despite the formulation of the summarium, either in the gloss or in the scholion as referring to the resurrection of Christ. He speaks of Christ in this connection only because he ties God's ascending in our knowledge and love to the descending which must precede. 3:124.10-14: But this ascending does not take place unless he previously descended. Just as Christ previously descended and later ascended. Because no one has ascended into heaven except the one who descended (John 3:13), i.e., no one has come to the knowledge of the divinity, except the one who previously became humiliated and has descended into selfknowledge, for there he finds at the same time the knowledge of God. It does not at all mean that a "factwhich is a historical factis seen as dependent for its existence on the one who recognizes it. And probably not elsewhere either. For what is it supposed to mean when a historical fact is to be thought of as dependent in its facticity on the one who recognizes it? That a certain "existentialist" interpretation, especially of (primarily anthropomorphous or anthropopathic) statements concerning God's acting was familiar already in the tradition, can be read in Luther's own writing in the scholion on Ps. 17.3:127.8.: . . . God is called such, i.e., spiritually, because he makes us such, according to Bernhard. (Luther refers to Bernhard, In Cant. serm. 69, 7.8. I owe this reference to a communication by letter from R. Schwarz.) Here we find also the passage Isa. 26:12 which is cited repeatedly by Luther for such a figure of interpretation. Cf. 55:2.1, 45.6-46,14 (3:35-7-32). The distinction between a christological (literal or historical) and a tropological interpretation really should make clear that Luther does not obliterate the distinction between Christ and the believer. Brandenburg therefore in my opinion pays too little attention to the fact that I preserve explicitly, even where I speak of existentialist interpretation, the distinction from the chris-

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tological interpretation, see below, ad loc. I believe so to have done justice to the state of affairs in Luther. 316. 4:1.i6f., 7.26. 317. 4:2.if., 246.; 8.6fi.; 52.10. The "in us" in the first Lectures on the Psalms never lets the "outside of us" become soft. Moreover, the genuine meaning of the Lutheran "outside of us" would still need clarification in comparison with the ordinary understanding of this formula. Since I would have to refer to some passages of the Lectures on Romans, this task would exceed the limits set for the task of the present essay. Cf. now K.-H. zur Mhlen, "Nos Extra Nos. Eine begrifTsgeschichtliche Studie zu Luthers Theologie." Diss. Zurich 1969. 318. 4:7.8f. 391. 4:19.31-34. 320. 3:466.26. 321. 3:335.21., 531.33fr.

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